The Issue Whether the license of Respondent should be suspended for violation of the Mortgage Brokerage Act, Chapter 494, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Respondent Irving Zimmerman holds Mortgage Brokerage Registration No. 90-3337. An Order of Emergency Suspension of License was issued by the Department of Banking and Finance dated March 24, 1975 and served on Respondent Irving Zimmerman by certified mail. Said Emergency Order is now in effect: Through his attorney, Milton R. Wasman, Respondent Zimmerman requested this formal administrative hearing. The attorney for Respondent, Mr. Milton R. Wasman, called the undersigned Hearing Officer on the day immediately preceding this hearing, that is June 23, 1975, requesting that the hearing be postponed because of a physical disability of said attorney. Said request was denied because of the late hour of request and because of grievous inconvenience to the parties and to the witnesses that had been subpoenaed. Said request was denied orally by telephone to Respondent's attorney whereupon said attorney requested that the transcript of the proceeding be made available. Said attorney was assured that he could view the transcript upon his request when it was available. Upon request of William Corbett, Counsel for the agency, authorization was given to take the deposition of witness Joseph M. Magill, a witness who could not attend the hearing. Said deposition is filed with this record. The attorney for Respondent Zimmerman, Mr. Wasman appeared in behalf of the Respondent at the taking of said deposition in Miami, Florida on July 18, 1975. The following instruments were made part of the record: Summons dated March 24, 1975; Order of Emergency Suspension of License filed March 24, 1975; Petition for Hearing filed by Respondent's attorney; Deposition of witness for the agency, Mr. Joseph M. Magill; Transcript of record of this hearing and also transcript of record at the taking of deposition. On or about July 10, 1974, Mr. Leonard G. Pardue issued a check in the amount of $7,500 payable to "State Farm Mortgage Co., escrow account" for the purpose of making a mortgage loan to Hans G. and Ann M. Widenhauser. Subsequently, after the Widenhausers decided not to make this loan, the Respondent contacted Mr. Pardue and attempted to negotiate a substitute loan to Alan and Marcia Hollet. After that loan did not close, Mr. Pardue, by his attorney, Mr. Roger G. Welcher, wrote several letters to Respondent which demanded a return of the $7,500 to his client. Mr. Pardue filed a civil suit against Respondent to recover said funds; however, as of the date of the hearing, the Respondent has failed or refused to return the money. Mr. Bernard Supworth made a mortgage loan to Robert E. and Madeline Pope in June of 1972, through the Respondent as broker. The monthly payments were made to Respondent who in turn was supposed to remit the funds to Mr. Supworth. Subsequently, on or about January 25, 1974, Respondent advised Mr. Supworth that the mortgage was being paid off and Mr. Supworth executed and delivered a Satisfaction thereof to Respondent. Later, Mr. Supworth learned that the Pope mortgage had been paid off in July, 1973, and that a check had been issued by Dade Federal and Savings & Loan Association on July 9, 1973, payable to State Farm Mortgage in the amount of $3,544.98. Notwithstanding such payment in full on the Pope mortgage in July, 1973, Respondent continued to remit monthly payments on it to Mr. Supworth. Mr. Supworth had not agreed to receive any monthly payments after the mortgage had been satisfied and to date has not received all of his money on the Pope transaction. Respondent Zimmerman negotiated another mortgage loan to Mr. Supworth to James and Phyllis Lowe, as borrowers in the amount of $4,600 to be paid in the amount of $97.74 per month. These payments were to be paid by the Lowes to the Respondent, who was to remit said payment to Mr. Supworth. Thereafter, on or about November 21, 1973, Respondent advised Mr. Supworth, by memorandum, that this mortgage must be paid off. Thereupon, Mr. Supworth executed and delivered a Satisfaction of Mortgage to Respondent. He continued to receive monthly payments from Respondent on the Lowe mortgage up until January, 1975. Mr. Supworth later learned that the Lowe mortgage had been paid in full to Respondent in October, 1973. Mr. Supworth had not agreed to this transaction. On or about August 15, 1973, Mrs. Judith Valenza made a mortgage loan at the Commercial Bank of Kendall. Later Mrs. Valenza negotiated a mortgage loan through Respondent, as broker, to pay off the existing mortgage to the Commercial Bank of Kendall. Pursuant to that transaction, Mrs. Valenza closed said loan through Respondent, as broker. Thereafter, a check was issued on "Irving Zimmerman Trust Account" in the amount of $3,510.78, and payable to the Commercial Bank of Kendall. The check was returned because of "insufficient funds". As of the date of the hearing, the Commercial Bank of Kendall had not received payment of said check from Respondent. On or about January 28, 1975, Mr. and Mrs. Joseph M. Magill executed a note and mortgage in the amount of $3,500 in favor or Helen R. Stahl, as trustee, at the offices of Respondent. Respondent failed to account for or deliver money to the person entitled thereto, on demand failed to disburse funds in accordance with the agreement, and failed to keep funds in a trust account.
The Issue In this proceeding pursuant to Section 120.56(4), Florida Statutes, Petitioner Dave Taylor (“Taylor) alleges that various purported “statements” which he attributes to Respondent Department of Banking and Finance (the “Department”) constitute rules-by-definition that were not adopted under, and therefore violate, Section 120.54(1)(a), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact The evidence adduced at final hearing established the facts that follow. The Department of Banking and Finance is the state agency charged with the administration of Chapter 494, Florida Statutes, titled “Mortgage Brokerage and Mortgage Lending.” As such, it is responsible for regulating all persons, including mortgage brokers and lenders, licensed under that chapter. Taylor is licensed under Chapter 494 as a mortgage broker and as a “continuing education school.” His firm, Florida Compliance Specialists, Inc., provides consulting services to Chapter 494 licensees. The present dispute stems from amendments to Chapter 494 that the legislature enacted during the 2001 regular session. See Ch. 2001-228, Laws of Florida. These amendments were contained in a bill (CS/HB 455) approved by the governor on June 13, 2001, and became effective on October 1, 2001; they created a new position called “principal representative.” As defined by the legislature, the term “principal representative” means “an individual who operates the business operations of a licensee under part III.” Section 494.001(29), Florida Statutes (2001) (emphasis added).4 This statutory definition is amplified in a mandate that requires all licensees (and applicants) to designate a “principal representative who exercises control of the licensee’s business[.]” Sections 494.0061(8) and 494.0062(11), Florida Statutes. (Emphasis added). Notably, the terms “operates” and “exercises control of” are not defined. As mentioned, the statute requires all licensees and applicants to designate a PR. Although PRs do not engage in a licensed occupation (i.e. there is no PR license), an individual appointed to the post of PR after October 1, 2001, must satisfy certain educational and testing requirements (the details of which are not important here), and the designating lender must submit documents showing that its PRD has complied with those requirements.5 After the governor signed CS/HB 455 into law but before the amended statutes took effect, the Department began making rules to implement the new provisions. Before long, proposed rules were published in the August 31, 2001, issue of Florida Administrative Weekly. One provision of these proposed rules instructed that “[a]n individual can only be a principal representative for one [lender].” This “one lender to a PR” proposal did not implement an explicit statutory directive but arose from the Department’s then-prevailing interpretation of the statutory description of a PR as one who “operates” and “exercises control of” the lender’s business. Further illuminating the Department’s understanding of these terms were the Designation forms that it proposed to adopt, wherein the PRD was required to acknowledge that he or she would be “in full charge, control, and supervision of the [lender’s] business.” A person, the Department reasoned, could be “in full charge,” etc., of but one company at a time. In the course of rulemaking, however, the Department receded from its original interpretation. As a result, revised proposed rules——from which the bright line, “one lender to a PR” directive had been deleted——were published in the October 5, 2001, Florida Administrative Weekly.6 An amended Designation, which unlike earlier versions lacked language requiring a PRD to confirm (with his or her signature) having “full charge, control, and supervision” of the applicant’s or licensee’s business, was proposed as well.7 By the end of January 2002, the Department’s proposed rules relating to PRs had been adopted and, at the time of this Final Order, were among the agency’s duly promulgated, existing rules. See Rule 3D-40.242, Florida Administrative Code. Although the Department does not presently have a bright line rule or policy that flatly forbids an individual from serving simultaneously as PR to more than one licensee, the Department continues to be skeptical that a dual designee can effectively perform, for more than one lender at a time, the responsibilities that it believes inhere in the office of PR. Accordingly, whenever a lender or applicant nominates an XPR for PR, the Department without exception subjects that lender’s Designation to stricter scrutiny than would be given if its PRD were not an XPR. (Indeed, if the PRD is not an XPR, then the Department presumes that he or she will be able to carry out the duties of a PR and hence makes no inquiry as to how the PRD will function as PR.) The first outward manifestations of the Department’s internal decision to scrutinize any Designation in which an applicant’s PRD is an XPR emerged in late November 2001 after the agency had received four separate applications naming Taylor as PR.8 As the Department had discovered upon review of these four applications, Taylor was already serving as PR to an existing licensee. This situation had given rise to a dilemma for which the Department was not fully prepared, as evidenced by a November 26, 2001, e-mail message from an agency attorney to the responsible policy makers in which she (the attorney) had advised that: There are two pending applications in which there are no deficiencies and we need to decide how will [sic] we will proceed since we took out the language in the rule that specifically stated an individual could only be a PR for one company at a time. Let me know what times you would be available [for a meeting to decide what to do]. The Department quickly decided what to do. Between November 27 and November 29, 2001, the Department issued four nearly identical letters, one sent by certified mail to each applicant who had chosen Taylor as its PR, which provided, in pertinent part: We are in receipt of your company’s application to become licensed as a mortgage lender in the State of Florida. A review of the application materials indicates that [applicant’s name] has designated Dave Taylor at [address] as the company’s Principal Representative. [The next four paragraphs quote Sections 494.001(29); 494.0062(11); 494.0062(1)(f); and 494.0062(12), Florida Statutes, which pertain to PRs.] Sections 494.0072(1) and (2)(c), Florida Statutes, provide as follows: Whenever the department finds a person in violation of an act specified in subsection (2), it may enter an order imposing one or more of the following penalties against that person: Revocation of a license or registration. Suspension of a license or registration, subject to reinstatement upon satisfying all reasonable conditions that the department specifies. Placement of the licensee or applicant on probation for a period of time and subject to all reasonable conditions that the department specifies. Issuance of a reprimand. Imposition of a fine in an amount not exceeding $5,000 for each count or separate offense. Denial of a license or registration. Each of the following acts constitutes a ground for which the disciplinary actions specified in subsection (1) may be taken: (c) A material misstatement of fact on an initial or renewal application.[9] Dave Taylor has already been designated as a principal representative for another licensed lender under part III of Chapter 494, Florida Statutes. Please advise in detail how Mr. Taylor will operate and exercise control over your business.[10] We request that your response be submitted to the Department within 10 days of the date of this letter. If you have any questions regarding this matter, please call me at [phone number]. On or about November 30, 2001, the Department created a new deficiency code, DF 416, the description of which is “principal representative is designated to more than one entity.” This is an active deficiency code and is used consistently as a “red flag” on all applications to which it applies. When an application is tagged with a DF 416, the applicant is sent a letter in the form of the letters quoted in the preceding paragraph. This letter will hereafter be referred to as the “DF 416 Inquiry Letter.”11 It is important to emphasize that all applicants whose PRD is an XPR are sent the DF 416 Inquiry Letter, without exception.12 It is undisputed that Taylor has met all of the educational and testing requirements necessary to serve as a PR, and that the Department has no objection, based on facts and circumstances unique to Taylor, to Taylor’s being a lender’s PR. (In fact, he is presently a PR to one lender,13 under a designation to which the Department, consistent with its policy and practice of making no inquiry concerning PRDs who are not XPRs, raised no objection.) The Department’s concern about Taylor’s having been designated a PR by more than one company is indistinguishable from the concern that it expresses regarding all dual designees. This is why, although the contents of the DF 416 Inquiry Letter were developed to resolve a problem that specifically involved Taylor and his clients, the Department decided (and was able) to implement its Taylor-made solution on a generally applicable basis by sending the DF 416 Inquiry Letter to all applicants whose PRD is a dual designee. Each of the four applicants that had designated Taylor as its PR declined the Department’s November 2001 invitation to submit detailed information regarding the manner in which Taylor would operate and control the licensed business. Each applicant chose, instead, to designate someone else as PR. Thus, whatever advantages or considerations Taylor expected to receive in exchange for serving as these lenders’ PR were lost; the Department’s letters (the letters that became the form for the DF 416 Inquiry Letter) were the proximate cause of that loss, in that but for the letters, the lenders would not summarily have severed their respective business relationships with Taylor. After deciding how to deal with applicants whose PRDs are XPRs, the Department turned its attention to the dual designees of existing licensees. This was, in a sense, a bigger problem because, in their respective Designations, more than 50 licensees had selected an individual for PR who was a dual designee. Beginning around December 12, 2001, the Department sent all these lenders a letter similar to the DF 416 Inquiry Letter. This letter stated: We are in receipt of the principal representative designation forms for the following companies: [lender’s names]. A review of the principal representative forms indicates that [PRD’s name and address] has been designated the Principal Representative for both companies. [The next two paragraphs quote statutory provisions pertaining to PRs.] Sections 494.0072(1) and (2)(p) state as follows: Whenever the department finds a person in violation of an act specified in subsection (2), it may enter an order imposing one or more of the following penalties against that person: Revocation of a license or registration. Suspension of a license or registration, subject to reinstatement upon satisfying all reasonable conditions that the department specifies. Placement of the licensee or applicant on probation for a period of time and subject to all reasonable conditions that the department specifies. Issuance of a reprimand. Imposition of a fine in an amount not exceeding $5,000 for each count or separate offense. Denial of a license or registration. Each of the following acts constitutes a ground for which the disciplinary actions specified in subsection (1) may be taken: (p) Failure to comply with, or violations of, any other provision of ss. 494.001-494.0077. Please advise in detail how you will operate and exercise control over both of the above- mentioned businesses. We request that your response be submitted to the Department within 14 days of the date of this letter. If you have any questions regarding this matter, please call me at [phone number]. This form letter will be referred to as the “Compliance Inquiry Letter.” The evidence is unequivocal that the Department has sent, and plans to send, the Compliance Inquiry Letter to all licensees whose Designation names a person determined to be a dual designee, without exception.14 Taylor’s Description of the Alleged Rules-by-Definition In his petition, as required by Section 120.56(4)(a), Florida Statutes, Taylor described the alleged rules-by- definition. Here, in his words, are the Department’s alleged statements: Only one person can realistically “operate the business operations” of a licensee and “exercise control over the licensee’s business.” Therefore, only one individual shall prima facie be designated as principal representative for only one mortgage lender. The above rule shall not apply, however, to mortgage lenders which the Department deems to be “grand-fathered” i.e., such companies who designated their principal representative on or prior to October 1, 2001, the effective date of the statutory amendments. In such instances, an individual will be permitted multiple designations without further departmental scrutiny or inquiry as to how that individual will “operate” or “exercise control over each business.”[Footnote omitted]. Except for “grand-fathered” companies, if an individual once designated principal representative by a mortgage lender is similarly designated principal representative by a separate mortgage lender, the Department based upon the agency statement recited in (a) above, will require the subsequent mortgage lender(s) (i.e., the lender(s) other than the one first designating that individual) to provide in writing a detailed explanation to the Department, subject to potential sanctions, describing how that individual will operate and exercise control over that second mortgage lender. The Department considers as a “licensing deficiency” any mortgage lender application or principal representative designation submitted to the Department where the individual designated as the mortgage lender’s principal representative has previously been and continues to be designated principal representative by another mortgage lender. The Department, based upon this “deficiency,” shall not deem the application(s) “complete” for purposes of section 120.60, Florida Statutes. Such application(s) shall be subjected to the licensing procedures set forth in paragraphs (e) and (f) hereafter. In conformity with the agency statement set forth in (a) above, the Department will not undertake an inquiry of the principal representative designation submitted by the mortgage lender who first designated the individual as its’ principal representative. The Department will require mortgage lenders to provide the information referred to in section c above, through the use of a form, [i.e., the form letters attached as EXHIBITS “14”, “15”, & “16”, to this Petition]. Further, this form created for the purpose of soliciting information [not specifically required by statute or an existing rule] will require mortgage lenders to provide a response, specifically subject to announced sanctions, of details not otherwise required under the applicable statutes or rules. The Department, though requiring mortgage lenders to comply with the agency statements through the threat of announced sanctions, shall not provide to mortgage lenders or their designated principal representatives any clarifying or defining circumstances or criteria the Department will deem as acceptable——contractual or otherwise——for a person to be designated as principal representative for more than one mortgage lender. Any responses provided by such mortgage lenders in response to the Department’s written form shall be submitted by the applicant “at their peril.” Ultimate Factual Determinations In his just-quoted statements “a,” “c,” “d,” and “e,” Taylor described, with reasonable particularity, the essence of policies that, in fact, fall within the statutory definition of the term “rule.” Statement “a” describes (albeit somewhat imprecisely) a Departmental mindset, the view that a person is likely to have difficulty simultaneously serving more than one master as a PR; the last sentence of statement “d” accurately describes the Department’s related policy of not inquiring as to how a PRD who is not a dual designee will operate and control the lender’s business (because the agency presumes that a person will probably have no difficulty serving as PR to one lender at a time). Taken together, these views, in fact, constitute the Department’s interpretation of the PR statutes.15 Taylor’s statement “c” and the third sentence of “d” (all of which, of course, he attributes to the Department) correctly describe, for the most part,16 the Department’s policy of requiring additional information from all licensees and applicants whose Designations nominate an XPR for the position of PR. This policy is plainly driven by the Department’s interpretation of the PR statutes, and it leads, in turn, directly to statement “e.” Restated to conform to the evidence, statement “e” holds that the Department will send either the DF 416 Inquiry Letter or the Compliance Inquiry Letter, whichever is applicable, to any lender whose PRD is an XPR. It is the form letters——the DF 416 Inquiry Letter and the Compliance Inquiry Letter——that have emerged as the most visible, most readily identifiable unadopted rules of the Department, for they solicit information not specifically required by statute or by an existing rule. By the end of December 2001 at the latest, rulemaking was both feasible and practicable with regard to the above- described statements, but no effort was made to adopt them as rules. Thus, the Department failed timely to commence rulemaking with regard to these statements in accordance with Section 120.54(1)(a), Florida Statutes.17
Conclusions For Petitioner: H. Richard Bisbee, Esquire Law Office of H. Richard Bisbee 124 Salem Court, Suite A Tallahassee, Florida 32301-2810 For Respondent: Cynthia K. Maynard, Esquire James H. Harris, Esquire Department of Banking and Finance Fletcher Building, Suite 526 101 East Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0350
Other Judicial Opinions A party who is adversely affected by this Final Order is entitled to judicial review pursuant to Section 120.68, Florida Statutes. Review proceedings are governed by the Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure. Such proceedings are commenced by filing the original notice of appeal with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings and a copy, accompanied by filing fees prescribed by law, with the District Court of Appeal, First District, or with the District Court of Appeal in the Appellate District where the party resides. The notice of appeal must be filed within 30 days of rendition of the order to be reviewed.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondent discriminated against Petitioner based on Petitioner's disability.
Findings Of Fact Mr. McMahon was a member of Suncoast beginning in approximately 1986. In 2008 and 2009, Mr. McMahon had a checking account, a VISA card, a savings account, and a loan with Suncoast. Mr. McMahon claims that he is disabled and that he suffers from personality disorders, post-traumatic stress, passive aggression, and obsessive compulsive disorder. No medical evidence was presented to substantiate his claims. He has been receiving benefits from the Social Security Administration based on a personality disorder since approximately 1996. Suncoast perceived Mr. McMahon as having a disability, based on his repeated assertions that he was disabled. In November 2008, Mr. McMahon filed a complaint with the Better Business Bureau of West Florida, Inc. (BBB), alleging that Suncoast was discriminating against him by not accommodating his communication disability. The BBB investigated and found that Suncoast had blocked access to Mr. McMahon's accounts because he was delinquent on a loan. The BBB contacted Suncoast concerning the complaint, and Suncoast provided Mr. McMahon a three-month payment due date extension on the loan, lowered his monthly payments, and unblocked his account. In January 2009, Mr. McMahon was delinquent on his loan. Again Suncoast tried to help Mr. McMahon with his delinquent account. At some point, Mr. McMahon's loan payments were put on automatic payments in order to reduce his delinquencies. Money would automatically be taken out of his account to make the monthly loan payments. Mr. McMahon had a direct deposit for his Social Security benefits payments. After the loan payments began being deducted automatically, Mr. McMahon canceled his direct deposits into the account from which his payments were automatically being deducted. Thus, there was no money in the account to make the monthly payments on his loan, and Mr. McMahon ceased making payments on the loan and again became delinquent on his loan. When one of Suncoast's members becomes overdrawn with regards to either a checking or savings account or credit card, or is delinquent in making payments on any credit card or loan obligation, that member loses access to his or her services, including use of all internet services, ATM cards, ATM machines, credit cards, and debit cards. The member would also be unable to access his or her account balance or make deposits into overdrawn accounts if the member attempted to make a deposit via ATM, as those services are suspended. These restrictions are typically automatically placed upon the accounts of any member with a delinquent loan account after 60 days of delinquency, and within 30 days of any overdrawn share draft account. Any member with a delinquent or overdrawn account, where services were suspended would be prevented from applying for a mortgage loan. If the member contacted Suncoast staff to apply for a mortgage loan or to utilize any other services, the member would be directed to the loss mitigation section of Suncoast, and loss mitigation would attempt to collect the debt or rectify the delinquency. Because Mr. McMahon again became delinquent on his loan payments after stopping the direct deposits, his accounts were restricted, meaning that he could not access the accounts. Mr. McMahon began a campaign of making repeated calls to Suncoast, screaming and yelling at Suncoast representatives, talking over the representatives, making vulgar statements, and using profanity. Mr. McMahon attributes his behavior to his communication disability and requested on numerous occasions that Suncoast accommodate his disability with "patience and understanding." A note was placed in the loss mitigation's note system and in Suncoast's host system, so that all employees of Suncoast who were working with Mr. McMahon could see and accommodate his request for patience and understanding. Suncoast representatives did provide Mr. McMahon with an abundance of patience and understanding. However, nothing seemed to appease Mr. McMahon, and his repeated calls were unproductive. Because of the repeated nature of Mr. McMahon's calls and his behavior during the telephone calls, there were numerous complaints by Suncoast's representatives to management. Jacqueline Gilbert (Ms. Gilbert), vice president of loss mitigation, determined that in order to protect Suncoast's representatives from Mr. McMahon's harassing behavior that all calls should be directed to her; Linda Fales (Ms. Fales), vice president of risk management, cardholder disputes, and DSA compliance for Suncoast; or Ben Felder (Mr. Felder), Suncoast's general counsel. Suncoast's representatives were advised that Mr. McMahon's calls should be transferred to Ms. Gilbert, Ms. Fales, or Mr. Felder. When the representatives would tell Mr. McMahon that they could not help him and that his call would have to be transferred, Mr. McMahon was verbally abusive to the representatives. Many times, if Mr. McMahon was going to be transferred, he would hang up and call right back to speak with a different representative. Sometimes, Mr. McMahon would call and hang up when a representative answered the call. At different times, Ms. Gilbert, Ms. Fales, and Mr. Felder talked with Mr. McMahon to attempt to discuss the reasons that his account was restricted. However, they had little success in communicating with Mr. McMahon because of his behavior. Although Mr. Felder was not able to service Mr. McMahon's account, he decided to handle all Mr. McMahon's requests and assign any work to be done to the appropriate employee because Mr. McMahon's behavior toward Ms. Gilbert and other Suncoast employees was unacceptable. Mr. McMahon did not make any loan payments between May 2009 and August 2009. During this same time period, Mr. McMahon's VISA credit card was well overdrawn. Carolyn Stepp (Ms. Stepp) had cosigned on Mr. McMahon's loan. On or about September 4, 2009, Suncoast exercised its "right of offset" and used funds in both Mr. McMahon's and Ms. Stepp's accounts to pay off the loan. There was still an outstanding balance of $1,046.86 on his VISA credit card. On September 10 and 14, 2009, Mr. McMahon asked to apply for a mortgage loan by telephone. He was not sure that Suncoast would give him a loan because of his delinquent accounts, but he felt that he should have the opportunity to apply because the loan had been satisfied when Suncoast exercised its right of offset. Although the loan was satisfied, Mr. McMahon still had an outstanding balance on his VISA credit card, which he had not been able to use for several months because his accounts had been restricted. He was advised that he would have to contact Mr. Felder to discuss the status of his account. On September 11, 2009, Mr. Felder and Mr. McMahon discussed his account. Part of the discussion concerned Suncoast's writing off Mr. McMahon's loan and VISA credit card balance, returning the offset amounts to Mr. McMahon's and Ms. Stepp's accounts, disbursing the remaining amounts in Mr. McMahon's account to him, and closing Mr. McMahon's accounts. At the conclusion of the conversation, Mr. Felder understood that Mr. McMahon was in favor of this solution and began to take steps to accomplish the tasks. Mr. Felder advised Mr. McMahon by telephone on September 17, 2009, that the tasks had been completed and that Mr. McMahon's accounts with Suncoast were closed, meaning that services at Suncoast were terminated and that Mr. McMahon's access to information was no longer available. Mr. Felder followed up the telephone conversation with a letter dated September 17, 2009, confirming the telephone conversation. Individuals who are not members of Suncoast are not qualified to apply for a mortgage loan with Suncoast. At the time that Mr. McMahon applied for a mortgage loan on September 14, 2009, his accounts at Suncoast were in the process of being closed. Mr. McMahon's requests to apply for a mortgage with Suncoast were not denied because Mr. McMahon was disabled. They were denied because Mr. McMahon had various account delinquencies.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered finding that Suncoast did not commit an unlawful housing practice and dismissing Mr. McMahon's Petition. DONE AND ENTERED this 27th day of April, 2011, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S SUSAN B. HARRELL Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of April, 2011.
The Issue Whether employees of Production Credit Associations and the Federal Land Bank Associations of Florida may be licensed to sell insurance by the Florida Department of Insurance. (a) Whether the affidavit by C. W. S. Horne offered by Intervenors Production Credit Associations of Florida and Federal Land Bank Associations of Florida is relevant and material to the issues. Whether the Production Credit Associations of Florida and the Federal Land Bank Associations of Florida are financial institutions as defined in Section 636.9_8 of the Florida Statutes. Whether the Department of Insurance, in its licensing proceedings, should consider or must consider the Federal laws, rules and regulations.
Findings Of Fact Facts stipulated by the parties on the record: "The Petitioners, the Florida Association of Insurance Agents, representing the Association and its members individually and collectively, is a representative party in interest for these proceedings and any review thereof. And its members will be effected by any decision of the Department of Insurance in licensing insurance agents to be employed by, retained by, or associated with Production Credit Associations in the State of Florida. For the purposes of this proceeding, and any review thereof, no member of the Association may take a position contrary to or in opposition to that taken herein by the Petitioner. "The Production Credit Associations of Florida and the Federal Land Bank Associations of Florida and the Federal Land Bank Associations of Florida have an interest in the decisions of the Department of Insurance with respect to the licensing of insurance agents to sell insurance on their behalf. And the decisions of the Department in licensing of such insurance agents will substantially effect the interest of the Production Credit Associations and the Federal Land Bank Associations of Florida, and they are therefore proper parties to the Administrative Proceedings. "Florida Farm Bureau Federation, L.A.A., (Limited Agricultural Association) is a non-profit voluntary general farm membership organization comprised of approximately 65,000 member families. The Florida Farm Bureau offers comprehensive insurance services to their members, and if the Department licenses insurance agents to be employed by or associated with the Production Credit Associations of Florida, they will be offering similar services that are already offered by the Florida Farm Bureau. "The Department of Insurance has licensed two insurance agents with type 2-20 general lines insurance licenses, which licenses since their issuance have been utilized by the holders thereof. The Production Credit Associations of Florida and the Federal Land Bank Associations of Florida have retained such licensed agents and have entered into the insurance business through the process of having such agents solicit and sell insurance to persons, including those who borrow from either the Production Credit Associations or the Federal Land Bank Associations of Florida. "The Intervenors, Production Credit Associations of Florida, may offer into evidence an affidavit concerning the operations of the Associations and their affiliates in Florida. The other parties hereto will not object to the form of the evidence, but reserve the right to object to its introduction on the grounds that it is irrelevant and immaterial. ". . .there are Federal rules and regulations under the Farm Credit Administration Act. The Hearing Officer may take judicial knowledge of such rules and regulations and any amendments thereto. ". . .it is stipulated that Mr. Field has witnesses that would testify to these items, and the other parties waive cross examination of such witnesses and agree to these facts without necessarily stipulating that such facts are true. ". . .Mr. Bob Taylor, Vice President for Underwriting of Farm Bureau Insurance Companies, would testify that Farm Bureau, through its related insurance companies and other competitive companies are currently offering cost, qualitatively and availability, similar insurance services to those being sought in rural communities. ". . .Mr. Doug Oswald, President of Sun Bank, Ocala, would testify as to the availability of farm loans during the last 24 years in the Ocala, Marion County, Florida area. He would testify that such loans are currently available through current commercial sources and have been available, and such loans, including both mortgage and production type loans, are presently available in Marion County. And that insurance related services in connection with the farm type loans in his community have been available through the Farm Bureau and other companies during this period of time. ". . .Mr. Bob Taylor, Vice President of Underwriting, Farm Bureau Insurance Companies, would also testify that similar insurance services proposed to be offered to the Production Credit Association and the Land Bank are presently being and have been offered by the Farm Bureau Insurance Companies in the rural communities on a competitive form from both cost, qualitatively and availability. The Hearing Officer further finds: The Production Credit Associations of Florida and the Federal Land Bank Associations of Florida are chartered by the Farm Credit Administration [a federal agency in the executive branch of the government subject to regulation and supervision by the Farm Credit Administration, Title 12, Chapter IV, United States Code] upon application of local persons eligible to borrow money from the Farm Credit System. There are nine (9) Production Credit Associations and seven (7) Federal Land Bank Associations in Florida. Two licenses have been approved by the Respondent for two employees or associates of the Production Credit Association. The following affidavit of C. W. S. Horne, Executive Vice President of Federal Land Banks of Columbia and the Federal Land Bank of Columbia, is admissible for the purpose of describing the operations and functions of the associations and their affiliates in Florida: "PERSONALLY APPEARED BEFORE ME C. W. S. Horne, being duly sworn deposes and says that he is the Executive Vice President of the Federal Land Bank of Columbia, and the Federal Credit Bank of Columbia, and that if called upon to testify in the above captioned matter he would state that according to his knowledge and belief the Farm Credit Act of 1971 does in fact provide in Section 1.4(11) as follows: "Accept deposits of securities or of current funds"; and that neither the Federal Land Bank nor the Federal Intermediate Credit Bank accepts any deposits from members of the general public in any form such as is common with commercial banks and that it accepts no deposits either for time or checking accounts or issue certificates of deposit or other similar evidences of indebtedness; and that pursuant to Section 1.4(11) of the Farm Credit Act of 1971, the Federal Land Bank of Columbia does retain certain funds belonging to Federal land bank Associations and that it issues an advice of indebtedness to the associations and pays interest thereon based upon the cost of money to the Federal Land Bank of Columbia and that in practice these transactions amount to loans by certain associations to the Federal Land Bank of Columbia. Further the deponent sayeth not." The Florida Farm Bureau Federation, a limited agricultural association is a non-profit, voluntary general farm membership organization. Members may, and many do, borrow from the Production Credit Associations and the Federal Land Bank Associations, associations which are a part of the Farm credit Systems. The Florida Farm Bureau offers comprehensive insurance to its members through individual agents licensed by the Respondent Department of Insurance.
Recommendation Deny applications for licensure from the Production credit Associations of Florida and for the federal Land Bank Associations of Florida and revoke any licenses that have been issued. DONE and ORDERED this 16th day of December, 1976 in Tallahassee, Florida. DELPHENE C. STRICKLAND Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of December, 1976. COPIES FURNISHED: Fred B. Karl, Esquire Post Office Drawer 229 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Edward L. Kutter, Esquire Room 268 Larson Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 E. Harper Field, Esquire Post Office Box 1879 Tallahassee, Florida Joseph C. Jacobs, Esquire Post Office Box 1170 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 J. R. Lowry, Esquire Bevin Ritch, Esquire Post Office Box 1025 Gainesville, Florida
The Issue Whether Respondent committed the violations alleged in the First Amended Administrative Complaint; and If so, what disciplinary action should be taken against him.
Findings Of Fact Based upon the evidence adduced at hearing, and the record as a whole, the following findings of fact are made: Respondent's Licensure Status Respondent is now, and has been at all times material to the instant case, a Florida-licensed life and health insurance agent. Counts I through VI At all times material to the instant case, Peter DeBello, Inc., d/b/a Emery Richardson Insurance (Corporation), a Florida corporation owned by Respondent's father, operated a general lines insurance agency (Emery Richardson Insurance) located in the state of Florida. The Corporation was formed to manage the assets of Emery Richardson, Inc., which assets Respondent's father had obtained through litigation. Respondent's father delegated to Respondent the authority to manage the affairs of the Corporation. The same day (in 1992) that the Corporation took possession of Emery Richardson, Inc.'s assets, it so notified the Department of Insurance (Department) by telephone. Shortly thereafter, Leo Joy, a Florida-licensed property and casualty insurance agent since 1961, was designated on a Department- provided form as the primary agent for Emery Richardson Insurance at its 240 Commercial Boulevard location in Lauderdale By The Sea, Florida, and the completed form was provided to the Department.3 At no time prior to the commencement of the instant administrative proceeding did Respondent himself personally notify the Department of the identity of Emery Richardson Insurance's primary agent. It was Mr. Joy who (in 1992) filled out the primary agent designation form and submitted it to the Department. Mr. Joy, however, did so on behalf of Respondent, who had verbally designated Mr. Joy as Emery Richardson Insurance's primary agent. Neither Respondent, Mr. Joy, nor any one else, has subsequently used the Department's primary agent designation form to advise the Department of Mr. Joy's continuing status as Emery Richardson Insurance's primary agent. In his capacity as president of the Corporation, Respondent, on behalf of the Corporation, in April of 1994, entered into an agreement (Agreement) with Ulico Casualty Company of Washington, D.C. (Ulico), which provided as follows: WHEREAS, the Applicant (Corporation), a licensed insurance agent and/or insurance broker, has heretofore obtained from the COMPANY (Ulico) or is desirous of obtaining from the COMPANY the placement of insurance for the Applicant's customers or principals, and WHEREAS, the COMPANY, using its facilities, has placed insurance for the Applicant or with whom Applicant has requested the placement of such insurance, NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the mutual promises herein contained, and for other good and valuable consideration, the receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged. It is mutually AGREED as follows: With reference to the placement of new insurance, Applicant shall submit to the COMPANY a separate application containing the name of each prospective insured, describing the risk to be considered for underwriting and binding. Applicant specifically understands and agrees that Applicant shall have no authority to authorize or write any insurance or bind any risk on behalf of the COMPANY without the prior written approval by a duly authorized representative of the COMPANY. With respect to any insurance heretofore placed with the COMPANY by the Applicant, and with respect to any insurance hereinafter placed by the Applicant, all premiums shall be payable to the COMPANY and such Applicant assumes and agrees to pay the COMPANY premiums on all the policies of insurance heretofore or hereinafter placed by Applicant with the COMPANY in accordance with the current statements rendered to the Applicant by the COMPANY, such payment to be made no later than 30 days after the month of issue of the insurance policy, or due date of any installment if issued on an installment basis, less any credits due to the Applicant for return premium, provided an appropriate credit memorandum therefor has previously been issued by the COMPANY to Applicant. In the absence of such credit memorandum, Applicant shall have no right of counterclaim or setoff with respect to any claimed credits due, but shall be required to establish entitlement to the same in a separate action. Applicant shall have the right, so long as Applicant is not indebted to the COMPANY, to deduct agreed upon commissions on each policy of insurance prior to remitting the remaining premium to the COMPANY. In the event that premiums on behalf of any insured party shall have been financed and refund of financed premiums are required from the COMPANY to the financing institution, Applicant shall forthwith refund and pay to the COMPANY all unearned commissions heretofore received with respect to such financed premiums. In the event that Applicant shall fail to make any payment to the COMPANY which is required to be made pursuant to this Agreement, within the time specified, the COMPANY shall have the right, at any time subsequent to the due date of payment, to cancel any policy on which the premium payments have not been remitted to the COMPANY, without prior notice to the Applicant, by sending notice of cancellation directly to the insured, except that Applicant shall continue to remain liable to the COMPANY for the payment of all premiums earned as of the date of cancellation which are collected by Applicant. Applicant represents that they are duly licensed as an insurance broker or agent for Casualty and Property Insurance as indicated in the States set forth below, and agrees that in the event that any license shall cease, terminate or be cancelled, that the Applicant will promptly notify the COMPANY accordingly. Applicant agrees, where required, to file at Applicant's expense, all necessary affidavits and collect all State or local premium taxes and to pay the same promptly to the respective taxing authorities on all insurance placed with the COMPANY, in accordance with the laws applicable in the State of licensing. No changes or modification of this Agreement shall be valid unless such change or modification is subscribed, in writing, by the COMPANY and Applicant. Ulico is one of approximately 47 insurance companies that Emery Richardson Insurance represents. In the past five years, Emery Richardson Insurance has received from clients in excess of seven or eight million dollars in premium payments, which it has deposited in its various checking accounts and then paid over to these insurance companies. Ulico is the only one of these 47 insurance companies to have experienced "problems" in receiving from Emery Richardson Insurance monies due. These "problems" are detailed below. On June 13, 1994, the Corporation opened a checking account (account no. 458-902279-9, hereinafter referred to as the "Account") with Savings of America at the bank's Hollywood, Florida, branch. The Peter Debello described on the signature card for the Account was Respondent's father. Respondent's father, however, through execution of a power of attorney, had authorized Respondent to act on his behalf in connection with the Account. On August 20, 1996, Respondent drafted and signed four checks drawn on the Account, which were made payable to Ulico: check no. 804, in the amount of $1,729.15, for "Teamsters #769, Policy #BOU 907"; check no. 805, in the amount of $1,071.65, for "Sheet Metal Appr. #32, Policy #CLU 668"; check no. 806, in the amount of $700.00, for "Sheet Metal #32, Policy #CLU 682"; and check no. 807, in the amount of $96.05, for "Painters L.U. 160, Policy #CLU 451." (These policies will hereinafter be referred to as the "Subject Policies.") On January 24, 1997, Respondent drafted and signed a check (check no. 882) drawn on the Account, in the amount of $7,500.00, which was also made payable to Ulico. Check nos. 804, 805, 806, 807,4 and 882 were sent to Ulico as payment for monies the Corporation owed Ulico (pursuant to the Agreement) for insurance coverage obtained from Ulico by the Corporation for its clients (as reflected in invoices Ulico sent the Corporation, which hereinafter will be referred to as the "Subject Invoices").5 At the time that he drafted and signed these checks and submitted them to Ulico, Respondent assumed that there were sufficient funds in the Account to cover the amounts of the checks. In drafting and signing these checks and submitting them to Ulico, Respondent did not make any statements or representations that he knew to be false or misleading. All five checks were returned by Savings of America unpaid, with the explanation, "insufficient funds," stamped on each check.6 (These checks will hereinafter be referred to as the "Dishonored Checks.") Ulico's premium collection manager, Gayle Shuler, spoke with Respondent, as well as with Mr. Joy, "many times" concerning the monies the Corporation owed Ulico. At no time did either Respondent or Mr. Joy indicate that they disputed the Subject Invoices7 (although Respondent and Mr. Joy did contest other invoices that they received from Ulico). Although aware that the Dishonored Checks had been returned due to insufficient funds8 and knowing that Ulico desired payment, Respondent failed to act promptly to remedy the situation. It was not until early 1998, after the commencement of the instant administrative proceeding, that Respondent, on behalf of the Corporation, took steps to address the matter. At that time, using Fidelity Express money orders purchased between February 26, 1998, and March 1, 1998, (which Respondent dated August 26, 1996), Respondent paid Ulico a portion ($1,867.70) of the total amount of the Dishonored Checks. The money orders were sent to Ulico by certified mail, along with a cover letter from Respondent. Respondent "backdated" the money orders to reflect "when [the monies owed Ulico] should have been" paid. He did so without any intent to mislead or deceive. There is no clear and convincing evidence that anyone other than Ulico was injured by Respondent's failure to timely pay over to Ulico the monies Emery Richardson Insurance had received from its clients for the Subject Policies (which monies belonged to Ulico). Respondent's failure to timely make such payments, it appears, was the product of isolated instances of carelessness, neglect and inattention on Respondent's part,9 which, when considered in light of the totality of circumstances, including his problem-free dealings with the other insurance companies Emery Richardson Insurance represents, were not so serious as to demonstrate a lack of fitness, trustworthiness or competency to engage in transactions authorized by his license. Count VII In August of 1986, Respondent visited Gary Faske, Esquire, at Mr. Faske's office in Dade County, Florida. The purpose of the visit was to have Mr. Faske complete the paperwork necessary to add Mr. Faske to his new employer's group major medical insurance policy with Union Bankers Insurance Company. After the paperwork was completed, Respondent left Mr. Faske's office with the completed paperwork, as well as a check from Mr. Faske's employer to cover the cost of adding Mr. Faske to the group policy.10 It is unclear what Respondent did with the paperwork and check after he left Mr. Faske's office. In October of that same year (1986), Mr. Faske took ill and had to be hospitalized on an emergency basis. He assumed that he was covered by his employer's group major medical insurance policy, but he subsequently learned that he was wrong and had to pay between $50,000.00 to $60,000.00 in medical bills. The evidence does not clearly and convincingly establish that Respondent (as opposed to Union Bankers Insurance Company or some other party) was responsible for Mr. Faske not having such coverage. Mr. Faske thereafter filed suit against Respondent and Union Bankers Insurance Company in Dade County Circuit Court. He settled his claim against the insurance company, but was unable to reach an agreement with Respondent. Respondent's case therefore went to trial, following which, on August 12, 1997, a Final Judgment11 was entered against Respondent in the amount of $40,271.00.12 Count VIII By filing an Address Correction Request, dated January 29, 1992, Respondent notified the Department that his new mailing address was 40 Hendricks Isle, Fort Lauderdale, Florida. The Department subsequently sent a letter, dated April 14, 1995, to Respondent at this 40 Hendricks Isle address. Respondent, however, "had just moved from that address," and the letter was returned to the Department stamped, "forward expired." In May of 1995, Respondent advised the Department in writing of his new mailing address. It is unclear whether such written notification was given more than, or within, 30 days from the date Respondent had moved to his new address.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Department issue a final order: (1) finding Respondent guilty of the violations noted in the Conclusions of Law of this Recommended Order; (2) penalizing Respondent for having committed these violations by suspending his license for 18 months; and (3) dismissing the remaining allegations of misconduct advanced in the First Amended Administrative Complaint. DONE AND ENTERED this 12th day of February, 1999, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. STUART M. LERNER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of February, 1999.
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the evidence adduced at the hearing, the Report of the hearing officer submitted on December 6, 1979, is hereby adopted and incorporated herein. It should be noted, however, that the total time and savings deposits for commercial banks in Collier County as of June 30, 1979, was $266,668,000 rather than $226,668,000 as indicated in the hearing officer's Report. The idea of establishing another savings and loan association in Naples originated with Robert E. Talley, a banker, and Allan L. McPeak, a lawyer. The name proposed for the new association is Marine Savings and Loan Association. No financial institution operating in Collier County at the time of the hearing had the word "Marine" in its name. All of the savings and loan associations in operation in Collier County at the time of the hearing had the word "federal" in their names. Applicant proposes to establish an office in downtown Naples, within a few blocks of several other financial institutions. Applicant has entered into a lease for the proposed facility, at an annual rental of $50,000, renewable for two three-month periods, during the pendency of Applicant's application. The lease provides for a ten-year term at an annual rental of $50,000, if the application is approved, with the option to renew for two additional five-year terms. The lease also contains an option to purchase which must be exercised within thirty-six months of opening or no later than March, 1983, whichever first occurs, at a purchase price of $600,000. In support of its application, Applicant caused an MAI appraisal to be prepared. According to the appraisal, the leased premises have a fair market value, as of March 14, 1979, of $433,000. According to a second, CCIM appraisal, also prepared at Applicant's instance, the property will be worth $632,400 as of February 26, 1982. Initially, Applicant plans to occupy the northern 4,285 square feet of the 6,700 square foot, single-story building it is leasing. Subleases with two tenants who are to occupy the southern portion of the building will be structured so as to provide additional space for expansion by Applicant. The leased premises include 43 parking spaces. Additional parking is available on adjacent streets. The site is easily accessible. Traffic conditions appear to pose no problems. The proposed savings and loan association would be a full service financial institution and expects to be competitive with the existing savings and loan offices in the primary service area (hereinafter PSA) with respect to interest rates and breadth of services. Some of the services that the proposed savings and loan association plans are a drive-in teller window, a night depository, safety deposit boxes, a walk-up window, extended hours on week days (from 9:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m.), evening hours on Fridays (from 9:00 a.m. to 7:00 pm.), Saturday hours (from 9:00 a.m. to Noon), and safekeeping facilities. Most of the existing savings and loan associations in the PSA do not offer extended hours, drive-in teller windows or safekeeping facilities. The proposed PSA includes the populated portion of the city of Naples and segments of unincorporated Collier County to the north and east of the city. It is bounded on the north by Pine Ridge Road, 4.7 miles away; on the east by County Barn Road, 4.2 miles away; on the south by Gordon Pass and Holly Avenue, 3 miles away; and on the west by the Gulf of Mexico, .7 miles away. The PSA is roughly rectangular except for an indentation in the northeastern corner. Twelve savings and loan association offices now operate within the PSA. One savings and loan association has headquarters within the PSA. Four of the eleven branch offices in the PSA are limited facilities. The Protestant's main office is located 0.2 miles southeast of the premises Applicant has leased. Protestant has filed an application to relocate its main office to a site in unincorporated Collier County, 4.8 miles north of Applicant's proposed site and to make its present main office a branch office. One branch office is now located 0.2 miles southwest of the proposed site; three are between 1.3 miles and 2.0 miles from it; and one is 8.7 miles to the north. Except for the Protestant, no savings and loan association now operating in Collier County has headquarters in Collier County. There are 14 commercial bank offices, including five main banking offices and nine branch offices in operation within the PSA. Three of the five main bank offices are located within 0.3 miles of the proposed site; one is 2.6 miles away and another is 7.5 miles away. Of the branch offices, one is located one mile southwest of the proposed site; three are 1.3 to 2.0 miles from it; four are between 2.2 and 4.0 miles from it and one is 8 miles away. In addition, there are three approved but unopened branch offices which are to be located between 3.1 and 5.3 miles-from Applicant's proposed site. The main office of Security Trust of Naples, a non-deposit trust company, is located 0.3 miles southwest of Applicant's proposed site. Applicant proposed five million dollars as the initial capitalization for the savings and loan association. The capital accounts would initially consist of $1,500,000 common stock and $3,500,000 paid-in surplus. Eighteen percent of the stock of the proposed savings and loan association has been subscribed to by nine organizers. The remaining 82 percent has been subscribed to by more-than 400 members of the general public, mostly from the Collier County area. Applicant has estimated the permanent 1979 population of the PSA at 47,000. This represents an average annual rate of growth of 11.6 percent from the PSA's 1970 population of 23,000. Applicant estimates the County's 1979 permanent population at 77,900, the seasonal population of the PSA at between 12,000 and 14,000, and the seasonal County population at between 15,000 and 20,000. The Applicant estimated the combined permanent and seasonal populations of the County at between 92,900 and 97,900 and that of the PSA at between 59,000 and 61,000. The Applicant projects for the 1982 permanent population of the PSA a figure of 53,000, representing an average annual growth rate of 4.3 percent from 1979. According to data compiled by the Bureau of Economic and Business Research, Division of Population Studies, at the University of Florida, the population of Collier County on April 1, 1970, was 38,040; on July 1, 1979, 64,761; on July 1, 1977, 68,900; on July 1, 1978, 74,572. According to the same source, the population of Naples on April 1, 1970, was 12,042; on July 1, 1976, 17,425; on July 1, 1977, 17,437; and on July 1, 1978, 17,462. The population of unincorporated areas of Collier County, including Everglade City, according to the same source, was 25,998, on April 1, 1970; 47,336, on July, 1976; 51,463 on July 1, 1977; and on July 1, 1978, The population of Collier County grew at an average annual rate of approximately 11.7 percent between 1970 and 1976. Between 1976 and 1977, the County's population grew at a slower rate, viz., approximately 6.4 percent. The rate of growth increased to approximately 8.2 percent between 1977 and 1978. Between 1970 and 1976, the population of Naples grew at an annual average rate of approximately 7.5 percent. During the years 1976, 1977 and 1978, the population of Naples did not increase significantly. The population of the unincorporated areas of Collier County grew at an average annual rate of approximately 13.7 percent between 1970 and 1976, at a rate of approximately 8.7 percent between 1976 and 1977, and at a rate of approximately 11.0 percent between 1977 and 1978. Almost all (94.14 percent) of the population growth in the County between 1970 and 1978, was the result of net migration. Between 1970 and 1978, the proportion of Collier County's population older than 65 years of age increased from 14.0 percent in 1970, to approximately 17.5 percent in 1978. Recent unemployment data for Collier County show an unemployment rate of 10.2 percent for July, 1979 (revised), and 9.8 percent for August, 1979 (preliminary), in the County as compared to the state averages of 6.6 and 6.1 percent for the same months, respectively. The per capita personal income for Collier County was $6,905 in 1976, and $7,663 in 1977. The 11.0 percent increase from 1976 to 1977, is higher than the 9.8 percent increase in the state average for the same period. Collier County's averages were above the state averages of $6,101 in 1976, and $6,697 in 1977. The proposed board of directors would be composed of nine members, at least seven of whom are full-time Florida residents and at least eight of whom are United States citizens. Robert E. Talley, the proposed president and chief executive officer, has had extensive commercial banking experience. From 1964 to 1972, he served as vice-president and loan officer for the Manatee National Bank; from 1972 through 1973, he was senior vice-president of the National Bank of St. Petersburg; from 1973 through 1977, he was president, chief executive officer, and a director of the Community Bank of Homestead; and from 1977 to 1978, he was executive vice-president and branch manager of the National Bank of Collier County. Proposed director, Roland Erickson, served as president and director of the Guaranty Bank and Trust Company, Worcester, Massachusetts, from 1947 to 1964. Proposed director, Harold S. Smith, served as a director and member of the executive committee of the Bank of Everglades from 1948 through 1951. Proposed director, Hendry P. Albrecht, is president of Gale-Realty, Inc., which is involved in investments, including rental property. Although most of the proposed board of directors appear to be successful businessmen, none of them has had direct savings and loan association experience. On June 30, 1975, commercial banks in Collier County had total deposits of $245,086,000 of which $152,499,000 were time and savings deposits. On June 30, 1976, commercial banks in Collier County had total deposits of $301,664,000, of which $193,488,000 were time and savings deposits. On June 30, 1978, commercial banks in Collier County had total deposits of $369,928,000 of which $224,982,000 were time and savings deposits. On June 30, 1979, commercial banks in Collier County had total deposits of $423,365,000 of which $266,668,000 were time and savings deposits. In March of 1979, Protestant held more than three quarters of all moneys on deposit with savings and loan associations in Collier County. At that time, $141,996,000 was on deposit at the Protestant's home office; $10,890,000 at its Tamiami North branch, even though this office first opened in September of 1977; $26,989,000 at its Lely branch; $4,728,000 at its Tamiami South satellite; and $5,537,000 at its Golden Gate facility. In March of 1979, Coast Federal's Tamiami North branch held $56,667,000. On deposit at First City Federal's Tamiami North branch was $6,855,000 in March of 1979. At the same time, Gulf Federal's Fifth Avenue branch had deposits of $7,018,000. In March of 1979, First Federal of Fort Myers had $10,256,000 on deposit at its Tamiami North branch and $235,000 at its Olde Naples facility, which opened in February of 1979. Time and savings deposits in savings and loan associations and commercial banks in Collier County amounted to $552,839,000 in 1978, up 55.62 percent from 1976. At the time of the hearing, there was commercial activity in Naples and residential development, particularly to the north of the PSA. Some thirteen financial institutions were in operation in the western part of Collier County, north of Applicant's proposed site, at the time of the hearing. Applicant has projected savings deposits at the end of the first, second and third years of operation to be $10,000,000, $15,000,000 and $20,000,000, respectively. Applicant also presented a pro forma budget which projected net profit for the first three years to be $191,700, $256,000 and $319,100, respectively. The Deputy Comptroller, Gerri Raines Dolan, and the Director of the Division of Banking, Ryland Terry Rigsby, as advisory staff members to the Comptroller, reviewed the application and the Department's entire file relating to the application. They assisted and concurred with the Comptroller in the ultimate determination of the application.
Conclusions As set forth in Rule 3C-20.45, Florida Administrative Code, when an application for authority to organize and operate a new state savings and loan association is filed pursuant to Chapter 3C-9, Florida Administrative Code, it is the applicant's responsibility to prove that the statutory criteria warranting the grant of authority are met. The Department shall conduct an investigation pursuant to Subsection 665.031(3), Florida Statutes, which was done in this case, and then approve or disapprove the application in its discretion. This discretion is neither absolute nor unqualified, but is instead conditioned by a consideration of the criteria listed in Subsection 655.031(4), Florida Statutes, wherein it is provided that: The Department shall approve the application upon such terms and conditions as it determines necessary to protect the public interest or disapprove the application at its discretion, but it shall not approve such application, unless in its opinion: Public convenience and advantage will be promoted by the establishment of the proposed thrift institution; Local conditions assure reasonable promise of successful operation of the proposed thrift institution and those thrift institutions already established in the community; The proposed officers and directors have good character, sufficient financial standing, and adequate experience and responsibility to assure reasonable promise of successful operation of the thrift institution; and The proposed savings account capital and organization expense fund or capital stock subscriptions comply with the requirements of this chapter. and Subsection 665.051(1), Florida Statutes, wherein it is provided that, The name of every association shall include either the words "savings association" or "savings and loan association." If in the opinion of the Department, any one of the above criteria has not been met and cannot be remedied by the applicant, it cannot approve the application. An applicant can, however, take corrective action in most circumstances to meet the criteria set forth in Subsections 665.031(4)(c), or (d), and 665.051(1), Florida Statutes, if any of these are found to be lacking. For example, if all other statutory criteria are met, the applicant may increase capital, or make certain changes in the board of directors, or change the name, or alter the provisions for suitable quarters, because these factors, at least to some degree, are within its control. It is the Department's policy to allow applicants to make certain changes to meet these criteria if all other criteria are met; to do otherwise would be to subject applicants to unnecessary red tape. However, it is the Department's opinion that there is little, if anything, that an applicant can do to alter its ability to meet the criteria set forth in Subsections 665.031(4)(a) and (b), Florida Statutes, since applicants CANNOT readily change the economic and demographic characteristics of an area. Therefore, if either one or both of these criteria are not met, the Department cannot approve the application. For purposes of applications for authority to organize and operate a new state savings and loan association, Rule 3C-20.45(1), Florida Administrative Code, defines PSA as the "smallest area from which the proposed association expects to draw approximately seventy-five percent of its deposits. It should be drawn around a natural customer base, should not be unrealistically delineated to exclude competing financial institutions or to include areas of concentrated population." Based upon, traffic patterns, natural and manmade geographic barriers and the location of other existing offices of financial institutions in the area, the Department concludes that the Applicant's PSA is realistically delineated. It is the opinion and conclusion of the Department that public convenience and advantage will be promoted by the establishment of the proposed savings and loan association. Therefore, the criterion in Subsection 665.031(4)(a), Florida Statutes, IS met. As set forth in Rule 3C-20.45(2)(a), Florida Administrative Code, the location and services offered by existing savings and loan association offices in a service area are indicative of the competitive climate of the market and should be considered. Other financial institutions such as banks and credit unions may be considered competing institutions to the extent their services parallel those of a new savings and loan association. Also, the traffic patterns in the area, as well as the general economic and demographic characteristics of the area, must be considered in evaluating this statutory criterion. Because it is recognized that the establishment of a new savings and loan association ANYWHERE would promote the convenience and advantage for at least a few people, SUBSTANTIAL convenience and advantage for a SIGNIFICANT number of people must be shown; otherwise, a new savings and loan association could be justified for every street corner in the state. Clearly, such a result was not the legislative intent in regulating entry into the savings and loan association industry, nor is it in the public interest. Based upon the facts set forth above, the Department has determined that the establishment of the proposed savings and loan association will substantially increase convenience to a significant number of residents of the PSA. This is particularly true in view of the significant growth of the various financial institutions in the area since 1976, as well as the past and projected population growth in the PSA. The Protestant, which is the only other savings and loan association with a main office in Collier County, held more than seventy-five percent of all savings and loan deposits in the County in March, 1979. Consequently, the proposed institution will served as a needed competitive alternative. The site is easily accessible and traffic patterns are favorable. Furthermore, the Applicant intends to offer a variety of new services not generally offered by other financial institutions within the PSA. Therefore, the criterion of public convenience and advantage is met. It is the opinion and conclusion of the Department that local conditions do assure reasonable promise of successful operation of the proposed thrift institution and those thrift institutions already established in the community. Therefore, the criterion in Subsection 665.031(4)(b), Florida Statutes, IS met. As set forth in Rule 3C-20.45(2)(b), Florida Administrative Code, current economic conditions and, to a lesser extent, the growth potential of the area in which the new savings and loan association proposes to locate are important considerations in determining the association's probable success. Essential to the concept of thrift institution opportunity is that there does and will exist a significant volume of business for which the new savings and loan association can realistically compete. The growth rate, size, financial strength and operating characteristics of savings and loan associations and other financial institutions in the service area are also important indicators of economic conditions and potential business for a new savings and loan association. It is noted that the statutory standards require that " . . . local conditions ASSURE reasonable PROMISE of successful operation of the proposed thrift institution and those thrift institutions already established in the community . . ." (E.S.), NOT merely that local conditions INDICATE a POSSIBILITY of such success. Thrift institutions involve a public trust. Unlike private enterprise establishments generally, a savings and loan association operates on the public's capital and therefore, the Legislature has vested in the Comptroller the responsibility to protect that public interest. Furthermore, the failure of a savings and loan association, as opposed to private enterprise establishments generally, may have an unsettling effect on the overall economic welfare of the community and that is why the Florida Legislature and the United States Congress have imposed stringent requirements for the industry. This Department is responsible for enforcing this legislative standard. Public interest is best served by having a thrift institution system whereby new competition is encouraged where appropriate, yet, at the same time, ensuring that the financial resources of the residents in the community are stable and safe. That was the obvious intent of the Legislature in regulating entry into the thrift institution industry. The Applicant's estimated 1979 PSA population of 47,000 and its projections for the near future seem more than reasonable in view of the latest official estimates by the University of Florida. The population base is healthy, a balanced mixture of residents, local businessmen and commuters, with a steady recent history of growth and projections for significant future growth. Although there are other savings and loan offices already existing in or near the PSA, the Department has concluded that the total savings potential within the PSA will readily support a new institution. The Department further concludes that the extensive deposit and loan growth of the existing financial institutions within the PSA justifies the establishment of another competitive alternative. The increasing population, the high per capita income, and the business and residential mix of the PSA point to an expanding and stimulated economy in the PSA for the present as well as the near future. Clearly, these factors are conducive to assuring the reasonable promise of success for the proposed savings and loan association and for those thrift institutions already established in the community. It is the opinion and conclusion of the Department that the proposed directors, as a group, have good character, sufficient financial standing and responsibility, but do not have sufficient experience in the savings and loan field to assure reasonable promise of successful operation of the proposed association. Therefore, one of the criteria of Subsection 665.031(4)(c), Florida Statutes, IS NOT met. As set forth in Rule 3C-20.45(2)(c), Florida Administrative Code, the organizers, proposed directors and officers shall have reputations evidencing honesty and integrity. They shall have employment and business histories demonstrating their responsibility in financial affairs. At least one member of a proposed board of directors, other than the chief managing officer, shall have experience in the savings and loan field or in a business directly related thereto such as mortgage banking, real estate finance and commercial banking where real property lending has constituted an integral part of such banking experience. The organizers, proposed director's and officers shall meet the requirements of Sections 665.131 and 665.703, Florida Statutes, as applicable. A majority of the organizers and directors of a proposed thrift institution shall be, whenever possible, from the local community and shall represent a diversification of occupation and experience commensurate with the position for which proposed. Members of the initial management group, which includes directors and officers, shall require prior approval of the Department. Changes of directors or chief managing officer during the first year of operation shall also require prior approval of the Department. While it is not necessary that the names of proposed officers he submitted with an application to organize a new savings and loan association, the chief managing officer and operations officer must be named and their names submitted for departmental approval at least sixty (60) days prior to the association' opening. In addition, interlocking directorships involving existing financial institutions competitively near the proposed site of a new institution are discouraged. Such interlocking directorships could possibly restrict competition and create fiduciary problems. Although the proposed directors have, as a group, good character, sufficient financial standing and responsibility, none of the proposed directors has any direct experience in the savings and loan field. Only Robert E. Talley, as a proposed director, has demonstrated that he has the requisite related business experience by virtue of his background in commercial banking, real estate, and mortgage brokerage. Because the selection of directors for a proposed new savings and loan association is generally within an applicant's control, the Department wilt, in this case, allow the Applicant to remedy the above inadequacy in the proposed board of directors by the addition of one director with sufficient experience in the savings and loan field or in a business directly related thereto or by further demonstrating that one of the proposed board members already has the requisite related business experience. While the department has noted that Robert E. Talley has been proposed as the chief managing officer, the Department does not approve or disapprove an applicant's proposed chief managing officer until the association makes an application for insurance of its accounts. It is the opinion and conclusion of the Department that the proposed savings account capital and the organization expense fund or capital stock subscriptions comply with the requirements of Chapter 665, Florida Statutes. Therefore, the criteria of Subsection 665.031(4)(d), ARE met. As set forth in Rule 3C-20.45(2)(d), Florida Administrative Code, capital should be adequate to enable the new savings and loan association to provide the necessary services of promoting thrift and home financing to meet the needs of prospective customers. Capital should be sufficient to purchase, build or lease a suitable permanent facility complete with equipment. Generally, the initial capital (withdrawable savings for a mutual association applicant and total stock and paid-in surplus for a stock association applicant) for a new savings and loan association should not be less than $1.5 million in non- metropolitan areas and $2.0 million in metropolitan areas. To encourage community support, a wide distribution of stock ownership is desirable. A majority of the stock should be issued wherever possible to local residents of the community, persons with substantial business interests in the community, or others who may reasonably be expected to utilize the services of the association. Subscribers to five (5) percent or more of the stock may not finance more than fifty (50) percent of the purchase price if the extension of credit is predicated in any manner on the stock of the new association, whether or not such stock is pledged. Generally, all proposed stock for-a stock savings and loan association shall be subscribed to at the time the application is submitted to the Department. The organizers may initially subscribe to all proposed stock, but should disclose the anticipated amount of individual stock to be retained. It is the opinion and conclusion of the Department that the name, Marine Savings and Loan Association, meets the criterion of Subsection 665.051(1), Florida Statutes, and is not so similar as to cause confusion with the name of an existing financial institution. As set forth in Rule 3C-20.45(4), Florida Administrative Code, the Department will consider the possibility that a name similar to that of another financial institution may cause confusion in the minds of the public or be misleading and may deny the use of such name, with the exception of names specifically authorized under Subsection 665.051(1), Florida Statutes. The Department concludes that the name Maring Savings and Loan Association is not so similar as to cause confusion with the name of an existing financial institution. It is the opinion and conclusion of the Department that provision has been made for suitable quarters. Therefore, the provisions of Rule 3C- 20.45(6)(d), Florida Administrative Code, ARE met. As set forth in Rule 3C-20.45(6)(d), should temporary quarters be contemplated by an applicant until a permanent facility is completed, permission to open in temporary quarters may be granted, generally not to exceed one year. The permanent structure of a new savings and loan association should generally contain a minimum of 5,000 square feet unless the applicant satisfactorily shows that smaller quarters are justified due to the performance of certain auxiliary services off-premises. It shall be of sufficient size to handle the projected business for a reasonable period of time. The facility shall be of a nature to warrant customer confidence in the association's security, stability and permanence. Other pertinent factors include availability of adequate parking, an adequate drive-in facility if such is contemplated and possibilities for expansion. The Applicant presently plans permanent quarters in a building containing 4,285 square feet, which will have adequate parking and drive-in facilities. No temporary quarters are contemplated. Since adequate provision has been made for expansion up to 6,700 square feet, the Department considers that provision has been made for suitable quarters. It is the opinion and conclusion of the Department that the proposed acquisition of the association's proposed site has been fully disclosed and does not constitute an insider transaction. Therefore, the provisions of Rule 3C- 20.45(3) ARE met. Rule 3C-20.45(3), Florida Administrative Code, provides that any financial arrangement or transaction involving the organization of a proposed association and its organizers, directors, officers and shareholders owning five (5) percent or more of the stock, or their relatives, their associates or interests should ordinarily be avoided. Should there be transactions of this nature, they must be fair and reasonable, fully disclosed and comparable to similar arrangements which could have been made with unrelated parties. It is the opinion and conclusion of the Department that the provisions of Rule 3C-20.45(6)(e), Florida Administrative Code, have NOT been met. Pursuant to Rule 3C-20.45(6)(e), Florida Administrative Code, appraisals of land and improvements thereon shall be made by an independent qualified appraiser and be dated no earlier than six months from the filing date of the application. In those instances where the application involves a lease arrangement, the appraisal should be directed to the comparability of the proposed lease with other leasing arrangements for similar business property. The application involves a lease arrangement and, although the Applicant has submitted an acceptable appraisal as to the fair market value of the leased premises, it has not submitted an appraisal directed to the comparability of the proposed lease with other leasing arrangements for similar business property. However, since this is a criterion that is within the control of the Applicant, the Department may approve the application upon the condition that this deficiency is remedied.
The Issue Whether Respondent discriminated against Petitioner on the basis of his age and handicap in violation of the Florida Human Rights Act of 1977 and the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992, Chapter 760, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Harold Asher (Asher), was born on January 13, 1929, and as of April 1, 1992, he was 63 years old. Respondent, Barnett Banks, Inc. (BBI), is a holding company that owns and controls numerous banks in Florida and Georgia. The banks in Florida owned by BBI are located in three geographical regions: the north region, the central region, and the south region. In the south region there are nine banks: Barnett Bank of Key West, Barnett Bank of South Florida (Miami), Barnett Bank of Broward (Fort Lauderdale), Barnett Bank of Palm Beach County, Barnett Bank of Martin County, Barnett Bank of Treasure Coast, Barnett Bank of Lake Okeechobee, Barnett Bank of Naples, and Barnett Bank of Lee County (Fort Myers). Each bank has branches. Barnett Banks, Inc. is an employer subject to Section 760.10, Florida Statutes. Harold Asher was hired by Barnett Bank of Palm Beach County in 1983, at the age of 54 as a loan review officer and was later promoted to Vice President/Loan Review. His job responsibility was to review loans which had been granted by Barnett Bank of Palm Beach County. A loan review is an evaluation of the portfolio after a loan is made to insure that the loan was properly approved, that the analysis done to support the sources of repayment was adequate, that the loan is collectible, that the risk factors associated with the loan is in line with policy and regulatory standards, and that the loan is properly underwritten. The loan review is memorialized on a line or summary sheet. While employed by Barnett Bank of Palm Beach County, Asher had several supervisors, including Ken Parrish, Art Kite, James Kammert, Noel Coan, and Martin Streischek. Barnett Bank of Palm Beach County used a rating system of one to five in evaluating its employees, which equated as follows: 1.0 to 1.49 means fails to meet minimum position accountabilities; 1.5 to 2.49 means with few exceptions, meets position accountabilities; 2.5 to 3.49 means meets position accountabilities; 3.5 to 4.49 means exceeds position accountabilities; and 4.5 to 5.0 means significantly exceeds position accountabilities. In March, 1988, James Kammert rated Asher's performance as 3.0. On January 1, 1989, Art Kite rated Asher's performance for 1988 as 3.70. In June, 1989, Art Kite rated Asher as meeting or exceeding in the key result areas (KRAs) of Asher's position. On January 1, 1990, Art Kite performed an evaluation of Asher's performance for 1989 and rated him 3.45. On January 18, 1991, Neal Coan rated Asher's performance for 1990 as 3.0. While working for Barnett Bank of Palm Beach County, Asher was never disciplined. Prior to 1991, BBI and its banks had a dual system for loan reviews. Some of the banks such as Barnett Bank of Palm Beach County, had set up loan review sections which operated at the bank level only. The staff of these sections would report directly to the bank. BBI had a loan review section for each of its regions. The BBI regional loan review sections would review loans in each of the banks located in that particular region. In January, 1991 a decision was made by BBI to consolidate the loan reviews at the holding company level. On-site teams were established in Miami, Fort Lauderdale, and Palm Beach. A travel team reviewed loans at all the banks including the banks which had on-site teams. As a result of the consolidation, the local banks eliminated their loan review departments and the staff comprising those particular departments were terminated from their positions. At the time of the decision to consolidate, Barnett Bank of Palm Beach County's loan review section consisted of one secretary and three loan officers, one of whom was Asher. The three loan officers interviewed for positions with BBI. Asher and Steven Clapp were hired by BBI. Asher was 61 years of age when he was hired by BBI on January 1, 1991, as the on-site manager for Credit Quality Review at the Barnett Bank of Palm Beach County. His office was located on Datura Street in West Palm Beach. Part of Asher's duties included supervising Mr. Clapp. The BBI on-site manager for Credit Quality Review at Barnett Bank of South Florida (Miami) was Barry Goldberg, who was born on September 24, 1962. The BBI on-site manager for Credit Quality Review at the Barnett Bank of Broward County was Mark Tavoletti, who was born on December 19, 1961. Although the same methods were used to review loans for BBI as were used to review loans for Barnett Bank of Palm Beach County, there were some changes. Computers were used more at BBI. Instead of traveling to the 45 branches of Barnett Bank of Palm Beach to review loans, Asher received the files through the interoffice mail. BBI loan reviews focused more on a loan instead of the work of the loan officer. Monthly reports were required by BBI. BBI report formats differed from those of Barnett Bank of Palm Beach County. Asher no longer selected the loans to be reviewed. BBI selected the loans using specific criteria established by BBI. Asher reported to Scott Bechtle. While working with Mr. Bechtle, Asher did not receive any criticism or disciplinary action. In July, 1991, Edward Angulo (Angulo) took over Mr. Bechtle's position as the Regional Credit Review Director for the south region. Asher, Mr. Goldberg, and Mr. Tavoletti began reporting to Angulo. Angulo's primary duty was to review the line sheets that were generated by the on-site groups and the travel team. From July, 1991 to the end of December, 1991, Angulo met with Asher approximately three to five times and talked with Asher numerous times on the telephone. Angulo reviewed all the line sheets that were generated by Asher and Clapp during that six-month period. In reviewing the work done by the Palm Beach on-site group, Angulo noted that generally the line sheets did not have sufficient quantifiable information, did not contain information supported by an independent evaluation, and contained deficiencies regarding underwriting. He would make comments concerning these problems and call Asher to discuss them. Some times Asher would not provide additional information requested by Angulo or would provide it in an unsatisfactory manner. During the last six months in 1991, Angulo spent more time in connection with the Palm Beach loan reviews than he did with the other loan review teams because of the problems the Palm Beach team was having. Angulo sat in with Asher during an exit meeting with bank management wherein Asher appeared indecisive and unprepared, forcing Angulo to take over and conduct the meeting in its entirety. Angulo completed a performance evaluation on Asher for the period 1/91 to 12/91. Asher was evaluated on nine KRAs: 1) supervise staff, 2) analyze specific loans, 3) determine quality of credit analyses, 4) evaluate underwriting standards, 5) insure accuracy of CSS, 6) evaluate overall credit administration, 7) evaluate loan approval process, 8) prepare reports and exit meetings, and 9) train junior officers. Each KRA was weighted and rated on a scale of one to five, with one being the lowest rating and five being the highest. For KRAs 1, 5, and 9, Asher was rated as 3, which meant that his performance met expectations. For KRAs 2, 3, 7, and 8, Asher received a rating of 2, which stood for approaches expectations. In the KRA concerning evaluating underwriting standards, Asher received a rating of 1, which meant that Asher's performance failed to meet expectations. Angulo noted on the evaluation that Asher needed to improve his performance in the following areas: technical/analytical, independent/inquisitive attitudes, and judgement/decisiveness. Asher's total weighted rating was 2.25, which equates to an overall rating of 2. At the time of the evaluation, Asher and Angulo understood that Asher's position was a Review Officer III. Asher had been performing the work of a Review Officer III. Accordingly, Angulo evaluated his work using the standards for Review Officer III, and evaluated the work actually performed by Asher. However, at the hearing it was revealed that Asher had been a Review Officer II at the time of his employment with BBI and held that position until his termination. On or about April 1, 1992, Angulo met with Asher and discussed Asher's performance since January, 1992. Angulo cited a problem that had occurred concerning a review of Southside Investors which had been done by Asher's subordinate, Steven Clapp. Angulo had discussed with Asher several inconsistencies or omissions in the report relating to potential underwriting problems and asked Asher to have the deficiencies cleared up. As of April 1, 1992, the deficiencies had not been resolved. Angulo also discussed with Asher problems dealing with the adequacy of supervision of report preparation and the conduct of exit meetings with bank management. Deficiencies in these areas had been pointed out in Asher's 1991 annual performance evaluation. Since that evaluation, a monthly report by Steven Clapp had to be amended because of his erroneous conclusion that the bank's overall underwriting and lending practices were inadequate. The incorrect finding was not corrected until a draft of the report was reviewed by the regional office. As the on-site manager, Asher should have reviewed Mr. Clapp's report and caught the error before it was sent to the regional office. Angulo also pointed out to Asher that his performance at exit meetings with bank management still lacked decisiveness, resulting in the need for frequent changes in reports. As a result of the continued deficiencies in Asher's performance since his 1991 performance evaluation, Angulo felt that Asher needed technical training, improvement in supervisory skills, and familiarization with BBI policies and procedures. To assist Asher in reaching an acceptable level of performance, Asher was moved from his on-site manager position to Barnett Banks, Inc.'s Credit Review Office travel team on or about April 1, 1992. There was no decrease in salary, benefits, or pay grade. Additionally, Asher was placed on a 90-day probationary period. In mid-April, 1992, Asher wrote Ken Veniard, a Senior Vice President, stating that he disagreed with Angulo's evaluation and felt that the negative comments were "based on factors totally unrelated to performance, such as age, personality, or simply the lack of complete information." Asher requested to be considered for a transfer. Veniard received the memorandum on April 29, 1992. On or about April 1, 1992, Jack Shoben, a credit review officer with BBI since 1989, was moved into the position of on-site manager for Credit Quality Review at the Barnett Bank of Palm Beach County at the Datura Street location. Jack Shoben was born on October 1, 1947, and as of April 1, 1992, he was 44 years old. Angulo chose Shoben as the on-site manager because of Mr. Shoben's qualifications and experience. After Mr. Shoben became on-site manager, the work product from the on-site team at Barnett Bank of Palm Beach County began to improve; thus Angulo did not have to spend as much time on the Palm Beach site as he had when Asher was on-site manager. William Westland, who was born on October 26, 1927, was Asher's supervisor on the travel team. During Asher's first two weeks on the travel team, he worked in Broward County. His performance was satisfactory. The third week on the travel team was spent in Miami, where Asher was required to review real estate loans. Mr. Westland noted that Asher needed some training in the real estate loan area. On May 10, 1992, shortly after Asher returned from Miami, he suffered a brain seizure and was hospitalized for two days. Six weeks after his seizure, Asher returned to work. As a result of Asher's seizure, his doctors prohibited Asher from driving for at least six months and possibly longer and required his work-related travel to be kept to an absolute minimum, which included avoiding long travel trips of any type. An essential requirement for the position that Asher held on the travel team was that he be able to travel to the different banks in the south region to conduct loan reviews. Asher was aware that extensive travel was a requirement of his job and so advised his doctor by letter dated July 3, 1992. When Asher returned to work, he was temporarily placed on the on-site review team at Palm Beach under the supervision of Jack Shoben. Steven Clapp who had been at Palm Beach on the on-site review team was transferred to the travel team. Asher's probationary period was extended to August 7, 1992. The temporary placement was to accommodate Asher's non-travel status until December 31, 1992, and after such time Asher's continued employment was contingent upon his satisfactory completion of the probationary period and his ability to meet the requirements of all credit review officers of his level, which included travel. During June 1992 until Mr. Asher's termination, Jeff Asher, his son, often drove Asher to Barnett Bank's offices on Datura Street in West Palm Beach. He also drove him home from that location during the same time. Jeff Asher also drove Asher to and from branch locations within Palm Beach County during the same period. A memorandum dated July 28, 1992, was sent from Ken Veniard, Angulo's supervisor, to BBI Credit Quality Staff, stating that although BBI was committed to maintain the on-site loan review teams, that all on-site staff would be required to travel and assist the travel team as necessary. On August 7, 1992, Asher's probationary period lapsed. There was no evaluation of Asher's performance at that time. In August, 1992, Steven Clapp was transferred to the BBI office in Jacksonville to fill a position for which he had posted. The position on the travel team that Mr. Clapp had filled in Asher's absence was held open for Asher in the event that his travel restrictions would be lifted in January, 1993, thereby enabling him to return to his position on the travel. In November, 1992, Asher, Sarah Ketchum, Jack Shoben, and Angulo participated in a teleconference, at which time Angulo advised Asher that if Asher's doctor did not approve a full time travel schedule in January, 1993, Asher's employment with BBI would be terminated effective as of December 31, 1992. On December 28, 1992, Asher visited his doctor, who continued the travel restrictions. On December 30, 1992, Asher, Jack Shoben, Joan Slaughenhaupt, and Angulo participated in a teleconference. Asher stated that his travel restrictions had not changed. Angulo advised Asher that his employment would be terminated effective December 31 due to his inability to travel. Mr. Asher's employment ended on December 31, 1992. On January 1, 1992, the on-site teams in Miami and Fort Lauderdale were each reduced from three to two on-site personnel. The Palm Beach on-site team was reduced to one one-site person, Jack Shoben, who was the only loan review officer there from January 1, 1993 to December 31, 1993. In January, 1994, all on-site positions were eliminated. Mr. Asher's salary at the time of his termination was $47,339.96 annually. In the spring of 1993, Asher and his wife went to Huntsville, Alabama, traveling by automobile two days each way. In June, 1993, all Asher's travel restrictions were lifted. Prior to his driving restrictions being lifted, Asher began driving short distances in his neighborhood. In January, 1994, BBI made an offer of reinstatement to Asher, whereby he would have been reinstated as a Credit Review Officer II on the regional travel team with the same salary, same seniority, and same salary grade level as when he was terminated on December 31, 1992. In addition, a procedure was implemented whereby Asher could report directly to Janice Gurny, Director of Human Resources for BBI in the Jacksonville office, any complaints regarding harassment on the part of his supervisors. Asher received the offer but did not contact anyone at BBI regarding the offer of reinstatement. Asher did not take the offer because it was a Credit Review Officer II position (he was under the impression he was a Credit Review Officer III at the time of his termination); he felt the environment was hostile; and he had his house on the market to sell.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a Final Order denying the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 8th day of June, 1994, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. SUSAN B. KIRKLAND Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of June, 1994. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 93-5815 To comply with the requirements of Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes (1993), the following rulings are made on the parties' proposed findings of fact: Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact Paragraph 1: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 2: Accepted. Paragraphs 3: The first sentence is accepted in substance. The second sentence is rejected as constituting argument. The third sentence is accepted to the extent that Petitioner received two letters which advised him of his increase in salary and thanked him for his hard work and professionalism and advised him that the bank was glad that he was on the team. Paragraph 4: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 5: The first three sentences are accepted in substance. The last sentence is accepted to the extent that the methods to review loans were basically the same but rejected to the extent that the only changes were in the format of the loan review reporting process. Paragraphs 6-7: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 8: The third, fourth, and fifth sentences are rejected as constituting argument. The remainder of the paragraph is accepted in substance. Paragraph 9: Rejected as subordinate to the facts actually found. Paragraphs 10-11: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 12: The last sentence is rejected to the extent that it implies that Asher was rated on work for which he was not performing. He was doing the job of a level III but his personnel file reflected that he officially was placed in a level II position. The remainder of the paragraph is accepted in substance. Paragraph 13: Rejected as constituting argument. Paragraphs 14-16: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 17: The first sentence is rejected as recitation of testimony. The remainder of the paragraph is rejected as constituting argument. Paragraph 18: The first, second, sixth, and tenth sentences are rejected as not supported by the greater weight of the evidence. The third, fourth, fifth, eighth and ninth sentences are accepted in substance except as to the reference to the placement on the travel team as a demotion. The seventh sentence is rejected as unnecessary. Paragraph 19: The first sentence is rejected as not supported by the greater weight of the evidence. The second sentence is accepted. The last sentence is rejected as recitation of testimony. Paragraphs 20-23: Rejected as recitation of testimony and constituting argument. Paragraph 24: Rejected as constituting argument. Paragraph 25: The first, second, third, and fourth sentences are accepted in substance. The fifth, sixth, and seventh sentences are rejected as not supported by the greater weight of the evidence. The eight sentence is rejected as constituting argument. The ninth sentence is rejected as not supported by the greater weight of the evidence in that the charge against Asher was his failure to catch Mr. Clapp's errors before the report left the Palm Beach office. The last sentence is rejected as irrelevant. Paragraph 26: The first sentence is rejected as subordinate to the facts actually found. The second sentence is rejected as not supported by any evidence. The remainder of the paragraph is accepted in substance. Paragraph 27: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 28: The first, third, and fourth sentences are accepted in substance. The second and fifth sentences are rejected as subordinate to the facts actually found. Paragraph 29: The first sentence is accepted. The remainder of the paragraph is rejected as subordinate to the facts actually found. Paragraph 30: The first sentence is accepted in substance. The remainder of the paragraph is rejected as subordinate to the facts actually found. Paragraph 31: Rejected as mere recitation of testimony. Paragraph 32: Rejected as mere recitation of testimony. Paragraph 33: Rejected as subordinate to the facts actually found. Paragraph 34: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 35: Rejected as subordinate to the facts actually found. Paragraph 36: The first and second sentences are accepted in substance. The remainder of the paragraph is rejected as subordinate to the facts actually found. Paragraph 37: Rejected as constituting argument. Paragraph 38: Rejected as subordinate to the facts actually found. Paragraph 39: Rejected as constituting argument. Paragraph 40: Rejected as subordinate to the facts actually found. Paragraph 41: Accepted. Paragraphs 42: Rejected as subordinate to the facts actually found. Paragraph 43: The first sentence is rejected as not supported by the greater weight of the evidence as it applies to the time period from June, 1992 to June, 1993. The second sentence is accepted. The remainder of the paragraph is accepted in substance. Paragraph 44: Rejected as subordinate to the facts actually found. Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact Paragraph 1: Accepted. Paragraphs 2-13: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 13: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 14: The first sentence is rejected as constituting argument. The remainder of the paragraph is accepted in substance. Paragraph 15: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 16: The first two sentences are accepted in substance. The remainder of the paragraph is rejected as constituting argument. Paragraphs 17-18: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 19: The first sentence is accepted. The remainder of the paragraph is accepted in substance. Paragraph 20: The first sentence is accepted. The remainder of the paragraph is rejected as unnecessary. Paragraphs 21: The sixth sentence is rejected as constituting argument. The remainder of the paragraph is accepted in substance. Paragraphs 22-24: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 25: The first sentence is accepted in substance. The third sentence is rejected as not supported by the greater weight of the evidence. The remainder of the paragraph is rejected as subordinate to the facts actually found. Paragraphs 26-27: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 28: The first sentence is accepted in substance. The remainder of the sentence is rejected as subordinate to the facts actually found. Paragraph 29: Accepted in substance. Paragraphs 30-34: Rejected as subordinate to the facts actually found. Paragraph 35-39: Accepted in substance. COPIES FURNISHED: James E. Moye, Esquire Patrick J. Kennedy, Esquire 201 East Pine Street, Suite 710 Orlando, Florida 32801 Richard Tannenbaum, Esquire Shea & Tannenbaum 204 Brazilian Avenue, Suite 210 Palm Beach, Florida 33480 Sharon Moultry, Clerk Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road, Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149 Dana Baird General Counsel Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road, Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149
Findings Of Fact Based upon the parties' factual stipulations, the evidence adduced at hearing, and the record as a whole, the following Findings of Fact are made: On August 28, 1992, Petitioner submitted to the Department its application for licensure as a mortgage lender. 1/ On October 28, 1992, the Department sent Petitioner a letter announcing its intent to deny Petitioner's application for licensure as a mortgage lender. The text of the letter read as follows: This is to inform you that your Application for Licensure as a Mortgage Lender for Citifirst Mortgage Corp. is hereby denied. The denial is based on Section 494.0072(2)(k), Florida Statutes. Section 494.0072(2), Florida Statutes, "Each of the following acts constitutes a ground for which the disciplinary actions specified in subsection may be taken: . . . (k) Acting as a mortgage lender or correspondent mortgage lender without a current active license issued under ss. 494.006-494.0077." The Department's investigation revealed Citifirst Mortgage Corp. has acted as a mortgage lender without a current, active license. Please be advised that you may request a hearing concerning this denial to be conducted in accordance with the provisions of Section 120.57, Florida Statutes. Requests for such a hearing must comply with the provisions of Rule 3-7.002, Florida Administrative Code (attached hereto) and must be filed in duplicate with: Clerk Division of Finance Department of Banking and Finance The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0350 (904) 487-2583 within twenty-one (21) days after receipt of this notice. Failure to respond within twenty-one days of receipt of this notice shall be deemed to be a waiver of all rights to a hearing. Should you request such a hearing, you are further advised that at such a hearing, you will have the right to be represented by counsel or other qualified representative; to offer testimony, either oral or written; to call and cross examine witnesses; and to have subpoenas and subpoenas duces tecum issued on your behalf. Petitioner timely requested a formal hearing on the proposed denial of its application. The matter was referred to the Division of Administrative Hearings, where it is still pending.
The Issue The issue is whether The Department of Financial Services properly imposed a Stop Work Order and Amended Order of Penalty Assessment pursuant to the requirements of Chapter 440, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact The Division is charged with the regulation of workers' compensation insurance in the State of Florida. Respondent AFS, LLC. (AFS), is a corporation located in Jacksonville, Florida, and is involved in the construction industry, primarily framing houses. Braman Avery is the owner and manager of AFS. Lee Arsenault is a general contractor whose business is located in Jacksonville, Florida. Mr. Arsenault contracted with AFS to perform framing services at a construction site located at 1944 Copperstone Drive in Orange Park, Florida. At all times material to this proceeding, AFS maintained workers' compensation coverage for its employees through a licensed employee leasing company. AFS contracted with Greenleads Carpentry, Inc. (Greenleads) to perform work at the job site in question. Prior to subcontracting with Greenleads, Mr. Avery requested from Greenleads, among other things, a certificate of insurance showing that Greenleads had general liability coverage and workers' compensation insurance. Greenleads provided a certificate of insurance to Mr. Avery showing that Greenleads had workers' compensation coverage. The certificate of insurance contains a policy number, dollar limits, and effective and expiration dates of June 1, 2004 through June 1, 2005. Debra Cochran is office manager of Labor Finders, an employee leasing company. According to Ms. Cochran, Labor Finders' corporate office issued the certificate of insurance to Greenleads. At the time of issuance, the certificate of insurance was valid. Greenleads did not follow through on its obligations to Labor Finders in that Green Leads did not "run its workers through" Labor Finders. Consequently, Greenleads' workers were not covered by workers' compensation as indicated on the certificate of insurance. Labor Finders did not issue any document showing cancellation or voiding of the certificate of insurance previously issued. Mr. Avery relied upon the face of the certificate of insurance believing AFS to be in total compliance with statutory requirements regarding workers' compensation for subcontractors. That is, he believed that the Greenleads' workers were covered for workers' compensation as indicated on the face of the certificate of insurance. Mr. Avery was not informed by Labor Finders or Greenleads that Greenleads did not, after all, have workers' compensation coverage in place on the workers performing work under the contract between AFS and Greenleads on the worksite in question. Bobby Walton is president of Insure America and has been in the insurance business for 35 years. His company provides general liability insurance to AFS. According to Mr. Walton, Mr. Avery's reliance on Greenleads' presentation to him of a purportedly valid certificate of insurance is the industry standard. Further, Mr. Walton is of the opinion that there was no obligation on behalf of Mr. Avery to confirm coverage beyond receipt of the certificate of insurance provided by the subcontractor. That is, there is no duty on behalf of the contractor to confirm coverage beyond receipt of the certificate of insurance. Allen DiMaria is an investigator employed by the Division. His duties include investigating businesses to ensure that the employers in the state are in compliance with the requirements of the workers' compensation law and related rules. On January 5, 2005, Mr. DiMaria visited the job site in question and observed 13 workers engaged in construction activities. This visit was a random site check. Mr. DiMaria interviewed the owner of Greenleads and checked the Division's database. Mr. DiMaria determined that Greenleads did not have workers' compensation coverage. After conferring with his supervisor, Mr. DiMaria issued a stop-work order to Greenleads, along with a request for business records for the purpose of calculating a penalty for Greenleads. In response to the business records request, Greenleads submitted its check ledger along with an employee cash payment ledger, both of which were utilized in calculating a penalty for Greenleads. On January 11, 2005, Mr. DiMaria issued an Amended Order of Penalty Assessment to Greenleads for $45,623.34. Attached to the Amended Order of Penalty Assessment issued to Greenleads is a penalty worksheet with a list of names under the heading, "Employee Name", listing the names of the employees and amounts paid to each employee. During the investigation of Greenleads, Mr. DiMaria determined that Greenleads was performing subcontracting work for Respondent. This led to the Division's investigation of AFS. Mr. DiMaria spoke to Mr. Avery and determined that AFS paid remuneration to Greenleads for work performed at the worksite. He checked the Division's data base system and found no workers' compensation coverage for AFS. He determined that AFS had secured workers' compensation coverage through Southeast Personnel Services, Inc. (SPLI), also a licensed employee leasing company. However, the policy with SPLI did not cover the employees of Greenleads performing work at the job site. Mr. DiMaria requested business records from Mr. Avery. Mr. Avery fully complied with this request. He examined AFS' check registry and certificates of insurance from AFS. Other than the situation involving Greenleads on this worksite, Mr. DiMaria found AFS to be in complete compliance. On January 10, 2005, after consulting with his supervisor, Robert Lambert, Mr. DiMaria issued a Stop Work Order to AFS. A Stop Work Order issued by the Division requires the recipient to cease operations on a job site because the recipient is believed to be not in compliance with the workers' compensation law. The Stop Work Order issued by Mr. DiMaria was site specific to the work site in question. Based upon the records provided by Mr. Avery, Mr. DiMaria calculated a fine. Penalties are calculated by determining the premium amount the employer would have paid based on his or her Florida payroll and multiplying by a factor of 1.5. Mr. DiMaria's calculation of the fine imposed on AFS was based solely on the Greenleads' employees not having workers' compensation coverage. On February 16, 2005, Mr. DiMaria issued an Amended Order of Penalty in the amount of $45,643.87, the identical amount imposed upon Greenleads. A penalty worksheet was attached to the Amended Order of Penalty Assessment. The penalty worksheet is identical to the penalty worksheet attached to Greenleads' penalty assessment, with the exception of the business name at the top of the worksheet and the Division's case number. Greenleads partially paid the penalty by entering into a penalty payment agreement with the Division. Greenleads then received an Order of Conditional Release. Similarly, AFS entered into a penalty payment agreement with the Division and received an Order of Conditional Release on February 16, 2005. Moreover, AFS terminated its contract with Greenleads. Lee Arsenault is the general contractor involved in the work site in question. AFS was the sole framing contractor on this project, which Mr. Arsenault described as a "pretty significant project." He has hired AFS to perform framing services over the years. However, because the Stop Work Order was issued to AFS, Mr. Arsenault had to hire another company to complete the framing work on the project. Mr. Avery estimates economic losses to AFS as a result of losing this job to be approximately $150,000, in addition to the fine. Mr. Arsenault, Ms. Cochran, as well as the Division's investigator, Mr. DiMaria, all agree with Mr. Walton's opinion, that it is customary practice in the construction industry for a contractor who is subcontracting work to rely on the face of an insurance certificate provided by a subcontractor. Robert Lambert is a workers' compensation district supervisor for the Division. When asked under what authority the Division may impose a penalty on both Greenleads and AFS for the same infraction, he replied that it was based on the Division's policy and its interpretation of Sections 440.02, 440.10, and 440.107, Florida Statutes.
Recommendation Based upon the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Division of Workers' Compensation rescind the Amended Order of Penalty Assessment issued February 16, 2005, and the Stop Work Order issued to Petitioner on January 10, 2005. DONE AND ENTERED this 26th day of August, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S BARBARA J. STAROS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of August, 2005. Endnote 1/ While this Recommended Order does not rely upon the case cited by Respondent in its Notice of Supplemental Authority, Respondent was entitled to file it. COPIES FURNISHED: Colin M. Roopnarine, Esquire Douglas D. Dolin, Esquire Department of Financial Services Division of Workers' Compensation East Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Mark K. Eckels, ESquire Boyd & Jenerette, P.A. North Hogan Street, Suite 400 Jacksonville, Florida 32202 Honorable Tom Gallagher Chief Financial Officer Department of Financial Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Carlos G. Muniz, General Counsel Department of Financial Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300
