The Issue The issue is whether the Petition for Relief was timely filed.
Findings Of Fact In January 2008, Petitioner filed a “Housing Discrimination Complaint” with FCHR and/or the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development. The complaint alleged that Respondent discriminated against Petitioner based upon her race (black) and religion (Christian) in its servicing of her home mortgage loan. On or about March 27, 2008, a “Determination” was issued finding no reasonable cause to believe that Respondent committed a discriminatory housing practice against Petitioner. On April 18, 2008, FCHR sent a “Notice of Determination of No Cause” to Petitioner by certified mail No. 7007 1490 0002 5958 0931. Petitioner received the Notice on April 22, 2008, according to the certified mail receipt included in the case file. The Notice advised Petitioner that “FCHR has determined reasonable cause does not exist to believe that a discriminatory housing practice has occurred.” The Notice further advised Petitioner that she could request an administrative hearing, and clearly stated that any such request “must be filed with the FCHR within 30 days of the date of mailing of this Notice.” A “Petition for Relief, in blank” was sent to Petitioner along with the Notice. On May 23, 2008, FCHR received a completed “Petition for Relief” form from Petitioner. The form was signed by Petitioner and dated May 20, 2008. Petitioner stated in her response to the Order to Show Cause that she “never received any paperwork on the above case” and that “the only paperwork that [she] received was on or a about June 9, 2008.”
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that FCHR issue a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief with prejudice. DONE AND ENTERED this 18th day of June, 2008, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S T. KENT WETHERELL, II Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of June, 2008.
The Issue Whether Petitioners were subject to discrimination in the rental of a dwelling, or in the terms, conditions, or privileges of rental of a dwelling, based on their race or familial status, in violation of the Florida Fair Housing Act, chapter 760, Part II, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Petitioners, Rolstan and Leticia Hodge, are African- American and currently reside in Virginia Beach, Virginia. Petitioners have six children. Respondent, Watson Realty Corp.,1/ is a real estate and property management company with offices throughout the state of Florida and an office in Georgia. Wendell Davis is the company’s Executive Vice President in charge of Watson Realty Management Division, including its Jacksonville office located at 4456 Sunbeam Road, Jacksonville, Florida 32257. On June 3, 2013, Petitioners completed applications to rent a property from Respondent located at 2314 Creekfront Drive in Green Cove Springs, Florida (the Property). Petitioners’ applications were taken by Gayle Aljets, Secretary at Respondent’s Westside office. Ms. Aljets sent, via facsimile transmission, Petitioners’ applications, along with copies of their photo identification, social security cards, and proof of income, to Anne Fletchall, Application Specialist in Respondent’s Sunbeam office.2/ Ms. Fletchall entered pertinent information from Petitioners’ applications, including personal identification and income information, into a system run by LexisNexis, a company with which Respondent contracted to conduct background, criminal, and financial screening of applicants.3/ LexisNexis screens applicants based on criteria selected by Respondent. For example, Respondent requires applicants to establish income of three times the rental amount, applies the combined income of multiple applicants for the same property (roommates), and requires criminal background checks on applicants 18 years of age and older. On debt issues, Respondent screens applicants for legal debts (e.g., judgments) of $1,000 or more within the most recent 48 months; as well as tax liens, landlord debt, and utility debt within the most recent 24 months. The screening system allows for exceptions, or “overrides,” on negative results for specified criteria. For example, if an applicant has a legal debt of $1,000 or more in the most recent 48 months, or a tax lien, landlord debt, or utility debt within the most recent 24 months, the system will return an override code of “800,” allowing approval of the applicant with a co-signor, or guarantor. The override determinations were made by Respondent at the time Respondent contracted with LexisNexis. Ms. Fletchall entered Petitioners’ information separately as two roommates applying for the Property. LexisNexis reported to Ms. Fletchall that Mr. Hodge had a legal debt of $1,000 or more within the last 48 months, thus failing one of the screening criteria. However, the program assigned an override code of “800,” meaning the application could be approved if Mr. Hodge obtained a guarantor. Mrs. Hodge passed all the LexisNexis screening criteria. LexisNexis further reported Petitioners’ rent-to- income ratio as 24.73 percent, based on a monthly rent of $1,195.00 and a combined income of $5,055.00. According to the criteria established by Respondent when setting up the screening process, a guarantor must establish an income of three and one-half times the amount of the monthly rent. Mrs. Hodge’s individual verified income was approximately $1,400.00, less than three and one-half times the monthly rental amount. Ms. Fletchall sent an email to Heather Cornett, property manager in the Westside office, informing her that Mr. Hodge was approved conditioned upon obtaining a guarantor. Ms. Cornett informed Mr. Hodge by phone that he would need a guarantor in order to qualify to rent the Property. Mr. Hodge asked why a guarantor would be required, but Ms. Cornett was unable to explain. Ms. Cornett informed Mr. Hodge that he would receive a letter from the third-party screening company that explained the details. During that telephone conversation, Mr. Hodge requested a telephone number for LexisNexis. Ms. Cornett did not have the LexisNexis telephone number and informed Mr. Hodge she would have to call him back with the number. Ms. Cornett obtained the number and made a return call to Mr. Hodge with the telephone number the same day. Through contact with LexisNexis, Mr. Hodge learned that a judgment against him by Freedom Furniture and Electronics had caused him to fail the applicable screening criteria, thus triggering the need for a guarantor. Mr. Hodge contacted Ms. Cornett and informed her that the debt had been satisfied. Ms. Cornett asked Mr. Hodge to obtain a letter from the debtor on the debtor’s letterhead verifying the debt had been satisfied. Mr. Hodge subsequently met with Ms. Cornett in her office and presented a letter from Freedom Furniture and Electronics. The letter represented that Mr. Hodge had entered into a payment agreement to satisfy the debt and that, thus far, payments had been made on time. Ms. Cornett faxed the letter to Ms. Fletchall to submit to LexisNexis as additional information. Ms. Fletchall called Ms. Cornett and told her the letter was only proof that payments were being made on the debt, not that the debt had been satisfied. Ms. Cornett called Mr. Hodge and informed him that the letter did not change the status of his application, and a guarantor was still required. Mr. Hodge requested Ms. Cornett submit the matter to a manager for review. Ms. Cornett took the Hodge’s applications, the letter, and the LexisNexis report to Terri Brown, Respondent’s Regional Manager. Ms. Cornett spoke to Ms. Brown via telephone, who confirmed that a guarantor would still be required for approval. Ms. Cornett again called Mr. Hodge with this information. Mr. Hodge did not obtain a guarantor and did not make another application, or otherwise arrange with Respondent to rent the Property. On June 10, 2013, Respondent received an application from a different set of applicants to rent the Property. The applicants were white and listed on their application that they had three children.4/ Ms. Fletchall processed two separate applications for the applicants as roommates, just as she did with Petitioners’ applications. The LexisNexis report showed that the male applicant failed three of the screening criteria, while the female applicant passed all the criteria. The system assigned an override code of “800” for the male applicant’s prior landlord debt, triggering the requirement for a guarantor. The system also assigned an override code of “920” based on the male applicant’s prior issue with a personal check, triggering a requirement that the male applicant pay monthly rent by certified funds. On June 21, 2013, the new applicants entered into a lease for the Property. The tenants obtained a guarantor who signed a lease guarantee which was incorporated into the lease.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief filed in FCHR No. 2014H0082. DONE AND ENTERED this 25th day of September, 2014, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S Suzanne Van Wyk Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSotoBuilding 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of September, 2014.
The Issue Whether Petitioner was the subject of unlawful coercion, intimidation, threats, or interference in the exercise of her rights in connection with Respondent?s regulatory actions regarding rental property owned by Petitioner, in violation of section 818 of Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, as amended by the Fair Housing Act of 1988 and the Florida Fair Housing Act, chapter 760, Part II, Florida Statutes (2011).
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, an African-American woman, owns and manages a residential tri-plex rental unit located at 302 Dubs Drive, Holly Hill, Florida. Dubs Drive is zoned R-2 single-family residential. Petitioner?s tri-plex was constructed in 1955, and is grandfathered as a non-conforming use. The other houses on Dubs Drive are newer, and are all single-family homes. Petitioner purchased the tri-plex in 1998. At the time of her purchase, the tri-plex consisted of a single-story building with 3 apartments and two garages, and was configured, from south to north, as a two-bedroom apartment, a two-bedroom apartment, a one-bedroom apartment, a garage with a washer/dryer connection, and a garage with a toilet. The garages had drywall interiors, except that the ceilings lacked drywall. After she purchased the tri-plex, Petitioner hired Arthur Kowitz, a realtor, to manage the property for her. He performed management services from the time of the purchase until 2001. Mr. Kowitz is white. In 2001, Petitioner retained All-Florida Realtors to manage the property. All-Florida performed management services from 2001 to 2004. All-Florida is a white-owned company. In 2004, Petitioner retained John Benzette to manage the property. Mr. Benzette performed management services from 2004 through November 2007. Mr. Benzette is white. In 2004, Petitioner applied to Respondent for a permit to install an electric meter at the tri-plex. The purpose of the meter was not to serve the apartments -- each of which already had meters by which the tenants individually received and paid for service -- but was a “house meter” or “landlord?s meter” for exterior lighting, garage lighting and outlets, and other uses common to the tri-plex. The permit was issued, and the meter was installed. During one of the 2005 hurricanes that hit the area, the meter was knocked off of the unit by falling debris. It was not reinstalled at that time. The property managers from 1998 through 2007 were responsible for general maintenance and repair activities. Those types of activities did not require building permits. From the time she purchased the tri-plex in 1998, until 2008, the unit was not subject to any formal code-enforcement actions by Respondent. Starting in December, 2007, Petitioner began managing the tri-plex on her own. One of the first activities she performed as owner/manager was the conversion of the garage on the northern end of the building -- separated from the apartments by the other garage -- to a living space. That was accomplished by removing the garage door, constructing a block wall with a window and exterior door, completing interior drywall work, and installing a shower. Petitioner did not apply for or receive a building permit for the work. As part of the construction, Petitioner had the electric meter that was knocked off in 2005 renovated and reinstalled onto the unit. When Petitioner requested service from Florida Power & Light, Florida Power & Light contacted Respondent to confirm a legal connection. Respondent sent employees Mark Ballard and Tim Harbuck to the tri-plex. At that time, it was determined that Petitioner had performed construction without a building permit. Respondent?s employees initially thought the new living space was to be rented as a fourth apartment, an act that would have constituted an unallowable expansion of the non- conforming use of the property. Their belief was not unreasonable, as the configuration of the converted garage was conducive to its being used as a separate apartment, and since Petitioner subsequently placed a “For Rent” sign on the unit, despite the fact that she was living in apartment #3 at the time. However, Petitioner has denied that the rental of the converted garage as a separate unit was her intent, but that the converted garage was intended as an added room for apartment #3. Regardless of whether the conversion of the garage was intended to result in a separate apartment, the construction required a building permit. As a result of the determination that the construction was not permitted, the meter was removed on February 8, 2008. The requirement that the meter be removed, despite the 2004 permit, was not related to Petitioner?s race, but was related to the unauthorized construction and intended use of the converted garage. On April 25, 2008, Respondent sent Petitioner a Notice to Appear at a hearing before a special magistrate. The notice provided that the purpose of the hearing was the “violation of City Ordinance Building Permit Required.” The hearing was set for May 14, 2008. Petitioner asserted that she called the telephone number printed on the notice to ascertain the purpose of the May 14, 2008, hearing. She alleged that she was told by an unnamed city employee that the hearing was to be held regarding issues pertaining to her rental license. The evidence of the call was entirely hearsay, and was not corroborated by any non- hearsay evidence. Regardless of the substance of the telephone call, the notice plainly stated that the purpose of the hearing was related to a required building permit. The hearing was held as scheduled on May 14, 2008. At the hearing, Petitioner was advised that the subject of the hearing was the unpermitted construction at the Dubs Drive location. Petitioner, claiming to have had no knowledge of the subject of the hearing, requested a continuance to retain an attorney to represent her. The request was denied. At the hearing, it was determined that, at a minimum, Petitioner removed the garage door, blocked up the front of the garage and installed a door and window in its place to convert it to living space, and installed a shower. On May 22, 2008, the special magistrate entered an Order of Non-Compliance in which he concluded that Petitioner violated the Holly Hill Zoning Ordinance requiring a building permit for the work done on the property, required Petitioner to obtain a building permit, and imposed an administrative fine of $250.00. If the corrective measures were not taken, or the fine was not paid, the Order authorized an additional penalty of $150.00 per day, and authorized Respondent to place a lien on the Dubs Drive location. Petitioner was warned that she was not to use the renovated garage as a separate dwelling unit, but could only use it as an addition to apartment #3. The action by Respondent to enforce its building code was entirely appropriate, and was undertaken with all due process rights having been afforded to Petitioner. There was no evidence presented to support a finding that Petitioner?s race had anything to do with Respondent?s reaction to Petitioner?s unpermitted construction, or that Respondent failed to enforce its building code, including permit requirements, against similarly-situated property owners who were not members of Petitioner?s protected class. Petitioner paid the administrative fine on June 2, 2008, and received the after-the-fact building permit on June 10, 2008. On September 5, 2008, Respondent placed a lien on the Dubs Drive location based on its mistaken belief that Petitioner had failed to pay the $250.00 administrative fine. The notice of lien letter was received by Petitioner on November 18, 2008. Petitioner advised Respondent that she had paid the fine. Ms. Sue Meeks confirmed that the fine was paid, and Respondent promptly recorded a satisfaction of lien. The evidence indicates that the decision to record the lien was a bureaucratic error that was immediately corrected. There was no evidence presented to support a finding that Petitioner?s race was Respondent?s motive for recording the lien. A business tax receipt is required for each of the three apartments at the Dubs Drive location in order for Petitioner to engage in the business of real estate rental. Authorization for the business tax receipt was adopted by ordinance by Respondent in July, 2000, and is applicable to all rental units in the city of the type owned by Petitioner. Prior to July 2000, Respondent did not require an owner of a small rental location to obtain a business tax receipt. The business tax receipt ordinance required Respondent to perform annual inspections of businesses within its municipal boundaries. The inspections were started in 2000 or 2001. Business tax receipts are issued for a term from October 1 to September 30 of each year. If a business tax receipt is not renewed on time, Respondent is authorized to assess a 25 percent penalty, plus additional filing fees. For 2008-2009, Petitioner timely paid the business tax receipts for apartment Nos. 1 and 2. The tax was $45.00 for each apartment. Petitioner failed to pay the business tax receipt for apartment #3 until March 2009, after the renewal date had passed. Therefore, a penalty and additional filing fees were assessed which raised the business tax receipt fee for that apartment to $70.00. Petitioner alleged that Respondent “overcharged” her for the apartment #3 business tax receipt, which she construed as evidence of a pattern of discrimination. The evidence demonstrates that the $70.00 charge was the result of Petitioner?s failure to timely renew, and was not the result of discrimination based on her race. There was no evidence presented to support a finding that Petitioner?s race had anything to do with Respondent?s assessment of late penalties and fees, or that Respondent failed to assess such late penalties and fees against similarly-situated rental apartment owners who were not members of Petitioner?s protected class. On or about February 6, 2009, Respondent issued a violation notice alleging that Petitioner failed to renew her business tax receipt for apartment #1 and #2. The notice was posted on the doors of the apartments on February 10, 2009. The notice allowed three days to correct the violation, a period that had already passed when the notice was received. Petitioner had already paid the business tax receipt, and went to city hall to inquire about the violation notice. She was advised that her check, identified by Petitioner as check #486, had not been received. Petitioner went to Bank of America to stop payment on check #486, for which a banking fee of $30.00 was assessed. Upon her return to city hall, Petitioner was advised that a search had resulted in the discovery of check #486 on a city employee?s desk. It had not been cashed. Petitioner wrote a replacement check. Respondent credited Petitioner?s utility bill for $30.00 to reimburse her for the Bank of America stop-payment charge and the matter was resolved without further ado. Petitioner alleged that the incident was “harassment,” which she construed as further evidence of discrimination. To the contrary, the evidence demonstrates that the violation notice was a minor bureaucratic error that was promptly corrected, and for which Petitioner was made financially whole. There is no evidence in the record that the incident was the result of discrimination based on Petitioner?s race. On February 19, 2009, Petitioner wrote Respondent to express her belief that she was being overcharged for water. She had a single meter to serve the Dubs Drive tri-plex, but was being charged for three connections. In fact, Petitioner had three apartments. In such cases, Respondent bills for each unit served by a single “master meter.” The minimum bill per apartment includes 2000 gallons of water per month, with additional usage added as an additional charge. Respondent billed for three connections at the Dubs Drive location since at least 1997, prior to Petitioner?s purchase of the tri-plex. Petitioner inquired whether she could have separate meters installed for each apartment, rather than having minimum and total bills determined by the “master meter.” Respondent would not allow separate meters since the Dubs Drive tri-plex was a non-conforming use in a single-family zoned area, and the installation of separate meters would “enhance the non- conformity.” Respondent?s approach to billing for water in multi- family locations accounts for the demand created by three families versus one family. The evidence demonstrates that Respondent bills all multi-unit complexes in a manner to account for the demand of multiple family consumption on its water facilities. There is no evidence in the record that Respondent?s billing practice for water consumption was applied to Petitioner differently from any other multi-family facilities, or was the result of discrimination based on Petitioner?s race. On or about March 3, 2009, as a result of an annual inspection conducted as part of the business tax receipt process, Respondent cited Petitioner for several deficiencies at the Dubs Drive tri-plex, including a lack of smoke alarms, some windows that would not open, and a lack of GFI (ground-fault interrupter) electrical outlets at one location in apartment #1, and two locations in apartment #2. GFI outlets are commonly known to prevent shocks, and are required at locations where the outlets may be exposed to water, e.g. kitchens and bathrooms. Petitioner installed the GFI outlets. There was no other sanction or penalty. There is no evidence in the record that the requirement that Petitioner install a reasonable and necessary safety feature in apartments being rented to others was the result of discrimination based on Petitioner?s race. On or about March 24, 2009, during the follow-up compliance inspection of the tri-plex, one of Petitioner?s tenants advised the inspector that Petitioner had been living in the converted garage for two months, and was receiving mail in “mailbox #4” during that period. The use of the converted garage as a separate living unit would be a violation of Respondent?s zoning ordinance regarding limitations on the expansion of a non-conforming use, and would have violated the special magistrate?s Order entered at the May 14, 2008, hearing. As a result, Respondent issued violation notices to Petitioner on March 24, 2009, and March 27, 2009, each of which concerned the use of the converted garage as a separate living unit. The March 27, 2009, notice indicated that Petitioner and Respondent were “working to resolve” the issue. On March 31, 2009, Respondent provided Petitioner with a letter resolving the separate living unit issue that stated: This letter is to inform you of the requirements of Compliance in reference to 302 Dubs Ave. Your triplex must not be occupied by more than 3 separate families. The new addition on the north end of the building can be used in conjunction with #3, [b]ut can not be used as a separate unit. Mailbox #4 must be taken down within 45 Days of this date. (March 31, 2009) The letter contained nothing more than a straight-forward recitation of the terms and conditions applicable to the non- conforming residential structure. Respondent imposed no penalties or sanctions. There is no evidence to suggest that Respondent imposed terms or conditions on the use of the tri- plex different from any other similarly-situated non-conforming structure. There is no evidence in the record that Respondent?s response to the tenant?s statement that Petitioner was using the converted garage as a fourth apartment was either disproportionate under the circumstances, or was the result of discrimination based on Petitioner?s race. On April 30, 2009, the tenants of apartment #2 wrote to Petitioner with a long list of complaints regarding the conditions at the apartment that, on their face, were very serious, and which included structural, electrical, plumbing, and safety issues. The couple that lived in the apartment was white. The fact that the tenants were white does not minimize the fact that their concerns were legitimate. Having received no response to their complaints, the tenants called Respondent about the living conditions. In accordance with Respondent?s routine practice regarding complaints, Ms. Meeks was dispatched to inspect the property. Her inspection of apartment #2 confirmed the tenant complaints. Ms. Meeks also inspected apartment #1 at the request of the tenants of that apartment, and noted problems with “the bottom of the walls pealing [sic.] off and has some kind of bugs that are biting the children that live there.” The tenants also provided Ms. Meeks with a list of dates on which they alleged Petitioner had been staying in the converted garage which, if true, would have indicated that Petitioner used the addition as a separate living unit for more than 50 days over a three-month period. Respondent sent Petitioner a letter detailing the problems observed during the inspection, and advising Petitioner that her issues would be taken up at a hearing before the Special Master on July 8, 2009. The letter was received by Petitioner on June 15, 2009. The time between the letter and the scheduled hearing was ample time for Petitioner to correct the problems. On June 24, 2009, Respondent served Petitioner with a Notice to Appear at the July 8, 2009, hearing. On June 25, 2009, and June 29, 2009, Respondent obtained written statements from the tenants of apartment #2 detailing the problems that they had encountered with their leased apartment. Their statements were consistent with their earlier descriptions and the results of the inspection. On July 7, 2009, Petitioner requested a continuance of the July 8, 2009, hearing due to the death of her father. The request was granted by notice dated July 15, 2009, and the hearing was continued to August 12, 2009. Respondent was directed to “bring proof of her father?s passing” to the August hearing. On July 27, 2009, Respondent reissued a Notice to Appear for the August 12, 2009, hearing. On August 12, 2009, a hearing was convened before the special magistrate. Petitioner was represented by counsel. At the hearing it was determined that the back door of apartment #2 had been replaced to the tenant?s satisfaction, though Petitioner failed to obtain a building permit for the same, and that the electrical issue with the GFI outlet and the water heater breaker had been resolved. It was ultimately determined to be in the best interest of all of the parties to have the tri-plex inspected by Respondent, and to reconvene the hearing in September, 2009. Petitioner asserted that the August 12, 2009, hearing was continued because a white tenant had not appeared at the hearing to testify against her. The record does not support that reason. An Order Continuing Case was entered on August 26, 2009. The Order noted that Petitioner had not produced evidence of her father?s death as instructed. On August 27, 2009, Respondent reissued a Notice to Appear for September 9, 2009. On August 18, 2009, Respondent conducted an inspection of the tri-plex. It was determined that some of the deficiencies identified in the June notice had been made, but others had not. The hearing was reconvened on September 9, 2009. Petitioner was represented by counsel. After considerable discussion, it was determined that Petitioner had substantially resolved the issues identified in the June notice, some more recently than others. The special magistrate assessed a $250.00 administrative fine for the initial items of non-compliance resulting in the need to have the hearings, and $300.00 for failure to make repairs within a reasonable period after the initial notice in June. Petitioner also produced a copy of her father?s obituary as proof of his death in July. An Order of Non-Compliance reciting the outcome of the hearing was entered on September 25, 2009. The Order was not appealed. Petitioner stated her belief that the requirement that she provide evidence of her father?s death to substantiate the basis for the July 7, 2009, request for continuance was imposed as a result of harassment and discrimination against her due to her race. Although the requirement that she produce an obituary or the like seems insensitive and unnecessary, there was no evidence that Petitioner?s race was the basis for the request, or that such a requirement was not imposed on all persons seeking a continuance of a code enforcement hearing, regardless of race. On November 4, 2009, the special magistrate, after having received evidence of the completion of the repairs from Respondent, entered an Order of Compliance by which he found all of the deficiencies at the Dubs Drive location had been satisfactorily resolved. Petitioner has alleged that the code enforcement actions taken by Respondent were part of a pattern of harassment and intimidation directed at her because of her race. She argued that her white property managers were not cited for violations, thus establishing evidence of racial bias. While it is true that some of the violations for which Petitioner was cited concerned issues that pre-dated Petitioner?s assumption of management duties in December 2007, e.g., the use of interior- grade doors being used as exterior doors and the lack of GFI outlets, there was no evidence that Respondent ever noticed those deficiencies, or that any tenant had ever complained. The evidence demonstrates that the triggering event that drew the attention of Respondent?s code enforcement section was not Petitioner?s race, but was Petitioner?s unpermitted conversion of the garage into living space. The other triggering event was the complaint filed with Respondent by Petitioner?s tenants that alleged crumbling infrastructure, including the very poor condition of the exterior doors. Both incidents properly resulted in thorough inspections. There was no event at the Dubs Drive location prior to December 2007, that would have resulted in increased scrutiny. Thus, the evidence demonstrates that Respondent?s actions were reasonable and appropriate responses to conditions at the Dubs Drive location that were brought to its attention by the actions of Petitioner and her tenants, conditions for which Respondent would have been remiss had it failed to act. The evidence in this proceeding does not support a finding that Respondent?s actions were taken due to Petitioner?s race. The evidence produced at the hearing contained not a shred of competent, substantial evidence that would support a finding that Respondent took any action regarding the Dubs Drive tri-plex because of Petitioner?s race. Rather, the evidence supports a finding that Respondent was appropriately exercising its police powers to ensure that rental dwelling units within its jurisdiction are safe and sanitary. If anything, Respondent and the special magistrate treated Petitioner with considerable patience, restraint, and leniency given the nature of the non- compliance resulting from the unpermitted renovations, and from the delays in making necessary repairs to the property. Petitioner?s dated signature on the Housing Discrimination Complaint that forms the basis for this proceeding indicates that Petitioner filed her initial complaint of discrimination no earlier than August 31, 2010. However, the HUD Determination gives two dates on which Petitioner supposedly filed her complaint -- August 13, 2010, and September 2, 2009. Given the findings and conclusions herein that Respondent had no racial animus or bias in its actions regarding Petitioner -- going back to the December 2007 date on which Petitioner assumed her property management duties -- it is not necessary to determine which of the dates is accurate. However, to the extent it were to become an issue with regard to the application of the jurisdictional limits established by section 760.34(2), the most persuasive evidence demonstrates that Petitioner filed her Housing Discrimination Complaint on or after August 31, 2010. Ultimate Findings of Fact There was no competent, substantial evidence adduced at the hearing that Respondent took any regulatory, utility billing, or code enforcement action regarding Petitioner, or the Dubs Drive location, in an effort to coerce, intimidate, threaten, or interfere with Petitioner in the exercise of her rights as an owner of rental housing due to Petitioner?s race. Respondent?s actions were, in each instance, a legitimate response to unpermitted building activities, a correct application of Respondent?s ordinances, or a reasonable response to complaints filed by Petitioner?s tenants. At worst, Respondent committed two minor bureaucratic errors that were quickly resolved, and for which Petitioner suffered no loss. There was no evidence that Respondent applied its code enforcement ordinances or policies in its dealings with Petitioner in a manner that was inconsistent with their application to similarly-situated persons who were not members of Petitioner?s protected class. Having found no evidence to demonstrate that Respondent discriminated against Petitioner on the basis of her race, the Petition for Relief should be dismissed.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief filed in FCHR No. 2011H0053. DONE AND ENTERED this 22nd day of May, 2012, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S E. GARY EARLY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of May, 2012.
The Issue Whether Petitioner showed by a preponderance of the evidence that Respondent engaged in an unfair and discriminatory housing practice in violation of the Florida Fair Housing Act, section 760.20 et seq., Florida Statutes (2010).1/
Findings Of Fact Ms. Billingsley is an African-American woman; thus, a member of a protected class. The Housing Authority is a government entity of the City of Winter Park, Florida, that provides affordable, public assistance housing for elderly, disabled, and low-income families and individuals. Applicants for the public housing are required to fill out an application that requests information identifying the applicant's income source, Social Security number, addresses for the past five years, and the size of the apartment that the applicant is seeking to rent. The applicant is then placed on a waiting list for an available apartment. Generally, an applicant is informed that the wait for housing is between six to 12 months. The time on this waiting list can be affected by whether or not an applicant meets the criteria for a preference in granting the housing and transfers of existing tenants within the housing complex. Ms. Hinckley, the Housing Authority's executive director, credibly testified that the Housing Authority provides preferences for working families and families with disabled members. In order to qualify for a working-family preference, an applicant must have worked at least 20 hours a week for six of the last 12 months. Ms. Hinckley credibly explained that before an applicant is moved into a housing unit, the Housing Authority will conduct a home visit and verify the applicant's employment for the working preference. In addition to preferences, Ms. Hinckley explained that the amount of time an applicant is on the waiting list can be affected by transfers within the housing complex. The Housing Authority allows a family to transfer within the housing complex based on need, before accepting new families from the waiting list. For example, a family living in a two-bedroom apartment would be allowed to transfer to a larger three-bedroom apartment before an applicant from the waiting list would be allowed to move into the housing complex. On August 27, 2008, Ms. Billingsley applied with the Housing Authority for a three-bedroom apartment. She indicated in her application that she was eligible for the working-family preference. Ms. Billingsley was then placed on the waiting list and given a working-family preference. On June 2, 2009, Ms. Hinckley conducted the home visit with Ms. Billingsley concerning her application. Between December 2009 and Spring 2010, the Housing Authority began renovations of the rental unit bathrooms. During this time, the Housing Authority was unable to accommodate Ms. Billingsley for a three-bedroom apartment. Moreover, the Housing Authority honored transfers within the housing complex before offering Ms. Billingsley a housing unit. On April 9, 2010, the Housing Authority contacted Ms. Billingsley and informed her that a three-bedroom unit would be available in May of 2010. The Housing Authority then sought to verify Ms. Billingsley's working status. Unfortunately, Ms. Billingsley had recently been discharged from employment. The Housing Authority contacted Ms. Billingsley and asked her to provide proof of employment. On May 12, 2010, Ms. Billingsley informed the Housing Authority that she was not employed, but that she was looking for work. Based on the fact that Ms. Billingsley was not working at the time in late April 2010, she was no longer eligible for the working-family preference. As a result, the Housing Authority did not rent the available unit to Ms. Billingsley. Ms. Billingsley has not provided the Housing Authority with any subsequent proof of employment. Moreover, the Housing Authority has not been able to verify her recent claim that she has been employed by Toys-R-Us. Ms. Billingsley did not introduce any evidence, either direct or indirect, showing that the Housing Authority discriminated against her based on her race or that the Housing Authority had a racial preference for Hispanics.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing Petitioner, Fannie Billingsley's, Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 21st day of March, 2011, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S THOMAS P. CRAPPS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of March, 2011.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondent unlawfully discriminated against Petitioner on the basis of his race, sex, or handicap in violation of the Florida Fair Housing Act.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner Vincent Hall ("Hall") is a middle-aged black man. Although he alleges that he is handicapped, Hall failed to produce any evidence during the final hearing concerning his alleged disability——or even to identify it.1 Respondent Miami-Dade Housing Agency ("Housing Agency") is a department within Miami-Dade County (the "County"), which is a political subdivision of the State of Florida.2 The County is the public housing authority ("PHA") within its territorial jurisdiction. As the PHA, the County, through its Housing Agency, administers several federally funded housing programs, including the Section 8 Housing Choice Voucher Program ("Section 8"). The County is subject to, and must comply with, the Ann-Marie Adker Consent Decree ("Consent Decree"), which the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida entered in 1998. The Consent Decree requires the County to give certain preferences in housing programs to eligible black public housing residents who qualify as "mobility pool members." Hall is a former resident of Smathers Plaza, one of the County's public housing developments. (Hall lived in Smathers Plaza for a period of time in 2000, leaving voluntarily in November of that year, at which time he relocated to Palm Beach County, where he continued to reside as of the final hearing.) As a former public housing resident, Hall is a mobility pool member. On December 3, 2007, Hall executed a form called an "Application for Assistance Under the Ann-Marie Adker, Et. Al. Vs. United States Department of Housing and Urban Development and Miami-Dade County Consent Decree," whose purpose is evident from its title. Hall submitted this application to the Housing Agency's Applicant and Leasing Center. By letter dated May 2, 2008, the Housing Agency instructed Hall to appear at the Applicant and Leasing Center on May 15, 2008, for an appointment intended to begin the process of verifying Hall's eligibility for assistance under the Consent Decree. Hall attended this meeting, during which he completed additional paperwork, including a form entitled "Change of Address/Family Size or Special Unit Requirements." One of the questions on this document asked: "Does the Head of Household or other member of the family have a disability?" Hall answered, "No." By signing the document, which Hall did on May 15, 2008, Hall declared "that the information presented [herein] is true and accurate." Despite having disclaimed the existence of any disability, Hall requested that he be provided a live-in aide. Hall was furnished the documents necessary to apply for "reasonable accommodations" such as an aide, which documents included a certificate to be signed by a physician attesting to the disability, but Hall never returned the completed forms. Accordingly, the Housing Agency could not provide Hall a reasonable accommodation and had not done so as of the final hearing. The Housing Agency did, however, authorize the issuance of a Section 8 voucher for Hall, which he picked up on August 21, 2008. The voucher gave Hall 60 days (extendible to a maximum of 120 days) within which to locate an owner willing to participate in Section 8. As of the final hearing, Hall had not found a unit. The County's fair housing center, operated by Housing Opportunities Project for Excellence, Inc. ("HOPE, Inc.") stood ready to assist Hall if he sought help in returning to Miami-Dade County to live. Unfortunately for him, Hall had not taken advantage of the counseling available through HOPE, Inc. There is no competent, persuasive evidence in the record, direct or circumstantial, upon which a finding of any sort of unlawful housing discrimination could be made. Ultimately, therefore, it is determined that the County and, specifically, its Housing Agency, did not commit any prohibited act vis-à-vis Hall.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the FCHR enter a final order finding the Housing Agency not liable for housing discrimination and awarding Hall no relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 8th day of January, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. JOHN G. VAN LANINGHAM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of January, 2009.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondent unlawfully discriminated against Petitioner on the basis of his national origin or race in violation of the Florida Fair Housing Act.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner Manuel Rodriguez ("Rodriguez") is a middle- aged white man of (in his words) "Spanish and Italian" descent who at all times relevant lived in Vero Beach, Florida. Respondent Indian River County Habitat for Humanity, Inc. ("Habitat"), is a nonprofit charitable corporation that makes interest-free loans to qualified applicants for the purchase of affordable housing, which the buyers, in return, must help build or renovate. In or around December 2018, Rodriguez submitted a "pre- screening" application for a Habitat home. By letter dated January 3, 2019, Habitat informed Rodriguez that, according to the information he had provided, he fell "within the income guidelines." This meant that Rodriguez could progress to the next step (group orientation) of the multi-step application process. As it happened, however, he did not make it all the way. In a letter dated February 19, 2019, Habitat told Rodriguez that his application could not be approved because his monthly income was insufficient to cover the estimated debt service. Rodriguez presented no evidence at hearing suggesting that Habitat had denied his application for any reason other than the one given to him, namely that "you [Rodriguez] do not earn enough to support a mortgage." Rodriguez was not satisfied with this rationale and arranged to meet with a Habitat employee named David Willis to discuss the matter. Rodriguez believes that Mr. Willis was rude and disrespectful to him. Further, Rodriguez testified that, during their conversation, Mr. Willis used the phrase, "you people." Clearly, this is a potentially offensive remark, and Rodriguez was, in fact, offended by it. When pressed, however, Rodriguez admitted that he did not consider the comment to have been a slur against Spanish or Italian people; rather, he took it as a more focused insult——against, for example, disputatious people. In any event, there is no evidence that Mr. Willis intended to disparage an ethnic or racial group. Determinations of Ultimate Fact There is no persuasive evidence that any of Habitat's decisions concerning, or actions affecting, Rodriguez, directly or indirectly, were motivated in any way by discriminatory animus. Thus, there is no competent, persuasive evidence in the record, direct or circumstantial, upon which a finding of any sort of unlawful housing discrimination could be made. Ultimately, therefore, it is determined that Habitat did not commit any prohibited act.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order finding Habitat not liable for housing discrimination and awarding Rodriguez no relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 15th day of August, 2019, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JOHN G. VAN LANINGHAM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of August, 2019.
The Issue Whether Petitioner was the subject of discrimination based on her sex or handicap in leasing her apartment from Respondent in violation of Sections 804d and 804d or f of Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, as amended by the Fair Housing Act of 1988 and the Florida Fair Housing Act, Chapter 760.23(2) (4), Florida Statutes (2006).
Findings Of Fact Petitioner resided at Respondent’s Thacker I property for at least a year prior to her move to Respondent’s Pinewoods Place Apartments located at 5929 Pinewoods Place, Milton, Florida 32570. Petitioner moved to Pinewoods, Apartment 25, around March or April of 2003. Neither Petitioner nor Respondent had any material problems with each other during her residency at Thacker I. Her move to Pinewoods resulted from her request to move to a larger apartment. Pinewoods is a large complex managed by Respondent. Some of the units are subsidized by HUD. A list of tenants in the Pinewood complex reflect 58 tenants. Of the 58 tenants, 34 are female. Eleven of the tenants have a disability. In fact, Respondent contracts with providers who serve the disabled to provide apartments to their clients and provides such apartments regularly. Respondent accommodated Petitioner’s request to move to Pinewoods by not requiring a full year’s lease since she had already completed a year at Thacker I and by allowing Petitioner to transfer her deposit from the Thacker I apartment to the Pinewoods apartment. Because of these accommodations, Petitioner was permitted to lease her Pinewoods apartment on a month-to-month lease with an additional deposit of $95. Respondent also accommodated Petitioner in her move by leaving her rent amount the same as it was at Thacker I. Thus, Petitioner paid $400 a month rent instead of the normal $450 a month rent paid by other tenants in comparable apartments. Petitioner did not visit Unit 25 prior to her move to Pinewoods because it was occupied. No other units were available for her to inspect prior to her move. Additionally, HUD inspected the Unit 25 prior to Petitioner’s move and found no violations and that the apartment met HUD standards for being mechanically sound and safe. There was no evidence of any representations made by Respondent to Petitioner regarding Unit 25, and Petitioner did not introduce any evidence of such misrepresentations. Clearly, contrary to Petitioner’s assertions of misrepresentations about her apartment or her assertion that she looked at her Unit or a model, her apartment was not misrepresented to her prior to her move to Pinewoods, and no discrimination on the basis of sex or handicap occurred. Sometime after her move, Petitioner began to complain about her apartment. The evidence was vague regarding most of her complaints, and Petitioner declined to testify about many of her allegations. For instance, there was a vague complaint about leaves being blown into her yard from the sidewalk when the maintenance crew would clear the sidewalk of leaves. However, this method of clearing the sidewalk occurred throughout the complex and was not directed toward Petitioner. Likewise, there was a vague complaint about the trash lady disturbing Petitioner’s morning coffee by performing her assigned duty of picking up trash around the apartment complex. Again, there was no evidence of any activity being directed at Petitioner based on her sex or handicap. At some point, Petitioner complained to Respondent about her dryer vent not working properly. After several complaints and in an effort to resolve Petitioner’s complaint, Respondent’s maintenance person put an interior box-style lint trap, in her Unit. Respondent stated he felt this was the best solution because a member of the maintenance staff used the same type lint trap at his home. Petitioner, for a variety of reasons, was not satisfied with Respondent’s solution and vented the dryer to the outside herself. There is some dispute over whether Petitioner’s repair was safe or done correctly. There is no evidence that indicates Respondent discriminated against Petitioner on the basis of sex or handicap. Petitioner also complained about the sliding glass doors being fogged and wanted them replaced. Respondent explained that the doors were safe and that 55 other residents have fogged glass doors. Respondent refused to replace the glass doors. The next day Petitioner complained to HUD about the fogged glass door being “non-operable.” Because of the complaint, Robert Youngblood from the HUD office in Milton met Respondent’s maintenance staff at Petitioner’s apartment and discovered that the slider had been knocked off its track. Mr. Youngblood reported to Respondent that it was very clear the door had been sabotaged because he had just inspected that same door just days before because of a prior complaint. Respondent fixed Petitioner’s door again. Additionally, the sliding glass door that Petitioner complained about was inspected by both Santa Rosa Glass and Milton Glass. Petitioner also kept an untagged vehicle in the parking lot and threatened to sue if it were towed. All the Pinewoods’ leases contain a provision that untagged vehicles are not permitted on the premises and will be towed. In order to avoid the vehicle being towed, Petitioner switched the tag from her tagged vehicle to her untagged vehicle and back again as notice was given to her. Petitioner again felt this action was discrimination. Again there was no evidence to support Petitioner’s claim. On January 5, 2006, a little more than two years after she moved to Pinewoods, Petitioner complained, when she came to the office to pay her rent, that her garbage disposal did not work. The staff person who took Petitioner’s rent sent a maintenance person that day to look at Petitioner’s garbage disposal. The maintenance person looked at the alleged disposal location and discovered that Petitioner did not have a garbage disposal. There was no plumbing for one. The evidence showed that many units did not have a garbage disposal and that disposals were removed from each unit as they broke down. Petitioner insisted that she should have a garbage disposal since there was a switch on the wall for one. Because of her actions concerning the garbage disposal, Petitioner was given a Notice of Non-Renewal, dated January 6, 2006. Petitioner refused to pay any rent and refused to vacate the apartment based on her belief that Respondent had discriminated against her based on her sex and handicap. She maintained this belief even though she testified that “everybody had problems getting things fixed.” Indeed, her only witness corroborated that men and women, handicapped and non-handicapped have trouble getting things fixed. No reason was given for the non-renewal. Respondent testified that he was tired of Petitioner’s actions and deceitfulness. Petitioner chose to withhold her rent when it was due in February 2006, so that Respondent would bring eviction proceedings against her. Respondent eventually brought eviction proceedings against Petitioner. At the eviction hearing, Petitioner told the judge she wanted to be evicted so it would become public record. Respondent was awarded possession of the premises. After Respondent was given possession, the next morning he received a copy of a letter to the judge requesting that he rescind his decision and requesting another judge. Petitioner has since moved to another apartment. As with the other incidents described above, the evidence did not demonstrate that Respondent discriminated against Petitioner on the basis of her sex or handicap. Therefore, the Petition for Relief should be dismissed.
