The Issue The issues in this case are whether Respondent violated certain rules of the Department of Environmental Protection (Department) related to petroleum contamination site cleanup criteria as alleged in the Department’s Notice of Violation, Orders for Corrective Action, and Administrative Penalty Assessment (NOV); whether Respondent is liable for the administrative fines and investigative costs assessed by the Department; whether mitigation of the administrative fine is appropriate; and whether Respondent should be required to take the corrective action described in the NOV.
Findings Of Fact The Parties The Department is the state agency charged with the power and duty to administer and enforce the provisions of Chapters 376 and 403, Florida Statutes (2008),1 and the rules promulgated in Florida Administrative Code Title 62, pertaining to petroleum contamination. Respondent Z.K. Mart, Inc., is a Florida corporation, and owns and operates a retail fueling facility (DEP Facility No. 8507091) located at 5077 Normand Boulevard, Jacksonville, Florida (“the facility”). In January 2004, soil sampling in conjunction with the removal of an underground petroleum storage tank at the facility showed petroleum contamination. Respondent reported the contamination to the Department in a Discharge Report Form on January 29, 2004. Respondent removed the tank that was the source of the contamination, conducted source removal activities, and submitted various reports to the Department, including a Site Assessment Report (SAR), submitted in February 2006. In March 2006, the Department determined the SAR was incomplete and requested that Respondent submit a SAR addendum. To date, Respondent has not submitted the SAR addendum. Respondent’s insurer, Mid-Continent Casualty Company, refused coverage for the assessment and cleanup costs associated with the reported discharge, asserting that the contamination “arose out of” the tank removal. Respondent contends that the contamination occurred before the tank removal. In October 2004, Respondent sued Mid-Continent in the circuit court for Duval County for wrongful denial of coverage. Respondent requested that the Department also file suit against Mid-Continent, pursuant to Section 376.309(2), Florida Statutes, for violating financial responsibility requirements. In December 2008, the Department sued Mid-Continent. The litigation is ongoing. Respondent spent over $300,000 to remove 2,503 tons of contaminated soil and to conduct site assessment activities associated with the reported contamination. In August, September, and October 2006, Respondent filed financial affidavits and additional materials with the Department in support of Respondent’s claim that it was unable to pay for additional assessment work. By letter dated November 3, 2008, the Department rejected Respondent’s claim that it was financially unable to undertake the requested site assessment. Respondent submitted a financial affidavit prepared by Abdul Khan, the vice president and secretary of Z.K. Mart, Inc., which states that the net income of Respondent was $36,479 at the end of 2005. Financial information for later years, including 2008, was also submitted by Respondent. However, no financial analysis was included. No evidence was submitted to establish the estimated costs of future site assessment activities. It cannot be determined from the financial information in the record whether Respondent is currently financially able to conduct additional site assessment activities. The Department states in the NOV that Count I constitutes a violation of Florida Administrative Code Rule 62- 770.800(5). That rule provides that it is a violation of Chapters 376 and 403, Florida Statutes, for a responsible party to fail to submit additional information or meet any time frame “herein.” The Department explained that Count I was intended to charge Respondent with failing to complete site assessment. The only applicable time frame in Florida Administrative Code Rule 62-770.800, entitled “Time Schedules,” is in subsection (3), which requires a responsible party to submit additional information within 60 days of the Department’s request for the information. That violation, however, is more specifically charged in Count II. Count II of the NOV charges Respondent with violating Florida Administrative Code Rule 62-770.600(11), which states that, if a SAR is incomplete, the Department shall inform the responsible party and the responsible party shall submit a SAR addendum within 60 days. Counts I and II charge Respondent with the same offense, failing to submit requested information within 60 days of the request. As stated in the Conclusions of Law, Respondent cannot be made to pay administrative fines under a duplicate charge. Count III of the NOV charges Respondent with liability for the Department’s investigative costs of $500 incurred in conjunction with this enforcement matter. These are nominal costs and were never disputed by Respondent.
Findings Of Fact Reimbursement Program The Florida Legislature created the Petroleum Contamination Site Cleanup Program to encourage responsible persons with adequate financial ability to conduct site rehabilitation and seek reimbursement in lieu of the state conducting cleanup. Section 376.3071(12), Florida Statutes (1993). Site owners and operators or their designees become entitled to reimbursement from the Inland Protection Trust Fund (IPTF) of their allowable costs at reasonable rates after completing a program task. Section 376.3071(12)(b), Florida Statutes. The costs of site rehabilitation must be actual and reasonable. Section 376.3071(12)(d), Florida Statutes. "Allowable" costs are those which are associated with work that is appropriate for cleanup tasks, i.e. whether the cost represents work that is technically necessary for the program task and otherwise not in violation of reimbursement limitations prescribed by statute or rule. In order for costs to be reimbursable, an applicant must convert charges in an application into applicable units and rates. Rule 17-773.100(5), Florida Administrative Code. DEP has a predominate rate schedule to determine whether a specific allowable cost is reasonable. DEP bases its predominate rates on a study of average rates that contractors charge for a particular task. In addition, DEP reviews each application to determine whether the overall cost and the methods used to perform the work are reasonable. DEP must also evaluate each application to determine whether a charge is an actual cost of a project. Contractors or subcontractors do not actually incur a fully reimbursable cost when they promise the site owner or its designee that they will perform work for an amount less than other professionals would charge, then allow the site owner or its designee to file a claim for reimbursement at or near the predominate rate. Such an agreement creates a back flow of funds to the site owner or its designee. This is true even though the charges are within the range of DEP's predominate rates. DEP never intended the rate schedule to create an entitlement to reimbursement regardless of the cost that contractors and subcontractors actually incur. Requests for reimbursement must apply to costs which are "integral" to site rehabilitation. Rule 17-773.100(2), Florida Administrative Code. "Integral" costs are those which are essential to completion of site rehabilitation. Rule 17-773.200(2)(11), Florida Administrative Code. After integral costs have been identified and incorporated on a units and rates basis in an invoice, the invoice may be marked up at two levels. These markups are subject to certain limitations: There can be no more than two levels of markups or handling fees applied to contractor, subcontractor or vendor invoices (Rule 17-773.350(9), F.A.C.); There can be no markups or handling fees in excess of 15 percent for each level of allowable markup applied to contractor, subcontractor or vendor invoices (Rule 17-773.350(10), F.A.C.); and There can be no markups or handling fees applied to invoices between any two entities which have a financial, familial, or beneficial relationship with each other (Rule 17-773.350(11), F.A.C.). In order to be reimbursable, costs must have been actually "incurred." Rule 17-773.700, Florida Administrative Code. "Incurred" means that allowable costs have been paid. Rule 17-773.200(9), Florida Administrative Code. A contractor must pay all invoices generated by a subcontractor at 100 percent of their face value prior to submission of an application in order to qualify those invoices for reimbursement. When a contractor pays a subcontractor's invoices, the contractor paying those invoices may apply the first-tier markup. Prior to submitting a reimbursement application, a funder or "the person responsible for contamination site rehabilitation" (PRFCSR) must pay the contractor for its invoices and markup. Then, the funder may apply the second- tier markup and submit the reimbursement application to DEP. DEP does not contest the second level of markup in these applications. DEP rules restrict reimbursement when parties within the usual "chain" of reimbursement (PRFCSR or funder, contractor and subcontractor) have financial, beneficial or familial relationships with each other or the site owner. These terms are defined in Rules 17-773.200(1), 17-773.200(6), 17- 773.200(7), Florida Administrative Code. The application form requires disclosure of such relationships through the Program Task and Site Identification Form. DEP's rules and written guidelines do not address or apply to activities, including financing arrangements, occurring outside of the chain of reimbursement if an applicant does not include charges for such activities in an application. Heretofore, DEP has not deducted finance costs that an applicant does not include as a line item in a reimbursement application. DEP must perform financial audits to ensure compliance with Chapter 376, Florida Statutes, and to certify site rehabilitation costs. Rule 17- 773.300(1), Florida Administrative Code. DEP performs this audit function: (a) to establish that the PRFCSR incurred the cost; (b) to determine that adequate documentation supports the claimed costs as incurred; and (c) and to review the reasonableness and allowance of the costs. The audit staff interprets the term "incurred" to mean that the applicant paid the costs included in the reimbursement application. DEP's audit staff usually does not inquire as to the level of a PRFCSR's financing where the application contains no line-item financing charges. However, the audit staff makes appropriate inquiries depending on the facts and events surrounding an individual application. Pursuant to Rule 17-773.350(4)(e), Florida Administrative Code, "[i]nterest or carrying charges of any kind with the exception of those outlined in Rule 17-773.650(1), F.A.C." are not reimbursable. The exceptions to the payment of interest set forth in Rule 17-773.650(1), Florida Administrative Code, are not at issue here. An interest rate charge on short-term borrowed capital from an unrelated third-party source is a "cost of doing business." DEP's predominate rates are fully loaded. They include a variable for all direct and indirect business overhead costs such as rent, utilities and personnel costs. DEP includes the cost of short-term borrowed capital in the direct and indirect overhead components of the fully-loaded personnel rates. Rule 17-773.700(5)(a), Florida Administrative Code. Petitioners PRFCSRs are entitled to make application for reimbursement of allowable markups and costs of site rehabilitation that they incur. In these consolidated cases, the site owners or operators designated either Petitioner ET or Petitioner SEI as PRFCSR. The PRFCSR is typically referred to as the "funder" in the reimbursement chain. Petitioner ET is a trust formed in 1993 and domiciled in Bermuda. It acts as American Factors Group, Inc.'s (AFG discussed below) conduit for funds that finance activities associated with Florida's petroleum contamination site cleanup program. The named beneficiaries of the trust are those contractors and subcontractors entitled to payment of costs for activities integral to site rehabilitation and for allowable markups of such costs. The sole trustee of ET is Western Investors Fiduciary, Ltd. (WIFL). WIFL is also the owner and a beneficiary of ET. Any profit that ET derives from funding petroleum contamination site cleanup flows through WIFL to investors who provide funds to finance site rehabilitation. American Environmental Enterprises, Inc. (AEE, discussed below) provided the investment funds for the reimbursement applications at issue here. WIFL is a limited liability corporation created and domiciled in Bermuda. The officers of WIFL are: William R. Robins, President; John G. Engler, Vice-President; and Peter Bougner, Secretary. The directors and shareholders of WIFL are: William R. Robins, John G. Engler, Paul H. DeCoster, Alec R. Anderson and Nicholas Johnson. Petitioner SEI is a corporation incorporated and operating under Florida law. Organized in 1994, SEI acts as AFG's conduit for funds to finance activities associated with Florida's petroleum contamination cleanup program. The officers and directors of SEI are: William R. Robins, President; John G. Engler, Executive Vice President; and Paul H. DeCoster, Secretary. William R. Robins is the sole shareholder of SEI. ET filed the petition for administrative hearing on behalf of SEI in at least four cases: Case Numbers 96-405, 96-425, 96-433, 96-437. Respondent DEP is the agency charged with the duty to administer the IPTF and Chapter 376, Florida Statutes. Financing Entities American Factors Group, Inc. (AFG) is a privately held corporation incorporated and operating under New Jersey law. AFG is not a party to this proceeding. AFG, acts as the servicing agent for contracts associated with factoring activities and other types of financing operations. AFG, through one of its divisions, Environmental Factors (EF), entered into factoring contracts with: (a) Gator Environmental, Inc. (Gator), general contractor; and (b) Tower Environmental, Inc. (Tower), prime subcontractor. Through these agreements, EF or its assignee bought the rights of Gator and Tower to future reimbursement payments at a percentage of the face value of the relevant invoices. The officers of AFG are: William R. Robins, President; John G. Engler, Vice President; and Paul H. DeCoster, Secretary. Bleak House, Inc. (Texas) owns the stock of AFG. American Environmental Enterprises, Inc. (AEE) is incorporated and operating under Nevada law. AEE is not a party to this proceeding. AEE, as the assignee under the EF contracts, is a third-party provider of capital to various entities in the reimbursement process. The officers of AEE are: William R. Robins, President; John G. Engler, Vice-President; and Paul H. DeCoster, Secretary. Bleak House, Inc., (Nevada) owns the stock of AEE. Bleak House, Inc., (Nevada) is incorporated and operating under Nevada law. Bleak House, Inc. (Texas) is incorporated and operating under Texas law. Officers of both corporations are William R. Robins, President; John G. Engler, Vice President; and Paul H. DeCoster, Secretary. Magazine Funding, Inc. owns the stock of both Bleak House corporations. Magazine Funding, Inc. is incorporated and operating under Nevada law. Officers of Magazine Funding, Inc. are William R. Robins, President; John G. Engler, Vice-President; and Paul H. DeCoster, Secretary. Family Food Garden, Inc. owns the stock of Magazine Funding, Inc. Family Food Garden, Inc. is incorporated and operating under Massachusetts law. Officers of Family Food Garden, Inc., are William R. Robins, President; and Paul H. DeCoster, Secretary. Six shareholders own the stock of Family Food Garden, Inc. None of these shareholders are related by familial ties to the officers or directors of the aforementioned companies or any relative thereof. Each of these companies -- ET, SEI, WIFL, AEE and AFG (including EF) share common officers and directors. Each of the companies maintain their own books and business records, file their own tax returns, and maintain records in accordance with the laws of the jurisdiction in which they were established. They operate pursuant to their respective bylaws or trust documents. ET, WIFL, and SEI do not have common assets with AEE or AFG (including EF). ET, WIFL and SEI do not have a beneficial, financial, or familial relationship with AEE or AFG (including EF) as Rule 17-773.200, Florida Administrative Code, defines those terms. Despite the facial organizational and structural integrity of ET, WIFL, SEI, AEE and AFG, the officers and directors of AFG and/or AEE created ET, WIFL, and SEI, in large part, for the benefit of AFG and/or AEE as a means to invest funds in petroleum contamination site cleanup programs. The officers and directors of AFG specifically created SEI to meet the needs of AFG's Florida investors. The purpose of each funder is to maximize the profits of AFG and its investors. AFG has other investment vehicles (funders) which it uses at times depending on the needs of its investors. AFG waits until the last instance before deciding which entity it will designate as funder in any particular factoring scenario. AFG usually does not make that decision until the day AFG's designated funder issues a funder's authorization to the general contractor. At the hearing, Mr. Stephen Parrish, a vice president of AFG, testified as the party representative for ET and SEI. ET, WIFL and SEI have no employees. EF or AFG responded to DEP's request for Petitioners to provide additional information about the financing scheme utilized here using stationary bearing EF's or AFG's letterhead. At least five of these letters written on SEI's behalf, refer to ET, an affiliate of AEE, as the funder. Nineteen of the letters written on ET's behalf refer to ET, an affiliate of AEE, as the funder. The greater weight of the evidence indicates that AFG and/or AEE negotiated less than arms-length contractual agreements with ET, WIFL, and SEI. Petitioners admit that they are "affiliates" of AEE and AFG through contractual agreements. However, there are no written factoring contracts between Petitioners and AFG such as the ones that exist between AFG, Gator and Tower. The only documented evidence of agreements between Petitioners and AFG are transactional based bills of sale representing the sale to AEE of Petitioners' right to receive reimbursement from IPTF. AFG created these bills of sale for bookkeeping purposes. AFG did not even go to the trouble of tailoring the form for the bills of sale for their stated purpose. For all practical purposes, Petitioners are under the management and control of AEE and AFG. Petitioners and AFG disclosed their affiliation in meetings with DEP staff and through correspondence and other documentation, including but not limited to: (a) letter to DEP dated July 13, 1994 from AFG's counsel; (b) Addendum to Certification Affidavit signed by a certified public accountant in each application; (c) funder's authorization form; (d) letters sent to DEP between August 14, 1995 and November 19, 1996. Factoring and the Factoring Transactions Factoring is the purchase and sale of an asset, such as an account receivable, at a discount. An account receivable reflects the costs that a business charges after rendering a service but before the entity responsible for payment pays for that service. When a contractor completes a rehabilitation task, the contractor's invoice is an account receivable until it receives payment. In these consolidated cases, AEE provided short-term capital to Gator and Tower at an interest rate equal to the discount percentage of the relevant invoice (account receivable). Gator and Tower did not sell their account receivables to AEE. Instead, AEE, as the assignee of EF, purchased a contractual right to receive Gator's and Tower's reimbursement payments. In exchange, AEE advanced them a discounted amount of their invoices. The discounted amount of each invoice represents a loan from AEE to Gator and Tower. The difference between the face amount of the invoices and the discounted amount of the invoices represents interest. A discount percentage and an interest rate are equivalent. The amount of the discount represents interest on the loans or advances provided by AEE. It is an interest expense to the contractor or subcontractor. The amount that Gator and Tower actually incurred is the discounted amount of their invoices. The Factoring Agreements On or about April 25, 1994, EF and Tower entered into a Prime Subcontractor Factoring Agreement which set forth the terms under which EF or its assignee would finance Tower's site remediation work. At that time, the parties to the contract anticipated that EF would retain a general contractor to perform on-site remediation services with Tower acting as prime subcontractor. In the contract, Tower agreed to sell to EF its right to receive payments from the general contractor at a percentage of the underlying invoices. Subsequent to the execution of April 1994 Prime Subcontractor Factoring Agreement, Tower experienced financial difficulties resulting in its inability to pay subcontractors for work that they performed under non-EF contracts. These financial difficulties made it impossible for Tower to meet its payroll that was due in two weeks. Tower and its subcontractors under the non-EF contracts approached AFG and EF requesting financial assistance to resolve Tower's financial difficulties and to ensure that the subcontractors would be paid for their work. At that time, the program tasks under these non-EF contracts were complete or substantially complete. Given the preexisting contractual relationship between EF and Tower on other projects, AFG determined that it could use a similar financing arrangement to resolve Tower's financial problems. Such an arrangement also would protect AFG's investment in projects being conducted under the EF-Tower contracts. On or about July 8, 1994, EF and Tower executed an addendum to the April 1994 Prime Subcontractor Factoring Agreement. This addendum applied to projects that were not covered by the original Prime Subcontractor Factoring Agreement. The addendum required Tower to sell to EF Tower's right to receive payments from the general contractor. In return, EF agreed to advance Tower a discounted amount equal to 97 percent of the face amount of Tower's invoices. Tower agreed to pay EF 100 percent of the face amount of the invoices upon receipt of payments from the general contractor. The discounted amount of each invoice represents a loan from AEE to Tower. Late in 1993 or early in 1994, Gator began negotiating a contract with EF to provide general contracting services for on-site remediation work on unspecified Florida projects being financed by EF. Gator began serving as general contractor on some of these unspecified projects prior to the execution of a contract. On or about July 8, 1994, EF and Gator entered into a General Contractor Factoring Agreement. In this contract, EF agreed to provide financing for projects on which Gator served as general contractor. Gator agreed to sell to EF its right to receive payments from the funder (ET or SEI) at a percentage of Gator's underlying invoices. On or about July 13, 1994, EF and Gator entered into an Addendum to the July 8, 1994 General Contractor Factoring Agreement. This addendum applied to projects which were not covered under the original General Contractor Factoring Agreement. The addendum required Gator to sell to EF Gator's right to receive payments from the funder (ET or SEI). In return, EF agreed to advance Gator a discounted amount equal to 88 percent of the face amount of Gator's invoices. Gator agreed to pay EF 100 percent of the face amount of the invoices upon receipt of payments from the funder. The discounted amount on each invoice represents a loan from AEE to Gator. Gator and Tower negotiated the respective factoring contracts and addenda thereto at arms-length. Pursuant to the terms of these contracts, EF assigned to AEE the rights to payments due to Tower from Gator and to Gator from ET or SEI. ET and SEI were not named parties to these contracts. The factoring contracts and the corresponding addenda apply to the reimbursement applications at issue here. Pursuant to those agreements, the following interrelated transactions took place though not necessarily in this order. First, Tower provided EF with a Site Certification Affidavit for a certain project. Tower also sent Gator a complete reimbursement application for the project and an invoice for Tower's services and the services of its subcontractors and vendors. Next, EF designated either ET or SEI as the funder. The funder then sent Gator a funder's authorization form. This form acknowledged that EF was an affiliate of the funder. It is the only documented evidence of a contract between the funder and Gator. Gator's receipt of the form constituted authorization for Gator to perform work on the project subject to reimbursement for all reimbursable costs and paid subcontractor invoices. Within two days of receiving the funder's authorization for a project, Gator issued Tower a subcontract/purchase order. Gator notified EF and the funder of such issuance. Upon receipt of the subcontract/purchase order, Tower sold to AEE (at a discount) Tower's right to receive full payment from Gator. A bill of sale evidenced this transaction. Tower agreed to repay AEE the face amount of Tower's invoice upon receipt of payment from Gator. Tower executed an agreement indemnifying the funder and guaranteeing the performance of all services and the delivery of all goods. Tower agreed to a reserve trust fund deposit as security for the ultimate reimbursement payment from the IPTF. Within four days of receiving the complete reimbursement application from Tower and within two days of receiving the funder's authorization, Gator and a certified public accountant (retained by EF) were supposed to review all supporting documentation on the project. The stated purpose of this review was to determine whether the invoices of Tower and its subcontractors were reimbursable under DEP guidelines. As to 30 of the instant applications, Tower completed the on-site work before Gator became involved. In those cases, Gator performed a minimal due diligence review, if any, of Tower's on-site work. This included comparing Tower's technical and administrative files with the applications prepared by Tower. Without Gator's minimal review and risk assessment on these 30 applications, EF would not have included them as projects covered by the addenda to the factoring contracts. As to 15 of the instant applications, Petitioners claim that Gator not only reviewed Tower's work product but also, issued subcontractor/purchase orders selected and scheduled subcontractors, and made on-site visits. However, there is no persuasive record evidence as to the specific activities or the level of Gator's involvement in on-site work on any one of these 15 applications. When Gator and EF's certified public accountant completed their assessment, Gator prepared a deficiency letter and sent it to all parties. The report advised EF, the funder and Tower whether any of Tower's charges were in excess of the reimbursable amount. Tower could accept or reject any disallowance set forth in the deficiency letter. If there was no problem with a disallowance or within five days of Tower's acceptance of a disallowance, AEE advanced Tower an amount equal to 97 percent of Tower's invoice. Tower used these funds to pay subcontractors and vendors. The discounted amount of Tower's invoice represents the actual cost that Tower incurred. Tower signed a repayment agreement in which it promised to repay AEE the face amount of Tower's invoice upon receipt of payment from Gator. When Tower received the discounted cash advance from AEE, it had to contribute the reserve deposit (to cover any reimbursement shortfalls) to a reserve trust, domiciled in Bermuda, which was affiliated with EF. Tower was a beneficiary of the reserve trust to the extent of its contribution less any monies it owed AEE after the IPTF reimbursed the funder. Meanwhile, Gator sold to AEE (at a discount) Gator's right to receive full payment from the funder. A bill of sale evidenced this transaction. Gator agreed to repay AEE the face amount of Gator's invoice upon receipt of payment from the funder. AEE advanced Gator an amount equal to 88 percent of the face amount of Gator's invoice. The discounted amount of Gator's invoice represent the amount that Gator actually incurred. Gator used these funds to pay Tower the face amount of its invoice. Tower in turn repaid AEE in full. Gator signed a repayment agreement in which it promised to repay AEE the face amount of its invoice upon receipt of payment from the funder. For the 45 applications at issue here, the addendum to the General Contractor Factoring Agreement did not require Gator to deposit any amount in the reserve trust which was domiciled in Bermuda and affiliated with EF. Next, Gator prepared an invoice for its services and the services of Tower and its subcontractors including a 15 percent markup and an application preparation fee. Gator's invoice could not include a charge for "management time." Then, Gator forwarded its invoice and Tower's invoice to the funder together with the complete reimbursement application. In the meantime, ET and SEI sold AEE their right to receive reimbursement from the IPTF at a discount equal to 87 percent of their total invoice amount. A bill of sale for each transaction is the only documented evidence of an agreement between the funders and AEE. ET and SEI agreed to repay AEE for the face amount of their invoices upon receipt of payment from IPTF. The funder prepared an invoice for the face amount of Gator's and Tower's invoices plus a 15 percent markup. Upon receipt of ET's or SEI's invoice, AEE advanced them the discounted amount as agreed. ET or SEI used the funds advanced by AEE to pay Gator the face amount of its invoice. Gator in turn repaid AEE in full. When ET or SEI receive a reimbursement payment from the IPTF, they will remit the total payment to AEE. The total cost for each project increased as the discount percentage and the face amount of each invoice passing up through the chain grew larger. In regards to some applications, the relevant dates on the subcontract/purchase order, Gator invoice, and Tower invoice are the same. It is clear that the turn around time on all of the above referenced transactions, including the time between the payment of the advances by AEE to Gator and Tower and their subsequent repayment of 100 percent of the face amount of an invoice to AEE, was very short--a matter of days or weeks. In Summary, the financing of the pending reimbursement applications involved the following interrelated transactions but not necessarily in this order: AEE as the assignee of EF purchased the right of ET, SEI, Gator and Tower to receive reimbursement for their services at a discount. ET, SEI, Gator and Tower agreed to repay AEE in full. Tower prepared and submitted to Gator an invoice for services provided by Tower and its subcontractors. Tower also prepared and submitted to Gator a reimbursement application for the program task. AEE advanced Tower the agreed upon discount amount. Tower used these funds to pay its subcontractors and vendors. AEE advanced Gator the agreed upon discount amount. Gator used these funds to pay Tower. Tower repaid AEE in full. Gator prepared an invoice for services provided by Gator, Tower and Tower's subcontractors including a 15 percent markup and submitted it with the reimbursement application either to ET or SEI. AEE advanced ET or SEI the discounted amounts as agreed. ET or SEI paid Gator in the full amount of Gator's invoice plus markup. Gator repaid AEE in full. ET or SEI prepared an invoice for its services plus the services of Gator, Tower, and Tower's subcontractors and a 15 percent markup. ET or SEI submitted the reimbursement application to DEP. When ET or SEI receives reimbursement from the IPTF, they will remit the total payment to AEE. The Applications Petitioners filed the 45 applications that are the subject of this proceeding between July 18, 1994 and February 17, 1995. The financing scheme that Petitioners utilized in these applications was unique. Prior to receiving these applications, DEP never had reviewed reimbursement applications using the type of financing scheme at issue here. In fact, the instant cases present a scenario never contemplated by DEP when promulgating rules and developing written policies. DEP has established a list by which it determines whether an applicant is charging a "reasonable rate." DEP developed that list in accordance with Petroleum Cleanup Reimbursement (PCR) Guideline Number 1. PCR 1 establishes a "predominant rate" for costs involved in the site rehabilitation process. The predominant rate may be exceeded by up to 30 percent for personnel charges, and by up to 50 percent for non-personnel charges. Within these ranges, DEP evaluates each application and determines whether the PRFCSR is entitled to reimbursement for "allowable cost" at "reasonable rates." The work performed by Tower was at or near DEP's "predominant" rate. In no instance were Tower's rates near the upper limits of the reasonable rate ceiling. Tower's invoices appear to represent work that was integral to site rehabilitation which was broken down into appropriate units and rates. There is no evidence of "price fixing" between any entities engaged in site rehabilitation. There is no evidence that Tower intentionally inflated the costs of cleanup or of the scope of cleanup services to cover the cost of financing. There are no familial, beneficial or financial relationships, or any other form of affiliation between Tower and its subcontractors. A certified public accountant (CPA) attestation accompanied the applications indicating that Petitioners incurred (paid) all relevant costs. The applications did not include charges associated with the financing arrangements as line items. The CPA attestations referenced an addendum to the Certification Affidavit. The addendum indicated that "American Environmental Enterprises, Inc., an affiliate of the Environmental Trust, has provided financing to certain contractors and subcontractors by factoring invoices which are included within this application." The CPA provided the reference to the addendum in the CPA attestation as an "emphasis of the matter" statement rather then an "exception," or a modification of the CPA's attestation that Petitioners had incurred all costs in the application. The CPA firm performing the attestation services previously informed DEP of its intent with regard to "emphasis of the matter" reports. Nevertheless, the difference between the face amount of an invoice and the discounted amount of that invoice clearly represents interest. This interest was not allowable as an actual and reasonable cost of site remediation because Gator and Tower agreed to accept a lesser amount for their services prior to submittal of the applications. Therefore, they did not actually incur the amount reflected in the face amount of their invoices. DEP's predominate rates and units are fully loaded. Interest rate charges on borrowed capital from unrelated third-party sources are a "cost of doing business." DEP's fully-loaded rates include a variable for all direct and indirect business overhead costs such as rent, utilities and personnel costs. The direct and indirect overhead components of DEP's fully-loaded rates include the cost of short-term "working" capital. However, DEP never intended the predominate rate schedule to entitle an applicant to reimbursement for costs that it did not actually incur. In the instant cases, funds that passed down through the chain from ET or SEI to Gator or from Gator to Tower flowed directly and immediately back to AEE who was affiliated with the funder. Any profit derived by the funder, ET or SEI, will flow directly to AEE and its investors. The amount that Petitioner's actually incurred before they submitted the applications was the amount that AEE advanced to Tower and/or its subcontractors for integral site work plus the actual cost of Gator's allowable services, if any, which were separate and distinct from Tower's work, plus any allowable markup(s). Factoring Policy At the time that Petitioners submitted the subject applications for reimbursement, there was no rule or written guideline governing financing transactions, including factoring, occurring outside of the usual chain of reimbursement. DEP normally did not inquire about such financing so long as an applicant did not pass the costs of such financial transactions to DEP in the application as a line-item cost. There was no policy disallowing reimbursement for the face amount of the invoices when an applicant sold the right to payment, i.e. the receivable, at a discount to a disinterested third-party in an arms- length transaction. Commencing on August 31, 1994, DEP began to develop a policy regarding the use of factoring as a financing mechanism in the reimbursement program. DEP staff exchanged numerous documents regarding the subject of factoring. In one of those documents, Charles Williams, DEP's Reimbursement Administrator indicated that "we absolutely need to have a Big Meeting to decide what to do once and for all." In a November 1994 telephone conversation, DEP provided AFG's counsel with an informal opinion of how DEP would handle a factored application as described by Will Robins of AFG in an earlier meeting with DEP staff. The statement was: that the difference between the amount that a contractor accepted in payment for his services, which was a discounted amount after factoring, . . . and the face value of the invoice which was claimed and marked up in the application was determined to be a carrying charge or interest, which is specifically disallowed for reimbursement in the reimbursement rule. American Factors Group. Inc. and the Environmental Trust v. Department of Environmental Protection, DOAH Case No. 95-0343RU, Final Order issued July 24, 1995. DEP advised AFG's counsel that it would deal with factored applications involving other entities on a case by case basis. On December 20, 1994, John Ruddell, Director of DEP's Division of Waste Management, sought permission from DEP's Policy Coordinating Committee to promulgate a rule amendment to Chapter 62-773, Florida Administrative Code (formerly Chapter 17-773, Florida Administrative Code.) A draft rule accompanied the request. The draft rule was developed in compliance with Chapter 94-311, Section 6, Laws of Florida, which required DEP to revise its reimbursement rule. The draft rule provided that: nothing in this Chapter shall be construed to authorize reimbursement for the face amount of any bill or invoice representing incurred costs when the receivable has been sold at a discount. In all such cases, reimbursement shall be limited to the actual discounted amount accepted by the provider of the goods or services . . . . The draft rule had the effect of prohibiting factoring as a mechanism for financing site rehabilitation work. It did not single out any other type of financing mechanism. DEP did not promulgate the draft rule because the problems with the program were too numerous to correct in a timely fashion by rulemaking. Instead, DEP focused on drafting proposed legislation. In the meantime, DEP requested that Petitioners furnish additional information regarding the instant applications. Between March 1, 1995 and November 17, 1995, ET and SEI responded to DEP's requests with letters bearing AFG's or EF's letterhead. The letters state that prior to filing the applications, ET or SEI paid Gator for the face amount of Gator's invoices plus Gator's markup. Gator then paid the subcontractors for the face amount of their invoices. Prior to these payments, AEE an affiliate of ET, or SEI purchased the right to receive the amount due to Gator from ET and the right to receive the amount due to subcontractors from Gator. In each case, AEE bought the right to receive at a discount. According to the financing scheme, ET or SEI received sufficient funds from AEE to make the payments to Gator. ET or SEI, in turn, were obligated to pay AEE following their receipt of the funds claimed in the reimbursement application. On April 21, 1995, DEP issued a memorandum to DEP application reviewers to guide them in the processing of reimbursement applications. The memorandum indicated that: invoices from subcontractors, vendors, suppliers and/or the general contractor which were paid a factored (e.g., discounted) amount by a third party capital participant (e.g., funder) represents the actual amount incurred by that entity and subsequently by the general contractor. The memorandum directed reviewers to deduct costs in an amount equal to the difference in the face value of an invoice or application and the amount paid for the right to receive payment under that invoice or application. DEP did not direct the policy set forth in the April 21, 1995 memorandum towards any individual company. DEP intended the policy to apply to "any combination of a general contractor, management company, funder and responsible party" in any situation in which a third-party capital provider paid any program participants a factored (discounted) amount of their invoices." The April 21, 1995, policy did not condition DEP's position on factoring on any affiliation between any parties. Between August 14, 1995 and January 19, 1996, DEP took action on the 45 applications that are the subject of this proceeding. As reflected in those notices, DEP denied reimbursement of costs claimed in those applications "as a result of factoring of the supporting invoices" and because "the difference between the face amount of the supporting invoices and the amount factored represents interests or carrying charges which are specifically excluded from reimbursement pursuant to Rule 62-773.350, F.A.C." The notices properly reflect a basis of denial of costs that is consistent with DEP's policy as reflected in the December 20, 1994 draft rule and the April 21, 1995 memorandum. DEP has proven that its policy on factoring is consistent with its legislative mandate to deny reimbursement of costs which are not actual and reasonable. Affiliation Policy Not all out-of-chain affiliations between entities constitute a problem with regard to reimbursement. However, the instant cases presented DEP with unique facts as to the relationship between AEE, AFG, ET, WIFL and SEI which DEP's rules and written policies do cover. The mere existence of common corporate officers does not, in and of itself, cause AFG/AEE, ET, WIFL, and SEI to lose their integrity as separate legal entities, or make them "one and the same." Common officers of corporations are not an element of the term "financial relationship," nor does the concept of common corporate officers appear in the definitions of beneficial relationship, familial relationship, indirect interests, material interests, or sources of income. DEP's position at hearing that "affiliation" is a major key to it's position with regard to factoring does not appear in any of the documents in which DEP has either discussed or disseminated information regarding factoring. There are no requirements in DEP's application forms to disclose the nature of the relationships between an applicant and an applicant's source of financing. DEP makes no standard inquiry of funders to disclose the nature of any affiliation between the funder and the provider of capital. Nevertheless, the record supports DEP's position that it can deny reimbursement for costs when a PRFCSR has an "affiliation" with a factoring company outside of the chain of reimbursement under the facts of these cases. It is not contested that ET, WIFL, SEI and AFG and its sister company AEE are affiliated. The greater weight of the evidence indicates that this affiliation goes beyond a mere contractual agreement. AFG, AEE, WIFL (which owns ET and is a trust beneficiary), and SEI have common officers and directors. These officers and directors created ET and SEI primarily for the benefit of AFG and AEE as conduits for investment of funds in Florida's petroleum contamination site rehabilitation program. AFG has other investment vehicles, in addition to ET and SEI, which it can designate as a funder depending on the needs of its investors. AFG usually waits until the last instance to select the funder that it will use in any particular case. AFG often selects the funder on the same day that the funder issues its authorization to the general contractor. The greater weight of the evidence indicates that AFG and/or AEE and the Petitioners did not negotiate the contractual agreements between them at arms-length. A bill of sale evidencing the sale of Petitioners' right to receive reimbursement on each application is the only documented evidence of agreements between Petitioners and AFG or AEE. Any profit derived by ET flows back to AEE through WIFL. ET and SEI are under the management and control of AEE and AFG's officers and directors. For all practical purposes ET and SEI are "one and the same" as AEE and AFG. The affiliation between AEE, AFG, WIFL, ET and SEI is especially troublesome here where AEE advanced the discounted amount of invoices to: (a) Tower so that it could pay its subcontractors in full; (b) Gator so that it could pay Tower in full; and (c) its affiliates, ET and SEI, so that they could pay Gator in full. Gator's and Tower's immediate repayment in the face amount of the invoices to AEE is a back flow of funds (interest) to an entity affiliated with Petitioners. All of these transactions took place before Petitioners filed the instant applications or within a few days thereafter. They create a paper trail indicating that the parties within the "chain" at each level incurred the face amount of the next lowest level. However, the only amount actually incurred at the time Petitioners submitted the applications was the discounted amount of the invoices. Interest or Carrying Charges "Incurred" means that "allowable costs have been paid." (Rule 17- 773.200(9), Florida Administrative Code) Under DEP's rules, the facial meaning of the term is that persons must receive due return for their invoiced goods and services, billed on a units and reasonable rates basis, for allowable costs of site rehabilitation. A finance charge usually does not effect DEP's determination of charges that were "incurred" unless that charge appears as a line-item cost which is not the case here. However, these consolidated cases presented DEP with a new scenario in which Gator and Tower immediately repaid the face amount of their invoices to AEE retaining only the discount amount of their invoices to pay the actual costs of the level below them before submitting the applications. Moreover, they included the carrying charges in the applications as having been "incurred." Case Number 95-403RU, Pick Kwick No. 143, DEP Facility No. 528515448 is a typical example showing how the entities in the chain paid interest charges and included them in the application. In that case, Gator provided Tower with a subcontract/purchase order on July 8, 1994. Tower provided Gator with an invoice in the amount of $17,556.43 on July 8, 1994. Tower's invoice represented services performed in connection with the initial remedial action task at the Pick Kwick No. 143 facility including $269.90 for application preparation. On or about July 8, 1994, Gator provided ET with an invoice in the amount of $20,149.41. This invoice included Gator's 15 percent markup in the amount of $2,592.98 and $269.90 for application preparation. On August 4, 1994, AEE purchased Gator's right to receive payment from ET. AEE advanced Gator $17,696.44 or 88 percent of Gator's invoice. The interest charge on the advance was $2,452.97. On August 4, 1994, AEE purchased Tower's right to receive payment from Gator. AEE advanced Tower $17,029.74 or 97 percent of Tower's invoice. The interest charge on the advance was $526.69. On August 10, 1994, AEE purchased ET's right to receive payment from IPTF. AEE advanced ET $20,831.41 or 87 percent of ET's invoice. The interest charge on the advance was $2,981.93. On August 15, 1994, ET filed the reimbursement application in the amount of $23,813.34. This amount included ET's 15 percent markup on the face amount of Gator's invoice. Prior to filing the application, ET paid Gator, $20,149.41. Gator then paid Tower $17,556.43. Following receipt of payment from ET, Gator repaid AEE $20,149.41. Following receipt of payment from Gator, Tower repaid AEE $17,556.43. Gator and Tower made these repayments within a matter of weeks of the time that AEE advanced funds to them. Calculating simple interest, the annualized interest rate on the loan from AEE to Gator was approximately 144 percent. The annualized interest rate on the loan from AEE to Tower was approximately 36 percent. These were the interest rates, as predetermined by the discount percentage in the addenda to the factoring contracts (Gator at 88 percent and Tower at 97 percent), in approximately 30 of the 45 applications. In the other 15 applications, the Gator sold its right to receive payment at a discount percentage between 87 to 89 percent of the face amount of the invoice. In those cases, Tower sold its right to receive payment at a discount percentage between 95 and 72 percent of the face amount of the invoice. There is no evidence that Petitioners made adjustments to the costs in the applications where Gator and Tower sold their right to payments for a discount percentage at an amount other than as stated in the addenda to the factoring contracts. Analysis of the transactions involved in each of the subject applications clearly shows that the financing scheme utilized here was not equivalent to a "plain vanilla" loan from a disinterested third-party capital provider such as a bank. DEP properly deducted costs from Petitioners' applications that represented interest which Gator and Tower agreed to repay to Petitioners' affiliate, AEE, before Petitioners submitted the applications. The only costs that Gator and Tower actually incurred was the net amount that they received after factoring their invoices. That amount includes the difference between the face amount Gator's and Tower's invoices and the amount that AEE advanced to them. Gator and Tower did not actually incur allowable costs in the amount of the interest paid to AEE when they : (a) agreed to accept reimbursement for their services at a discount; (b) accepted the full amount of their invoices from the next highest level; and (c) passed the full amount of their respective invoices back to AEE. DEP did not envision this type of elaborate factoring plan when it created its simple definition of "incurred" as meaning allowable costs have been paid. It is important for participants in the program to know the "rules of the game." Applicants have to make technical and financial decisions regarding site cleanup. They have to pay all contractors and subcontractors prior to submitting an application. In this case Petitioners' attempts to win DEP's pre-approval of their various factoring proposals were unsuccessful because DEP did not have enough information about the transactions and the relationships of the entities involved. After DEP received additional information from Petitioners, it became abundantly clear that the rules were insufficient to cover the financing scheme presented here. As early as November 4, 1993, Petitioners acknowledged that "the provisions of Rule 170773, F.A.C. do not specifically address the types of situations that arise when providing capital for cleanup activities through funding groups such as AFG." Petitioners revealed their final plan in July of 1994 just before they began filing the applications. At that time, Petitioners knew DEP's concerns. They also knew DEP could not make a decision on an application until they filed the application with DEP. Inconsistent Application of Statutes, Rules and Written Guidelines DEP has authorized financial transactions by which other applicants, after incurring (paying) all costs and filing their applications, sold or pledged their right to future payment to an entity outside the usual reimbursement chain. In those cases, DEP did not deduct interest associated with such transactions. DEP's approval of such transactions came before Petitioners filed their applications in this matter. There is no evidence that those transactions involved the factoring of invoices and an agreement to repay interest before the PRFCSR submitted the applications. Likewise, there is no evidence of an affiliation and less than arms-length negotiation between the funder and the financing company in those cases. The record contains no evidence of an inconsistent application of DEP's statutes, rules or written policies before or after Petitioners filed the instant applications. Reservoir Capital On March 14, 1994, DEP met with Reservoir Capital Corporation (Reservoir) to discuss a change of address notice directing reimbursement orders and checks for Clean America Financial, Inc. (Clean America) applications to a Baltimore, Maryland address. During that meeting Reservoir's counsel informed DEP that Reservoir "paid a percentage, not the full cost, for each application." DEP representative, Paul DiGuisseppe, informed Charles Williams of that conversation by memorandum dated March 15, 1994. Mr. DiGuisseppe later spoke with a representative of Clean America (the funder) and advised him to provide a list of facilities pledged to Reservoir for which notices and payments were to be sent to the Baltimore, Maryland address. On March 30, 1994, Clean America wrote to Charles Williams and Doug Jones, providing a list of sites pledged to Reservoir and directing DEP to send payments to the Baltimore, Maryland address. Among the sites pledged to Reservoir were Curry Station, DEP Facility No. 309103537 and Scardo Automotive, DEP Facility No. 428511319. On June 17, 1994, DEP issued a reimbursement order to Scardo Automotive at the Baltimore, Maryland address. On July 1, 1994, DEP issued a reimbursement order to Curry Station at the Baltimore, Maryland address. These orders did not contain a denial of costs or deductions of interest based upon the disclosed fact that Reservoir had purchased the applications for an amount less than their face value. However, there is no evidence that either of the applicants sold the right to receive reimbursement before submitting the application. Additionally, there is no evidence that Reservoir was affiliated with Clean America. On April 11, 1996, DEP revisited the Reservoir Capital factoring mechanism. In that instance, DEP reviewed a situation in which Reservoir Capital directly paid a subcontractor's invoice in an application that All American Funding (All American) filed. Reservoir had purchased the receivable of All American, and applied part of the purchase price to directly pay a subcontractor. There is no evidence of any "affiliation" between Reservoir and any other entity in the reimbursement chain. Prior to the meeting with Reservoir, DEP intended to deny those costs since it appeared that Reservoir actually paid them rather than the applicant, All American. As a result of that meeting, DEP requested additional information from Reservoir. At the time of hearing in these cases, DEP had not made a decision in that case pending receipt of the requested information. Governor's Bank On March 9, 1994, Governors Bank wrote to Charles Williams requesting that DEP directly remit to Governors Bank any reimbursement due on an application filed by Clean America due to the fact that Clean America "secured its borrowings from the bank with any rights to payment which CAFC has in connection with certain reimbursement applications." On March 30, 1994, Clean America sent a letter to Charles Williams and Doug Jones requesting that the DEP honor the March 9, 1994 letter directing payment to Governor's Bank. On November 4, 1994, Clean America advised DEP that DEP was to remit additional final reimbursements to Governors Bank. The letter advised DEP that "based upon a loan relationship Governor's Bank established with Clean America . . ." reimbursement payments had been assigned to Governors Bank and therefore "all payments and proceeds must be remitted to Governor's Bank." There is no record evidence that Clean America entered into a loan agreement with Governors Bank prior to submittal of the application or that the applications included claims for interest paid to the bank. There is no evidence of any affiliation between Clean America and the bank. The financing mechanism that Petitioners used for these 45 applications is not similar to a "plain vanilla" bank loan where a lender advances funds after an applicant files an application and directs DEP to forward reimbursement payments to a bank lock box. Barriston Environmental Investors L.P. On March 11, 1993, Barriston Environmental Investors, L.P. (Barriston) wrote to John Ruddell, Director of the DEP's Division of Waste Management and described a mechanism of financing by which Barriston (the funder) would obtain funds, at least partially through bank debt, for the payment of subcontractors' site rehabilitation invoices. In the Barriston proposal, the subcontractor would remit an "investment banking fee" of 5 percent of the value of the invoices back to the funder upon payment of 100 percent of the invoices. Barriston's letter acknowledged that this fee would not be reimbursable under the program. In addition, the Barriston funder would receive a commitment fee from the site owner which the Barriston funder would not include in the reimbursement claim. A reference in the letter to the payment of interest on funds advanced on the site owner's behalf does not specify the time frame in which interest would be paid, i.e. before or after the filing of an application. The letter sought DEP's approval and assurance that the payment of 100 percent of the invoices would entitle Barriston to full reimbursement including both markups. Barriston's letter requested an informal response because it realized that DEP had no authority to take official agency action without the submission of an application. On April 9, 1993, DEP responded to the Barriston letter. In its response, DEP stated that the arrangements appeared to be consistent with current statutes and rules and would be eligible for the full reimbursement allowed by DEP's rules. However, there is no record evidence of any official agency action on an application submitted in accordance with Barriston's proposal. Interest Indemnification Interest indemnification encompasses a situation in which a contractor pays interest directly back to a funder during the period of time after submittal of an application but before reimbursement by the IPTF. In June 1995, a DEP employee contacted Petitioners' certified public accountant (CPA) inquiring about the practice and seeking copies of his other clients' interest indemnification contracts. After that conversation, the CPA discussed the matter with another DEP employee to confirm his understanding that financing issues were outside of the scope of DEP's review so long as an applicant did not include such charges in the application. Since the June 1995 discussions, DEP has reimbursed applications which were financed through interest indemnification without adjustments for the payment of interest. However, the interest indemnification payments applied to applications after the applicants filed them with DEP to replace long-term interest that IPTF is no longer paying. The applicants were not seeking reimbursement of those payments as incurred costs. Petitioners have not established their entitlement to reimbursement for the factored amounts of their invoices. DEP presented competent evidence to support its "factoring" and "affiliation" policies as applied here. In addition, the evidence indicates that DEP has not inconsistently applied such policies to other similarly situated reimbursement applicants. Petitioners have failed to prove that DEP's denial of costs based upon factoring is not reasonably related to the purpose of reimbursement review and otherwise unsupported by competent evidence. The April 21, 1995 policy statement is a rule as defined in Section 120.52(16), Florida Statutes. DEP was not aware of the need for such a rule when it made the last substantive amendments to Rule 17-773, Florida Administrative Code, in 1993. Nevertheless, DEP demonstrated that the non-rule policy is a reasonable interpretation of Sections 376.3071(12)(b) and 376.3071(12)(d), Florida Statutes. DEP provided an evidentiary basis to support its factoring policy in these consolidated cases. The difference between the face amount of the invoices and their factored amount did not represent allowable costs which were actual and reasonable. DEP deducted the amount of the relevant discount percentage (on a prorated basis) from each invoice submitted by Tower and its subcontractors. There is a discrepancy between the amount that DEP deducted from each invoice (itemized) and the total deduction based on a lump sum in 33 of the 45 cases which DEP did not explain during the hearing. Therefore, before DEP enters a Final Order, it should review the supporting documents to determine the correct deduction in each application. "Value Added" Policy Funders and contractors are entitled to take a markup of paid contractor and subcontractor invoices for allowable costs at reasonable rates. The invoices must represent actual and reasonable costs which are integral to site remediation. Contractors are entitled to a first-tier 15 percent markup for supervising and/or coordinating on-site remediation, for investing capital while awaiting reimbursement by paying subcontractors invoices, and for assuming liability for the performance of the subcontractors. Funders generally are entitled to a second-tier 15 percent markup as an incentive to provide funds to finance the work. Markups are expressly subject to limitations set forth in Section 17- 773.350(9), (10) and (11), Florida Administrative Code. There are no other specific or implied limitations on markups in the rules or written guidelines. Requiring each entity that receives a markup in the reimbursement chain to pay contractor, subcontractor, and vendor invoices helps ensure that each level in the reimbursement chain pays the participant at the next lowest level. In these cases, each level in the reimbursement application chain "technically" paid the next lowest level. DEP policy in effect at the time Petitioners submitted the instant applications for reimbursement was to allow markups of paid invoices at two levels. However, prior to the submission of the instant applications, DEP was not aware of a case where a general contractor claimed a markup for work that was complete before the general contractor became involved in the project. With regard to all of the pending reimbursement applications, Gator applied a 15 percent markup to all of Tower's invoices including the invoices of Tower's subcontractors. With regard to a minimum of 30 of the 45 sites, Gator clearly did not supervise, manage or direct site remediation activities performed by Tower or its subcontractors. In fact, Gator did not become involved until after Tower completed these tasks. In at least 30 of the instant cases, Tower was acting as the general contractor when all of the on-site remediation took place. However, Tower could not apply a 15 percent markup to the invoices for its own services. Gator made it possible for Petitioners to claim the markup on Tower's invoices. As to the 15 sites at which Gator allegedly had some type of involvement with on-site remediation activities, there is no persuasive evidence regarding the specific activities or the level of Gator's involvement on any particular project. On September 1, 1994, Restoration Assistance, an entity under contract with DEP to review reimbursement applications, issued a memorandum to its reviewers directing them to complete their review and do a "total denial" on "Gator Environmental packages." The memorandum advised the reviewers that "Bruce" was drafting canned language to use in DEP's denial statement. On or about April 21, 1995, DEP presented its reviewers with a memorandum setting forth an initial overview of a "value added" policy for markups taken by a "management company" involved in site remediation activities. According to the memorandum, DEP would allow reimbursement of claims for actual project management work and value-added services. The memorandum further provided that DEP would allow markups to a management company which only provided cash-flow services for a majority of the program task period even if the management company performed no other service. However, DEP would deny a markup if the management company provided such services during a "one month time period." DEP intended for the April 21, 1995 memorandum to acquaint DEP reviewers with the emerging DEP policy on markups. DEP's rules and written guidelines do not address the distinction made in the April 21, 1995 memorandum regarding the timing during which a management company could provide cash flow services and still be entitled to a markup. On October 20, 1995, Charles Williams issued a DEP policy memorandum for reviewers to use in reviewing reimbursement applications. Through that memorandum, DEP finalized and implemented the "value added" policy. The memorandum states that: if the 'GC' [general contractor] was involved with the management of the project during the course of the actual work by subcontractors, [DEP] rules do not preclude them from applying a markup. However, if the 'GC' came along after the work was completed by other contractors and their involvement was more of a due diligence exercise to faciltiate (sic) a funding arrangement by a third party, then the 'GC' markup would not be justified, though a markup by the actual funder listed as the PRFCSR could be allowed. Prior to the establishment of the "value added" policy on October 20, 1995, DEP made no inquiry as to whether a contractor provided value added services in order for the contractor to be entitled to a markup. DEP applied the "value added" policy to all pending applications (including the ones at issue here) resulting in a deduction of Gator's markup in all of the subject cases. The Department of Banking and Finance reviewed and issued a report (Comptroller's Report) on the Petroleum Contamination Site Cleanup Reimbursement Program on November 29, 1994. This report addressed the issue of markups in the reimbursement program. The Comptroller's Report recognized that DEP found the multiple markup structure to be beneficial in that it "attracts the involvement of companies whose role in cleanup projects is limited to providing funds to finance the work [and] attracts investors who provide funds which might not otherwise be available--thus facilitating cleanup of contaminated sites." The Comptroller's Report describes a two-tier arrangement involving a "prime contractor engaged to manage the cleanup project" and a "funding entity." The report acknowledges that the prime contractor "might have only limited direct involvement in the cleanup, having engaged subcontractors for most or all of the actual work." The example in the Comptroller's report did not state what DEP's policy would be if a subcontractor had completed all of the actual work before the contractor became involved. Even without this consideration, the report was critical of DEP's allowance of markups on either level. The Petroleum Efficiency Task Force (PETF) issued its final report on financing contractors on August 17, 1994. This report discussed DEP's policy of allowing two markups. In this discussion, the PETF recognized that "funders must be able to rely on the skills and knowledge of contractors to minimize reimbursement shortfalls." The PETF recommended for future consideration that "the Department should provide in rulemaking that contractors who take the first-tier 15 percent markup on subcontracted work must adequately supervise the work." When the PETF issued its report, there was no existing rule that established any level of on site supervision or any other specific criteria for applying one of the two allowable levels of markup, other than paying invoices for integral site rehabilitation work. DEP's rules and written guidelines did not substantively change with regard to the "value added" policy from the April 22, 1993 revision of Chapter 17-773, Florida Administrative Code, to the October 20, 1995 memorandum which established a non-rule limitation on the ability of an entity to apply a markup to paid invoices. Because the rules and written guidelines do not reflect the "value added" policy, a participant in the program would not be aware of it even if the participant requested program information. Gator technically paid 100 percent of the face value of Tower's invoices. Without Gator's involvement, AFG and AEE would not have financed these applications. However, DEP presented persuasive evidence at the hearing to support its position that Gator was not entitled to a markup because Gator's services added no value to site remediation projects. In the instant cases, Gator performed some type of a minimal due diligence review of Tower's site work. Gator allegedly reviewed Tower's technical and administrative files, cross-referenced technical and administrative files with the applications which Tower prepared, made visits to some job sites, and prepared a deficiency letter to determine the appropriateness of the scope of Tower's work. However, all of these functions were repetitious of the work that was performed by Tower and the certified public accountant attesting to the Certification Affidavit. Gator limited the deficiency letters to the question of whether the scope of Tower's services were reimbursable. However, there is no evidence that Tower's deficiency letters resulted in adjustments to costs in the applications as filed by Petitioners. The deficiency letters served only to adjust the discount percentage set forth in the addenda to the factoring contracts. Tower was a qualified engineering consulting firm that employed its own engineers and geologists. Gator's employee that reviewed the technical information in Tower's files was not a Florida professional engineer. He was not qualified as a certified public accountant to determine whether a charge was within DEP's reasonable rates. The Gator employee was a Florida professional geologist but he did not sign and seal the deficiency letter as such. There is no reference in DEP's rules or written policies to a deficiency letter. AFG required Gator to prepare the deficiency letter within two days of the date on which EF provided Gator with the opportunity to review a completed task. This two-day turn around time allegedly afforded efficiency of payment. Gator did not begin its review of an reimbursement application until after Gator received an invoice from Tower. The relevant subcontract/purchase order issued by Gator to Tower, the Tower invoice and the Gator invoice were often prepared on the same day. Gator technically paid Tower's invoices with funds that AEE advanced. Tower used these funds to repay AEE. When Gator received payment from ET or SEI, it passed the funds back to AEE before ET or SEI submitted the applications to DEP or immediately thereafter. Pursuant to the addenda to the factoring contracts, Tower, not Gator, contributed to a reserve trust account which AEE will use to cover any reimbursement shortfalls. Gator indemnified AEE and guaranteed its own work but did not assume a risk of loss on Tower's work. On most if not all of the applications, Gator performed no meaningful management or supervisory functions. The greater weight of the evidence indicates that Gator's primary purpose in these consolidated cases was not to afford AFG a level of comfort as to the appropriate scope of the individual program tasks but to ensure that third-party investors maximized their profits. The "value added" agency statement has the effect of a rule which DEP did not contemplate when it promulgated its rules and written policies. Nevertheless, DEP's decision concerning the value added policy is within the scope of its delegated legislative authority. DEP has proven that reimbursement for Gator's services was not allowable as actual and reasonable costs of site remediation. Therefore, it is not entitled to a first-tier markup. Computer Costs Prior to January 1, 1995, DEP determined the reimbursability of computer costs based upon a "units and rates basis" as provided by Rules 17- 773.100(5), and 17-733.700(2)(d), Florida Administrative Code. DEP evaluated computer costs "as a certain number of hours [at] a reasonable rate." Pursuant to the units and rates rule provisions, there was no rational basis for DEP to deny the computer costs contained in applications filed prior to January 1, 1995. On January 1, 1995, DEP established a policy by which it would disallow in full any computer costs greater than $750. Under that policy, DEP would reimburse in full an applicant's computer costs with supporting invoices of $749 dollars, but disallow in full computer costs with supporting invoices of $751. DEP's reimbursement orders involving more than $750 in computer costs after January 1, 1995 routinely stated that "there was insufficient justification to demonstrate that this computer time was integral to the task or necessary." DEP applied the computer policy to all applications filed and pending review at the time it developed the policy, regardless of when an applicant performed the work or generated the records. DEP applied the January 1, 1995 computer policy to the application in Case No. 95-4606 which ET filed on July 18, 1994. In that case DEP denied $1,456.25 in computer costs allowing no reimbursement for computer time. On April 27, 1995, DEP implemented a new policy by which it evaluated computer costs based upon a calculation of allowable personnel hours per task as opposed to a units and rates basis. Under that policy DEP would evaluate the total allowable personnel hours in a task and limit computer costs to 10 percent of those hours up to a maximum of $750. Under the April 27, 1995 policy, DEP reduced the reimbursement for computer costs to $500 if the reimbursable amount exceeded $750 after DEP made the 10 percent calculation. DEP implemented the April 27, 1995 policy through the use of a calculation work sheet which it provided to its application reviewers. DEP applied the April 27, 1995 computer policy and work sheet to all applications pending review at the time DEP developed the policy, regardless of when the applicant performed the work or generated the records. DEP applied the April 27, 1995, policy in all of the subject cases subsequent to Case No. 95-4606, with the following exceptions: Case Nos. 96- 0432RU, 96-1006 and 96-1009, which had no denial of computer costs; and Case No. 96-1352, in which DEP applied the 10 percent limitation, but reimbursed 896.75 dollars of the computer costs. After implementation of the April 27, 1995 policy, DEP made no effort to adjust the denial of all computer costs in Case No. 95-4606 under the January 1, 1995 policy. The only other category in which DEP evaluates reimbursement on a percentage of hours basis, rather than a units and rates basis, is total management costs. DEP's written guidelines and Rule 17-773.350(16), Florida Administrative Code, limit management costs to a percentage of total allowable personnel hours. There are no rules or written guidelines that would limit computer costs based upon criteria other than a units and rates evaluation, or that would support DEP's policies as reflected in the January 1, 1995 and April 27, 1995 policy memoranda. DEP's rules and written guidelines did not substantively change with regard to this issue from the time Petitioners filed the subject applications, to the time DEP established the January 1, 1995 and the April 27, 1995 computer policies. DEP did not issue any PCRs or other written guidelines to place applicants on fair notice of DEP's new policies with regard to computer costs. DEP presented no persuasive evidence at the hearing to support its January 1, 1995 and April 27, 1995 policies. The only basis for the policy was DEP's representation that it developed the policies as a "reasonableness issue" in order to reduce the amount of computer costs that were appearing in reimbursement applications. DEP did not demonstrate that it based the new policies on any calculation of the amount of computer time necessary to perform a remediation task. Once the total computer costs reached $750 dollars, DEP gave no consideration to the scope or complexity of the task. Given the difference in the amounts involved in performing site remediation services (e.g. an application totaling 7,249.75 dollars in Case No. 96-0411RU versus an application totaling 149,080.02 dollars in Case No. 96-0425RU) and the differences in program tasks (see Rule 17-773.500, Florida Administrative Code), a policy establishing a flat numerical limit on computer costs that an applicant may claim in an application is not reasonable. DEP presented no evidence at the hearing to prove the basis for its retroactive application of the policies to work performed and applications submitted prior to the development of the policies. DEP did not attempt to explain the basis for its failure to apply the rules and written guidelines in effect at the time the work was performed or the records generated. Based upon the foregoing, DEP's denial of computer costs in each of these applications is not supported by the statutes, rules and written guidelines in effect at the time the work was performed or the applications were filed. Each application contains information supporting the computer costs. The application Certification Affidavits and CPA attestations demonstrate that Petitioners incurred the computer costs which DEP should reimburse. The reimbursement for computer costs should be in full except to the extent that DEP allocates to a supporting document a prorated share of the amount of a discount on a factored invoice. As a final note, of the computer costs denied in 16 of the 45 reimbursement notices, the sum of the allowances and deductions does not equal the overall claim. The differences ranged from a few dollars to over four hundred dollars. DEP provided no evidence to explain the discrepancy in the amount calculated by DEP in its notices. Miscellaneous Costs Prior to September 27, 1995, DEP reimbursed miscellaneous line-item costs when the applicant furnished support for them in the application. The miscellaneous costs policy as of May 17, 1995 even dispensed with the requirement of supporting invoices when these costs totaled less than 300 dollars. DEP's reviewers are employees of a firm that provides DEP with application review services as an independent contractor. On September 27, 1995, after a meeting with DEP staff, the application reviewers implemented a policy to deny costs for "overhead." Under the new policy, certain items were overhead, including but not limited to: gloves, mason jars, sampling disposables, phone calls, excessive faxes, excessive copying, small hand tools, shipping documents, etc. The application reviewers had to exercise their own discretion as to which items were "overhead" until they received a guideline from DEP. The reviewers decided to approve overhead expenses of less than $50 and deny items for more than $50. The policy continued in existence at least through November 9, 1995. DEP applied the miscellaneous/overhead policy to all of the subject applications, regardless of the date of cleanup work or application submittal. The application reviewers applied the miscellaneous/overhead "policy" without the knowledge of DEP's Reimbursement Administrator, Charles Williams. When Mr. Williams found out about the policy, he "counselled them that they need to reverse that position." The correct policy would allow reimbursement of "miscellaneous/overhead" costs that the reviewers denied in 33 of the 45 applications. DEP made no effort to correct the denial of these costs based upon its erroneously applied policy. DEP presented no persuasive evidence at the hearing to support its application of the miscellaneous/overhead policy in applications submitted prior to the development of the policy. DEP did not explain the basis for its failure to apply the rules and written guidelines in effect at the time the subcontractors performed the work or generated the records. Based upon the foregoing, DEP's denial of miscellaneous/overhead costs in 33 applications in which DEP denied such costs is not supported by the applicable states, rules and written guidelines. Each application contains information supporting the miscellaneous costs. The applications' Certification Affidavits and CPA Attestations demonstrate that Petitioner's incurred the miscellaneous costs. Therefore, DEP should reimburse those miscellaneous costs. The reimbursement should be in full except to the extent that DEP allocates to a supporting document a prorated share of the amount of a discount on a factored invoice. Airfare From June 17, 1993, to sometime prior to January 31, 1996, DEP's policy with regard to the reimbursement of airfare was to pay airfare integral to site rehabilitation when such costs were relatively inexpensive. By no later than January 31, 1996, DEP developed and applied a policy to deny all airfare costs regardless of whether the applicant provided justification. On March 13, 1996, DEP decided that once again it would reimburse airfare with sufficient justification such as a comparison with car travel. DEP considers the changes in reimbursability of airfare as "just procedures to follow," and applicable without regard to the timing of work performed. DEP denied airfare charges in Case No. 96-1353 as overhead charges. DEP's rules and written guidelines did not substantively change with regard to airfare from June 17, 1993, when airfare was reimbursable, to the policy implemented on January 31, 1996, in which airfare was not reimbursable, to March 13, 1996, when airfare was reimbursable once again. DEP issued no PCRs or other written guidelines to place applicants on fair notice of the changes in policy with regard to airfare. DEP has not provided any evidence to support the basis for the fluctuations in its airfare policy. DEP presented no evidence at the hearing to provide the basis for its application of the airfare policy to work performed and applications submitted prior to the development of the changes in policy. DEP did not explain the basis for its failure to apply the rules and written guidelines in effect at the time the subcontractors performed the work or generated the records. Based upon the foregoing, DEP's denial of airfare costs in the application for Case No. 96-1353 is not supported by the applicable rules and written guidelines. The application contains information supporting the miscellaneous costs. The application's Certification Affidavit and CPA Attestation demonstrate that Petitioner ET incurred the airfare costs. Therefore, DEP should reimburse airfare costs in full except to the extent that DEP allocates to a supporting invoice the prorated amount of a discount on a factored invoice. Inconsistent Agency Practice The application of DEP's factoring policy did not treat Petitioners in a manner different from other funders. Heretofore, DEP was not aware of a case where program participants factored their invoices before filing an application and claimed the face amount of those invoices for reimbursement. The affiliation between Petitioners and AFG and/or AEE was also unique. DEP issued a memorandum requiring funders to provide "clarification regarding essential cost documentation" on July 26, 1995. The purpose of this memorandum was to remind application reviewers of the need for a funder to submit an invoice documenting and supporting its line-item claim for the second- tier 15 percent markup. DEP did not intend for this memorandum to limit DEP's ability to inquire about relationships and transactions taking place outside the usual chain of reimbursement when an application on its face refers to a factoring scheme involving an "affiliation" between the factoring company and the funder. DEP does not deduct finance charges when an applicant incurs (pays) all invoices, submits the application, then sells the receivable or agrees to pay long-term interest pending receipt of payment from the IPTF. In the instant cases, Petitioners agreed to accept reimbursement for their services at a discount before they submitted the applications then included the cost of borrowing capital in the application. DEP does not routinely ask questions of other applicants regarding their financing. Nevertheless, under the facts of these cases, DEP would have been remiss in its duty if it had not made such inquiries. DEP's actions in the instant cases are not inconsistent with its actions taken in other cases with other similarly situated entities because there is no evidence that other such cases exist. Bias On August 31, 1994, Bruce French provided Charles Williams with a memorandum in which Mr. French discussed factoring. In his memorandum, Mr. French concluded that DEP could only reimburse the "discount" amount that the factoring company actually incurred/paid the funders. On September 1, 1994, Mr. French had a discussion with someone named "Toni" at McGuinnes Laboratories regarding the laboratories' use of AFG services for financing invoices to Tower. On September 2, 1994, Mr. French related in a memorandum to Charles Williams, his understanding that the laboratory had different price lists for different customers, generally depending on volume of analysis performed and individual payment agreements. Mr. French surmised that the laboratory's price for services "is inflated to deal with AFG's discount price to be paid by AFG." Mr. French concluded that, under those circumstances, AFG's financing arrangements may "represent collusion on behalf of all parties to the application to defraud DEP for the benefit of AFG. That is, prices are 'fixed' prior to performing of services." On September 2, 1994, Mr. Williams responded to Mr. French's memo by indicating that the scenario presented by Mr. French "sounds interesting" and that DEP would "absolutely need to have a Big Meeting to decide what to do once and for all." On September 12, 1994, Mr. French provided information on factoring to Bill Sittig of DEP's Office of the Inspector General and to Mr. Williams. Mr. French included a drawing entitled "The Tangled Web They Weave or the Hidden Discount Line Items and other Fluff, August 31, 1994 Interpretation of Bruce French's Discussion." At the hearing, neither Mr. Sittig nor Mr. Williams remembered seeing the drawing. There is no competent evidence as to the identity of the person creating the drawing. There is no persuasive competent evidence that Mr. French was biased against Petitioners or any other entity utilizing factoring as a mechanism of financing. Moreover, DEP had no direct and demonstrable bias against Petitioners. Timeliness of Agency Action Prior to filing the instant applications, representatives of the funders and AFG presented various financing schemes to DEP for pre-approval. In each proposal, the person speaking for AFG also spoke on behalf of the funders. At all times relevant here, Paul DeCoster was secretary and counsel for AFG. He was also secretary of SEI and a corporate director and shareholder of WIFL. In September of 1993, Mr. DeCoster wrote a letter to DEP describing a proposed financing scheme in which AFG would purchase the account receivables of contractors engaged in site rehabilitation. AFG's plans were in a formative stage at this time. Mr. DeCoster wrote DEP a follow-up letter dated October 4, 1993. This letter states that: the amount of financing required to meet [certain contractor clients'] working capital needs is so large that FEC [a funder] must find large institutional investors to accommodate them. For service of finding such investors, FEC proposes to charge a fee to the contractor client, which would be in addition to the 15 [percent] 'markup' taken by the investor providing the financing. The October 4, 1993 letter disclosed that contractor clients would deposit funds in a trust account as security for the performance of their work. The trust would invest its funds "in accounts receivable purchased from AFG, the parent of FEC, and any income earned by the trust on those investments would inure to the benefit of AFG." The plan that Mr. DeCoster proposed was markedly different from the scheme utilized here. The most noticeable differences are that the subject applications did not involve a finder's fee, FEC as a funder, or the purchase of AFG's accounts receivable by a reserve trust. In October of 1993, Will Robins met with DEP staff to discuss the manner in which the reimbursement program would apply to a proposed financing scheme. In this proposal, AFG would charge contractors an application/initiation fee and/or a commitment fee. The transactions between the entities in the instant applications did not involve an application/initiation fee and/or a commitment fee. When Mr. Robins made his presentation, DEP did not know the specific relationships between the entities involved or Mr. Robins' position as an officer, director, and or shareholder of these entities. After that meeting, counsel for AFG sent DEP a letter dated November 4, 1993. The letter acknowledges that the existing rules did not "specifically address the types of situations that arise when providing capital for cleanup activities through funding groups such as AFG." The letter identifies ET as the proposed funder through which AFG would finance cleanups. According to the letter, ET would incur the costs but AFG would hold the right to receive the ultimate reimbursement payment from the IPTF. The letter clearly reveals DEP's concern that the proposed application/initiation fee was a "kickback" which should be deducted from the funder's markup. In January of 1994, counsel for AFG wrote a letter to DEP describing a financing scheme which differs in some respects from the financing scheme at issue here. This letter states that AFG intended to purchase receivables of the funder and the general contractor at a discount. Under this plan, the general contractor and the funder would claim the two allowable markups. The subcontractors would pay AFG a finder's fee. The letter reveals that AFG, its affiliates, and investors would recover the cash equivalent of both levels of markups plus a fee from subcontractors for funding the high costs of risky projects. The letter states that: since the Department's reimbursement rules do not specifically address the issue of site cleanups that are funded through private sources of capital . . . it is important that we know if there are any obvious or glaring problems with this plan that would cause reimbursement to be withheld otherwise restricted. On July 13, 1994, counsel for AFG wrote DEP to explain some modifications in the details to the proposed plan for the purchase and sale of receivables at a discount. This letter informed DEP that AFG would have a financial affiliation with the funder (ET) which would exist outside the chain of reimbursement and which would have no effect on either the markups or the overall reimbursement amount reflected in any application. All contracts within the chain of reimbursement (between ET, SEI, Gator, Tower, and its subcontractors) would be negotiated in arms-length transactions. The letter states: In this plan the subcontractors will perform their work on the site and will prepare their invoices in a manner consistent with any publicly or privately financed cleanup. Those invoices will be complied and forwarded to the general contractor for its review and the general contractor will add on the markup allowed by rule to the subcontractor's bills. The reimbursement application will then be forwarded to the funder who will ensure that all bills have been paid and who will be identified as the "person responsible for conducting site rehabilitation" on the reimbursement application. The funder will take the second markup allowed by rule, and will submit the reimbursement application to the Department of Environmental Protection for processing. Reimbursement will ultimately be paid by the Department to the funder in accordance with the reimbursement application. At no step in this process will the Department relinquish any authority to review and approve either the scope and nature of the cleanup or the rates charged by the contractors and subcontractors. Petitioners filed the first of their applications with DEP on July 18, 1994, five days after the date of the July 13, 1994 letter. In late November, 1994, after all but 4 of the 45 applications were filed, DEP placed a telephone call to Petitioners' counsel advising him of the position DEP intended to take with regard to his client's financing arrangements. DEP did not provide any written confirmation of that call, or issue any document describing its policy, until April 21, 1995. In each of the above described letters and/or meetings, AFG's attempt to ascertain DEP's position regarding the various proposed financing mechanisms was unsuccessful. However, AFG was aware that DEP could not take a position that represented official agency action until an applicant actually filed an application. At no time did DEP make any affirmative statement which misled Petitioners regarding the acceptability of AFG's proposals. There is no persuasive evidence to support a finding that the agency did not timely respond to the claims for reimbursement.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing, it is recommended that DEP enter a Final Order in each of these consolidated cases: (a) disallowing reimbursement of the first- tier markup; (b) disallowing reimbursement of any factored invoice in an amount equal to the amount of the discount on that invoice; and (c) allowing reimbursement of costs associated with airfare, computers, and miscellaneous/overhead expenses. DONE AND ENTERED this 8th day of October, 1996, in Tallahassee, Florida. SUZANNE F. HOOD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of October, 1996. COPIES FURNISHED: E. Gary Early, Esquire Christopher R. Haughee, Esquire Akerman, Senterfitt and Eidson, P.A. 216 South Monroe Street, Suite 200 Tallahassee, Florida 32302-2555 W. Douglas Beason, Esquire Betsy F. Hewitt, Esquire Department of Environmental Protection 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2400 Virginia B. Wetherell, Secretary Department of Environmental Protection Douglas Building 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3000 Perry Odom, Esquire Department of Environmental Protection 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3000
The Issue Is Wayne Dean (Dean) entitled to a radon mitigation specialist certificate issued by the Department of Health (the Department)? Is Radon Win, Inc. (Radon Win) entitled to a radon mitigation business certificate issued by the Department?
Findings Of Fact Radon gas is a radioactive gas that has been demonstrated to cause lung cancer and is a Class A carcinogen. It is odorless and colorless. Once the particles within the gas are inhaled, they are retained in the lung and irradiate lung tissue. Its health effects are not immediately manifested. Exposure over a long period of time increases the risk for contracting lung cancer. Mr. Dean had been issued certificate number RO228 to act as a radon mitigation specialist. That certificate was issued by the Department. The certificate was effective from January 1, 1996, through December 31, 1996. Mr. Dean is the President of Radon Win. Radon Win had been issued certificate number RB0251 to act as a radon mitigation business. The Department issued the certificate. The period of that certificate was from January 10, 1996 through January 9, 1997. Radon mitigation specialist certificates and Radon mitigation business certificates expire annually pursuant to Section 404.056, Florida Statutes, as reflected in the certificates held by Mr. Dean and Radon Win that have been described. Ordinarily the Department notifies certificate holders of the need to renew the certificates. Notification occurs once prior to the expiration date of the certificates. Another occasion for notification follows the month in which it expired and a third occasion for notification occurs if the certificate holders have not responded before the issuance of the third notice. More specifically, on March 3, 1997, the Department gave Mr. Dean notice to this effect: THIS IS A THIRD AND FINAL NOTICE. FAILURE TO RESPOND TO THIS NOTICE MAY INITIATE ENFORCEMENT ACTION. Performing radon services with an expired certification is a violation of the requirements of Florida Control of Radiation Hazards Regulations, Chapter 10D-91, Florida Administrative Code (F.A.C.). Department records show that you have not paid your annual radon certification renewal for the period January 01, 97 to January 01, 98 or notified this office of your intention to no longer provide radon measurement or mitigation services for financial or other remuneration. In accordance with the authority contained in section 404.056, Florida Statutes, you are hereby notified that if you are performing radon services after the expiration of your certificate, the department intends to impose an administrative fine of $250 against Wayne P. Dean, Jr., certification number RO228, for violation of the radon certification renewal requirements of section 10D-91.1304, F.A.C. You are further notified that you have thirty (30) days from the receipt of this notice in which to respond. If you are performing radon services you must remit the certification fee in the amount of $200. Otherwise, please provide written notice of your intention to no longer provide radon measurement or mitigation services for financial or other remuneration. If the department finds cause to issue an administrative complaint, you will be afforded the right to an administrative hearing. In reference to the March 3, 1997 letter from Norman M. Gilly, Health Physicist Manager, Bureau of Environmental Toxicology, Radon and Indoor Air Quality within the Department, addressed to Mr. Dean, the reference to Rule 10D-91.1304, Florida Administrative Code, should correctly have been made to Rule 64E- 5.1203, Florida Administrative Code. The latter rule was in effect when the correspondence was dated. On March 12, 1997, Mr. Dean wrote a check to the Department for $600 which was intended to defray the cost of renewing the two certificates that have been described and a radon measurement specialist certification, certificate number R1121 related to the Radon Win business. The latter certificate is not at issue in this case in that the Radon measurement specialist certificate has been issued. The check in the amount of $600 was received by the Department on March 18, 1997. Mr. Dean communicated with the Department on March 26, 1997, to advise that the $600 check might not be honored by the bank, in that there were insufficient funds in the bank account on which the check was drawn to cover the amount of the check. On April 28, 1997, Mr. Dean spoke with Walter G. Klein by telephone. Mr. Klein was and is with the Office of Environmental Toxicology Radon and Indoor Air Quality, part of the Department. His present position is as an Environmental Specialist III. While conversing, Mr. Klein asked Mr. Dean if Mr. Dean had spoken with his bank to see if the $600 check for payment of the renewal of the certificates had cleared. Mr. Dean responded that the check had not cleared and indicated his belief that the check had "bounced." This refers to the fact that the check had been dishonored by the bank. Mr. Dean then told Mr. Klein that Mr. Dean would try to collect enough money to send a money order to pay for the three certificates. On May 13, 1997, Janet M. Cooksey, Administrative Assistant II-C, Bureau of Radiation Control within the Department wrote to Radon Win, to the person concerned within that firm, to advise that the March 12, 1997 check to pay for the three certificates had been dishonored. That correspondence indicated that the concerned person at Radon Win had thirty days from the notice in the letter to tender payment in the full amount for the dishonored check plus a $30 service charge to address the dishonored check. According to the letter, the failure to pay $600 plus the $30 service charge would promote the possibility that the Department might surrender the dishonored check to the State Attorney for filing a criminal and/or civil action. This notice to Radon Win indicated that the further payment should be by cashier's check, money order, or, if personally delivered, by cash. The notice indicated the person and the place for return of the $630 in payment and listed the name of an individual who could be consulted concerning any questions about the notice. Subsequently, the Petitioners and the Department made an arrangement for Petitioners to submit a cashier's check in the amount of $880 which covered the renewal of the three certificates in the amount of $600; a $30 service charge for the dishonored check; and a level II administrative fine in the amount of $250, corresponding to the amount reflected in the March 3, 1997 letter from the Department to Mr. Dean concerning the penalty for performing radon mitigation services after Mr. Dean's radon mitigation specialist certificate had expired. The cashier's check was drawn on May 29, 1997, and received by the Department on May 30, 1997. Under the circumstances Ms. Cooksey returned the dishonored $600 check written on March 12, 1997, to Radon Win. The letter transmitting the dishonored check was written on June 9, 1997. On June 17, 1997, Mr. Klein wrote to Mr. Dean to advise, among other matters, that with the receipt of the $880 check on May 30, 1997, the renewal applications for the three certificates was considered complete as of May 30, 1997. The June 17, 1997 correspondence also indicated that other matters of concern that had been set forth in correspondence from Mr. Klein to Mr. Dean dated May 29, 1997, had been corrected. This May 29, 1997 letter stated grounds for denying renewal of the three certificates held by Petitioners. Nonetheless, the June 17, 1997 correspondence indicated that the Department continued to be concerned that Radon Win had installed previously unmentioned mitigation systems after certificates expired. The June 17, 1997 correspondence advised that the Department intended to inspect additional installations for compliance with Florida's mitigation installation standards before, what the correspondence described, as the deadline for issuing the renewal. This is read to mean before issuing or denying the three certificates sought by Petitioners. On August 28, 1997, the Department wrote to Mr. Dean to advise him concerning the decision to grant the radon measurement specialist certification (certificate number R1121); to deny Mr. Dean his radon mitigation specialist certificate, RO228, and to deny Radon Win its radon mitigation business certificate, RB0251. The specific grounds for denial were stated as: Wayne Dean and/or Radon Win, Inc. installed radon mitigation systems at the locations identified in a), b) and c) below, after the expiration dates of mitigation certificates RO228 and Radon Win, Inc.'s mitigation business certificate, RB0251. This determination is made under sections 404.056, and 404.162, Florida Statutes, and the rules promulgated thereunder, chapter 64E-5, Florida Administrative Code and constitute level II administrative violations as identified in the department's 'General Statement of Policies and Procedures for Radon Enforcement Actions.' On or about May 30, 1997, Wayne Dean and/or Radon Win, Inc. installed a radon mitigation system at 13465 N.E. 44th Court, Sparr, Florida. On or about May 21, 1997, Wayne Dean and/or Radon Win, Inc. installed a radon mitigation system at 8435 N.W. 43rd Lane, Ocala, Florida. On or about July 15, 1997, Wayne Dean and/or Radon Win, inc. installed a radon mitigation system at 4909 Buck Lake Road, Tallahassee, Florida. The radon mitigation systems identified in a), b) and c) below, installed by Wayne Dean and/or Radon Win, Inc., failed to meet all of the installation requirements of the Florida Standard for Mitigation of Radon in Existing Buildings. This standard is adopted and incorporated by reference by rule 64E- 5.1207, Florida Administrative Code. Therefore, each failure to comply is a violation of rule 64E-5.1207 and, constitutes a level II administrative violation as identified in the departments 'General Statement of Policies and Procedures for Radon Enforcement Actions.' In December 1995, Wayne Dean and/or Radon Win, Inc. completed installation of approximately 124 radon mitigation systems at Doral Pointe Apartments, whose offices are at 4630 N.W. 97th Court, Miami, Florida while in possession of a valid certificate. These mitigation systems do not have a 'soil gas system' labels or system monitoring devices to automatically indicate system failure to the system occupants, as required by sections 602.3, 4, 602.2, and 502.3 of the Florida Standard for Mitigation of Radon in Existing Buildings. The radon mitigation system installed on or about May 30, 1997, by Wayne Dean and/or Radon Win, Inc. at 13465 N.E. 44th Court, Sparr, Florida lacked the required spacing of 'soil gas system' labels and lacked proper system sealing, as required by sections 602.3.1 amid section 602.3.4 of the Florida Standard for Mitigation of Radon in Existing Buildings. The radon mitigation system installed on or about May 21, 1997, by Wayne Dean and/or Radon Win, Inc. at 8435 N.W. 43rd Lane, Ocala, Florida lacked system monitoring devices to automatically indicate system failure to the system occupants, contained unapproved vent piping material and did not gasket a 'crawlspace' door as required by section 502.3, 602.3.1, and 404.3 of the Florida Standard for Mitigation of Radon in Existing Buildings. Dr. Kaiss Al-Ahmady, an employee of the Department, in a conversation held with Mr. Dean at Mr. Dean's office, reminded Mr. Dean not to install radon mitigation systems without a license. This conversation took place on March 20, 1997. After sending the $600 on March 12, 1997, Mr. Dean advised Mr. Klein that he was installing a radon mitigation system at 8435 Northwest 43rd Lane, Ocala, Florida. On or about May 1997, Petitioners installed a radon mitigation system at 8435 Northwest 43rd Lane, Ocala, Florida. Mr. Klein had been advised by the owner of the residence in Sparr, Florida, which is the subject of this case, that Mr. Dean was going to install a radon mitigation system at that residence. Mr. Klein knew of the progress of the job and was aware when the system had been completely installed. On or about May 30, 1997, Petitioners installed a radon mitigation system at 13465 Northeast 44th Court, Sparr, Florida. On or about June 1997, Petitioners installed a radon mitigation system at 4909 Buck Lake Road, Tallahassee, Florida. In December 1995, while in possession of valid certificates issued by the Department, Petitioner's completed the installation of approximately 124 radon mitigation systems at Doral Pointe Apartments at 4630 Northwest 97th Court, Miami, Florida. In July 1997, Mr. Klein performed an inspection of the radon mitigation systems installed by Petitioners at the Doral Pointe Apartments, 4630 Northwest 97th Court, Miami, Florida. The inspection revealed that the systems were missing labels contemplated by the Florida Standard for Mitigation of Radon in Existing Buildings, effective: June 1, 1994 (the Florida Standard). In particular that requirement is set forth in Section 602.3.4. of the Florida Standards. In addition, the inspection revealed that the mitigation system lacked a system monitoring device as called for by Sections 502.3 and 602.2, of the Florida Standard. Mr. Klein performed an inspection of the radon mitigation system installed by Petitioners at 13465 Northeast 44th Court, Sparr, Florida. This inspection was performed on June 12, 1997. The labeling for the "soil gas system" was deficient, in that the labels were more than three feet apart. The problem with labeling was in contravention of Section 602.3.4, of the Florida Standard. On July 3, 1997, Mr. Klein inspected the radon mitigation system which Petitioners had installed at 8435 Northwest 43rd Lane, Ocala, Florida. The radon mitigation system that had been installed at the Ocala address was not a soil depressurization system as addressed in Chapter 6 of the Florida Standard. The system which Petitioners had installed at the Ocala address was not a mitigation system referred to as "crawl space depressurization." The Ocala radon mitigation system that Mr. Klein inspected did not have a system monitoring device called for in Section 502.3, of the Florida Standard.
Recommendation Based upon the facts found and the conclusions of law reached, it is RECOMMENDED: That a Final Order be entered which denies the request by the Petitioners to be granted a radon mitigation specialist certificate and a radon mitigation business certificate for Mr. Dean and Radon Win, respectively. DONE AND ENTERED this 5th day of March, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. CHARLES C. ADAMS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of March, 1998. COPIES FURNISHED: Wayne Dean 1713 East Silver Springs Boulevard Ocala, Florida 34478 Radon Win, Inc. Wayne Dean, President Post Office Box 4257 Ocala, Florida 34478 Wayne Dean and Radon Win, Inc. 4255 Northeast 36th Avenue Ocala, Florida 34479 Patricia Matthews, Esquire Department of Health Building 6 Room 102 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Angela T. Hall, Agency Clerk Department of Health Building 6 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Pete Peterson, Esquire Department of Health Building 6, Room 102-E 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the owner of the site known as Union 76 #702 or as Taylor's 76, Inc., located at 9700 East Indigo Street, Perrine, Dade County, Florida. The prior owner of that site was Lawrence Oil Company. There appears to be a commonality of principals between Petitioner TYU, Inc., and its predecessor in title, Lawrence Oil Company. In 1986 the Legislature created the Early Detection Incentive Program (hereinafter "EDI") to encourage early detection, reporting, and cleanup of contamination from leaking petroleum storage systems. Essentially, the Legislature created a 30-month grace period ending on December 31, 1988, for owners of sites with contamination from petroleum storage systems to apply for reimbursement for cleanup expenses due to the contamination, without retribution from the State. The statute also provided several bases for which an applicant would be deemed ineligible. Prior to the December 31, 1988, deadline Petitioner checked the various sites owned by it, including the site which is the subject of this proceeding, to determine whether contamination was present. The subject site had been a service station, selling gasoline for 30 to 35 years. From 1986 forward, however, gasoline was no longer being dispensed at the site although the underground gasoline tanks were still present. It is unknown whether the tanks were emptied at the time that they were taken out of service. Automobile repairs were still performed at the site. By 1989, the site was also occupied by a lawn maintenance company and a pool company. In 1988 and 1989 a 55-gallon drum of used oil was located on the site. The lawn company employees used that oil to lubricate their chain saws. The remainder of the used oil and the solvents from the small parts washer were picked up from that site for recycling. In November or December of 1988, Harry Barkett, president of Lawrence Oil Company, personally visited the site. He sampled the monitoring wells. Because he smelled gasoline in the monitoring wells, he retained Seyfried & Associates, Inc., an environmental consultant, to prepare a report to be submitted to the Department. That report is dated December 15, 1988. Petitioner's application for participation in the EDI program, together with the report of Seyfried & Associates, Inc., was submitted to the Department prior to the December 31, 1988, deadline. At the time, Metropolitan Dade County's Department of Environmental Resources Management (hereinafter "DERM") was performing EDI inspections for the Department pursuant to a contract. On March 22, 1989, a DERM employee who performed only industrial waste inspections went to the subject site. He specifically was not there to inspect the petroleum storage systems, and he did not do so. That employee went into the service bays where the routine auto repair and maintenance services were performed. He noticed the floor drains going from the service bays to the oil/water separator. He then inspected the oil/water separator. He noted that a hole had been cut at the top of the effluent pipe, which breached the system and which might allow oil to flow into either a drain field or a septic tank system. He did not check further to ascertain which. He took three samples from inside the oil/water separator, one for oil and grease, one for phenols, and one for metals, specifically cadmium, chromium, and lead. Not surprisingly, the laboratory analysis of those samples indicated the presence of phenols, oil, and grease. The only sampling done by that employee was of the contents of the oil/water separator. No investigation was made of, and no samples were taken from, the soil or groundwater anywhere on the site. Such sampling was not part of that employee's authority or responsibility. On October 11, 1989, Dade County DERM sent a different employee to perform the EDI inspection at the subject site. To determine the presence of contamination from petroleum or petroleum products, that employee dipped an acrylic bailer into each of the monitoring wells and then "sniffed the bailer" to ascertain if the odor of gasoline could be detected. He did not dip the bailer lower than the top foot of water since he did not wish to bring the bailer up through a column of water before sniffing. Dade County DERM employees no longer "sniff the bailer" due to the health risk involved in such a procedure. In 1989, however, it was the common practice for DERM employees to "sniff the bailer," albeit cautiously. That employee failed to detect the odor of gasoline and did not see any petroleum contamination in the monitoring wells. He issued a report to that effect. He took no samples from the soil or groundwater to determine if there were contamination from petroleum or petroleum products at the site. Based upon the second report indicating the absence of gasoline odor and based upon the first report indicating the presence of oil, grease, and phenols inside the oil/water separator, Dade County DERM recommended to the Department that Petitioner's application for participation in the EDI program be denied. Based upon that recommendation, the Department sent Petitioner a letter dated May 23, 1990, denying Petitioner's application for participation in the EDI program. That letter stated as the two reasons for denial the following: Contamination is not the result of a discharge from a petroleum storage facility as defined in Section 376.301(11), Florida Statutes. Waste oil contamination found on the ground and groundwater was the result of poor maintenance practices by site owner/ operator. Participation in the Early Detection Incentive Program is restricted to contamination from such storage facilities pursuant to 376.3071(9), Florida Statutes. Contamination is a mixture of waste oil, grease and phenolic compounds. Participation in the Early Detection Incentive Program is limited to petroleum or petroleum products as defined in Section 37.301 [sic] (9) and (10), Florida Statutes. That letter further advised Petitioner of its right to request a hearing regarding that determination and advised Petitioner that its failure to timely request an administrative hearing would render that correspondence to be a final Order of Determination of Ineligibility. When Petitioner received that correspondence, one of its employees interpreted the letter to mean that the Department had determined that the site did not have contamination from petroleum or a petroleum product. Viewing that as good news, that employee merely put the letter in a file. No request for an administrative hearing was made by Petitioner, and the correspondence became a final Order of Determination of Ineligibility by its own terms. In 1990 the Legislature determined that all sites which had been declared ineligible by the Department would be re-determined for eligibility. The Legislature established March 31, 1991, as the new deadline by which owners or operators could request the Department to reevaluate eligibility for sites for which a timely EDI application had been filed but which had been deemed ineligible by the Department. The new legislation set forth several circumstances under which the Department would not redetermine the eligibility of a previously denied site. One of those exceptions related to the reason for which a site had initially been denied. Petitioner had remained convinced that the subject site was contaminated by petroleum or petroleum products prior to the original deadline for filing EDI applications. Petitioner was aware of the new legislation and new deadline by which sites determined ineligible could have their eligibility redetermined. Petitioner therefore retained Kiefer-Block Environmental Services, Inc., to do a site analysis to verify Petitioner's belief that the site had a petroleum contamination. That company issued a report indicating that was the case. Petitioner timely filed its application for redetermination before the March 31, 1991, deadline and submitted to the Department the information obtained from Kiefer-Block, the second environmental consultant to verify the presence of petroleum contamination. In reviewing applications for redetermination, the Department established a procedure whereby it simply looked at its original letter denying eligibility to ascertain the reason for denial. If that reason matched one of the exclusions under the new legislation, the Department advised the applicant that it was not eligible to have its site redetermined. The Department did not review the Department's files relating to a site and did no additional inspection. In 1991 the Legislature again amended the statute, this time carving out an exception to those sites excluded from redetermination of eligibility by directing that sites excluded due to an absence of contamination be redetermined for eligibility if contamination had in fact existed. That amendment went into effect July 1, 1991. Accordingly, that amendment was part of the law in effect when the Department made its decision as to whether it would redetermine Petitioner's eligibility. By letter dated September 3, 1991, the Department advised Petitioner that it was not eligible to participate in the redetermination process. That letter specifically provided as follows: This Order is to inform you that this site is not eligible to participate in the eligibility redetermination process pursuant to Section 376.3071(9)(b), F.S., because the original reasons for ineligibility were: Contamination is not the result of a discharge from a petroleum storage facility as defined in Section 376.301(11), Florida Statutes [definition in Section 376.301(15), F.S., current revision]. Waste oil contamination found on the ground and groundwater was the result of poor maintenance practices by site owner/ operator. Participation in the Early Detection Incentive Program is restricted to contamination from such storage facilities pursuant to 376.3071(9), F.S. Contamination is a mixture of waste oil, grease and phenolic compounds. Participation in the Early Detection Incentive Program is limited to petroleum or petroleum products as defined in Section 376.301(9) and (10), Florida Statutes [definitions in Section 376.301(13) and (14), F.S., current revision]. Section 376.3071(9)(b)3.c., F.S., states that redetermination of eligibility is not available to facilities that were denied eligibility due to contamination from substances that were not petroleum or a petroleum product, or contamination that was not from a petroleum storage system. Petitioner timely filed its request for an administrative hearing regarding that letter, contesting the Department's refusal to redetermine Petitioner's eligibility to participate in the EDI program.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered: (1) granting Petitioner's application for redetermination of eligibility and (2) finding Petitioner ineligible to participate in the Early Detection Incentive Program. DONE and ENTERED this 26th day of August, 1992, at Tallahassee, Florida. LINDA M. RIGOT Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of August, 1992. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER DOAH CASE NO. 92-0678 Petitioner's three unnumbered paragraphs contained in its post-hearing submittal have been rejected as not constituting findings of fact but rather as constituting conclusions of law or argument. Respondent's proposed findings of fact numbered 1-3, 5-18, and 20 have been adopted either verbatim or in substance in this Recommended Order. Respondent's proposed finding of fact numbered 4 has been rejected as being unnecessary to the issues involved herein. Respondent's proposed finding of fact numbered 19 has been rejected as not being supported by the weight of the competent evidence in this cause. COPIES FURNISHED: C. Vittorino Special Projects Manager TYU, Inc. 1601 McCloskey Boulevard Tampa, Florida 33605-6710 Brigette A. Ffolkes, Esquire Department of Environmental Regulation 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2400 Carol Browner, Secretary Department of Environmental Regulation 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2400 Daniel H. Thompson, General Counsel Department of Environmental Regulation 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2400
The Issue The issues to be determined in this case are whether Respondents should pay the administrative penalty, investigative costs, and attorney’s fees and undertake the corrective actions that are demanded by the Florida Department of Environmental Protection (the “Department”) as set forth in the Final Amended Notice of Violation, Orders for Corrective Action, and Administrative Penalty Assessment.
Findings Of Fact The Parties The Department is the administrative agency of the state of Florida having the power and duty to protect Florida’s air and water resources and to administer and enforce the provisions of chapters 376 and 403, Florida Statutes, and the rules promulgated thereunder in Florida Administrative Code Title 62. Germain is a licensed Florida attorney. From May 2006 to January 2013, Germain was the record owner of the real property at 1120 West Main Street, Leesburg, Lake County, Florida (the “Germain property”). Leesburg’s is an active Florida corporation that was incorporated in January 2013 by Germain. Germain is Leesburg’s sole corporate officer and sole shareholder and has managerial authority over the Germain property. John Doe 1-5 is a placeholder designation used by the Department for the purpose of covering all potential entities to which Germain might transfer the property. No other such entity materialized. Background A gas station was operated on the Germain property continually from the 1920s through the late 1980s. During the 1980s and perhaps for a longer period, C.E. Griner operated the gas station under the name Griner’s Service Station. Griner’s Service Station had at least three underground storage tanks (“USTs”) used to store leaded and unleaded gasoline. In 1989 or 1990, Griner ceased operation of the gas station and the USTs were filled with concrete and abandoned in place. The Germain property has not been used as a gas station since that time. In 1990, the Department inspected the Germain property and prepared a report. The inspection report noted that the USTs at the Germain property “were not cleaned properly prior to filling with concrete.” The report also noted that the tanks were not properly abandoned in place. No evidence was presented to explain in what way the tanks were not properly abandoned, or to indicate whether the Department took any enforcement action based on this report. In 1996, Gustavo Garcia purchased the Germain property from Griner. In May 2006, Germain purchased the property from Garcia. Another gas station, operating for many years under several names (now “Sunoco”), is located at 1200 West Main Street, across a side street and west of the Germain property. Since 1990, one or more discharges of petroleum contaminants occurred on the Sunoco property. There were also gas stations at the other two corners of the Main Street intersection, but no evidence was presented about their operations or conditions. In March 2003, apparently as part of a pre-purchase investigation, testing was conducted at the Sunoco property that revealed petroleum contamination in the groundwater. Soil contamination was not reported. S&ME, Inc. (“S&ME”), an environmental consulting firm, subsequently submitted a discharge report to the Department’s Central District Office in Orlando. Later in 2003, S&ME conducted an initial site assessment for the Sunoco property. In the report it produced, S&ME noted that it found concentrations of petroleum contaminants in the groundwater that were above the Department’s Groundwater Cleanup Target Levels (“GCTLs”). The concentrations exceeding GCTLs were in samples taken from the eastern side of the Sunoco property, closest to the Germain property. In 2004, S&ME completed a Templated Site Assessment Report for the Sunoco property. Groundwater samples from the eastern portion of the Sunoco property again revealed petroleum contamination exceeding GCTLs. Garcia, who owned the Germain property at the time, allowed S&ME to conduct soil testing on the Germain property. The soil samples were taken by direct push methods and were tested with an organic vapor analyzer (“OVA”), which revealed toluene, ethylbenzene, total xylenes, naphthalene, 1-methyl naphthalene, and total recoverable petroleum hydrocarbons exceeding the Department’s Soil Cleanup Target Levels (“SCTLs”). In 2005, another private environmental consulting firm, ATC Associates, Inc. (“ATC”), performed a Supplemental Site Assessment on the Sunoco property and produced a report. As part of its assessment, ATC installed three monitoring wells on the Germain property and collected groundwater samples. These groundwater samples revealed petroleum constituent concentrations that exceeded GCTLs and were higher than concentrations found in groundwater samples taken under the Sunoco property. Both the 2004 and 2005 site assessment reports concluded that the groundwater in the area flowed from the southeast to the northwest; that is, from the Germain property toward the Sunoco property. Germain referred to a figure in S&ME’s 2004 report that he claimed indicated a southeasterly flow of groundwater from Sunoco toward the Germain property. However, a preponderance of the evidence establishes that groundwater flow in the area is generally northwesterly from the Germain property toward the Sunoco property. Based on the results of its testing, ATC concluded in its site assessment report that the groundwater contamination on the eastern portion of the Sunoco property had migrated from the Germain property. ATC also took soil samples from the Germain property. It screened the soil samples with an OVA and reported petroleum contamination exceeding the Department’s SCTLs. Petroleum contamination in soil typically does not travel far horizontally. It remains in the vicinity of the source. Therefore, the soil contamination found on the Germain property indicates an onsite source of the contamination. All of the assessment reports were filed with Seminole County, presumably with the Department of Public Safety, Emergency Management Division, which is the local entity with which the Department contracted to inspect and manage petroleum facilities in the area. These reports were public records before Germain purchased his property. A June 2005 Memorandum from Seminole County informed Bret LeRoux at the Department’s Central District Office that ATC’s 2005 site assessment report indicated the Germain property was the source of petroleum contamination. The Memorandum recommended that the Department contact the owner of the property about the contamination. The Memorandum was filed at the Department. After the Department received the Memorandum, it requested and received the site assessment reports from Seminole County. The Department did not notify Garcia or the public about the contamination in 2005. The Department did not notify Germain about the contamination until August 2007. All Appropriate Inquiry The principal factual dispute in this case is whether Germain undertook “all appropriate inquiry into the previous ownership and use of” the Germain property before purchasing it, as required by section 376.308(1)(c)1/: [A person acquiring title to petroleum- contaminated property after July 1992] must also establish by a preponderance of the evidence that he or she undertook, at the time of acquisition, all appropriate inquiry into the previous ownership and use of the property consistent with good commercial or customary practice in an effort to minimize liability. Before he purchased the Germain property in 2006, Germain knew that it had been a gas station for a number of years. Garcia told Germain that the USTs had been filled with concrete and were “within the law.” Germain was also aware that the Sunoco USTs had recently been excavated and that there was a problem with the tanks and possible contamination there. Germain said he spoke with neighbors about the property, but he did not say what he learned from them. Before the purchase, Germain conducted a visual inspection of the property and saw “several little metal plates” in the parking lot. Germain claimed it was only later that he learned that some of the plates were covers for groundwater monitoring wells. Germain said he visited and reviewed files at a Lake County office, but he was not specific about which county offices he visited. He also went to the Leesburg Historic Board to review property records. Germain’s testimony was not clear about what records he saw on these visits. Germain did not go to the office of the Seminole County Department of Public Safety, Emergency Management Division, to view records pertaining to the Germain property. He did not claim to have gone to the Department’s Central District Office in Orlando. In other words, Germain did not go to the offices of the agencies responsible for regulating petroleum USTs. Nor did Germain say that he talked to any knowledgeable employee of these agencies by telephone about possible contamination issues on the Germain property. While at a Lake County office, Germain searched the DEP website and saw two documents that indicated the USTs on the Germain property had been closed in place. One of the documents indicated a cleanup status of “no contamination.” Germain claimed that he relied on these documents to conclude that the property was clean. The Department explained that the phrase “no contamination” is used in its database as a default where no contamination has been reported and no discharge form has been filed. It is not a determination based on a site investigation that the site is free of contamination. However, the Department had received information that the Germain property was contaminated, so its explanation of the “no contamination” status for the Germain property was unsatisfactory. Germain does not practice environmental law. He neither claimed nor demonstrated knowledge or experience with the legal or factual issues associated with petroleum contamination. Germain did not present evidence to establish that he followed “good commercial or customary practice” in his investigation of the property as required by section 376.308(1)(c). Good commercial practice in the purchase of property upon which potentially contaminating activities have occurred entails consultation with a person with appropriate knowledge and experience. Germain did not consult with an environmental attorney or environmental consultant regarding the potential liability associated with property used as a gas station. If Germain had hired an environmental consultant to assist him, the consultant would have known where to find public records about the gas station, including any soil and groundwater analyses. An environmental consultant would have seen the site assessment reports and other public records that indicated petroleum contamination on the Germain property. A consultant would likely have recommended a Phase I environmental site assessment (“ESA”). A Phase I ESA entails, generally, determining past uses of a property, inspecting the property for visible indications of potential contamination, and reviewing aerial photographs, historical documents, and public records related to the property and its surroundings. A Phase II ESA would follow if potential contamination is discovered and usually includes taking soil and groundwater samples. In considering whether all appropriate inquiry was undertaken by a purchaser of contaminated property, section 376.308(1)(c) directs the court or administrative law judge to take into account: any specialized knowledge or experience on the part of the defendant, the relationship of the purchase price to the value of the property if uncontaminated, commonly known or reasonably ascertainable information about the property, the obviousness of the presence or likely presence of contamination at the property, and the ability to detect such contamination by appropriate inspection. Germain did not have specialized knowledge regarding the regulation of petroleum USTs. However, as a lawyer, he was familiar with the practice of employing or working with professionals with specialized knowledge in order to achieve the objectives or solve the problems of his clients. If Germain’s legal assistance had been sought by a client to solve an environmental problem, Germain would have declined to proceed because he did not possess the requisite knowledge or he would have sought the assistance of an environmental lawyer or environmental consultant. In purchasing the Germain property, Germain did not undertake the reasonable steps a lawyer must take for a client. No evidence was presented about the relationship of the purchase price to the value of the Germain property. Germain did not show that the site assessment reports and other documents discussed above were not “reasonably ascertainable information.” Although a visual inspection by a lay person would not have disclosed the presence of contamination at the property, an environmental consultant would have recognized the groundwater monitor wells and would have known to seek information about the reason for their installation and the groundwater sampling results. Taking all relevant considerations into account, Germain failed to show that he made all appropriate inquiry before he purchased the Germain property. Germain transferred the property to Leesburg’s in January 2013 in part to limit his potential personal liability for petroleum contamination. The Germain property is Leesburg’s primary asset. Because Leesburg’s took title to the Germain property after the NOV was issued, it had full knowledge of the contamination and cannot claim to be an innocent purchaser. Post-Purchase Investigation In August 2007, the Department sent Germain a letter informing him that the Department had reason to believe his property was contaminated with petroleum and requiring him to conduct a site assessment pursuant to rule 62-770.600(1).2/ In September 2007, the Department sent Germain the 2004 and 2005 site assessment reports. Germain did not conduct a site assessment. At the final hearing, the Department did not state whether it had made any effort to take enforcement action against Griner, whom the record evidence indicates was the owner of the gas station when the discharge occurred. In 2012, the Department issued Germain a notice of violation for failing to conduct a site assessment and remediation. After Germain transferred the property to Leesburg’s, the Department issued the Final NOV to add Leesburg’s as a Respondent. The Final NOV seeks penalties of $10,000 against Germain, and $10,000 against Leesburg’s. While investigating this matter, the Department incurred expenses of $11,380.37 in investigative costs. Confirmation of On-site Contamination Despite the site assessment reports that documented contamination on the Germain property, Germain disputed the Department’s claim that the property was contaminated. The Department conducted testing and completed a Site Investigation Report in 2010. Because Germain would not allow the Department onto his property, the Department installed groundwater monitoring wells adjacent to the Germain property to the west and south, and collected groundwater samples. The Department confirmed the northwesterly flow of groundwater documented in previous reports and found elevated levels of petroleum contaminants above GCTLs, including benzene, ethylbenzene, toluene, xylene, total lead, EDB, and total recoverable petroleum hydrocarbons. Monitoring wells west of, or downgradient of, the Germain property showed high levels of groundwater contamination, while monitoring wells to the south and southeast, or upgradient of the property showed no signs of contamination, indicating that the source of the groundwater contamination was on the Germain property. Based on the site assessments and its own investigation, the Department determined that the Germain property is the source of petroleum contamination detected along the eastern portion of the Sunoco property. Germain and Leesburg’s did not present any expert testimony to support their claim that the Germain property is not contaminated or that the contamination migrated to the Germain property from offsite. A preponderance of the record evidence shows that the Germain property is the source of the petroleum contamination found in the onsite soil and groundwater, as well as in groundwater on the eastern portion of the Sunoco property.
The Issue Whether petitioner should take disciplinary action against respondent for the reasons alleged in the administrative complaint? Respondent's proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law and petitioner's proposed recommended order have been considered in preparation of the following findings of fact. Proposed findings of fact have been adopted for the most part, in substance, but they have been rejected when not supported by the weight of the evidence, immaterial, cumulative or subordinate.
Findings Of Fact At all pertinent times respondent Son-Mar Propane, Inc. operated as a liquefied petroleum gas dealer under license No. 0156030178 issued by petitioner. Liquefied petroleum gas is stored under pressure. A gallon of the liquid expands to 270 gallons of vapor, at normal temperatures and pressures. Because it is so much denser, the liquid occupies the bottom of any space in which both liquid and vapor are confined. If a storage tank stands upright, and the valve is open or there is a leak at or near the valve (by far the most common place for leaks), vapor will escape. But, if the cylinder is on its side, the top-mounted valve is low enough that liquid can escape, immediately to expand as vapor to 270 times its volume as liquid. More fuel increases the risk of fire. The agent of ignition is unknown in the present case. SAINT PATRICK'S DAY 1983 Raymond Towse is not a well man; fourteen surgical operations have taken their toll; and Loretta Towse was arthritic. On March 17, 1983, Mr. and Mrs. Towse discovered that there was no propane to cook breakfast with, so they put the empty tank into their customized, 1975 Dodge Tradesman 200 van. The tank, big enough to hold 239 pounds of water, stands 49 1/4 inches tall. Curtis Howard Jones, Jr., the next door neighbor who owned the tank and had made a loan of it to the Towses, regularly helped the Towses lift the tank, which weighed 71 pounds empty, into the van. After getting something to eat at K-Mart, Mr. and Mrs. Towse drove to respondent's place of business. On their way inside, Mr. Towse asked John Dahlem to fill the cylinder tank with propane. Mr. Dahlem, who can handle these tanks single-handedly, even when they are full, retrieved the tank from the van, filled it with liquefied petroleum gas, and replaced the filled tank in the van. Only he and Mrs. Towse witnessed this replacement and she is no longer alive. Mrs. Towse went inside to look at a stereo cassette recorder they were considering purchasing, then returned to the van without it. She climbed into the front seat on the passenger's side. Later she left the front seat of the van and moved, inside the vehicle, toward the cylinder tank. She may have heard gas escaping or seen liquid leaking. She may actually have reached the tank and turned the valve perhaps, inadvertently, the wrong way. When the explosion occurred, the tank lay horizontally across the bottom of the van, leaving only the carpet underneath to tell the color of the whole before the conflagration. A moan then a sigh, as Mrs. Towse breathed her last, followed the whoosh of the exploding fire, gasping for oxygen. The windshield and the skylight popped out. The frame buckled. The Pasco County Fire Service arrived at two o'clock and put the fire out. The tank was red hot. The valve lacked a half turn being closed. Forty- nine and a half pounds of liquefied petroleum gas had escaped to be consumed by the fire. Full, the tank had weighed 171 pounds. NO RECERTIFICATION The propane cylinder tank involved was manufactured in January of 1959. Mr. Dahlem filled this tank, No. 23860, with propane at least four times in the last three and a half years. It had never been recertified, even though "NFPA requires recertification 12 years after date of manufacture" (T. 41) and periodically thereafter. Recertification contemplates at least a visual inspection for rust, dents and gouges in the cylinder, and soaping the welds and valve to determine whether there are any leaks. If the cylinder passes the test, "they mark it `E' for external, then the month and the year that they do the inspection. It's stamped right in the top of the cylinder." (T. 41) NOT SECURED VERTICALLY The Towses' neighbor, Mr. Jones, who used to help lay the tank on its side in the van, also saw it lying on its side, ready for unloading, after having been filled and driven back, on at least three occasions. The tank was too tall to be made to stand upright in the van, Mr. Jones believed. Whether the tank is too tall in fact was unclear from the evidence. Measurements of the van after the fire suggest there would not have been room enough, but the fire caused buckling of the van's roof and maybe other changes. Measurement of another Dodge van with different customizing suggest that there may have been room enough to stand the tank vertically, after all, perhaps with as much as an inch clearance. The burn patterns leave no doubt that the cylinder lay on its side during the fire. The bottom of the tank, which has a diameter of 16 to 18 inches, was almost flush with the side of the van; the likelihood that the cylinder simply fell over is very small. Mr. Dahlem testified that, although the empty tank arrived lying down, he stood the tank upright in the van, after he filled it, but his testimony that he left the tank in a vertical position has not been credited. There is no dispute that he did not say anything to the Towses about securing it on March 17, 1983. DAHLEM ACTED FOR CORPORATION John Dahlem is the brother-in-law of one of the principals of Son-Mar, Inc. He has worked there for three and a half years. He cuts the grass, pumps gas and works on trucks in addition to filling propane tanks. Before he filled propane tanks himself, Mr. Dahlem watched it being done many times over a period of a year and a half. This was evidently the extent of his training. (T. 143-144) Mr. Dahlem testified that he had been instructed to check for certification but had failed to do so on the four occasions he refilled the tank the Towses used. At one time, but not on the day of Mrs. Towse's death, he did use soapy water to check for a leak, and discussed replacing part of the tank with the Towses: I had checked that tank previous when I . . . on the shroud because he had an option then. He could either have a standard valve put in, which would have been cheaper, because he would have bought just the cap; he wouldn't have needed the shroud. (T. 138-139). Mr. Berdeaux and Mr. Johnson, respondent's principals, told Mr. Dahlem he need not secure propane tanks he filled and placed in people's conveyances. "They had to tie the tank off themselves. . . I didn't have to tie it off. No, sir." (T. 143) STANDARDS The National Fire Protection Association publishes safety standards which include the following: 6115. Containers and their appurtenances shall be determined to be leak-free before being loaded into vehicles. Containers shall be loaded into vehicles with sub stantially flat floors or equipped with suitable racks for holding containers. Containers shall be securely fastened in position to minimize the possibility of movement, tipping over or physical damage. 6116. Containers having an individual water capacity exceeding 200 pounds shall be transported with the relief valves of containers in direct communication with the vapor space. * * * B-212. All containers, including those apparently undamaged, must be periodically requalified for continued service. The first requalification for a new cylinder is required within 12 years after the date of manufacture. Subsequent requalifications are required within the periods specified under the requalification method used. B-213. DOT regulations permit three alternative methods of requalification for most commonly used LP-Gas specification containers (see DOT regulations for permissible requalification methods for specific cylinder specifications). Two use hydrostatic testing, and the third uses a carefully made and duly recorded visual examination by a competent person. In the case of the two hydrostatic test methods, only test results are recorded but a careful visual examination of each container is also required. DOT regulations cite in detail the data to be recorded for the hydrostatic test methods, the observations to be made during the recorded visual examination method, and the marking of containers to indicate the requalification date and the method used. The three methods are outlined as follows: The water jacket type hydrostatic test may be used to requalify containers for 12 years before the next requalification is due. A pressure of twice the marked service pressure is applied, using a water jacket (or the equivalent) so that the total expansion of the container during the application of the test pressure can be observed and recorded for comparison with the permanent expansion of the container after depressurization. The following disposition is made of containers tested in this manner: Containers which pass the retest, and the visual examination required with it (see B-213), are marked with the date and year of the test (Example: "6-70", indicating requalification by the water jacket test method in June 1970) and may be placed back in service. Containers which leak, or for which the permanent expansion exceeds 10 percent of the total expansion (12 percent for Specification 4-E aluminum cylinders) shall be rejected. If rejected for leakage, containers may be repaired in accordance with B-220. The simple hydrostatic test may be used to requalify containers for 7 years before the next requalification is due. A pressure of twice the marked service pressure is applied but no provision is made for measuring total and permanent expansion during the test outlined in B-213(a) above. The container is carefully observed while under the test pressure for leaks; undue swelling or bulging indicating weaknesses. The following disposition is made of containers tested in this manner: Containers which pass the test, and the visual examination required with it (see B-213) are marked with the date and year of the retest followed by an "S" (Example: "8-715", indicating requalification by the simple hydrostatic test method in August 1971), and may be placed back in service. Containers developing leaks or showing undue swelling or bulging shall be rejected. If rejected for leaks, containers may be repaired in accordance with B-220. The recorded visual examination may be used to requalify containers for 5 years before the next requalification is due provided the container has been used exclusively for LP-Gas commercially free from corroding components. Inspection is to be made by a competent person, using as a guide Compressed Gas Association "Standards for the Visual Inspection of Compressed Gas Cylinders" (CGA Pamphlet C06, 1975), and recording the inspection results as required by DOT regulations. (Note: Reference to NLPGA Safety Bulletin Recommended Procedures for Visual Inspection and Requalification of ICC Cylinders in LP-Gas Service is also recommended). The following disposition is to be made of containers inspected in this manner: Containers which pass the visual examination are marked with the date and year of the examination followed by an "E" (Example: "7-70E," indicating requalification by the recorded visual examination method in July 1970), and may be placed back in service. Containers which leak, show serious denting or gouging, or excessive corrosion shall either be scrapped or repaired in accordance with B-220. Petitioner's Exhibit No. 1, NFPA No. 58 (1979 ed.). These provisions are adopted by reference in Rule 4B-1.01, Florida Administrative Code.
Recommendation Upon consideration of the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That petitioner revoke respondent's license No. 0156030178. DONE and ENTERED this 29th day of June, 1984, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT T. BENTON II Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of June, 1984. COPIES FURNISHED: Dennis Silverman, Esquire Department of Insurance 413-B Larson Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Leslie King O'Neal, Esquire Markel, McDonough & O'Neal Post Office Drawer 1991 Orlando, Florida 32802 William Gunter, Commissioner Department of Insurance and Treasurer The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, Florida 32301
Findings Of Fact Petitioner has been a dentist for five years, licensed to practice in Massachusetts, New York and New Jersey. Petitioner took Florida's dentist exam in June, 1979. As the result of scoring a zero on the cast gold laboratory part oil the exam, he received a failing grade of 74 percent (75 percent was passing) on the clinical or practical portion of the exam. Petitioner reviewed the exam with the Board, who refused to change the grade for lack of jurisdiction. The involved laboratory exam dealt with the Examinee's ability to do laboratory procedures and is graded independently of other aspects of the clinical portion of the exam. The procedure required the taking an impression of the patient's mouth, the mounting of that cast on a semi-adjustable articulator, the preparation of a die model of the tooth being restored, the preparation of a wax pattern on the die, the investing of the wax pattern in a stove, and the injection of molten gold into the area from which the wax has been burned out. The gold inlay may be pickled and cleaned but not otherwise made to fit the die. Prior to the exam, Petitioner had received a copy of the instructions and basis for grading. Petitioner took two impressions of the cavity. From the accurate portions of the two impressions, two dies were made. Petitioner undercut the deficient area of the first die so it would reflect the accurate portion of the second die. From this procedure an acceptable cast gold inlay was produced. The Board's graders were given instruction, standardized and tested for consistency prior to the exam. Petitioner's two graders received an inter-rater reliability of 95 percent for the June 1979 exam. Each grader rated Petitioner's work independently and concluded his work was completely unacceptable in every category listed on the grade sheet. Petitioner's witness contended the zero grade was unwarranted as a gold inlay had been produced that did fit the patient's tooth; however, he could not grade all of the Petitioner's lab work as it was not before him.
Recommendation From the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner's request to revise the laboratory portion of his June 1979 dentist exam to a higher grade be DENIED; however, Petitioner should be permitted to retake only that portion of the exam in which he received a zero. DONE AND ENTERED this 4th day of December, 1980, in Tallahassee, Florida. H. E. SMITHERS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings 101 Collins Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of December, 1980. COPIES FURNISHED: Kenneth Meer, Esquire Post Office Drawer B Winter Park, Florida 32790 John Griffin, Esquire Assistant Attorney General Department of Legal Affairs The Capitol, Room 1604 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Deborah Miller, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue Whether Petitioner is entitled to participate in the Reimbursement Program established under the State Underground Petroleum Environmental Response (SUPER) Act of 1986 for the petroleum terminal owned by Gulf Products Division of BP Oil Company at Port Everglades, Florida.
Findings Of Fact The State Underground Petroleum Environmental Response (SUPER) Act of 1986 provides for the expeditious cleanup of sites contaminated as the result of storage of petroleum or petroleum products. The Reimbursement Program, found in Section 376.3071(12), Florida Statutes, provides for reimbursement of the allowable costs of site rehabilitation contaminated as a result of a discharge related to the storage of petroleum or petroleum products from a storage tank, or its integral piping or dispensing system. The Reimbursement Program does not provide for reimbursement of cleanup costs for discharges related to the transportation or disposal of petroleum or petroleum products. The site at issue in this proceeding is a terminal facility used for the storage of petroleum and petroleum product located at 1500 Southeast 26th Street, Port Everglades, Florida. This facility is referred to as Gulf Facility No. 46888 and DER Facility No. 068732278 (Gulf Terminal). The subject terminal facility is one of fourteen petroleum storage terminals located at Port Everglades, Florida. Petroleum and petroleum products come to the terminal by ship and are pumped from the ship through permanent pipelines to the large aboveground storage tanks located at the facility. The petroleum and petroleum products are stored in these large tanks until it is time for the product to be distributed to the end user. The Gulf Terminal contains eighteen storage tanks whose total capacity is 650,000 barrels of petroleum or petroleum products. These tanks vary in size, with the smallest having a capacity of 10,000 barrels and the largest having a capacity of 80,000 barrels. One barrel equals 42 gallons. The primary activity of the terminals at Port Everglades is to store petroleum or petroleum products. None of the terminals at Port Everglades, including the Gulf Terminal, refines or produces petroleum or petroleum products. Operation of this facility began in 1946. Petitioner, as the successor to the Gulf Oil Corporation, owned and operated the facility until February 1, 1985, when it sold the facility to BP Oil, Inc. As the previous owner of the facility, Petitioner performed an environmental audit which revealed petroleum hydrocarbon contamination at the site. Petitioner is responsible for the cleanup and is entitled to reimbursement of the allowable costs of the cleanup if the site is eligible to participate in the reimbursement program. Any contamination of the soil and groundwater at the site was caused by discharges of petroleum or petroleum products, water contaminated with petroleum or petroleum product or sludges which consist predominately of petroleum or petroleum product constituents. Based on hydrogeological assessment information, Petitioner determined that response action, including ground water cleanup activities, was required at the site. Petitioner hired independent contractors to conduct the response action. In 1986, Petitioner designed a recovery system for petroleum and petroleum product and a ground water treatment system at the site. Through February, 1989, the recovery system had recovered over 12,000 gallons of petroleum or petroleum products, which constitutes the recovery of between 60%- 70% of the total amount in the ground. Through November 1989, Petitioner had expended in excess of $560,000 on its response action at the Gulf Terminal. Petitioner advised Respondent of its response action at the site by letter dated January 6, 1988. Petitioner submitted documentation to Respondent concerning hydrogeological assessment at the site which included field and laboratory work and investigation performed for the site from 1984 to the present. Pursuant to the requirements of SUPER Act, Petitioner notified Respondent of its intention to seek reimbursement for money spent conducting response action in accordance with Chapter 17-70, Florida Administrative Code, with regard to petroleum and petroleum product contamination at the site. Petitioner's notice to Respondent was timely and was procedurally correct. On July 13, 1989, Respondent issued its Order of Determination of Ineligibility concerning Petitioner's request for reimbursement. As stated in this order the initial basis for Respondent's denial of eligibility was: The determination is based on the fact that the contamination was not related to the storage of petroleum or petroleum products. Sources of contamination at this site include tanker trucks, an oil/water separator, a holding pond, and crude oil and tank-bottom sludge disposal pit. These items are not petroleum storage systems as defined in Section 376.301 F.S. therefore (sic), this site is not eligible for reimbursement under the SUPER Act. ... Respondent clarified its Order of Ineligibility by a Notice to Amend and Clarify dated November 14, 1989, which provides, in pertinent part, as follows: The notice of denial provides that the site is being denied due to the fact that the disclosed sources of contamination are not petroleum storage systems. One of the criteria for being a petroleum storage system is that it be used or intended to be used for storage of petroleum or petroleum product. It is the criteria that the Department contends is not met in this case; i.e., that the discharges were not intended for storage. Section 376.3071(4), Florida Statutes, specifically limits the use of the Environmental Protection Trust Fund to incidents of inland contamination related to storage of petroleum or petroleum product. * * * The Department recently became aware that prior to 1983, contaminated water was disposed of directly from tanks at the site with no pretreatment by an oil/water separator. As with the disposal of oil and sludge to a pit, the act of intentionally disposing of contaminants to the ground is not "related to storage" as required by Chapter 376, Florida Statutes. * * * Wherefore, The State of Florida Department of Environmental Regulation hereby requests that the Hearing Officer allow for the amendment of the notice of denial of eligibility to include the following basis for denial: Contamination at the site is related to the disposal of petroleum or petroleum product, or water contaminated with petroleum or petroleum products. Disposal activities including the intentional discharge and disposal of contaminated water and/or fuel from tanks, oil water separators and sump areas, the intentional discharge and disposal of contaminated water to a percolation pond, the intentional discharge and disposal of oil and sludge to a disposal pit, and the intentional discharge and disposal of fuel to the ground at the loading rack. Among the causes of contamination of the Gulf Terminal are accidental overfills of tanks and leaks from an integral pipeline. Absent any other source of contamination, the discharges that occurred at the Gulf Terminal due to these causes would be eligible for the reimbursement. Respondent has determined, however, that the following additional sources of contamination render the entire response action ineligible for reimbursement: Discharges of dissolved hydrocarbon molecules contained in water which accumulated in storage tanks; Discharges of petroleum or petroleum products at the loading rack at the terminal; and The discharge of crude oil and of crude oil tank bottoms. TANK OVERFILL During the operation of the Gulf Terminal, petroleum and petroleum products have been accidentally discharged onto the ground. In 1955, an unknown quantity of petroleum or petroleum products was accidentally discharged onto the ground in the areas of tanks 104 and 105 as a result of these tanks being over- filled. Following this massive spill, between 5,000 - 10,000 barrels of product was recovered, while an unknown quantity could not be recovered. PIPELINE LEAK Since 1955, approximately 15,000 additional barrels of petroleum or petroleum products were leaked from an underground pipeline that is integral to the storage system in an area between the loading rack and tank 101, extending toward the west to between tanks 110 and 102. This is the vicinity where the heaviest free floating petroleum contamination exists. DISCHARGE OF CONTAMINATED WATER Florida has adopted the standard code for the design of aboveground storage tanks prepared by the American Petroleum Institute (API-650). The tanks at the Gulf Terminal are in compliance with API-650. The accumulation of water in storage tanks is a problem associated with the storage of petroleum or petroleum products in the storage tanks at the Gulf Terminal and at the other terminals at Port Everglades. Water accumulates in the storage tanks from rainfall and from condensation. The records of the US Department of Commerce, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration for Station 08063163 (Fort Lauderdale, Florida) accurately depict the rainfall levels at the terminal facility. The total annual rainfall levels are as follows: 1980, 69.67 inches; 1981, 57.9 inches; 1982, 82.92 inches; 1983 75.16 inches; 1984, 59.4 inches; 1985, 63.74 inches; 1986, 64.14 inches, 1987, 58.50 inches; 1988 40.66 inches. Because water is heavier than petroleum and petroleum products, the water accumulates at the bottom of the tanks. It is essential to the proper storage of the petroleum or petroleum products that the water be removed for at least three reasons. First, if the water is not removed, the tanks would eventually become filled with water instead of product. Second, the product contaminated by water, particularly fuel for motor vehicles and aircraft, would not meet specifications. Third, water in the tanks speeds the corrosion of the tank. In order to remove this water that accumulates at the bottom of the storage tanks, a water draw-off mechanism located at the bottom of the tank is a design feature of API-650. When water accumulates in the bottom of the tank, the water is drained out through the water draw-off mechanism. The storage tanks located at the Gulf Terminal are equipped with such a water draw-off mechanism. Throughout the existence of the facility, accumulated water in the tanks has been controlled by discharging the water through the water draw-off mechanism. From 1948 to 1980, water was drained out of the tanks through the water draw-off mechanism and on to the ground. Beginning in 1980, the water was taken from the tanks through the water draw-off mechanism and piped to a catch basin where an effort was made to recover petroleum product by skimming the water before the water was discharged into the ground. Since 1985, the water taken from the tanks through the water draw-off mechanism has been treated by an oil/water separator which effectively removes all petroleum product before the water is discharged. The purpose of the oil/water separator is to separate petroleum product from water so that the petroleum product can be returned to the storage tank and the water can be discharged. This process serves to prevent the discharge of petroleum product. Up to 1988, the discharges to the ground from the oil/water separator at the Gulf Terminal accumulated in a holding pond. In 1988, the holding pond was eliminated and the water discharges from the oil/water separator were routed to a holding tank prior to treatment by an air stripper and subsequent discharge into the canal adjacent to the property. At all times since 1983, the water drawn out of the tanks has been the subject of permits issued by Respondent which approve the use of the oil/water separator. While it is necessary for the operation of the storage tanks that water be drawn from the tanks, it is not necessary for the operation of the storage tanks for the contaminated water to be discharged onto the ground. The purpose of discharging the water was to dispose of it. There was no intent to recover the contaminated water after it was discharged. Any water coming out of a storage tank is contaminated with dissolved petroleum. It may have solids in it and floating residue or product on it. Between 1946 and 1980, when this water from the storage tanks was discharged to the ground, any contaminates in the water would be discharged along with it. Water has been drained from tanks numbered 101, 106, 109, 110, 111, 112 113, and 114 on a daily basis. The other tanks are drained after a rainfall. An average of one or two inches of water was drained off each time it rained. Following a rainfall, in excess of 30 barrels of water would be drained from the smaller tanks, while approximately 300 barrels of water would be drained from the larger tanks. The discharge of the water drawn from the storage tanks contributed to the contamination of the groundwater at the Gulf Terminal. This type contamination exists in almost all areas of the site. Petitioner was unable to distinguish the contamination to the groundwater caused by the discharge of contaminated water drawn from the storage tanks from contamination to the groundwater which resulted from other causes. Petitioner failed to establish that the contribution to this contamination to the groundwater by the discharge of the contaminated water drawn from the storage tanks was insignificant. THE LOADING RACK The loading rack at the Gulf Terminal is the apparatus by which the petroleum in the storage tanks is dispensed to tanker truck for distribution to consumers. The loading rack is a series of dispensers which operate much like at a service station except that it fuels tanker trucks rather than automobiles. The loading rack is connected by permanent integral piping to the storage tanks. The purpose of the loading rack is to load the transport trucks. Without the storage tanks at the terminal, there would be no need for a loading rack. Over the years, discharges have occurred in the loading rack, usually as the result of human error. Occasional overfills in the 10-15 gallon range have occurred while a truck was being filled. This type discharge is analogous to a spill which occurs at a service station when an automobile is being fueled and the fuel splashes back or overfills the automobile's fuel tank. The supervisor of Respondent's Reimbursement Section testified that this type discharge, absent other causes, would probably be eligible for reimbursement. This testimony conflicts with the official position taken by Respondent in this proceeding that the cleanup caused by the operation of the loading rack is ineligible for reimbursement. In other incidents, small amounts of product ranging from a teacup to less than a gallon, were occasionally discharged while a truck was being drained of one type of product so that the truck could transport another type of product. The loading rack is an integral part of the storage system because without a means of moving the product out of storage and into the distribution system, the storage tanks could not provide a meaningful function. The discharges which occurred at the loading rack during the course of both loading and unloading trucks are insignificant when compared with the other sources of contamination at the site. TANK BOTTOMS In 1956, a storage tank was emptied for the purpose of switching product from crude oil to diesel fuel. At the time the change in product was made, approximately 1000 barrels of sludge and crude oil were disposed of in a pit adjacent to tank 101. Also disposed of was the tank bottom, a hard tar residue which formed at the bottom of the tank. Oil occasionally oozes to the surface in the vicinity of the pit adjacent to tank 101, but the area around the sludge pit has not been found to be contaminated, and the tank bottom has remained a hardened mass. Each tank on the site also had a pit alongside the tank where a tank bottom was disposed. Although it was necessary to remove the sludge and the tank bottoms to be able to properly operate the storage tanks, it was not necessary for the operation of the storage tanks to dump the sludge and the tank bottoms onto the ground or into the pits. The purpose of discharging the crude oil sludge and the tank bottoms was to dispose of them. There was no intent to recover the crude oil sludge or the tank bottoms water after they were discharged. CONTAMINATION PHASES The contamination at the site exists in three phases, floating petroleum product contamination, dissolved petroleum groundwater contamination, and sludge contamination. The contamination in the form of floating petroleum was caused by discharges of petroleum or petroleum products following the tank overfills, the pipeline leaks, and spills at the loading rack. The dissolved groundwater contamination was caused by two primary sources. First, the dissolved groundwater contamination was caused by floating petroleum product coming into contact with groundwater. Upon such contact, molecules from the floating petroleum would dissolve into the water, causing contamination. Second, the dissolved groundwater contamination was caused by the discharge of the contaminated water that had been drawn off from the storage tanks. Petitioner was unable to distinguish the dissolved groundwater contamination that was caused by accidental discharges of product from the contamination caused by the discharge of the contaminated water. Petitioner was also unable to establish that the dissolved groundwater contamination caused by the contaminated water was insignificant. The sludge contamination was caused by the discharge of crude oil and crude oil tank bottoms. CLEANUP The sludge contamination is capable of being cleaned up separately from the free floating petroleum contamination and the groundwater contamination at the site. The sludge contamination is separate and distinct from the other contamination at the site both as to the location of the contamination and as to the methods that would be employed to clean up that type of contamination. Free floating petroleum contamination is recovered by drawing down the water level in a well by use of a pump so that a cone of depression is created. The cone of depression is a funnel shaped depression that causes the surface of the underground water table to bend down towards the well in all directions. The free floating petroleum which flows on top of the underground water surface is then recovered by use of a second pump. The free floating petroleum is then pumped into a holding tank where the recovery of free floating petroleum is completed. The recovery of free floating petroleum contamination is usually more expensive to accomplish than groundwater cleanup because more equipment is required. Groundwater cleanup usually takes a longer period of time to accomplish than does free floating product cleanup. The same or a similar well used to recover the free floating petroleum can also be used for the cleanup of contaminated groundwater. The contaminated groundwater is pumped from the well into an oil/water separator where the water and dissolved petroleum is separated, water is taken off the bottom, put through an air stripper, and is returned to the ground through an infiltration unit. Respondent has previously found sites eligible for the reimbursement program even though those sites experienced discharges which alone would render a site ineligible for the reimbursement program. The basis for finding these sites eligible was that the ineligible discharges had become indistinguishable from the eligible discharges and were insignificant by comparison. Petitioner has complied with all procedural requirements for seeking eligibility contained in Section 376.3701, Florida Statutes. Respondent has not been denied access to the Gulf Terminal. Respondent has made no determination that there has been gross negligence in the maintenance of the petroleum storage system locate at the Gulf Terminal. Petitioner has not willfully concealed the existence of a serious discharge at the Gulf Terminal. Petitioner has not falsified any inventory records maintained with respect to the Gulf Terminal. Petitioner has not caused any intentional damage to the Gulf Terminal. The Gulf Terminal is not owned by the federal government. Petitioner's challenge to Respondent's order of ineligibility was filed in a timely manner.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is Recommended that Respondent enter a final order which determines that the subject site is eligible to participate in the reimbursement program for the cleanup of the free floating petroleum contamination, but that the subject site is ineligible to participate in the reimbursement program for the cleanup of the sludge contamination and for the cleanup of the groundwater contamination. RECOMMENDED this 20th day of July, 1990, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. CLAUDE B. ARRINGTON Hearing Officer The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 904/488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of July, 1990. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE 89-4521 The following rulings are made on the proposed findings of fact submitted by Petitioner in its Supplemental Proposed Recommended Order. The proposed findings contained in paragraphs 1-16, 18-25, 27-30, 33, 36-42, 44, 47-50, and 53-54 of the Supplemental Proposed Recommended Order are adopted in material part by the Recommended Order. The proposed findings contained in paragraphs 17, 31-32, 46, and 51-52 of the Supplemental Proposed Recommended Order are rejected as being contrary to the findings made and to the conclusions reached. The proposed findings contained in paragraph 26 of the Supplemental Proposed Recommended Order are adopted in part and are rejected in part as being unnecessary to the conclusions reached. The proposed findings contained in paragraph 34 of the Supplemental Proposed Recommended Order are rejected as not being established by the greater weight of the evidence. The testimony cited by Petitioner in support of these proposed findings do not establish the proposed findings. The proposed findings conflict with the contents of the Report of Ground-Water Quality Assessment accepted into evidence as Respondent's Exhibit 1. The proposed findings contained in paragraphs 35 , 43, and 45 of the Supplemental Proposed Recommended Order are rejected to the extent the proposed findings conflict with the findings made and the conclusions reached. The following rulings are made on the proposed findings of fact contained in Respondent's Proposed Recommended Order and in Respondent's Supplemental Proposed Recommended Order. The proposed findings of fact in paragraphs 1-5, 7-19, 23, 25-31, 33-34, 39- 52, 55-68, and 70-72 of Respondent's Proposed Recommended Order are adopted in material part. The proposed findings of fact in paragraphs 6, 20-22, 24, 32, 35-38, and 69 of Respondent's Proposed Recommended Order are rejected as being subordinate to the findings made or to the conclusions reached. The proposed findings of fact in paragraphs 53 and 54 of Respondent's Proposed Recommended Order are rejected because the testimony referred to by Respondent in support of the proposed findings relates to amounts discharged following rainfalls, not amounts discharged daily. The proposed findings of fact in paragraphs 1-14 of Respondent's Supplemental Proposed Recommended Order are rejected as being subordinate to the findings made or to the conclusions reached. COPIES FURNISHED: E. Gray Early, Esquire Assistant General Counsel Department of Environmental Regulation Twin Towers Office Building 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2400 Robert W. Wells, Esquire Ignacio E. Sanchez, Esquire KELLEY, DRYE & WARREN 2400 Miami Center 201 South Biscayne Boulevard Miami, Florida 33131 Dale H. Twachtmann, Secretary Department of Environmental Regulation Twin Towers Office Building 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2400 Daniel H. Thompson, General Counsel Department of Environmental Regulation Twin Towers Office Building 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2400
The Issue There are three legal issues which remain for determination: (1) Whether Florida Petroleum has standing in this case; (2) Whether proposed rule 62-770.220(3)(b), requiring constructive notice to residents or business tenants of real property into which the temporary point of compliance is allowed to extend is an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority within the meaning of Section 120.52(8)(c), Florida Statutes; and (3) Whether proposed rule 62-770.220(4), requiring additional constructive notice of the status of site rehabilitation is an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority within the meaning of Section 120.52(8)(c), Florida Statutes.i
Findings Of Fact On December 23, 2004, the Department published a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking regarding amendments to Florida Administrative Code Chapter 62-770. In particular, proposed rule 62-770.220(3)(b) and (4), provides: Subsequent Notice of Contamination Beyond Source Property Boundaries for Establishment of a Temporary Point of Compliance (TPOC) - Prior to the Department authorizing a temporary extension of the point of compliance beyond the boundary of the source property (i.e., the location from which the contamination originates) in conjunction with Natural Attenuation Monitoring pursuant to Rule 62-770.690, F.A.C., or Active Remediation pursuant to Rule 62-770.700, F.A.C., the PRSP shall provide the following notices: * * * (b) Constructive notice to residents [if different from the real property owner(s) notified pursuant to paragraph 62- 770.220(3)(a), F.A.C.] and business tenants of any real property into which the point of compliance is allowed to extend. Such constructive notice, which shall include the same information as required in the actual notice, shall be provided by complying with the following: * * * Status Update 5-Year Notice - When utilizing a TPOC beyond the boundary of the source property to facilitate natural attenuation monitoring or active remediation, an additional notice concerning the status of the site rehabilitation shall be similarly provided every five years to [the classes of] those persons who received notice pursuant to subsection 62-770.220(3), F.A.C., unless in the intervening time, such persons have been informed that the contamination no longer affects the property into which the point of compliance was allowed to extend. * * * (The language in brackets was added pursuant to the Department's Notice of Change and "those" was deleted.) The proposed rule implements Section 376.3071, Florida Statutes. The specific authority for the proposed rule is Sections 376.303 and 376.3071, Florida Statutes. On February 2, 2005, the Environmental Regulation Commission held a public hearing on the proposed rules and approved the proposed rules with certain amendments. On February 14, 2005, Florida Petroleum filed a Petition for Determination of Invalidity of Proposed Rule (Petition) challenging the validity of proposed amendments to proposed rule 62-770.220(3)(b) and (4). The Petition was filed pursuant to Section 120.56(1) and (2), Florida Statutes, and in each instance, Florida Petroleum alleges that the proposed rule violates Section 120.52(8)(c), Florida Statutes. On March 4, 2005, the Department published a Notice of Change regarding the above-referenced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking. With respect to the pending proceeding, the Notice of Change reflects revisions to language of proposed rule 62- 770.220(4), which are not subject to challenge. See Finding of Fact 1. On May 16, 2005, without objection, official recognition was taken of the Department's Notice of Proposed Rulemaking and Notice of Change. Florida Petroleum is a Florida voluntary, non-profit trade association, which comprise, in part, approximately 194 Marketer Members who own and/or operate petroleum storage system facilities in Florida. Florida Petroleum’s purposes include providing representation on behalf of its members in legislative and regulatory matters before the Florida legislature and agencies. Florida Petroleum routinely represents its members in rule development proceeding and other regulatory matters before the Department of Environmental Protection, Department of Revenue, and Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services. Florida Petroleum’s By-Laws state that its purposes include advancing the business concerns of its members, pooling the energy and resources of its members, and communicating with elected officials at the national, state, and local levels of government. Towards those ends, Florida Petroleum has represented it members before the Florida Legislature in matters relating to the regulation of petroleum facilities under Chapter 376, Florida Statutes, and has appeared before the Department in rulemaking proceedings involving the regulation of petroleum cleanups, and the various state restoration funding assistance programs. The subject matter of the rule at issue is within the general scope of interest and activity of Florida Petroleum, in particular, its marketer members, who own or operate facilities that store petroleum products for consumption, use, or sale. Florida Petroleum submitted oral and written comments, recommendations, objections, and proposed amendments to the Department and the Environmental Regulation Commission in connection with the rules at issue in this case. A substantial number of Florida Petroleum marketer members are "persons responsible" for assessment and remediation of one or more petroleum-contaminated sites. Florida Administrative Code Chapter 62-770, governs the remediation of petroleum-contaminated sites. A substantial number of Florida Petroleum’s marketer members are "persons responsible" for assessment and remediation of sites identified by the Department as "confirmed" or "suspected" sources of contamination beyond the boundary of the facility (i.e., "off-site contamination"). In certain instances, the Department's rules allow for the use of No Further Action with Conditions procedures in cases of petroleum contamination where applicable regulatory requirements are met because the use of conditions, such as institutional and engineering controls, may be more cost- effective than active remediation. As of February 2005, the Department estimated that it had reports of approximately 23,000 petroleum-contaminated sites. In 2004, the Department received an estimated 539 Discharge Report Forms in connection with petroleum storage facilities. As of March 2005, the Department had information indicating that approximately 2,000 "off-site" properties have been affected by contamination. Assessment Reports filed with the Department indicate that a substantial number of these sites may have been affected by discharges of petroleum or petroleum products. Petroleum discharges will in all likelihood continue to occur in the future at petroleum facilities. Petroleum discharges will in all likelihood continue to affect off-site properties in the future.
The Issue The issue to be determined in this case is whether the Notice of Intent to Issue Order Requiring Access to Property (“Access Order”) issued by the Department of Environmental Protection (“Department”) and directed to Glenda Mahaney, as the property owner, is a valid exercise of the Department’s authority.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner Glenda Mahaney is a natural person and the owner of the property identified in the Access Order. The Department is the state agency which has been granted powers and assigned duties under chapters 376 and 403, Florida Statutes, for the protection and restoration of air and water quality and to adopt rules and issue orders in furtherance of these powers and duties. Background The groundwater beneath a parcel of land adjacent to Petitioner’s property was contaminated with petroleum when the land was used in the past for auto salvage operations. Initial groundwater sampling near the border of Petitioner’s property showed groundwater contamination by gasoline constituents which exceeded Groundwater Cleanup Target Levels (“GCTLs”). In other words, the contamination was at levels that required cleanup. However, later sampling showed the concentration of contaminants had decreased below GCTLs, probably as a result of natural attenuation. The existing data suggests that any groundwater contamination beneath Petitioner’s property is probably now at a level that would not require cleanup. However, the Department issued the Access Order because the Department is not certain about the contamination beneath Petitioner’s property and because Petitioner has continually requested further investigation. Petitioner believes contamination from the auto salvage site has caused illness in a tenant and even contributed to other persons’ deaths. However, no expert testimony was received on this subject and no finding is made about whether contamination exists on Petitioner’s property which has caused illness or death. The Department’s Site Investigation Section wants access to Petitioner’s property in order to determine whether contamination has migrated beneath Petitioner’s property and, if it has, the extent and concentration of the contaminants. The Department wants to: (a) install up to five temporary groundwater monitoring wells, (b) collect groundwater samples from the wells, (c) collect a groundwater sample from Petitioner’s potable water well, and (d) remove the monitoring wells after the sampling. The Access Order includes terms related to advance notice, scheduling, and related matters. Liability Although Petitioner believes petroleum contamination is present and wants it cleaned up, she objects to the provision of the Access Order related to liability. Paragraph 9(e) of the Access Order provides: Ms. Mahaney shall not be liable for any injury, damage or loss on the property suffered by the Department, its agents, or employees which is not caused by the [sic] negligence or intentional acts. Petitioner insists that she should not be liable under any circumstances for injuries or damages suffered by Department’s agents or employees who come on her property for these purposes. She demands that the Department come onto her property “at their own risk.” At the final hearing, the Department stated that it did not intend to impose on Petitioner a level of liability different than the liability that would already be applicable under Florida law. The Department offered to amend Paragraph 9(e) of the Access Order to indicate that Petitioner’s “liability, if any, shall be determined in accordance with Florida law.” Scope of the Investigation Petitioner objects to the proposed groundwater sampling because she does not believe it is extensive enough. Petitioner also believes the Department should test for soil contamination. The Department’s expert, David Phillips, testified that the proposed monitoring well locations were selected based on the direction of groundwater flow in the area and the wells are along the likely path of migration of any contaminated groundwater from the former auto salvage site. Another Department witness, Tracy Jewsbury, testified that no soil contamination was found on the auto salvage site, so the Department has no reason to expect there would be soil contamination on Petitioner’s property that came from the auto salvage operation. The Department will use the data collected from the wells to determine if contamination is present and whether future contamination assessment and/or remediation activities are necessary.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Environmental Protection withdraw the Access Order or, alternatively, that Paragraph 9(e) of the Access Order be amended to provide that Ms. Mahaney’s potential liability, if any, shall be determined in accordance with Florida law. DONE AND ENTERED this 15th day of November, 2017, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S BRAM D. E. CANTER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us COPIES FURNISHED: Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of November, 2017. William W. Gwaltney, Esquire Department of Environmental Protection Mail Station 35 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3000 (eServed) Glenda Q. Mahaney Post Office Box 123 Mount Dora, Florida 32756 Lea Crandall, Agency Clerk Department of Environmental Protection Douglas Building, Mail Station 35 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3000 (eServed) Robert A. Williams, General Counsel Department of Environmental Protection Legal Department, Suite 1051-J Douglas Building, Mail Station 35 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3000 (eServed) Noah Valenstein, Secretary Department of Environmental Protection Douglas Building 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3000 (eServed
