The Issue The issue to be determined is whether Respondents engaged in prohibited conduct against Petitioner by discriminating against him based on his race and/or national origin in the terms and conditions, privileges, or provision of services or facilities in the sale or rental of real property in violation of Section 760.23, Florida Statutes (2009).
Findings Of Fact Based on the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the final hearing and the entire record in this proceeding, the following Findings of Fact are made: The Florida Commission on Human Relations is the state agency charged with investigating complaints of discriminatory housing practices and enforcing the Fair Housing Act. It is also charged with investigating fair housing complaints filed with the federal Department of Housing and Urban Development under the Federal Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. Section 3601, et seq. Petitioner, Emmanuel Agbara, is an adult, black male, who is of Nigerian decent. On or about September 18, 2008, Petitioner submitted an offer to purchase Condominium 406 in Orchid Springs Village. Because the real property sought to be purchased was a part of a condominium, there were several contingencies imposed by the declaration of condominium and associated house rules. Respondent, Orchid Springs Condominium, No. 200, Inc., is a non-profit corporation charged with the management of the condominium. Incidental to this responsibility, in conjunction with Bay Tree Management Company, the board of directors has the responsibility to approve or disapprove of the sale of a condominium to a third party. In the event the board of directors or Bay Tree Management Company disapproves of the sale, the condominium documents outline a procedure wherein the proposed sale can be pursued by the property owner and prospective buyer (Petitioner herein). After Orchid Springs advised Petitioner that it had not approved his sale, this alternative was not pursued. Orchid Springs is a part of a mixed-use development of condominiums, patio homes, and private [single-family] residences and is diverse in terms of religion, national origin and income. Prospective buyers, and the Petitioner herein, were required to complete an application that inquired into the prospective buyer's background, intended use of the property, and required three character references. In addition, prospective buyers were required to pay for a "background" check. On September 20, 2008, Petitioner traveled from his home in Maryland to meet with Respondent, John Carroll, president of the condominium board of directors. As they met, an inspection of the condominium unit was being conducted by a home inspection professional. Petitioner anticipated that he would meet with Carroll and two other board members for the personal interview required by the condominium documents as a prerequisite for board approval. The two board members were not available to meet with Petitioner during his September 20, 2008, visit. During the course of the discussion between Petitioner and Carroll, it became apparent that Petitioner anticipated being an "absentee landlord." Carroll advised Petitioner that the owner/residents had various problems with renters, including recent police activity incidental to a drug laboratory in one of the rented condominium units. Carroll also related that four of the absentee owner units were in foreclosure and that placed an economic burden on the remaining owners. During the discussion between Petitioner and Carroll, Petitioner inquired as to whether he could do the three-board member interview by telephone. Mr. Carroll advised him that a telephone conference might be arranged, but that one board member could not do it alone. On October 8, 2008, Petitioner submitted his Association Application. As a part of the application process, Petitioner certified that he had been supplied copies of the Articles of Declaration of Condominium Ownership and By-Laws of Orchid Springs Village, No. 200, Inc.; the Service and Maintenance Agreement; and the manual, "Condominium Living--The Seville." The Association Application includes the following language: "[A]pplicant purchasing Condominium certifies that he/she has . . . read [and] agrees to abide by" the foregoing documents. The Association Application states that "[i]mmediately after submission of the application, Applicant is requested to arrange with the President for a personal interview with at least [three] Board Members present. Such personal interview is a firm requirement [and] may not be waived." Following receipt of a prospective buyer or renter's Association Application, the tasks of conducting the customary background and criminal checks are divided among board members. In this instance, Mrs. Thibodaux, now deceased, did the background check; and Mrs. Douglas did the criminal background check, which, apparently, was a local records check utilizing the county records available through the internet. Testimony reveals that Mrs. Thibodaux reported that she had some problems with two of Petitioner's character references and that the Social Security number he provided was incorrect. This testimony is discounted as Mrs. Thibodaux is dead and not available to testify, and there is no indication that Petitioner's Social security number is incorrect. In addition, two of Petitioner's character references testified at the final hearing. Mrs. Douglas' local criminal background check revealed a January 13, 1997, arrest for battery--domestic violence. The case was "nolle prossed" after the Petitioner was placed in pre-trial diversion. Orchid Spring's critical examination and appraisal of prospective buyers and renters is apparently "slipshod," but not atypical when the prospective cost of a thorough examination that would involve an investigation of an individual's credit history and a thorough criminal and background check. Concern raised by the background and criminal check prompted Carroll to contact Petitioner and request that he come to Florida and meet with three board members for the interview required by the condominium documents. Petitioner was unable to meet with the interview committee. On November 7, 2008, Petitioner was advised by Respondents that his application had been denied. No evidence of damages was advanced by Petitioner.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 22nd day of November, 2010, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JEFF B. CLARK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of November, 2010. COPIES FURNISHED: Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Lawrence F. Kranert, Jr., General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Emmanuel Agbara 1822 Metzerott Road, No. 206 Adelphi, Maryland 20783 Rex P. Cowan, Esquire Post Office Box 857 Winter Haven, Florida 33882-0857
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent, The Pines at Warrington, LP, et al., and Pinnacle, and American Management Service Company (The Pines), discriminated against Petitioner, Susan M. Walters (Ms. Walters), because of her disability and gender in violation of the Florida Fair Housing Act, Sections 760.20- 760.37, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Ms. Walters, during times pertinent, suffered from schizophrenia, chronic differentiated type alcohol abuse, and a personality disorder. The Pines is an apartment community consisting of 160 units. The community is managed by Pinnacle, a subsidiary of American Management Services, LLC. Approximately 90 percent of the residents at The Pines are women. Ms. Walters completed a detailed application for residency in The Pines with Joy John (Ms. John), the facility's leasing specialist. Ms. Walters signed the application on October 24, 2007. She entered into a lease for a term of one year on October 31, 2007. During the course of these events, Ms. Walters did not claim a disability or mention that she was disabled. No one in management at The Pines perceived Ms. Walters to be disabled. During the application and contract process, Ms. Walters was provided with copies of the rules and regulations governing residents of The Pines. The lease required Ms. Walters to provide management at The Pines 60 day's notice, if she wanted to vacate the premises. In or around February 2008, Ms. Walters acquired a dog. She informed management at The Pines, and in accordance with the lease agreement, began making payments toward the required pet deposit. During April 2008, Ms. John and Dawn Chapman, Property Manager, received complaints about Ms. Walters' dog. The dog's barking was disturbing residents of The Pines. Four to five complaints were received each week during April. Ms. John and Ms. Chapman advised Ms. Walters of the complaints and provided her with suggestions as to how to ameliorate the problem. Nevertheless, the barking continued. On May 13, 2008, Ms. Walters was provided a "Seven Day Notice of Noncompliance with Opportunity to Cure," addressing the dog issue. It informed Ms. Walters that she must prevent the dog from disturbing other tenants. It further informed her that if the problem continued, she might be evicted. Another week of barking precipitated a "Seven Day Notice of Noncompliance with Possible Lease Termination Following." This was dated May 21, 2008, and signed by Dawn Chapman. The notice again made clear to Ms. Walters that if the barking continued she might be evicted. These notices were often given to other residents of The Pines when their barking dogs annoyed other tenants. Many of the residents of The Pines were minorities. One of them, Rhonda Lavender, complained about Ms. Walters because she put up a sign in a stairwell that included the word "nigger." Another resident, a disabled man who lived in the unit above her, complained that she "lambasted him" because he dropped a boot and it made a loud noise. Others complained about her coming out of the door to her apartment and screaming. None of the residents, who complained about Ms. Walters' barking dog, or her other offensive actions, mentioned her gender or that she was disabled. At no time during the residency of Ms. Walters at The Pines did she provide Ms. John or Ms. Chapman information with regard to having a disability. The only evidence of a disability presented at the hearing was a form Ms. Walters referred to as "a doctor's release for medical records," signed by an unidentified "physician." It was also agreed that Ms. Walters received payments based on a disability from the U.S. Social Security Administration. However, no evidence was adduced that indicated Ms. Walters was limited in one or more major life activities. Ms. Walters' rent payment for June was due June 5, 2008, but was not paid. On June 6, 2008, a "Three Day Notice- Demand for Payment of Rent or Possession" was affixed to the door of her apartment. The notice demanded payment of the sum of $518.00 or delivery of possession of the premises. The notice informed Ms. Walters that eviction proceedings would ensue if she did not pay in three days. By June 6, 2008, however, Ms. Walters had determined that she was going to vacate the premises. She told Ms. Chapman that she would pay her June rent on June 20, 2008, but this was a prevarication because Ms. Walters had no intention of paying any more rent. On or about July 4, 2008, Petitioner vacated her apartment. She placed her keys in the drop box designated for rental payments. The rent for June was never paid. Ms. Walters testified under oath that during her occupancy of the dwelling her bank card went missing. She stated that on another occasion $20 went missing from her apartment and that subsequently $10 disappeared. She said the fire alarm rang once for two hours. She said she was disturbed by noisy neighbors and a loud maintenance man. She said that once after returning from her job she discovered a glass plate in her apartment that had been shattered. She did not reveal any of these allegations to management at The Pines when they occurred, if they did occur. Ms. Walters claimed that someone entered her apartment in May and sprayed a chemical that encouraged her dog to defecate inside the apartment. She said she could not check her mail because management at The Pines had locked her out of her mailbox. She said someone came in and scratched her Teflon frying pan and burned up her microwave oven. She did not make these allegations to management at The Pines when they occurred, if they did occur. Even if one believes that her property was violated, and evidence to that effect was thin, there is no indication at all that anyone involved in managing The Pines was involved. Moreover, no adverse action was taken toward Ms. Walters. Two notices about barking dogs and a written demand that she pay rent do not amount to an adverse action.
Recommendation Based upon the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Petition for Relief of Susan M. Walters be dismissed. DONE AND ENTERED this 16th day of October, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S HARRY L. HOOPER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of October, 2009. COPIES FURNISHED: Dawn Chapman The Pines at Warrington 4101 West Navy Boulevard Pensacola, Florida 32507 Angela North Olgetree, Deakins, Nash, Smoak & Stewart, P.C. 301 Congress Avenue, Suite 1150 Austin, Texas 78701 Susan M. Walters 1112 Bartow Avenue Pensacola, Florida 32507 Monica Jerelle Williams, Esquire Ogletree, Deakins, Nash, Smoak, and Stewart, P.C. 100 North Tampa Street, Suite 3600 Tampa, Florida 33602 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Larry Kranert, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondents unlawfully discriminated against Petitioner on the basis of her race, religion, or disability in violation of the Florida Fair Housing Act.
Findings Of Fact Parklife is the owner of a mobile home community known as St. Lucie Mobile Village (the “Village”), which comprises approximately 220 homes. For the last 21 years, McGrath has leased a lot in the Village, upon which her double-wide mobile home sits. She is a white woman, approximately 60 years old, who claims to suffer from post-traumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”) and other unspecified anxiety disorders, and to be a practicing Jehovah’s Witness. This is a case of alleged housing discrimination brought under Florida’s Fair Housing Act (the “Act”). McGrath alleges that Parklife has discriminated against her in several ways, which can be classified as selective enforcement, disparate treatment, and retaliation. Specifically, McGrath alleges that Parklife required her to upgrade the skirting around, and also to re-level, her home, while excusing other (predominately Hispanic) residents, whose homes were in comparable condition, from making similar improvements. McGrath alleges that Parklife issued warnings to her for violating the “two vehicle” rule, while allowing other (predominately Hispanic) residents to keep three or more cars on their lots. She alleges that Parklife permitted Hispanic residents to shoot off fireworks and make noise in violation of park rules, depriving her of the peaceful enjoyment of her premises. Finally, McGrath alleges that Parklife commenced a retaliatory eviction proceeding against her for being a whistle blower. McGrath does not dispute that her home needed new skirting and to be leveled, and she admits having violated the two vehicle rule. She claims, nevertheless, that Parklife took action against her on the basis of her race (white), religion (Jehovah’s Witness), disability (PTSD), or some combination of these, as shown by its more lenient treatment of residents outside the protected categories. McGrath’s allegations are legally sufficient to state a claim of housing discrimination. That is, if McGrath were able to prove the facts she has alleged, she would be entitled to relief. She failed, however, to present sufficient, persuasive evidence in support of the charges. It is not that there is no evidence behind McGrath’s claims. She and her witness, Kassandra Rosa, testified that other residents have violated park rules regarding skirting, leveling, and allowable vehicles––seemingly without consequence. To determine whether the circumstances of these other residents were truly comparable to McGrath’s, however, so as to conclude that she was singled out for different treatment, requires more information than the evidence affords. Taken together, McGraths’s testimony and that of Ms. Rosa was simply too vague and lacking in relevant detail to support findings of disparate treatment or selective enforcement on the basis of race, religion, or handicap. Indeed, the persuasive evidence fails to establish that Parklife declined to take appropriate action with regard to similarly-situated violators, or that it otherwise condoned, or acquiesced to, the rulebreaking of such residents. At most, the evidence shows that other residents violated the same rules as McGrath––not that they got off scot-free, which is a different matter. As for the eviction proceeding, which was pending in county court at the time of the final hearing, there is insufficient evidence (if any) to support McGrath’s contention that Parklife is retaliating against her or using the legal process as a pretext for unlawfully depriving her of a dwelling in violation of the Act. In terms of timing, Parklife initiated the eviction proceeding before it became aware that McGrath had filed a complaint of housing discrimination, which tends to undermine the assertion that the eviction was brought to retaliate against McGrath for exercising her rights under the Act. More important is that Parklife has articulated and proved nondiscriminatory grounds for seeking to terminate McGrath’s lease. Residents have complained to the Village’s management that McGrath has harassed her neighbors at various times, in various ways. While there is insufficient nonhearsay evidence in the instant record for the undersigned to make findings as to whether McGrath did, in fact, harass other residents in violation of park rules, Parklife proved by a preponderance of the competent substantial evidence that it was on notice of such alleged misconduct on McGrath’s part. The fact that Parklife had such notice is sufficient to show that its bringing an action to evict McGrath was not merely a pretext for unlawful discrimination against her. Of course, the question of whether Parklife is entitled to terminate McGrath’s tenancy is one that need not, and cannot, be decided in this proceeding. It is determined as a matter of ultimate fact that McGrath has failed to establish by the greater weight of the evidence that Parklife or any of the Respondents, jointly or severally, committed an unlawful housing practice.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order finding Parklife not liable for housing discrimination and awarding McGrath no relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 2nd day of November, 2020, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JOHN G. VAN LANINGHAM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of November, 2020. COPIES FURNISHED: Tammy S. Barton, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 4075 Esplanade Way, Room 110 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-7020 (eServed) Laney H. McGrath 11500 Southwest Kanner Highway, Lot 317 Indiantown, Florida 34956 (eServed) Teresa Schenk St. Lucie Village Parklife, LLC 11500 Southwest Kanner Highway Indiantown, Florida 34956 (eServed) Cheyanne Costilla, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 4075 Esplanade Way, Room 110 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-7020 (eServed)
The Issue Whether Petitioners were subject to discrimination in the rental of a dwelling, or in the terms, conditions, or privileges of rental of a dwelling, based on their race or familial status, in violation of the Florida Fair Housing Act, chapter 760, Part II, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Petitioners, Rolstan and Leticia Hodge, are African- American and currently reside in Virginia Beach, Virginia. Petitioners have six children. Respondent, Watson Realty Corp.,1/ is a real estate and property management company with offices throughout the state of Florida and an office in Georgia. Wendell Davis is the company’s Executive Vice President in charge of Watson Realty Management Division, including its Jacksonville office located at 4456 Sunbeam Road, Jacksonville, Florida 32257. On June 3, 2013, Petitioners completed applications to rent a property from Respondent located at 2314 Creekfront Drive in Green Cove Springs, Florida (the Property). Petitioners’ applications were taken by Gayle Aljets, Secretary at Respondent’s Westside office. Ms. Aljets sent, via facsimile transmission, Petitioners’ applications, along with copies of their photo identification, social security cards, and proof of income, to Anne Fletchall, Application Specialist in Respondent’s Sunbeam office.2/ Ms. Fletchall entered pertinent information from Petitioners’ applications, including personal identification and income information, into a system run by LexisNexis, a company with which Respondent contracted to conduct background, criminal, and financial screening of applicants.3/ LexisNexis screens applicants based on criteria selected by Respondent. For example, Respondent requires applicants to establish income of three times the rental amount, applies the combined income of multiple applicants for the same property (roommates), and requires criminal background checks on applicants 18 years of age and older. On debt issues, Respondent screens applicants for legal debts (e.g., judgments) of $1,000 or more within the most recent 48 months; as well as tax liens, landlord debt, and utility debt within the most recent 24 months. The screening system allows for exceptions, or “overrides,” on negative results for specified criteria. For example, if an applicant has a legal debt of $1,000 or more in the most recent 48 months, or a tax lien, landlord debt, or utility debt within the most recent 24 months, the system will return an override code of “800,” allowing approval of the applicant with a co-signor, or guarantor. The override determinations were made by Respondent at the time Respondent contracted with LexisNexis. Ms. Fletchall entered Petitioners’ information separately as two roommates applying for the Property. LexisNexis reported to Ms. Fletchall that Mr. Hodge had a legal debt of $1,000 or more within the last 48 months, thus failing one of the screening criteria. However, the program assigned an override code of “800,” meaning the application could be approved if Mr. Hodge obtained a guarantor. Mrs. Hodge passed all the LexisNexis screening criteria. LexisNexis further reported Petitioners’ rent-to- income ratio as 24.73 percent, based on a monthly rent of $1,195.00 and a combined income of $5,055.00. According to the criteria established by Respondent when setting up the screening process, a guarantor must establish an income of three and one-half times the amount of the monthly rent. Mrs. Hodge’s individual verified income was approximately $1,400.00, less than three and one-half times the monthly rental amount. Ms. Fletchall sent an email to Heather Cornett, property manager in the Westside office, informing her that Mr. Hodge was approved conditioned upon obtaining a guarantor. Ms. Cornett informed Mr. Hodge by phone that he would need a guarantor in order to qualify to rent the Property. Mr. Hodge asked why a guarantor would be required, but Ms. Cornett was unable to explain. Ms. Cornett informed Mr. Hodge that he would receive a letter from the third-party screening company that explained the details. During that telephone conversation, Mr. Hodge requested a telephone number for LexisNexis. Ms. Cornett did not have the LexisNexis telephone number and informed Mr. Hodge she would have to call him back with the number. Ms. Cornett obtained the number and made a return call to Mr. Hodge with the telephone number the same day. Through contact with LexisNexis, Mr. Hodge learned that a judgment against him by Freedom Furniture and Electronics had caused him to fail the applicable screening criteria, thus triggering the need for a guarantor. Mr. Hodge contacted Ms. Cornett and informed her that the debt had been satisfied. Ms. Cornett asked Mr. Hodge to obtain a letter from the debtor on the debtor’s letterhead verifying the debt had been satisfied. Mr. Hodge subsequently met with Ms. Cornett in her office and presented a letter from Freedom Furniture and Electronics. The letter represented that Mr. Hodge had entered into a payment agreement to satisfy the debt and that, thus far, payments had been made on time. Ms. Cornett faxed the letter to Ms. Fletchall to submit to LexisNexis as additional information. Ms. Fletchall called Ms. Cornett and told her the letter was only proof that payments were being made on the debt, not that the debt had been satisfied. Ms. Cornett called Mr. Hodge and informed him that the letter did not change the status of his application, and a guarantor was still required. Mr. Hodge requested Ms. Cornett submit the matter to a manager for review. Ms. Cornett took the Hodge’s applications, the letter, and the LexisNexis report to Terri Brown, Respondent’s Regional Manager. Ms. Cornett spoke to Ms. Brown via telephone, who confirmed that a guarantor would still be required for approval. Ms. Cornett again called Mr. Hodge with this information. Mr. Hodge did not obtain a guarantor and did not make another application, or otherwise arrange with Respondent to rent the Property. On June 10, 2013, Respondent received an application from a different set of applicants to rent the Property. The applicants were white and listed on their application that they had three children.4/ Ms. Fletchall processed two separate applications for the applicants as roommates, just as she did with Petitioners’ applications. The LexisNexis report showed that the male applicant failed three of the screening criteria, while the female applicant passed all the criteria. The system assigned an override code of “800” for the male applicant’s prior landlord debt, triggering the requirement for a guarantor. The system also assigned an override code of “920” based on the male applicant’s prior issue with a personal check, triggering a requirement that the male applicant pay monthly rent by certified funds. On June 21, 2013, the new applicants entered into a lease for the Property. The tenants obtained a guarantor who signed a lease guarantee which was incorporated into the lease.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief filed in FCHR No. 2014H0082. DONE AND ENTERED this 25th day of September, 2014, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S Suzanne Van Wyk Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSotoBuilding 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of September, 2014.
The Issue Whether Respondents discriminated against Petitioner in the provision of housing, or services in connection therewith, in violation of the Florida Fair Housing Act (“the Act”).
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Pedro Tamayo, suffers from anxiety, depression, memory loss, and complex regional pain syndrome (“RPD”). Respondent, Avtec, is a residential construction contractor, doing business in Palm Bay, Florida. On November 10, 2018, Petitioner executed a Contract for Sale and Purchase (“Contract”) with Avtec to construct a residential structure on property owned by Petitioner on Raleigh Road Southeast in Palm Bay, Florida. The specific floor plan chosen by Petitioner was the Citation 4 Plus. Avtec executed the Contract on November 12, 2018. The Contract covers clearing of property for construction, materials and color selections by the buyer, and the buyer’s right to reverse the floor plan, among other terms. When Petitioner entered into the Contract, he simultaneously chose many of the options available to customize the Citation 4 Plus, such as impact windows, an exterior pedestrian door in the garage, and a front septic system. Among the options Petitioner chose was 36-inch (36”) doors for the master bedroom entrance, closet, and master bathroom entrance. Petitioner has no obvious physical disability and does not require use of a wheelchair or walker. Construction Setback The Contract does not address the construction setbacks from the property lines. Setbacks are governed by local government codes and Avtec is required to follow those codes. On November 30, 2018, Petitioner met with his sales agent, Sean McCarry, at the Avtec showroom, to discuss some of the options he had chosen for his new home. They specifically discussed plumbing issues for the master bathroom, 36” wide doors in the master bedroom, placement of the septic tank, the concrete culverts for the driveway, and a 45-foot (45’) setback of the home from the property line. While the standard setback for a home with a front septic tank is 38’ to 40’, Petitioner indicated he wanted to build an aluminum carport, which required additional setback footage. Respondent Amicucci stepped into the meeting with Petitioner and Mr. McCarry to address Petitioner’s request for mitered ends on the culvert pipe. Mr. Amicucci was not present when Petitioner requested a 45’ setback. Mr. McCarry verbally agreed to “take care of” the setback requested by Petitioner. Petitioner’s selection of 36” doorways for the master bedroom, and a front septic system were reduced to writing and included in the Contract, signed by both parties, as an Option to Sales Agreement. Petitioner executed five addenda to the Contract between November 30, 2018, and May 1, 2019, including optional upgrades and a modification to the design of the sidewalk. On July 23, 2019, Petitioner and Avtec executed a change order to include the mitered ends of the culvert pipe. No part of the Contract, any addenda thereto, or any change order, addresses Petitioner’s request for a 45’ setback. Section 28 of the Contract provides that “NO OTHER AGREEMENTS exist between the BUYER and SELLER except as set forth in this Agreement. This Agreement shall not be modified except by an instrument in writing executed by both BUYER and SELLER.” Section 29 of the Contract contains the following statement in red underlined text: No representative of Seller has authority to make any verbal statements that modify or change the terms or conditions of this contract. Buyer represents that buyer has read and understands this entire contract. Buyer also represents that buyer is not relying on any verbal statement, promise, or condition not specifically set forth in this contract. It is acknowledged that builder is relying on these representations and would not enter into this contract without this understanding. Section 20 of the Contract specifically provides, “Once the rough plumbing is installed, absolutely NO CHANGES will be allowed.” Petitioner’s new home was built 40’ from the property line, rather than 45’ as Petitioner requested. Sometime after the rough plumbing was installed and the foundation was poured, Petitioner complained to Avtec that his home was not built with a 45’ setback as promised by Mr. McCarry. On August 22, 2019, Avtec, through its Director of Corporate Development, responded in writing to Petitioner’s complaint. Avtec apologized that the home was not built to the setback he had communicated to Mr. McCarry, and referred to the Contract terms that exclude any verbal agreements. Avtec offered to release Petitioner from his contract, refund his deposit of $6,250, and give Petitioner $30,000 for the property after selling it to another buyer. On November 13, 2019, Petitioner signed a “Final Acceptance of Completion” of the construction of his home. Fill Dirt On March 8, 2019, Petitioner drove by the construction site and noted that the fill dirt being used was “contaminated” with tree branches and other material. He drove to the model home to discuss the issue with Mr. McCarry. Mr. McCarry contacted Mr. Amicucci, who agreed to meet Petitioner at the property to inspect the fill and address Petitioner’s concerns. Petitioner and Mr. Amicucci testified to two very different versions of the events at the construction site that day. Petitioner testified that, when Mr. Amicucci arrived, he got out of his vehicle, visibly upset, and raised his voice and cursed at Petitioner regarding his lack of knowledge of proper fill material. Petitioner testified, specifically that: I feared that [Mr. Amicucci] would physically attack me by his aggressive demeanor and I immediately froze. I could not comprehend how a paying customer could be treated this way by raising concerns for the foundation of my home. I am not a builder. [Mr. Amicucci] simply needed to explain the common practice of standard fill. Since March 8th, 2019, my quality of life has not been the same. I have severe anxiety due to the memories of that day and suffer constant nightmares. I feel as [sic] my life can be in danger and, therefore, live in a state of high alert. My daily life has been disrupted. Simply having to drive by Avtec showroom due to my normal routine routes triggers flashbacks of that day. Mr. Amicucci testified that when he arrived at the property, Petitioner was upset and aggressive toward him, demanding that the fill be removed from his property. Mr. Amicucci reassured Petitioner that the fill was all good soil and that it would be root-raked before it was spread for the foundation. Mr. Amicucci explained the root-raking process and the equipment used therefor. Nevertheless, Petitioner insisted that Mr. Amicucci go with him to another construction site to show him the type of fill he wanted used on his property. Mr. Amicucci accompanied Petitioner to the specific construction site, which was not an Avtec project, and Mr. Amicucci identified the fill being used there as a hard white shell material. Mr. Amicucci assured Petitioner that the brown sandy soil imported to his property would be better for the sod and plants Petitioner would be using to landscape the property. Mr. Amicucci testified that, at the end of the meeting, Petitioner extended his hand and said, “[l]ook, that all sounds good. I just want to start back over. Are we good?” Mr. Amicucci shook Petitioner’s hand and assured him that they “were good.” Mr. Amicucci’s testimony regarding the events that occurred on March 8, 2019, is accepted as more credible and reliable than Petitioner’s. Knowledge of Petitioner’s Disability Mr. Amicucci testified that he was not aware that Petitioner had any kind of disability until the Complaint was filed against him and Avtec. Petitioner testified that his disability was revealed to Mr. Amicucci on November 30, 2018, during a meeting at the Avtec showroom to discuss the various options selected by Petitioner when he signed the contract. Petitioner testified that Mr. Amicucci asked him what he did for a living and Petitioner told him that he was retired and disabled from the City of Hialeah. He testified that Mr. Amicucci was further on notice because Petitioner always wears a glove to improve circulation in his right hand and that he can hardly sign his name, which would have been apparent to Mr. Amicucci at the November 30, 2018 meeting. Finally, Petitioner alleges Mr. Amicucci should have been aware of his disability because he requested 36” ADA-compliant door widths for the master bedroom. Mr. Amicucci did not recall Petitioner telling him he was disabled or seeing Petitioner wearing a glove. He did recall seeing Petitioner wearing a sling of some sort and inquiring whether he had been injured. He recalled Petitioner telling him it was related to an old injury. Mr. Amicucci was not present for any discussion about the 36” doorways. Assuming, arguendo, that he was present for that discussion, a request for 36” doorways alone is not proof of a disability. Many buyers upgrade to larger doorways to accommodate larger furniture or in anticipation of needing a walker or wheelchair access in the future. Furthermore, requesting ADA-compliant doorways is irrelevant to Petitioner’s claim that he has emotional disabilities and chronic pain. The evidence does not support a finding that Mr. Amicucci knew of Petitioner’s disabilities of anxiety, depression, memory loss, and RPD. No other witness was offered on behalf of Avtec. There is no evidence to support a finding that Avtec had knowledge of Petitioner’s disability through any other employee.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a final order dismissing Petition for Relief from a Discriminatory Housing Practice No. 202022149. DONE AND ENTERED this 22nd day of December, 2020, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S SUZANNE VAN WYK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of December, 2020. COPIES FURNISHED: Mike Amicucci Suite 3 590 Malabar Road Palm Bay, Florida 32909 Tammy S. Barton, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations Room 110 4075 Esplanade Way Tallahassee, Florida 32399-7020 (eServed) Pedro Tamayo 987 Raleigh Road Southeast Palm Bay, Florida 32909 (eServed) Rebecca E. Rhoden, Esquire Lowndes, Drosdick, Doster, Kantor & Reed, P.A. 215 North Eola Drive Orlando, Florida 32801 (eServed) Lawrence F. Sietsma Avtec Homes, Inc. et al 2860 North Riverside Drive Indialantic, Florida 32903 Cheyanne Costilla, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations Room 110 4075 Esplanade Way Tallahassee, Florida 32399-7020 (eServed)
The Issue Whether Respondent discriminated against Petitioner in the rental of a dwelling based on her race, in violation of Florida Fair Housing Act, chapter 760, Part II, Florida Statutes (2015).
Findings Of Fact The following Findings of Fact are based on the exhibit admitted into evidence and testimony offered by witnesses at the final hearing. Ms. Smith is a Black female and currently resides in Gainesville, Florida. Saul Silber Properties is a company that manages Oak Glade located at 3427 Southwest 30th Terrace, Gainesville, Florida 32608. Respondent provides residential rental apartments in Gainesville, Florida. Saul Silber is the owner of Saul Silber Properties. Ms. Smith is a former resident of apartment number 54I of Oak Glade.1/ Ms. Smith rented the apartment pursuant to a residential lease agreement entered into on January 15, 2014.2/ The lease was for a one-year renewable term. Ms. Smith filed a complaint with the Commission alleging Respondent issued her a Notice of Non-Renewal of her lease agreement on the basis of her race. The Commission issued a “No Cause” determination and Ms. Smith filed a Petition for Relief, which is the matter before the undersigned. During her tenancy at Oak Glade, Ms. Smith had raised numerous complaints with the property manager regarding matters involving her neighbor, Anne E. Dowling. Ms. Dowling, who was White, was a former resident of apartment number 54H. Ms. Smith’s issues with Ms. Dowling included complaints concerning smoking, loud music, non-residents living in the apartment, the number of visitors outside Ms. Dowling’s apartment, and Ms. Dowling’s cat scratching her car. All of the complaints were addressed and resolved by the property manager. The incident that led to the major blow-up between the neighbors involved Ms. Smith and Ms. Dowling’s daughter. Ms. Smith and Ms. Dowling’s daughter were involved in a verbal altercation after Ms. Smith verbally reprimanded Ms. Dowling’s granddaughter (age range of 7-9 years old) and her friend. Ms. Smith testified that the two girls turned their backs to her, bent over, and wiggled their buttocks in a side-to-side motion. Ms. Smith understood this gesture to be disrespectful and a suggestion to “kiss their behinds.” Ms. Dowling’s daughter was not a resident of the apartment complex. The altercation was so loud that Ms. Osteen heard people “screaming” while she was in her office. Ms. Osteen discovered Ms. Smith and Ms. Dowling’s daughter involved in a screaming match. Ms. Osteen later consulted with the senior property manager about the incident and it was determined that both Ms. Dowling and Ms. Smith would be issued a Notice of Non-Renewal. On March 15, 2016, Respondent issued Ms. Smith and Ms. Dowling a Notice of Non-Renewal, which was posted on the door of each tenant’s respective apartment. The notices did not state a reason for non-renewal. Ms. Dowling’s lease would expire effective May 30, 2016; and Ms. Smith’s lease would expire effective December 30, 2016. Prior to expiration of her lease, Ms. Dowling advised Ms. Osteen that she was terminally ill and requested that she be permitted to stay at Oak Glade. Ms. Dowling explained that her support system was located in the area and due to financial limitations, moving from the complex would create a hardship for her. For these reasons, Ms. Dowling was permitted to enter a new lease and was moved to a different apartment. The decision to permit Ms. Dowling to remain at the complex was made by the senior property manager. Ms. Dowling passed away approximately four months later, on September 28, 2016. Other than her mistaken belief that Ms. Dowling did not receive a Notice of Non-Renewal, Ms. Smith did not offer any evidence to support her claim of housing discrimination in violation of the Florida Fair Housing Act.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a final order: finding that Respondent, Saul Silber Properties, LLC, did not commit a discriminatory housing practice against Petitioner, Ms. Smith; and dismissing the Petition for Relief filed in FCHR No. 2017H0320. DONE AND ENTERED this 29th day of August, 2018, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S YOLONDA Y. GREEN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of August, 2018.
The Issue Whether Respondent discriminated against Petitioner in the terms, conditions, or privileges of rental of a dwelling; or provision of services or facilities in connection therewith, in violation of the Florida Fair Housing Act (“the Act”), section 760.23, Florida Statutes (2019).
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a female residing in Tallahassee, Florida, who purports to have diagnoses of depression, attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder (“ADHD”), and a learning disability. Petitioner offered no evidence regarding how her diagnoses affect her daily life. Petitioner originally signed a lease with Respondent to rent apartment F201 at Sabal Court Apartments, 2125 Jackson Bluff Road, Tallahassee, Florida, from November 1, 2017, to October 31, 2018. Petitioner moved into the apartment with her two minor children on November 2, 2017. Petitioner testified her two minor children also have ADHD. On October 24, 2018, Petitioner renewed her lease for the apartment for the term of November 1, 2018, through October 31, 2019. Petitioner testified that, during the term of both leases, she experienced problems with the apartment; including mold in the bathroom, bed bugs, ants, roaches, spiders, and cracked flooring. Most distressing to Petitioner was the air conditioning unit, which Petitioner alleges was filthy and failed to cool the apartment. Petitioner testified she submitted several requests for the unit to be serviced, but it was never repaired to good working condition. Petitioner complained that the apartment was too hot—frequently reaching temperatures in excess of 80 degrees—for her and her children to sleep at night. On August 7, 2019, Petitioner executed a lease renewal form, requesting to renew her lease for an additional 12 months—through October 31, 2020. On September 23, 2019, Respondent posted a Notice of Non-Renewal of Lease (“Notice”) on Petitioner’s apartment door. The Notice notified Petitioner that her tenancy would not be renewed and that she was expected to vacate the premises on or before October 31, 2019. Petitioner testified that she did not know why her lease was non- renewed, but believed it to be additional mistreatment of her and her family by Respondent. In response to the undersigned’s question why Petitioner believed Respondent’s treatment of her to be related to her handicap, or that of her children, Petitioner replied that she does not believe that the non-renewal of her lease, or other issues with Respondent’s management, was based on either her handicap or that of her children.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a final order dismissing Petition for Relief from a Discriminatory Housing Practice No. 202021115. DONE AND ENTERED this 11th day of May, 2020, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S SUZANNE VAN WYK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of May, 2020. COPIES FURNISHED: Tammy S. Barton, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations Room 110 4075 Esplanade Way Tallahassee, Florida 32399-7020 (eServed) Dastha L. Crews Apartment A 2125 Pecan Lane Tallahassee, Florida 32303 (eServed) Joni Henley, Assistant Manager Sabal Court Apartments 2125 Jackson Bluff Road Tallahassee, Florida 32304 Todd A. Ruderman Green Oaks Tampa, LLC Suite 218 3201 West Commercial Boulevard Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33309 Cheyanne Costilla, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations Room 110 4075 Esplanade Way Tallahassee, Florida 32399-7020 (eServed)
The Issue Whether Respondent discriminated against Petitioner on the basis of handicap in violation of the Florida Fair Housing Act and, if so, the relief to which Petitioner is entitled.
Findings Of Fact At times relevant to this proceeding, Petitioner, a female born in October 1953, received housing assistance from a federally funded assistance program referred to as the Section 8 Choice Voucher program (the Section 8 program). The Section 8 program relevant to this proceeding is administered by Respondent and has eligibility criteria that a participant must meet. A participant receives a voucher from the Section 8 program that pays part, but not all, of the participant’s rent. Petitioner has also received Supplemental Security Income (SSI) at all times relevant to this proceeding. Respondent knew that Petitioner received SSI, but it had no information as to why she qualified to receive SSI. At the times relevant to this proceeding, Petitioner’s landlord was named Rupert Phipps. On May 27, 2007, Mr. Phipps issued to Petitioner a notice styled “Three-day Notice for Non- payment of Rent pursuant to Florida Statutes" (Notice). After stating the amount owed and the address of the rented premises, the Notice demanded “. . . payment of the rent or possession of the Premises within three days (excluding Saturday, Sunday and legal holidays). ” Petitioner was evicted from her apartment. The date of the eviction was not established. After being advised by Mr. Phipps that Petitioner had failed to pay her rent, Ms. Smith mailed to Petitioner a certified letter dated July 6, 2007, stating that she would be terminated from the Section 8 program effective August 6, 2007. The stated reason for the termination was Petitioner’s failure to pay rent to the landlord, which is considered a serious violation of the lease and, therefore, a violation of 24 C.F.R. § 982,511(4)(c), which prohibits a participant in the Section 8 program from committing any serious or repeated violation of the lease with the participant’s landlord. Ms. Smith’s letter also contained the following statement: . . . If you wish to appeal this decision, you have the right to an informal hearing. The request must be submitted to this agency in writing within 10 days from the date of this letter. Your request should be directed to Alex Morales, Executive Director. The ten-day period for the appeal is part of Respondent’s written policies and is consistent with the requirements of 24 C.F.R. § 982.554(a), that require an agency such as Respondent to have a written appeals process. Respondent has consistently treated the failure of a participant to pay his or her share of the rent as a serious violation of a lease. Petitioner was familiar with Respondent’s appeal process because she had successfully appealed a prior notice of termination of her participation in the Section 8 program. Ms. Smith’s letter was received by Petitioner on July 7, 2007. At some undetermined time between July 7 and July 19, 2007, Ms. Tennie called Ms. Smith and told Ms. Smith that she was sick. Ms. Smith told Ms. Tennie that she would have to follow the instructions set forth in the letter and respond in writing if she wanted an informal appeal. On July 19, 2007, Petitioner sent the following letter to the attention of Ms. Smith and Mr. Morales: Would you give me Mae Tennie another hearing because I got the letter to [sic] late and I was in the hospital due to an anurism [sic] stroke at the brain their [sic] was blood on my head and I’m still rehabilitating the after affects [sic] of this serious condition. In the case of my Section 8 voucher being terminated I plead for another hearing due to the terms [sic] of my hospitalization. Respondent received Petitioner’s letter on July 23, 2007. Petitioner’s written request for an appeal was after the ten-day deadline for filing the request. By letter signed by Mr. Morales and dated July 25, 2007, Respondent denied Petitioner’s request contained in her letter dated July 19 as follows: I am in receipt of your letter requesting a hearing. Please be advised that your request for a hearing cannot be granted because your request was not made within the required 10 day period. For this reason, your case will remain closed. No further action was taken by either party to this proceeding until December 2007, when Petitioner sought the services of Legal Services of Greater Miami, Inc. On December 20, 2007, Mr. Lewis, as counsel for Petitioner, sent the following letter to Mr. Morales: This office represents Ms. Mae Tennie regarding her participation in the Section 8 program administered through the Hialeah Housing Authority (“HHA”). Ms. Tennie has been a participant of Section 8 through HHA for the past 25 years. On July 6, 2007, HHA served Ms. Tennie with notice of its intent to terminate her Section 8 assistance on the basis that she violated one of her obligations under the program. The notice informed Ms. Tennie of her right to appeal the decision and to attend an informal hearing. The written request was to be submitted to HHA within 10 days of the date of the letter. Ms. Tennie faxed her written request for an appeal on July 19, 2007. A copy of Ms. Tennie’s letter is attached as “Attachment A.” In her request, she notified HHA that she was unable to submit her request within the time required because she [had] been, and still was, recovering from a brain aneurism.[2] On or about July 31, 2007, HHA notified Ms. Tennie that her request was denied because it was submitted too late. Ms. Tennie requests that HHA reconsider its denial and provide Ms. Tennie with an informal hearing to appeal the termination. Ms. Tennie is an elderly woman in failing health. In June 2007, Ms. Tennie was hospitalized twice at Jackson South Community Hospital as a result of suffering an “intracranial hemorrhage.”[3] I have attached copies of supporting medical documentation as “Attachment B.” As a result of this very serious medical condition, Ms. Tennie’s cognitive abilities were significantly diminished. Ms. Tennie was bed-bound and only able to communicate under great strain. The Fair Housing Act, the Americans with Disabilities Act, and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, prohibits [sic] any agency or landlord receiving federal funds to deny equal access for individuals with disabilities to housing or other program benefits and services. To ensure individuals with disabilities have equal access to those services and benefits, an agency or landlord is required to provide reasonable accommodations to that person’s disability. One form of reasonable accommodations is the modification of a program rule or policy. The right to a hearing to appeal the termination of Section 8 assistance is a benefit that Ms. Tennie, as a participant, was entitled to. Ms. Tennie made clear in her letter to HHA that she was unable to comply with HHA’s time requirement because of her disabling medical condition. Ms. Tennie also asked that the policy be modified to accommodate her disability. HHA should have reasonably accommodated Ms. Tennie’s disability by simply modifying the time period by adding 3 extra days for her to submit her request for a hearing. By failing to do so, HHA effectively denied Ms. Tennie equal access to federal benefit under the Section 8 program, that of having a hearing to appeal her termination. Ms. Tennie is therefore renewing her request to HHA for reasonable accommodations to her disability by modifying the time limit to request a hearing. For the above reasons, Ms. Tennie requests that HHA reconsider its denial and provide Ms. Tennie a hearing to challenge her termination from Section 8. Please do not hesitate to contact me with any questions or additional information at ... . [telephone number omitted.] [Footnotes omitted.] By letter dated December 26, 2007, Respondent denied the request set forth in Mr. Lewis’s letter. Thereafter, Petitioner filed the complaint with HUD that culminated in this proceeding as described in the Preliminary Statement of this Recommended Order. Ms. Tennie was hospitalized June 7, 2007, and discharged June 14, 2007. Mr. Lewis attached to his letter a discharge summary from Jackson Memorial Hospital, which contained the following diagnoses on discharge: Intracranial hemorrhage with intraventricular extension secondary to uncontrolled hypertension. Diabetes. The discharge summary reflects that Petitioner had fallen the Saturday before admission and had hit her head on a doorknob. The discharge summary reflects that on discharge she was awake, alert, and oriented times three. She had fluent speech and she was able to ambulate without difficulty. She was instructed to make an appointment with her primary care doctor in one week and to follow up in the Jackson Memorial’s Stroke Clinic in 4 to 8 weeks. Petitioner was discharged to home in a stable condition. Petitioner scheduled an appointment with Milton R. Bengoa, M.D., and on June 18, 2007, she kept that appointment. No finding is made as to Petitioner’s physical status as determined by Dr. Bengoa because nearly all of his notes of that meeting are illegible. In response to questions from her attorney, Petitioner testified as follows beginning at page 27, line 12: Q. And Ms. Tennie, can you please describe what your current health conditions are? A. Right now it’s not very good, because after I had the aneurism I have been having problems walking and problems breathing and I have seizures that I never had before until I had the aneurism and I take all kinds of medicines. And I just found out last week I have a brain mass and they don’t know if it is cancer or what, because the blood that was left in my head was still there so I have excruciating headaches. Q. And could you please explain what your health condition was at or about the time you suffered the stroke or shortly after you had suffered the stroke? A. Well, shortly after I suffered the stroke I had to try and walk all over again, because my memory where I had the stroke at, the neurologist said that it was so deep in my brain that they couldn’t do surgery and that it was going to mess my motor skills up. So I had to learn how to swallow. I forgot how to swallow meat and stuff, so I started eating soft food. I had problems breathing, so when I come [sic] home I had a breathing machine – oxygen machine there. My daughter had to help me try to walk all over again. Q. And so I take it you had someone helping you? A. Yes. My daughter. I moved home with my daughter, because they wanted to put me out at Purdue, it is a nursing facility, but she wanted me to come home with her, so that is what I did. I went home with my daughter and I stayed there for six months. Then I found the place down the street, close to her, which was a two bedroom. Q. Now, prior to suffering the stroke, how was your – can you describe what your health condition was. A. Before I had the stroke, I was sick too. I have congestive heart failure, so I kept going back and forth into the hospital because of my breathing. When the water built up around my heart it had [sic] me to where I can’t breathe. So I have to go in and let them pull the water off. And I was sick before I had the stroke. Petitioner also testified that she could not timely request a hearing and blamed that inability on her general medical condition. Petitioner’s testimony as to her medical condition shortly after the hospitalization is unconvincing because it contradicts the description of her medical condition as described by her treating physician in the discharge notes. The evidence established that Petitioner received Ms. Smith's letter dated July 6, 2007, and understood its contents. Petitioner’s testimony is insufficient to establish that her medical condition caused her failure to timely request an informal hearing to appeal of the termination of her participation in the Section 8 program. Petitioner failed to establish that she required an extension of the expired deadline to request an informal hearing as a “reasonable accommodation” of her condition.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order finding Respondent not liable for the acts of discrimination alleged in the subject Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 16th day of December 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. CLAUDE B. ARRINGTON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of December 2009.
