The Issue Is the Notice of Violation against Respondent valid; and if valid, may the Department of Transportation require that the allegedly offending signs be removed?
Findings Of Fact On June 7, 2001, DOT issued Notice of Violation 10B ST 2001 412, against a billboard sign located adjacent to Interstate 95 (I-95), approximately 1.3 miles north of the intersection of I-95 and U.S. Highway 1 at Exit 92. The notice alleged that the sign violates Chapter 479, Florida Statutes, in that it is unpermitted. DOT contends that the sign advertises for the Café Erotica restaurant, a business establishment not located on the same premises as the sign, and that there is no visible business occurring on the premises where the sign is located. I-95 is part of the Interstate Highway System. The sign is located within 660 feet of the nearest edge of the right-of-way of I-95 and can be seen without visual aid by motorists of normal visual acuity traveling on I-95. The sign is a "permanent" one and has never been permitted by DOT. Exit 94 has not applied to DOT for a sign permit for the subject sign or paid any sign permit fees for it. No sign permit has been issued to any entity for the sign. The sign displays the words "Café Erotica/We Dare to Bare/Adult Toys/Great Food/Exit 94, Inc." The phrases on the sign are displayed on two stacked faces without the slashes. The letters are all capitalized; the size of the letters and the paint colors of yellow and black call the viewer's attention to the phrases, "CAFE? EROTICA," "WE DARE TO BARE," "ADULT TOYS," "GREAT FOOD," and "EXIT 94." The words "WE DARE TO BARE" and "EXIT 94" are in very large black type and cover most of the two faces of the sign. The phrases "CAFÉ EROTICA," "ADULT TOYS," "GREAT FOOD," and the abbreviation "INC.," are the phrases smallest in size, located at the very top left, middle right, middle left and bottom right of the sign. All the small phrases are in black type and are relatively inconspicuous compared with the rest of the sign. There are no addresses, telephone numbers, arrows, or other identifying information on the sign. Respondent, Cafe Erotica, We Dare to Bare, Adult Toys/Great Food, Exit 94, Inc., is a Florida corporation. It was incorporated in 1998. At all times material, Café Erotica, We Dare to Bare, Adult Toys/Great Food, Exit 94, Inc., has been a corporation in good standing with the Florida Department of State, which has registered and approved its corporate name pursuant to Section 607.0401, Florida Statutes. Asher G. Sullivan, Jr., a/k/a Jerry Sullivan, is incorporator, president, shareholder, and director of Respondent. Mr. Sullivan chose the name of the company because the words and phrases "get your attention," are memorable, and are words and phrases Mr. Sullivan has used a lot over the years to advertise for the Café Erotica. Exit 94 does not sell food or adult toys. It does not offer dancers for public viewing. The business of Exit 94 is the development of hunting and fishing camps on various pieces of property it owns or leases in Florida and Georgia. Café Erotica of Florida, Inc., d/b/a Café Erotica (Café Erotica), is a Florida corporation which holds the license and owns the assets of the Café Erotica restaurant. Jerry Sullivan also is president, shareholder, and owner of Café Erotica. Exit 94 leases the land where the sign is located from James Grady Wainright, the owner of the property. The rental property consists of approximately ten acres. The lease was signed on April 20, 2001. The annual rent is $3000.00 per year. Mr. Wainright has received all the rent for 2001 from Mr. Sullivan. Mr. Sullivan was reimbursed by Respondent shortly after he paid the rent to Mr. Wainright. The stated purpose of the lease is the construction and maintenance of a hunting and fishing camp. The lease also authorizes Exit 94 to erect advertising signs on the property, states that any such signs will remain the property of Exit 94, forbids Mr. Wainright from obstructing the highway view of such signs, and grants Exit 94 permission to remove any vegetation that may obstruct the view of such signs. Mr. Wainright originally contacted Mr. Sullivan about leasing the property because he was interested in obtaining income from having a sign on his property. However, his interest resulted in the current hunting and fishing camp lease. The Café Erotica restaurant is a 24-hour per day, full-service restaurant which features dancers clad in bathing suits and which sells adult toys. The Café Erotica restaurant is located at 2620 State Road 207 (SR 207), at the intersection of SR 207 and the exit 94 off-ramp from I-95. The real property owned by Café Erotica is not contiguous to the subject real property owned by Exit 94. The real property owned by Exit 94, which is the subject of DOT's Notice of Violation, is approximately nine miles from the Café Erotica restaurant. Mr. Sullivan makes the advertising decisions for Café Erotica. In the past, Café Erotica has advertised "we dare to bare," "adult toys," and "exit 94" on other billboards located adjacent to I-95 in St. Johns County. Until about two weeks before the hearing of this matter, Café Erotica maintained a billboard at the café that displayed the words "PRIVATE DANCES," "GREAT FOOD," and "ADULT TOYS." At the time of hearing the billboards at Café Erotica now include words disparaging of the Department. Café Erotica does not own any interest in the subject sign and no citizen testified that the sign had caused him/her to patronize Café Erotica. However, given the similarity of the corporate name of Exit 94 to advertising used by Café Erotica and the location of Café Erotica at Exit 94, it is likely that Respondent's corporate advertising could also be interpreted as intended for Café Erotica and therefore be of incidental benefit to Café Erotica. On the other hand, the sign is intended to advertise Exit 94's hunting and fishing camps. In short, Mr. Sullivan and his corporations receive a dual benefit from the sign at issue here. Exit 94 lists addresses and locations other than the subject property as its business address(es) for various purposes. Mr. Sullivan's and Exit 94's main business address and office is on SR 206 off Exit 93 on I-95. Exit 94 maintains no office or telephone on the subject property. Jerry Sullivan has directed all activity on the Exit 94 property. His son is a licensed hunting and fishing guide. Jerry Sullivan anticipates creating, maintaining, and charging people for the privilege of using the subject property as a fishing and hunting camp with guide services, if desired, provided by his son. He also intends to reward employees and clients of his various enterprises with free privileges at the camp. Currently, Exit 94's only revenues have been payments from other companies owned by Mr. Sullivan or his wife for use of the hunting and fishing camps maintained by Exit 94. The company has operated at a loss since its inception. The loss is made up by Mr. Sullivan as is needed. There is no public access to the property Exit 94 leases from Mr. Wainright. The property is accessible by going through property owned by a timber company. The closest exit off I-95 to get to the property is Exit 92, where U.S. Highway 1 intersects with I-95. As of the hearing of this matter, Exit 94 was not operating a fishing camp open to the public on the property leased from Mr. Wainright. However, such a public enterprise is not required in order for Exit 94 to be a legitimate business. The parties do not dispute the fact that there is a pond on the subject property. The evidence varied as to the size and quality of the pond with the lower estimate by the Department at 1/2 to 3/4 of an acre and the higher estimate of two acres provided by the landowner. Respondent estimated the size of the pond to be slightly less than two acres. The pond was not stocked with fish, but did have some fish present. Respondent has ordered special hybrid bream to stock the pond for "catch and release" by Respondent's customers and guests. The property was not stocked with game animals, although such stocks would not be necessary for hunting since wild game including turkey, boars, and ducks are already present. There was also one very ramshackle deer blind on the property. There were no public restrooms, offices, or facilities to clean game on the premises. No fishing equipment was available for purchase. A small trailer was located on the premises. The trailer was placed there and is owned by Mr. Wainright. It is unknown if the trailer is available for overnight lodging. However, the trailer is not necessary for the property to function as an overnight camp and no witness testified to having camped overnight on the subject property. Petitioner routinely distributes corn for seeding the woods for deer and other game. Given the location of the subject property, game attraction is certainly feasible. Bill Harry showed DOT personnel around the subject property. The Department's witness, Tom Simmons, was generally critical of the quality of the hunting and fishing facilities. While there were no people using the pond during his brief inspection, Mr. Simmons has no personal knowledge as to whether people actually hunted or fished on the property at any other time. The Department's representative acknowledged that he saw feed corn scattered on the property for use in luring wildlife to the premises. Exit 94 holds an occupational license from St. Johns County as a "fish camp." In issuing this license, the county accepted Exit 94's designation of its business. Exit 94 has applied for a "fish farm" license from the Florida Game and Freshwater Fish Commission. Exit 94 produced invoices sent to clients for hunting and fishing privileges on the subject property, corresponding checks in payment, and tax returns. Exit 94 is a legitimate business. It is in the business of providing and developing hunting and fishing camps for use as directed by Exit 94. No reason was demonstrated to pierce the corporate veil of Exit 94. The sign located on the property at issue here only and primarily contains the name of the corporation and is exempt from the general sign permitting requirements. Therefore, the Notice of Violation should be dismissed.
Recommendation Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is
The Issue Whether Petitioner’s application for a permit for an outdoor advertising sign should be granted.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Poz Outdoor Advertising, Inc. (Poz), filed an application dated June 19, 1996, with the Department of Transportation (Department) for an outdoor advertising sign permit. The application stated that the sign was to be located at I-95 approximately 2500 feet north of Midway Road in St. Lucie County, Florida. Additionally the application provided that the sign would not be located within city limits. The Department issued a Notice of Denied Application to Poz on July 16, 1996, stating the application was not approved because the “site is within 500 feet of a restricted interchange or intersection at grade," citing Rule 14-10.006(1)(b)5, Florida Administrative Code. The Department uniformly interprets Rule 14- 10.006(1)(b)5, Florida Administrative Code. In the mid-80’s, the Department's central office sent out a diagram and instruction memo to all district staff explaining the measurement and distance requirements in Rule 14-10.006(1)(b)5. Based on the methodology used by the Department for measuring compliance with Rule 14-10.006(1)(b)5, the site of the sign proposed by Poz is within 500 feet of a restricted interchange. The area where I-95 crosses or intersects with Midway Road is called an interchange. Petitioner claims that the Department has approved other signs which are within 500 feet of a restricted interchange, namely, signs with permit numbers BM 097 and BM 096, located at the east side of I-95 and State Road 514; signs with permit numbers BM 819 and BM 820 located at the west side of I-95 and State Road 516; and signs with permit numbers BM 825 and BM 826 located at the west side of I-95 and State Road 514. The signs with permit numbers BM 096 and BM 097 are located within the city limits of Palm Bay according to the approved applications for those signs. According to the information contained in the Department’s computerized outdoor advertising location information, the signs with permit numbers BM 825 AND BM 826 are located within city limits. According to the information contained in the Department’s computerized outdoor advertising location information, the signs with permit numbers BM 819 and BM 820, are located within city limits. Petitioner also claims that the sign located at the interchange of I-95 and State Road 60 was within 500 feet of a restricted interchange. This sign is located in an unincorporated area of Indian River County. A sign was erected in this location in 1973 and was replaced with another sign at the same location in 1991. The county building permit for the restructured sign was issued conditioned upon the applicant receiving approval from the “State of Florida Right of Way Administration.” No evidence was presented to show that such approval was sought from or given by the Department. No evidence was presented to establish that the Department was aware that the sign had been restructured. Richard Pozniak, the husband of one of the owners of Poz, testified that a former sign inspector for the Department, Vanna Kinchen, had showed him how to measure for proposed sign sites. Ms. Kinchen rode out with Mr. Pozniak to a location about five miles from the interchange at issue and taught Mr. Pozniak how to measure from the interchange. Ms. Kinchen was not involved with the site at issue and was no longer a sign inspector at the time that Poz made the application for a permit of the site at issue. All interchanges are not constructed alike. Richard Pozniak and his wife, Barbara, measured the site which is at issue. Mr. Pozniak computed the distance from the interchange to the site by measuring 500 feet from the safety zone or gore area on I-95. The gore area is located on the inside of an entrance or exit ramp rather than along the outside of the widening of the pavement. In determining whether the site is within 500 feet of the interchange, the Department measures 500 feet beyond the widening of the entrance ramp onto I-95. The site proposed by Poz was located in the area before the widening of the ramp ends. A sign cannot be placed in the area. The logo program is a federally funded program. The requirements for the issuance of an outdoor advertising permit is different from the requirements for a business to display its logo in the logo program. In the logo program, the business is limited to displaying its logo on a Department sign structure located on the interstate.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered denying Petitioner, Poz Outdoor Advertising, Inc.’s application for a permit for an outdoor sign at I-95 and Midway Road in St. Lucie County, Florida. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 23rd day of May, 1997. SUSAN B. KIRKLAND Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of May, 1997. COPIES FURNISHED: Robert S. Cohen, Esquire Pennington, Culpepper, Moore, Wilkinson Dunbar & Dunlap, P.A. Post Office Box 10095 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Andrea V. Nelson, Esquire Department of Transportation 605 Suwannee Street, MS-58 Tallahassee, Florida 34399-0450 Ben G. Watts, Secretary Department of Transportation Attn: Diedre Grubbs, M.S. 58 Haydon Burns Building 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450 Pamela Leslie, General Counsel Department of Transportation 562 Haydon Burns Building 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450
Findings Of Fact The outdoor advertising sign which is the subject of these proceedings is located on U.S. 1 (State Road 5) approximately 1,029 feet north of Summerland Road in North Key Largo. The outdoor advertising sign is owned and maintained by the Respondent and is visible from the main traveled way of the adjacent roadway. The Respondent purchased the sign from the Daly Outdoor Advertising Company in 1984. The sign consist percents of a ten feet by forty feet plywood sign face supported ]by five four inch by six inch poles which serve as uprights. In addition, the sign has 5 stringers (wooden planks placed in a cross-type fashion on the upright poles to hold the sign face in place). The parties stipulated that the sign, in place prior to 1971, was a "nonconforming sign" as defined by Rule 14- 10.07, Florida Administrative Code. The sign permit number is AK-332-10. In November of 1985, Hurricane Kate traveled through the Keys and damaged the sign. On December 4, 1985, Mr. William Kenney, District VI Outdoor Advertising Administrator, passed the site of the sign and noticed that the face of the structure was blown over In the water. Because the sign was surrounded by water and mud, Mr. Kenney observed the sign from approximately 30 feet away. Although the sign was blown over into the water, the face was intact. The poles which were used to hold the sign face snapped. On December 10, 1985, the Respondent purchased 5 used telephone poles at a cost of $50.00 each and repaired the damaged sign. The poles were used as uprights to support the sign face. On January 8, 1986, Mr. Kenney walked over to the sign and inspected it. In Mr. Kenney's opinion, the replaced upright poles appeared to be longer than the old ones, the stringers appeared to be made out of new wood and the plywood used on the face of the structure appeared to be new. The overall size of the repaired structure appeared to be the same size that it was before being damaged by the hurricane. The sign is located at exactly the same location as it was prior to being blown down. It is standard practice in the outdoor advertising industry for a company to exchange, refinish and replace faces of outdoor advertising signs on a routine basis. By letter dated January 14, 1986, the Petitioner advised Respondent that its sign permit number AK-332-10 was no longer valid and by notice to show cause dated February 14, 1986, the Petitioner advised Respondent that the repaired sign had no valid permit and was illegal.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is therefore, RECOMMENDED: That a final order be issued declaring that sign permit AK-332-10 remains valid and dismissing the notice of violation and notice to show cause. W. MATTHEW STEVENSON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of December, 1986. APPENDIX TO THE RECOMMENDED ORDER IN CASE NO. 86-0575T & 86-0966T (consolidated) The following constitutes my specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on all of the Proposed Findings of Fact submitted by the parties to these cases. Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by the Petitioner Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 1 and 5. Addressed in Conclusions of Law section. Adopted in Finding of Fact 2. Rejected as subordinate. Rejected as subordinate. Partially adopted in Finding of Fact 3. Matters not contained therein are rejected as subordinate. Partially adopted in Finding of Fact 8. Matters not contained therein are rejected as subordinate. Addressed in Conclusions of Law section. Rejected as subordinate and/or not supported by competent substantial evidence. Adopted in Finding of Fact 6. Adopted in Finding of Fact 7. Adopted in Finding of Fact 7. Adopted in substance in Finding of Fact 4. Adopted in substance in Finding of Fact 9. Matters not contained therein are rejected as subordinate. Adopted in Finding of Fact 9. Adopted in substance in Finding of Fact 9. Matters not contained therein are rejected as subordinate. Partially adopted in Finding of Fact 9. Matters not contained therein are rejected as argument and/or contrary to the weight of the evidence. Rulings of Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by the Respondent Adopted in Finding of Fact 1. Adopted in Findings of Fact 2 and 8. Adopted in substance in Finding of Fact 7. Adopted in substance in Finding of Fact 6. Rejected as a recitation of testimony. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 6 and 9. Adopted in Finding of Fact 10. Rejected as a recitation of testimony. Adopted in substance in Finding of Fact 11. Rejected as a recitation of testimony. COPIES FURNISHED: Charles G. Gardner, Esquire -Department of Transportation -Haydon Burns Building, MS-58 Tallahassee, Florida 32301-8064 Charles C. Papy, III, Esquire 201 Alhambra Circle, Suite 502 Coral Gables, Florida 33134 Thomas Drawdy, Secretary Department of Transportation Hayden Burns Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 A. J. Spalla, General Counsel Department of Transportation 562 Haydon Burns Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue Whether Petitioner's outdoor advertising sign on the east side of U. S. Highway 441, 1.2 miles north of State Road 46, in Lake County, Florida, can be maintained on the ground it is exempt from permitting requirements.
Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, the following findings of fact are determined: At issue in this case is whether Petitioner, Donald E. Stevens, is entitled to maintain an existing outdoor advertising sign located on the eastern side of U. S. Highway 441, 1.2 miles north of State Road 46, in Lake County, Florida. In proposed agency action issued on October 17, 1994, Respondent, Department of Transportation (DOT), denied Petitioner's application for a permit on the ground the sign was located "only 818' North of location - Tag BJ630.25. [It] [m]ust be at least 1,000' to be a conforming location." Petitioner now concedes that he cannot qualify for a permit, but he maintains that the sign is an "on- premise sign" and is therefore exempt. Petitioner owns certain real property bordering on U. S. Highway 441, in Lake County, Florida, on which is located a commercial building and a large billboard sign. The structure has been located on the property since 1968. The building contains a large, walk-in cooler, while two portable coolers are located just outside the building. An occupied mobile home sits on the rear part of the property. On September 1, 1994, Petitioner received a Notice of Violation - Illegally Erected Sign from DOT indicating the sign was not properly permitted. In response to this notice, Petitioner submitted an application to DOT on September 15, 1994. After reviewing the application, on October 17, 1994, DOT denied the same on the ground the sign violated statutory spacing requirements by being within 1,000 feet of another permitted sign. In an effort to informally resolve the matter, Petitioner met with DOT representatives in Tallahassee and eventually executed a stipulation on March 13, 1995, in which he agreed that by March 20, 1995, he would "provide [DOT] with written documentation (e.g., a lease) that the business being advertised on the subject sign is on the same business' premises as the subject sign." Petitioner also agreed to "safely cover over or paint out that portion of advertising copy on the subject sign which refers to an off-site business location." The stipulation further provided that if these conditions were met, DOT would enter a Final Order dismissing the petition for hearing and allowing Petitioner to maintain the sign as an off-premise sign. If, however, Petitioner failed to comply with the agreement, DOT would refer the matter to the Division of Administrative Hearings for a formal hearing. Contending that Petitioner has failed to meet the terms of the agreement, and that his sign is now unlawful, DOT has initiated this proceeding. In order for the sign to qualify as an on-premise sign under the terms of the stipulation, there would have to be business activity inside the building related to the business advertisement on the sign. In other words, the lessee would have to utilize a portion of the building on Petitioner's property for its business. To fulfill his side of the agreement, Petitioner provided DOT with a lease agreement dated January 5, 1995, between he and Vic Donahey, under which Donahey agreed to rent the "on-site bill board and walk in cooler in the building" for a fixed sum of $150.00 plus tax each month. Donahey operates a restaurant in Leesburg, Florida, known as Vic's Embers, which is approximately fifteen miles from the location of the sign, and a catering business at three locations in Sumter and Lake Counties. Pursuant to the lease agreement, Petitioner has allowed Donahey to carry the following message on his sign: "Vic Embers - Great Steak! Fresh Seafood! Perfect Pasta!" Accordingly, the sign meets the definition of an outdoor advertising sign. Within a few weeks after the stipulation was executed by the parties, a DOT inspector attempted to inspect the commercial building to determine whether Donahey was actually using the cooler for his business activities. At that time, the inspector found the building with a "for rent" sign and could not gain access to the cooler area. In the following months, the inspector attempted to inspect the cooler on several occasions but was never given access to that part of the building. As recently as a week prior to the hearing, the inspector again visited the premises but found the building closed and could not gain access to the premies. When the lease was executed, Petitioner was under the impression that Donahey would use the cooler to store foodstuffs (such as vegetables) for his restaurant and catering business. However, he has no knowledge as to whether Donahey has ever used the facility for storage purposes and says he has never inspected the coolers since 1995 to ascertain if Donahey actually uses them. In view of the complete absence of proof that there is any business activity in the building that is related to the message on the sign, it is found that the terms of the stipulation have not been satisfied by Petitioner, and that his existing sign cannot qualify for an exemption.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Transportation enter a Final Order determining that Petitioner's outdoor advertising sign is in violation of Chapter 479, Florida Statutes, and should be removed. DONE AND ENTERED this 2nd day of December, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675, SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this day 2nd of December, 1998. COPIES FURNISHED: Diedre Grubbs, Agency Clerk Department of Transportation 605 Suwannee Street Mail Station 58 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-00458 Michael A. Croak 14229 U. S. Highway 441 Tavares, Florida 32778 Andrea V. Nelson, Esquire Department of Transporation 605 Suwannee Street Mail Station 58 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458 Pamela S. Leslie, Esquire Department of Transportation 562 Haydon Burns Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450
Findings Of Fact Lamar acquired permits AA-634 and 7504 from Peterson Outdoor Advertising Company for a double-faced sign located on U.S. 98, South, approximately one-half mile north of Crystal Lake Drive on a site leased from Mary D. and Billy Allred. The lease (Exhibit 1.), executed in 1978, was for a three-year term with automatic renewal for an additional five year period and thereafter from year to year on the same terms and conditions unless terminated by lessee by giving 30-days notice prior to the end of the lease year. By warranty deed dated June 14, 1983, (Exhibit 2.) Sun State acquired the property on which this sign was located from Allred. Rent on this lease for 1984 was sent to Allred by Lamar, endorsed over to Sun State and cashed by Sun State. A check for rent for 1985 sent by Lamar to Sun State was never negotiated. By letter dated April 3, 1985, (Exhibit 4.) Sun State Homes told Lamar to immediately remove the sign from its property on U.S. 98, South. On May 16, 1985, Sun State applied for a permit for a sign on U.S. 98, 550-feet north of North Crystal Lake Drive. This application was disapproved by DOT on June 7, 1985, in Exhibit 3 because it was in conflict with the sign for which Lamar held tags for the proposed site. On or about the same time, Sun State applied to Polk County for a building permit to erect a sign at this site. Polk County disapproved the application because DOT had denied the permit. By letter dated May 29, 1985, Sun State appealed the denial of their application. On or about May 27, 1985, Lamar removed their sign from Sun State's property. On May 28, 1985, Lamar submitted an application for a permit to erect a sign on U.S. 98, 1,200 feet north of N. Crystal Lake Drive (Exhibit 5.) and simultaneously surrendered tags no. AA-634 and 7504. Lamar had obtained permission from the owner of that property to erect a sign at this site. This application was denied by DOT because of the appeal by Sun State from its denial. DOT will not approve an application for a sign permit when the right of occupancy of the site is contested. Lamar appealed this denial and the two cases were consolidated for hearing. The two applications are mutually exclusive as only one can be granted without violating spacing requirements.
The Issue Whether Petitioner, IMG Citrus, Inc. (“Petitioner”), is entitled to recover the sum of $40,075.65, as alleged in the Amended Complaint.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner sold Respondent grapefruits, oranges, and tangerines following the 2012-2013 citrus season. The citrus was shipped by Petitioner to Respondent in April-May 2013, and the sales were evidenced by numerous invoices between the parties. Petitioner contacted Respondent on various occasions to request payment on the outstanding invoices, to no avail. On June 30, 2013, Respondent wrote to Petitioner apologizing for “falling in arrears.” At that time, Respondent indicated it would make partial payments, without prejudice, as frequently as possible. On September 7, 2013, Respondent again wrote to Petitioner, acknowledging, at that time, an outstanding balance of $43,543.40. Respondent requested that Petitioner allow it to enter into a promissory note for $43,543.40, with monthly payments of $800.00 per month for 54 months, and one final balloon payment at the end of the term to satisfy the outstanding amount due. Respondent also offered a bagging machine as security for the proposed promissory note. Petitioner rejected Respondent’s offer. Contrary to Respondent’s contention, no settlement agreement was reached between the parties. At hearing, the parties agreed that there is no dispute as to the amount sought by Petitioner in the Amended Complaint: $40,075.65. This amount reflects some partial payments made by Respondent on the outstanding invoices after the filing of the initial complaint. Respondent does not deny its failure to pay the outstanding invoices. Respondent does not dispute that the product he received was of acceptable quality. Respondent’s principal argument is that Petitioner’s claim is untimely because the complaint was not filed with the Department prior to May 1, 2014, as required by section 601.66, Florida Statutes. The evidence adduced at hearing demonstrates that Petitioner’s complaint was shipped by Petitioner to the Department via federal express overnight delivery on April 30, 2014. The federal express package containing the complaint was not received by the Department until May 1, 2014. The complaint was not filed with the Department until May 1, 2014, when it was received by the Department. Because the complaint was not filed with the Department before May 1, 2014, it is untimely. At hearing, Petitioner attempted to defend its late filing by contending that the April 30, 2014, shipping date of the federal express package to Respondent is the correct filing date--not May 1, 2014, when the federal express package containing the complaint was received by the Department. In support of Petitioner’s position, Mr. Kastensmidt testified, based on hearsay, that he was told by an unidentified employee of the Department, on some unidentified occasion, that the federal express shipping date is what counts, not the date the complaint is actually received by the Department. No one on behalf of the Department testified at the hearing. Furthermore, Petitioner did not identify the person who allegedly made the statement or when the statement was made. The purported statement by an unidentified Department employee, on some unidentified date, is rejected as hearsay and unpersuasive.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner’s Amended Complaint be dismissed as untimely. DONE AND ENTERED this 28th day of October, 2014, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DARREN A. SCHWARTZ Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of October, 2014.
The Issue Whether Respondent's outdoor sign permit should be revoked because the original sign has been destroyed by an Act of God, as alleged by Petitioner.
Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, the following findings of fact are determined: In this sign permit dispute, Petitioner, Department of Transportation (DOT), seeks to revoke the permit for an off- premise outdoor advertising sign owned by Respondent, North Florida Pecan 1 & 2, Inc. (Respondent), on the grounds that the original sign was destroyed by a fire in June 1998, the newly rebuilt sign has lost its nonconforming status, and any rebuilt sign is now illegal. In response to these charges, Respondent contends that the fire that destroyed the sign was an act of criminal mischief or arson, rather than an Act of God, and thus the sign still qualifies for a nonconforming status. The sign in question is located 12.2 miles north of the Flagler County line on the west side of Interstate 95 (I-95) facing south, and is perhaps a mile or so south of the intersection of State Road 207 and I-95 (intersection) in St. Johns County, Florida. Respondent does not own the property where the sign is located, and it conducts no other business activities on that property. The property on which the sign is located is zoned Open Rural by St. Johns County (County), and it is not designated predominately for commercial or industrial uses by the County under the County's future land use map, comprehensive plan, or zoning ordinances. The sign is used to advertise Respondent's combination gas station and "open-area fruit market" located "just off" the intersection. The parties have stipulated that the sign was originally constructed more than 20 years ago before the current sign regulations became effective; under the present law, it would be a nonconforming sign and illegal. On May 27, 1998, a thunderstorm occurred in St. Johns County, resulting in between one-quarter and one-half inch of rainfall in the area. Due to a lightning strike on a tree, a 2-acre fire started approximately 1,000 feet southwest of the intersection in the vicinity of the sign. Although firefighters believed they had "knocked out" the fire within a day or two, the fire continued to smoulder under the dampened top layer of organic matter for several weeks until June 15, 1998, when it "worked its way back to the surface," broke out again, and cleared the containment line of the earlier fire. Aided by a light wind from the southeast and extremely dry conditions, the fire quickly spread eastward at the rate of 1,000 to 1,500 feet every 15 minutes and consumed several hundred acres, including the land on which Respondent's sign was located, before it was brought under control. That fire is commonly referred to as the Fort Peyton fire. In determining the cause of the Fort Peyton fire, forestry officials could not find any indicators of arson, and visual burn patterns clearly indicated that the new fire's origin was where the May 27 fire had begun. Therefore, it was officially classified as a "rekindle or breakout" of the May 27 fire, which was started by lightning. Put another way, the fire was the result of an Act of God, which is "the sudden manifestation and forces of nature." On either May 30 or June 5, 1998, depending on whether court or forestry records are accepted as being the most accurate, a fire began in Flagler Estates, which, "as the crow flies," lies approximately 12 to 15 miles southeast of the Fort Peyton fire. The Flagler Estates fire, however, was the result of an unattended illegal burn which was started by three individuals and went out of control. The fire was brought under control the same evening by firefighters, but only after some 450 surrounding acres were destroyed. The three individuals were later charged with arson. Respondent established that the prevailing winds during May and June 1998 were from the southeast and that "spoilers" or "floaters" (hot debris) from existing fires can sometimes float in the air and ignite new fires several miles away. Indeed, Respondent's investigator observed spoilers from inland fires floating through the air some 8 or 9 miles out in the Atlantic Ocean while he was fishing during that period of time. Accordingly, Respondent contends that it is just as likely that a spoiler floated northeastward from the Flagler Estates fire on May 30, 1998, and ignited the Fort Peyton blaze, some 12 to 15 miles away. If this theory is accepted, it would mean that the Fort Peyton fire would be attributable to arson, and not to an Act of God. The foregoing assumption has been rejected for several reasons. First, spoilers from the Flagler Estates fire did in fact ignite several spot fires in the area, but all of these spot fires occurred on the same day as the fire started and were within an eighth of an mile from the Flagler Estates perimeter. Second, it is highly unlikely that a spoiler would float up to 15 miles and then lie dormant for two weeks before igniting the Fort Peyton fire. Finally, the theory goes counter to the more persuasive evidence given by the supervising forester who investigated the Fort Peyton fire and concluded that it was an outbreak of the earlier fire that was started on May 27, 1998. After the sign was destroyed, Respondent rebuilt the sign at the same location using substantially the same materials that had composed the sign before it burned. However, the materials used to rebuild the sign were not part of the sign structure which was burned in the Fort Peyton fire. The new sign is the same size, shape, and height of the destroyed sign.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Transportation enter a final order confirming that the outdoor advertising sign maintained by North Florida Pecan 1 & 2, Inc., under sign permit number BR 252-55 is illegal and must be removed. The permit should also be revoked. DONE AND ENTERED this 17th day of March, 2000, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675, SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this day 17th of March, 2000. COPIES FURNISHED: Thomas F. Barry, Secretary Department of Transportation ATTN: James C. Myers, Clerk of Agency Proceedings 605 Suwannee Street Mail Station 58 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450 J. Stephen Alexander, Esquire 19 Old Mission Avenue St. Augustine, Florida 32084 Robert M. Burdick, Esquire Department of Transportation 605 Suwannee Street Mail Station 58 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458 Pamela S. Leslie, General Counsel Department of Transportation 605 Suwannee Street Mail Station 58 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450
Findings Of Fact V.J. Patel, general manager of the Best Western North Florida Inn, caused a sign to be erected a tenth of a mile south of State Road 143, advertising the motel. At all pertinent times, Shree Realty, Inc., Mr. Patel's employer, owned both the motel and the sign. At no time was the owner's name anywhere on the sign. Glenel Bowden, an outdoor advertising sign inspector employed by the Department of Transportation (DOT), told Mr. Patel he thought the unpermitted sign, visible to southbound traffic on Interstate 75, was unlawful. Mr. Pate1 and Mr. Bowden discussed the question of the sign's legality on several occasions. On August 28, 1989, Mr. Bowden posted a fluorescent orange violation notice on one of the poles supporting the sign, visible to anyone viewing either of the sign's faces from the highway. Petitioner's Exhibit No. 3. With this development, conversations between the two men ceased. When Mr. Bowden returned to the sign a few days after posting the violation notice, the notice had been removed. Although he stopped by the motel in search of Mr. Patel, and telephoned several times, leaving requests that Mr. Patel return his telephone calls, Mr. Bowden did not succeed in speaking to Mr. Patel again until October 17, 1989, the day the sign was taken down. On August 29, 1989, DOT's administrator for District Two, Tom Brown, signed a notice to show cause addressed to "Vijay" Patel at Route 1, Box 222, Jennings, Florida. DOT sent the notice by certified mail that day, and it arrived at the motel the following day. Tina Williams, a desk clerk, signed for it. The notice DOT mailed to Mr. Patel advised of the necessity to ask for a formal administrative hearing, if desired, within 30 days. The notice stated: You must comply with the applicable provisions of the said Statute(s) and Code(s) within thirty (30) days from the date of the posted notice . . . or, in the alternative, an administrative hearing must be requested by you within thirty (30) days of the date of this notice. . . . In either case, if you fail to comply within the thirty (30) day period above, then the . . . violation(s) shall be considered true . . . [one possible result being] removal of the sign without further notice. The notice, itself dated August 29, 1989, advised that the sign "was posted with a notice pursuant to Section 479.105(l)(a) on August 28, 1989." On October 2, 1989, 32 days after the notice DOT mailed reached the motel, Mr. Patel went to a lawyer's office. That day the lawyer signed and mailed a request for hearing on behalf of V. J. Patel. The hearing request reached DOT on October 5, 1989, 38 days after Mr. Bowden posted the notice of violation on the sign pole, and 37 days after DOT mailed notice to Mr. Patel. Until the final hearing, when counsel first disclosed the true owner of the sign to DOT, Shree Realty, Inc. never requested a hearing.
Recommendation It is, accordingly, RECOMMENDED: That DOT enter an order dismissing the request for formal hearing with prejudice. DONE and ENTERED this 13th day of April, 1990, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT T. BENTON, II Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of April, 1990. COPIES FURNISHED: Charles G. Gardner, Esquire Department of Transportation 605 Suwannee Street, M.S. 58 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0458 William J. Haley, Esquire Nancy Staff Slayden, Esquire Brannon, Brown, Haley, Robinson & Cole, P.A. Post Office Box 1029 Lake City, FL 32056-1029 Robert Scanlon, III General Counsel Department of Transportation 562 Haydon Burns Building Tallahassee, FL 32399-0458 Ben G. Watts, Secretary Department of Transportation 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0458
