The Issue The issue is whether Respondent, Townsend Seafood, violated section 760.08, Florida Statutes (2018),1/ by discriminating against Petitioner based on her race and/or her sex.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a black woman who lives in Jacksonville, Florida. Petitioner testified that she frequently waits at a bus stop adjacent to a strip mall on Townsend Boulevard in Jacksonville, across the street from a Publix Supermarket. In 2017, Townsend Seafood occupied the end of the strip mall nearest the bus stop. Townsend Seafood was a seafood market and restaurant. Petitioner testified that Ahmed Al Janaby, the apparent proprietor of Townsend Seafood,3/ repeatedly accosted her on the public walkway near the bus stop. In early May 2017, Mr. Al Janaby demanded that Petitioner remove a Publix grocery cart from the bus stop. Petitioner responded that she needed the cart because she has a chronic back disease and was unable to carry the several bags of groceries she had in the cart. Furthermore, the cart was on public property, not Mr. Al Janaby’s premises, and Petitioner knew that a Publix employee would retrieve the cart after she got on the bus. On Memorial Day, 2017, Petitioner stopped by Publix on her way home from festivities downtown. As she stood on the public walkway near the bus stop, Mr. Al Janaby came out of his premises and demanded that Petitioner move. When Petitioner declined, Mr. Al Janaby began insulting her choice of clothing, stating that she looked like a “whore.” Petitioner responded by calling Mr. Al Janaby’s mother a whore. At that point, Mr. Al Janaby spat at Petitioner. On July 4, 2017, Mr. Al Janaby again confronted Petitioner on the public walkway near the bus stop, demanding that she move. On this occasion, Mr. Al Janaby used what Petitioner called “the N-word.” When she threatened to call the police, he retreated to his business, but not before again spitting in her direction. On August 21, 2017, Mr. Al Janaby assaulted Petitioner with a broom, which resulted in Petitioner’s toe being broken. This incident also occurred on the public walkway near the bus stop. Petitioner testified that she had no choice but to use the bus stop near Mr. Al Janaby’s business. The bus stop itself was not covered, and the public walkway at the strip mall was the only place to seek refuge from the sun on hot days. Petitioner did most of her shopping in that area, and frequented one business in the same strip mall as Townsend Seafood. She did not shop or eat at Townsend Seafood. Judy Slonka, a white friend of Petitioner’s, testified that she once stood on the public walkway while waiting for the bus on a day when the heat index was over 100 degrees. Mr. Al Janaby emerged from Townsend Seafood and hit her with a broom, saying that she was obstructing the entrance to his business. Petitioner testified that since the events described by her and Ms. Slonka, Townsend Seafood has relocated from the end of the strip mall to an interior storefront. Neither woman has had a problem with Mr. Al Janaby since he moved his business away from the bus stop. Petitioner’s testimony was credible as to the facts of the events she described. Ms. Slonka’s testimony was likewise credible. As the undersigned explained to Petitioner at the conclusion of the hearing, the problem is that the events they described do not meet the statutory definition of discrimination in a “place of public accommodation,” because they occurred on the public walkway outside of Townsend Seafood. Mr. Al Janaby certainly had no right to accost these women on a public walkway, but this was a matter for local law enforcement, not the FCHR.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a final order finding that Townsend Seafood did not commit an act of public accommodation discrimination against Petitioner, Shirley P. Williams, and dismissing the Petition for Relief filed in this case. DONE AND ENTERED this 13th day of July, 2018, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LAWRENCE P. STEVENSON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of July, 2018.
The Issue The issues in this case are, one, whether Respondent unlawfully discriminated against Petitioner on the basis of her alleged handicap in violation of the Florida Fair Housing Act; and, two, whether Respondent subjected Petitioner to acts of coercion or retaliation as a result of Petitioner's exercise, or attempted exercise, of a protected housing right.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner Maria Thornhill ("Thornhill") owns and lives in a unit in the Admiral Farragut Condominium Apartments. Respondent Admiral Farragut Condominium Association, Inc. ("AFCA"), manages the property of which Thornhill's condominium is a part. This case continues a dispute between Thornhill and AFCA which began in 1997, when Thornhill——without first securing AFCA's permission——installed three wooden steps leading from her rear balcony down to a patio located about 30 inches below. AFCA disapproved of the steps and directed Thornhill to remove them, which was done long ago. In the past, Thornhill has alleged, among other things, that AFCA and its individual directors unlawfully discriminated against her in denying her many requests to reinstall the steps, which she claims are needed as a reasonable accommodation for her handicap.2 Consequently, the parties have been pitted against each other for years in one legal proceeding after another, in various forums including DOAH. Thornhill has lost many battles in this protracted litigation——and consequently been ordered to pay tens of thousands of dollars in sanctions, court costs, and attorney's fees. Still, she presses on. In this case, Thornhill argues, as she has for more than a decade, that she needs to attach steps to her rear balcony because she is physically unable to traverse the 30 inches which separate the balcony from the ground and hence would be trapped if a fire were to block both of the unit's two doors to the outside. Not for the first time, Thornhill alleges here that AFCA discriminated against her on the basis of handicap when it denied her request(s), the most recent of which was made in January 2004, for approval of the steps. In addition to her claim involving the steps, Thornhill alleges that AFCA has discriminated or retaliated against her, in some unspecified way(s), in connection with a boat slip, which she is, evidently, "next in line" to rent, once the lease expires under which another unit owner currently enjoys the right to use the slip. Finally, Thornhill contends that, in its efforts to collect the various money judgments it has been awarded, AFCA has retaliated against her unlawfully. Determinations of Ultimate Fact With regard to the steps, Thornhill presented no evidence suggesting that such a modification is reasonable, nor any proof that installation of such steps is necessary to ameliorate the effects of her particular handicap. There is no evidence that any of AFCA's decisions concerning the boat slip were motivated in any way by discriminatory animus directed toward Thornhill. There is likewise no evidence that AFCA ever undertook to execute or otherwise enforce the judgments it has obtained against Thornhill because of discriminatory animus. In sum, there is not a shred of competent, persuasive evidence in the record, direct or circumstantial, upon which a finding of any sort of unlawful housing discrimination, coercion, or retaliation could possibly be made. Ultimately, therefore, it is determined that AFCA did not commit any prohibited act.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the FCHR enter a final order finding AFCA not liable for housing discrimination and awarding Thornhill no relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 20th day of January, 2010, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. JOHN G. VAN LANINGHAM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of January, 2010.
The Issue Whether Respondent, Eve Management, Inc./KA and KM Development, Inc., denied Petitioners full and equal enjoyment of the goods and services offered at its place of public accommodation, in violation of sections 509.092 and 760.08, Florida Statutes (2011).1/
Findings Of Fact Parties and Jurisdiction Petitioners are African Americans who reside in the State of Ohio, who visited Orlando, Florida, in June 2011 and stayed at Lake Eve Resort beginning on June 21, 2011. Respondent, Eve Management, Inc./KA and KM Development, Inc., was the owner of Lake Eve Resort, located at 12388 International Drive, Orlando, Florida, at all times relevant hereto. Each Petitioner filed a Complaint of Discrimination with the Commission as follows: Jessica Austin – July 20, 2012 Denise Austin – July 21, 2012 Tracie Austin – January 18, 2013 (Amended Complaint)2/ Bonlydia Jones – July 11, 2012 James Austin – July 31, 2012 Dionne Harrington – August 1, 2012 Esther Hall – January 28, 2013 (Amended Complaint)3/ Boniris McNeal – March 27, 2013 Summer McNeal – March 27, 2013 Derek McNeal – March 27, 2013 In each Complaint, the Petitioner alleges that the most recent date of discrimination is June 22, 2011. On June 21, 2012, Petitioners Esther Hall, Summer McNeal, Boniris McNeal, Derek McNeal, and Dionne Harrington, each filed a Technical Assistance Questionnaire (TAQ) with the Commission. Each TAQ is signed by the named Petitioner, is stamped received by the Commission on June 21, 2012, and contains the specific facts alleged to be an act of discrimination in the provision of public accommodation by Respondent. Allegations of Discrimination On or about May 23, 2011, Petitioner, Boniris McNeal, entered into a Standard Group Contract with Lake Eve Resort (the Resort) to reserve 15 Resort rooms for five nights at a discounted group rate beginning June 21, 2011.4/ The rooms were to accommodate approximately 55 members of her extended family on the occasion of the Boss/Williams/Harris family reunion. Petitioners traveled from Ohio to Orlando via charter bus, arriving at the Resort on the evening of June 21, 2011. Erika Bell, a relative of Petitioners, drove a rental car from Ohio to Orlando. She did not arrive in Orlando until June 22, 2011. Petitioners checked in to the Resort without incident. However, one family member, John Harris, was informed that the three-bedroom suite he had reserved for his family was not available due to a mistake in reservations. He was offered two two-bedroom suites to accommodate his family. Petitioner, Boniris McNeal, dined off-property on the evening of June 21, 2011, to celebrate her wedding anniversary. Petitioner, Bonlydia Jones, left the Resort property shortly after check-in to shop for groceries. Petitioners, Dionne Harrington and Esther Hall, were very tired after the long bus trip and went to bed early on June 21, 2011. Petitioner, Denise Austin, arrived in Orlando with the family on June 21, 2011. On the morning of June 22, 2011, Ms. Jones received a call from Mr. Harris, informing her that the Resort management wanted to speak with them about his room. That morning, Ms. Jones and Mr. Harris met with two members of Resort management, Amanda Simon and Marie Silbe. Mr. Harris was informed that he needed to change rooms to a three-bedroom suite, the accommodation he had reserved, which had become available. Mr. Harris disputed that he had to change rooms and argued that he was told at check-in the prior evening he would not have to move from the two two-bedroom suites he was offered when his preferred three-bedroom suite was not available. After some discussion, it was agreed that Mr. Harris would move his family to an available three-bedroom suite. The Resort provided an employee to assist with the move. Following the meeting with management, Ms. Jones went to the pool, along with Ms. Harrington and other members of the family. After a period of time which was not established at hearing, Mary Hall, one of Ms. Harrington’s relatives, came to the pool and informed Ms. Harrington that the family was being evicted from the Resort. Ms. Harrington left the pool and entered the lobby, where she observed police officers and members of Resort management. She approached a member of management and was informed that she and her family were being evicted from the Resort and must be off the property within an hour. Ms. Harrington left the lobby and returned to her room, where her mother, Ms. Hall was sleeping. Ms. Harrington informed Ms. Hall that the family was being evicted from the Resort and instructed Ms. Hall to pack her belongings. Ms. Jones’ cousin, Denise Strickland, came to the pool and informed her that the family was being evicted from the Resort. Ms. Jones entered the lobby where she was approached by a member of management, who introduced herself as the general manager and informed her that the family was being evicted. Ms. Jones requested a reason, but was informed by a police officer that the owners did not have to give a reason. In the lobby, Ms. Jones observed that an African- American male was stopped by police and asked whether he was with the Boss/Williams/Harris reunion. He was not a family member. Ms. Jones observed that no Caucasian guests were approached in the lobby by management or the police. Ms. Austin was on a trolley to lunch off-property on June 22, 2011, when she received a call from her cousin, Ms. Strickland. Ms. Strickland informed Ms. Austin that the family was being evicted from the Resort and she needed to return to pack her things. Ms. Austin returned to the property, where she was escorted to her room by a security guard and asked to pack her belongings. Ms. McNeal was en route to rent a car and buy groceries on June 22, 2011, when she received a call from Ms. Strickland informing her that the family was being evicted and that she needed to return to the Resort to pack her belongings. Upon her arrival at the Resort, Ms. McNeal entered the lobby. There, she was approached by Resort staff, asked whether she was with the Boss/Williams/Harris reunion, and informed that the Resort could not honor the reservations and the family was being evicted. Ms. McNeal observed that Caucasian guests entering the lobby were not approached by either the police or Resort management. Ms. McNeal was escorted to her room by both a police officer and a member of management and instructed to be out of the room within 30 minutes. Ms. McNeal inquired why they were being evicted, but was told by a police officer that the Resort was not required to give a reason. Erika Bell received a call from her mother, Ms. Austin, while en route to the Resort on June 22, 2011. Ms. Austin informed Ms. Bell that the family was being evicted from the Resort and asked her to call the Resort and cancel her reservation. Respondent gave no reason for evicting Petitioners from the property. Respondent refunded Petitioners’ money.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a final order: Finding that Respondent, Eve Management, Inc./KA and KM Development, Inc., committed an act of public accommodation discrimination in violation of sections 509.092 and 760.08, Florida Statutes (2011), against Petitioners Jessica Austin, Denise Austin, Tracie Austin, James Austin, Bonlydia Jones, Esther Hall, Boniris McNeal, Derek McNeal, Summer McNeal, and Dionne Harrington; and Prohibiting any future acts of discrimination by Respondent. DONE AND ENTERED this 28th day of May, 2014, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S SUZANNE VAN WYK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of May, 2014.
The Issue The issues in this matter are whether Respondent, Walmart, violated section 760.08, Florida Statutes, by discriminating against Petitioner based on his race; and, if so, the relief to which Petitioner is entitled.
Findings Of Fact On March 6, 2017, Petitioner, who is Hispanic, visited the Walmart in his neighborhood in Tampa (store #5255) to make several purchases. Petitioner is a frequent customer of the store, shopping there every two to three days. After selecting several items and placing them in a cart, Petitioner proceeded to the self-checkout area. When he arrived at the self-checkout section, Petitioner found all the registers in use by other customers. So, he waited for an opening. As he stood with his cart, Petitioner observed a Walmart employee, Dipti Vora, stationed in the self-checkout area. Ms. Vora was working as the self-checkout “hostess” to assist and monitor the customers using the self-checkout registers. Petitioner was familiar with Ms. Vora who he had seen on previous visits. Petitioner recalled that they exchanged pleasantries while he waited for a free register. While he waited, Petitioner noticed another Walmart employee, who he later learned was Sara Revelia, walk up to Ms. Vora. As Ms. Revelia approached Ms. Vora, Petitioner saw her raise a finger to her eye, and then point her finger at him. Petitioner also observed Ms. Revelia give him a nasty look. Petitioner interpreted Ms. Revelia’s actions as instructing Ms. Vora to “keep an eye on him” because she suspected that he might steal something. Petitioner believed that Ms. Revelia, who appeared to be white, pointed at him solely because he is Hispanic. Petitioner expressed that he did not see Ms. Revelia point at any other customers. Petitioner particularly noted that Ms. Revelia did not point to any other white customers who were waiting in the self-checkout area. Petitioner was so upset by Ms. Revelia’s presumptuous gesture that he abandoned his cart in the self-checkout area and left the store without purchasing his items. Petitioner declared that he has never returned to that Walmart store and has no plans to ever shop there again. Petitioner was very embarrassed and disturbed by Ms. Revelia’s action singling him out to be watched. Petitioner is convinced that Ms. Revelia racially profiled him because he is Hispanic. Based on her demeanor, Petitioner declared that Ms. Revelia acted in a very arrogant and authoritative manner and prejudged his character. When questioned by Walmart at the final hearing, Petitioner conceded that he did not hear any words pass between Ms. Vora and Ms. Revelia. Nor did any Walmart employee (including Ms. Revelia) accuse him of stealing or instruct him to leave Walmart. However, Petitioner firmly believes that Ms. Revelia perceived him as a thief or a bad person who might not pay for the items he was carrying. Petitioner asserts that Ms. Revelia’s action was an “injustice,” and Walmart must take responsibility for its employee’s actions. Walmart denied that it failed to allow Petitioner access to its facility or services or took any actions based on his race. Walmart further asserts that at no time did it ask Petitioner to leave or refuse to sell him the items he wished to purchase. Walmart specifically refuted Petitioner’s allegation that an employee suspected that he was going to steal from the store or singled him out as a thief. Walmart presented the testimony of Ms. Vora, the employee who was assigned as the “hostess” in the self-checkout area at the time of Petitioner’s visit. Ms. Vora had worked in store #5255 for approximately 12 years. She was familiar with Petitioner and had regularly seen him shopping at that Tampa Walmart. Ms. Vora recalled the incident involving Petitioner. Ms. Vora also remembered the encounter with Ms. Revelia, the employee who allegedly pointed at Petitioner. Ms. Vora testified that while Petitioner was standing in the self-checkout area, another customer with a baby stroller was also waiting to use a register. Just at that moment, Ms. Revelia walked up to her and alerted her to watch the woman with the stroller. Ms. Vora explained that the woman had placed several items in the open compartment below the stroller seat. Ms. Revelia was cautioning her to ensure that the woman did not neglect to scan all the items she brought to the register, specifically including the items in the lower section of the stroller. Ms. Vora stated that Ms. Revelia was not pointing at Petitioner. Instead, she was signaling Ms. Vora to monitor the woman pushing the stroller, who was standing just ahead of Petitioner. Ms. Vora also recalled that, after Ms. Revelia walked away, Petitioner approached her and asked who was the employee who had just talked to her. At that time, Ms. Vora did not know Ms. Revelia’s name because she was visiting from another store. Ms. Revelia testified at the final hearing. Ms. Revelia is an Asset Protection Manager for Walmart. She principally works in a Walmart store in Largo, Florida. However, she does visit the Tampa store regularly as part of her area of assignment. Ms. Revelia explained that her job duties include overseeing inventory preparation and compliance at Walmart facilities, as well as assisting with the detection and apprehension of shoplifters. She was specifically trained on how to “shrink” financial losses at Walmart facilities due to theft. Ms. Revelia relayed that she was instructed to constantly watch for any suspicious behavior from Walmart customers. Ms. Revelia recalled working at the Walmart Petitioner visited on March 6, 2017. However, she did not remember talking to Ms. Vora, pointing at a customer, or seeing Petitioner while he waited in the self-checkout area. Instead, Ms. Revelia conveyed that she was primarily focused on helping store #5255 prepare for its annual inventory. Although she did not recall specifically pointing out a customer to Ms. Vora, Ms. Revelia described suspicious situations she frequently sees that cause her alarm. Such activity includes customers who wear heavy jackets in summer or carry open backpacks. In addition (and particularly relevant to this matter), Ms. Revelia is also cognizant of customers who bring in strollers that are equipped with a compartment or shelf under the baby seat. Ms. Revelia expounded that, in her experience as an asset manager, she has personally witnessed customers place goods and items in a stroller’s “undercart” and forget (either intentionally or unintentionally) to scan them at the self- checkout register. Despite not remembering the incident involving Petitioner, Ms. Revelia offered that, if she did walk by the self-checkout area and saw a stroller with items stored under the seat, she very well may have instructed the hostess to “keep an eye on” that customer. Conversely, Ms. Revelia denied that she would point at any Walmart customer simply because he or she was Hispanic. Neither would she automatically suspect that a customer would steal from Walmart because of their race. Ms. Revelia adamantly denied that she took any discriminatory action against Petitioner. As additional evidence that Walmart did not discriminate against Petitioner, Elsie Rodriguez, the store manager for store #5255, testified that approximately 70 percent of the customers who shop at her store are Hispanic. Furthermore, in light of the populace it serves, store #5255 specifically offers Spanish based foods and other products catering to the Latino community. Consequently, Ms. Rodriguez asserted that it would not make sense for Walmart, or any of its employees, to discriminate against its Hispanic customers. Walmart also maintains a Statement of Ethics and Discrimination, as well as a Harassment Prevention Policy, which prohibit discrimination by its employees based on race and national origin. Ms. Rodriguez also testified that store #5255 does not hold itself out as, nor does it include, a cafeteria, dining facility, or restaurant. Ms. Rodriguez explained that store #5255 is a “Neighborhood Market.” The store does not offer food principally for consumption on its premises. Neither does it contain an area where customers can sit and dine. Instead, all the facility sells is groceries. In response to the testimony from the Walmart witnesses, Petitioner insisted that the Walmart employees were not telling the truth. Petitioner vigorously maintained that Ms. Revelia was pointing at him and not another customer with a baby stroller. Based on the competent substantial evidence in the record, the preponderance of the evidence does not establish that Walmart discriminated against Petitioner based on his race. Accordingly, Petitioner failed to meet his burden of proving that he was denied full and equal enjoyment of goods or services in a place of public accommodation in violation of the FCRA.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a final order finding that Respondent, Walmart, is not a “place of public accommodation” under the facts of this case; and, even if it were, that Respondent did not unlawfully discriminate against Petitioner’s race. Petitioner’s Petition for Relief should be dismissed. DONE AND ENTERED this 10th day of July, 2018, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S J. BRUCE CULPEPPER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of July, 2018.
Findings Of Fact On or about January 26, 1990, the Respondent sought competitive bids through Invitation to Bid Number 590:2123 for the lease of certain office space in Plant City, Florida. The bid opening occurred on March 1, 1990, and Intervenor was determined to have submitted the lowest responsive bid. In addition to Intervenor's bid, bids were received from Petitioner and Walden Investment Company, which is not a party in this case. On or about May 8, 1990, the Respondent notified all bidders of its intent to award this lease to Intervenor, and on May 10, 1990, the Petitioner filed its notice of protest concerning this award claiming that Intervenor's bid was not responsive to the parking requirements in the Invitation to Bid. Section 15 of the Invitation to Bid requires that a minimum of 65 parking spaces be provided, and that a minimum of 15 of these spaces must be full size and a minimum of 5 must meet ANSI standards for handicapped parking spaces. No definition or specification for full size parking spaces is provided in the Invitation to Bid. Petitioner did not establish that there is a commonly accepted standard for full size parking spaces in the construction or development industry, or that the Respondent uniformly requires all full size parking spaces to be of certain dimensions. The Intervenor certified in its bid that it would meet the parking space requirement of the Invitation to Bid. The Respondent does not require detailed site plans which would depict actual dimensions for each parking space to be submitted with each bid. Rather, Section 10(d) of the Invitation to Bid requires only a line drawing "drawn roughly to scale", and specifies that final site layout will be a "joint effort between the department and the lessor so as to best meet the needs of the department". The Intervenor did submit a rough line drawing with its bid which depicts 71 parking spaces. The Respondent routinely accepts a bidder's certification that it will meet the parking requirements in an Invitation to Bid, and if those requirements ultimately are not met, the Respondent may proceed against the performance bond which the successful bidder is required to post. The Petitioner presented evidence that there is not enough room on Intervenor's site to provide 15 full size parking spaces measuring 10 feet wide by 20 feet long. However, there is nothing in the Invitation to Bid, or in the City of Plant City's Code which requires full size parking spaces of this dimension. Based upon its certification and the inclusion of a rough line drawing showing space for parking in excess of the requirements in the Invitation to Bid on this site,, it is found that Intervenor was responsive to the parking requirements in this Invitation to Bid.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is recommended that the Respondent enter a Final Order dismissing Petitioner's protest and awarding Lease Number 590:2123 to Intervenor. DONE AND ENTERED this 3rd day of August, 1990, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DONALD D. CONN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of August, 1990. COPIES FURNISHED: Jack Farley, Esquire District 6 Legal Office 4000 West Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., Blvd. 5th Floor, Room 520 Tampa, FL 33614-9990 Alan Taylor P. O. Box 7077 Winter Haven, FL 33883-7077 Richard C. Langford, Esquire P. O. Box 3706 St. Petersburg, FL 33731-3706 R. S. Power, Agency Clerk 1323 Winewood Blvd. Building One, Room 407 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0700 John Miller, General Counsel 1323 Winewood Blvd. Tallahassee, FL 32399-0700
The Issue Whether Petitioner has been the subject of discrimination in a public accommodation due to a disability.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Cari Anderson, is a veteran of the Iraq War and has Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD). Her PTSD is sufficiently severe so as to constitute a disability under Florida law. Because of her disability, Petitioner keeps with her two small poodle-type service dogs that help her remain calm. Petitioner also trains such service dogs. On April 5, 2009, Petitioner was visiting her friend, Michelle Clas-Williams, at her home in Panama City, Florida. During her visit at around 2:00 in the morning, Petitioner, along with her friend, and her friend’s daughter, decided to go shopping at the Wal-Mart store in Callaway, Florida. Petitioner brought along her two service animals to the Callaway Wal-Mart. Neither of the dogs wore any identification as service dogs; and therefore, could not be readily identified as such. Upon arrival, Petitioner and her friend obtained separate shopping carts. Petitioner placed her two dogs on the bottom of the shopping cart, on a towel. Petitioner and her shopping companions entered the main part of the store. No one from Wal-Mart stopped Petitioner from entering the store. Both she and her friend spent the next 20- 30 minutes shopping throughout the Callaway Wal-Mart store where surveillance cameras intermittently monitored their passage through the store. None of the surveillance footage has sound. As a consequence, the surveillance footage of Petitioner’s visit does not add support for either party’s version of the events in this case. During her time in the store, Petitioner walked freely throughout the aisles and was not prevented from shopping at the Callaway store. On at least two separate occasions, individual employees politely informed Petitioner that she could not have her dogs in the store. However, on each such occasion Petitioner explained to the employee that her dogs were service animals. The employees responded positively and Petitioner continued her shopping. There was no evidence that these employees communicated with Wal-Mart management. As Petitioner and her friend approached the checkout lines, the Customer Service Manager, Monica Amis, noticed Petitioner’s two dogs in her shopping cart. Ms. Amis walked up to Petitioner and said, “Ma’am those dogs cannot be in the store.” Before Ms. Amis could ask anything else, including whether the dogs were service animals, Petitioner erupted into a loud vocal tirade stating among other things, “You don’t tell me what the fuck to do. I can do what I want. I’m sick of Wal- Mart’s shit you think you own the world.” Ms. Amis could not get a word in and could not calm Petitioner down. Petitioner demanded the store manager be called and demanded that some papers which “proved” her dogs were service animals be looked at. Within minutes of first approaching Petitioner, Ms. Amis instructed the cashier to process Petitioner’s purchases. She then walked away and called the store manager. The better evidence did not demonstrate that Ms. Amis was rude or profane with Petitioner. The evidence did demonstrate that Ms. Amis’ actions in approaching and interacting with Petitioner were clearly reasonable and did not constitute discrimination against Petitioner. Shortly after Ms. Amis’ call, the store manager, Gary Wright, approached the front of the store. He could hear Petitioner yelling. He was very concerned about her behavior and the disturbance she was making. He approached her at the cash register. Mr. Wright asked Petitioner to calm down so he could speak with her. As she was paying for her items, Petitioner continued to yell loudly and use profanity. She was permitted to complete her transaction and no one from Wal-Mart interfered with her ability to do so. However, Petitioner remained belligerent, loud, and profane. Petitioner believed that her rights were being violated and that Ms. Amis and the manager could not tell her that her dogs could not accompany her in the store and if they inquired about them, they could only ask one specific question about whether her dogs were service dogs under an alleged agreement Wal-Mart recently entered into with the federal government. Petitioner’s beliefs about the meaning and scope of this alleged agreement, which was not introduced into evidence, is simply misplaced and does not establish any of the actions by either Ms. Amis or Mr. Wright as discriminatory acts. Like Ms. Amis, Mr. Wright could not get a word in. He understandably became exasperated with Petitioner and the conversation devolved with Mr. Wright telling Petitioner on at least two occasions to “shut up” and “shut the fuck up.” He also told her that he did not think poodles were service animals, but old-lady dogs. In the meantime, Petitioner was yelling about her papers and that Mr. Wright needed to look at them. Mr. Wright simply wanted Petitioner to leave the store. He also told her that he had no problems with the service dogs being in the store, but if she did not calm down, he would have to call the Bay County Sherriff’s office. Given Petitioner’s loud and irrational behavior it was reasonable for Mr. Wright to ask Petitioner to leave the store. When Mr. Wright informed Petitioner that he was calling the Sheriff’s office, Petitioner stated that she was glad they were coming. She wanted their assistance. Mr. Wright walked away and called the Sheriff’s office. There was no evidence that Mr. Wright made a false report to the Sheriff’s office. Additionally, Petitioner called 911 to confirm that an officer was en-route. Likewise, given Petitioner’s continued behavior and her assent to the call, it was reasonable for Mr. Wright to call the Sheriff’s office. Notably, the entire interaction between Petitioner, Ms. Amis, and Mr. Wright took less than 10 minutes. After completing her purchase, Petitioner remained at the checkout lane while her friend, who was in another checkout lane, paid for her merchandise. Petitioner continued yelling, using profanity, and causing a disturbance. Then Deputy, now Investigator, VanStrander arrived outside of Wal-Mart’s east entrance doors and was met by Mr. Wright. Mr. Wright informed Investigator VanStrander that Petitioner was making a scene and being very loud and disruptive. Indeed, Investigator VanStrander could hear Petitioner yelling while he was outside the store and she was inside the store. Mr. Wright did not ask the officer to arrest Petitioner. Once both Petitioner and her friend had completed their purchases, they began walking toward the exit, with Petitioner continuing to yell. Investigator VanStrander entered the store and was immediately approached by Petitioner who was screaming and “cussing like a sailor.” Investigator VanStrander instructed Petitioner that she needed to leave the store. He also informed her that she would be arrested if she did not comply. Petitioner did not immediately follow his instructions. Instead she attempted to argue her position and show the officer her papers. He again instructed her to leave and motioned to the door. He did not block the doorway as Petitioner claimed that he did. She again did not immediately comply and within seconds the officer arrested Petitioner. With little to no struggle she was handcuffed, placed into custody, and charged with disorderly conduct and resisting an officer without violence. Petitioner’s interaction with the deputy while in the store lasted less than 5 minutes. Importantly, the evidence clearly demonstrated that the decision to arrest Petitioner was made by Investigator VanStrander. Respondent was not responsible for the actions of the officer or for Petitioner's behavior which led to her arrest. Given these facts, the Petition for Relief should be dismissed.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing Petitioner’s Complaint of Discrimination and Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 1st day of November, 2011, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DIANE CLEAVINGER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of November, 2011. COPIES FURNISHED: Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Amy Harrison Turci, Esquire Ford & Harrison LLP 225 Water Street, Suite 710 Jacksonville, Florida 32202 Cari Anderson Post Office Box 371792 Las Vegas, Nevada 89137 Larry Kranert, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue Whether Respondent committed the violation alleged in Petitioner's Public Accommodations Complaint of Discrimination and, if so, what relief should the Florida Commission on Human Relations grant Petitioner.
Findings Of Fact Based on the evidence adduced at hearing, and the record as a whole, the following findings of fact are made: Petitioner is a black woman. On March 27, 2007, Petitioner went shopping at the Wal- Mart Supercenter located at 9300 Northwest 77th Avenue in Hialeah Gardens, Florida (Store). This was Petitioner's "favorite store." She had shopped there every other week for the previous four or five years and had had a positive "overall [shopping] experience." At no time had she ever had any problem making purchases at the Store. At around 5:00 p.m. on March 27, 2007, Petitioner entered the Store's electronics department to look for two black ink cartridges for her printer. In her cart were several items she had picked up elsewhere in the store (for which she had not yet paid). Because the cartridges she needed were located in a locked display cabinet, Petitioner went to the counter at the electronics department to ask for assistance. Maria Castillo was the cashier behind the counter. She was engaged in a "casual conversation," punctuated with laughter, with one of the Store's loss prevention officers, Jessy Fair, as she was taking care of a customer, Carlos Fojo, a non-black Hispanic off-duty lieutenant with the Hialeah Gardens Police Department. Lieutenant Fojo was paying for a DVD he intended to use as a "training video." The DVD had been in a locked display cabinet in the electronics department. A sales associate had taken the DVD out of the cabinet for Lieutenant Fojo. It was Store policy to require customers seeking to purchase items in locked display cabinets in the electronics department to immediately pay for these items at the electronics department register. Lieutenant Fojo was making his purchase in accordance with that policy. Two Store sales associates, Carlos Espino and Sigfredo Gomez, were near the counter in the electronics department when Petitioner requested assistance. In response to Petitioner's request for help, Mr. Espino and Mr. Gomez went to the locked display cabinet to get two black ink cartridges for Petitioner, with Petitioner following behind them. Ms. Castillo and Mr. Fair remained at the counter and continued their lighthearted conversation, as Ms. Castillo was finishing up with Lieutenant Fojo. Petitioner was offended by Ms. Castillo's and Mr. Fair's laughter. She thought that they were laughing at her because she was black (despite her not having any reasonable basis to support such a belief). She turned around and loudly and angrily asked Ms. Castillo and Mr. Fair what they were laughing at. After receiving no response to her inquiry, she continued on her way behind Mr. Espino and Mr. Gomez to the display cabinet containing the ink cartridges. When Mr. Espino arrived at the cabinet, he unlocked and opened the cabinet door and removed two black ink cartridges, which he handed to Mr. Gomez. Petitioner took the cartridges from Mr. Gomez and placed them in her shopping cart. Mr. Espino tried to explain to Petitioner that, in accordance with Store policy, before doing anything else, she needed to go the register in the electronics department and pay for the ink cartridges. Petitioner responded by yelling at Mr. Espino and Mr. Gomez. In a raised voice, she proclaimed that she was "no thief" and "not going to steal" the ink cartridges, and she "repeated[ly]" accused Mr. Espino and Mr. Gomez of being "racist." Instead of going directly to the register in the electronics department to pay for the cartridges (as she had been instructed to do by Mr. Espino), Petitioner took her shopping cart containing the ink cartridges and the other items she intended to purchase and "proceeded over to the CD aisle" in the electronics department. Mr. Espino "attempt[ed] to speak to her," but his efforts were thwarted by Petitioner's "screaming at [him and Mr. Gomez as to] how racist they were." Lieutenant Fojo, who had completed his DVD purchase, heard the commotion and walked over to the "CD aisle" to investigate. When he got there, he approached Petitioner and asked her, "What's the problem?" She responded, "Oh, I see you too are racist and I see where this is coming from." Lieutenant Fojo went on to tell Petitioner the same thing that Mr. Espino had: that the ink cartridges had to be taken to the register in the electronics department and paid for immediately ("just like he had paid for his [DVD]"). Petitioner was defiant. She told Lieutenant Fojo that she would eventually pay for the cartridges, but she was "still shopping." Moreover, she continued her rant that Lieutenant Fojo and the Store employees were "racist." "[C]ustomers in the area were gathering" to observe the disturbance. To avoid a further "disrupt[ion] [of] the normal business affairs of the [S]tore," Lieutenant Fojo directed Petitioner to leave and escorted her outside the Store. In taking such action, Lieutenant Fojo was acting solely in his capacity as a law enforcement officer with the Hialeah Gardens Police Department. Once outside the Store, Lieutenant Fojo left Petitioner to go to his vehicle. Petitioner telephoned the Hialeah Gardens Police Department to complain about the treatment she had just received and waited outside the Store for a police officer to arrive in response to her call. Officer Lawrence Perez of the Hialeah Gardens Police Department responded to the scene and met Petitioner outside the Store. After conducting an investigation of the matter, Officer Perez issued Petitioner a trespass warning, directing that she not return to the Store. At no time subsequent to the issuance of this trespass warning has Petitioner returned the Store (although she has shopped at other Wal-Mart stores in the area). While Petitioner has been deprived of the opportunity to shop at the Store, it has been because of action taken, not by any Store employee, but by Hialeah Gardens law enforcement personnel. Moreover, there has been no showing that Petitioner's race was a motivating factor in the taking of this action.3
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the FCHR issue a final order dismissing Petitioner's Public Accommodations Complaint of Discrimination. DONE AND ENTERED this 10th day of September, 2008, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S STUART M. LERNER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of September, 2006.
The Issue The issue for determination is whether Respondent discriminated against Petitioner in violation of the Fair Housing Act by failing to make reasonable accommodations for Petitioner's handicap.
Findings Of Fact Mr. Botero has a Ph.D. in engineering. Due to a medical mishap, involving the administration of anesthesia, Mr. Botero suffers from narcolepsy. His narcolepsy is controlled by medication. Narcolepsy is a medical disorder which causes Mr. Botero to have sudden and uncontrollable, though brief, attacks of deep sleep, and he becomes unintelligible and unable to move. His condition gives him a warning before an attack occurs, and he has a small window period of time, approximately five to seven minutes, of reaction time. A narcolepsy attack for him lasts approximately three to four minutes. Mr. Botero is handicapped. Even though Mr. Botero suffers from narcolepsy, he has been licensed by the State of Florida to drive a vehicle and has a handicap parking permit. If his disorder presents itself when he is operating a vehicle, the small window period of reaction time allows him to maneuver his vehicle to a safe spot and park before the narcolepsy attack occurs.1 If he is not driving, but is parked when his disorder presents itself, Mr. Botero needs additional space to exit his vehicle or for someone to remove him from his vehicle. Calusa Club was constructed in 1980 and consists of several condominium buildings. Each condominium building has a homeowner’s association and is also referred to as a community. The developer of Calusa Club assigned reserved parking spaces for each condominium unit. As a result, each condominium owner is assigned a reserved parking space. Some handicap parking spaces are reserved and some are available on a first- come, first-serve basis. Only testimony, not written documentation, was presented at hearing evidencing the assignment of reserved parking spaces. The undersigned finds this testimony credible. Calusa Club is managed by Miami Management, Inc. Miami Management does not have the authority to change the reserved parking spaces assigned to condominium units, including reserved handicapped parking spaces, or to add additional reserved parking spaces for a condominium unit. Only testimony, not written documentation, was presented at hearing evidencing the assignment of reserved parking spaces. The undersigned finds this testimony credible. In 1997, Mr. Botero purchased a condominium unit at Calusa Club, unit number E-201. Mr. Botero's condominium association is Calusa Club Condominium D North Association, Inc. His assigned reserved parking space was number 9 (Reserved Space Number 9). At that time, he informed Miami Management, through its property manager for Calusa Club, Kathie Roder,2 that he was handicapped and needed a handicapped parking space close to his community. No reserved handicapped parking spaces were located at Mr. Botero's community. Ms. Roder informed Mr. Botero that no reserved handicapped parking space was available in his community; however, she gave Mr. Botero a non-reserved parking space in his community. Based on the testimony of the Miami Management's current assistant property manager for Calusa Club, Michelle Lopez, which is found to be credible, an inference is made that the parking space given to Mr. Botero by Ms. Roder was a guest parking space. To Mr. Botero, the parking space given to him was too small dimensionally to accommodate his condition. When he opened the door on the driver's side of his vehicle, Mr. Botero was unable to open the door fully and, therefore, the parking space given to him failed to provide sufficient space dimensionally for him to exit his vehicle or for someone to remove him from his vehicle. He subsequently requested another parking space.3 Mr. Botero was given another non-reserved parking space, but he again complained that it too was too small dimensionally for the same reason as before. Based on the testimony of Ms. Lopez, which is found to be credible, an inference is made that the second parking space given to Mr. Botero by Ms. Roder was a guest parking space. After complaining a third time,4 Ms. Roder moved Mr. Botero's Reserved Space Number 9 next to the access walkway to his condominium building, which is the current space complained of. Reserved Space Number 9 measures 78 inches in width; immediately to its left is another reserved space assigned to another condominium unit; immediately to its right is the access walkway to Mr. Botero's condominium building; and immediately to the right of the access walkway is a guest parking space. The width of the Reserved Space Number 9 is the same width of the other parking spaces of his condominium building. Mr. Botero complains that Reserved Space Number 9, even though it is located next to the access walkway to his unit, is also too small dimensionally to accommodate his condition in that, if an attack occurs in the parking space and if a vehicle is in the parking space next to him, insufficient space exists for him to exit his vehicle or for someone to remove him from his vehicle. Furthermore, Mr. Botero is unable to back into Reserved Space Number 9 because he is fearful of hitting another vehicle, an object, or someone else if he has a narcolepsy attack while he is backing-up. If he could back-in, the position of his vehicle would give him sufficient space to exit his vehicle or for someone to remove him because the driver's side of his vehicle would be next to the access walkway. Moreover, Mr. Botero would back into Reserved Space Number 9 if it was larger dimensionally because he would then not be fearful of hitting another vehicle, an object, or someone else. After complaining to Ms. Roder, regarding the re- location of Reserved Space Number 9, she advised him in a letter dated May 5, 2004, among other things, that Calusa Club had provided him a reasonable accommodation and that nothing else could be done. The letter provided, in pertinent part, as follows: Please be advised that we have contacted our attorney regarding providing you with a Handicapped parking place. We are sorry to report that because our community was built in the early 1980's, we are only required to provide you with "reasonable accommodation". We have done so by moving your reserved space #9 next to your access walkway. We would not be able to place a handicapped space anywhere near that location. No evidence was presented to demonstrate that Calusa Club incurred any expense moving Reserved Space Number 9 to the guest parking space to the left of the access walkway. Therefore, an inference is drawn and a finding is made that Calusa Club incurred no expense moving Reserved Space Number 9 to the guest parking space to the left of the access walkway. No reserved handicapped parking space was or is available at Mr. Botero's community; they were and are all assigned. In order to widen Reserved Space Number 9, Miami Management would have to take away the reserved parking space assigned to the owner of another condominium unit. Ms. Lopez testified that Miami Management could not take away a reserved parking space assigned to the owner of another condominium unit. The undersigned finds her testimony to be credible. Ms. Lopez also testified that Miami Management could not "change" a reserved parking space assigned to the owner of a condominium unit. She later testified that Miami Management could not "take away" a reserved parking space assigned to the owner of a condominium unit. No documentation was presented at hearing evidencing Miami Management's lack of authority to "change" or to "take away" a reserved parking space. An inference is drawn and a finding is made that "change" and "take away" have identical meaning as used by Ms. Lopez. Mr. Botero has had narcolepsy attacks since residing at Calusa Club. His neighbors have had to remove him from his vehicle and park his vehicle in Reserved Space Number 9 for him. Around 2001, Mr. Botero deeded his condominium unit to his son, a college student. He and his son live together in the unit. Mr. Botero did not inform Calusa Club or his condominium association that he had deeded the condominium unit to his son. Mr. Botero continues to pay the maintenance and condominium association fees. Mr. Botero parks his vehicle in a guest space, while his son parks his (son's) vehicle in Reserved Space Number 9. Calusa Club learned of Mr. Botero's present arrangement with his son at hearing through Mr. Botero's testimony. Mr. Botero filed his complaint of discrimination under Florida's Fair Housing Act (Act) with the FCHR on about June 4, 2004.5
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order: Finding that Calusa Club Village, P.O.A., discriminated against Humberto Botero under Florida’s Fair Housing Act by failing and refusing to make a reasonable accommodation for his handicap; Ordering Calusa Club Village, P.O.A.,to cease the discriminatory practice; and Ordering Calusa Club Village, P.O.A., to move the reserved parking space of condominium unit number E-201 to the right of the access walkway of the condominium building. DONE AND ENTERED this 31st day of October, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ERROL H. POWELL Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of October, 2005.
