Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documented evidence adduced at the hearing, the following relevant facts are found: In General Petitioner is the state agency charged with regulating the practice of medicine pursuant to Section 20.30, Florida Statutes; Chapter 455, Florida Statutes; Chapter 458, Florida Statutes. Respondent is and has been at all times material hereto a licensed physician in the state of Florida, having been issued license number ME 0016786. On February 27, 1984, Florida Medical license of the Respondent was suspended for a period of one year in Department of Professional Regulation vs. Teotimo D. Bonzon, M.D., Case Number 82-799. At all times material to this proceeding, Respondent was the primary care physician for Mary T. Upton, a patient with a history of bronchial asthma. Valium On January 11, 1985 the patient, Mary T. Upton, developed onset of acute respiratory distress and was seen by the Respondent, first in his office and then as an outpatient. On the second occasion, Respondent gave the patient valium, a Schedule IV Controlled Substance. On January 12, 1985, Upton was admitted to Methodist Hospital of Jacksonville, Florida, with a complaint of Acute Asthmatic Bronchitis. Bronchial Asthma is a condition that affects the respiratory drive. Valium relaxes the muscles and sedates the central nervous system and respiratory drive of a person and, as such, is not a drug to be administered in an outpatient setting under the circumstances that Respondent administered valium to Upton. Theo-Dur After admission and initial treatment, the patient continued to experience respiratory distress, and the Respondent was notified. Respondent ordered the drug Theo-Dur to be given orally. This was after Upton was given Theophylline, but before she was stabilized on Theophylline. Theo-Dur is a long sustained action form of Theophylline, which takes twelve hours to have an appreciable affect and, as such, is used primarily for maintenance and should not be used in acute situations such as Upton's until the patient is stabilized. Theophylline At the time Upton was admitted to the hospital on January 12, 1985 and Respondent started her on Aminophylline (also called Theophylline I.V.), Respondent was aware of Upton's previous use of medication containing Theophylline for her asthma condition and that she had a prescription to obtain such medication. Although Respondent was aware of Upton's previous use of medication containing Theophylline, Respondent did not inquire of Upton, or in any other manner determine, if she had ingested any form of Theophylline before administering the Aminophylline I.V. upon admission to the hospital on January 12, 1985. Upton had taken Theophylline before the Theophylline I.V. was administered. It is the recognized standard of care for a physician to obtain the level of Theophylline in the patient's body before administering Theophylline and, to periodically check the level of Theophylline to assure the best therapeutic level is achieved. Upton was on the hospital floor at approximately 11:20 a.m. on January 12, 1985 and the first time a physician ordered the Theophylline level checked was between 4:00 p.m. and 5:00 p.m. on January 12, 1985 after Respondent consulted with Dr. Libao. Before the Theophylline level was checked, Respondent had already administered Theo-Dur. Toxicity of Theophylline occurs when the content of the blood exceeds 20 milligrams per 100cc and any level over the 20 milligrams per 100cc may cause the patient to have gastrointestinal side affects such as nausea, vomiting and nervousness which may be life threatening. Respondent's failure to monitor the Theophylline level resulted in the patient receiving a toxic level of 24 milligrams per 100cc of Theophylline; however, there was no evidence that Upton suffered any side affects. D. Thoracostomy On January 17, 1985, routine chest x-rays confirmed a pneumothorax in Upton's left lung which was reported to the Respondent by the radiologist, Dr. Victor Saenz, by telephone between 10:00 a.m. and 11:00 a.m. on January 17, 1985. Without reviewing the x-rays, Respondent proceeded to treat the left pneumothorax with a chest tub (or Thoracostomy) in Upton's right lung. There was sufficient time to review the x-rays since the Thoracostomy was not performed until between 2:00 p.m. and 3:00 p.m. on January 17, 1985. Respondent did not order follow-up x-rays the day of the surgery to determine the effectiveness of the surgery. It is accepted medical practice for the physician, particularly a surgeon who performs an invasive procedure such as a thoracostomy, to order x- rays immediately following the surgery to make sure the procedure is working By placing the chest tub in the wrong side of the lung, Respondent created a situation wherein another pneumothorax might occur; however, by removing the chest tub from the right lung and placing it in the left lung alleviated this possibility. Respondent failed to realize that the chest tub had been placed in the wrong side of the lung (the right side) until the morning of January 18, 1985 when he was advised by the nurse that Upton had a pneumothorax on the left side rather than the right side where the chest tub had been placed by Respondent. Respondent's error was discovered as a result of routine x-rays performed by Dr. Walkett at 7:45 a.m. on January 18, 1985, the day following surgery. These follow-up x-rays also revealed Subcutaneous Emphysema throughout Upton's chest. Placing the chest tub in the right lung will not re-expand the left lung. Upon being informed of his error, Respondent proceeded to the hospital and removed the chest tub from Upton's right lung and placed it in her left lung. As a result of Respondent's error, Upton's heart beat increased around 3:00 a.m. on January 18, 1985 causing cardiac distress. Allergies At the time of the patient's admission it was noted that she was allergic to iodine. However, Respondent having treated Upton for some time prior to this admission, had knowledge that she was not allergic to iodine. Prior to the Thoracostomy and Tracheostomy, Respondent used Betadine scrub on Upton. Betadine contains iodine. Other solutions are readily available at Methodist Hospital that are not iodine-based. Tracheostomy On January 17, 1985 at or about the same time he performed the Thoracostomy, the Respondent performed a surgical procedure known as a Tracheostomy on Upton. Following the Tracheostomy, performed by the Respondent, the patient's condition did not improve and she continued to experience complications, including Subcutaneous Emphysema. Subcutaneous Emphysema occurs when air pockets form under the patient's fat tissue layer which cause swelling and can compromise the patient. On January 18, 1985, the Respondent's temporary admitting and consultation privileges at Methodist Hospital were suspended in a letter from Dr. Wallace Walkett, the president of the Medical and Dental Staff. The treatment of Upton was turned over to other physicians. Dr. Frederick Vontz, a Board Certified Cardiovascular and Thoracic Surgeon was called in by Dr. Walklett to repair the problems with Upton's trachea. When Dr. Vontz first saw Upton she was in moderate to severe distress and her body was swollen from the Subcutaneous Emphysema. On January 26, 1985, Dr. Vontz performed a Bronchoscopy on Upton that showed granulation tissue, which is scar tissue that may be an obstacle to breathing. The cause of this granulation tissue was the tracheostomy procedure performed by Respondent. Due to Upton's difficulty in breathing and the continuing Subcutaneous Emphysema, she was taken to the operating room on January 31, 1985. In the operating room, Dr. Vontz discovered a tear in the trachea that extended to six and one-half centimeters above the carina. Dr. Vontz also discovered that the air causing the Subcutaneous Emphysema was escaping from a false channel in the trachea. The damage to the posterior wall of the patient's trachea was caused by the improper tracheostomy procedure performed by Respondent on January 17, 1985. Upton died at 12:00 noon on March 6, 1985 and, although there is evidence that the tear in Upton's trachea may have contributed to Upton's death, there is insufficient evidence to show that it was clearly the sole cause of Upton's death. The record is clear that the level of care, skill and treatment provided Upton by the Respondent, fell below that which would be recognized as being acceptable under similar conditions and circumstances by a prudent similar physician.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, evidence of record, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses, and Rule 21M- 20.001(2), Florida Administrative Code, it is, therefore RECOMMENDED that the Board enter a Final Order suspending the Respondent, Teotimo D. Bonzon's license to practice medicine in the state of Florida for a period of two (2) years with condition for reinstatement determined by the Board as it deems appropriate. RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED and ENTERED this 24th day of February, 1989, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. WILLIAM R. CAVE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 904/488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of February, 1989. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER IN CASE NO. 87-3022 The following constitutes my specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on all of the Proposed Findings of Fact submitted by the parties in this case. Specific Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by Petitioner In General 1.-4. Adopted in Findings of Fact 1-4. Valium 1.-4. Adopted in Findings of Fact 5, 8, 7 and 6, respectively. Theo-Dur 1.-2. Adopted in Findings of Fact 9 and 10. Theophylline 1.-2. Adopted in Findings of Fact 11 and 13, respectively. 3.-4. Adopted in Finding of Fact 14. Adopted in Finding of Fact 15. Adopted in Findings of Fact 12 and 16. 7.-8. Adopted in Findings of Fact 12 and 17, respectively. Thoracostomy 1.-4. Adopted in Finding of Fact 18. Adopted in Finding of Fact 19. Adopted in Finding of Fact 20. 7.-8. Adopted in Finding of Fact 19. Adopted in Finding of Fact 21. Adopted in Finding of Fact 20. Adopted in Finding of Fact 22. Adopted in Finding of Fact 23. Adopted in Finding of Fact 24. Adopted in Finding of Fact 26. 15.-l6. Adopted in Finding of Fact 27. 17. Adopted in Finding of Fact 25. Allergies 1.-2. Adopted in Findings of Fact 28 and 29. 3. Rejected as not being material or relevant. Tracheostomy 1.-9. Adopted in Findings of Fact 31-39 Unnecessary in reaching a conclusion in this case. Adopted in Finding of Fact 40. 12.-13. Subordinate to facts actually found in the Recommended Order. Specific Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by Respondent A. General 1.-3. Adopted in Findings of Fact 2, 1 and 4, respectively. B. The Use of Betadine 1. Adopted in Finding of Fact 28, but clarified. Theophylline Adopted in Finding of Fact 9, but clarified. Adopted in Finding of Fact 13 that Respondent had ordered Theophylline intravenously before checking the Theophylline level in the patient. Theo-Dur Rejected as not supported by substantial competent evidence in the record. Valium Rejected as not supported by substantial competent evidence in the record. Thoracostomy Adopted in part in Findings of Fact 18-27, otherwise rejected. Tracheostomy Adopted in Finding of Fact 31, but modified. Adopted in Finding of Fact 34. Adopted in Findings of Fact 24, 32 and 33, but modified. Adopted in Finding of Fact 36. The first sentence and the first phrase of the second sentence are adopted in Findings of Fact 38 and 39. The balance is rejected as being a restatement of testimony rather than a finding of fact. However, even if the last sentence was stated as a finding of fact, it would be rejected as not being supported by substantial competent evidence in the record. Rejected as not supported by substantial competent evidence in the record. COPIES FURNISHED: MARK A. SIERON, ESQUIRE POST OFFICE BOX 855 ORANGE PARK, FLORIDA 32067 JOHN R. WEED, ESQUIRE 605 SOUTH JEFFERSON STREET PERRY, FLORIDA 32347 STEPHANIE A. DANIEL, ESQUIRE CHIEF ATTORNEY DEPARTMENT OF PROFESSIONAL REGULATION 130 NORTH MONROE STREET TALLAHASSEE, FLORIDA 32399-0750 KENNETH D. EASLEY, ESQUIRE GENERAL COUNSEL DEPARTMENT OF PROFESSIONAL REGULATION 130 NORTH MONROE STREET TALLAHASSEE, FLORIDA 32399-0750 DOROTHY FAIRCLOTH, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR BOARD OF MEDICINE 130 NORTH MONROE STREET TALLAHASSEE, FLORIDA 32399-0750 =================================================================
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent violated the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992, as alleged in the Petition for Relief filed by Petitioner in May 1998.
Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, the following findings of fact are determined: In this proceeding, Petitioner, Jerrylene Barr, who is an African-American, contends that in May 1994, Respondent, Columbia Ocala Regional Medical Center (Respondent), unlawfully terminated her from employment as a registered nurse on account of her race. Respondent has denied the charges and contends instead that Petitioner was terminated after she negligently overmedicated a patient, in addition to her prior performance of medication errors over a two-year period. After a preliminary investigation was conducted by the Commission on Human Relations (Commission), which took some three years to complete, the Commission issued a Notice of Determination: No Cause on April 27, 1998. Although not specifically established at hearing, it can be reasonably inferred from the evidence that Respondent employed at least fifteen employees for each working day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding year and thus is an employer within the meaning of the law. Petitioner began working for Respondent as a nurse in January 1992. Between September 1992 and May 1994, a period of seventeen months, Petitioner had twelve documented errors in giving medications to patients under her supervision. This was more than any other employee at Respondent's facility. During Petitioner's tenure at Respondent's facility, Respondent had a Medication Error Policy in effect. This policy outlined the procedures and penalties for medication errors. For each error, points were assigned according to the severity and frequency of errors. The policy provided, however, that management had the right to terminate an employee at any time for a serious medication error regardless of whether the employee had accumulated any points under the policy. Petitioner was aware of, and understood, this policy. On May 2, 1994, Petitioner was working the night shift at Respondent's facility and was in charge of six patients on the third floor. One of her patients was a 78-year-old male who was scheduled to have surgery for a life-threatening abdominal aortic aneurysm. The attending physician had written on his orders that day that the patient was to be given "Halcion 0.125 milligrams PO noon." This meant that he was to receive one-half of a .25 milligrams tablet of Halcion, a narcotic-type drug, by mouth at noon on May 3, the following day. The order was attached to the patient's chart. Around 6:30 p.m. on May 2, 1994, Petitioner mistakenly gave the patient five Halcion 0.25 milligrams tablets by mouth, or ten times the prescribed dosage. Although Petitioner did not initially disclose this fact to other personnel, she eventually conceded that she had made an error. When the patient was found in a comatose state a few hours later, three physicians were called to check on his condition, including his primary physician, a critical care physician, and a neurologist. Not knowing that Petitioner had overmedicated the patient, the primary physician initially believed the patient had suffered a stroke. The patient was admitted to the intensive care unit (ICU), a catheter was inserted, and he was placed on a respirator. After reading the medication record, the ICU nurses discovered that the patient had been overmedicated. The patient eventually recovered, but his surgery had to be postponed, which might have resulted in a burst aorta. His family later sued the hospital for Petitioner's negligence. Because of the serious nature of the error, and given Petitioner's past history of medication errors, Respondent terminated Petitioner on May 3, 1994. The employment decision was not based on Petitioner's race, but rather was based on "her poor work performance overall." There is no evidence as to whom, if anyone, was hired to replace Petitioner. The termination was wholly consistent with Respondent's Medication Error Policy. At hearing, Petitioner contended that the hospital did not terminate other nurses for similar offenses. However, during the same period of time that Petitioner was employed by Respondent, another nurse, M. C., a Caucasian female, was also terminated for making a serious medication error with a narcotic- type drug. Although M. C. had an otherwise "very good" record at the hospital, and did not have a history of medication errors, Respondent nonetheless terminated her since her conduct, like that of Petitioner, constituted a "life-threatening nurse practice error." Petitioner also contended that another nurse on duty that evening assisted her in calculating the Halcion dosage and this should relieve her of any responsibility. Although there was no independent testimony to corroborate this claim, even if true, the patient was under the direct supervision of Petitioner, and it would not diminish Petitioner's responsibility for placing the patient in a life-threatening situation.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing, with prejudice, the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 14th day of April, 1999, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (850) 488-9675, SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of April, 1999. COPIES FURNISHED: Jerrylene Barr Post Office Box 289 Reddick, Florida 32686 Kip P. Roth, Esquire 2501 Park Plaza Nashville, Tennessee 37203 Sharon Moultry, Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations Building F, Suite 240 325 John Knox Road Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149 Dana A. Baird, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations Building F, Suite 240 325 John Knox Road Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149
The Issue The issue in this case is whether the Board of Osteopathic Medicine (the Board) should discipline the Respondent's license on charges alleged in an Administrative Complaint, AHCA Case No. 94-09207, filed against him on August 17, 1994.
Findings Of Fact On March 31, 1986, the Respondent's license to practice osteopathic medicine was revoked. The Respondent reapplied for licensure, and the Board issued an Order on April 5, 1993, approving the application and relicensing the Respondent subject to a period of probation. One of the conditions of the Respondent's probation was: "Respondent shall not examine or treat any female patients without a female employee who is a health care practitioner licensed by the Department of Professional Regulation present in the room during the examination." On various occasions since April 5, 1993, while on probation, the Respondent examined female patients while just one of the following female employees was present in the room during the examination: Jacqueline Mehle, a licensed practical nurse who worked for him from approximately July through October, 1993; Teresa Patrick, a medical lab technician licensed by the Department of Business and Professional Regulation (formerly the Department of Professional Regulation, now the ACHA), who worked for the Respondent in 1994; Lynn Gongre, either a licensed practical nurse or a licensed registered nurse who worked for the Respondent starting in June, 1994; Susan Almgreen, a certified nurse assistant; and Lynn Sanford, a licensed X-ray technician. During times when Mehle worked for the Respondent, usually she would be present, but sometimes Almgreen or Sanford would take her place when she stepped out of the room. While Gongre worked for him, usually she would be present, but sometimes Patrick would be and sometimes one of the others took their place when Gongre or Patrick stepped out of the room. In 1994, before Gongre started working for him, Patrick usually would be present, but sometimes one of the others took her place when she stepped out of the room. The Respondent did not see patients during the time period after Mehle left but before Patrick started working for him. On other occasions, Almgreen or Carmen McGrew were present in the examination room with female patients to take information concerning insurance and payment for services, but those interviews generally occurred before the Respondent entered the examination room with Mehle, Patrick or Gongre. It was not proven whether either Patrick, Almgreen or Sanford is a "health care practitioner licensed by the Department of Professional Regulation" under the terms of the Respondent's probation conditions. It was not proven that the Respondent believed that either Patrick, Almgreen or Sanford was not a "health care practitioner licensed by the Department of Professional Regulation" under the terms of the Respondent's probation conditions. There is no evidence that any female patient has complained about anything the Respondent has said or done during an examination since his relicensure. After his relicensure, the Respondent reapplied for Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) certification to prescribe and dispense controlled substances. When the Respondent filled out the DEA application, he correctly checked the box on the form to indicate that he was applying as a "Practitioner," not as a "Teaching Institution" or one of the other categories. But he misread the form and mistakenly checked the "no" box in answer to the following question, which was single-spaced in very small print on the form: Has the applicant ever been convicted of a crime in connection with controlled substances under State or Federal law, or ever surrendered or had a Federal controlled substance registration revoked, suspended, restricted or denied, or ever had a State professional license or controlled substances registration revoked, suspended, denied, restricted or placed on probation? The evidence on the DEA application process is confusing. This finding reflects what is believed to be what transpired. It is believed that the Respondent's initial application was returned for failure to include an osteopathic medicine license number. The Respondent telephoned the DEA to resolve the problem and fully discussed his prior revocation and relicensure under probation. (In addition, copies of the documentation of the prior revocation were contained in DEA files under the Respondent's name both in the DEA's Florida office and in Washington, D.C.) After his discussions with the DEA, the Respondent contacted the Board to obtain a license number. After being told that it takes time, the Respondent resubmitted the DEA application, together with copies of both the Final Order revoking his previous license and the April 5, 1993, Order relicensing him under probation conditions. When the Respondent received his DEA certificate, it mistakenly indicated that the Respondent was a "Teaching Institution," instead of a "Practitioner." The Respondent again telephoned the DEA to have the error corrected. While the Respondent was waiting for his certificate to be corrected, a DEA investigator noticed the mistaken reference to the Respondent's being a "Teaching Institution" and investigated. While investigating, she also noticed the false statement in the Respondent's application. She notified the AHCA, which dispatched an investigator to accompany the DEA investigator to the Respondent's office. The charges in the Order of Emergency Restriction of License and the Administrative Complaint followed.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Board of Osteopathic Medicine enter a final order dismissing the Administrative Complaint. RECOMMENDED this 3rd day of October, 1994, in Tallahassee, Florida. J. LAWRENCE JOHNSTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of October, 1994. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 94-4595 To comply with the requirements of Section 120.59(2), Fla. Stat. (1993), the following rulings are made on the parties' proposed findings of fact: Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact. 1.-3. Accepted but subordinate and unnecessary. 4.-7. Accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. 8. Rejected as not proven. 9.-10. Accepted, but whether either was a "health care licensee" is not the issue. Rejected as not proven. Also, whether she was a "health care licensee" is not the issue. Accepted, but whether she was a "health care licensee" is not the issue. Rejected as not proven. Also, whether he had a "health care licensee in the room" is not the issue. Rejected as not proven. Rejected as largely not proven. Accepted and incorporated that his license was revoked and that his application for relicensure was granted with probation conditions. 16.-17. Rejected as not proven. Accepted and incorporated. Rejected as not proven. Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact. Rejected as unclear. His license was revoked; he applied for relicensure; he was relicensed with probation conditions. Rejected as contrary to the greater weight of the evidence. It is believed that he applied, that the application was returned for failure to include a license number, and that then he spoke to DEA about the probation conditions. Accepted and incorporated. Second sentence, rejected as contrary to the greater weight of the evidence. See 2., above. Third sentence, also rejected as contrary to the greater weight of the evidence. (It is believed that the conversation related here took place after the surrender of the Respondent's DEA certificate on June 2, 1994.) Otherwise, accepted and incorporated. Accepted and incorporated. Generally accepted but largely argument, and subordinate and unnecessary. Accepted and incorporated. Rejected as contrary to the greater weight of the evidence that the Respondent always "keeps the Torah." Otherwise, accepted but subordinate and unnecessary. Rejected as contrary to the greater weight of the evidence. Sometimes Almgreen or Sanford replaced them for periods of time. 10.-14. Accepted and incorporated. 15.-16. Accepted; subordinate to facts found. 17. Accepted and incorporated. COPIES FURNISHED: Francesca Plendl, Esquire Agency for Health Care Administration Northwood Centre, Suite 60 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Salvatore Carpino, Esquire 8001 North Dale Mabry, Suite 301-A Tampa, Florida 33614 Henry Dover Executive Director Northwood Centre 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Harold D. Lewis, Esquire Agency for Health Care Administration The Atrium, Suite 301 325 John Knox Road Tallahassee, Florida 32303
The Issue The issues in these cases are whether Respondent violated Subsections 458.331(1)(m) and 458.331(1)(t), Florida Statutes (2002), in DOAH Case No. 09-4678PL; Subsections 456.072(1)(l), 458.331(1)(m), and 458.331(1)(t), Florida Statutes (2003), in DOAH Case No. 09-4679PL; and Subsections 458.331(1)(m) and 458.331(1)(t), Florida Statutes (2005), in DOAH Case No. 09-4680PL, and, if so, what discipline should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact At all times relating to the three Administrative Complaints at issue, Dr. Kachinas was a licensed medical doctor within the State of Florida, having been issued license number ME 65595. He is board-certified by the American Board of Obstetrics and Gynecology. DOAH CASE NO. 09-4678PL In 2002, Dr. Kachinas was working at several clinics that were owned by the same individual. He received payment from Sarasota Women’s Health Center and Tampa Women’s Health Center. His primary office was located in Sarasota, but he rotated through the offices located in Clearwater and Tampa. He was advised that he would be attending a patient in the Tampa office. One of the medications that he used in his method of sedating patients, Propofol, was not available in the Tampa office. He took a vial of the Propofol and took it to the Tampa office, holding the vial in his hand. While at the Tampa office, Dr. Kachinas drew the Propofol into a syringe. He did not have to use the Propofol for the patient. He placed the syringe filled with Propofol inside the sock that he was wearing. Dr. Kachinas transported the syringe back to the Tampa office. He used this method of transport so that the office manager in the Tampa office would not know that he was transporting the drug. When he got back to the Tampa office, he placed the filled syringe in a secure place. Propofol must be used within 24 hours after being drawn into a syringe. The next day it was decided that the drug would not be used on another patient, and Dr. Kachinas wasted the syringe filled with Propofol. At the clinics where Dr. Kachinas worked, there were no logs to keep track of the drugs, except for the drug Fentanyl. Dr. Kachinas acknowledged in a letter dated January 30, 2007, to the Department of Health that his method of transporting Propofol was “unorthodox.” In the same letter, Dr. Kachinas acknowledged that “a reasonable and prudent doctor would not generally transport medication in that manner, but foolishness seemed reasonable in that aberrant environment.” DOAH CASE NO. 09-4679PL On March 26, 2004, B.S. presented to Premier Institute for Women’s Health (Premier) for an elective termination of pregnancy. Dr. Kachinas was the physician who handled the procedure. Dr. Kachinas maintained records relating to B.S. at Premier. In 2004, Petitioner subpoenaed B.S.’s records from Dr. Kachinas’ office. Petitioner received a packet of documents, which purported to be B.S.’s medical records. In July 2006, Lori Jacobs, an employee of Premier, sent Petitioner another copy of the documents sent in 2004. Neither the records provided in 2004 nor the records provided in 2006 contain progress notes for B.S.’s treatment on March 26, 2004, and March 27, 2004. For the first time on November 5, 2009, Dr. Kachinas produced a three-page document, which he claimed was part of B.S.’s medical records that had been misplaced in B.S.’s insurance file. Two of the pages purported to be progress notes for March 26 and 27, 2004. The third page, which is also labeled as a progress note, is dated June 29, 2004, and appears to relate to insurance claims. The two pages relating to March 26 and 27 are on paper which is a different color from the progress note relating to insurance claims and the progress notes which were previously furnished in 2004 and 2006.1 Additionally, the progress notes for March 26 and 27, 2004, contain a break in each of the ruled lines on the sheets on both the right and left sides of the sheets. The insurance progress note and the progress notes furnished in 2004 and 2006 do not have such breaks in the ruled lines. Dr. Kachinas completed a Laminaria Insertion report documenting procedures done on March 26, 2004, and March 27, 2004. The March 26, 2004, report documents the insertion of Laminaria and administration of medications. The comment section of the report documents the removal of the Laminaria and administration of medications on March 27, 2004. The comment section continues to document the administration of medications and the taking of vital signs after the removal of the Laminaria and also the transfer of the patient to Doctors Hospital. The detail on the comment sections suggests that Dr. Kachinas was making his progress notes in the Laminaria Insertion report. The failure to produce the purported progress notes for March 26 and 27, 2004, until November 5, 2009; the difference in the color of the paper of the March 26 and 27, 2004, purported progress notes and the other progress notes in Dr. Kachinas’ records; the presence of breaks in the ruled lines on the March 26 and 27, 2004, purported progress reports, which do not appear on the other progress notes; and the detail of the comments on the Laminaria Insertion report support the conclusion that the progress notes submitted as Respondent’s Exhibit 1 were not done contemporaneously with the treatment given to B.S. on March 26 and 27, 2004, but were prepared for this proceeding. Thus, the progress notes for March 26 and 27, 2004, are not credited. Dr. Kachinas determined B.S.’s pregnancy to be at approximately 23½-to-24 weeks’ gestation, the last week of the second trimester. He confirmed by sonogram that the gestation period was 24 weeks. On March 26, 2004, Dr. Kachinas began the induction of labor ordering the insertion of ten Laminaria, which are osomotic cervical dilators which cause the cervix to open and allow easier emptying of the uterus. Dr. Kachinas’ records do not show that B.S.’s medical history was taken prior to the insertion of the Laminaria. However, Dr. Kachinas did take a medical history of B.S. at the time of her admission to Doctors Hospital, and the history is recorded in the medical records. Prior to the insertion of the Laminaria, Dr. Kachinas’ records do show that a limited physical examination of B.S. was done. The Laminaria Insertion report shows that B.S.’s baseline blood pressure, temperature, and pulse were taken and recorded. There was no expert testimony of what other physical examination should have been done. Dr. Kachinas injected the fetus with Digoxin, which is injected directly into the fetus to stop the fetal heartbeat, causing an Intrauterine Fetal Demise (IUFD). The injection of the Digoxin was not documented in B.S.’s medical records. B.S. was then released from Premier. On March 27, 2004, B.S. returned to Premier. Prior to removing the Laminaria, Dr. Kachinas did an ultrasound and determined that there was still fetal heart activity and fetal movements. Dr. Kachinas continued the labor induction procedure by removing the Laminaria and administering Cytotec and high dosages of Pitocin. When the Laminaria were removed, there was a rupture of membranes with a loss of essentially all the amniotic fluid. Sometime during the afternoon of March 27, 2004, Dr. Kachinas did another ultrasound and determined that there was no fetal heart activity. Based on the length of time from the Digoxin injection to the ultrasound showing no fetal heart activity, the loss of amniotic fluid, and the administering of medication to cause contractions, Dr. Kachinas determined that the Digoxin injection was not the cause of death. On March 27, 2004, at approximately 6:30 p.m., Dr. Kachinas transferred B.S. to Doctors Hospital and had her admitted to the hospital for failure to progress with the induction of labor procedure. While at the hospital, B.S. continued to experience pain. On March 28, 2004, Dr. Kachinas performed the following procedures on B.S.: mini-laparotomy, hysterotomy, removal of products of conception, and a modified Pomeroy bilateral tubal ligation. In his description of the procedures, he stated that the fetal demise was at least of 48 hours duration. However, Dr. Kachinas’ records do not reflect the time of the fetal demise. Jorge Gomez, M.D., Petitioner’s expert witness, credibly testified that a physician is required to document the time of the fetal demise. In the hospital records following B.S.’s surgery, Dr. Kachinas listed the post-operative diagnosis as a failure to induce labor, an intrauterine fetal demise, a thin umbilical cord, and asymmetric intrauterine growth retardation, a condition in which the fetus is smaller than expected for the number of weeks of pregnancy. An autopsy was performed on the fetus. A surgical pathology report was also issued. The pathology report showed mild infarcts on the maternal side. On the fetal death certificate, Dr. Kachinas listed the immediate causes for the IUFD as a possible cord incident and multiple placental infarctions. Dr. Kachinas did not document the elective termination or the Digoxin injection on the fetal death certificate. Dr. Gomez disagrees with the reasons for IUFD given on the death certificate. His credible reading of the pathology report does not indicate that the infarcts were severe enough to have contributed to the fetal demise. His credible reading of the pathology report does not indicate that there was any evidence of a cord incident. Dr. Gomez is of the opinion that the cause of death should have been listed as elective termination. Dr. Gomez’ opinion is credited. However, Dr. Gomez did not give an opinion on whether the fetal demise was caused by the injection of Digoxin. DOAH CASE NO. 09-4680PL On December 13, 2005, K.M. was seen by Walter J. Morales, M.D., at Florida Perinatal Associates, which specializes in internal fetal medicine. Dr. Morales performed an ultrasound on K.M., who was pregnant with twins as a result of in vitro fertilization. The ultrasound revealed that the twins were fraternal, meaning that each twin had a separate placenta and a separate sac. One of the twins, Twin A, had an anomaly called a cystic hygroma, which results from an obstruction, causing the lymphatic fluid, which normally drains into the juglar vein, to accumulate in the neck area. Approximately 50 percent of the fetuses which have this anomaly in the first trimester also have a chromosomal anomaly, such as Down syndrome. The decision was made to have K.M. return to Florida Perinatal Associates in three weeks for further evaluation. On January 3, 2006, Edgard Ramos-Santos, M.D., a partner of Dr. Morales, performed another ultrasound on K.M. Dr. Ramos-Santos found that Twin A, a male, had a cystic hydroma, a thickening of the nuchal fold2, and shortened femur and humerus. These findings are soft markers for abnormal chromosomes. The ultrasound also revealed a possible heart defect. At the time of the ultrasound, Twin A was cephalic bottom, meaning that Twin A was positioned lowest in the uterus. Dr. Ramos-Santos also performed an amniocentesis on Twin A on the same date as the ultrasound. The amniocentesis showed that Twin A had an abnormal chromosome pattern compatible with trisomy 21 or Down syndrome. Both ultrasounds showed that Twin B, a female, appeared to be normal. At the request of K.M., no amniocentesis was performed on Twin B on January 3, 2006. At the time of the ultrasound performed on January 3, 2006, the presentation of Twin B was cephalic right. The findings of the January 3, 2006, ultrasound were discussed with K.M. and her husband. On January 9, 2006, Dr. Ramos-Santos discussed the results of the amniocentesis with K.M.’s husband. It was decided that a selective feticide would be performed on Twin A. Selective feticide is a procedure in which a solution of potassium hydroxide is injected into the fetus’ heart to make the heart stop beating. K.M. was referred to Dr. Kachinas at Premier for the selective feticide. On January 10, 2006, Roberta Bruce, a nurse at Florida Perinatal Associates, sent to Premier by facsimile transmission the January 3, 2006, ultrasound report for K.M. and K.M.’s insurance information. The cover page for the facsimile transmission included a note from Ms. Bruce, which stated: “* FYI Fetus have different gender. The male is the affected one.” The standard of care as specified in Section 766.102, Florida Statutes (2005), requires a physician performing a selective feticide to correctly identify the affected fetus. Dr. Kachinas did not correctly identify Twin A prior to performing the selective feticide and performed the procedure on Twin B, the normal fetus. Dr. Kachinas performed an ultrasound on K.M., but failed to identify the correct position of Twin A in relation to K.M. The ultrasound done on January 3, 2006, by Dr. Ramos-Santos showed that Twin A was located at the bottom and Twin B was located to the right of K.M. In his progress notes, Dr. Kachinas placed Twin A on the right and Twin B on the left. Although it is possible for twins to shift positions, it is not probable that the twins shifted from left to right. Dr. Kachinas performed an ultrasound, but failed to identify that Twin A was the fetus with multiple anomalies. Although the standard of care required Dr. Kachinas to do a Level 2 ultrasound evaluation, a Level 1 ultrasound evaluation would have identified the cystic hygroma, the shortened long bones, and the sex of Twin A. Dr. Kachinas failed to perform an adequate ultrasound evaluation by failing to identify the anomalies and the gender of Twin A. Dr. Kachinas’ notes do not show whether Twin A or Twin B had anomalies. His notes did not identify the sex of each of the twins. His notes did not document the attempts that Dr. Kachinas made to identify the anomalies such as a recording of the length of the long bones or any examination made to identify the sex of each of the twins. On January 24, 2006, K.M. returned to Florida Perinatal Associates for another consultation. Dr. Morales performed another ultrasound, which revealed that Twin A, who had the anomalies, was still viable. The ultrasound revealed the continued presence of a cystic hygroma, the thickening of the nuchal fold, shortened extremities, and a congenital heart defect. The ultrasound also showed that the viable twin was male. The presentation of Twin A was shown by the ultrasound as cephalic bottom.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED as to DOAH Case No. 09-4678PL that a final order be entered finding that Dr. Kachinas violated Subsection 458.331(1)(t), Florida Statutes (2002), by failing to practice medicine with that level of care, skill, and treatment which is recognized by a reasonably prudent physician as being acceptable under similar conditions and circumstances; finding that Dr. Kachinas did not violate Subsection 458.331(1)(m), Florida Statutes (2002); imposing an administrative fine of $2,500; and placing Dr. Kachinas on probation for one year. Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED as to DOAH Case No. 09-4679PL that a final order be entered finding that Dr. Kachinas did not violate Subsections 456.072(1)(l) and 458.331(1)(t), Florida Statutes (2003); finding that Dr. Kachinas violated Subsection 458.331(1)(m), Florida Statutes (2003); imposing an administrative fine of $1,000; and placing Dr. Kachinas on probation for one year. Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED as to DOAH Case No. 09-4680PL that a final order be entered finding that Dr. Kachinas violated Subsection 458.331(1)(t), Florida Statutes (2005), by committing gross medical malpractice; finding that Dr. Kachinas violated Subsection 458.331(1)(m), Florida Statutes (2005); imposing an administrative fine of $2,000 and placing him on probation for one year for the violation of Subsection 458.331(1)(m), Florida Statutes (2005); and revoking his license for the violation of Subsection 458.331(1)(t), Florida Statutes (2005). DONE AND ENTERED this 26th day of January, 2010, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S SUSAN B. HARRELL Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of January, 2010.
Findings Of Fact Prior to and during part of 1983 Dr. Sturdivant practiced as an osteopathic physician. Dr. Sturdivant operated an office in Bradenton, Florida. Sometime during 1983 Dr. Sturdivant met and discussed employment with Dr. Daniel Clark. Dr. Clark operated the Total Health Care Clinic Center (hereinafter referred to as the "Center"), in Ormond Beach, Volusia County, Florida. Dr. Clark had been licensed as a physician in Florida. Dr. Clark's license to practice medicine in Florida was revoked, however, on April 21, 1983. As a result of his discussions with Dr. Clark, Dr. Sturdivant practiced medicine at the Center four days a week during most of 1983. One day a week Dr. Sturdivant continued to work out of his office in Bradenton. Sometime during 1984 Dr. Sturdivant left the Center. He did not return to the Center until 1985. During the early part of 1985 Dr. Sturdivant returned to the Center where he worked full time as the Center's Medical Director. Dr. Sturdivant worked at the Center from at least March 27, 1985 to at least June 22, 1985. During the period of time during 1985 that Dr. Sturdivant acted as the Medical Director of the Center, Dr. Clark's title was Administrator of the Center. During the period of time after April 21, 1983, that Dr. Sturdivant was employed at the Center Dr. Sturdivant knew or had reason to know that Dr. Clark's license to practice medicine in the State of Florida had been revoked. During the portion of 1985 that Dr. Sturdivant was employed as the Medical Director of the Center Dr. Sturdivant was aware that he was responsible for the medical care of patients seen at the Center. Ms. Judy Baxley was seen as a patient at the Center several times beginning in March, 1985, while Dr. Sturdivant was the Medical Director. Ms. Baxley was treated for asthma and a "yeast" infection. Ms. Baxley was seen by Dr. Clark on some of her visits. She received medical tests and treatments at the direction of Dr. Clark, as evidenced, at least in part, by progress notes signed by Dr. Clark. Ms. Shirley Van Gampler was seen as a patient at the Center on May 8, 1985, while Dr. Sturdivant was the Medical Director of the Center. Ms. Van Gampler was seen by Dr. Clark as a patient. Dr. Clark's treatment of Ms. Van Gampler included examination, testing and diagnosis, as evidenced, at least in part, by progress notes signed by Dr. Clark. Mr. Douglas Cutsail was seen as a patient at the Center in April, 1985, while Dr. Sturdivant was the Medical Director. Mr. Cutsail had a history of heart attacks and hypertension. He went to the Clinic in an effort to control his high blood pressure. Dr. Clark treated Mr. Cutsail as a patient, performing tests on Mr. Cutsail and directing chelation therapy treatments of Mr. Cutsail's medical problems. Dr. Clark signed the progress notes on Mr. Cutsail. Dr. Sturdivant also signed the progress notes but his signature was added at a later date after Dr. Clark had already treated Mr. Cutsail. Ms. Eileen Deasy was seen as a patient at the Center in April, 1985, while Dr. Sturdivant was the Medical Director of the Center. Dr. Clark treated Ms. Deasy as a patient, as evidenced by progress notes signed by Dr. Clark. Ms. Lonna Sloan was seen as a patient at the Center in April, 1985, while Dr. Sturdivant was the Medical Director of the Center. Ms. Sloan, who is now deceased, had breast cancer at the time she was seen by Dr. Clark. Ms. Sloan was treated as a patient by Dr. Clark. The treatment received by Ms. Sloan was substandard treatment. Dr. Sturdivant allowed Dr. Clark to exercise professional medical responsibilities during 1985 while Dr. Sturdivant was the Medical Director of the Center and with knowledge that Dr. Clark was not licensed to carry out those responsibilities.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that Dr. Sturdivant's license to practice in the State of Florida be suspended for a period of one (1) year. It is further, RECOMMENDED that the recommended suspension of Dr. Sturdivant's license for one (1) year be stayed and set aside and that he be placed on probation for a period of three (3) years in lieu thereof. During the period that Dr. Sturdivant is on probation, he should be required to work under the supervision of an osteopathic physician. He should not work in any supervisory capacity. During the period of his probation, Dr. Sturdivant and his supervisor should submit quarterly written reports of Dr. Sturdivant's employment activities. DONE and ENTERED this 8th day of February, 1988, in Tallahassee, Florida. LARRY J. SARTIN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of February, 1988. APPENDIX The parties have submitted proposed findings of fact. It has been noted below which proposed findings of fact have been generally accepted and the paragraph number(s) in the Recommended Order where they have been accepted, if any. Those proposed findings of fact which have been rejected and the reason for their rejection have also been noted. The Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact Proposed Finding Paragraph Number in Recommended Order of Fact of Acceptance or Reason for Rejection 1 Stipulated to by the parties. 2 3. 2 and 4. 5 and 6. 5 6. 6 7. 7 8. 8 9. 9 10. 10 11. 11 12. 12-13 13. This is a conclusion of law. Lonna Sloan's deposition is hearsay. It has been accepted only to the extent that it corroborates the testimony of Dr. Smith and Petitioner's exhibit 3, the progress notes on Ms. Sloan. Summary of testimony. Cumulative and hearsay. The Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact Not supported by the weight of the evidence and irrelevant. The evidence established that Dr. Sturdivant was aware that Dr. Clark's license to practice in Florida had been revoked. Whether Dr. Clark had a license to practice in Georgia is irrelevant. The evidence failed to prove this contention. The evidence did prove that some of the products sold by the Center were nutritional products available in health food stores. The evidence also proved that persons who received nutritional products were treated medically by Dr. Clark. The evidence failed to prove that these nutritional products were prescribed as only for nutritional purposes. COPIES FURNISHED: Susan Branson, Esquire William O'Neil, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750 David L. Sturdivant, D.O. 800 South Nova Road Suite H Ormond Beach, Florida 32074 Mr. Rod Presnell Executive Director Department of Professional Regulation Osteopathic Medical Examiners 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750 William O'Neil General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750 =================================================================
The Issue The issue in this proceeding is whether the Respondent, Jules Jonas Dossick, D.O. violated statutes governing the practice of osteopathic medicine on the grounds alleged in the administrative complaint and if so, what disciplinary action is appropriate. Background and Procedural Matters This proceeding commenced when Petitioner filed its administrative complaint and Respondent timely requested a formal hearing. At the hearing Petitioner verbally amended its complaint by deleting all factual and legal allegations relating to sexual misconduct and violations of Section 459.015(1)(k) Florida Statutes. Petitioner presented evidence through three witnesses and four exhibits. Respondent testified on his own behalf and presented one exhibit. All exhibits were admitted without objection. Petitioner has submitted a proposed recommended order, which proposal has been considered and, in part, included in this order. A specific ruling on each proposed finding of fact is found in the appendix attached hereto. By pleadings dated May 23, 1986, Respondent has moved for a re- hearing and has objected to the Petitioner's proposed recommended order, both on the grounds that he has now retained counsel and should have the opportunity to have the case re-heard with the benefit of an attorney. Respondent had an attorney in an earlier part of this proceeding and discharged him by letter dated February 22, 1986. (see letter attached to motion to withdraw filed March 3, 1986). Approximately two months later the final hearing was held. Respondent had ample time to retain new counsel or ask for a continuance. He proceeded to hearing, aware of his rights and without protest. The record is void of any basis to consider such extraordinary relief.
Findings Of Fact Respondent, Dr. Dossick, is now and at all times relevant has been licensed as an osteopathic physician in Florida under license number OS 0000874. He practices at his clinic, North Miami Medical Center, located at 4805 East 4th Avenue in Hialeah, Florida. (T-10,11). The clinic is comprised of a reception room, a kitchen that is also used as an office, a bathroom near the reception area, a supply room, two examining rooms, and two additional rooms with a bathroom and shower at the rear of the clinic. Dr. Dossick lives at the clinic and keeps the additional rooms for his bedroom, for storage and for personal use. One of the additional rooms was used several years ago as a third examining room. (T-43, 44, 114-116). In January 1985, two investigators from the Department of Professional Regulation went to Respondent's Clinic for an inspection. They took pictures and spoke to Dr. Dossick. Three other individuals were at the clinic the day of the inspection: a man and woman in one examining room, and a woman in what the inspectors thought was an examining room, but was identified by Dr. Dossick as his personal use and storage room. (T-41, 49, 57, 64, 116). The investigators found the clinic in varying stages of filth and disarray. The reception room was old and worn, unclean, but with little sign of current use. The kitchen had dirty dishes and exposed garbage. The examining rooms were fairly neat but the medications on the countertops were old, dirty and, in some cases, expired. There was no garbage in the two examining rooms, but they did not appear clean. The third room, the former examining room (now used for storage and Dr. Dossick's personal living quarters) was a mess: clothing, mail and fast food containers were strewn about, cotton swabs were exposed and piled on a counter; syringes and medications were also exposed on the countertops. In this room the narcotics supply was stored in a locked cabinet. Two dogs were present in the clinic, one of which had patches of hair missing as if diseased. (T-46, 49, Petitioner's Exhibits #3 and #4) There was no evidence that patients had access to the kitchen, supply room or Dr. Dossick's bedroom. Patients occasionally go to the former examining room and wait there prior to seeing the doctor. Dr. Dossick keeps his own dog at the clinic and, even though he does not encourage them, his patients sometimes bring their animals to the clinic with them. Dr. Dossick admitted that he had trouble for a while keeping the place clean. The woman who worked for him injured her knee in a karate tournament and had surgery. While the admission of problems was candid, the excuse regarding the former cleaning worker was confused: the handwritten statement Dr. Dossick presented from Barbara O'Rourke suggested that her accident and subsequent surgery occurred in April and July 1 85, respectively; that is, several months after the DPR inspectors' visit. (T-64, 87-89, 105-106, 112-113). Linda Joyce Godfrey is a patient of Dr. Dossick. She is thirty-nine years old, was born with cerebral palsy, and around 1981 was diagnosed with multiple-sclerosis. She is crippled and walks unaided with considerable difficulty. She has undergone several operations and lengthy periods of hospitalization. She has been under the care of various physicians, including an orthopedist, several neurosurgeons, and another osteopathic physician. (T-66, 69) Ms. Godfrey began seeing Dr. Dossick after an extended hospitalization period. She picked him at random and asked for percodan, a controlled narcotic substance, generally prescribed for pain relief. He refused to give her the percodan and prescribed a non-narcotic medication instead. She continued seeing him and later he prescribed placidyl, percocet and percodan at various times to help her sleep and for the severe pain in her muscles and bones. He did not give her these medications until he obtained her hospital reports and talked with her regular physicians. (T-66,69,81) Ms. Godfrey admits that she was an addict. She claims that Dr. Dossick was initially unaware of this but later helped her get off the habit. On one occasion she went to his office in the state of apparent overdose. He called Hialeah Fire and Rescue and got her out of there. He told her not to come around anymore because he didn't go for drugs. She later went back and asked for help. The evidence is inconclusive as to whether Ms. Godfrey's episode was an overdose or a grand mal seizure. (T-69, 73-76, 80, 90-91). According to Ms. Godfrey, Dr. Dossick injected her with Demerol on only one occasion, around six weeks prior to the hearing, after her apartment was broken into and she was raped. (T-71, 72). The practice of osteopathic medicine encompasses all aspects of medicine commonly referred to as allopathic medicine, but also includes physiotherapy, manipulative therapy, nutrition: a holistic approach. (T-13,14). This characterization of the distinction between the professions is borne out in the statutory definitions of "practice of medicine" and "practice of osteopathic medicine": "Practice of osteopathic medicine" means the diagnosis, treatment, operation, or prescription for any human disease, pain, injury, deformity, or other physical or mental condition, which practice is based in part upon educational standards and requirements which emphasize the importance of the musculoskeletal structure and manipulative therapy in the maintenance and restoration of health. 1l. Except for the underlined verbiage the two definitions are the same. See Section 458.305(3) Florida Statutes, and Section 459.003(3) Florida Statutes. One of the rudiments of osteopathic medicine values the "laying of hands" as part of caring for a patient in a very kind and personal manner. Cleanliness of the person and the physical area surrounding the practitioner is essential to avoid transferring disease from one patient to another. (T-18,19) Animals should not be present in the clinic because of the potential for communicating disease to humans through fleas, flies or the animals. (T-18) Old, dirty drugs and syringes should be disposed of in such a manner as to avoid access and use. (T-19,20) The above standards were described in the competent, uncontroverted testimony of Petitioner's expert, Ralph Birzon, D.O. Those standards were violated by Dr. Dossick when he allowed dogs in the clinic, when he failed to properly dispose of old drugs and syringes, and when he failed to keep his clinic clean. Dr. Dossick does, however, treat his patients in a very kind and personal manner. Ms. Godfrey was called as Petitioner's witness. Her testimony was credible and touchingly candid, as also was Dr. Dossick's. Ms. Godfrey said Dr. Dossick helped her; he took pity on her; he is good to his patients and is a good man. She does not have the money to pay for his treatment or the prescriptions, so she sometimes files and answers the phone at the clinic. Dr. Dossick is the oldest physician in the area; he spends a lot of time with his patients and they depend on him. He regularly treats his patients without charge, or for a token fee. He also loans them money for prescriptions. He has treated some patients for 25-30 years. (T-81, 83, 93, 95-96, 103) Dr. Dossick has previously been suspended by the Board of Osteopathic Medical Examiners for six months because of allegations that he prescribed medication without performing an examination. He volunteered this fact. (T-97, 107-109) The violations occurred approximately ten years ago. See Board of Osteopathic Medical Examiners v Dossick DOAH #76-1814; Dossick v Florida State Board of Osteopathic Medical Examiners, 359 So. 2d 12 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1978). The clinic has been cleaned up since the investigators' visit and the dirty and outdated drugs have been discarded. (T- 88,104)
Findings Of Fact At all times here relevant Theodore S. Brandwein, D.O., held License No. 3259 issued by the Board of Osteopathic Medical Examiners. During the calendar year 1977 and for some period subsequent thereto Respondent maintained his office and practice at 18055 Franjo Road, Perrine, Florida under the name of Brandwein Medical Practice, P.A. The sign marking Respondent's office in 1977, when these charges were preferred, is the same sign depicted in Exhibit 6 which is a photograph taken in 1979. It is the sign for which Respondent registered with the Florida Secretary of State as a service mark. In his application (Exhibit 11) for this registration Respondent described this mark as "a stethoscope, binaural in design, lying horizontally on the paper, sign, building, item, or object on which it is emblazoned, the earpieces and connecting piece forming in script the letter 'D' and the tubing and chest piece convoluted to form the 'O'. Taken together, the stethoscope forms the letters 'D. O.'" The application further provided "applicant is the owner of the mark and no other person except a related company has the right to use such mark in Florida, whether in identical form thereof, or in such resemblance thereto as might be, calculated to deceive or confuse". The sign on Respondent's office in 1977 consisted of this mark depicting a convoluted stethoscope which forms the letters "D.O." only after the exercise of a vivid imagination and an appreciation of surrealistic art. In the yellow pages of the 1977 Miami telephone directory Respondent is listed under Physicians and Surgeons MD. (Exhibit 9). He is not listed under Physicians and "Surgeons - DO. (Exhibit 10). Brandwein Medical Practice, P.A., is the Theodore S. Brandwein who is Respondent in these proceedings. Respondent's Florida license is presently inactive.
The Issue The central issue in this case is whether Richard Koenig, D.P.M., should be licensed as a podiatrist in the State of Florida. More specifically, this case must determine these issues: whether Richard Koenig, D.P.M., has practiced podiatry in the past at an acceptable standard of care as required by Section 461.013(1)(s), Florida Statutes; whether he fraudulently misrepresented material facts on his application for licensure as a podiatrist in violation of Section 461.013(1)(a), Florida Statutes; and whether his application to become licensed as a podiatrist is barred on grounds of administrative res judicata because of the Board of Podiatry's denial of his application in 1994-1995.
Findings Of Fact Dr. Koenig is an applicant for licensure as a podiatrist in the State of Florida. He is presently licensed to practice podiatry in the State of Missouri and was previously licensed in Illinois and Florida. Both of the latter licenses have expired. Dr. Koenig meets all criteria for licensure in Florida other than the grounds for denial cited by the Board in its Notice of Intent to Deny and described in the Statement of the Issues, above. The Board is responsible for certifying individuals who are qualified to become licensed as podiatrists and the Department of Health is responsible for issuing the licenses after the Board's certification. Dr. Koenig permitted his Florida license to lapse while he practiced in Missouri. He initially sought to be licensed again in this state in 1994. At that time, his application to sit for the examination, and thereafter to be licensed, was denied by the Board. Dr. Koenig requested a hearing on the denial before the Division of Administrative Hearings (DOAH) and a case was opened as DOAH Case No. 95-0570. Dr. Koenig later dismissed his petition and the DOAH file was closed. The earlier denial thus became final. Dr. Koenig reapplied for licensure in 1997. It is this application which is the subject of the instant proceeding. Dr. Koenig has already taken and passed the national podiatric licensure examination in Louisiana in 1997, thus meeting the examination requirement. Dr. Koenig was involved in approximately eleven podiatric malpractice cases during his practice in Missouri in the 1980's and early 1990's. Eight of the cases were settled by his insurance carrier. Three additional cases were pending at the time of Dr. Koenig's initial application in 1994. Of these three, Dr. Koenig prevailed at trial in two cases. The third case has been voluntarily dismissed by the plaintiff and has not been refiled. Dr. Koenig has not been engaged in the practice of podiatry as his primary professional activity since 1993-1994. He occasionally provides podiatric services as part of his commitment to the U.S. Navy, but he has primarily been engaged in developing and marketing two devices for use in podiatric and related services and has been teaching. Dr. Koenig received and reviewed the 1994 Board Notice of Intent to Deny Application for Examination and Licensure prior to filing his 1997 licensure application. In addition, he was aware that he had dismissed his petition to review that decision and the Board's decision was thus final. Nevertheless when called upon to state in the 1997 application whether he had ever been denied licensure as a podiatrist, Dr. Koenig answered "No." (Petitioner's Exhibit No. 1) This answer was false. Question five of the application for podiatry licensure reads: "Has any podiatry license held by you ever been acted upon, suspended or revoked, or have you ever been denied licensure?" Dr. Koenig's explanation concerning his negative answer to this question was that he thought he was being denied the right to take the examination, which was a condition required before he could be licensed. His understanding is supported by a reading of the minutes of the Board meeting at which the decision was made: "Dr. Simmonds moved to deny Dr. Koenig from taking the examination based on not having the ability to practice Podiatric Medicine at a level of care and safety." (Petitioner's Exhibit No. 1) However, the Board sent, and Dr. Koenig received, a Notice of Intent to Deny Application for Examination and Licensure. While that document plainly states that he was both being denied the right to take the examination and the right to be licensed, he did not focus on the second point--the right to be licensed. Dr. Koenig offered his explanation to the Board at its meeting on July 25, 1997, and when asked about the application question, he stated, "Because it is a misunderstanding. I make a differentiation between being denied a license and being denied the opportunity to sit for a license, and I may be wrong, and I stand corrected if I am, but that's what my intention was." (Petitioner's Exhibit No. 1, Transcript pp. 21-22). He understood that the Board was denying him the right to take the examination, an essential element of his application process. Dr. Koenig's explanation has been consistent throughout this proceeding, both before the Board and in the formal hearing. Although Dr. Koenig did answer the question incorrectly, his explanation that he did so without any fraudulent intent is entirely credible. Had there been an intent to defraud the Board regarding his application, Dr. Koenig might have avoided disclosing the malpractice suits which resulted in the Board's earlier decision to deny him licensure. Those malpractice suits are no longer an appropriate basis to deny licensure. Dr. Koenig is a Board-certified podiatrist and is a Fellow of the American College of Foot and Ankle Surgeons. One becomes Board-certified by taking an examination, by meeting practice requirements, and by submitting a number of medical cases to the Board for evaluation. Only about 10 percent of all podiatrists are Board-certified. Dr. Koenig's specialty is foot surgery and he has operated more often than a podiatrist in standard practice. Dr. Koenig has written several articles in peer- reviewed journals, and has spoken widely in the United States and elsewhere at various continuing medical education seminars. A frequent topic of his speeches involves the use of an implant which he developed to replace the big toe joint. This implant is patented, approved as a safe device by the FDA, and is covered by Medicare and Medicaid. Dr. Koenig has developed and marketed a special shoe for patients who have had foot surgery. There have been no Medicare or Medicaid complaints brought against Dr. Koenig and he maintains Medicare and Medicaid provided numbers. The two lawsuits which went to a jury verdict were decided in his favor and there are no lawsuits pending now. The multiple claims of malpractice occurred when he was actively engaged in foot surgery practice in Missouri. His insurance carrier, without consulting him, settled those claims. After he changed carriers and contested the claims, he has prevailed. The Board in this proceeding presented no evidence that Dr. Koenig has practiced below the standard of care. Nor did it refute his credible testimony.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby RECOMMENDED: that a Final Order be entered granting Dr. Koenig's license to practice podiatry in the State of Florida. DONE AND ENTERED this 24th day of April, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. MARY CLARK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of April, 1998. COPIES FURNISHED: John J. Rimes, III Office of Attorney General The Capitol, Plaza Level 01 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Eric B. Tilton Gustafson, Tilton, Henning & Metzger, P.A. Suite 200 204 South Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Angela T. Hall, Agency Clerk Department of Health Building 6 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Eric G. Walker, Executive Director Board of Podiatry Department of Health 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792
