The Issue The issue in this case is whether Petitioner, Department of Children and Families (Department), should impose a $75 fine on Respondent, Jumpstart Enrichment Program, Inc. (Jumpstart), and place it on probation for up to six months for not complying with child care facility staff-to-children ratio requirements for the fourth time.
Findings Of Fact The Department has issued Respondent license C09OR0629 to operate a child care facility in Orlando under sections 402.301 through 402.319, Florida Statutes, and Florida Administrative Code Chapter 65C-22. The statutes and rules have minimum staff-to-children ratio requirements that are clear, but not uncomplicated, and not always easy to implement. It is necessary to have one staff person for every four children from birth to age one, for every six aged one to two, for every ten aged two to three, for every 15 aged three to four, for every 20 aged four to five, and for every 25 aged five or older. Generally, the ratio requirement for a mixed group of children aged two or older is dictated by the age group with the largest number of children in the group. However, if children under the age of two are present, the ratio requirement for a group is dictated by the age of the youngest child. It was undisputed that staff-to-children ratio requirements are Class II standards under the Department's rules. Citation Issued January 6, 2012 The Administrative Complaint alleges that a citation for insufficient staff was issued to Respondent during a Department inspection on January 6, 2012. It alleges that this was the fourth violation of the standard, justifying a $75 fine and probation for up to six months conditioned on being subject to unannounced visits to ensure compliance with all statutes and codes and on ensuring the maintenance of appropriate staff-to- children ratio. On January 4, 2012, Sabrina Hayles and Conswela Green were the staff on duty at Jumpstart. Eight children were present that morning when Ms. Hayles left the facility to go to lunch. She took two of the children with her so that Ms. Green would meet ratio requirements for the remaining six. While Ms. Hayles was gone, a grandmother dropped off another child, which put the facility out-of-compliance with staffing ratio requirements. Ms. Green asked the grandmother to stay until Ms. Hayles returned, but she said she had an appointment and could not stay. Ms. Green accepted the child into the facility and telephoned Ms. Hayles to tell her to return to the facility because they were out-of-compliance. Ms. Hayles, who already was on her way back, arrived several minutes later. The facility's being out- of-compliance was observed by staff from the Early Learning Coalition of Orange County (ELCOC), who happened to drop some paperwork off at the facility at that time. ELCOC reported the ratio violation to the Department, which investigated the allegation on January 6 and issued a citation. The Administrative Complaint alleges that this was Respondent's fourth insufficient staff violation and that the previous violations were on September 9 and April 14, 2011, and on August 20, 2010. Alleged Violation on September 9, 2011 There was no evidence of a staffing ratio violation on September 9, 2011. Actually, there was a staffing violation on September 7, 2011. One staff was caring for an infant and five toddlers; two staff were required. ELCOC reported the violation to the Department. When apprised of the violation, Michael Collins, the owner and director of the facility, took immediate action to increase staffing and bring the violation to an end as soon as possible. The Department investigated on September 9, 2011, verified the violation through interviews with Shawnda Bernard, and cited Respondent for the violation on September 9, 2011. Alleged Violation on April 14, 2011 Another entity involved in child care and school readiness, referred to in the hearing as Devoreaux, reported to the Department on April 12, 2011, that there was one staff caring for 13 children, when two staff were required. The Department investigated on April 14, 2011, determined from interviews with staff that the violation had in fact occurred, and cited Respondent for the violation. There was hearsay evidence of another staffing violation after the Department's inspection on April 14, 2012. The second alleged violation was not proven by any direct evidence or by any hearsay evidence that would be admissible over objection in a civil action. See § 120.57(1)(c), Fla. Stat. Alleged Violation on August 20, 2010 On August 20, 2010, the Department conducted a routine inspection and cited Respondent for having six children at its facility and no staff, just the owner/director, Mr. Collins. Two qualified staff were required for the six children. There was an unscreened volunteer there, who would have counted and made the staffing ratio sufficient prior to August 1, 2010, when the law changed to require staff to be screened. First Affirmative Defense In May 2011, the Department filed an Administrative Complaint against Respondent charging staffing ratio violations on August 20, 2010, and on August 6 and December 28, 2009, plus numerous other kinds of violations, including some on August 20, 2010. In October 2011, the Department and Respondent settled the charges in that Administrative Complaint by payment of a $500 fine (reduced from $2,205) and a reduced period of probation, through August 15, 2011. The alleged facts and charges were not admitted as part of the settlement. The settlement included a provision that the Department would "make no further orders and will take no further action on the Administrative Complaint and underlying violations in connection with this proceeding that is being settled." It also including a provision in the next numbered paragraph saying: However, if in the future, the Petitioner should have to take administrative action against the Respondent, the Respondent agrees that the Petitioner shall not be estopped from using the facts set forth in the Administrative Complaint in this case as additional basis' [sic] for any future denials, revocations or other administrative actions, taken against the Respondent by the Petitioner resulting from any future non- compliances with applicable statute, code or agreements, by the Respondent. Since one of the "facts set forth" in the settled Administrative Complaint was that Respondent had insufficient staffing on August 20, 2010, the Department was not estopped from using those facts as it does in this case--i.e., as one of the three staffing violations that preceded the one in January of 2012. Second Affirmative Defense Because of the insufficient staffing on January 4, 2012, ELCOC withheld payment for that day under the federal school readiness program it administers, which requires qualified staff to be present.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Children and Families enter a final order: finding Respondent guilty as charged; fining Respondent $75; and placing Respondent on probation for six months, with unannounced visits to ensure compliance with all statutes and codes, including the maintenance of appropriate staff-to-children ratio. DONE AND ENTERED this 17th day of September, 2012, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S J. LAWRENCE JOHNSTON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of September, 2012. COPIES FURNISHED: Stefanie C. Beach, Esquire Department of Children and Families Suite S-1129 400 West Robinson Street Orlando, Florida 32801-1782 Jack P. Caolo, Esquire 131 East Woodland Drive Sanford, Florida 32773 Gregory Venz, Agency Clerk Department of Children and Families Building 2, Room 204B 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Marion Drew Parker, General Counsel Department of Children and Families Building 2, Room 204 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 David Wilkins, Secretary Department of Children and Families Building 1, Room 202 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700
Findings Of Fact Gerald M. Swindle was employed by the SFWMD on May 15, 1974 as a Water Resource Technician, and remained employed by SFWMD until he was terminated July 25, 1990. In 1977, Petitioner was counseled regarding his performance of duty needing improvement (Exhibit 11). In 1978, Petitioner violated a verbal order not to become involved in enforcement matters with E. N. Willis. This order was reiterated in Exhibit 13 dated October 24, 1978. In 1981, Petitioner was placed on probation which ended November 15, 1981 (Exhibit 15). During this probationary period, SFWMD continued to receive complaints regarding personal use of the district vehicle assigned to Petitioner (Exhibit 15). In his evaluation report dated 11/23/81, Petitioner was given an overall grade of satisfactory, although he was marked slightly below average on 6 of the 11 items on which rated. In 1988, a reorganization changed the job description of Water Resource Technician to Field Service Technician with a higher pay grade. Petitioner was not reclassified into this position when the other Water Resource Technicians were reclassified because his superiors felt he was deficient in some of the skills required of a Field Service Technician (Exhibit 19). By letter dated November 4, 1988 (Exhibit 17), Petitioner was advised of the need to make improvements in reading and interpreting blueprints, site plans and as-builts; in the production of accurate and timely reports; in basic knowledge of district rules; and in effective communication. By memorandum dated March 15, 1989, William Hartman, Petitioner's supervisor, submitted a memorandum to the Director, Bartow Permitting Department, advising that he, and others, had spent time with Petitioner reviewing and interpreting blueprints, as-builts, aerial maps, etc., that Petitioner had attended workshops, and that some improvement was noted. By memorandum dated April 10, 1989 (Exhibit 19), the Director, Bartow Permitting Department, recommended Swindle not be promoted to Field Services Technician II. In 1989, Petitioner was suspended from duty without pay for two weeks (80 hours) for an incident involving playing cards at a public park for some two hours during working hours and falsifying a log entry to conceal the time so spent (Exhibit 22). In Swindle's evaluation for the first quarter of 1989, his supervisor, William Hartman, gave him an overall evaluation of Effective, although in the narrative he noted that what he observed most about Petitioner is his apparent paranoia over "someone out to get him." The narrative also referred to his weak areas of preparing investigative reports and surveying. In his comments to this report, Petitioner generally denied all of the adverse comments and contended that, if given the proper training, he could do the job in a wholly satisfactory manner. About this time, Petitioner was getting the impression that his present supervisors were looking for grounds to dismiss him. In the April 1990 evaluation of Petitioner (Exhibit 3), he was given an overall evaluation of "Acceptable," but he was marked in the lowest category for meeting minimum requirements in quantity of work, stability, and requiring more than average instructions. Most of the other categories were marked below average. A nominal supervisor at this time, Jim Calandra, was a contributor to the April 1990 evaluation, and in his comments pointed out that considering his time with the Department, the training received, and comments from his superiors over the years, Petitioner should possess "better and more varied technical skills needed for his FST II position." Calandra further concluded that "Gerry will inevitably blame any of his technical deficiencies on lack of training provided by the District or the absence of cooperation from others." The comments of Petitioner's immediate supervisor, Steve Stokes, further noted Petitioner's deficiencies in preparing field investigation reports and in his log keeping. Also the comments of Robert Viertel, Director, Permitting Department, attached to this evaluation, expressed his concern about the lack of initiative, dependability, stability and alertness reflected in the evaluation. To more rapidly gauge the adequacy of Swindle's efforts to improve, Viertel recommended by-monthly evaluations of Petitioner. In his comments to this evaluation (Exhibit 4), Petitioner essentially denied all of the adverse comments made on this evaluation, and blamed the poor evaluation on an "intent ... to upset me, break down my morale and cause me to loose [sic] faith in my ability." In commenting on those factors reflecting poor utilization of his time, Petitioner contended he uses his time better than some others in the Bartow office and specifically alleged that Calandra conducted much personal business on District time, used Department vehicles for personal business and used Petitioner to pick up personal items for Calandra during regular business hours. These comments regarding Calandra led to the memorandum dated 5/15/90 from Stokes to Swindle (Exhibit 8) in which Swindle was directed to be specific as to times and places regarding the allegations. Petitioner's response is a part of Exhibit 8. The charges made by Petitioner against Calandra were investigated, and some of these charges were confirmed in the investigation. Calandra was given an oral reprimand for conducting personal business during District working time and for using District vehicles on personal business. Petitioner apparently contends that his actions in June 1990 in stopping the dredging in a canal in Peace Creek because no permit was issued also affected his dismissal as this constituted "whistle blowing" by him. It was determined by Petitioner's supervisor that no permit was required for this dredging, and no further record or notation of this incident was presented which, in any wise, was shown to be a factor in his dismissal. On the special evaluation of Swindle dated July 20, 1990, Petitioner was marked unsatisfactory in 7 of the 16 categories on which he was rated, and the overall evaluation was "unacceptable." In his comments, Stokes noted that the April evaluation of "acceptable" was based partly on the fact that "Stokes and Viertel had been Swindle's supervisors for only three months, and since Swindle was a longtime employee of the District they decided to rate him marginally satisfactory." Stokes noted no improvement in Swindle's performance during the period between April and July, and cited specific incidents of unsatisfactory performance. In Viertel's comments on this evaluation, he concurred in the evaluation and recommended biweekly evaluations following which, if Petitioner's performance remained unacceptable, that he be terminated. Facing the likelihood of dismissal, Petitioner went on sick leave during July 1990 contending he was under stress. He submitted a letter from Dr. Jones at the Peace River Crisis Center confirming Swindle had been seen for stress-related adjustment (Exhibit 7). During this time, Petitioner, when contacted by District personnel regarding his absence from work, referred to the Jacksonville, Florida, incident in which a disgruntled (and mentally disturbed) employee had entered the workplace with an AK-47 and killed several people. This led the person to whom Petitioner relayed this message to think Petitioner may be contemplating similar action. Petitioner's last day at work was July 25, 1990, after which he took leave. He was dismissed sometime after July 25, 1990. The allegations Petitioner made against Calandra were not a factor in a decision of SWFMD to dismiss Petitioner.
Recommendation It is recommended that a Final Order be entered finding Gerald M. Swindle was dismissed as a Field Services Technician II by SFWMD because of poor performance, and Swindle's allegations made against a fellow employee was not a proximate cause of his dismissal. ENTERED this 28th day of February, 1991, in Tallahassee, Florida. K. N. AYERS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Desoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of February, 1991. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER Petitioner's proposed findings of fact are accepted, except: Rejected. The Peace Creek incident occurred in June 1990, and Petitioner's allegations against a fellow employee (Calandra) were made April 30, 1990. Second sentence rejected. Rejected. Rejected that Swindle lost knowledge of his job responsibilities. 13. Rejected as irrelevant. Proposed findings submitted by Respondent are generally accepted. Those not included herein were deemed unnecessary to he results reached. COPIES FURNISHED: Richard D. Mars, Esquire Post Office Box 1276 Bartow, FL 33830 Joseph W. Carvin, Esquire Post Office Box 1427 Tampa, FL 33601 Catherine D'Andrea, Esquire 2379 Broad Street Brooksville, FL 33609-6899 Peter G. Hubbell Executive Director Southwest Florida Water Management District 2379 Broad Street Brooksville, FL 34609-6899
Findings Of Fact Each of the Petitioners is a school teacher at Rosenwald Middle School in Bay County, Panama City, Florida. Celestine Cherry has a total of twenty-four years of teaching experience, all of which have been in the Bay County school system. She has taught home economics and physical education at Rosenwald Middle School for the last nine of those years. Ida Conner has had twenty which have been in Bay County. She began at Rosenwald teaching language arts and U.S. history in 1988. Albert Harris has had fourteen years of teaching experience, all but one of which have been in Bay County. He has a BS degree in biology and is certified to teach science to grades seven through twelve. Grace Bryan has had twenty time of the hearing, she had been teaching at Rosenwald for fifteen years. She is an ESE teacher who is certified in the area of mental retardtion. Carol Love became the assistant principal at Rosenwald in 1989 and was promoted to principal of Rosenwald in 1990. During the 1989-90 school year, Love performed teacher evaluations of the four Petitioners and rated each as unsatisfactory. It is these unsatisfactory evaluations which the Petitioners allege were the result of racial discrimination. Love taught for eighteen years at all levels and has been an administrator since 1986. She holds a Masters Degree in Education and had served as assistant principal for three years at Rutherford High School prior to her assignment to Rosenwald. Jack Simonson was the superintendent of the Bay County schools from November 22, 1988, to November 16, 1992. The Bay County School Board is the entity ultimately responsible for the operation of the schools of that county and is the Petitioners' employer. One of Simonson's major campaign promises in seeking election as superintendent was to rigorously evaluate school administrators and employees. After his election, he regularly reminded the administrators of his desire that they conduct accurate evaluations. During his term as superintendent, Simonson strictly pursued the evaluation of district administrators. This policy resulted in the non-renewal of four white administrators, who either returned to the classroom or left the school system. He reduced one black administrator from principal to assistant principal. No black administrators were returned to the classroom or non-renewed. Except for his demand for rigorous evaluations, Simonson took no part in the 1989-90 annual evaluations of the Petitioners. When Carol Love began as assistant principal at Rosenwald in 1989, she worked for Eli Campbell, the principal. The other assistant principal was Lynn Stryker. Campbell is black and Stryker is white. The Bay County School District uses the Florida Performance Measurement System (FPMS), which is a Florida Department of Education approved method for teacher evaluation. Love is a certified FPMS evaluator. The FPMS identifies effective and ineffective teacher behaviors. The evaluator's responsibility is to observe whether or not the teacher exhibits these behaviors during the periods of observation. The actual observations are noted on a summative form and are then transferred to the evaluation form. A tallying of the observations determines whether or not the teacher receives a satisfactory or unsatisfactory evaluation. The FPMS evaluation instrument predetermines which behaviors are effective and which are ineffective. These decisions are not made by the evaluator. The evaluator merely notes the behaviors observed. Bay County teachers are all given in includes copies of the evaluation instruments. The teachers are therefore aware, at the beginning of each school year, of the behavior which will be observed, and whether or not they are effective or ineffective under the FPMS. For the 1989-90 evaluations, Campbell assigned one teachers to himself and one previously taught with Karl Elliott, who is white, and Conner, who is black, she felt uncomfortable in evaluating these two teachers, and therefore requested Love do their annual evaluations. In addition, the two assistant principals thought it best to keep departments together for the purpose of evaluation. It was agreed that Bryan and Laticia Washington, both of whom are black, would be assigned to Love, so that she would then be evaluating the entire EMH Department. All of these proposed changes in evaluations were discussed with Mr. Campbell at the administrators' regular Monday morning meeting and he gave his approval for these changes to be made. In addition to the unsatisfactory evaluations of the Petitioners, Love also gave unsatisfactory evaluations in 1989-90 to Karl Elliott, Fran Walters, Wayne Davidson, and Charles Clark, all of whom are white. Two black teachers, Ms. Washington and Ms. Smith, received satisfactory evaluations from Love for that same evaluation period. Campbell signed all of the evaluations and improvement notices given to the Petitioners in their annual evaluation in 1989-90. It was not until some time later that he raised some procedural objections to the improvement notices. None of these procedural objections are at issue in this matter. For the 1989-90 school year, Simonson assigned Assistant Superintendent Glenda Hamby to evaluate Campbell. Prior to the beginning of the 1989-90 school year, Simonson determined that teacher evaluations at Rosenwald had not been appropriately conducted for the 1988-89 school year. By a memo dated August 1, 1989, Simonson gave specific directions to Campbell regarding Campbell's performance and the expectations regarding Campbell's administration of Rosenwald for the 1989-90 school year. Campbell clearly was on notice that big improvements were expected or else Campbell would be removed as principal of Rosenwald. Rather than making a genuine effort to improve his administration at Rosenwald, Campbell instead embarked on a campaign of public challenges to Simonson, agitated the faculty and the black community to help him keep his position as principal, failed to acknowledge deficiencies in his performance, and publicly alleged that his problems were the result of racism. Campbell was unhappy that Love had been assigned to Rosenwald and his relationship with her was markedly uncooperative. Campbell publicly aired his allegations of racism, going so far as to discuss them on television. Hamby's unsatisfactory evaluation of Campbell was the final factor that resulted in his removal as principal at Rosenwald and his reassignment within the Bay County School District. Love's evaluations of the Petitioners for the 1989-90 school year were consistent with the requirements of the FPMS system. She conducted several classroom observations of each Petitioner and based the teacher assessments, professional development plans and improvement notices on the observations. Cherry received an overall assessment of unsatisfactory based on deficiencies in the areas of Instructional Organization and Development and Communication: Verbal and Nonverbal. A professional development plan was given which further identified the specific goals and strategies for correcting the deficiencies. Finally, improvement notices were given that specifically defined the unsatisfactory performance, the improvement desired and the assistance to be provided to the teacher for achieving that improvement. Cherry was unsatisfactory for her use of incorrect English in the classroom, inadequate verbal and nonverbal communication skills, inadequate instructional organization and development, and inappropriate and/or lack of supervision in class. She refused to accept the validity of the criticisms and failed to do any of the suggested strategies for improvement. Instead, Cherry took the position that the evaluations were incorrect and were based on racism. In May, 1990, Love went to Cherry's class in response to a complaint from a teacher and a student. She discovered that the student's were engaged in writing and turning in to Cherry letters directed to Love concerning Cherry's unsatisfactory evaluation and her quality of teaching. Love sent Cherry from the room and conducted an investigation of the incident. As a result, Cherry received two letters of reprimand for these actions in her classroom. While Cherry did grieve these two letters of reprimand, the grievances were denied after binding arbitration. Cherry has received unsatisfactory evaluations from Love in each school year since the 1989-90 school year. Cherry continues to believe that the evaluations and reprimands are the result of racism. To support this belief, Cherry also cites to an incident during a school picture when Love told her to sit on the ground, a time when Love told Cherry not to read her newspaper during faculty meetings, and an occasion when Love required Cherry to get to her class room in a timely fashion. In fact, the great weight of evidence is contrary to Cherry's allegations of racism and no racial content in these incidents has been shown. Cherry maintains that the deficiencies noted in the evaulations are incorrect and are pretexts for discrimination. In reviewing the actual Summative Observation Instruments upon which Cherry's evaluations were based and in comparing those observations with Cherry's demeanor as a witness at hearing, it is found that some of the unsatisfactory observations regarding communication, verbal and nonverbal, were evident in this proceeding. Specifically, Cherry did not use grammatically correct English, was at times vague and rambling, maintained a hostile posture, and was verbally hostile and caustic. The observations which underlay the evaluations appear to be supported by the evidence and are not pretexts for discrimination. Conner received an overall evaluation of unsatisfactory with areas of deficiency in Instruction Organization and Development, Knowledge/Presentation of Subject Matter, and Communication: Verbal and Nonverbal. Conner also received a Professional Development Plan with goals and strategies for remediating the deficiencies and three improvement notices which set forth a description of the unsatisfactory performance, improvement desired, and assistance to be provided to assist Conner in improving the unsatisfactory performance areas. Conner was unsatisfactory for verbal and nonverbal communication; for failure to begin instruction promptly, handle materials efficiently, maintain academic focus, conduct beginning and ending review, question effectively, recognize and amplify responses, and give appropriate praise; and for her inability to use English correctly. Conner also refused to accept the validity of the criticisms and failed to carry out any of the strategies for improvement. Conner took the position that the evaluations were incorrect and were based on racism. Conner has received unsatisfactory evaluations from Love in each school year since 1989-90. The inadequacies remained the same. Because of her failure to remediate these deficiencies, Conner was removed from teaching language arts and history and was reassigned to teach alternative education for the 1990-91 school year. Conner suggests that her charge of racism is supported by several incidents. Conner asserts that Love took money from her alternative education budget to buy computers to go in other classrooms. This is simply not so. Conner also believes that Love's racist motivation resulted in omission of an award for Conner in September 1990, in interception of a note that Conner sent by way of a student, in the failure to invite Conner to a school literary luncheon in January, 1993, and in the failure to invite Conner to an in program on Macintosh computers in December, 1992. The evidence is to the contrary in each of these incidents. No evidence of racial content or motivation has been presented in any of these incidents. Conner also maintains that the deficiencies noted in the evaluations are incorrect and are pretexts for discrimination. In reviewing the actual Summative Observation Instruments upon which Conner's evaluations were based and in comparing those observations with Conner's demeanor as a witness at hearing, it is found that some of the unsatisfactory behaviors regarding communication, verbal and nonverbal, were evident in this proceeding. Specifically, Conner did not use grammatically correct English, mispronounced basic words, and was at times loud, hostile, and sarcastic. The observations which underlay the evaluations appear to be supported by the evidence and are not pretexts for discrimination. Harris received an overall evaluation of unsatisfactory for the 1989- 90 school year. Deficiencies were noted in the areas of Instructional Organization and Development, Communication: Verbal and Nonverbal, and Personal Qualities. As with the other Petitioners, a professional development plan and improvement notices were provided. Harris was unsatisfactory for his inability to question effectively, to recognize and amplify responses, to give appropriate praise and to express enthusiasm and interest verbally and through body behavior. He was also frequently tardy to his classes thus leaving students unsupervised and he needed improvement in classroom behavior management. As did Cherry and Conner, Harris refused to accept the validity of the criticisms and failed to do any of the suggested strategies for improvement. Harris also believed that the unsatisfactory evaluation was the product of racism. Harris complained that he could not effectively teach science from a regular classroom as he had done since 1987. At the beginning of the 1990-91 school year, Love assigned Harris to a science room, which gave him better access to the science closet for equipment and a demonstration table, running water, and an outside access door. Harris' teaching did not improve and he has been evaluated as unsatisfactory in every subsequent year. He was finally reassigned to teach alternative education. To support his claim that these unsatisfactory evaluations are the result of racial discrimination, Harris cites to two incidents in which he thought Love was rude and abrasive. One incident occurred when Love chided Harris in the hallway about being late for his class; the other occurred in the gymnasium just before an assembly when Love told Harris to "move it" and to "get those kids in line." No evidence was offered to show a racially discriminatory motivation for these incidents. Harris also maintains that the deficiencies noted in the evaluations are incorrect and are pretexts for discrimination. In examining the Summative Observation Instruments and in comparing those observations with Harris' demeanor as a witness at hearing, it is found the some of those same unsatisfactory behaviors were evident in the hearing. Specifically, Harris spoke in a low monotone, showing no enthusiasm or interest. He was lethargic, made no eye contact, and had a flat affect. The observations which underlay the evaluations appear to be supported by the evidence and are not pretexts for discrimination. Bryan received an overall unsatisfactory evaluation for the 1989-90 school year, with deficiencies noted in Instructional Organization and Development, Communication: Verbal and Nonverbal, and Management of Student Conduct. Bryan was given a Professional Development Plan and improvement notices. She also believes that the unsatisfactory evaluation was the result of a racial motivation, but she, unlike the other Petitioners, took advantage to the suggested strategies for improvement by reviewing tapes and research, exploring new methods, practicing those improved behaviors, and attending a class. Bryan's efforts to improve were successful and she has not received another unsatisfactory evaluation from Love. Bryan tendered no competent evidence to show a racially discriminatory motivation for the unsatisfactory rating given in 1989-90. The improvement notices given to the Petitioners required "Improvement will be demonstrated by October 1, 90." The stated consequences if improvements were not made was "Progressive discipline which could lead to dismissal." No disciplinary actions have been taken against the Petitioners at any time since the initial evaluations. Love has consistently reproved both black and white teachers for being late to class. In dealing with the faculty, staff and students of Rosenwald, Love is direct, firm, aggressive, and at times, abrasive, regardless of the race of the party with whom she is dealing. It is not unusual for her to call out instructions to teachers or students in the common areas of the campus. The assistant principals under Love are Stryker and Linwood Barnes. Barnes is black. Both have observed Love's interactions with students and faculty on a daily basis. Neither have ever observed Love to treat black students or teachers in a manner different than that with which she treats white students and faculty. Petitioners assert that Love acknowledged her prejudice to Bronkelly Porter, a black student at Rosenwald. In fact, the incident cited occurred after Campbell had rallied students, teachers and the black community in an effort to retain his job. Because of Campbell's accusations against Love, she was regularly harassed by students. The event in question occurred in the cafeteria when she was challenged by Porter, a student with whom she had had problems in the past. Bronkelly yelled out to Love a question about whether she was prejudiced. Love spontaneously and sarcastically said "Yeah, right, Bronkelly, I am." While it is recognized that Love, in an off used a poor choice of words, this statement is not taken to be probative evidence of racial prejudice on the part of Love. Love also made certain statements while counseling Michelle Ward regarding her discipline problems. Specifically, Love told Ward that "if she'd hang around with her own kind then she would not get in so much trouble." The statement was not made in reference to the race of any individual, but instead was intended to get Ward to reconsider the group she was running with in an attempt to decrease Ward's discipline problems. The greater weight of the probative and material evidence establishes that Love at no time took any discriminatory action against the Petitioners on account of their race. Further, there is even less evidence of racial discrimination on the part of Simonson or the Bay County School Board. Petitioners have simply failed to prove their case.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a Final Order denying and dismissing the claims for relief filed by Albert Harris, Celestine Cherry, Grace D. Bryan and Ida Conner. DONE and ENTERED this 1st day of June, 1993, in Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE K. KIESLING Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of June, 1993. APPENDIX TO THE RECOMMENDED ORDER IN CASE NOS. 92-1698, 92-1699, 92-1700, and 92-2304 The following constitutes my specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on the proposed findings of fact submitted by the parties in this case. Specific Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by Petitioners Each of the following proposed findings of fact is adopted in substance as modified in the Recommended Order. The number in parentheses is the Finding of Fact which so adopts the proposed finding of fact: 1-6(1-6); 7(6); 9(7); 15(18); and 17(13). Proposed findings of fact 8, 10, 16, 21-23, 26-32, and 37-39 are subordinate to the facts actually found in this Recommended Order. Proposed findings of fact 11-14, 20, 25, and 33 are irrelevant. Proposed findings of fact 18, 19, 24, and 34-36 are unsupported by the credible, competent and substantial evidence. Specific Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by Respondents Each of the following proposed findings of fact is adopted in substance as modified in the Recommended Order. The number in parentheses is the Finding of Fact which so adopts the proposed finding of fact: 1(9); 2(10); 3(6&11); 4(12); 5(13); 6(15); 7(23); 14(39); 15(35); 16(34); 18(42); 20(39); 22(40); and 24 & 25(14). Proposed findings of fact 8-13, 17, 21, 23, 28, and 29 are subordinate to the facts actually found in this Recommended Order. Proposed findings of fact 19, 26, and 27 are irrelevant. Proposed finding of fact 30 is unnecessary. COPIES FURNISHED: Leslie Holland Attorney at Law 924 North Gadsden Street Tallahassee, Florida 32303 Franklin Harrison Attorney at Law 304 Magnolia Avenue Panama City, Florida 32402 Sharon Moultry, Clerk Human Relations Commission 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, FL 32303-4149 Dana Baird General Counsel Human Relations Commission 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, FL 32303-4149
Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to the issues herein, Respondent, Joe Raymond Johnson was employed as a plant operator (janitor), at St. Petersburg High School. His employment was subject to labor conditions outlined in an agreement between the School Board of Pinellas County and the International Brotherhood of Firemen and Oilers, AFL-CIO, Local 1221. He has worked at the school since December, 1980. Respondent's immediate supervisor was Dennis N. Nelson, the night foreman who supervises the night crew of 10 plant operators (janitors). The night crew duty hours were from 2:30 - 11:00 p.m., Monday through Friday. At all times material hereto, Respondent was assigned to the night crew. The plant operators, of whom Respondent is one, are advised at periodic meetings of their duty hours, reporting times, break times, and lunch times, and other facets of their employment. In addition, this same information is posted on the bulletin board in the maintenance office. As a part of their employment orientation, the plant operators, including Respondent, were told how to make arrangements for excused absences and tardiness. They were advised to call in, in advance, and advise Mr. Jones, the Head Plant operator, that they would be late or absent and why. If Mr. Jones is not available, the worker is to leave a message for him with either a secretary in the administrative office or a student working in that office, who is to place the message in Mr. Jones' box for subsequent pick-up. Respondent was personally advised of this procedure by Mr. Nelson, his immediate supervisor. On July 5, 1987, Respondent signed a Stipulation of Agreement with the School Board whereby he was suspended without pay for three days because of a continuing history of unexcused tardiness up to that time. The Stipulation was signed by School Board officials on August 11 and August 26, 1987. On August 27, 1987, the Director of Personnel Services, Pinellas County Schools, advised Respondent by letter that the suspension had been approved and cautioning him that future infractions might lead to further disciplinary action, to include dismissal. Subsequent to July 13, 1987, even after signing the Stipulation relating to his prior tardiness, and accepting punishment therefor, Respondent continued to be tardy without excuse or prior notice as called for in the school procedure. Specifically, he was late as follows: July 13, 1987 - 3 minutes late August 13, 1987 - 8 minutes late August 17, 1987 - 2 minutes late August 26, 1987 - 5 minutes late September 24, 1987 - 42 minutes late September 30, 1987 - 1 minute late October 10, 1987 - 4 minutes October 16, 1987 - 32 minutes late November 4, 1987 - 1 minute late November 11, 1987 - 13 minutes late December 3, 1987 - 4 minutes late from lunch December 8, 1987 - 13 minutes late from lunch February 21, 1988 - 21 minutes late As a result of this continuing tardiness, on October 19, 1987, Respondent was called to a conference with the Principal, Mr. Grey, who advised him of the continuing problem. Respondent professed to be unaware of the problem and claimed discrimination by his supervisors. Nonetheless, Mr. Grey advised Respondent to be punctual in the future upon pain of further disciplinary action. When asked to sign a copy of the memorandum memorializing this conference, Respondent refused to do so. On December 16, 1987, Mr. Jones, the Head Plant operator, wrote to Mr. Johnson outlining a series of unexcused tardies and absences in early December, 1987 and indicating he was referring the matter to the Principal for action. Respondent, again, refused to acknowledge this communication. On January 21, 1988, Mr. Jones again wrote to Respondent noting a thirteen minute tardiness that day and again referring the matter to the Principal. As was the case with previous communications, Respondent refused to sign in acknowledgement. According to Mr. Nelson, Respondent failed to call in on any one of the above-mentioned tardiness in advance as was required. He admits that Respondent is generally a good worker but was the subject of some other, unidentified disciplinary problems during the period of his employment. These not being further identified or supported, they are hereby disregarded. Mr. Grey, the Principal, personally spoke with Respondent about his lateness on several occasions. Initially Respondent offered no explanation for his tardiness but with regard to the last two incidents, indicated he had physical problems. Respondent also, on one occasion, indicated to Mr. Grey that the plant operator, Mr. Jones, was prejudiced against him. Mr. Grey did not believe Respondent's representations to him that he had tried to call in to say he would be late. After the last referral from Mr. Jones, Mr. Grey decided that more stringent disciplinary action was appropriate and recommended to the Superintendent of Schools that Respondent be dismissed. This recommendation was based upon his own interviews with the Respondent and the reports of Respondent's supervisors. While admittedly other janitorial personnel have been tardy without a recommendation for dismissal, their records are not as aggravated as that of Respondent who continued his tardiness regardless of repeated counselings and warnings. Even though Respondent has not been late since February, 1988, Mr. Grey still feels he should be dismissed because regardless of the counselings, Respondent was repeatedly tardy until this present dismissal action was initiated. Mr. Johnson, who is fifty-one years old, has worked for the School Board continuously since December, 1980, and this job is his sole source of income. He admits that there was justification for the three day suspension imposed on him previously but contends that as to the latter incidents being used to support the current action, he called in in advance on most - at least those of significance. He does not consider one or two minutes beyond the starting time as being late, however. That much time could be expended waiting in line to clock in. As to these short periods, he asserts he was there on time but had to wait to sign in and by the time it was his turn, he was late by one or two minutes. What Respondent overlooks, however, is that the sign in clock was purposely set between two and three minutes slow for just that purpose. Consequently, if the clock showed Respondent to be two minutes late, he was, in reality, between four and five minutes late - well beyond the delay time. Respondent also contends without any evidence to support his contention, that the clock was ordinarily inaccurate and was adjusted purposely to entrap employees. Evidence introduced by Petitioner, however, indicates the clock was periodically checked and found to be accurate, except in times of power outages not pertinent here, until it was replaced when it broke down for a week. During that period, however, Respondent was not late. As stated above, Respondent claims that he did call in when he would be significantly late and leave a message with the student who answered. To support his claim, he asserts that neither Nelson nor Jones ever complained to him on those occasions. When he would see them after arrival, they would acknowledge his presence and say they were glad he had made it. On one of these occasions, September 30, 1987, on which date he was forty-two minutes late, he had car trouble and told Mr. Jones about it, when he arrived. During this same period from July, 1987 to January, 1988, he was having physical problems and was under a doctor's care; a fact which he made known to both Jones and Nelson. At one point, he brought in a doctor's certificate which he discussed with the Assistant Principal who told him to leave it in the Principal's box. The Principal denied receiving it, however. These assertions do not, however, establish that Respondent followed the school rules and called in in advance when he was going to be late. Respondent claims that though the school administration is claiming his tardiness as the basis for this dismissal action, in reality it is because of an altercation he had with Mr. Jones over a period of sick leave. In the incident in reference, Respondent had been to the doctor and upon his return to school, signed an application for sick leave furnished to him by Mr. Jones who had indicated it would be approved. When he saw it later, he noted that sick leave had been disapproved. When he spoke with Mr. Jones about this, Jones allegedly told him he didn't have any sick leave accrued. Respondent called the district payroll office and reportedly was told he did have sick leave available, but when Respondent reported this to Jones, Jones supposedly said it didn't matter, he wasn't going to get it. When Respondent complained to the Assistant Principal, the matter was referred back to Jones for resolution. Respondent was counseled about this incident in writing by the Principal and believes it is the real basis for the disciplinary action. Both Grey and Jones deny this, however, and in light of the Respondent's repeated lateness, it is found that the basis for this action is the lateness and not the other matter. Mr. Grey admits that Respondent's tardiness was documented with a view toward disciplinary action but not because of this incident. The documentation was begun before the incident in question and relates solely to the continuing tardiness. Respondent has not been late since January 21, 1988, because he fears the separation action. He made up his mind to be on time and he has been on time.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, therefore: RECOMMENDED that Respondent, Joe Raymond Johnson be suspended without pay from employment with the School Board of Pinellas County for thirty days. RECOMMENDED this 7th day of June, 1988, in Tallahassee, Florida. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of June, 1988. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 88-1370 The following constitutes my specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on all of the Proposed Findings of Fact submitted by the parties to this case. By the Petitioner NONE By the Respondent 1 - 2. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted. Accepted and incorporated herein. 8 - 10. Accepted and incorporated herein. 11 - 14. Accepted and incorporated herein. Rejected as not entirely supported by of record. Accepted and incorporated herein. 17 - 18. Accepted and incorporated herein. 19. Accepted. 20 - 21. Accepted and incorporated herein. COPIES FURNISHED: Bruce P. Taylor, Esquire School Board Attorney 1960 East Druid Road Clearwater, Florida 34624 B. Edwin Johnson, Esquire 1433 South Ft. Harrison Avenue Suite C Clearwater, Florida 34616 Betty Castor Commissioner of Education The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Scott N. Rose, Ed.D. Superintendent School Board of Pinellas County 1960 East Druid Road Post Office Box 4688 Clearwater, Florida 34618-4688
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent committed an unlawful employment action by discriminating against Petitioner based on her race contrary to Section 760.10, Florida Statutes (2005).
Findings Of Fact Respondent is an employer as defined in Section 760.027, Florida Statutes (2005). Petitioner is an African-American female. At all times relevant here, Petitioner worked full-time as a floor technician (floor tech) at Respondent's nursing home facility. As a floor tech, Petitioner was responsible for dusting, mopping and buffing the floors. At all relevant times, Cheryl Johnson was Respondent's facility administrator. Ms. Johnson has held that position since December 2002. In May 2003, Petitioner asked Ms. Johnson if she could receive her paycheck early. Petitioner was aware that Ms. Johnson had given an early paycheck to a nurse. The record does not reveal the nurse's race. Ms. Johnson refused to give Petitioner the early paycheck. Ms. Johnson admitted that she had made a mistake in giving the nurse an early paycheck. Ms. Johnson stated that she would not violate Respondent's policy against early paychecks again. Petitioner filed a grievance, claiming that Ms. Johnson was not being fair. Sometime thereafter, Ms. Johnson gave an early paycheck to a dietary employee. The dietary employee was an African- American. With regard to early paychecks, there is no evidence that Ms. Johnson ever gave preferential treatment to employees who were not members of a protected group. In October 2003, Sue Goldfarb was Petitioner's supervisor. Ms. Goldfarb criticized Petitioner because Petitioner was spending too much time in the Activities Room. Petitioner complained to Ms. Johnson and filed two grievances, claiming that she was being treated unfairly. According to Petitioner, Ms. Goldfarb and a medical records clerk, Pam Brock, did not get into trouble for spending time in the Activities Room. Ms. Johnson explained that Petitioner could assist in the Activities Room, but only after she completed her floor tech duties. There is no evidence that Respondent ever allowed employees to assist in the Activities Room before they completed their regularly assigned duties. Petitioner did not suffer any adverse consequences as a result of Ms. Goldfarb's criticism. At some point in time, Respondent informed all housekeepers, including Petitioner, that their hours were being cut from seven-and-a-half hours per day to six-and-a-half hours per day. Respondent also informed the housekeepers that they would not be eligible for overtime hours. Respondent took these actions because the facility's "census" (number of residents) was low. In February 2004, Ms. Johnson decided to redecorate the Activity Room as a special weekend project. Ms. Johnson requested Gary Brock, Pam Brock's husband and a maintenance man for the facility, to work over the weekend to complete project. Ms. Johnson also requested Ms. Brock to assist with the project because Ms. Brock recently had been short on hours. Thereafter, Petitioner impermissibly reviewed a document on a supervisor's desk. The document indicated that Ms. Brock, the medical records clerk, received three hours of overtime on the weekend of the special project. Petitioner copied the document and returned the original to the supervisor's desk. Petitioner admitted during the hearing that she was not supposed to be looking at documents on the supervisor's desk. In February 2004, Petitioner filed a grievance, complaining that Ms. Brock had received overtime. Petitioner thought it was unfair for Ms. Brock, a medical records clerk, to receive overtime hours, while the housekeepers had their hours reduced. There is no evidence that Petitioner was treated any differently than any other housekeeper. At some point in time, Petitioner complained to Ms. Johnson and filed a grievance that Ms. Goldfarb was not doing her job. After receiving Petitioner's complaint, Ms. Johnson decided to obtain a statement from each housekeeper as to whether they had any concerns regarding Ms. Goldfarb. In March 2004, Ms. Johnson temporarily held all of the housekeepers' paychecks. She requested the housekeepers to visit her office, render their opinions about the housekeeping supervisor, and collect their checks. Petitioner, like all of the housekeepers had to visit Ms. Johnson's office to pick up her paycheck. While she was there, Petitioner signed a statement, indicating that Ms. Goldfarb did not treat her fairly. Subsequently, Petitioner filed a grievance, complaining, in part, because Ms. Johnson held the paychecks for the entire housekeeping department. There is no evidence that Petitioner was treated any differently than any other housekeeper. At the end of March 2004, Petitioner had a confrontation with a co-worker, Robert Goldfarb. Mr. Goldfarb was Sue Goldfarb's husband. The altercation occurred after Mr. Goldfarb walked across a wet floor that Petitioner had just mopped. Mr. Goldfarb had to walk across the wet floor to get to the restroom. Petitioner and Mr. Goldfarb cursed at each other and engaged in a shouting match. Petitioner filed a grievance about the incident. Respondent did not discipline Petitioner or Mr. Goldfarb for getting into the argument. Petitioner and Mr. Goldfarb have not had a similar exchange since the March 2004 incident. In September 2004, Petitioner and her supervisor, Ms. Goldfarb, engaged in an argument outside Ms. Johnson's office. Ms. Johnson suspended both employees for three days. After an investigation, Ms. Johnson reinstated Petitioner and Ms. Goldfarb and gave them back pay to make them whole. Since September 2004, Petitioner has received pay raises. She has not received any write-ups, reprimands, or any other type of discipline. She has not filed any grievances since September 2004. At the time of the hearing, Ms. Goldfarb was still Petitioner's supervisor. Petitioner was serving as Respondent's Chairperson of the Safety Committee, a position of special trust and responsibility.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That FCHR enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 26th day of October, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S SUZANNE F. HOOD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of October, 2005. COPIES FURNISHED: Dorina Smith 1160 East Mays Street Monticello, Florida 32344 Alvin J. Taylor Delta Health Group 2 North Palafox Street Pensacola, Florida 32502 Mark E. Levitt, Esquire Allen, Norton & Blue, P.A. 324 South Hyde Park Avenue Suite 225 Tampa, Florida 33606 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue The issues are whether Respondent, City of Edgewater (the City), committed unlawful employment practices contrary to section 760.10, Florida Statutes (2013),1/ by discriminating against Petitioner based on her age, gender, and/or disability by the manner in which the City terminated Petitioner’s employment. Also at issue is whether Petitioner’s termination was in retaliation for Petitioner’s complaints regarding discriminatory conduct by her immediate superior.
Findings Of Fact The City is an employer as that term is defined in section 760.02(7), Florida Statutes. Petitioner is a white female who was over the age of 40 during the events relevant to this proceeding. Petitioner was hired by the City as a part-time animal control officer on June 9, 1993. At the time Petitioner was hired, animal control was part of the City’s police department. On October 15, 1993, Petitioner was transferred to a full-time position as records clerk/telecommunicator in the police department. Petitioner maintained the department’s records and answered all police calls, including 911 calls. She dispatched officers and emergency personnel. Petitioner testified that this was a desk job with no real physical requirements beyond walking to a window to deal with members of the public. She received excellent evaluations and stayed in this position until early 1999. While working this job, Petitioner obtained police training at Daytona State College. Upon graduation, Petitioner applied for a job as a police officer with the City. On February 19, 1999, the City hired Petitioner as a police officer. Petitioner was promoted to sergeant on May 7, 2006, and served in that position until her demotion following an altercation with a female detainee in the City’s holding facility on June 16, 2011. Petitioner was continuously employed by the City for 18 years and eight months. During her employment, she received regular pay increases and numerous commendations. Over the years, she received three written warnings and one demotion, from sergeant to officer after the incident on June 16, 2011. Chief of Police David Arcieri characterized her disciplinary record as good in light of Petitioner’s length of service. During the course of her employment, Petitioner had multiple health problems. In 2001, during work-related mountain bike training, Petitioner suffered a fall that badly injured her shoulder.3/ Petitioner had surgery and recalled that she missed at least four months of work. When she came back to work, Petitioner was unable to perform the normal duties of a police officer. She was allowed to return in a light-duty desk position, working with the City’s chief of grants. She worked in this position for approximately six months before returning to regular duty as a police officer. In 2004, Petitioner was diagnosed with lupus and rheumatoid arthritis (“RA”). Petitioner testified that she freely discussed her condition with her co-workers because of the problems she had establishing a medication regime that did not cause allergic reactions. Until late 2011, she was forced to give herself painful injections in the stomach. She now has a port implanted that allows her to take the medications via infusion. Chief Arcieri confirmed that it was common knowledge in the City’s police force that Petitioner had lupus. Petitioner testified that she missed very little work because of the lupus and RA. She requested no accommodations in the workplace for these conditions. Sometime in 2009, Petitioner underwent neck surgery to repair a disc “that was almost gone.” Petitioner recalled discussing her condition with then-Sergeant Arcieri4/ prior to the surgery. They talked about the fact that her doctors were unsure whether the neck condition had been brought on by her RA. Petitioner testified that she was out of work for two or three months due to this surgery, but did not require a light-duty assignment when she reported back to her position. On September 22, 2009, Petitioner was at work conducting a witness interview when her nose began bleeding uncontrollably. A fellow officer drove her to the emergency room. Another city employee came to the emergency room to make sure Petitioner got home safely. At the hospital, Petitioner was diagnosed with hypertension. She missed several days of work and was placed on medications to control her blood pressure. City Manager Tracey Barlow testified that he was contemporaneously aware of Petitioner’s hypertension. Petitioner requested no workplace accommodations for her hypertension. In early 2010, Petitioner was out of work for a time with uncontrolled vomiting and diarrhea. Petitioner’s physician, Dr. Beatrice Bratu, diagnosed her condition as stress-induced colitis. Petitioner testified that her treatments for the colitis lasted about three months but that she was back at work within a few weeks. On March 15, 2010, Personnel Director Donna Looney addressed the following email to Petitioner: We are very pleased to see you back and doing well! I am in receipt of a note from Dr. Bratu which indicated you may return to work. I want to stress that we understand the necessity for you to follow your doctor’s instructions. No restrictions are noted; therefore you are allowed to continue your regular duties. Please be advised that you have a continuing obligation not to work when you are feeling impaired (fatigue, weakness, pain, etc.). It is City policy that if you expect to have any adverse side effect while taking medication, you must inform your supervisor, and you are never to drive a City vehicle when you are feeling impaired. If I can be of any further assistance, please feel free to contact me. Petitioner requested no workplace accommodation related to her colitis. On June 16, 2011, Petitioner was involved in an altercation with a 28-year-old female detainee at the City police station. Several officers submitted witness statements about the incident and police station video cameras captured the essentials of the acts that occurred. The video recording did not include sound. The detainee, J.G., had been arrested for battery and was by all accounts heavily intoxicated and belligerent. J.G. asked to go to the bathroom. Petitioner let her out of the cell and escorted her to the bathroom. The video shows Petitioner standing in the open doorway of the bathroom, waiting for J.G. to finish. Petitioner told the police department’s internal affairs investigator that J.G. asked for tampons. Petitioner responded that the police department did not keep such items and that she would have to clean up as best she could with the materials available in the bathroom. J.G. replied that she could not put back on the shorts she had been wearing. She stated they were not her shorts and they were bloody. Petitioner told her that she had to put the shorts back on. At this point, the video shows the shorts flying out of the bathroom and landing behind Petitioner, who kicked them back into the bathroom and stepped into the doorway. J.G., stepping into camera range, picked up the shorts and threw them at Petitioner. The shorts hit Petitioner along her beltline. Petitioner took a step forward and struck J.G. in the face with her open right hand. J.G. pushed forward momentarily, but retreated into the bathroom as Petitioner continued to advance. At this point, Officer Eric Selvaggio entered the picture to assist. For a period of roughly forty seconds, all three people were inside the bathroom, invisible to the camera. The doors then opened, and the three emerged. The two police officers guided the handcuffed J.G. toward a point outside the range of the camera. J.G. wore only a shirt and underwear. The video next cut to an empty holding cell. Petitioner and Officer Selvaggio entered the picture, guiding the handcuffed J.G. toward the cell. J.G. continued to struggle with the officers. She dropped to the ground. The officers pulled her to her feet and pushed her into the cell. J.G. kicked at Petitioner. The camera angle made it impossible to see whether there was contact, but Petitioner stated at the time, and has consistently maintained since the incident, that J.G. kicked her in the stomach. Immediately after the kick, Petitioner attempted to push her way past Officer Selvaggio toward J.G. Petitioner drew back her right fist but Officer Selvaggio’s left arm blocked her from throwing a punch. He pushed Petitioner away and then secured J.G. in the holding cell. Though there is no sound on the video, it is clear that Petitioner and J.G. continued an animated conversation after J.G. was locked in the cell. Multiple police witnesses recalled Petitioner calling J.G. a “fucking bitch.” Petitioner and the other officers on duty went out the back door to discuss the situation. The video appears to show Petitioner performing a joking reenactment of her attempted punch at J.G. Officer Selvaggio stated to the investigator that Petitioner told him she might not charge J.G. for the incident, but he replied that under the circumstances it would be best if she did follow through with charges. Petitioner filled out a charging affidavit against J.G., charging her with battery on a law enforcement officer, in violation of section 784.07(2)(b), Florida Statutes. In her charging affidavit, Petitioner wrote as follows, in relevant part, verbatim: On June 16, 2011 at approximately 12:45 a.m., the defendant, [J.G.] was in police custody at the Edgewater Police Department on a battery charge from a previous police call. The defendant requested to use the bathroom and was escorted to the bathroom by me. The defendant was upset over being arrested, while sitting on the toilet, she kicked off her shorts and threw them out of the restroom stating that she was not putting them back on as they were not hers and were soiled from her menstrual cycle. I pushed the shorts back into the restroom with my foot and advised her she needed to put them back on, she screamed she was not going to. When the defendant rose from the toilet, she picked up the shorts and threw them directly into my face, striking me with the shorts. The defendant then pushed herself up against the sink and began calling me a bitch and telling me again she was not putting the shorts back on and she was leaving. I entered and attempted to get her out of the bathroom, she began to punch at me. Myself and Officer Selvaggio, who was standing nearby, grabbed hold of the defendant in an effort to get her out of the bathroom. The defendant struggled against us, before we got her to the floor and secured her. As we were getting her back into the cell, the defendant threw herself onto the bench and kicked out striking me in the stomach with her right foot. The defendant was left in the cell with no shorts on and in handcuffs . . . . It should be noted that Petitioner’s charging affidavit states that J.G. hit her in the face with the bloody shorts, when in fact the shorts hit Petitioner in the waist area. Petitioner failed to mention that she slapped J.G. in the bathroom or that Petitioner attempted to punch J.G. in the holding cell. Chief Arcieri testified that when he came in later that morning, he reviewed all of the reports filed since the previous day. Petitioner’s report caught his eye because it involved battery on a law enforcement officer inside the station house. He instructed his assistant to pull the video of the incident and make one copy for him and one for Petitioner. When he saw the video, Chief Arcieri notified the Florida Department of Law Enforcement (“FDLE”) and requested an investigation. Chief Arcieri testified that he went to FDLE because he thought criminal charges could ensue in the case and that he does not like to investigate criminal matters internally. He also ordered an internal affairs investigation, but placed it on hold pending the outcome of the FDLE investigation. On June 21, 2011, Petitioner was placed on paid administrative leave for the duration of the investigations. J.G. refused to cooperate with the FDLE investigators. Without a victim willing to go forward, no criminal charges could be brought against Petitioner. The FDLE investigation was dropped. The internal affairs investigation was completed on August 15, 2011. The investigator’s written report concluded as follows: Sgt. Winston did commit the act of perjury on an official felony charging affidavit. Sgt. Winston did in fact using her hand strike a prisoner in the face which caused her to fall back onto the sink. Sgt. Winston did reach her right arm over the shoulder of Officer Selvaggio in an attempt to strike a handcuffed prisoner which Officer Selvaggio was attempting to secure inside the holding cell. Sgt. Winston did violate Edgewater Police [sic] & Procedure by removing a prisoner, removing the prisoner’s handcuffs without another officer present and allowed the prisoner to use the restroom. Sgt. Winston violated Edgewater Policy & Procedure by entering the cell/booking area wearing both her issued side arm as well as her issued taser. Sgt. Winston violated Edgewater Police [sic] & Procedure by openly criticizing the policy of securing any and all weapons prior to entering the booking/cell area when prisoners are present. This was done openly in the presence of fellow officers. Sgt. Winston violated City Policy and Procedure 12.02 Inappropriate/Unacceptable Behavior. Sgt. Winston did violate Edgewater Police Department Policy & Procedure Excessive force not resulting in injury. Petitioner was represented by counsel for the Fraternal Order of Police (“FOP”) in defending herself against the allegations that resulted from the internal affairs investigation. Negotiations ensued between the City and Petitioner to resolve the matter short of litigation. A settlement agreement was reached and executed on August 24, 2011. Petitioner agreed to findings that some of the allegations were sustained.5/ Petitioner agreed to a demotion from sergeant to officer, effective August 19, 2011, with a resulting salary cut, and she agreed to attend anger management courses. On August 24, 2011, Chief Arcieri ordered Petitioner to report for duty at 6:00 a.m. the following morning. Petitioner called in sick and did not report for work on August 25, 2011. Ms. Looney, the personnel director, contacted Petitioner to find out why she was not reporting for work. Petitioner told Ms. Looney that she had sustained a back injury during the altercation with J.G. on June 16, 2011. Ms. Looney testified that this was the first she knew of Petitioner’s back injury. In a letter dated August 24, 2011, and received by Chief Arcieri on August 25, 2011, Petitioner’s personal workers’ compensation attorney wrote as follows, in relevant part: As you know, Ms. Winston is an 18 year employee with our [sic] agency who was recently in an altercation with a belligerent, drunken female on June 16, 2011. Ms. Winston was injured during the arrest but was placed on Administrative leave pending an internal investigation and the matter has not been reported as an injury as of yet. Ms. Winston was not aware that she had injured her low back immediately due to circumstances surrounding the altercation and the typical adrenaline response resulting from such an altercation. She thought she was just sore from being beat up a bit but as the weeks went by her condition worsened. A recent MRI has revealed two herniated discs in the lower back and Ms. Winston does require medical treatment for this work related injury. I am requesting at this time that the Agency immediately file a First Report of injury on behalf of Ms. Winston. This should be considered notice under Chapter 440 of the work related injury. In addition to the back injury, Ms. Winston now suffers from uncontrolled high blood pressure which is also disabling. Ms. Winston will be receiving a letter from her doctor indicating that she is unable to work due to her uncontrolled blood pressure at this juncture. That is also a work related claim under F.S. 112.18, more popularly known as the “Heart/Lung Bill.” This claim should also be processed and medical care should be provided as soon as possible. Please see that a First Report of Injury is completed with regard to this claim . . . . In a related claim, Ms. Winston also has a September 22, 2009 uncontrolled hypertension incident which resulted in hospitalization. As you know, the 2009 accident occurred while Ms. Winston was interviewing a sex crime victim. She was experiencing a severe headache and then had an uncontrollable nose bleed during the interview. The blood pressure reading at the time revealed her blood pressure was severely elevated and she was taken to the hospital. This incident should have triggered the immediate filing of a First Report of Injury under F.S. 112.18 as referenced above. For whatever reason, no First Report of Injury was filed but I am requesting that you file such a First Report of Injury immediately on Ms. Winston’s behalf and that you provide appropriate medical care for this condition . . . . Finally, Ms. Winston advises me that she has been under an internal investigation since the June, 2011 incident. This internal investigation appears to be entirely inappropriate given the circumstances surrounding this event and would appear to be part of an intimidation practice on the part of your Agency, which is in clear violation of F.S. 440.205. As I am sure you know, 440.205 prohibits the harassment, intimidation, retaliation, or termination of an employee by virtue of a workers’ compensation claim. Needless to say, Ms. Winston has numerous ongoing workers’ compensation claims and it appears that all of the harassment which she has been subjected to since the time the internal investigation was opened in this matter appears to be directly attributable to her ongoing workers’ compensation issues. It should also be noted that Ms. Winston is suffering from post traumatic stress disorder as a result of this recent altercation and all of the fallout related to same. As I am sure you are well aware, post traumatic stress disorder of this nature is also covered for First Responders under the auspices of F.S. 112.1815. I am requesting again that a First Report of Injury be filed relative to this issue and that appropriate medical care be provided. Ms. Winston is entitled to full pay as she was injured during an altercation with a violent individual. Full pay is appropriate pursuant to the provisions of F.S. 440.15(11). This means that she should be receiving a regular paycheck without deduction of sick or vacation bank time. Please see that the appropriate adjustment is made relative to payment of benefits and feel free to contact me with any question . . . . On August 30, 2011, Petitioner submitted three “Incident/Accident Information Forms” to the City in regard to her workers’ compensation claims. The first states that Petitioner suffered an injury to her lower back on June 16, 2011, when “an intoxicated combative prisoner . . . kicked me in my stomach just above my gun belt.” The second describes “stress” as the injury, dated June 28, 2011, caused by “constant harassment & belittled by Dave Arcieri.” The third form states that the date of injury was September 22, 2009, the injury was “blood pressure caused bleeding of the nose,” and describes the incident in terms similar to those used in the attorney’s letter of June 24, 2011. Petitioner testified that she still sees a psychiatrist once a month and goes to counseling every two weeks, but that she first sought mental health counseling in June 2011 because of problems with Chief Arcieri that dated from long before he became chief. She testified that “he would cuss me out, call me names, have people that were subordinates watching me and reporting back to him to make sure I didn’t breathe the wrong way.” Petitioner testified that Chief Arcieri’s animus toward her dated from her handling of a situation as a sergeant that led to the firing of an officer. A member of Petitioner’s squad reported to her that an officer in another squad stole property from a civilian during a traffic stop and then gave him the stolen item. Petitioner told the officer to file a report and drop the item into evidence and that she would meet with the other officer’s sergeant. The other officer’s sergeant required him to write a report. The officer lied in the report. Petitioner and the other sergeant brought the matter to the attention of their superiors. After an investigation, the department had no choice but to fire the officer. At a sergeants’ meeting a little while later, then- Administrative Sergeant Arcieri said that Petitioner was incompetent. If she had handled the situation differently, Sergeant Arcieri would not have had to fire a good officer. Petitioner asked how the department could tolerate a lying thief in its midst. Sergeant Arcieri told her that the officer could have been reprimanded in some other way. Petitioner testified that she was afraid of Chief Arcieri because of threats he made to her. He made it clear to her and to any other officer who thought about reporting something to Ms. Looney or Mr. Barlow that these officials would let him know and the snitch would pay a price. On September 27, 2011, Petitioner sent an email to Michelle Grenham, Chief Arcieri’s secretary, stating that she would be unable to attend the anger management class required by the settlement agreement because she was undergoing major surgery on September 28 at Halifax Hospital in Daytona Beach. Ms. Grenham forwarded the email to Chief Arcieri and Ms. Looney. Petitioner underwent surgery on September 28, 2011, to repair the herniated discs in her back. Petitioner testified that prior to the surgery, she had difficulty walking, standing, bending at the waist, reaching, and climbing stairs due to the pain in her back. She was able to drive a car but only for short distances. She did not have full control of her bladder and bowels. She could only sleep by putting herself in a fetal position then bracing herself with pillows to keep her in that position. Petitioner described the surgery as less than a complete success. She had numbness in her right leg, was unable to bend, squat, kneel or stretch, and could not sit for very long. She eventually required spinal injections and the surgical insertion of a morphine pump in her stomach for pain in her spine. The morphine pump was still in place at the time of the hearing. Physicians also implanted a spinal cord stimulator in her back. She regained control of her excretory functions but was unable to walk without the use of a walker for several months and a cane thereafter. She wore a back brace most of the time. On November 29, 2011, Petitioner and her husband met with Mr. Barlow and Ms. Looney to discuss Petitioner’s medical situation and when she might return to work. The meeting was held at Petitioner’s request. Petitioner testified that she came into the meeting wearing a back brace and using a walker. Her husband had to drive her to the meeting. Petitioner testified that she asked for the meeting to find out if she could get an extended leave until her physician cleared her to go back to work. She also wanted to discuss Chief Arcieri’s harassment and belittling of her. At the meeting, Petitioner told Mr. Barlow that she didn’t know how long the healing process would take or whether she would need additional surgeries. Petitioner testified that Mr. Barlow told her it might be in her best interest to retire, in light of her age and her many health problems, including RA, lupus, hypertension, and now the back injury. Mr. Barlow stated that it seemed to him that Petitioner didn’t have anything that was going to go away, and that anyone with a back injury would have issues with it for life. Mr. Barlow asked whether Petitioner really thought she could ever come back as a police officer. Petitioner could only say that she didn’t know. Petitioner testified that she told Mr. Barlow that she hoped to reach retirement as a police officer but that she was willing to take another position with the City if her physical limitations kept her from returning to her former position. Petitioner testified that she told Mr. Barlow that she had a doctor’s appointment on May 3, 2012, and that Mr. Barlow promised to give her a leave of absence until that appointment. Petitioner’s husband, Ricky Winston, testified that at the meeting, his wife explained her injuries to Mr. Barlow and complained about Chief Arcieri’s constant ridicule and badgering. Mr. Winston stated that Mr. Barlow had a calendar and some paper and a calculator that he was using to diligently figure out something. It turned out that Mr. Barlow was calculating the date of Petitioner’s full retirement, with the idea of carrying her on the City’s employment roster until then. Mr. Winston testified that he left the meeting with the understanding that Mr. Barlow had agreed to grant Petitioner unpaid leave until she reached retirement. Mr. Winston recalled that Mr. Barlow listed all of Petitioner’s physical problems and asked why she didn’t just quit. Mr. Winston testified that this question was devastating to his wife because she never had any intention of leaving the job she loved. Ms. Looney testified that she did not recall Mr. Barlow mentioning any of Petitioner’s physical infirmities aside from her back injury. She did not recall Mr. Barlow using a calculator or calendar during the meeting or stating a date for Petitioner’s retirement. Ms. Looney stated that the goal was for Petitioner to return from her next doctor’s appointment with a physician’s statement as to when she could return to work, whether at full or light duty. Ms. Looney’s assumption, based on Petitioner’s condition, was that Petitioner would return to light duty at first. Mr. Barlow explicitly stated that the City wanted Petitioner to return to work, either full or light duty. Ms. Looney testified that she believed everyone at the meeting understood that Petitioner wanted to return to light duty and that the police department would try to find light duty restricted work for Petitioner when her doctor cleared her to return. Petitioner would remain on unpaid leave until her next doctor’s appointment in January 2012, at which time the City would need to know whether she could return to work. Petitioner had given Ms. Looney light duty notes from physicians in the past, which led Ms. Looney to assume that Petitioner understood what she needed to provide to the City. Ms. Looney stated that Mr. Barlow did not promise to keep Petitioner’s job open until May 2012. Mr. Barlow recalled almost nothing about the November 29, 2011, meeting with Petitioner. The only relevant specific testimony he provided on the subject was a denial that he told Petitioner that she could have a leave of absence until May 2012. However, given his lack of recall as to anything else that transpired in the meeting, Mr. Barlow’s testimony on this single point is not credited. The testimony of Petitioner and her husband regarding the statements made at the November 29, 2011, meeting is credited as to Mr. Barlow’s discussing Petitioner’s retirement and as to the fact that a discussion of Chief Arcieri’s behavior toward Petitioner occurred. On these points, Petitioner and Mr. Winston were credible, consistent witnesses. Ms. Looney’s testimony on these points was confused and equivocal. Mr. Barlow’s testimony was of little use at all as he claimed to remember virtually nothing about the meeting. However, the testimony of Petitioner and her husband cannot be credited as to the matter of Mr. Barlow’s promise to give Petitioner a leave of absence until May 3, 2012. Even disregarding Mr. Barlow’s convenient memory on this point, Petitioner’s testimony and that of her husband diverged on the ground for the leave of absence. Petitioner testified that Mr. Barlow gave her until May 3, 2012, because that was the date of her next doctor’s appointment. Mr. Winston vaguely recalled that a date was mentioned, either March or May, and that this date was based on Mr. Barlow’s calculation of Petitioner’s retirement date. Petitioner’s claim that Mr. Barlow gave her until May 2012 is further undercut by documentary evidence. On January 26, 2012, Petitioner sent Ms. Looney an email that stated as follows, in relevant part: Call me when you get the chance, I have prescriptions to pick up and get fitted for another brace, but I am going to need to take a leave of absence for a bit. Dr. Vinas [Petitioner’s surgeon] is not releasing me for duty at this time . . ., I will be going into a new brace and will be going to pain management for epidural injections in my spine. I have attached the letter from Dr. Vinas, as well as a copy of the medications I will be taking. My next appointment with him will be May 03/2012 unless the Dr. at the pain management center feels I need further surgery. I have no idea what to do about taking a leave, is there paperwork I need to file or just send you a letter? I would rather speak to you so if you are not busy please call me . . . . If the November 29, 2011, meeting had settled the question regarding Petitioner’s leave of absence until her doctor’s appointment on May 3, 2012, there would have been no need for Petitioner to write to Ms. Looney on January 26, 2012, to request a leave of absence and to inform Ms. Looney that her next doctor’s appointment would be on May 3. This email is consistent with the assertion made in the City’s February 21, 2012, letter terminating Petitioner’s employment that Mr. Barlow agreed to maintain the status quo until January 23, 2012, the date of Petitioner’s next scheduled doctor’s appointment.6/ In an email to Ms. Looney dated February 9, 2012, Petitioner stated, “[A]t this stage nothing surprises me anymore, I mean after all, I was supposed to be back on my feet and rarin to go by January, well that, as you know did not happen.” Petitioner closed a separate February 9, 2012, email to Ms. Looney with the following: “I forwarded this to [Mr. Barlow] also, but if he does not get it please let him know and tell him I said to keep his chin up as he always does and thank him for allowing me to take a leave of absence. Hopefully it won’t be much longer.” These emails cast further doubt on Petitioner’s claim that she had obtained a leave of absence until May 3, 2012, from Mr. Barlow at the November 29, 2011, meeting. The greater weight of the evidence indicates that Petitioner was granted an unpaid leave of absence at the November 29 meeting, but only until her physician cleared her to return to work in some capacity, which Petitioner at the time anticipated would occur in January 2012. The evidence presented at the hearing showed that Petitioner had used her twelve weeks of leave under the Family Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”) as of November 16, 2011. She had exhausted all of her accrued leave as of December 9, 2011, when she formally began the unpaid leave of absence. On January 1, 2012, Petitioner began receiving the City’s long-term disability benefits. Ms. Looney signed a letter to Dr. Federico Vinas, dated January 25, 2012, that stated as follows: Ms. Winston has informed us she is a patient of yours. She has a follow-up appointment January 26, 2012 in association with surgery perform [sic] by you. First, and foremost, enclosed you will find the Authorization to Disclose Medical Information form executed by Ms. Winston along with her job description (Police Officer) setting out the physical requirement. JoAnne is a valued City employee and it would be greatly appreciated if you verify her ability to perform any or all of these duties. Please provide us with specific restrictions or requirements necessary not to aggravate her condition and advise as to exactly when she can be cleared for full police officer’s duties. Your expertise is [sic] this matter is greatly appreciated. Please contact me for any further information you may need. The City’s job description for “Police Officer” reads as follows, in relevant part: PRIMARY DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES: (all duties may not be performed by all incumbents) Patrols designated area of the City to preserve the peace, to prevent and discover criminal acts, and to enforce traffic regulations. Answers calls and complaints involving drunkenness, domestic disputes, assaults and batteries, missing persons, fires, thefts, accidents and other felonies and misdemeanors. Is responsible for being knowledgeable of the crime problem in assigned work area and developing strategies to combat the problem. Develop contacts and provide intelligence reports to detectives and administration. Makes preliminary investigations at crime scenes or incidents, protects and collects physical evidence, locates witnesses, interviews witnesses, makes arrests, assists paramedics with basic and advance [sic] life support. Interviews complaints [sic] and witnesses to obtain information about crimes; assists in investigative work. Prepares evidence for issuance of complaints and testifies as a witness in both civil and criminal court, transports prisoners. Patrols school zones and high activity areas when assigned. Assists motorists, directs traffic, investigates accidents, recovers stolen automobiles, prepares detailed reports, advise of and interpret laws and ordinances and provides general information to the public. Cooperates and coordinates with other law enforcement agencies and other components of the Criminal Justice System. * * * Environmental Conditions: Outdoor environment with exposure to discomforting and dangerous working conditions Office environment with exposure to computer operations Physical exertion in lifting/moving items weighing up to 50 pounds Routine travel is required along daily assigned routes Occasional overnight travel is required Other physical/mental requirements may apply * * * DISCLAIMER STATEMENT This job description is not intended as complete listing of job duties. The incumbent is responsible for the performance of other related duties as assigned/required. The physical demands described herein are representative of those that must be met to successfully perform the essential functions of this job. Reasonable accommodations may be made to enable qualified individuals with disabilities to perform the essential functions. On January 26, 2012, Dr. Vinas forwarded to Ms. Looney a “Work Status” form regarding Petitioner that provided as follows: The above captioned patient is being treated in this office. The patient’s current work status is as follows: ( ) This patient was seen for treatment in our office today, please excuse any absence from work or school. (X) Based on the job description provided by the patient, it is in this patient’s best interest to be excused from all work duties at this time. Restrictions The patient may return to or continue to work with the following restrictions: ( ) No lifting over pounds. ( ) No excessive/repetitive bending or twisting. ( ) No prolonged sitting/standing or stooping. ( ) No excessive/repetitive pulling or pushing. ( ) No excessive activity with arms above shoulder level/overhead activity. ( ) ALL OF THE ABOVE ( ) Specific instructions ( ) This patient does not work at this time, but has been instructed to limit household/daily activities so as to remain within the above noted restrictions. ( ) This patient’s most recent evaluation supports a return to normal, routine work activities. The effective date of this Work Status is from the date noted above until further notice. If the patient’s current position of employment can be modified or other position found that conforms to the above restrictions, then the patient may return to work. If these restrictions cannot be maintained, I would recommend that the patient be excused from work until further notice. The patient’s work status will be evaluated on a visit-to-visit basis. Ms. Looney testified that based on Dr. Vinas’ Work Status form and her own conversations with Petitioner, she concluded that Petitioner was unable to return to work in any capacity, full or light duty, as of January 26, 2012. At the hearing, Petitioner conceded that she could not have returned to work as a police officer on January 26, 2012. As set forth in Finding of Fact 54, supra, Petitioner notified Ms. Looney via email on January 26 that her next appointment with Dr. Vinas would be on May 3, 2012. In the same email, Petitioner asked for guidance on how to request a further leave of absence. The record of this proceeding includes a “Request for Leave of Absence” form in which Petitioner asked for a leave of absence commencing on January 26, 2012, with an “anticipated return date” of May 3, 2012. At the hearing, Petitioner could not recall filling out this form. In her testimony, Ms. Looney indicated that she filled out the form for Petitioner. In the space in which the applicant is to set forth reasons for the leave of absence, Ms. Looney wrote, “See attached e-mail,” which was Petitioner’s January 26 email to Ms. Looney. Mr. Barlow denied the request for a further leave of absence by signature on the request form. The form does not indicate when Ms. Looney filled it out or when Mr. Barlow denied the request. The record is also unclear as to when Petitioner was notified that the City was denying her a further leave of absence. As late as February 9, 2012, Petitioner was still sending chatty emails to Ms. Looney regarding her medical condition and treatment, even asking Ms. Looney and Mr. Barlow to stop by her house for a visit if they are ever in the neighborhood. The first clear notice of the denial was in the termination letter set forth in the next paragraph. On February 21, 2012, Ms. Looney wrote the following letter to Petitioner: On November 29, 2011 Tracey Barlow, City Manager, and myself met with you to discuss your medical situation. You informed us your next doctor’s appointment was January 23, 2012, at which time you were hoping to be taken out of your brace. We agreed your continued employment with the City would depend on your returning to full duty and I would send Dr. Vinas a letter requesting exactly when you would be cleared to return to full duty as a police officer. Following your exam on January 26, 2012, you emailed me Dr. Vinas’ work status form which states “based on the job description provided by the patient, it is in this patient’s best interest to be excused from all work duties at this time.” You also stated your next appointment is May 3, 2012 and asked about taking a leave of absence. JoAnne, as you are aware your FMLA was met as of November 16, 2011; all your workers compensation claims have been denied;7/ you exhausted all of your accruals as of December 9, 2011 and have been granted unpaid leave of absence for the previous 74 days, and as of January 1, 2012 you began receiving the city’s long term disability benefit. Therefore, due to all the facts stated too [sic] include uncertain ability to return to work date, the City Manager has denied your request for leave of absence exceeding 30 days. As a result, consider this formal notification that your employment with the City of Edgewater ends effective February 24, 2012. It is very important that you contact the Personnel Department to make the necessary arrangements for your continued insurance coverage and any outstanding benefits/obligations you have with the City. Petitioner testified that at the time the City terminated her employment, she was still using a cane at home and a walker when she went out. There is no question that Petitioner was unable to return to full duty as a police officer on February 24, 2012. It was Petitioner’s contention that she could have come back to work for the police department in some form of light duty, as she had been allowed to do in the past, or in one of several jobs that the City advertised as open during her convalescence. Petitioner further contended that Ms. Looney should have sent Dr. Vinas the job descriptions of all open City jobs rather than just the job description of a police officer. As to the last point, Ms. Looney testified that it was standard practice for the City to send the physician an employee’s current job description for an assessment of the employee’s ability to return to work. Petitioner was treated no differently than any other City employee in this regard. Petitioner testified that she asked the City to bring her back in another position, but could offer no documentary evidence to support that testimony. She claimed that part of the discussion at the November 29 meeting with Mr. Barlow and Ms. Looney was her hope to retire as a police officer, but her desire to remain a city employee in whatever capacity she could. Ms. Looney testified that Petitioner never asked to work in any position other than that of police officer. Petitioner sent an email to Ms. Looney on December 26, 2011, asking whether Ms. Looney had “heard from my Dr. as to when I might be able to come back light duty or anything else?” Petitioner claims that the “anything else” portion of the email indicated her desire to be placed in any available job. Ms. Looney read the email as merely asking whether she had heard from Petitioner’s doctor, not as a job request. Ms. Looney’s reading is not unreasonable given that this was the only document Petitioner produced that even arguably contained a statement asking to be placed in a position other than police officer. In any event, whether Petitioner asked to be placed in another position is not decisive because of the blanket statement in Dr. Vinas’ work status form. Ms. Looney testified that she was unable to place Petitioner in any position because Petitioner’s physician had clearly stated that it was in her best interest to be excused from all work duties. It was always the City’s understanding that Petitioner would return to work in a light duty function at first, but in fact Petitioner was not cleared to work at all. Ms. Looney might have followed up with Dr. Vinas and inquired whether Petitioner was capable of doing clerical work or some other form of indoor, deskbound job, but Petitioner has pointed to nothing that required Ms. Looney to do so in light of Petitioner’s failure to request that accommodation. Ms. Looney testified that it was the City’s practice to hold off on discussing positions outside of an employee’s department until the employee has actually been cleared for light duty. No evidence was presented that the City treated Petitioner any differently than it treated other employees in a similar position. Similarly, Mr. Barlow might have agreed to extend Petitioner’s unpaid leave of absence to May 3, 2012, but he was not required to do so. At the time of her termination, Petitioner had used twelve weeks of FMLA leave and had been granted an additional 74 days of unpaid leave at Mr. Barlow’s discretion. Petitioner had been out on some form of medical leave for approximately six months. The City did not seize on some early opportunity to dismiss Petitioner; rather, the City had anticipated that Petitioner would return to work as a police officer and waited until Petitioner had exhausted all avenues of leave except a second discretionary unpaid leave of absence before deciding to terminate her employment. Petitioner offered no credible evidence that her termination was based on her age, gender, disability or perceived disability or that she was treated differently than other employees due to her age, gender, or disability. The lone indication of possible bias was Mr. Barlow’s statement at the November 29, 2011, meeting that Petitioner should consider retirement in light of her age and poor health. This statement may be easily read as a kindly (if poorly phrased) expression of concern for Petitioner. By her own testimony, Petitioner was on good terms with Mr. Barlow and Ms. Looney right up to the time of her termination. Petitioner sent solicitous emails to them as late as February 9, 2012. Petitioner’s feelings were hurt by the statement, but no other ill effect followed. She was granted the requested unpaid leave of absence and remained employed by the City for three more months. Petitioner testified that she never considered herself disabled and prided herself on not calling in sick or requesting accommodations for her conditions. Ms. Looney, Mr. Barlow, and Chief Arcieri all testified that they did not perceive Petitioner as having a disability that required accommodation in the workplace, though they were all aware of at least some of her chronic conditions such as lupus, RA, and hypertension. Petitioner claimed that Chief Arcieri carried on something of a vendetta against her. Chief Arcieri testified that prior to the demotion his relationship with Petitioner was friendly. When Petitioner’s house was flooded, Chief Arcieri took off work to help Mr. Winston solder a broken shower valve. After Petitioner was demoted, the relationship was less friendly but always professional. Chief Arcieri testified that he has never yelled at Petitioner or any other employee. He never called her names. The harassment and belittling that Petitioner alleged never happened. Chief Arcieri denied any sort of gender bias, pointing to the successful efforts his department has made to recruit and hire female officers. He denied ever making a comment about Petitioner’s age. He testified that he never considered Petitioner disabled while she was on active duty, despite her lupus. Petitioner never requested an accommodation and Chief Arcieri never saw the need for an accommodation. Chief Arcieri testified that at the close of the internal affairs investigation of the June 16, 2011, incident, he declined to sustain some of the allegations in order to protect Petitioner from a referral to the Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission (“Commission”) for further discipline. Chief Arcieri assented to a request by the FOP that he submit a letter to the Commission stating that he believed the demotion was sufficient and asking the Commission not to take further action against Petitioner. Petitioner’s testimony against Chief Arcieri consisted of general statements that he harassed and belittled her. The only specific incident Petitioner recounted as to the source of any possible animus the chief bore toward her involved the firing of the officer who stole something during a traffic stop. Even if Petitioner’s version of events is accepted, Chief Arcieri’s anger toward Petitioner had nothing to do with her age, gender, or disability. He called her “incompetent.” He was upset about the manner in which Petitioner performed her job, which he believed led to the needless dismissal of a good officer. Whether Chief Arcieri was right or wrong to be angry at Petitioner, he did not engage in an act of discrimination. Even if the factfinder were to accept Petitioner’s description of Chief Arcieri as a bully on the job, there is no evidence aside from Petitioner’s general comments to indicate that she was singled out due to her age, gender or disability. It is telling that in testifying about her fear of reporting the bullying, Petitioner stated, “I was afraid. I was very afraid. David Arcieri made it not only clear to me, but to any other officer who even thought about going to report to Donna Looney or to Tracey Barlow, ‘Don’t worry, they’ll let me know and you will pay the price.’” This statement might be evidence that Chief Arcieri is a bully, a poor leader of his department, or a bad administrator. However, the statement does not establish that Chief Arcieri discriminated against Petitioner in a manner prohibited by section 760.10, Florida Statutes. If anything, the statement indicates that Petitioner found herself in the same boat as the other officers in her department.8/ Petitioner was aware of and understood the City’s nondiscrimination and no-harassment policy, the operative language of which states: The nature of some discrimination and harassment makes it virtually impossible to detect unless someone reports the discrimination or harassment. THUS, IF ANY EMPLOYEE BELIEVES THAT HE OR SHE OR ANY OTHER EMPLOYEE IS BEING SUBJECTED TO ANY OF THESE FORMS OF DISCRIMINATION OR HARRASSMENT, HE OR SHE MUST REPORT THIS TO THE PERSONNEL DIRECTOR (386-424-2408) AND/OR CITY MANAGER (386-424-2404). If you are encountering a problem, please do not assume that the City is aware of it. The City is committed to ensuring that you have a pleasant working environment, and your assistance in bringing your complaints and concerns to our attention is a necessary first step. (Emphasis in original). The policy was included in the City’s personnel manual. Petitioner was provided with copies of the policy and amendments thereto several times during her tenure with the City. Petitioner conceded that, notwithstanding the policy, she did not report any incidents of harassment or discrimination to either Ms. Looney or Mr. Barlow while she was actively working for the City. The allegations of intimidation and harassment made by Petitioner’s attorney in his August 24, 2011, letter and Petitioner’s allegation of “constant harassment and belittlement by Dave Arcieri” in her workers’ compensation incident report were made only after Petitioner had been off the job for eight weeks. Further, the specific allegations made by Petitioner’s attorney claimed that the City was in violation of section 440.205, Florida Statutes, not that Chief Arcieri or any other City employee was discriminating against or harassing Petitioner because of her age, gender, disability, or perceived disability. The evidence produced at the hearing established that Petitioner sustained an injury to her back, most likely due to an altercation with a detainee on June 16, 2011, that necessitated surgery and a rehabilitation process that was not complete even at the time of the hearing in May 2014. The City carried Petitioner as an employee until all of her available leave had been used and then for another 74 days on an unpaid leave of absence. The City had no legal obligation to grant Petitioner an unpaid leave of absence but did so in the hope that Petitioner would be able to return to work in January 2012. As of the termination date of February 24, 2012, Petitioner had been away from her job for more than six months, had not been cleared by a physician to do work of any kind, and would not receive a physician’s clearance to work any sooner than May 3, 2012. The City could have consented to carry Petitioner even longer on an unpaid leave of absence, but it was not discriminatory for the City to make the business decision to terminate Petitioner’s employment. Petitioner offered insufficient credible evidence to refute the legitimate, non-discriminatory reason given by the City for the termination of her employment. Petitioner offered insufficient credible evidence that the City's stated reason for the termination of her employment was a pretext for discrimination based on her age, gender, disability, or perceived disability. Petitioner offered insufficient credible evidence that the City discriminated against her because of her age, gender, disability, or perceived disability in violation of section 760.10, Florida Statutes. Petitioner offered insufficient credible evidence that her dismissal from employment was in retaliation for any complaint of discriminatory employment practices that she made while an employee of the City.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a final order finding that the City of Edgewater did not commit any unlawful employment practices and dismissing the Petition for Relief filed in this case. DONE AND ENTERED this 30th day of January, 2015, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LAWRENCE P. STEVENSON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of January, 2015.
The Issue The issue for determination is whether Petitioner was subjected to discrimination in the work environment by Respondent due to Petitioner's gender in violation of Section 760.10, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner was employed as a payload operator by Respondent, a fertilizer manufacturer, at the time of her employment termination in August of 1996. Petitioner’s job duties included scooping fertilizer onto the pay loader, or front-end loader, and dropping the fertilizer into a “hopper” for subsequent loading into rail cars. Petitioner was expected, along with other payload operators, to perform other duties, including the cleaning of work areas when she ceased her loading function. During Petitioner's employment, a union contract existed between Respondent and the International Chemical Workers Union of which Petitioner was a member. The union contract governed overtime assignments, pay structure, shift structure, disciplinary/termination procedures and lay-offs, among other things. Respondent paid Petitioner and gave her breaks, contrary to her allegations, in the same manner as other employees. Governed by the union contract during the busy 1995-96 period, Respondent assigned work to employees on many different shifts. The plant operated 24 hours a day, seven days a week. Overtime requirements were based on business necessity. All employees worked the same number of hours regardless of the shift to which they were assigned. Petitioner never formally complained to anyone regarding displeasure with shift assignments. Neither salary nor number of work hours were affected by Petitioner’s assignments to different work shifts. Petitioner and other employees worked the same number of hours. Petitioner took breaks just like other employees. Changes from shift to shift experienced by Petitioner had nothing to do with her gender. The union contract governed how Respondent assigned overtime to its employees. The contract established a procedure that distributed overtime hours evenly and fairly among all of Respondent's employees. Those procedures were adhered to by Respondent and all employees were given overtime opportunities in an equal manner without regard to gender. On one occasion, Petitioner complained about her overtime assignment. She felt that she should have been called into work on a day when another operator (male) was called to come in and work. Respondent had attempted to contact Petitioner at contact numbers provided by Petitioner, without success. Safety equipment was distributed to all employees. Petitioner signed a check list indicating that she had received or knew how to request safety equipment. A pair of boots requested by Petitioner on one occasion had not yet arrived, but did arrive before the conclusion of the business day. The delay in delivery of Petitioner's requested boots to her was not related to her gender. Petitioner complained that adverse comments were made to her on the job by male workers. The alleged comments ranged from women should only do "clean up work" to "if you don't smoke or drink, we don't need you in this department." All of the alleged comments were roundly denied by Petitioner's co-workers at the final hearing. The credibility and candor of the testifying co-workers establishes that the adverse comments were not made. One incident in which Petitioner complained about her work assignment resulted in the general foreman's immediately contacting Respondent's human resource department. A meeting was then held with Petitioner to address the situation. The foreman felt confident that Petitioner would voice any additional concerns if the situation did not change. Petitioner never voiced further concerns to the foreman. Petitioner alleged that she was denied the right of free speech at a meeting attended by her, Respondent representatives, and union representatives. As established at the final hearing, she was told by the union representative to remain quiet and let him do the talking if Respondent representatives made Petitioner angry. However, the union representative did not instruct Petitioner to otherwise remain silent. Under the union contract, Respondent could terminate employees who received three reprimands within a 12-month period. Petitioner was aware of this procedure. Petitioner had numerous instances of work-related misconduct and received more than three reprimands in a 12-month period. Counseled on June 4, 1995, for damaging a payloader, Petitioner received a reprimand on July 18, 1995, for again damaging a payloader. Petitioner was counseled again on August 14, 1995, for failure to communicate with the shipping operator. On October 16, 1995, Petitioner received a second reprimand for poor work performance for mixing discarded product with good product, a violation of Respondent policy. Petitioner received her third reprimand on February 28, 1996, for loading hot fertilizer, a violation of Respondent's policy. The difficulty of loading fertilizer before it cooled was the later removal of the hot product which would harden upon cooling into a concrete-like substance. Petitioner was given a second chance and not fired upon receiving her third reprimand in a 12-month period. Management hoped that Petitioner would seek to improve her work performance. Petitioner refused to help clean the plant on July 10, 1996, and was counseled by her supervisor. On July 25, 1996, she received a verbal warning for failure to report an accident. In August of 1996, Petitioner received her final reprimand for failure to attend a company meeting at the proper time and for again loading hot product. Petitioner's employment was terminated. The various reprimands imposed on Petitioner were from different supervisors at different times. None of the reprimands were based on Petitioner's gender. After a complete review of Petitioner's case, the union representative determined that Respondent had properly terminated her employment.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law it is RECOMMENDED: That a Final Order be entered dismissing the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 12th day of October, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DON W. DAVIS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of October, 2001. COPIES FURNISHED: Azizi M. Dixon, Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149 Artie Johnson 2672 Northwest 6th Drive Jennings, Florida 32053 Mary L. Wakeman, Esquire McConnaughhay, Duffy, Coonrod, Pope, and Weaver, P.A. Post Office Drawer 229 Tallahassee, Florida 32302-0229 Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149
Findings Of Fact The Respondent YWCA is a nonprofit corporation that sponsors educational, social, and recreational programs. The YWCA's purpose states that it is a "movement rooted in the Christian faith"; however, expressed belief in Christianity is not required for membership in the YWCA or for employment by the YWCA. Its membership is comprised of adult women seventeen years of age and older. The personnel policy of the YWCA expressly states that: "Equal employment opportunity and affirmative action will be applied in recruitment, hiring, compensation, fringe benefits, staff development, and training, promotion, and any other condition of employment regardless of race, color, religion, sex, handicap, age, national origin, or any other nonperformance factors." (Emphasis added.) Regarding termination, the personnel policy of the YWCA expressly states that: "Reasons for staff termination must be carefully documented. They should be based upon objective performance appraisals, which in turn are based upon job descriptions, work plans, and performance standards. Except in cases of reorganization/retrenchment or termination for cause, a probationary period for work improvement must be provided, followed by another performance appraisal." The YWCA of West Palm Beach operates three facilities: Central and Residence, the Mamie Adair Branch, and the Recreation Center. The Mamie Adair Branch primarily serves the black community in West Palm Beach and includes a day-care facility. The Petitioner, Davis, was hired as the Branch Executive of the Mamie Adair Branch of the YWCA, effective July 21, 1980, at a starting salary of $12,000.00. The Petitioner was given copies of the YWCA's personnel policy, affirmative action plan, and job description. She was not given notice of particular standards of behavior to which she was required to conform away from the job. As branch Executive she was supervised by the Executive Director, Jo Prout. The Petitioner successfully completed her initial 90-day probationary period, and her annual salary was increased by five percent to $12,600.00. In October 1981, however, the Petitioner received her annual evaluation and was again placed on three months probations due primarily to an unsatisfactory working relationship with the Branch Committee. The Petitioner had a bad attitude and was antagonistic. The Petitioner became pregnant but did not immediately disclose the fact of her pregnancy. In approximately December, 1981, the Petitioner confided to a coworker that she was pregnant and the coworker, in turn, told the YWCA's Executive Director, Jo Prout, that the Petitioner was pregnant. The YWCA's Executive Director was concerned that the Petitioner's relationship with the Branch Committee would be severely adversely affected if the Committee found out the Petitioner was pregnant and unmarried. Because of this concern, the Executive Director removed the Petitioner from her position as Branch Executive, effective December 31, 1981. The Petitioner would not have been removed from her position on December 31, 1981, but for the fact that she was pregnant and unmarried. Prior to removing the Petitioner from her position as Branch Executive, the Executive Director did not attempt less drastic alternatives such as asking the Petitioner not to discuss or disclose her marital status or asking the Petitioner to take a leave of absence. Prior to her removal, the Petitioner had not discussed the fact that she was pregnant and unmarried with members of the Branch Committee or with the YWCA membership in general. At no time had the Petitioner advocated unwed motherhood as an alternative life- style or otherwise advocated or espoused principles contrary to her understanding of Christianity. In the past, certain employees of the YWCA whose on-the-job behavior was contrary to Christian principles received job discipline but were not removed from their positions. A desk clerk at the YWCA's residence, for example, who was found to have stolen property from residence guests was not discharged. The removal of the Petitioner from her position by the YWCA because she was pregnant and unmarried was not justified by the business necessity rule because: A requirement to conduct one's life, including one's off-the-job activities, according to Christian principles, was not disclosed to the Petitioner or to other employees; The YWCA did not discipline or discharge other employees for conduct which conflicted with the YWCA's alleged requirement to conduct one's life by Christian principles; and The YWCA did not show that a requirement of all employees to conduct their lives by Christian principles has a manifest relationship to the employment in question. Then the Petitioner was removed from the Branch Executive position, she was transferred to the position of center consultant for gymnastics. The position of the center consultant for gymnastics to which the Petitioner was transferred was a demotion in that the Petitioner went from an administrative to a non-administrative position. The transfer also changed the Petitioner's employment status from full-time employee to part-time employee with a 25 percent decrease in earned income and a lunch "hour" reduced to 30 minutes. The petitioner's new position as center consultant was a temporary one designated to last no longer than five months. Petitioner was removed from probationary status as a result of the transfer. The position of center consultant to which the Petitioner was transferred was not a legitimate position. The position did not exist prior to December 31, 1981, the date the Petitioner was transferred. No job description was ever written for this position, despite the fact that the YWCA personnel policy required job descriptions. The Petitioner was verbally assigned job tasks inconsistent with her title of center consultant, including cleaning toilets at the gymnastics center. The position was eliminated on February 16, 1982, approximately six weeks after it was created, allegedly due to financial streamlining. The YWCA committed an unlawful employment act against the Petitioner, discriminating against her on the basis of sex and marital status by removing her from her position as Branch Executive because she was pregnant and unmarried. Moreover, this transfer was not justified by business necessity. Because the YWCA committed an unlawful employment act against the Petitioner, the Petitioner could be entitled to be reinstated to her former position or to a comparable position and could also be entitled to recover lost wages and fringe benefits, plus interest thereon, from the date of the wrongful act, December 31, 1981, to November 31, 1982, the date she was hired by the Lutheran Ministries, set off by any interim earnings and reduced by the Petitioner's unemployment compensation benefits plus her reasonable attorney's fees and costs. Regarding reinstatement, the Petitioner has been and is now willing and able to be reinstated to her former position as Branch Executive or to a comparable administrative position. The employer's argument that the Petitioner is not entitled to reinstatement because she was an unsatisfactory employee is rejected for the following reasons: The employer's allegations that the Petitioner will not satisfactorily perform her job if reinstated are too speculative and any doubts about the Petitioner's entitlement to reinstatement should be resolved in favor of the victim of discrimination; and In the event that the Petitioner's job performance upon reinstatement is not satisfactory, the employer may avail itself of the procedures set forth in its personnel policy to improve the Petitioner's performance or discharge her for unsatisfactory job performance. However, reinstatement may not be feasible in this case due to the fact that another employee has been placed in the Petitioner's former position. If the Petitioner is not reinstated to a comparable administrative position, then she should be compensated by the award of six months front pay in lieu of reinstatement. The Petitioner is entitled to damages in the amount of $13,551, which represents a back pay award of $11,000 plus 10 percent interest, six months front pay in the amount of $6,000, minus $1,575 for salary paid from January 1, 1982 - February 16, 1982, including two weeks severance pay and $2,974 in unemployment compensation benefits. The Petitioner is also entitled to costs of $232.65 and attorneys fees totaling $5,000.
Findings Of Fact Based upon the entire record, the following findings of fact are determined: This controversy involves an allegation by petitioner, William E. Bergen (Bergen or petitioner), that respondent, BellSouth Telecommunications, Inc. (BellSouth), refused to reasonably accommodate his handicap. BellSouth is an employer that employs fifteen or more employees and thus is subject to the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992. BellSouth denies the allegation, and a preliminary investigation by the Florida Commission on Human Relations (Commission) found no probable cause that an unlawful employment practice had occurred. Petitioner began his employment with BellSouth (then known as Southern Bell) in 1979. He was initially stationed in the Metro Dade service area (greater Miami area) but six months later was transferred to the North Dade service area. While employed in South Florida, Bergen briefly worked as an outside plant technician but soon changed to the position of service technician. In that position, he was required to install and repair residential and business telephone lines. In May 1990, Bergen moved to Gainesville, Florida, which lies within the North Florida Division of BellSouth. After taking a test, he began working in operator services on July 13, 1990. An operator generally assists customers in placing calls, arranges credit for misdialed numbers, assists handicapped customers in dialing numbers, answers customer inquiries and performs other related tasks. At the Gainesville office, an operator sits or stands at one of a number of unassigned work stations, all having a standard size desk with a computer terminal and keyboard. At least two work stations have stand-up desks for those operators who choose to work in a standing position. All operators generally work a seven and one-half hour shift with one-half hour for meals. In Bergen's case, he usually worked the 3:30 p. m. - 11:30 p. m. shift. Except for Bergen, who stands six feet four and one-half inches tall, all other operators working in the Gainesville office were less than six feet. Thus, Bergen could not fit his knees underneath the standard size desk and the computer screens were not at eye level. Also, because his hands were so large, Bergen used an erasor rather than his fingers to key the keyboard. Until October 1992, petitioner says that, except for absences due to injuries to his lower back and eye, his attendance had been "perfect" over the prior 13-year period, and BellSouth did not dispute this contention. BellSouth has a Benefits Administration Department, which makes determinations regarding an employee's disability status, as well as decisions regarding any medical restrictions that will be imposed upon an employee after returning to work. In doing so, that Department relies upon the treating physician's notes and "quite often" it requires the employee to have a functional capacity evaluation performed. In some cases, the employee is required to have an independent medical evaluation performed by another doctor. Finally, the Department relies upon advice from its own in-house medical consultant, Dr. Barry Kern, who is board certified in occupational medicine. As will be recounted in subsequent findings, in making a decision as to petitioner's status, the Benefits Administration Department relied upon the doctor's notes, a functional capacity evaluation, an independent medical evaluation, three work site evaluations by occupational therapists, and input from its in-house medical specialist. In the latter part of October 1992, petitioner woke up one morning with his shoulder and neck "bothering" him. He continued to work that week but the condition became progressively worse. He eventually went to the emergency room at a local hospital on Friday, October 23, 1992. Petitioner was given pain medication and told to put his right arm in a sling. The following Monday, October 26, 1992, petitioner visited his family physician (Dr. Guillen) who believed he might be suffering from a pulled muscle. After returning to work, petitioner had his computer and keyboard moved to the left side of his desk so that he could rest his right arm on the desk and "key" the keyboard using his left arm. Petitioner continued working with his left hand until Thanksgiving Day, November 26, but went home that day because he says he "couldn't stand the pain anymore." He called in sick the next day and began a week's vacation the following Monday. In early December, petitioner visited a chiropractic physician, who recommended that an MRI be performed and that petitioner consult a neurosurgeon. Accordingly, petitioner had an MRI performed and on December 3 visited a Gainesville neurosurgeon, Dr. Freeman. He was told by Dr. Freeman that he had probable cervical disc disease (multiple level cervical spondylosis), a condition that causes pain in the neck area, and a possible herniated disc in the C-5 and C-6 area. In layman's terms, cervical spondylosis means arthritis of the neck and wear and tear on the discs and small joints of the neck. It is a degenerative condition that comes with age and produces bony growth in the spine that can put pressure on nerves in the neck. Dr. Freeman suggested petitioner undergo physical therapy on a twice-weekly basis. Bergen did so beginning December 10. Because of his ailments, petitioner was placed on short-term disability leave with pay from December 7 until January 8, 1993. This type of leave is required when an employee is absent from work due to illness or injury more than seven consecutive days. By January 5, 1993, Bergen was no longer experiencing any neck pain and he was able to "use (his) arms." Accordingly, he asked Dr. Freeman for permission to return to work. Dr. Freeman prepared a disability certificate authorizing Bergen to return to work effective January 11 and assume his "regular" work duties with no restrictions. When he returned to work that day, petitioner asked his second level manager, Rebecca P. Leynes, if he could be "loaned" from the operator services section to "outside forces" but Leynes declined to do so. Bergen then assumed his regular operator job duties. Because of pain in his arm and neck, however, he again went on short-term disability leave on January 20 and remained on leave with pay until February 3. During his absence, petitioner was treated by Dr. Freeman, who suggested that an occupational therapist evaluate his work site to determine what changes could be made to alleviate some of his discomfort. The therapist visited the work site on January 25 and prepared a report the same date. The report recommended that BellSouth provide an anti-glare screen, provide a larger swivel desk chair at least twenty-two inches high, raise the desk to at least thirty-two inches to accommodate Bergen's height, place the keyboard at a forty-five degree angle, and "provide use of an adequate standing table daily." Petitioner returned to work on February 3 and was told to use the stand-up position as an accommodation to his ailment. After a heated conversation with Leynes because no work station had been modified, Leynes advised him that the Gainesville operator services center was slated for two adjustable work surfaces but they were delayed for budgetary reasons since the center already had two stand-up positions. Leynes then proceeded to modify a stand-up work station for Bergen by raising the CRT, keyboard and multileaf to a height that she says was "comfortable to (petitioner)." She did this in part by placing six or seven reams of paper under the computer screen to raise it to eye level. Even so, Bergen left work early that day because of pain. The next day, a nurse in the Benefits Administration Department telephoned Leynes and advised her that if Bergen had a disability, federal law required that his work station be modified. During a telephone conference call with the nurse and Leynes on February 5, Leynes' supervisor stated that if the company ordered special furniture for Bergen, it would have to accommodate every employee who had an injury. He raised the possibility of "effect(ing) a job change" for Bergen and changing the job requirements for an operator to exclude all persons over six feet. Finally, he told the nurse to advise her Department that he did not want to order the special equipment and set a precedent. On February 4 petitioner again visited Dr. Freeman, who agreed to prepare a note suggesting that certain medical restrictions be imposed. The note stated that, based upon the therapist's recommendations and Dr. Freeman's own evaluation, petitioner should "be placed in a work environment where he can frequently change positions," the computer terminal should be placed at eye level, his chair should be raised high enough to allow partial weight bearing by the lower extremities, and "the keyboard should be positioned so as to avoid continued cervical flexion and rotation while operating the keyboard and viewing the terminal screen simultaneously." Dr. Freeman also recommended that Bergen be allowed ten minute breaks every thirty minutes during working hours. This note was faxed by Dr. Freeman to the Benefits Administration Department. The same day, Bergen telephoned a representative of that Department, Kathy Green, who told him a ten minute break was "excessive" but he would be authorized to take five minute breaks every thirty minutes. Petitioner returned to work on February 5 and 6 and was counseled for poor attendance by his immediate supervisor. On those two days, he was given five-minute breaks every thirty minutes. On Monday, February 8, however, Leynes terminated the breaks since she says the Benefits Administration Department had never sanctioned them. When Bergen's union representative made a suggestion to Leynes that Bergen work only four hours per day, Leynes replied that such a restriction would have to come from his doctor. The next day, February 9, petitioner visited Dr. Freeman and obtained a "disability certificate" with the following restriction: "pt to work only 4 hours per day" in "light" as opposed to regular work duties. In a follow-up letter prepared on February 10, Dr. Freeman also suggested that BellSouth investigate the possibility of changing petitioner's job duties to provide him more mobility and less stress. The same day, a BellSouth nurse who observed Bergen at work commented that he was working in an incorrect job because of his size. The certificate of disability was given to Leynes, who referred it to the Benefits Administration Department for evaluation. That Department advised Leynes that such a restriction was not a "reasonable accommodation" under the Americans with Disabilities Act, it would reduce the productivity of the employee, and she should not honor the restriction. After returning to work on February 11 for one day, petitioner took "excused time and vacation days" and was absent for six days. During this absence, he had a second MRI taken which reconfirmed his earlier diagnosis. On February 17, he returned to work. On February 18, he left work due to pain and was taken to the emergency room of a local hospital. On the same day, he was given a written disciplinary warning by Leynes for unimproved attendance. In conjunction with a worker's compensation claim filed by Bergen against BellSouth on February 18, he prepared an affidavit which stated in part that "(o)n February 9, 1993, my desk was raised eight inches. My computer, keyboard and chair were not raised." A copy of the affidavit was given to Leynes. While absent on and off between February 3 and February 25, he continued to be paid on what is known as temporary partial disability. On February 23, Dr. Freeman prepared another letter recommending that petitioner refrain from working at his current operator job until he could be evaluated by an orthopedic surgeon for reconstructive surgery versus continuation of conservative therapy. This letter was given to Leynes. As it turned out, the orthopedic surgeon agreed with the continuation of conservative therapy as previously recommended by Dr. Freeman, and this opinion is embodied in a letter from the surgeon dated March 18, 1993. Finally, on March 1, 1993, Bergen's personal physician prepared a letter stating that prolonged standing by Bergen had caused "significant varicosities and leg edema" which would get worse without measures to correct the prolonged standing. With the approval of the Benefits Administration Department, Leynes began making modifications and ordering new equipment in order to accommodate petitioner's disability. Specifically, on February 9 the desk at one operator position was raised to thirty-two inches, a chair with a higher seat and larger seat pad was obtained as an interim measure, and a new, special adjustable chair was ordered on May 5. A glare-proof screen was obtained on February 16, the computer terminal was raised by placing several reams of paper under it, and the keyboard was placed at a forty-five degree angle. Finally, BellSouth created a modified stand-up position specially fitted for petitioner to allow him to alternate between a sitting and a standing position. Because these changes had not been completed by late February, and Bergen had missed his employer-arranged appointment with an ergonomics specialist as a follow-up to evaluate the changes to the work station, Bergen continued to be paid while on leave in February. On March 2, 1993, petitioner filed a complaint of discrimination with the Commission alleging that (a) he was disciplined for absences relating to his disability, (b) he was denied reasonable accommodation in his position, and (c) he was discriminated against due to his disability and sex. In his petition for relief filed on September 22, 1993, however, he alleged only that BellSouth "did not make requested medical modifications or adhere to (his) medical restrictions like they have for other employees with disabilities in (his) department." As clarified by counsel at hearing, petitioner now contends that BellSouth failed to reasonably accommodate his handicap, which prevented him from working a regular, full-time job. After the initial complaint of discrimination was executed by petitioner on February 25, 1993, he completely stopped working. At that time, Bergen was offered the opportunity to work only four hours per day, but he declined this offer saying he wanted to be paid disability leave for the other four hours and could not afford a part-time job. Thereafter, Bergen continued to be paid for his first seven days of absence, but he was then placed on furlough, which is a non-pay code, since he was not authorized by the Benefits Administration Department to be on sick leave. While absent from work in March, Bergen obtained a statement from a physical therapist recommending that he change his work position every thirty minutes and be granted a ten minute break twice an hour. In early April 1993, petitioner was at risk of being dropped from the payroll due to his excessive absences. Pending further medical evaluation, and the opportunity to fully assess petitioner's medical condition, and perhaps motivated by the discrimination complaint, BellSouth decided to temporarily loan Bergen to its engineering department where he served as an engineering clerk from April 12 until November 1993. Prior to then, BellSouth had not seriously explored whether there were other positions to which petitioner could be transferred. In any event, this satisfied petitioner's earlier request that he be temporarily placed in another job which allowed him to be more mobile. During one week in July, however, Bergen temporarily worked half a day as an operator and the other half as an engineering clerk. By then, the modifications to the work station were in place. Afterwards, Leynes asked for his comments on the work station modifications and Bergen complained that his operator desk was still not high enough, the computer screen was not at eye-level, and the keyboard needed to be moved. Also, there was no longer a standing position available for him. At the recommendation of Dr. Freeman, on August 18, 1993, petitioner was given an independent medical evaluation by Dr. Oregon K. Hunter, Jr., who specializes in clinical medicine rehabilitation. His diagnosis was cervical spondylosis without evidence of myeleopathy and possible bilateral cervical radiculopathy, which corresponded to Dr. Freeman's diagnosis. Because Dr. Hunter was unable to assess the modifications to Bergen's work station, he recommended that a further evaluation of Bergen's work station be made by an occupational therapist, and until that time, he be given "continued alternate duty." Also, he concluded that Bergen "will eventually be able to return to his operator duties, however, he may continue to experience pain and radicular symptoms even in a modified work station." BellSouth honored Dr. Hunter's recommendation and continued to allow Bergen to work as an engineering clerk pending the outcome of the work site evaluation. On September 24, 1993, a work site evaluation was conducted by an occupational therapist who evaluated the best suited position for Bergen given his height and the appropriate placement of the video display terminal (VDT). The therapist recommended that when Bergen returned to his work station, the following modifications be made: Two reams of paper be kept under the VDT: A neoprene wrist support be provided to the leading edge of the table work surface on which Bergen could rest his forearms; and A foot rest be provided to allow Bergen to rest his feet. This report was forwarded to the Benefits Administration Department, and copies were also given to Drs. Freeman, Hunter and Kern. In early November 1993, the Benefits Administration Department determined that petitioner was medically capable of performing in his job as an operator with the workplace modifications suggested in the most recent work site evaluation. That decision was made in consultation with Dr. Kern, who reviewed the medical information regarding Bergen, including the results of the independent medical examination by Dr. Hunter. Accordingly, on November 11, 1993, Leynes advised petitioner by letter that beginning November 28, 1993, he would be reassigned to his regular position in operator services. The letter noted that BellSouth had made the following accommodations: An adjustable sitting position with VOT height and wrist rest additions specified in the job analysis; A chair ordered specifically for his frame size; A foot rest; A glare-proof screen for his video display terminal; and Use of a standing position as needed for his comfort. The letter added that those accommodations would allow him to perform his job without special hours or work breaks. Petitioner was officially reassigned to his operator position on November 28, 1993. Because Bergen used vacation leave, his first day back at work was actually on December 18, 1993. Three days later, Bergen says he again started "having problems," and the same day he visited Dr. Freeman who prepared another disability certificate certifying that petitioner could only return to "light" work duties subject, however, to the restrictions as outlined in the physical abilities assessment performed on March 30, 1993. The earlier assessment had recommended part-time, light duties. When the certificate was presented to Leynes, she said she could not honor those restrictions since the Benefits Administration Department had not approved the same, and he must continue working a full tour. Because of continuing complaints by Bergen, BellSouth made arrangements for a functional capacity test to be given on December 28, 1993, by the Medical Rehab and Sports Medicine Center in Jacksonville to determine if permanent medical restrictions or limited work hours were appropriate. The report's assessment concluded in part that Bergen was functional to return to work within his demonstrated capacities; restricted heavy to very heavy labor category with unrestricted positional tolerances, although sitting as well as prolonged upper extremity forward reaching produces the greatest amount of pressure on the disc. His symptoms would be likely to increase with these positions/job tasks. In plainer terms, this meant that because petitioner's job category (operator) was considered "light," and the assessment indicated that Bergen could perform a job in the heavy labor category without restrictions, he could return to a modified work station without restrictions. In an addendum to the report issued on February 28, 1994, it was pointed out that "stationary static positions can result in limited flow of fluid through spinal facet joints and disc resulting in stiffness and decreased nutrition to joints and discs." Also, a recommendation was made that Bergen "frequently change position as frequently as possible, (i. e., every 30 minutes) and maintain an active exercise program." Otherwise, there was no impediment to Bergen assuming his regular duties. A copy of this report was given by BellSouth to Dr. Freeman, who was asked to consider the report in light of his most recent disability certificate prepared on December 21, 1993, and petitioner's continuing "complaints," even after modifications to his work station had been made. Based upon the results of this latest test, Dr. Hunter concluded in a letter dated March 15, 1994, that petitioner should "be released to work based on the level of function that he demonstrated within that evaluation." In a second letter dated March 29, 1994, he concurred with a recommendation of Dr. Freeman that "job duties which require the use of (petitioner's) arms held in an extended position would probably exacerbate his symptoms and this would best be modified appropriately." As clarified at hearing, Dr. Hunter explained that petitioner should not extend his arms straight out while working, and he could not sit in one place continuously for hour after hour without being able to change positions. With proper ergonomic modifications and a certain degree of mobility, however, Dr. Hunter was of the opinion that petitioner could assume his regular job responsibilities without exacerbating his condition. Dr. Hunter further concluded that the physical condition was permanent, and that petitioner would likely experience pain the rest of his life, no matter what he did at work. Although Dr. Freeman continued to recommend ten minute breaks every hour "if possible," he basically concurred in Dr. Hunter's ultimate recommendation and deferred to that doctor's judgment in terms of restrictions and limitations. At the same time, Dr. Kern concluded that ten minute breaks every hour are not medically necessary because petitioner's problem is in the neck and only neck mobility is required. According to Dr. Kern, petitioner has aggravated his condition by using improper work techniques at his work station, such as sitting with his arms outstretched. If this technique is corrected, petitioner should eliminate many of his problems. On March 2, 1994, the Benefits Administration Department advised Bergen by letter that in view of the various medical evaluations and modifications to his work site, permanent medical restrictions, including a ten minute break every thirty minutes, were not appropriate. It is noted that since December 1993, Bergen had been given ten minute breaks every thirty minutes even though such breaks had not been approved by the Benefits Administration Department. The letter added that this conclusion was based on the fact that he "demonstrated no inability to function in a heavy duty job, let alone a sedentary job such as (his) present assignment." This information was reconveyed to Bergen in a meeting with Leynes on March 28, 1994. At the time of hearing, BellSouth had only four operator vacancies in Gainesville and no vacancies in that office's engineering department. This is because there is relatively little employee turnover in the Gainesville office. Since 1993, petitioner has had on file requests (bids) to transfer to a position as an outside plant technician in Daytona, Gainesville, and Lake City, engineering clerk in Gainesville, and service technician in Gainesville. However, none of these positions have been open. In April 1994 the company offered to transfer Bergen to a vacant service technician position in Dade County but he declined to accept a transfer to that location. Since March 9, 1994, and through the time of hearing, all of Bergen's absences from work have been without pay and coded as "FMLA" (Family Medical Leave Act). Under that federal law, which became effective on February 5, 1994, covered employees are authorized absences due to medical reasons of up to ninety days without pay. Therefore, by now, petitioner's authorized absences have probably ended. In challenging the accommodations offered him, Bergen asserts that other BellSouth employees, all of whom happen to be female, were given accommodations consistent with the recommendation of their doctors after suffering injuries and illnesses. Such accommodations included part-time work and reassignment to other jobs within the company. All of these cases, however, are distinguishable from Bergen's situation. For example, Patricia Peres, formerly an operator but now a sales representative, received special accommodations after she suffered three ruptured discs and misaligned her pelvic area in an automobile accident in May 1989. Because of the severity of these injuries, Peres was absent from work for two months and then worked on a part- time basis for two weeks after returning. She reinjured her neck in another automobile accident in February 1994. At her doctor's request, and without requiring a second medical opinion, BellSouth allowed Peres to work only half days and take a five-minute break every thirty minutes until she fully recuperated. Another operator, Judy LaSalle, had surgery in 1991 on her arms due to Degarian's disease and was forced to wear casts for five months on both arms from shoulder to wrist. After she returned to work, BellSouth agreed to her doctor's suggested weight lifting limitations, it placed ergoarms on her desk to rest her arms, and it allowed her to work a four-hour shift the first week, a six-hour shift the second week, and a seven and one-half hour shift the third week. Also, it authorized her to take work breaks every thirty or forty-five minutes. She is now back to work full time without restrictions. Petitioner also noted that a former operator, Rosemary Jackson, was given medical restrictions in 1992. In that case, the employee had Crohn's Disease (an enlargement of the intestines) which necessitated numerous restrictions, and Jackson died a short time later. Finally, Linda Davis, a service representative, had a rheumatoid arthritis bilateral hip and was unable to climb stairs to her permanent job. Because of this condition, she was temporarily loaned for five months to another department where she was able to work on the ground floor. Although Bergen continues to experience some degree of pain, his latest functional capacity evaluation places him in the "very heavy labor" category without restrictions. This means that he can engage in that category of work without medical restrictions. As a consequence, his present ability to engage in major life activities, such as work, is not substantially limited by his medical condition. In some measure, however, he does not enjoy the full and normal use of his physical facilities, and Dr. Hunter has established that the condition is permanent. Therefore, under this latter test, Bergen is a person with a handicap.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Commission enter a final order denying the petition for relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 22nd day of July, 1994, in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of July, 1994. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 93-5814 Petitioner: 1. Partially accepted in finding of fact 1. 2-3. Partially accepted in finding of fact 15. 4. Covered in conclusions of law. 5-7. Partially accepted in finding of fact 2. 8. Partially accepted in finding of fact 5. 9-10. Partially accepted in finding of fact 6. 11. Partially accepted in finding of fact 7. 12-13. Partially accepted in finding of fact 3. 14. Partially accepted in finding of fact 8. 15. Partially accepted in finding of fact 9. 16. Partially accepted in finding of fact 10. 17-18. Partially accepted in finding of fact 9. 19. Partially accepted in finding of fact 11. 20. Partially accepted in finding of fact 12. 21. Rejected as being unnecessary. 22-23. Partially accepted in finding of fact 12. 24. Partially accepted in finding of fact 13. 25-26. Partially accepted in finding of fact 12. 27. Partially accepted in finding of fact 13. 28. Rejected as being unnecessary. 29. Partially accepted in finding of fact 13. 30. Partially accepted in finding of fact 15. 31. Partially accepted in finding of fact 13. 32. Partially accepted in finding of fact 16. 33-34. Partially accepted in finding of fact 17. 35. Partially accepted in finding of fact 15. 36. Rejected as being unnecessary. 37. Partially accepted in finding of fact 17. 38. Partially accepted in finding of fact 1. 39. Partially accepted in finding of fact 20. 40-42. Partially accepted in finding of fact 21. 43-44. Partially accepted in finding of fact 24. 45. Partially accepted in finding of fact 45. 46-47. Partially accepted in finding of fact 23. 48. Rejected as being cumulative. 49. Partially accepted in finding of fact 18. 50. Partially accepted in finding of fact 23. 51. Partially accepted in finding of fact 26. 52. Rejected as being unnecessary. 53. Partially accepted in finding of fact 26. 54-58. Partially accepted in finding of fact 28. 59. Partially accepted in finding of fact 30. 60-62. Partially accepted in finding of fact 29. 63. Rejected as being unnecessary. 64. Partially accepted in finding of fact 30. Respondent: Partially accepted in finding of fact 2. Rejected as being unnecessary. Partially accepted in finding of fact 7. Partially accepted in finding of fact 5. Partially accepted in finding of fact 6. Partially accepted in findings of fact 4 and 6. Partially accepted in findings of fact 8 and 14. Partially accepted in finding of fact 17. Partially accepted in finding of fact 18. Partially accepted in finding of fact 20. Partially accepted in findings of fact 20 and 21. Partially accepted in finding of fact 25. Partially accepted in finding of fact 16. Partially accepted in finding of fact 26. 15-16. Partially accepted in findings of fact 23 and 24. Note - Where a proposed finding of fact has been partially accepted, the remainder has been rejected as being irrelevant, unnecessary, subordinate, not supported by the more credible and persuasive evidence, or a conclusion of law. COPIES FURNISHED: Sharon Moultry, Clerk Human Relations Commission Building F, Suite 240 325 John Knox Road Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149 Dana C. Baird, Esquire Building F, Suite 240 325 John Knox Road Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149 George F. Schaefer, Esquire The Liberty House 1005 S. W. 2nd Avenue Gainesville, Florida 32601-6116 Paul T. Stagliano, Esquire Stephen T. Breaux, Esquire Suite 4300 675 West Peachtree Street, N. E. Atlanta, Georgia 30375
The Issue The issue to be resolved is whether Petitioner, Emma J. Brown, was subject to discrimination in her employment by Respondent for the reasons alleged in her Petition for Relief.
Findings Of Fact Based upon the demeanor of the witnesses while testifying, exhibits admitted in evidence, and stipulations and argument of the parties, the following relevant, material, and substantive facts are found: Petitioner, Emma J. Brown (Ms. Brown), an African- American female, began working for Respondent, Sunbelt Health Care (Sunbelt), a nursing home in Zephyrhills, Florida, as a Certified Nursing Assistant (CNA) on or about February 11, 2002, after an interview by Barbara Derby-Bartlett (Ms. Derby- Bartlett), director of nursing, who made the decision to hire Ms. Brown. Margaret Levesque (Ms. Levesque), a white female, was hired as a CNA by Sunbelt in June of 2002. A CNA's duties include assisting the nursing staff in overall patient care. At the time of their hire, all new employees were required to attend an orientation process. During orientation, new employees, including Ms. Brown, were given a copy of Sunbelt's employee handbook and other printed materials, including Sunbelt's "Call-Off Guides" policy. The "Call-Off Guides" policy specifies the means and method employees are required to follow when they can not be present for their scheduled work shifts. The policy also informs the new employee that repeated absenteeism will result in immediate dismissal. Sunbelt is a 24-hour, full-care facility with residents located in both its north side wing and south side wing. Employees work on both wings. Sunbelt used two shifts, the day shift and the night shift, to provide residents with 24-hour care and service. Ms. Brown testified that at the time of her hire, she informed Sunbelt that she could not work the day (first) shift because she had another job. Her request to work the night (second) shift was granted. On February 22, 2002, after 11 days of employment, Ms. Brown suffered an on-the-job injury to her wrist. Ms. Brown re-injured her wrist on March 22, 2002, and suffered an on-the- job back injury on April 7, 2002. Ms. Brown, through counsel, filed workers' compensation claims for her on-the-job injuries. Ms. Brown's treating physician placed her on work restrictions, limiting her duties to no bending and no lifting over 20 pounds. On or about May 24, 2002, Ms. Brown returned to work and presented her work restrictions, and Sunbelt assigned Ms. Brown to the night shift to perform light-duty work assignments. The light-duty work assigned to Ms. Brown consisted of answering residents' call lights, checking their vital signs, assisting residents with their meals (passing trays), and replenishing their water supplies on both the north and south wings. Ms. Brown requested that Sunbelt change her work schedule to day shift and allow her to work five consecutive days with weekends off. This request was denied. During the pertinent time, two other CNAs, Ms. Levesque and Shirley Manley (Ms. Manley), were also on light-duty. Ms. Levesque and Ms. Manley, white females, performed light-duty work assignments on both the north and south wings similar to those performed by Ms. Brown. According to Ms. Brown, Ms. Levesque worked weekdays for two consecutive months with no weekend duty, and she was not allowed to do likewise. On June 6, 2002, Sunbelt transferred Ms. Brown from night shift to day shift. Ms. Brown maintained that there is "more light-duty work" during the day shift than during the night shift, and by keeping her on the day shift, her workload was increased when compared to CNAs working during the night shift. Ms. Brown filed her claim of discrimination, and Sunbelt, by and through counsel, attempted settlement of Ms. Brown's claim of discrimination without success. Ms. Brown maintained that the proffered settlement did not justify the treatment she received. Sunbelt presented the testimony of Ms. Levesque, who was hired in June 2002 as a CNA but was initially assigned to the duty and function of "staffing coordinator." The staffing coordinator is a day shift employee whose primarily duties consisted of preparing CNAs' work schedules and identifying and securing replacements for those CNAs who called in and, for whatever reasons, did not or could not report for duty as scheduled. During her staffing coordinator assignment, Ms. Levesque also assisted CNAs in their duties, but was assigned light-duty with a 20-pound lifting restriction. Her CNA duties include passing food trays during breakfast, lunch, and dinner; replenishing water; and anything that did not require her to physically pick-up and/or lift a resident. In or about mid-August of 2002, Ms. Levesque's schedule changed, and she was required to work every other weekend. On several occasions, Ms. Levesque and Ms. Brown worked on the same shift, but not on the same wing. Ms. Derby-Bartlett testified that upon receipt from an employee's physician detailing the employee's limitations, she would work within those specific limitations in assigning CNAs to light-duty. According to Ms. Derby-Bartlett, light-duty work assignments are less during the night when residents are asleep and more during the day when residents are awake. After her appointment to the position of director of nursing, Ms. Derby-Bartlett became aware that Ms. Levesque was not working every other weekend and informed Ms. Levesque that she would be scheduled to work every other weekend. Ms. Levesque's request for a couple of weeks to make adjustments was granted, and she thereafter was scheduled to work every other weekend. Ms. Derby-Bartlett confirmed that Ms. Brown was assigned light-duty work assignments on June 6, 2002, and Ms. Brown was a no-show for work. On July 3, 2002, Ms. Brown was assigned light-duty, and she called in as a no-show. On July 4, 2002, Ms. Brown was assigned light-duty, and she did not call in or show for work. On July 5, 2002, Ms. Brown was assigned light-duty, and she did not call in or show for work. Ms. Derby-Bartlett contacted the staffing person on each day Ms. Brown called in and on each day Ms. Brown was a no- show, confirming the accuracy of the reports. Ms. Derby-Bartlett contacted Ms. Brown regarding her no-calls and no-shows and informed her of Sunbelt's policy of termination for repeated absenteeism. Ms. Brown, believing her doctor had called Sunbelt on one of the days she was a no-show, was mistaken because no doctor called. On July 5, 2002, Ms. Derby-Bartlett completed Sunbelt's disciplinary form to terminate Ms. Brown due to her several no-calls and no-shows, in violation of Sunbelt's policy, and forwarded her recommendation to Maria Coddington, Sunbelt's unit manager. Ms. Derby-Bartlett testified that since her appointment as director of nursing, the no-show/no-call termination policy has been consistently applied, and she was not aware of any employee who had been no-show/no-call for two consecutive days who had not been terminated. Five months after hiring Ms. Brown, Ms. Derby-Bartlett terminated her. Sunbelt's employee handbook's "Call-Off Guides" policy regarding absenteeism provides, in pertinent part that: "if employees do not call in or do not show up for work for two consecutive days or three nonconsecutive days, it is grounds for termination." Each employee, as did Ms. Brown, signed individual employment documents attesting to having received a copy of Sunbelt's "Call-Off Guides" policy when hired. Ms. Brown was terminated because of her violation of Sunbelt's policy regarding two or more absenteeism without notice to her employer and her repeated failure, albeit her belief that her physician was going to call on her behalf and did not do so, to timely inform her employer of her absence from scheduled duty. Ms. Brown's termination by Sunbelt was based on her violation of their employee work attendance policy and not because of her race and/or ethnic origin. Ms. Brown failed to present a prima facie case of discrimination based on her race as alleged in her complaint of discrimination.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief filed by Petitioner, Emma J. Brown. DONE AND ENTERED this 20th day of August, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S FRED L. BUCKINE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of August, 2004. COPIES FURNISHED: Emma J. Brown 38723 Barbara Lane Dade City, Florida 33523 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Alan M. Gerlach, Esquire Adventist Health System-Legal Services 111 North Orlando Avenue Winter Park, Florida 32789 Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
