The Issue The issue is whether Respondent properly denied Petitioner's application for certification as a firefighter after Petitioner failed to successfully pass the practical portion of the Minimum Standards Examination pursuant to Sections 633.34 and 633.35, Florida Statutes, and Rules 4A-37.056 and 4A-37.062, Florida Administrative Code.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner has served as a voluntary firefighter in Bay County, Florida, for approximately nine years. He first applied for certification as a firefighter in October 2001. In order to be certified, Petitioner was required to successfully complete the Minimum Standards Course. The course consists of taking a minimum of 360 hours of training at an approved school or training facility. After completing the training course, Petitioner was required to take the Minimum Standards Examination, which is structured in two parts: a written portion and a practical portion. The practical portion consists of four sections including the Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus (SCBA), the hose pull, the ladder operation, and the fire ground skills. The purpose of the practical portion of the exam is to simulate real fire ground scenarios. To pass the four practical evolutions, an applicant must achieve a score of at least 70 percent on each one. Each evolution of the practical exam has certain steps that are mandatory. Failure to complete a mandatory step results in automatic failure of that portion of the exam. The mandatory steps for the SCBA evolution include the following: (a) complete the procedure in not more than one minute and forty-five seconds; and (b) activate the PASS device in the automatic position. After completing the Minimum Standards Course, Petitioner took the Initial Minimum Standards Examination on May 1, 2002. He was well rested on the day of the test, having slept approximately eight hours the night before. Petitioner passed the written portion of the exam but failed the practical portion of the initial exam because it took him one minute and fifty-nine seconds to complete the SCBA evolution. In a memorandum dated May 7, 2002, Respondent formally advised Petitioner that he had failed the SCBA portion of the practical exam because he exceeded the maximum time for the procedure. The memorandum also stated as follows in pertinent part: Important information about retesting and certification renewal is enclosed. Please read it carefully. You have automatically been scheduled for the next available examination, and written notification indicating your test date and location is enclosed. You are not required to call the Bureau for scheduling. Thank you. (Emphasis provided) In another memorandum dated May 7, 2002, Respondent advised Petitioner that he was scheduled to re-take the SCBA portion of the practical examination at the Florida State Fire College in Ocala, Florida, on May 24, 2002, at 8:00 a.m. The memorandum included the following relevant information: If you are unable to take the examination on the assigned date, please advise the Bureau and we will reschedule you for the next examination. Note: You must retest within six (6) months of the original test date. All an applicant has to do to reschedule a retest exam is to call Respondent's Bureau of Fire Standards and Training and request to be rescheduled. Respondent does not require applicants to provide a justifiable reason in order to be rescheduled. It is a routine and standard practice for Respondent to reschedule exams. Some applicants fail to show up for their retest exam without calling Respondent. In that case, Respondent automatically reschedules the retest. Applicants must take their retest exams within six months of their initial exam dates. Applicants that fail to meet this requirement must repeat the training course. Respondent reminds applicants of these requirements when they call to reschedule retests or fail to show up for retest, and the next retest exam date falls outside of the six-month window. If applicants still wish to reschedule retests outside the six-month window, Respondent will accommodate the requests. The next exam date that Petitioner could have taken his retest was in September 2002, which would have been within the six-month window. Petitioner testified that he called Respondent on May 16, 2002, to reschedule his retest because May 24, 2002, was not convenient with his work schedule. Petitioner also testified that an unidentified female in Respondent's office told him that he could not change the date of his retest. Petitioner's testimony in this regard is not persuasive. Petitioner's job involved working the "graveyard shift" at the Panama City Airport, loading and unloading planes. On May 23, 2002, Petitioner began working at 2:00 a.m. He finished his shift at approximately 1:00 p.m. Petitioner then immediately loaded his gear and began the trip to Ocala, Florida. The trip took about six hours, due to a traffic jam in Tallahassee, Florida. He arrived in Ocala at approximately 8:00 p.m. EST, located the testing site, and checked into a motel. Petitioner reported to the testing site the next morning. He did not tell any officials at the testing site that he was too tired to take the test. Petitioner failed the retest of the SCBA portion of the exam. Petitioner's time for the retest of the SCBA evolution was two minutes and twelve seconds. Additionally, Petitioner had point deductions for failing to complete the "seal check" and failing to properly don and secure all personal protective equipment correctly. In a letter dated May 26, 2002, Petitioner alleged that Respondent had denied his request for a different test date. Petitioner claimed that fatigue had prevented him from succeeding at the test. He requested another opportunity to retest the SCBA evolution within the required six-month period. Shortly thereafter, Fire Chief Tim McGarry from the Thomas Drive Fire Department on Panama City Beach, Florida, called Respondent's Field Representative Supervisor, Larry McCall. During that conversation, Mr. McCall told Chief McGarry that Petitioner could have decided not to show up for the retest. In a letter dated June 3, 2002, Mr. McCall responded to Petitioner's letter. In the letter, Mr. McCall stated that the question of whether Respondent erroneously denied Petitioner's request to reschedule the retest would be closed unless Petitioner could provide more specific details. In a memorandum dated June 6, 2002, Respondent formally advised Petitioner that he had failed the retest. In a letter dated June 6, 2002, Petitioner stated that he could not remember the name of the person he spoke to when he requested a change in his retest date. Once again, Petitioner requested an opportunity to take the retest. Mr. McCall spoke to Petitioner in a telephone call on June 18, 2002. During that conversation, Petitioner indicated that he would file his Election of Rights form, requesting an administrative proceeding.
Recommendation Based on the forgoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That Respondent enter a final order denying Petitioner's application. DONE AND ENTERED this 10th day of April, 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. _ SUZANNE F. HOOD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of April, 2003. COPIES FURNISHED: Elenita Gomez, Esquire Department of Financial Services Division of Legal Services 200 East Gaines Street 612 Larson Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0330 Mark D. Dreyer, Esquire 747 Jenks Avenue, Suite G Panama City, Florida 32401 Honorable Tom Gallagher Chief Financial Officer Department of Financial Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Mark Casteel, General Counsel Department of Financial Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300
The Issue The central issue in this case is whether Respondent is guilty of the violations alleged in the administrative complaint dated July 23, 1992; and, if so, what penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact The Respondent filed an application for fire safety inspector certification on or about March 4, 1992. One of the questions on the application for fire safety inspector certification posed the following: Have you ever been convicted of a felony, or a misdemeanor involving moral turpitude? Respondent answered the foregoing question by marking the space before "NO." On or about March 8, 1989, Respondent was charged by information issued through the State Attorney's Office in Lake County, Florida, with aggravated assault. Aggravated assault is a felony. On or about June 2, 1989, the information referenced above was amended but continued to allege aggravated assault. On June 8, 1989, the Respondent entered a plea of nolo contendere to the offense of aggravated assault and was placed on probation for a period of three years. Adjudication of guilt was withheld at that time. Subsequently, the Respondent was discharged from probation and the proceedings in the criminal case were terminated. Respondent had completed his probation at the time his application for certification as a firesafety inspector was made. Respondent is currently certified as a firesafety inspector, certificate number FI-66318. Additionally, Respondent is employed as a firefighter with the Reedy Creek Fire Department. Subsequent to the receipt of Respondent's application for certification, the Department requested information from the Florida Department of Law Enforcement and the Federal Bureau of Investigation regarding Respondent's criminal record. The information received from those sources led to the discovery of the facts addressed in paragraphs 3, 4, 5, and 6 above and the initiation of these proceedings.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is, hereby, RECOMMENDED: That the Department of Insurance and Treasurer enter a final order revoking Respondent's certification as a firesafety inspector. DONE AND RECOMMENDED this 27th day of January, 1993, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. JOYOUS D. PARRISH Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of January, 1993. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 92-4921 Rulings on the proposed findings of fact submitted by the Petitioner: 1. Paragraphs 1 through 11 are accepted. Rulings on the proposed findings of fact submitted by the Respondent: None submitted. COPIES FURNISHED: Joseph Egan, Jr. EGAN, LEV & SIWICA, P.A. Post Office Box 2231 Orlando, Florida 32802 Daniel T. Gross Division of Legal Services 412 Larson Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Tom Gallagher, Commissioner Department of Insurance and Treasurer The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Bill O'Neil, General Counsel Department of Insurance and Treasurer The Capitol, PL-11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300
The Issue The issues are: (1) whether Respondent properly scored Petitioner's retake of the Practical Examination for Firefighter Retention; and (2) whether Petitioner's application for firefighter recertification was properly denied.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner has worked in the fire service for almost 28 years. During that time, Petitioner served as the assistant fire marshal and the fire marshal for the City of Orlando. After Petitioner retired from the City of Orlando, he served as fire chief, building official, and code enforcer officer of Eatonville, Florida. After more than a three-year time period of not working as a firefighter or in the fire service field, Petitioner accepted a job as fire marshal in Hillsborough County, Florida. Although there is no legal requirement that a fire marshal be certified as a firefighter, a condition of Petitioner's employment with Hillsborough County was that he be recertified as a firefighter. In Florida, a firefighter retains his firefighter certification if he remains an active firefighter with an organized fire department. However, a firefighter who has not been active for a period of three years must successfully complete the Retention Examination in order to retain his certification. The Retention Examination is the practical portion of the examination given to new applicants. Because Petitioner has not been an active firefighter for the past three years, in order to be recertified as a firefighter, he was required to successfully complete the Retention Examination. The Retention Examination consists of the following four parts: Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus ("SCBA"), Hose Operations, Ladder Operations, and Fireground Skills. To pass the Retention Examination, a candidate must achieve a score of at least 70 percent on each part. Petitioner applied for and took the Retention Examination that was given on May 16, 2007. He successfully completed the Fireground Skills part, but did not earn a passing score on the SCBA, the Hose Operations, and the Ladder Operations parts.2/ Petitioner applied for and took the September 13, 2007, Retention Examination re-test. During this re-test, Petitioner took only the SCBA, the Hose Operations, and the Ladder Operations parts, the ones that he had not successfully completed in May 2007. Petitioner passed the Hose Operations part of the Retention Examination re-test, but did not successfully complete the SCBA and the Ladder Operations parts, because he did not complete those components within the maximum allotted time. Each part of the Retention Examination has certain elements or skills that are graded. The SCBA and the Ladder Operations parts of the Retention Examination are each comprised of eleven skills or steps that the examinee must complete within the specified time. Ten of the 11 skills or steps for each part of the Retention Examination are assigned a point value of ten.3/ The other skill (the 11th skill or step) under each part is designated as a "mandatory step" for which the examinee is awarded a score of either "pass" or "fail".4/ Under the scoring system described in paragraph 10, an examinee receives ten points for each of the ten skills he successfully completes and a passing score for the one skill designated as mandatory. The SCBA and Ladder Operations parts of the Retention Examination have an established maximum time allotted for the examinee to complete a minimum of 70 percent of the skills. The time requirements are a mandatory criterion/requirement. In order to successfully complete the Retention Examination, an individual must not only complete a minimum of 70 percent of the ten skills or steps for each part, but he must also successfully complete the two mandatory criteria for that part. If an examinee completes a minimum of 70 percent of the skills in a particular part, but fails to do so within the maximum allotted time specified for that part, he has not met the mandatory time requirement and, thus, is not awarded any points for that part. The Division established the minimum time requirements for completing the various parts of the practical examination for firefighters after consulting the NFPA standards and soliciting input from fire departments, fire chiefs, and other individuals in firefighter profession. Among the factors that were considered in establishing the minimum time frames were the nature of fires (i.e., how quickly they spread) and the need for firefighters to perform their job duties both safely and quickly. The Division uses these time requirements in testing the 3,500 to 3,800 firefighters a year that go through the testing process. On the September 13, 2007, re-test, Petitioner exceeded the maximum time allotted for the SCBA and the Ladder Operations parts. The maximum time allotted for completion of the SCBA part of the Retention Examination is one minute and 45 seconds. Petitioner's completion time on the September 2007 Retention Examination re-test was three minutes and ten seconds. The maximum time allotted on the Ladder Operations part of the Retention Examination is two minutes and 45 seconds. Petitioner's completion time on the September 2007 Retention Examination re-test was three minutes and ten seconds. Because Petitioner failed to complete a minimum of 70 percent of the skills in the SCBA and the Ladder Operations parts of the Retention Examination within the maximum time allotted, the Bureau properly awarded him no points. Therefore, Petitioner did not earn a passing score on the Retention Examination re-test. As a result of Petitioner's failing to pass the Retention Examination, his Firefighter Certificate of Compliance No. 3381 expired as of September 13, 2007. The Division's Bureau of Fire Standards and Training ("Bureau of Standards") employs field representatives to administer the Retention Examination to examinees in accordance with the applicable rules and procedures. Philip D. Oxendine is and has been a field representative with the Bureau of Standards for four years. As a field representative, Mr. Oxendine administers and scores the minimum standards examination for firefighters, including the Retention Examination. Prior to being employed as a field representative, Petitioner worked as a firefighter for 27 years, having retired as a lieutenant. He also has ten years of experience as an instructor in the fire science division of the then South Technical Institution in Palm Beach County, Florida. Mr. Oxendine administered and scored the three parts of the Retention Examination re-test that Petitioner took on September 13, 2007, in accordance with the Division's procedures. All examinees at the September 17, 2007, Retention Examination re-test location, were assigned a number. In an effort to avoid bias, throughout the testing process, examinees' assigned numbers were used instead of their names. On the day of the Retention Examination re-test, Petitioner was assigned a number by which he was identified. When Mr. Oxendine administered and scored Petitioner's re-test, he did not know Petitioner's name or anything about him. Prior to Petitioner's starting the Retention Examination re-test, Mr. Oxendine took Petitioner and other examinees to each station and told them what they had to do at that station. Mr. Oxendine also told the examinees, including Petitioner, how each part of the Retention Examination would be graded.5/ Mr. Oxendine's usual practice is to instruct examinees to touch the apparatus when they are ready for time to begin on a particular part of the examination. He also gives specific instructions to the examinees regarding how they should indicate that they have completed each part. Once an examinee touches the apparatus and says he is ready to begin, Mr. Oxendine starts the stop watch. Mr. Oxendine instructed the examinees to indicate that they had completed the SCBA part by standing up and clapping their hands. The examinees were told that the Ladder Operations part was considered completed when they were behind the ladder and holding it and when they announced that the ladder was ready to be climbed. Mr. Oxendine used the procedures described in paragraph 30 in timing Petitioner on the three parts of the Retention Examination re-test. Mr. Oxendine timed Petitioner's performance on each part of the Retention Examination re-test using a stop watch. This is the method that Mr. Oxendine was trained to use when timing the examinees' performances on the practical portion of the examination. An individual is allowed to re-take the Retention Examination one time. If the person does not pass the re-test, he must repeat the Firefighter Minimum Recruit Training Program before he is eligible to re-take the Retention Examination. See § 633.352, Fla. Stat., and Fla. Admin. Code R. 69A-37.0527. As noted above, Petitioner did not pass the SCBA and the Ladder Operations parts of the Retention Examination re- test. Therefore, before he is eligible to re-take that examination, he must repeat the Firefighter Minimum Recruit Training Program. Petitioner failed to establish that he was entitled to a passing grade for his performance on the Retention Examination re-test. The greater weight of the credible evidence established that Petitioner's performance on the Retention Examination re-test was appropriately and fairly graded.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department enter a final order denying Petitioner's application to retain his certification as a firefighter in the State of Florida. DONE AND ENTERED this 20th day of May, 2008, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S CAROLYN S. HOLIFIELD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of May, 2008.
The Issue Is Petitioner entitled to be certified as a Firefighter based upon examination results through an examination administered by Respondent? See Section 633.35, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner applied for certification as a Firefighter on June 19, 1998. Subsequently he completed the Firefighter training program administered at Volusia County Fire Science Institute commensurate with the requirements set forth in Section 633.35(1), Florida Statutes. On December 15, 1998, Petitioner took the state examination following completion of the "Minimum Standards Course." The state examination was administered by the Bureau of Fire Standards and Training. That examination was constituted of a written and practical portion with the expectation that a minimum score of 70% was required in both aspects of the examination. See Rule 4A-37.056(6)(b), Florida Administrative Code. When the December 15, 1998 examination was graded, the Petitioner passed the practical with a score of 90. Petitioner did not pass the written, receiving a score of 66. Officials within the Respondent's agency were persuaded that some portions of the examination given on December 15, 1998, were arguably beyond the abilities of a beginning Firefighter. This decision was arrived at recognizing that material on the test had been presented in the "Minimum Standards Course." Nonetheless, adjustments were made to the scores of the candidates in recognition of the difficulty of some of the examination questions. The re-scoring improved Petitioner's written score from 66 to 67. On February 9, 1999, Petitioner retook the written portion of the state examination and received a score of 59. That score was adjusted on the same basis as has been described in relation to the December 15, 1998, examination session. With the adjustment Petitioner received a score of 62. Petitioner took a third written examination on May 12, 1999. This examination was given, having purged the examination instrument of the more difficult questions that had been presented on the occasion of the December 15, 1998, and the February 9, 1999, examinations. In the instance of the May 12, 1999 examination, Petitioner received a 66 on the written portion. Petitioner has failed to demonstrate that the nature of the examinations, taking into account the adjustments in the scoring, were beyond the expectation of the competence of a candidate who had undergone the "Minimum Standards Course" in preparation for this state examination or that Respondent failed to appropriately administer and grade the examinations given Petitioner.
Recommendation Upon consideration of the facts found and conclusions of law reached, it is RECOMMENDED: That a final order be entered upholding the examination results in the several examinations administered to Petitioner in relation to the written portion, as adjusted, and finding that Petitioner has exhausted his opportunities for examination in this cycle. DONE AND ENTERED this 23rd day of December, 1999, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. CHARLES C. ADAMS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of December, 1999. COPIES FURNISHED: Elenita Gomez, Esquire Department of Insurance 612 Larson Building 200 East Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0333 Anthony Robert Shuta, II 3043 Pine Tree Drive Edgewater, Florida 32141 Daniel Y. Sumner, General Counsel Department of Insurance The Capitol, Lower Level 26 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Bill Nelson, State Treasurer and Insurance Commissioner The Capital, Plaza Level 11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300
The Issue The issue for determination is whether Petitioner successfully completed the Firefighter Minimum Standards Practical Examination or the Practical Examination Retest for certification as a firefighter in the State of Florida.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a candidate for certification as a firefighter in the State of Florida. To be certified as a firefighter, a candidate is required to successfully complete the Firefighter Minimum Standards Written and Practical Examination (Practical Examination). A candidate is able to take the certification test twice. If a candidate fails the first time, the candidate is automatically afforded an opportunity for a retest. On October 15, 2012, Petitioner initially took the Practical Examination at Daytona State Fire College in Daytona, Florida. The Practical Examination consists of four parts, or evolutions: self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA), hose operation, ladder operation, and fireground skills. To successfully complete the Practical Examination, a candidate is required to receive a minimum of 70 points on each evolution and to complete all mandatory steps. Petitioner received more than a minimum of 70 points on the SCBA and hose evolutions, but did not achieve a passing score on either the ladder evolution or the fireground skills evolution. The maximum time allowed on the ladder evolution is four minutes and 30 seconds. Exceeding the maximum time allowed is an automatic failure of the ladder evolution. Petitioner’s time on the ladder evolution was four minutes and 50 seconds, which was 20 seconds more than the maximum time allowed. Petitioner admitted that he exceeded the maximum time allowed to complete the ladder evolution. He blames that failure on the testing instructor, Mr. Johnson, for not being located where Petitioner could hand off a halligan to him in order to complete the test. A halligan is a tool used by firefighters to sound the floor of a burning building for safety. During the ladder evolution, a candidate is required to pick up the halligan prior to ascending a pre-positioned 24-foot extension ladder, sound the floor with the halligan, enter the second floor, descend a set of stairs to the first floor, locate a mannequin, and execute a “rescue” by dragging or carrying the mannequin out of a doorway. When a candidate clears the doorway threshold with the mannequin, the ladder evolution is complete. During testing, Petitioner understood he would be handing the halligan off to Mr. Johnson. However, Mr. Johnson was not there, and, as Petitioner explained, “I had my halligan in my hand and I was looking around for him, but he was nowhere to be found. . . . Well, the time that it took me to look for my instructor, which I am not supposed to do, he was supposed to be there, my time went over –- my time went over.” Because of his failure to pass the ladder evolution and fireground skills evolution, Petitioner failed to successfully complete the Practical Examination. On November 6, 2012, Petitioner took a Practical Examination Retest (Retest) at Florida State Fire College in Ocala, Florida. The Retest consisted of the same four evolutions. He was required to receive a minimum of 70 points on each evolution and to complete all mandatory steps in order to successfully complete the Retest. On the Retest, Petitioner received a perfect score of 100 points on the SCBA and hose evolutions. He received 90 points on the fireground skills evolution, but received no points on the ladder evolution. Petitioner exceeded the maximum time allowed on the ladder evolution. As on the original examination, the maximum time allowed is four minutes and 30 seconds and exceeding the maximum time allowed is an automatic failure of the ladder evolution. Petitioner’s time was four minutes and 38 seconds, which is 8 seconds more than the maximum time allowed. He received zero points on the ladder evolution for exceeding the maximum time allowed. As a result of his failing to pass the ladder evolution, Petitioner failed to successfully complete the Retest. Because Petitioner failed the Retest, the Department denied his certification as a firefighter. In support of his challenge to the Department's determination that he exceeded the maximum time allowed on the ladder evolution, Petitioner testified that his wife was present at the Retest and recorded his time on the ladder evolution as four minutes and 17 seconds, 13 seconds faster than the maximum time allowed. Petitioner explained that his wife was positioned in an automobile at the grounds with a “straight-shot” view of the ground skills course, then drove to the other side of the course to observe and time the ladder evolution. Petitioner introduced into evidence a photocopy of a sheet of notebook paper on which was written “Ricky’s time 3:58” on one line and “4:17” on the next line. Petitioner’s wife neither testified to overcome the hearsay nature of the evidence, nor did she authenticate the evidence. Further, Petitioner admitted that the time his wife recorded was likely not exact, but rather gave him a “ballpark figure of not going over the four minutes and 30 seconds that I had.” Petitioner stated his wife’s recorded time would not be the same as the field representative’s because the field representative started the stopwatch when Petitioner touched the ladder, as per protocol. Petitioner’s wife started her clock when Petitioner gave her the “thumbs up.” Dennis Hackett, Interim Standards Supervisor, testified that it would be impossible for a third party to accurately time a candidate during the ladder evolution at Florida State Fire College. Mr. Hackett explained: There’s just too many obstructions. If they were –- the tower, where the ladder evolution starts, is on the opposite side of where [third party observers] have to stay. Or they could go to another roadway that they could see the ladder evolution started, but there’s a burn building in the way to see the ascension of the ladder to the second floor. You can’t see that. They would have to be a marathon runner to get from where they could see to the second portion where they would come out of the building. [T.53:18 through T.54:2] The time of four minutes and 17 seconds recorded by Petitioner’s wife for Petitioner’s completion of the ladder evolution is not accepted as competent substantial evidence of the actual time in which Petitioner completed the ladder evolution on the Retest. Tuffy Dixon is the Department’s field representative who administered the Retest to Petitioner in Ocala. Petitioner argues that Mr. Dixon may have failed to reset the stopwatch to zero prior to Petitioner beginning the ladder evolution. Petitioner testified that he had been told by unnamed instructors at Daytona State Fire College that mistakes like that had been made. Petitioner failed to present any evidence as to the inaccuracy of the stopwatch used to time the ladder evolution or as to the inaccuracy of the Mr.Dixon’s use of the stopwatch at the Retest. He presented only assumptions or speculation as to the inaccuracy of Mr. Dixon’s use of the stopwatch. Mr. Dixon has administered approximately 500 practical examinations in the two years he has served the Department. He testified that he is certain his stopwatch was functioning correctly on the day of Petitioner’s Retest and that he reset the stopwatch to zero prior to Petitioner beginning the ladder evolution. Mr. Dixon’s testimony is accepted as credible. In further support of his arguments, Petitioner also testified that he never exceeded the maximum time allowed for the ladder evolution during practice runs at the facility. He maintained that the course in Daytona is longer than the course in Ocala, so it does not make sense that he would not complete the ladder evolution within the maximum time allowed. Despite the fact that Petitioner submitted with his petition in this case a list of names and telephone numbers of Daytona State Fire College classmates who could attest to his time on practice runs of the ladder evolution, Petitioner did not present the testimony of any of those candidates. Nor did he introduce any other evidence to corroborate his testimony that he never exceeded the maximum time allowed for the ladder evolution during practice. Further, no evidence was offered as to the comparable length of the two courses. The evidence fails to demonstrate that the amount of time in which Petitioner completed the ladder evolution, as determined by the Department, was incorrect or inaccurate. Therefore, the evidence demonstrates that Petitioner failed to successfully complete the ladder evolution within the maximum time allowed. Hence, the evidence demonstrates that Petitioner failed the Retest.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Financial Services enter a final order: Finding that Ricardo Francois failed to successfully complete the Practical Examination Firefighter Retest; and Denying Ricardo Francois’ application for certification as a firefighter in the State of Florida. DONE AND ENTERED this 3rd day of April, 2013, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S SUZANNE VAN WYK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of April, 2013. COPIES FURNISHED: Linje E. Rivers, Esquire Department of Financial Services 200 East Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Ricardo Francois 778 Jimmy Ann Drive, No. 1011 Daytona Beach, Florida 32114 Julie Jones, CP, FRP, Agency Clerk Division of Legal Services Department of Financial Services 200 East Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399
The Issue The issue is whether Florida Administrative Code Rules 69A- 62.001, 69A-62.003, 69A-62.006, and 69A-62.007, constitute an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority as defined in Sections 120.52(8)(d), 120.52(8)(e), and 120.52(8)(f), Florida Statutes (2004).
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is and, at all times material to this case, was a volunteer firefighter. The size of the volunteer firefighter population is dependent on the ability of volunteer fire departments to attract and keep volunteers. People are willing to volunteer as firefighters if the experience is rewarding, training is not excessive, and conflict is minimized. However, the greater weight of the evidence indicates that the subject rules do not detract from the volunteer experience, impose excessive training, or create between conflict between professional and volunteer firefighters. Petitioner testified that a reduction in volunteer population will result in increased hazards to volunteers and a reduction in the delivery of services to citizens. This testimony is not persuasive for two reasons. First, there is no persuasive testimony that the subject rules will result in a reduction of the number of volunteer firefighters. Second, the most persuasive evidence indicates that the subject rules will reduce hazards to volunteers without impairing the delivery of services to Floridians. Some labor unions that represent career firefighters discourage their members from volunteering their services with volunteer fire departments. The competition between the unions and the volunteer fire departments is commonly referred to as the "turf-war." There is no persuasive evidence that the subject rules contribute to the tension between the two groups of firefighters. The firefighter labor unions are usually very active in the political arena. It is undisputed that the unions support legislation that benefits their members. However, the subject rules were not promulgated to eliminate or place hardships on volunteer fire departments and volunteer firefighters. The safety needs and concerns of firefighters have evolved over time. Technology has improved firefighting equipment to such an extent that the greatest threat to firefighters is from heart attacks and transportation accidents. Nevertheless, the fact that the subject rules focus on safety enhancement at the scene of a fire instead of firefighter health and transportation safety does not render them invalid. Florida Administrative Code Rule 69A-62.003 provides as follows in pertinent part: (3) With respect to 29 C.F.R. Section 1910.134(g)(4), the two individuals located outside the immediately dangerous to life and health atmosphere may be assigned to an additional role, such as incident commander, pumper operator, engineer, or driver, so long as such individual is able to immediately perform assistance or rescue activities without jeopardizing the safety or health of any firefighter working at an incident. (a)1. Except as provided in subparagraphs 2., 3., and 4., no firefighter or any other person under the authority of the firefighter employer at the scene of a fire is permitted to participate in any operation involving two-in, two-out as one of the two or more persons inside the IDLH atmosphere or as one of the two or more persons outside of the IDLH atmosphere unless such firefighter or other person at the scene of a fire is certified in this state by the division as a Firefighter I or a Firefighter II, as established in subsections (1) and (2) of Rule 69A-37.055, F.A.C. Such training shall consist of the training described in subsection (6) of Rule 69A-37.055, F.A.C. This requirement specifically applies to volunteer fire departments and volunteer firefighters but is also applicable to any other person working under the authority of the Firefighter Employer at the scene of a fire. 2.a. A volunteer firefighter who possesses the State Basic Volunteer certificate previously issued by the division is exempt from the Firefighter I and Firefighter II requirement in subparagraph 1. The training encompassed in the basic volunteer certificate in itself may not meet “trained commensurate to duty” as defined depending upon duties or tasks assigned or undertaken in the exclusionary zone. A volunteer firefighter who provides evidence of having completed curriculum equivalent to the Florida Firefighter I course of study as provided in subsection 69A-37.055(6), F.A.C., prior to January 1, 2004, is exempt from the Firefighter I and Firefighter II requirement in subparagraph 1., if The fire chief or other chief administrative officer of the fire department of which the firefighter is a member files with the State Fire Marshal form DFS-K4-1594, “Firefighter I Training Exemption Application,” which is hereby adopted and incorporated by reference, and The said form is accepted by the State Fire Marshal after confirmation of the evidence provided. Form DFS-K4-1594 may be obtained by writing the Bureau of Fire Standards and Training, 11655 Northwest Gainesville Road, Ocala, Florida 34482-1486. Any volunteer exempted by sub- subparagraph a.or b. is permitted to take the Florida Firefighter I examination until December 31, 2005, upon the completion and filing with the division of form DFS-K4- 1380, “Firefighter I Training Record,” Rev. 03/00, adopted in Rule 69A-37.039, F.A.C., by a Florida certified instructor that verifies equivalent training and demonstration of competency. The above-referenced rule sets forth ways that a firefighter, trained prior to the current regulations, may keep his or her interior-firefighter status without becoming certified as a Firefighter I or Firefighter II. The rule will not disqualify all previously qualified firefighters as long as they are "trained commensurate to duty" for any type of work they are requested to perform. There is no persuasive evidence that Florida Administrative Code Rule 69A-62.003(3)(a) will cause a reduction in the number of volunteer firefighters due to newly created administrative hurtles. The rule, which has its basis in safety enhancement, clearly is not arbitrary or damaging to the safety of volunteers. Florida Administrative Code Rule 69A-62.003(3)(a)4. states as follows: 4. Volunteer firefighters having NWCG S- 130, S-190, and Standards for Survival certification by the Florida Division of Forestry are permitted to participate in wild land fire suppression without the Firefighter I certification. The above-referenced rule allows a volunteer to fight wild-land fires without earning Firefighter I certification. The rule sets forth an exception to the Firefighter I certification requirement; it does not mandate that the NWCG courses are the exclusive means to qualify as a wild-land firefighter. Florida Administrative Code Rule 69A-62.003(3)4. is not invalid or arbitrary because it requires volunteers to pass training courses that are accepted as setting national standards or because the training courses teach firefighting techniques that are applicable across the nation as well as Florida. Petitioner presented no persuasive evidence to the contrary. Florida Administrative Code Rule 69A-62.006 states as follows: 69A-62.006 Requirements for Recognition as a Fire Department. To be recognized as an organized fire department by the division, compliance with the following must be documented: Capability of providing fire protection 24 hours a day, seven days a week; Responsibility for response in an area capable of being depicted on a map; and Staffing with a sufficient number of qualified firefighters who are employed full-time or part-time or serve as volunteers and who shall have successfully completed an approved basic firefighting course recognized by the Bureau of Fire Standards and Training. (2)(a) A fire department shall meet the requirements of the Insurance Services Office (ISO) for Class 9 Protection, the 2003 edition, the Fire Suppression Rating Schedule, effective February, 2003, which is hereby adopted and incorporated by reference and which may be obtained from Insurance Services Office (ISO), 545 Washington Blvd., Jersey City, NJ 07310-1686 or at www.iso.com. If the fire department does not meet the requirements of this section, the fire department shall submit a plan of compliance which provides for meeting these requirements within 90 days of the date of submission of the plan. ISO measures the major elements of a community’s fire-suppression system and develops a numerical grade ranging from 1 to 10. Class 1 represents the best public protection rating and Class 10 indicates no recognized protection. The requirements for ISO 9 may be obtained at the ISO website located at www.iso.com, or it may be obtained by writing to the Division of State Fire Marshal, Bureau of Fire Standards and Training, 11655 Northwest Gainesville Road, Ocala, Florida 34482-1486. Florida Administrative Code Rule 69A-62.006(1)(a) is not invalid because it requires fire departments to document their capability of providing fire protection 24 hours a day/seven days a week. The requirement for full-time availability will provide significant safety enhancement for the communities being served. This is true because some voluntary fire departments in rural communities historically have provided only part-time service. There is no persuasive evidence that requiring full- time fire protection will result in the following: (a) the creation of a fire-suppression performance standard that is unauthorized by law; (b) the closing of some volunteer fire departments; (c) a reduction in services to the public; and (d) uncorrectable rule-violations; an increase in conflict between professional and volunteer firefighters. Florida Administrative Code Rule 69A-62.006(1)(c) requires that each fire department be staffed with a sufficient number of qualified firefighters. The rule is not vague because it uses the word "sufficient" to determine the number of firefighters that are required. One must read the applicable rules in their entirety and consider the needs of each community to determine adequate staffing. There is no persuasive evidence that the staffing requirement fails to establish adequate standards for determining compliance. Florida Administrative Code Rule 69A-62.006(2) requires fire departments to meet certain requirements of the Insurance Services Office (ISO) for Class 9 protection. This requirement determines the minimum equipment that is necessary to safely fight a structure fire. There is no persuasive evidence that requiring a fire department to provide Class 9 protection will make it impossible to start a new voluntary fire department. The rule clearly is not arbitrary in setting this minimum standard. Florida Administrative Code Rule 69A-62.007(1) states as follows in pertinent part: 69A-62.007 Minimum Requirements for Class 9 Protection. To be considered for Class 9 protection, the following minimum facilities must be available: Organization: The fire department shall be organized on a permanent basis under applicable state or local laws. The organization shall include one person responsible for operation of the department, usually with the title of chief. The fire department must serve an area with definite boundaries. If a municipality is not served by a fire department solely operated by or for the governing body of that city, the fire department providing such service shall do so under a contract or resolution. When a fire department’s service area involves one or more jurisdictions, a contract shall be executed with each jurisdiction served. Membership: The department shall have a sufficient number of firefighters/members to assure the response of at least 4 firefighters/members that can assemble at the scene of a fire as contemplated by subsection (1) of Rule 69A-62.003, F.A.C., to be compliant with Rule 69A-62.003, F.A.C., the two-in, two-out rule. The fire chief may be one of the 4 responding firefighters/members. The above-referenced rule does require fire departments to have four "interior-qualified" firefighters at the scene of a structure fire. The requirement is necessary to comply with the longstanding "two-in, two-out" rule. However, the rule does not preclude a fire department from relying on mutual-aid from other fire departments in order to comply with the rule. The rule clearly is not vague. Florida Administrative Code Rule 69A-62.007(4)(a) states as follows in relevant part: (4)(a) The chief of any fire department that includes volunteer firefighters shall annually submit a Roster of Volunteer Firefighters to the State Fire Marshal utilizing form DFS-K4-1581, effective 05/04, which is hereby adopted and incorporated by reference, no later than June 30 of each year. Form DFS-K4-1581 may be obtained by contacting the Division of State Fire Marshal, Bureau of Fire Standards and Training, 11655 Northwest Gainesville Road, Ocala, Florida 34482-1486 or at the division’s website located at http://www.fldfs.com/SFM/. The roster shall include: The fire department name, The fire department identification number (FDID), The complete fire department address, The fire department contact person, telephone number and the fire department fax number, if any, The certification level for each firefighter reported and, if any equivalency exemption has been issued, the number of persons for whom such exemption has been issued, and The firefighter certification number, the issue date of the certification, the status of the certification, i.e., volunteer or career, and the status of each firefighter who has been issued an equivalency exemption, i.e., volunteer or career, if any. The above-referenced rule requires the chief of a fire department to submit an annual roster of volunteer firefighters. Petitioner objects to the rule because some career firefighters volunteer their off-duty hours with the local volunteer fire department. Career firefighters who also perform volunteer work may do so contrary to their union rules. Publication of the roster might keep some professional firefighters from volunteering their services. Nevertheless, there is no persuasive evidence that losing some speculative number of career/volunteer firefighters will undermine the safety of firefighters or the public. The information that the roster contains is a public record. The information is necessary so that Respondent can perform statutorily-mandated studies involving injuries to firefighters. The rule clearly is not arbitrary.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Petitioner, Marlene Serrano ("Serrano"), should be awarded certification as a firefighter or, in the alternative, whether Serrano should be allowed to re-take the hose operation and ladder operation portions of the Firefighter Minimum Standards Written and Practical Examination.
Findings Of Fact Serrano was a candidate for certification as a firefighter in the State of Florida. The Department is the state agency responsible for testing all candidates for certification as a firefighter, for conducting such tests, and for issuing a certification upon successful completion of minimum requirements by a candidate. One such examination administered by the Department is the Firefighter Minimum Standards Written and Practical Examination ("Firefighter examination"). The Firefighter examination has a written portion, as well as three practical components: Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus, Hose Operations, and Ladder Operations. In order to meet the minimum requirements for certification, a candidate must obtain at least a 70-percent score on each component of the Firefighter examination. If a candidate fails the test, he or she is afforded one chance to take a re-test. The ladder component of the Firefighter examination is scored using a form listing five mandatory steps which the candidate must pass and ten evaluative component steps worth ten points each. A candidate taking the ladder component, who successfully passes the five mandatory steps, receives a total score of the sum of the scores from the ten evaluative component steps. A candidate who does not successfully complete one or more of the mandatory steps automatically fails the ladder component section and receives a score of zero out of 100 points. Serrano initially took the Firefighter examination on December 22, 2010. That test was administered at the Firefighter Academy, a more controlled environment. She failed to obtain a passing grade on two components of the examination, the hose operations component and the ladder operation component. Specifically, she failed to successfully complete the components within the required time limit of two minutes, 20 seconds; and one minute, 25 seconds, respectively. Her times were two minutes, 40 seconds; and one minute, 41 seconds, respectively. As allowed by law, Serrano was given the opportunity to re-take those components of the examination one time only. On February 15, 2011, Serrano went to a training facility in Ocala, Florida, to re-take the examination. The Ocala site was more open than the Academy site; there were other non-firefighter personnel engaged in activities in close proximity. Thomas Johnson and Kenneth Harper were the examiners assigned to administer the examination to Serrano. Serrano received a score of 100 on the hose operation component of the examination. She completed that portion of the test in one minute and 25 seconds, within the prescribed time. When Serrano finished the hose operation component, she was going to begin the ladder operation section. However, one of the examiners "yelled" at her that her protective face shield was not in place. That is, the shield had been raised to the top of her helmet, rather than being in the lowered position required during testing. The instructor yelled for her to "put your shield down." Serrano interpreted that instruction as a sign that she had failed the prior (hose operation) test. She began to walk toward the examiners, but they pointed her back in the direction of the ladder test. Serrano was confused, but undertook the ladder operation component of the examination anyway. Her concentration was somewhat broken by the examiner's comments, and she was flustered. Then she heard loud noises coming from the field next to the testing site. Apparently, there were military maneuvers of some type going on at the adjacent field. Furthermore, there was a four-wheeler driving around the training ground, creating more distraction for Serrano. However, the Department's field representative said he had administered over 1,000 tests in the same conditions as were present for Serrano's test. During the test, ten points were deducted from Serrano due to her inability to maintain the ladder in a vertical position. Further, Serrano did not complete the ladder operation component of the examination within the prescribed time frame for that section of the test. Her recorded time was two minutes and 49 seconds, some 29 seconds longer than allowed. The examiner also noted that Serrano almost lost control of the ladder twice during the examination and struggled with the halyard and safety lines. There are numerous events going on at the training site during testing. The training grounds are intentionally somewhat hectic in order to simulate real "fire ground" conditions. There is no attempt made by the examiners to keep the testing site quiet. Conversely, at the Firefighter Academy where firefighters are initially trained, there is less noise and distraction.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by Respondent, Department of Financial Services, dismissing the Petition of Marlene Serrano, in full. DONE AND ENTERED this 7th day of July, 2011, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. R. BRUCE MCKIBBEN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of July, 2011.
The Issue The issues are whether Respondents have violated various statutes and rules governing persons licensed to install and service fire extinguishers and fire suppression systems and, if so, what penalties Petitioner should impose.
Findings Of Fact General Respondents hold Class A and C licenses as fire extinguisher dealers, Class D licenses as pre-engineered systems dealers, Class 01 licenses as fire extinguisher permittees, and Class 04 licenses as pre-engineered systems permittees. Respondent Todd Jacobs (Jacobs) is the qualifier for Respondent National Fire and Safety Corporation (NFS). NFS has been in the fire-safety business for about 15 years. Jacobs received his first permit about ten years ago. Neither Respondent has been disciplined prior to the suspension of all of their licenses and permits effective May 15, 1997, for the incidents described below. The suspension has remained continuously in effect through the present. Pre-engineered systems are custom installations of fire-suppression systems. These pressurized systems, which are activated by heat-sensitive fusible links and small cylinders known as cartridges, feature large metal cylinders that supply the powder through pipes to specific hazard areas. Pre-engineered systems must be installed in accordance with pretested limitations and configurations. Petitioner has cited various violations of the standards of the National Fire Protection Association. As noted in the conclusions of law, violation of these standards, which are incorporated into the rules, provide the basis for discipline. The relevant standards of the National Fire Protection Association are divided into two sections: one governs persons dealing with fire extinguishers and the other governs persons dealing with pre-engineered systems. National Fire Protection Association 10 is titled, “Standard for Portable Fire Extinguishers.” National Fire Protection Association 10, Standard 1-3 defines a “portable fire extinguisher” as a “portable device carried on wheels and operated by hand containing an extinguishing agent that can be expelled under pressure for the purpose of suppressing or extinguishing a fire.” National Fire Protection Association 10 applies to fire extinguishers, not pre-engineered systems. National Fire Protection Association 10, Chapter 4 governs the inspection, maintenance, and recharging of fire extinguishers. National Fire Protection Association 10, Standard 4-1.4 provides that “[m]aintenance, servicing, and recharging” of fire extinguishers shall be performed by trained persons “having available the appropriate servicing manual(s), the proper types of tools, recharge materials, lubricants, and manufacturer’s recommended replacement parts or parts specifically listed for use in the fire extinguisher.” National Fire Protection Association 10, Standard 4-5.1.2 requires that persons recharging a fire extinguisher shall follow the “recommendations of the manufacturer.” National Fire Protection Association 10, Standard 4-5.3.1 requires that persons recharging fire extinguishers use “[o]nly those agents specified on the nameplate or agents proven to have equal chemical composition, physical characteristics, and fire extinguishing capabilities ” National Fire Protection Association 10, Standard 4-5.3.2 prohibits persons recharging fire extinguishers from mixing “[m]ultipurpose dry chemicals” with “alkaline-based dry chemicals.” National Fire Protection Association 10, Chapter 5 governs the hydrostatic testing of fire extinguishers. Table 5-2 provides that the longest hydrostatic test interval for fire extinguishers is 12 years. National Fire Protection Association 10, Standard 5-1.2 provides that the hydrostatic testing of fire extinguishers shall be performed by trained persons “having available suitable testing equipment, facilities, and appropriate servicing manual(s).” National Fire Protection Association 10, Standard 5-5.1.1 requires that persons hydrostatically testing fire extinguishers first conduct an internal examination of the cylinder. National Fire Protection Association 10, Standard 5-5.1.2 requires that persons hydrostatically testing fire extinguishers do so in accordance with the “procedures specified in the pamphlet Methods for Hydrostatic Testing of Compressed Gas Cylinders (CGA C-1), published by the Compressed Gas Association.” National Fire Protection Association 10, Standard 5-5.2 provides that the testing procedures for low-pressure cylinders, shells, and hose assemblies are detailed in Appendix A. Appendix A contains detailed material, but, according to a prefatory statement, “[t]his Appendix is not part of the requirements of this National Fire Protection Association document but is included for informational purposes only.” National Fire Protection Association 17 is titled, “Standard for Dry Chemical Extinguishing Systems.” National Fire Protection Association 17, Standard 1-4 defines “pre- engineered systems,” in part, as [t]hose having predetermined flow rates, nozzle pressures, and quantities of dry chemical [with] specific pipe size, maximum and minimum pipe lengths, flexible hose specifications, number of fittings and number and types of nozzles prescribed by a testing laboratory.” National Fire Protection Association 17 applies to pre- engineered systems, not fire extinguishers. National Fire Protection Association 17, Standard 1-4 defines “inspection” as a “’quick’ check to give reasonable assurance that the extinguishing system is fully charged and operable.” The definition adds that this is done by “seeing that the system is in place, that it has not been activated or tampered with, and that there is no obvious physical damage or condition to prevent operation.” National Fire Protection Association 17, Standard 3-8.3.1 requires that the dry chemical container and expellant gas assemblies of a pre-engineered system shall be located “so as not to be subjected to severe weather conditions or to mechanical, chemical, or other damage.” National Fire Protection Association 17, Standard 3-9.1 provides that, for pre-engineered systems, the “pipings and fittings shall be installed in accordance with good commercial practices.” National Fire Protection Association 17, Chapter 9 governs the inspection, maintenance, and recharging of pre- engineered systems. National Fire Protection Association 17, Standard 9-1.1 provides that, when dry chemical pressure containers are not attached to piping or hand hose lines, the discharge outlet shall have a protective diffusing safety cap to protect persons from recoil and high-flow discharge in case of accidental activation. The caps shall also be used on empty National Fire Protection Association 17, Standard 9- 1.4 provides that “[a]ll dry chemical extinguishing systems shall be inspected in accordance with the owner’s manual and maintained and recharged in accordance with the manufacturer’s listed installation and maintenance manual and service bulletins.” National Fire Protection Association 17, Standard 9-3.2 provides that “[f]ixed temperature-sensing elements of the fusible metal allow type shall be replaced at least annually from the date of installation. They shall be destroyed when removed.” National Fire Protection Association 17, Standard 9-3.2.1 provides that the “year of manufacture and date of installation of the fixed temperature-sensing element shall be marked on the system inspection tag[,]” and the “tag shall be signed or initialed by the installer.” National Fire Protection Association 17, Standard 9-4.2 provides that “[s]ystems shall be recharged in accordance with the manufacturer’s listed installation and maintenance manual.” National Fire Protection Association 17, Standard 9-5 requires that trained persons hydrostatically testing pre- engineered systems have “available suitable testing equipment, facilities, and an appropriate service manual(s).” This standard requires hydrostatic testing at 12-year intervals for the dry chemical container, auxiliary pressure containers (unless less than two inches in outside diameter and two feet in length or unless they bear the DOT stamp, “3E”), and hose assemblies. National Fire Protection Association 17, Standard 9-5.1 requires that persons hydrostatically testing pre- engineered systems subject the tested components of hydrostatic test pressure equal to the marked factory test pressure or the test pressure specified in the manufacturer’s listed installation and maintenance manual. This test prohibits any leakage, rupture, or movement of hose couplings and requires test procedures in accordance with the manufacturer’s detailed written hydrostatic test instructions.” National Fire Protection Association 17, Standard 9-5.2 requires that persons hydrostatically testing pre- engineered systems remove and discard the dry chemical agent from the containers prior to the test. Page Field (Counts I and II) In March 1997, Rick Clontz, a Lee County employee, asked Roland Taylor, an NFS employee, to service components of the fire-safety system at the Lee County Hazardous Materials Facility at Page Field in Fort Myers. This fire-safety system protects an area at which Lee County stores corrosive, flammable, and poisonous materials. Initially, Mr. Taylor removed three ten-pound ABC fire extinguishers. These are small portable cylinders, whose “ABC” designation refers to their ability to suppress a broad range of fires. According to the National Fire Protection Association standards, Class A fires involve “ordinary combustible materials, such as wood, cloth, paper, rubber, and many plastics.” Class B fires involve “flammable liquids, oils greases, tars, oil-based paints, lacquers, and flammable gases.” Class C fires involve “energized electrical equipment . . . .” On April 1, 1997, Mr. Taylor returned the three 10- pound ABC fire extinguishers. Later inspection revealed that Mr. Taylor had properly removed and discarded the ABC powder from each cylinder, but he had refilled only one of the three cylinders entirely with ABC powder. He erroneously filled the other two cylinders with mixtures of 75 percent and 50 percent BC powder. The improper filling of two of the fire extinguishers at the Page Field Hazardous Materials Facility threatened the public health, safety, and welfare. Meeting Mr. Taylor at the Page Field facility when Mr. Taylor returned the three small cylinders, Mr. Clontz asked him to remove the 50-pound Ansul SPA 50 cylinder and hydrostatically test it. Mr. Taylor noted that the cylinder was not yet due for this test, but quoted a price to which Mr. Clontz agreed, and Mr. Taylor disconnected the cylinder from the pre-engineered system and transported it from the site. Hydrostatic testing is a hydraulic interior pressurization test that measures ductility, which is the ability of cylinder walls to expand and contract. The purpose of hydrostatic testing is to determine the suitability of a cylinder for continued service. Hydrostatic testing requires the tester to release the pressure and empty the contents of a cylinder. Using specialized equipment, the tester then fills the cylinder with water, pressurizing it to twice the service pressure or, for the systems cylinders involved in this case, 1000 pounds per square inch. Cylinder failure from the loss of structural integrity can result in a dangerous rupture, possibly causing an improperly bracketed cylinder to launch like an unguided missile. A cylinder that passes its hydrostatic test does not have to be retested for 12 years. Three days later, Mr. Taylor returned the Ansul cylinder with a tag stamped to show the date on which NFS had hydrostatically tested the cylinder. Mr. Taylor reconnected it to the pre-engineered system, changing the three fusible links. However, Mr. Taylor did not tighten the actuation piping wrench-tight, as required by the manufacturer’s specification. Instead, Mr. Taylor left the actuation piping sufficiently loose that it might cause a failure of the pre- engineered system to activate. As Respondents conceded, the loose actuation piping threatened the public health, safety, and welfare. Finished with his work, Mr. Taylor gave Mr. Clontz a receipt, but no diagram or report, as Mr. Clontz usually received after such service. Consistent with the work requested by Lee County, the receipt stated that NFS had hydrostatically tested and recharged the three ten-pound and one 50-pound cylinders. However, NFS had not hydrostatically tested the 50- pound Ansul SPA 50 cylinder. NFS had not even changed the powder in the cylinder. Jacobs was personally aware of these facts and personally authorized the deceitful stamping of the tag to show a hydrostatic testing. The fraudulent misrepresentation concerning the hydrostatic testing of the Ansul SPA 50 cylinder threatened the public health, safety, and welfare. Additionally, NFS had replaced the three fusible links with three other fusible links. Petitioner failed to prove that there are material differences between the two types of links so as to justify discipline. There are two differences between the links. First, NFS used Globe links rather than Ansul links. However, Ansul links are manufactured by Globe. The Ansul expert testified that Ansul subjects the links to an additional inspection. However, the record does not reveal whether Globe does not also subject its brand-name links to another inspection that it does not perform for the links that it manufactures for Ansul. The Ansul expert did not testify as to the defect rate resulting from the Ansul inspection or any difference between the performance of the “two” links. On this record, then, there is no demonstrated difference in the two brand-named fusible links. The second difference is that NFS installed an ML link rather than the newer K link currently in use. Ansul approved the ML link in the Ansul SPA 50 pre-engineered system until five years ago. At that time, Ansul authorized use of the older ML link until dealer inventories were depleted. Even assuming that the K link represents a safety advance, compared to the ML link, Ansul’s gradual introduction of the new link precludes a finding that the difference was material, unless one were to assume that Ansul disregarded public safety when authorizing the gradual introduction of the new link. Respondents conceded that they did not have a copy of the Ansul SPA 50 manual when they serviced the Ansul SPA 50 system. They have since obtained the manual. Petitioner failed to show that the failure to have the manual threatened the public health, safety, or welfare. Respondents conceded that they did not produce the inspection form for the system. They had provided such a form previously. Petitioner failed to show that the failure to produce an inspection form threatened the public health, safety, or welfare. At the hearing, Petitioner agreed not to pursue the claim against Respondents regarding the LT10R cartridge. Petitioner effectively conceded that Respondents were not required to hydrostatically test the cartridge because it is exempt from such testing. Petitioner evidently elected not to pursue the recharging issue for other reasons. Mobile Service Units (Counts III-V The service truck operated by Mark Thackeray did not have a conductivity tester, certified scales, or proper manuals. The conductivity tester ensures that the braiding is intact on carbon dioxide hoses. The certified scales ensures that the cylinder is filled with the proper amount of dry chemical. The manuals ensure that the person servicing a pre- engineered system understands all of its components and how it works. Additionally, one cylinder in the truck had a drill bit instead of a safety pin installed in the head of the bottle. Petitioner also proved that the fire extinguisher and pre-engineered system tags bore the Naples and Fort Myers addresses for NFS. As noted below, the Fort Myers location was inactive, used only for storage and drop-offs and not for shop work or retail sales activity. For several years, Petitioner’s representatives knew that the tags bore both addresses and knew that the Fort Myers location was inactive, but never objected to Respondents’ practice. The only violation involving Mr. Thackeray’s truck that threatened the public health, safety, or welfare was the failure to have certified scales. The service truck operated by Ward Read lacked an operational inspection light, six-inch vise, and proper manuals. Additionally, Mr. Read’s truck had tags with the Fort Myers and Naples addresses for NFS. However, none of these violations involving Mr. Read’s truck threatened the public health, safety, or welfare. Petitioner failed to prove that Mr. Read’s truck lacked leak testing equipment. The truck had a bottle of Leak Tech with which to detect leaks in fire extinguishers. The truck also had a cable-crimping tool. The truck lacked a Kidde tool, but Petitioner failed to prove that Mr. Read installed Kidde systems off this truck or that the crimping tool present on the truck could not service adequately Kidde installations. The service truck operated by Donald Zelmanski lacked an inspection light, a six-inch vise, certified scales, leak-testing equipment, and proper manuals. Mr. Zelmanski’s truck contained tags with the Fort Myers and Naples addresses. The only violation that threatened the public health, safety, or welfare was the failure to have certified scales. Naples and Fort Myers Facilities (Counts VI-VII) The NFS Naples facility lacked operational hydrostatic test equipment on April 9, 1997. Respondents claim that they were having the equipment upgraded and calibrated at the time of the inspection. Ordinarily, this defense might be creditable, but not in this case. While the hydrostatic test equipment was out of service, NFS accepted the Page Field cylinder for hydrostatic testing and returned it to service, fraudulently representing that the cylinder had been hydrotested. This is precisely the practice against which the requirement of operational testing equipment is designed to protect. The Naples facility also lacked certified gauges for low-pressure testing. Respondents claim that the equipment upgrade described in the preceding paragraph would allow them to test high- and low-pressure cylinders on the same machine. However, due to Respondents’ fraudulent handling of the Page Field cylinder during the equipment downtime, this defense is unavailing. The Naples facility lacked an adapter to allow Respondents to recharge an Ansul SPA 50 cylinder. Jacobs drove the Page Field cylinder to St. Petersburg to have the cylinder recharged by a competitor that had such an adapter. However, the requirement that a facility have an adapter reduces the risk that a licensee will ignore its professional responsibilities and simply return a cylinder to service without first discharging it and performing a visual internal inspection. Respondents’ failure to discharge their other professional responsibilities underscores the materiality of the requirement that they keep an adapter for the Ansul SPA 50 that they elected to accept for service. Respondents kept tags at the Naples facility with tags containing addresses of the Naples and Fort Myers facilities. At the time of the inspection, Respondents also lacked documentation for two of eight scales, including a scale in 1/4-pound increments. Jacobs’ claim that they sent the two uncertified scales for servicing immediately after the inspection does not obviate the fact that, at the time of the inspection, they were available for use and in disrepair. Respondents failed to include serial numbers of serviced fire extinguishers on the relevant invoices. Respondents also failed to include the necessary permit number on inspection forms. Respondent falsely represented that they had hydrotested the Page Field Ansul SPA 50 cylinder at the Naples facility when they had not done so. Respondents stored cylinder bottles without safety caps in place. Petitioner failed to prove that Respondents did not post DOT certification near the hydrostatic testing equipment or that they stocked nitrogen cylinders without an acceptable blow-out disk in place. The blow-out disks were not Ansul brand, but Petitioner failed to prove that the disks were not UL listed or the substantial equivalent of Ansul disks. Respondents concede that the Fort Myers location lacked the items alleged by Petitioner. However, the Fort Myers location is inactive and serves merely as a drop-off or storage facility. All shop work and retail sales activities occur at the Naples location. At the time of the April 1997 inspection, Respondents surrendered the license for the inactive Fort Myers location. Other Jobs (Counts VIII-XI) Respondents installed a pre-engineered system at the SunTrust Bank in Naples. The cylinder is in the bank vault, which it is designed to protect. Petitioner charged that Respondents improperly located the cylinder in the hazard area, but Petitioner did not discuss the fact that the cylinder at Page Field was in the hazard area. Obviously, the corrosive effect of the hazardous materials at Page Field represents a greater risk to the cylinder than the corrosive effect of money and other valuables in the vault at the SunTrust. Additionally, some language in the Ansul manual cautions not to locate the cylinder in the hazard area, but only if the hazard is corrosive. Respondents replaced the fusible links at SunTrust annually. However, they failed to record the year of manufacture of the fusible links on the system tag when last servicing the system in October 1996. There is no evidence as to whether Respondents had suitable Ansul manuals and adapters when it serviced the system at that time. Respondents installed a pre-engineered system at the VFW Post in Naples. In doing so, their employee, who also misfilled the three fire extinguishers at Page Field, left the end-pipe-to-nozzle loose, so as to risk a loss of pressure in case of fire. This condition threatened the public health, safety, and welfare. Although Respondents fired this employee shortly after discovering his poor performance, this action does not eliminate the safety violations for which he, and they, are responsible. Petitioner also proved that Respondents located the 260 nozzle over the griddle in the wrong location. This condition threatened the public health, safety, and welfare because the system might not extinguish a fire on the griddle. Petitioner failed to prove that Respondents located the 230 nozzle in the wrong location. The Ansul manual allows this nozzle to be located anywhere along or within the perimeter of the fryer, if aimed to the center of the fryer. The 230 nozzle was so located and aimed. Respondents installed two pre-engineered systems at Mozzarella’s Café in Naples. In the course of this job, Respondents committed several violations governing documentation. Respondents improperly combined two pre- engineered systems on one inspection report, failed to include in the inspection report references to the manufacturer’s drawings and page numbers, failed to list in the inspection report a second gas valve on the front hood of one system, and failed to include in the inspection report Respondents’ permit number. However, Petitioner failed to prove that Respondents failed to list in the inspection report the type of fusible links in each hood. Respondents serviced a pre-engineered system at Kwan’s Express in Fort Myers in December 1996. Respondents failed to list in the inspection report the degree and types of fusible links installed and a reference to the drawing and page number in the manufacturer’s manual. However, Respondents listed in the inspection report the model number of the system. Red Lobster (Count XII) Several months after Petitioner had suspended Respondents’ licenses and permits, counsel for both parties negotiated a settlement agreement. Under the agreement, Petitioner would immediately lift the suspension. Jacobs and his general manager, Judson Schroyer, learned that Respondents’ counsel had received an unsigned, final draft settlement agreement on Monday, August 18, 1997. The settlement conditions were acceptable to Respondents, and Jacobs knew that Respondents’ counsel had signed the agreement and faxed it back to Petitioner’s counsel for execution by Petitioner’s representative. On August 18, the general manager of the Red Lobster in Naples called NFS and spoke with Jacobs. The general manager described a job involving the installation of a new oven, which would necessitate the relocation of other kitchen equipment a few feet. Thinking that the settlement agreement would be fully executed by then, Jacobs agreed to visit the general manager at the site the following morning. The next morning, Jacobs and Mr. Schroyer met the general manager at the Red Lobster. Giving the general manager NFS business cards with their names, Jacobs and Mr. Schroyer briefly examined the pre-engineered system in the kitchen, as the three men walked through the kitchen, and assured the general manager that there would be no problem doing the work in the short timeframe that the customer required. The purpose of the visit was much more for marketing than it was for preparation for the relatively simple job that the general manager envisioned. Shortly after leaving the Red Lobster, Mr. Schroyer realized that Respondents might not have their licenses and permits reinstated in time to do the job. He conveyed this concern to his supervisor, Jacobs, who spoke with Respondents’ counsel on the evening of August 19 and learned that they could not do the job. Jacobs instructed Mr. Schroyer to call another company in Fort Myers, FireMaster, to which Respondents had referred work during their suspension. Mr. Schroyer called a representative of FireMaster, and he agreed to perform the work. FireMaster assigned the job to Ward Read, who, as is authorized by Petitioner, held a dual permit, which means that he was permitted to work for two licensed dealers. One was NFS, and the other was FireMaster. Mr. Read reported to the Red Lobster in the predawn hours of August 21, as requested by the general manager of Red Lobster. Because his FireMaster truck had insufficient supplies, Mr. Read used an NFS truck, the equipment tags, inspection report, and invoice all bore the name of FireMaster.
Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that the State Fire Marshal enter a final order suspending the licenses and permits of both Respondents for two years, commencing from the effective date of the earlier emergency order of suspension. DONE AND ENTERED this 12th day of December, 1997, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ROBERT E. MEALE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of December, 1997. COPIES FURNISHED: Attorney Mechele R. McBride Attorney Richard Grumberg Department of Insurance and Treasurer 200 East Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0333 Mark H. Muller Quarles & Brady, P.A. 4501 North Tamiami Trail Naples, Florida 34103 Daniel Y. Sumner, General Counsel Department of Insurance and Treasurer The Capitol, Lower Level 26 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Bill Nelson State Treasurer and Insurance Commissioner The Capitol, Plaza Level 11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300
The Issue Whether Petitioner is entitled to a passing grade on the practical portion of the Florida Minimum Standards Examination for firefighters taken May 22, 2002.
Findings Of Fact At times pertinent to this proceeding, Petitioner held certification as a firefighter (Firefighter Certificate of Completion #81191) issued by the State Fire Marshal. For at least three years prior to December 5, 2001, Petitioner had not been active as a firefighter or as a volunteer firefighter with an organized fire department. Pursuant to Section 633.352, Florida Statutes, Petitioner was required to successfully complete the practical portion of the Florida Minimum Standards Examination for firefighters to retain his certification. 1/ The practical examinations at issue in this proceeding consisted of four sections: the Self Contained Breathing Apparatus (SCBA) section, the Hose and Nozzle Operation section, the Ladder Operation section, and the Fireground Skills section. A candidate must pass each section to pass the practical examination. On November 16, 2001, Petitioner applied to sit for the practical examination scheduled for December 5, 2001. Petitioner sat for and failed all four sections of the practical examination administered December 5. Respondent's Rule 4A- 37.0527(6), Florida Administrative Code, permits a candidate to retake the practical examination once without further training. Petitioner thereafter applied to retake the examination, which was scheduled for May 22, 2002. Petitioner passed the Hose and Nozzle Operation and the Ladder Operation sections of the practical examination on May 22, and the scoring on those sections are not at issue in this proceeding. At issue in this proceeding is whether Petitioner failed the SCBA section and/or the Fireground Skills section of the practical examination administered May 22, 2002. The SCBA section of the practical examination consisted of questions for which a candidate was awarded credit and certain items that a candidate was required to successfully complete (fatal items). If a candidate missed a fatal item, the candidate failed the SCBA section of the examination and, consequently, the entire practical examination. The Firegrounds Skills section of the examination tests a candidate on a variety of skills a firefighter is expected to demonstrate while fighting a fire, and the candidate is awarded a score for his or her performance. To pass each part of the practical examination, including the SCBA and the Fireground Skills sections, a candidate must achieve a score of 70 points and must not miss a fatal item. The SCBA section of the practical examination requires the candidate to properly don certain protective gear in 1 minute and 45 seconds. The failure to complete the exercise in the allotted time is a fatal item. In addition, the candidate must activate and check a personal alarm system as part of the exercise. The failure of the candidate to properly wear and activate the alarm system is also a fatal item. The greater weight of the credible evidence established that Petitioner's performance on the SCBA section of the practical examination was appropriately and fairly graded. Petitioner failed to timely complete the exercise, which is a fatal item. Petitioner failed to properly activate the personal alarm system, which is also a fatal item. Petitioner was awarded no points for 5 of 10 items for which points could be awarded (each item was worth 10 points). Even if he had passed the fatal items noted above, Petitioner would have failed the SCBA section because he failed to achieve a passing score of 70 on that section of the examination. Petitioner failed to establish that he was entitled to additional credit for the SCBA section of the practical examination. Petitioner received a failing score on the Firegrounds Skills section of the practical examination administered May 22, 2002. The greater weight of the credible evidence established that Petitioner's performance on the Firegrounds Skills section of the practical examination administered May 22, 2002, was appropriately and fairly graded. Of the 100 points available for this section of the examination, Respondent established that Petitioner deserved no credit for the following: 20 points on the forcible entry part of the section; 12 points on the ladders and fire service tools part of the section; and 4 points on the hazardous materials part of the section. Consequently, Respondent established that Petitioner was entitled to a total of 64 points on the Firegrounds Skills section of the practical examination administered May 22 2002, which is a failing grade. Petitioner failed to establish that he was entitled to additional credit for the Firegrounds Skills section of the practical examination administered May 22, 2002. Respondent established that the administration and grading of the subject exams were consistent with the provisions of Chapter 4A-37, Florida Administrative Code, which set forth by rule applicable guidelines for the practical examination.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner enter a final order adopting the Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law set forth herein. It is further RECOMMENDED that the final order deny Petitioner's application for re-certification as a firefighter. DONE AND ENTERED this 14th day of January, 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. CLAUDE B. ARRINGTON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of January, 2003.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner was employed as a firefighter with the Tallahassee Fire Department, Tallahassee, Florida, on September 23, 1963, and continued in employment until May 5, 1979. (The suggestion by Petitioner that he had 24 to 27 days of leave accrued upon the last day of his employment is not utilized in determining the official termination date of employment. Beyond May 5, 1979, Petitioner was entitled to be paid for leave time, but was no longer obligated to perform as a firefighter, having been terminated effective May 5, 1979.) During his service as a firefighter with the Tallahassee Fire Department, Petitioner received a certificate of tenure in 1974, pursuant to Section 633.41, Florida Statutes. This provision has been referred to as the savings clause or grandfather clause and allows firefighters who were employed upon the effective date of that section to be certified without the necessity of complying with provisions of law related to certification through training and examination. Section 633.41, Florida Statutes became effective in 1969, thus Petitioner was certified by the terms and conditions of that provision. Petitioner left his employment with the Tallahassee Fire Department to pursue private business and for reason of family obligations. Having terminated his employment with the Tallahassee Fire Department on a voluntary basis, there was no prohibition against reapplying for employment with the Tallahassee Fire Department at some future date. That eventuality occurred when the petitioner contacted the Fire Chief of the Tallahassee Fire Department in April, 1981 to discuss the possibility of reemployment. The Fire Chief of the Tallahassee Fire Department then and now is one Edwin C. Ragans. Shortly after this discussion with Chief Ragans, and in the same month, April, 1981, Ragans hired Petitioner with the effective date of Petitioner's reemployment being July 21, 1901. The delay between April and July was caused by the petitioner's need to conclude certain business undertakings before assuming his duties as a firefighter. The State of Florida, Bureau of Fire Standards and Training, had been informed of the date of original employment for the Petitioner, September 23, 1963, and the date of termination, May 5, 1979, based upon a notice of termination which was submitted by Chief Ragans in behalf of the Tallahassee Fire Department. A copy of that form may be found as Petitioner's exhibit number 1 admitted into evidence. Likewise, the Bureau of Fire Standards and Training was made aware of the reemployment of the Petitioner through the filing of a form known as Qualification of New Employee. A copy of that form may be found as Petitioner's exhibit number 2 admitted into evidence. That exhibit reflects the date of reemployment or rehiring as being July 21, 1981, and further notes that the initial employment was September 23, 1963. That form does not allude to the date of original termination of employment with the Tallahassee Fire Department which was May 5, 1979. When Petitioner returned to employment in July, 1981, Chief Ragans made mention of the "two year rule", which is a reference to Rule 4A-37.14, Florida Administrative Code, (1976), dealing with the idea that firefighters who had been employed with an employing agency, such as the Tallahassee Fire Department, would not have to reapply for certification in this same fashion as the person seeking initial employment as a firefighter, if that former individual resumed full time paid employment with the employing agency within a period of two years immediately subsequent to termination of the initial employment. In this connection Ragans told the Petitioner at the point of reemploying the Petitioner in 1981, that Petitioner had two options. First, he could challenge the examination related to firefighters and gain certification or if that choice was not made it would be necessary for the Petitioner to go through a minimum standards class before recertification. At the commencement of reemployment, Petitioner was mindful of the existence of the two year provision pertaining to continuing certification for those persons who had not been away from employment as a firefighter for more than two years. Furthermore, this topic had been discussed between Petitioner and some other individuals of the fire department on one occasion. Under these circumstances, Petitioner contacted an official within the training division of the Tallahassee Fire Department and obtained books necessary to study in preparation for standing the examination for certification as a firefighter. Petitioner had commenced preparation for the examination when he happened to see Bobby Presnell a lieutenant within the Tallahassee Fire Department and president of the local firefighters union. In the course of this conversation with Presnell, Petitioner mentioned that he was going to have to be examined through a test before receiving certification. Presnell indicated that he would check into the situation and find out exactly what would be necessary to obtain certification. A couple of weeks after that conversation, Presnell called the Petitioner and told him that he had spoken with Olin Greene the then Director of the Division of State Fire Marshal in the state of Florida. Presnell reported to the Petitioner that in the course of the conversation between Greene and Presnell, Greene had stated that the Petitioner was a certified fireman. These conversations between Petitioner and Presnell occurred some time in August or September, 1981. Presnell testified that the discussion between Presnell and Greene concerned the problem which Petitioner had with the two year requirement for continuing certification without the necessity of testing or schooling. In testimony, Presnell indicated that he told Greene that the Petitioner had been reemployed and everything was "supposed to be okay, and then a month or two or three later the problem arose", meaning a certification problem. Greene, according to Presnell, stated that he would get back in contact with Presnell on this subject. Again, per the testimony of Presnell, some ten days to two weeks later, beyond the initial discussion between Greene and Presnell, Greene called Presnell and told him that as far as he, Greene, was concerned, and the Fire Marshal's office was concerned, that "They didn't have any problem with Mr. Adams' recertification or certification." Greene has no recollection of any conversation with Presnell on the subject of the certification situation related to the Petitioner. Having considered the testimony of Presnell and Greene, the Presnell testimony is accepted as factually correct. Following the occurrence wherein Presnell related remarks attributed to Greene as described before, a few days after those events, Petitioner had a discussion with District Fire Chief Raymond Love of the Tallahassee Fire Department. In this conversation Love describes a discussion which he claims to have taken place between himself and Buddy Dewar, whose actual name is Dennis Dewar, in which Dewar is reported to have said that Petitioner was certified. At that time Dewar was the Bureau Chief of the Bureau of Fire Standards and Training. At present he is the Director of the Division of State Fire Marshal, having been promoted to that position in April 1982. In testimony, Love's account of the Dewar conversation concerning certification of the Petitioner, was that in the course of a fireman's convention in October 1981, Dewar asked Love if he knew Jimmy Adams, and Love replied in the affirmative. Given this opening, Love then related that he was impressed with Adams as a person and in terms of his capabilities as a firefighter. Love then recounts that he began to tell Dewar that there was a problem related to the Adams certification and if there was any help that Dewar could give, it would be most appreciated. To which, according to Love, Dewar replied that "he didn't see any problem with the recertification." Dewar, per Love's comments, did not state that he considered the Petitioner to be certified at the time of that conversation, nor was the two-year requirement pertaining to the return to the employment roles, to remain in a certified position without reapplication for certification mentioned in the Dewar conversation with Love, according to Love. Dewar, in his testimony, denied that the conversation between Love and Dewar concerned the Petitioner. His recollection is that Love asked Dewar how long the retention of certification would be valid for, to which he responded two years. Having considered the testimony and the demeanor of the witnesses, a decision cannot be reached on which of the witnesses Love or Dewar should be believed pertaining to the conversation which took place between them in October, 1981. Following discussion with Chief Love, and particularly on the next morning after that discussion, Petitioner talked to another fire chief within the Tallahassee Fire Department, whose name is Revel. This conversation was instituted by Revel in his inquiry of the petitioner on the subject of whether Petitioner was studying for the examination for certification. In response Petitioner stated that he had been but that he had found out the night before that he was certified. Revel in turn told Chief Ragans of this conversation and Ragans summoned the Petitioner to his office and the conversation between Love and Petitioner on the question of certification was recounted for the benefit of Chief Ragans. Petitioner and Love indicate that in the course of the meeting with Ragans, Ragans made a phone call and having concluded that phone call, stated that Petitioner did not have any problem with certification, or something to that effect, as Love recalls Ragans comments. Petitioner's recollection of the comment after the phone call was that Chief Ragans said, "You are a certified fireman." Ragans, in his testimony, does not relate having phoned someone on the topic of certification of the Petitioner in the presence of Petitioner and Love as previously described. His recollection is to the effect that some time prior to Love having stated in the fleeting between Ragans, Love and the Petitioner, that Dewar had confirmed Petitioner's status as a certified firefighter, he, Ragans, had talked to a Mr. Schaffner, Standards Coordinator, at the State of Florida, Fire College, and Schaffner had indicated that the time which Petitioner had been out of employment as a firefighter in a Florida department, was so close to being within the two years allowed, that Petitioner would not be required to go back through the certification process. At the time this case was placed at issue Schaffner had died. Having considered Ragans comments in the context of the other proof, it is determined that Ragans was sufficiently acquainted with Schaffner's voice to identify Schaffner in the course of the telephone conversation on the topic of the Petitioners certification. It is also concluded that this was the only conversation which Ragans had with officials within the State of Florida, Office of the State Fire Marshal, during 1981. Whether this conversation between Ragans and Schaffner occurred while Petitioner and Love were in Ragans office is uncertain. Benjamin E. Mclin, inspector with the Fire Department, speaks in terms of a conversation which he had with Olin Greene in October 1981, in the course of a seminar. Mclin introduced himself to Greene and, Greene is reputed, according to Mclin, to have asked Mclin if he knew Jimmy Adams, the Petitioner, and to have asked what kind of person Adams was. Mclin reports that he replied that he thought that Petitioner was an outstanding person as well as an impressive fireman, to which Mclin says that Greene stated, "Well, I know I did the right thing." Greene has no recollection of this conversation. Having considered the comment, even if it can be attributable to Greene, it is sufficiently ambiguous that it has no value in resolving the certification issue related to the Petitioner. After the conversation with Chief Ragans and Chief Love, which took place in Ragans office, Petitioner assumed that he was certified without the necessity of standing examination to receive certification. He had received no written indication from Respondent confirming or denying this understanding and had never personally spoken to anyone in the employ of the Respondent, on this subject. Petitioner continued his duties throughout 1981, into the beginning of 1984, serving in the capacity as a firefighter with the Tallahassee Fire Department. At that point, Petitioner had been promoted to Lieutenant within the Fire Department, and in the face of that action, a grievance was filed by another firefighter employed by the Tallahassee Fire Department indicating that Petitioner was not a certified firefighter. Ragans, in response to the grievance contacted Paul R. Steckle who was employed with the Office of the Bureau of Fire Standards and Training as a Field Representative Supervisor. Steckle had been asked by Dewar to check the Petitioner's file to determine the period of time between the termination of initial employment with the Tallahassee Fire Department and reemployment with that employer. Having made this check Steckle believed that the period was beyond the two years and reported this finding to Dewar. In conversation with Ragans, Steckle had asked Ragans when Petitioner had been employed and Ragans had indicated that Petitioner had been rehired in April but did not report to work until July, 1981. Steckle told Ragans that if Petitioner had been hired in April, 1981, and had been granted a leave of absence, allowing Petitioner to start work in July, 1981, that the reemployment would have been within the two year limit. Ragans indicated that the City of Tallahassee had no policy of allowing a leave of absence such as inquired about by Steckle. Nonetheless, Ragans got the impression that petitioner was duly certified based upon remarks made by Steckle. On January 30, 1984, Ragans wrote Steckle verifying that Petitioner had not returned to work in April, in view of commitments which would not allow him to be actually at work until July. (Mention is made of 1979, but it is determined that Ragans is referring to 1981.) This correspondence also mentions the conversation between Ragans and Schaffner. A copy of the correspondence is Respondent's exhibit number 3 admitted into evidence. On February 22, 1984, Steckle wrote to the Petitioner and advised the Petitioner that a review of the records of the Bureau of Fire Standards and Training revealed that the Petitioner had been out of fire service for over two years before reemployment. This correspondence refers to May 5, 1979, as the date of termination and July 21, 1981, as the date of reemployment. It alludes to the fact that Petitioner must regain certification through provisions of Rule 4A-37.52, Florida Administrative Code, (1981) 1/ related to an equivalency examination and encloses a copy of the package related to that examination process. It requests that the examination be taken in April, 1984. Otherwise, it is indicated in the correspondence, the Petitioner would be terminated from employment with the Tallahassee Fire Department upon request from the Bureau of Fire Standards and Training to the Tallahassee Fire Department. A copy of this correspondence may be found as Respondent's exhibit number 14, admitted into evidence. On April 10, 1984, through correspondence from counsel for the Respondent to counsel for the petitioner, the case is discussed and the Petitioner is requested to stand the equivalency examination and it alludes to the fact that in view of the error of the Respondent in failing to note at the time of reemployment that Petitioner had been away from fire fighting for more than two years, Petitioner is given until February 22, 1985, to undergo an equivalency examination for purposes of recertification. In lieu of this disposition, Petitioner is afforded the opportunity for a Section 120.57, Florida Statutes hearing, which he availed himself of, leading to the present Recommended Order. A copy of the April 10, 1984 correspondence may be found as Respondent's exhibit number 15 admitted into evidence. Luther Richter had been employed as a firefighter with the Tallahassee Fire Department and was dismissed from that employment after being arrested on a federal drug smuggling charge. He subsequently pleaded nolo contendere to the charge in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Georgia in 1976 and was given a three year probation. In April of 1979 he applied to the Tallahassee Fire Department to be reemployed. Through the reemployment paperwork, Chief Ragans recommended that Richter not be accepted based upon an alleged lack of good character. In response, Dewar, the then Bureau Chief of the Fire College, wrote Ragans on May 22, 1979 stating that Richter was not eligible for employment because of his drug conviction. Another letter was sent on June 15, 1979, from Dewar to Ragans to the same effect. On July 17, 1979, Dewar requested a legal interpretation of the Richter situation from the point of view of the Respondent's duties in considering the question of Richter's certification as a firefighter in Florida. On September 10, 1979, the City of Tallahassee and Richter entered into an agreement for Richter's reinstatement as an employee with the City of Tallahassee. In the face of the action of the City of Tallahassee, the Respondent accepted Richter for purposes of certification as if he had never been dismissed. As stated in the October 16, 1979 correspondence from Olin Greene to Daniel E. A. Kleman, City Manager of the City of Tallahassee, with Richter's reinstatement as an employee of the City of Tallahassee the Respondent would ". . . have no alternative but to accept the reinstatement order and allow his certification that was in effect prior to September 1, 1975, to come back into effect." The agreement for reinstatement can be found as part of the composite exhibit number 6 of the Petitioner, admitted into evidence. The October 16, 1979 correspondence may also be found within that document. Those items are copies of the originals. In furtherance of Greene's perception, Richter having been reinstated by the City of Tallahassee was deemed by the Respondent never to have left employment. Richter's certification continues from September 1, 1975, the dismissal date, and his initial certification remains valid to this date as established in the correspondence of Olin Greene to Kleman dated January 9, 1980, a copy of which is found in the Petitioner's composite exhibit number 6. In essence, Respondent felt that in view of the reinstatement it could not refuse to recognize Richter's certification as if it had never lapsed between the interim period of his dismissal in 1975 and the agreement for reinstatement in 1979. In early 1984 a minimum standards training course for firefighters in Florida was taught at Indian River Community College. An unusually high failure rate was experienced by those students who took that course and this led to an investigation by the State Fire College. Through the investigation it was learned that one of the instructors in the minimum standards course had not been properly certified. To resolve this problem, all students who attended that course were required to take further training with a certified instructor. Following that additional training session, another examination was given and those persons who passed the second examination, in addition to those persons who had passed the initial examination, were certified. Those who failed the second examination were not accepted for certification. On other occasions where tenured firefighters, as recognized by Section 633.41, Florida Statutes, have gone beyond the two year time period for reemployment and continuing certification without examination, those firefighters have had to stand the examination, without exception.
