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DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, BOARD OF PHARMACY vs CHRISTOPHER STEPHEN SWITLYK, R.PH., 14-000883PL (2014)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida Feb. 24, 2014 Number: 14-000883PL Latest Update: Nov. 04, 2014

The Issue The issue in this case is whether the Respondent’s license to practice pharmacy should be revoked or otherwise disciplined based on conduct that resulted in criminal convictions and his failure to report the convictions to the Board of Pharmacy (Board), as required.

Findings Of Fact The Respondent has been a licensed pharmacist in Florida and held Florida license PS 36908 at all pertinent times, until it expired on September 30, 2013. On December 14, 2010, the Respondent was indicted in federal court in the Middle District of Florida, Case No. 8:10- CR-530-T-33AEP. On September 5, 2012, the Respondent pled guilty to one count of conspiring to violate 21 U.S.C. sections 841(a)(1), 843(a)(2), 843(a)(3), and 856(a)(1), all of which also constituted violations of 21 U.S.C. section 846, and to two counts of knowingly engaging in monetary transactions, in and affecting interstate and foreign commerce, in property of a value of greater than $10,000, which was derived from a felonious criminal conspiracy to traffick in controlled substances, in violation of 18 U.S.C. section 1957. The plea also admitted to the factual basis of the charges--namely, that the Respondent conspired to allow the pharmacy he owned and operated in Tampa, Florida, to be used by the criminal conspiracy to fill and dispense forged, and otherwise illegal, prescriptions for over a million doses of Schedule II controlled substances, mostly oxycodone. The cash proceeds of the illegal sales were treated as income of the pharmacy, and the Respondent and others participated in monetary transactions whereby the illegally- obtained cash was used to purchase cashier’s checks and other assets and to conceal the illegal source of the money. Based on his guilty pleas, the Respondent was adjudicated guilty and sentenced to 108 months in prison. The special conditions of supervision in the Judgment require the Respondent to “refrain from engaging in any employment related to dispensing prescriptions drugs either in a pharmacy, pain clinic, or other medical environment.” The Respondent’s convictions clearly were related to his practice of pharmacy. The Respondent now maintains that he should not have pled guilty and would not have done so but for the incompetence of his attorney, who advised him to enter into the plea agreement. Based on this ground and others, he has been seeking to have his convictions vacated or his sentence reduced. There is no evidence that he has been successful in altering his convictions or sentence in any way, and the evidence does not suggest that it is likely that he will succeed in accomplishing either objective. The Respondent did not report his guilty pleas to the Board in writing within 30 days. The Respondent contends that his incarceration since his arrest made it impossible for him to do so. However, the greater weight of the evidence was to the contrary. More likely, compliance with the technical requirement to report to the Board in writing was not in the forefront of his mind. The Respondent has been licensed since July 31, 2002. This is the first time action has been taken by DOH and the Board to discipline his license. The Respondent’s actions had the potential to expose numerous people to harm from the misuse and abuse of oxycodone and other controlled substances. This violated the trust placed in him by the State of Florida when he became licensed as a pharmacist. His violation of the public trust demonstrated unsound judgment and a lack of integrity. As a result, the Respondent’s professional standing among his peers was lowered. (The only direct evidence of this was the testimony of DOH’s expert witness, but this fact can be inferred from the nature of his convictions and sentence, as well as the comments of the sentencing federal judge, who viewed the Respondent’s actions as an abuse of the public trust and undeserving of a second chance to be a pharmacist.) The Respondent also contends that he should be treated leniently in this case because alcohol abuse and long-standing emotional and psychological problems were primary reasons for his actions. His contention belies the criminal convictions, which were for intentional crimes and based on voluntary guilty pleas. To the extent that these problems were contributory factors, it is commendable that the Respondent is taking them seriously, and he will benefit in the long run from continuing to seek treatment and counseling to address them. Neither the problems, in themselves, nor the start of treatment and counseling warrants lenient license discipline. The Board has guidelines for the imposition of penalties for license violations. DOH submitted Petitioner’s Exhibit 4 as evidence of the guidelines in effect at the time of the Respondent’s guilty pleas and convictions. However, the exhibit actually purports to certify the guidelines in effect at various times from January 1, 2011, until December 31, 2013. It appears from the exhibit that as of the time of the Respondent’s guilty pleas and convictions, the range of penalties for a first violation of section 456.072(1)(c), Florida Statutes (2012), for a felony conviction or guilty plea was from a year probation and a $3,000 fine to a year suspension to revocation and a $5,000 fine. Fla. Admin. Code R. 64B16-30.001(o)3. (revised Nov. 29, 2006). The range of penalties for a first violation of section 456.072(1)(x), Florida Statutes (2012), is from a $1,000 fine to a $2,500 fine and a year probation. Fla. Admin. Code R. 64B16-30.001(o)(18) (revised Nov. 29, 2006). The guidelines in effect at that time also included aggravating circumstances that would justify deviating above the guidelines and mitigating circumstances that would justify deviating below the guidelines. The aggravating circumstances included: a history of previous violations; in the case of negligent acts, the magnitude and scope of the damage or potential damage inflicted on a patient or the general public; and violations of professional practice acts in other jurisdictions. The mitigating circumstances included: in the case of negligent acts, the minor nature of the damage or potential damage to the patient’s or the general public’s health, safety, and welfare; the lack of previous discipline; restitution of monetary damage suffered by the patient; the licensee’s professional standing among his peers; the steps taken by the licensee to ensure the non-occurrence of similar violations in the future, including continuing education; and the degree of financial hardship incurred by the licensee. In this case, there are no aggravating circumstances justifying a deviation above the guidelines. As for mitigating circumstances: the minor nature of the damage or potential damage to the patient’s or the general public’s health, safety, and welfare from his failure to report his convictions and guilty pleas to the Board might justify a deviation below the guidelines for that violation, but not for the convictions and pleas, themselves; the Respondent’s lack of previous discipline is a mitigating circumstance; restitution of monetary damage to the patient is not relevant; the Respondent’s professional standing among his peers has suffered and does not justify a deviation below the guidelines in this case; the Respondent forfeited all ill-gotten gains to the federal government and has incurred financial hardship as a result of the forfeitures and his incarceration, but that does not justify a deviation below the guidelines in this case; the Respondent has taken several continuing education courses since he has been incarcerated, but that does not justify a deviation below the guidelines in this case.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Board of Pharmacy enter a final order finding the Respondent guilty as charged and revoking his license to practice pharmacy. DONE AND ENTERED this 23rd day of June, 2014, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S J. LAWRENCE JOHNSTON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of June, 2014. COPIES FURNISHED: Mark Whitten, Executive Director Board of Pharmacy Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin C-04 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3254 Jennifer A. Tschetter, General Counsel Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin A-02 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1701 Yolanda Y. Green, Esquire Lucas L. May, Esquire Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin C-65 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3265 Christopher S. Switlyk Register No. 53913-018 Federal Satellite Camp Post Office Box 779800 Miami, Florida 33177-9800

USC (1) 21 U.S.C 846 Florida Laws (4) 120.569120.57120.68456.072
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DEPARTMENT OF FINANCIAL SERVICES, OFFICE OF INSURANCE REGULATION vs EDWARD MARTIN WERTEPNY, 03-003649PL (2003)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Fort Myers, Florida Oct. 07, 2003 Number: 03-003649PL Latest Update: Aug. 11, 2004

The Issue Whether Respondent, a licensed all lines adjuster, committed the offenses alleged in the Amended Administrative Complaint; and, if so, what penalties should be imposed.

Findings Of Fact The Department is a licensing and regulatory agency of the State of Florida charged with, among other duties, the responsibility and duty to enforce the provisions of the Florida Insurance Code, which consists of Chapters 624-632, 634, 635, 641, 642, 648, and 651, Florida Statutes (2002). See § 624.307(1), Fla. Stat. (2002). Respondent has been continuously licensed in the State of Florida as an independent all lines adjuster authorized to transact insurance adjusting business since August 1986. On January 1, 1999, at approximately 11:55 p.m., Respondent was driving his Ford Bronco in Tampa, Florida. Hillsborough County Sheriff's Deputy White noticed that Respondent's license tag appeared to be expired. He followed Respondent for about a quarter of a mile, while he ran Respondent's tag number through the computer to determine whether it was, in fact, expired. Upon receiving an affirmative response, Deputy White pulled over Respondent's vehicle. Reserve Deputy McLaughlin was riding with Deputy White. Deputy McLaughlin approached Respondent's car and immediately detected a strong odor of burning marijuana. Deputy White then approached the car and confirmed the smell of marijuana smoke. The deputies asked Respondent for permission to search his vehicle. According to both deputies, Respondent not only gave them permission to search his car, but told them where they could find the marijuana, which was inside a black travel bag on the back seat of the car. Both deputies testified that Respondent told them he had received the marijuana as a Christmas gift. Respondent was arrested for possession of more than 20 grams of cannabis, a third-degree felony pursuant to Subsection 893.13(6)(a), Florida Statutes (1998). At the hearing, Respondent testified that the black travel bag containing the marijuana belonged to an acquaintance to whom he had earlier given a ride. Respondent testified that he did not know the marijuana was in the car until the deputies found it and denied having told the deputies where to find it or that it was a Christmas gift. Respondent's testimony on these points was not credible. On or about February 12, 1999, a one-count information was filed in the Circuit Court of the Thirteenth Judicial Circuit, Hillsborough County, charging Respondent with possession of cannabis in violation of Subsection 893.13(6)(a), Florida Statutes (1998), a third-degree felony. On September 30, 2002, Respondent entered a plea of nolo contendere to the charge, which was accepted. Adjudication of guilt was withheld, and Respondent was placed on probation for a period of six months and ordered to perform 50 hours of community service. Respondent successfully completed his probation, and an order terminating probation was entered on February 5, 2003. After Respondent's arrest, but before the disposition of his case, the Department received an unrelated complaint concerning the manner in which Respondent was handling claims. Ms. Raulerson, a Department investigator, performed an investigation. She discovered that the Department did not have a current resident address for Respondent and obtained the correct address through Respondent's father. On January 3, 2002, Ms. Raulerson issued a letter of guidance to Respondent regarding the subject matter of the investigation. Ms. Raulerson's letter also reminded Respondent of his obligation to notify the Department of changes in his principal business, residence, and mailing addresses. She enclosed a copy of the appropriate form on which to notify the Department of address changes. During her investigation of Respondent's claims handling, Ms. Raulerson had a telephone conversation with Respondent. Ms. Raulerson mentioned that, unrelated to her investigation, the Department had received information indicating that Respondent had been charged with a felony. Respondent told Ms. Raulerson that the charge had been dismissed. Ms. Raulerson responded that if the charges had been dismissed, Respondent would be prudent to forward the paperwork to the Department so that its records could be corrected. In October 2002, Mr. Wilds, a Department investigator, was assigned to investigate whether Respondent had been convicted of, or pled guilty or nolo contendere to a felony, and had failed to notify the Department of his conviction or plea. Mr. Wilds was unable to contact Respondent at the addresses in the Department's files, which indicated that Respondent did not take the advice in Ms. Raulerson's letter of guidance. Mr. Wilds added the failure to notify the Department of his address change to his investigator. Mr. Wilds contacted the Hillsborough County Circuit Court to request documentation regarding the outcome of Respondent's criminal case. In response, the Hillsborough County clerk's office provided Mr. Wilds with certified documents indicating that Respondent had pled nolo contendere and been placed on probation. Mr. Wilds next contacted the Department of Corrections to obtain information on Respondent's probationary status. By letter dated December 6, 2002, Respondent's probation officer, Robert Hughey, confirmed that Respondent was serving a probationary period of six months, commencing September 30, 2002, and scheduled to terminate on March 29, 2003. Subsection 626.621(11), Florida Statutes (2002), provides that the following constitutes grounds for the discretionary discipline of an agent's licensure: (11) Failure to inform the department or office in writing within 30 days after pleading guilty or nolo contendere to, or being convicted or found guilty of, any felony or a crime punishable by imprisonment of 1 year or more under the law of the United States or of any state thereof, or under the law of any other country without regard to whether a judgment of conviction has been entered by the court having jurisdiction of the case. Respondent failed to report to the Department, within 30 days of doing so, that he entered a plea of nolo contendere to a third-degree felony charge of possession of cannabis on September 30, 2002. Respondent testified that he did not inform the Department of his plea of nolo contendere to a felony because Mr. Hughey assured him that he had already notified the Department. The evidence establishes that Mr. Hughey contacted the Department only after Mr. Wilds requested information as to Respondent's probationary status and that this occurred more than 30 days after Respondent entered his plea. However, Respondent's reliance on Mr. Hughey militates against a finding that Respondent's failure to notify the Department was willful. As to the failure to notify the Department of his address changes, Respondent testified that he has always relied on his employers to notify the Department of his address when appointment papers are filed on his behalf and that there was never a problem until these investigations commenced. While Respondent's reliance on his employers does not absolve him of the personal responsibility envisioned by Section 626.551, Florida Statutes (2002), it does militate against a finding that Respondent's failure to notify the Department of his address changes was willful. Respondent's insurance license has not been previously disciplined in the State of Florida.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department enter a final order finding Respondent guilty of violating Subsection 626.621(8), Florida Statutes (2002), as alleged in Count I of the Amended Administrative Complaint; guilty of violating Subsection 626.621(11), Florida Statutes (2002), as alleged in Count II of the Amended Administrative Complaint; and guilty of violating Section 626.551, Florida Statutes (2002), as alleged in Count III of the Amended Administrative Complaint. It is further RECOMMENDED that Respondent's licensure as an all lines adjuster be suspended for three months for the violation of Count I, for three months for the violation of Count II, and for two months for the violation of Count III, with the suspensions for Counts II and III to run concurrently. DONE AND ENTERED this 30th day of April, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LAWRENCE P. STEVENSON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of April, 2004.

Florida Laws (6) 120.57624.307626.551626.611626.621893.13
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DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS AND PROFESSIONAL REGULATION, REAL ESTATE COMMISSION vs JUDY LIMEKILLER, 12-004134PL (2012)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Sarasota, Florida Dec. 21, 2012 Number: 12-004134PL Latest Update: Aug. 14, 2013

The Issue Whether Judy Limekiller (Respondent) committed the violation alleged in the Administrative Complaint dated August 30, 2012, and, if so, what penalty should be imposed.

Findings Of Fact Petitioner is an agency of the State of Florida created by section 20.165, Florida Statutes. Petitioner is charged with the responsibility of regulating the real estate industry in Florida pursuant to chapters 455 and 475, Florida Statutes. As such, Petitioner is fully authorized to prosecute disciplinary cases against real estate licensees. Respondent was at all times material to this matter, the holder of a Florida real estate license, license number 3131887. At all times material to the allegations of this case Respondent was an active sales associate with Michael Saunders and Company. Respondent’s address of record is 1529 Pelican Point Drive, HA 205, Sarasota, Florida. In January 2012, Respondent was a sales associate handling a transaction with Regina Zahofnik (Ms. Zahofnik). Ms. Zahofnik was the seller of property located at 4527 MacEachen Boulevard, Sarasota, Florida. Respondent admits she signed Ms. Zahofnik’s name to a Cancellation of Contract and Release. Respondent did not have written authorization to sign for Ms. Zahofnik. Instead, she maintains Ms. Zahofnik gave her verbal authority to sign the document. In February 2012, Respondent was a sales associate handling a transaction with Lynda Kravitz. Ms. Kravitz was the seller of property located at 1526 Pelican Point Drive, BA 147, Sarasota, Florida. Respondent signed Ms. Kravitz’ name to a Seller’s Property Disclosure Statement. Ms. Kravitz did not authorize Respondent to sign the document. In February 2012, Respondent was a sales associate handling a transaction with Cherryne Kravitz. Ms. Kravitz was the seller of property located at 1526 Pelican Point Drive, BA 147, Sarasota, Florida. On or about February 10, 2012, Respondent signed Ms. Kravitz’ name to a Residential Contract for Sale and Purchase. Ms. Kravitz did not authorize Respondent to sign the document. In all situations, Respondent believed she was authorized to sign the documents. She claims either e-mail or text message gave her the go-ahead to sign documents so that they could be timely processed. In the case of Ms. Zahofnik, the “deal was dead” and could not close. Since the buyer elected to walk away from the purchase when the seller could not complete the transaction, Respondent maintains that no party was injured by the signing of the document and that by doing so the refund to the buyer was processed. In the case of the Kravitz sale, Respondent signed the property disclosure because she knew the property better than the sellers and an expedited completion of the paperwork was requested. Again, Respondent states Ms. Kravitz authorized the signature. And with regard to the signing of the contract, Respondent asserts that Ms. Kravitz was slow to return the contract and that she was getting pressure from the other Ms. Kravitz to get the paperwork completed. Eventually, both Kravitz daughters signed the contract. Respondent does not deny signing the contract. As a result of the allegations of this case, Michael Saunders and Company incurred expenses and lost commissions. Petitioner did not present evidence regarding the cost of investigating this matter.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the Florida Real Estate Commission finding Respondent in violation of the provision of law set forth in the Administrative Complaint as alleged by Petitioner, imposing an administrative fine in the amount of $2,500.00, and imposing a suspension of Respondent’s real estate license for a period of 30 days, with probation to follow for such period of time as the commission deems appropriate. DONE AND ENTERED this 21st day of June, 2013, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S J. D. PARRISH Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of June, 2013. COPIES FURNISHED: Susan Leigh Matchett, Esquire Department of Business and Professional Regulation Suite 42 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399 James P. Harwood, Esquire James Harwood, P.A. Suite 106 1277 North Semoran Boulevard Orlando, Florida 32807 J. Layne Smith, General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation Northwood Centre 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Juana Watkins, Director Division of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street, Suite N801 Orlando, Florida 32801 Darla Furst, Chair Real Estate Commission Department of Business and Professional Regulation 400 West Robinson Street, Suite N801 Orlando, Florida 32801

Florida Laws (5) 120.569120.5720.165455.2273475.25
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ELIZABETH RUBEIS vs FRSA SERVICES CORPORATION, 92-000356 (1992)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Orlando, Florida Jan. 17, 1992 Number: 92-000356 Latest Update: Mar. 10, 1994

The Issue The central issue in this case is whether Petitioner's employment with the Respondent was terminated in violation of Chapter 760, Florida Statutes.

Findings Of Fact Based upon the documentary evidence received at the hearing, the following findings of fact are made: At all times material to the allegations of this case, Petitioner was an employee of FRSA. On or about September 26, 1989, Petitioner's employment with FRSA was terminated and the charges of discrimination were filed. Prior to termination, Petitioner's work performance with the company had been acceptable. In fact, for the performance review issued on January 31, 1989, Petitioner received a superior rating in eight of the eleven categories, a good rating in two categories, and an outstanding rating in one category. At the time of her termination with FRSA, Petitioner earned an annual salary of $35,000. Petitioner claims a total of $83,568 for the lost wages and benefits resulting from her termination with FRSA. At the time of her termination, Petitioner was pregnant.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the charge of discrimination filed by the Petitioner in this cause against the Respondent. DONE and ENTERED this 4th day of September, 1992, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. JOYOUS D. PARRISH Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904)488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Elizabeth Rubeis Reno Rubeis 4350 Wyndcliff Circle Orlando, Florida 32817 Susan McKenna Garwood & McKenna, P.A. 322 East Pine Street Orlando, Florida 32801 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of September, 1992. Dana Baird, General Counsel Human Relations Commission 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1570 Margaret Jones, Clerk Human Relations Commission 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1570

Florida Laws (1) 760.10
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JERUSCHA M. TOUSSAINT vs WALMART, 20-003439 (2020)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida Aug. 03, 2020 Number: 20-003439 Latest Update: Dec. 25, 2024

The Issue The issues in this case are whether Respondent committed the unlawful employment practice alleged in the Employment Complaint of Discrimination filed with the Florida Commission on Human Relations (''FCHR''), and, if so, what relief should be granted.

Findings Of Fact Petitioner is an African-American female. Petitioner began working for Respondent as a part-time Self-Checkout Host on February 1, 2017. Upon hiring, her initial rate of pay was $9.00 per hour. After three months of employment, Petitioner’s pay was increased to $10.00 per hour in May of 2017. Subsequently, Petitioner received pay increases raising her hourly rate to $11.00, and then $11.50. In April of 2018, Petitioner was promoted to the full-time position of Customer Service Manager (''CSM''). Along with the promotion, Petitioner also received a raise, bringing her rate of pay to $13.65 per hour. In April of 2019, Respondent gave Petitioner another raise, resulting in hourly pay of $13.90. Respondent maintained a Statement of Ethics, of which Petitioner was aware. The Statement of Ethics explained that Respondent’s overall operations were guided by four core Beliefs, which were: Respect for the Individual; Service to our Customers; Striving for Excellence; and Act with Integrity. Based on what she heard from her coworkers, Petitioner believed that she was entitled to a market-adjustment pay increase in April of 2019. She sought information about the pay increase from her store manager and others. Petitioner reported her belief that she was entitled to a pay increase, which she had not received, to Respondent’s Associate Relations Department (''Department''). After what was described as a thorough review of Petitioner’s concerns, the Department closed the matter. Petitioner testified that a white male named Chance was making more money than she, based on conversations between Petitioner and Chance. Chance worked as a Money Manager Associate, a position that Petitioner never held during her employment with Respondent. Ms. Durocher testified that Chance was not paid more than Petitioner. In 2019, there were ten individuals who held the position of CSM at the store where Petitioner worked. In addition to Petitioner, those who worked in CSM positions included multiple African-American females and one African-American male. Petitioner did not present any evidence to suggest or establish that any male, or non-African-American, employee was paid more than she was for performing similar work. On October 26, 2019, Petitioner discussed the problem she perceived with her rate of pay with Ms. Durocher. During their conversation, Petitioner raised her voice and the interaction escalated to the point that another employee went to enlist the assistance of the Store Manager. When the Store Manager arrived, he joined the conversation with Petitioner and Ms. Durocher. Ms. Durocher expressed to Petitioner that she believed that Petitioner was being paid commensurate with her skills and duties; and that her rate of pay had been investigated and was determined to be appropriate. Throughout the conversation, Ms. Durocher perceived Respondent’s conduct to be disrespectful. Ms. Durocher and the Store Manager repeatedly encouraged Petitioner to calm down, but their attempts were unsuccessful. On the same day, Petitioner’s employment was terminated by Respondent for violating the core Belief of Respect for the Individual.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that FCHR enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 12th day of February, 2021, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. COPIES FURNISHED: Tammy S. Barton, Agency Clerk S BRITTANY O. FINKBEINER Administrative Law Judge 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of February, 2021. Jamie Rotteveel, Esquire Florida Commission on Human Relations 4075 Esplanade Way, Room 110 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-7020 Jeruscha Toussaint 5835 Northwest Lomb Court Port St. Lucie, Florida 34986 Allison Wiggins, Esquire Littler Mendelson, P.C. 111 North Orange Avenue, Suite 1750 Orlando, Florida 32801 Cheyanne Costilla, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 4075 Esplanade Way, Room 110 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-7020 Littler Mendelson, P.C. 2301 McGee Street, 8th Floor Kansas City, Missouri 64108 Kimberly Doud, Esquire Littler Mendelson, P.C. 111 North Orange Avenue, Suite 1750 Orlando, Florida 32801 Nancy A. Johnson, Esquire Littler Mendelson, P.C. 111 North Orange Avenue, Suite 1750 Orlando, Florida 32801

Florida Laws (4) 120.569120.57120.68760.10 DOAH Case (1) 20-3439
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S.A.C., LLC vs DEPARTMENT OF FINANCIAL SERVICES, DIVISION OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION, 07-003948 (2007)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Sarasota, Florida Aug. 29, 2007 Number: 07-003948 Latest Update: Oct. 25, 2019

The Issue The issue is whether Respondent, Department of Financial Services, Division of Workers' Compensation, properly assessed a penalty of $90,590.42 against Petitioner, S.A.C., LLC.

Findings Of Fact The Department is the state agency responsible for enforcing the statutory requirement that employers secure payment of workers' compensation for the benefit of their employees pursuant to Section 440.107, Florida Statutes. At all times relevant to this proceeding, Petitioner, S.A.C., LLC, was a corporation domiciled in Florida. S.A.C.'s 2007 Limited Liability Company Annual Report lists its principal place of business as 626 Lafayette Court, Sarasota, Florida, 34236, and its mailing address as Post Office Box 49075, Sarasota, Florida 34230. At all times relevant to this proceeding, William R. Suzor was the president and managing member of S.A.C. Collen Wharton is an Insurance Analyst II with the Department. In this position, Ms. Wharton conducts inspections to ensure that employers are in compliance with the law. On June 20, 2007, Ms. Wharton conducted a compliance check at 2111 South Osprey Avenue in Sarasota, Florida. During the compliance check, Ms. Wharton observed three males working at that location. The three men were framing a single-family house that was under construction. This type of work is carpentry, which is considered construction. During the compliance check, Ms. Wharton asked David Crawford, one of the men working at the site, who was their employer. Mr. Crawford told Ms. Wharton that he and the other two men worked for S.A.C., but were paid by a leasing company. Mr. Crawford told Ms. Wharton that the company was owned by Mr. Suzor and, in response to Ms. Wharton's inquiry, he gave her Mr. Suzor's telephone number. In addition to Mr. Crawford, the other workers at the site were identified as Terry Jenkins and Frank Orduno. By checking the records the Department maintains in a computerized database, Ms. Wharton determined that S.A.C. did not carry workers' compensation insurance, but had coverage on its employees through Employee Leasing Solutions, an employee leasing company. She also determined, by consulting the Department's database, that none of the men had a workers' compensation exemption. Ms. Wharton telephoned Employee Leasing Solutions, which advised her that two of the workers at the site, Mr. Crawford and Mr. Jenkins, were on the roster of employees that the company maintained. The company advised her that the other worker, Mr. Orduno, was not on its roster of employees. This information was verified by an employee list that the leasing company provided to Ms. Wharton. On June 20, 2007, after determining that one worker at the work site had no workers' compensation coverage, Mr. Wharton prepared a Stop-Work Order. She then telephoned Mr. Suzor, told him that he had one worker at the site who did not have workers' compensation coverage and requested that he come to the work site. During the conversation, Mr. Suzor advised Ms. Wharton that Mr. Crawford was in charge at the work site, that she could give the Stop-Work Order to Mr. Crawford, and that he (Mr. Suzor) would meet her the following day. Ms. Wharton, after she telephoned Mr. Suzor, she conferred with her supervisor and then issued Stop-Work Order No. 07-125-D3, posting it at the work site and serving it on Mr. Crawford. On June 21, 2007, Mr. Suzor met with Ms. Wharton at her office. During that meeting, Ms. Wharton served a copy of Stop-Work Order No. 07-125-D3 on Mr. Suzor. She also served him with a Request for Production of Business Records for Penalty Assessment Calculation ("Request for Business Records"). The Request for Business Records listed specific records that Mr. Suzor/S.A.C. should provide to the Department so that the Department could determine the workers who S.A.C. paid during the period of June 19, 2004, through June 20, 2007. The Request for Business Records notes that the requested records must be produced within five business days of receipt. According to the Request for Business Records, if no records are provided or the records provided are insufficient to enable the Department to determine the payroll for the time period requested for the calculation of the penalty in Subsection 440.107(7)(d), Florida Statutes, "the imputed weekly payroll for each employee, . . . shall be the statewide average weekly wage as defined in section 440.12(2), F.S. multiplied by 1.5." S.A.C. did not respond to the Department's Request for Business Records. On July 17, 2007, the Department had received no records from S.A.C. Without any records, Ms. Wharton had no information from which she could determine an accurate assessment of S.A.C.'s payroll for the previous three years. Therefore, Ms. Wharton calculated the penalty based on an imputed payroll. In her calculations, Ms. Wharton assumed that Mr. Orduno worked from June 21, 2004, through June 20, 2007, and that he was paid 1.5 times the state-wide average weekly wage for the class code assigned to the work he performed for each year or portion of the year. The Department then applied the statutory formula set out in Subsection 440.107(7)(d), Florida Statutes. Based on that calculation, the Department correctly calculated S.A.C.'s penalty assessment as $90,590.42, as specified in the Amended Order of Penalty Assessment dated July 17, 2007. The Amended Order of Penalty Assessment reflecting the correct penalty amount was served on S.A.C.'s attorney, John Myers, Esquire, by hand-delivery, on July 17, 2007.3/ On July 21, 2007, S.A.C., through its former counsel, filed a Petition for Hearing.

Recommendation Based upon the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, RECOMMENDED that Respondent, Department of Financial Services, Division of Workers' Compensation, enter a final order which affirms the Amended Order of Penalty Assessment issued July 17, 2007, assessing a penalty of $90,590.42, and the Stop-Work Order issued to Petitioner, S.A.C., LLC, on June 20, 2007. DONE AND ENTERED this 25th day of March, 2008, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S CAROLYN S. HOLIFIELD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of March, 2008.

Florida Laws (9) 120.569120.57120.68440.02440.10440.107440.12468.520590.42 Florida Administrative Code (1) 69L-6.028
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DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS AND PROFESSIONAL REGULATION, DIVISION OF ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGES AND TOBACCO, vs POLPO MARIO, INC., D/B/A POLPO MARIO RISTORANTE, 99-003065 (1999)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Sarasota, Florida Jul. 16, 1999 Number: 99-003065 Latest Update: Jul. 15, 2004

The Issue The issue is whether an administrative fine should be imposed on Respondent for unlawfully selling "spirituous beverages" on its licensed premises, as alleged in the Administrative Action served by Petitioner on March 17, 1999.

Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, the following findings of fact are determined: In this disciplinary action, Petitioner, Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco (Division), seeks to impose penal sanctions on the license of Respondent, Polpo Mario, Inc., doing business as Polpo Mario Ristorante, on the ground that on February 24, 1999, an employee of the establishment served a Division special agent a shot of vodka and a shot glass containing a mixture of vodka and amaretto, none of which could be lawfully sold under Respondent's license. After this proceeding began, the restaurant was voluntarily closed by the owner. Respondent has denied the charge and requested a formal hearing to contest this allegation. In his request for a hearing, Respondent contended that the employee who served the drinks was actually a bus boy and had no authority to wait on customers; that the bus boy was pressured into making the sale; that the employee was "slightly retarded"; and that the chef occasionally used amaretto in preparing a special dessert. Except for the latter assertion, none of these defenses was established at the final hearing. Respondent is subject to the regulatory jurisdiction of the Division, having been issued license no. 68-01763, Series 2COP. That license allows Respondent to make sales of beer and wine for consumption on the premises of its restaurant located at 3131 Clark Road, Sarasota, Florida. The license does not, however, authorize the sale of "spirituous beverages," such as vodka, whiskey, and liquors, which contain more than six percent of alcohol by volume. Besides the above license, Respondent also holds licenses from the Division for three other restaurants, including a Series 4COP, SRX license, which authorizes the sale of all types of alcoholic beverages in conjunction with food sales. This type of license has an annual fee of $1,820.00. On November 6, 1998, a Division auditor, Eileen O'Shea (O'Shea), performed a routine audit of Respondent's corporate offices. Such audits are required to be performed at least once every three years. During the course of the audit, O'Shea examined various invoices from liquor dealers, including one which suggested that liquor may have been transferred from one of the restaurants holding a Series 4COP, SRX license to Polpo Mario Ristorante. O'Shea cautioned Respondent's president, Joseph Casadio (Casadio), and his wife, that under a Series 2COP license, they were not authorized to sell or have alcoholic beverages on the licensed premises. She also gave them a copy of the state statutes which contained this restriction, and O'Shea suggested that if any liquor was kept in the kitchen for food prepration purposes, that the bottle be marked with a "K." She further advised them that if they intended to use alcoholic beverages for preparing certain special dishes, they must obtain written approval from the Division to do so. There is, however, no statutory or rule authority for this requirement. Finally, she referred her findings to a Division special agent. Both Casadio and his wife acknowledged to O'Shea that they now understood the requirements and that no laws were being violated. Casadio also told her that he had once served customers an after dinner expresso with Sambuca (a liquor) without charge, but he no longer did so. Around 6:15 p.m. on February 24, 1999, and presumably in response to O'Shea's referral, Division special agent Samuel J. Funaro (Funaro) visited the licensed premises of Respondent for the purpose of attempting to purchase spirituous beverages. Funaro was greeted by Gerard Woel (Woel), an employee who seated Funaro at a table near the bar and handed him a menu. Besides Woel, there were two other female waitresses on duty that evening, including Kim Mitchell (Mitchell). None of these former employees, or any others, testified at the final hearing; however, their out-of-court statements have been treated as admissions by employees of a party and therefore an exception to the hearsay rule. Although there were several special entrees shown on a display board at the entrance to the restaurant, none were desserts. Funaro ordered an Eggplant Parmigiana as his entree and a bottle of Budweiser beer to drink. He also asked Woel for a whiskey chaser to go with his beer. Woel departed and returned from the kitchen a few minutes later with a shot glass containing a clear liquid. The parties have stipulated that the liquid was vodka. Woel remarked that the vodka came from a bottle kept by the chef in the kitchen. By serving that drink, Respondent exceeded the authority under its license. At a later point in his meal, Funaro ordered a second bottle of beer and another whiskey chaser. A few minutes later, Woel returned with a shot glass containing a brownish colored liquid and explained that it represented the last vodka in the chef's bottle along with a small amount of amaretto, which was the only other alcoholic beverage in the kitchen. Although Funaro did not retain a sample of the drink, based on his experience, he concluded that the shot glass did in fact contain vodka and amaretto. By serving the drink, Respondent exceeded the authority under its license. Shortly before 8:00 p.m., Funaro completed his meal. Woel was busy with other customers, so the bill was presented by Mitchell, another waitress on duty. The bill totaled $17.91, including tax, and besides the food charge, contained a charge for one beer (even though two had been ordered) and an item for $5.50 entitled "2-Open Food Lunch." As to the latter item, Mitchell explained that this was the way liquor sales were rung up on the cash register because the cash register did not have a specific key for liquor sales. On March 10, 1999, O'Shea and Funaro returned to Respondent's restaurant for the purpose of conducting an inspection of the premises. They found a bottle of Bols Amaretto in the kitchen used for preparing desserts. At that time, the chef on duty told them that after dinner drinks were served at one time but the practice was discontinued. He also stated that the previous chef had kept a bottle of vodka on the premises for preparing a pasta sauce. On March 16, 1999, Funaro met with Casadio and explained the violations he had noted during his previous visit and inspection. Casadio explained again that he had once given a complimentary after dinner drink to patrons but discontinued that practice after O'Shea had given him a verbal warning during her audit. He also explained that the amaretto found in the kitchen on the March 10 inspection was used to prepare desserts for patrons. In mitigation, Casadio established that he had been in the restaurant business for some 20 years, and there is no evidence that he has ever been charged with, or convicted of, violating any Division regulations or state law. He pointed out that he would never risk his license for the price of two drinks ($5.50), that he has always attempted to comply with all relevant requirements, and that he immediately fired Woel after learning of his actions. Given the extremely small amount of liquor involved, the minimal amounts kept on hand in the kitchen for cooking purposes, and the fact that Respondent was obviously not engaged in this conduct on a widespread, continuing basis, a reduction in the fine is appropriate.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco enter a final order determining that Respondent has violated Section 562.12(1), Florida Statutes, as charged in the Administrative Action, and that an administrative fine in the amount of $750.00 be imposed. DONE AND ENTERED this 30th day of December, 1999, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of December, 1999. COPIES FURNISHED: Joseph Martelli, Director Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1007 Charles D. Peters, Esquire Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2202 Joseph Casadio 3131 Clark Road, Suite 103 Sarasota, Florida 34231 Barbara D. Auger, General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792

Florida Laws (3) 120.569120.57562.12 Florida Administrative Code (1) 61A-2.022
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DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS AND PROFESSIONAL REGULATION, CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY LICENSING BOARD vs MANUEL RIVERO, 01-003124PL (2001)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Miami, Florida Aug. 01, 2001 Number: 01-003124PL Latest Update: Mar. 25, 2002

The Issue Whether Respondent committed the offenses as set forth in the Administrative Complaint dated June 13, 2000, and if so, what penalty should be imposed.

Findings Of Fact At all times material to this case, Respondent is a licensed Certified General Contractor in the State of Florida. At all times material to this case, Respondent was the qualifying agent for Rivero Construction, Inc. On or about June 20, 1996, Respondent contracted with Manuel Chamizo (Chamizo) to construct a parking lot with drainage at 4735 Palm Avenue, Hialeah, Florida, and to repave the parking lot at 4719 Palm Avenue, Hialeah, Florida, for the total price of $7,090.00. Chamizo paid Rivero Construction, Inc., the full contract price. Respondent constructed the parking lot at 4735 Palm Avenue, but did so in a substandard manner. Specifically, the parking lot flooded and was rendered unusable because Respondent had broken a sewer pipe during construction. After being notified of the problem, Respondent failed to correct it. Respondent failed to perform any of the contracted work at 4719 Palm Avenue. Dissatisfied with Respondent's performance, Chamizo sued Rivero Construction, Inc., for damages in the County Court in and for Miami-Dade County, Florida. On or about August 24, 1998, the lawsuit was concluded in Chamizo's favor with the entry of a final judgment against Rivero Construction, Inc. Respondent has failed to satisfy the final judgment. Respondent has failed to obtain a qualified business certificate of authority. Petitioner has incurred costs of $1,669.09 in the investigation and prosecution of Respondent.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered finding that Respondent committed the offenses set forth in the Administrative Complaint dated June 13, 2000; ordering that Respondent pay an administrative fine in the amount of $1,250; pay restitution to Manuel Chamizo in the amount of the Final Judgement obtained by Manuel Chamizo; and pay costs incurred in the investigation and prosecution of this proceeding in the initial amount of $1,669.09, plus costs incurred through the date of final action, which revised affidavit of costs will be submitted to the Board at final action. DONE AND ENTERED this 12th day of December, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ___________________________________ FLORENCE SNYDER RIVAS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of December, 2001. COPIES FURNISHED: Diane Snell Perera, Esquire Department of Business and Professional Regulation 401 Northwest Second Avenue Suite N-607 Miami, Florida 33128 Manuel Rivero 61 East 16th Street Hialeah, Florida 33010 Suzanne Lee, Executive Director Construction Industry Licensing Board Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Hardy L. Roberts, General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2202

Florida Laws (5) 120.5717.00117.002489.119489.129
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BETTY CASTOR, AS COMMISSIONER OF EDUCATION vs SHERRY CURRY, 89-006822 (1989)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida Dec. 18, 1989 Number: 89-006822 Latest Update: Apr. 03, 1990

Findings Of Fact Based upon Section 120.65(11), Florida Statutes, and Ms. Curry's failure to dispute the allegations of paragraph 4 of the Administrative Complaint (quoted above), that count will be treated as admitted.

Recommendation It is recommended that a final order be entered by the Education Practices Commission revoking the teaching certificate of Sherry Curry. RECOMMENDED this 3rd day of April, 1990, at Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM R. DORSEY, JR., Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of April, 1990. COPIES FURNISHED: Karen B. Wilde, Executive Director Education Practices Commission 301 Florida Education Center 325 West Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400 Martin Schaap, Administrator Education Practices Commission 352 Florida Education Center 325 West Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400 Lane Burnett, Esquire 331 Union Street Jacksonville, Florida 32202 Sherry Curry 4260 Northwest 170 Street Carol City, Florida 33055 Sydney H. McKenzie, General Counsel Department of Education The Capitol, PL-08 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400

USC (1) 21 U. S. C. 841 Florida Laws (2) 120.57120.65
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JOHN WINN, AS COMMISSIONER OF EDUCATION vs CAROLYN STEWART, 06-003527PL (2006)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Bradenton, Florida Sep. 19, 2006 Number: 06-003527PL Latest Update: May 30, 2007

The Issue Whether Respondent's educator's certification should be sanctioned for alleged acts involving moral turpitude, in violation of Subsection 1012.795(1) (c), Florida Statutes (2003).1 Whether Respondent's educator's certification should be sanctioned for being convicted of a misdemeanor, felony, or other criminal charge, in violation of Subsection 1012.795(1)(e), Florida Statutes. Whether Respondent's educator's certification should be sanctioned for violation of the Principles of Professional Conduct for the Education Profession, in violation of Subsection 1012.795(1)(i), Florida Statutes. Whether Respondent's educator's certification should be sanctioned for a plea guilty or a decision of guilt in any court, in violation of Subsection 1012.795(2), Florida Statutes. Whether Respondent's educator's certification should be sanctioned for failure to maintain honesty in all professional dealings, in violation of Florida Administrative Code Rule 6B- 1.006(5)(a). Whether Respondent's educator's certification should be sanctioned for submitting fraudulent information on a document in connection with professional activities, in violation of Florida Administrative Code Rule 6B-1.006(5)(h).

Findings Of Fact Respondent, Carolyn Stewart, holds Florida Educator Certificate 747243, covering the area of Guidance and Counseling, which was valid through June 30, 2005. Respondent was employed as a guidance counselor at Sea Breeze Elementary School, in the Manatee County School District, during the 2003/2004 school year, until she resigned sometime in the fall of 2003. On or after October 1, 2003, Respondent was arrested and charged with two counts of fraudulent use of a credit card. Respondent entered a plea of guilty to those charges, both third degree felonies, in the Circuit Court for Manatee County, Florida, Case Nos. 2003-CF-3150 and 2003-CF-4094, on May 18, 2004. Adjudication was withheld, and Respondent was sentenced to credit for time served in the county jail, court costs, and facility fee. On or about March 18, 2004, following the issuance of an Information, Respondent was arrested and charged with the felony offense of filing fraudulent insurance claims, between October 1, 1999, and September 12, 2003, with her employer, the Manatee County School Board. Respondent entered a plea of nolo contendre to the charge of filing fraudulent insurance claims for less that $20,000, a third degree felony, in the Circuit Court for Manatee County, in Case No. 2004-CF-1067, on May 24, 2005. Respondent was adjudicated guilty and sentenced to five years probation. On April 15, 2004, Respondent was charged, by Information, with the offense of Poisoning Food or Water of Michael Skoyec, which occurred between August 31, 2003, and/or September 1, 2003. Respondent pled not guilty to the charge, a first degree felony, and the matter proceeded to a jury trial before the Circuit Court for Manatee County, Case No. 2004-CF- 1787. Prior to the trial, the State Attorney amended the Information by adding a second count, charging Respondent with Attempted Second Degree Murder, a second degree felony. Following the trial which concluded on February 11, 2005, the jury returned a verdict of guilty on the first count, Poisoning Food and Water, and a verdict of guilty on the lesser count included offense of Battery (a first degree misdemeanor), as to the second Count. At the sentencing hearing on April 19, 2005, Respondent was adjudicated guilty and sentenced to 15 years in the custody of the Department of Corrections, and costs, followed by five years' probation. Respondent was committed to the custody of the Department of Corrections on April 19, 2005, and is at present serving her sentence in the Gadsden Correctional Institution. Following her conviction and sentence, Respondent appealed her convictions to the Second District Court of Appeal. The conviction was affirmed on March 3, 2006, and the Mandate issued on May 18, 2006. In each of the criminal cases in which she entered a plea of guilty or no contest, Respondent, through her attorney, stipulated that there was a factual basis for the charge, or the facts were stated on the record for the court to determine the factual basis. Following these incidents, Respondent resigned her position with the Manatee School District in the fall of 2003. There was adverse publicity in the newspaper about the charges against Respondent, including the poisoning charge. There was no dispute that as a result of these incidents Respondent's effectiveness as a teacher was seriously, if not totally, reduced. The honesty of educators is relied upon by administrators. Respondent's actions, including her fraudulent acts, prevented administrators from relying on her honesty. Fellow employees rely on an educator's honesty, and Respondent's actions similarly prevent that reliance in the future. On October 18, 2004, Respondent was charged by Information, with one felony count of falsifying records, on September 22, 2003, of the Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS). She entered a plea of no contest, was adjudicated guilty, and placed on five years' probation for that offense on May 24, 2005. Although the avenue of direct appeal of her conviction has been exhausted, Respondent has retained legal counsel to explore the possibility of filing post-conviction relief in the courts in regard to those charges, where she has been adjudicated guilty by the court. Although Respondent acknowledged that grounds existed to revoke her teaching certificate, she testified that she was very good at what she did as a guidance counselor and desired the opportunity to seek reinstatement of her teaching certificate in the future. Respondent offered no evidence to support this assertion.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED as follows: A final order be issued finding that Respondent did violate the provisions of Subsections 1012.795(1) (c), (e) and (i), Florida Statutes, and Florida Administrative Code Rule 6b- 1.006(5) (a), and (h). Count 4 of the Administrative Complaint should be dismissed. If is further RECOMMENDED: That the Education Practices Commission enter a final order permanently revoking Respondent's teaching certificate. DONE AND ORDERED this 24th day of January, 2007, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DANIEL M. KILBRIDE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of January, 2007.

Florida Laws (7) 1012.7951012.796120.569120.5790.30290.303944.275
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