The Issue The issue to be determined in this case is whether Petitioner's application for licensure as a Resident Customer Representative insurance agent should be granted.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner is a receptionist for an insurance agency and is seeking licensure as a Florida Resident Customer Representative from the Department of Financial Services. The Department is an agency of the State of Florida responsible for the licensing of insurance agents and customer representatives in the State of Florida, in accordance with the provisions of Chapter 626, Florida Statutes. On October 22, 2003, the Petitioner filed a license application (electronically) with the Department seeking licensure as a Resident Customer Representative insurance agent. On her application for licensure, the Petitioner answered the following question in the negative: Have you ever been convicted, found guilty, or pled guilty or nolo contendere (no contest) to a crime punishable by imprisonment of one year or more under the laws of any municipality, county, state, territory or country, whether or not adjudication was withheld or a judgment of conviction was entered? When the Petitioner signed her application for licensure she signed an "Applicant Affirmation Statement" and mailed it to the Department. In that statement, she swore that all the answers on the questions on the application were true and correct to the best of her knowledge and belief. She knew of the requirement to be truthful and honest on the application and that had been stressed to her by her instructor for the insurance pre-licensing course which she attended. On March 16, 1995, the Petitioner entered a plea of nolo contendere to one count of forgery and one count of uttering a forged instrument, both felonies. The related arrest had occurred on November 10, 1994. The Petitioner was sentenced to three years probation, required to make restitution, pay court fines and costs and to perform fifty hours of community service. She was to write a letter of apology to the victim and to have no contact with the victim. Adjudication of guilt was withheld. She performed all of the requirements of her sentence. She was excused by the court from providing the fifty hours of community service because she was pregnant at the time. The Petitioner acknowledges that she answered the question incorrectly and had made a mistake, because she felt the phrase "punishable by one year or more" meant that she had been imprisoned for one year or more, which she had not. She testified that she intentionally answered the question in the negative because she was not aware that her felony crimes were potentially punishable by one year or more. She signed the 1995 plea agreement, which indicated that it was then her understanding that the offenses could carry a maximum sentence of ten years imprisonment. At the time she answered the relevant question on her application, however, she did not have a present understanding or recollection that that would be the case. The point is, she answered in good faith. She did not intentionally answer the question untruthfully but rather due to a mistaken impression, after some nine or so years had elapsed, concerning the nature and effect of the punishment or potential punishment her crimes carried. The Petitioner has not had a criminal history since her 1995 plea, with the exception of a June 7, 2000 arrest in Hernando County, Florida, after her return to Florida from Tennessee, for purported violation of probation with regard to the 1995 felony case. The Petitioner's testimony demonstrates in a credible way that indeed she had fulfilled the requirements of her probation. The judge had released her from her community service requirement and the reason for the arrest, because she was believed to have failed to pay relevant costs and restitution, apparently was a mistake. She established that at or around the time of her moving to Tennessee she had paid the relevant monetary sums required with two cashiers checks. The court terminated her probation. It is found that this arrest was based upon a mistake. The Petitioner's supervisor corroborated the testimony of the Petitioner and established that the circumstances and mental impression leading to the Petitioner's negative answer show no intent to be untruthful or to defraud. The Petitioner and her witnesses (her supervisors) established that she has been fit and trustworthy in her work with the insurance agency. Petitioner has routinely handled sums of money for the agency and for insurance clients, always with proper accounting and never with any funds being missing or mis-appropriated. The Petitioner's employment provides her family's only livelihood for her and her child. Her employment is dependent on her being granted licensure as a Customer Representative. Denial of the license application will create a hardship for her. She was nineteen years of age at the time of the arrest and plea, made full restitution and complied with the terms of her probation.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing findings of fact, conclusions of law, the evidence of record, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses and the pleadings and arguments of the parties, it is, therefore, RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the Department granting the licensure applied; or granting it for a probationary period of two years under reasonable terms and conditions specified by the Department in that final order. DONE AND ENTERED this 2nd day of December, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S P. MICHAEL RUFF Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of December, 2004. COPIES FURNISHED: Honorable Tom Gallagher Chief Financial Officer Department of Financial Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Pete Dunbar, General Counsel Department of Financial Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Tanya C. Lollie 4732 Elwood Road Spring Hill, Florida 34608 Elizabeth Penny, Certified Legal Intern Ladasiah Jackson, Esquire Department of Financial Services 200 East Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0333
The Issue The issue for determination is whether Respondent discriminated against Petitioner on the basis of a handicap, in violation of Section 760.10, Florida Statutes (2003).
Findings Of Fact Respondent operates a residential program for young, homeless women who are pregnant or have infants. Respondent is required by applicable state law to maintain minimum staffing requirements or expose its license to disciplinary action. Respondent employed Petitioner as a residential staff assistant (RSA) from sometime in August 2002 until February 2, 2004. Petitioner worked five days a week during shift hours that varied during her employment. As an RSA, Petitioner's duties included assisting residents with care for their babies, babysitting, assisting residents with meal planning and budgeting, writing staff notes for parent and child, driving residents to and from medical appointments, and otherwise "assist mother and child in anyway." With the exception of excessive absences discussed hereinafter, it is undisputed that Petitioner was able to perform the essential functions of her job and did so satisfactorily to Respondent. Sometime in May 2003, Petitioner suffered a back injury while riding a horse. Petitioner suffered a herniated disc located at L5-S1. After the injury, Petitioner experienced right-side pain and sought treatment initially from chiropractic therapy and acupuncture. However, Petitioner's symptoms persisted. Petitioner sought medical treatment sometime prior to July 2003. An MRI conducted on July 21, 2003, diagnosed the herniated disc, and Petitioner subsequently underwent surgery on September 11, 2003, identified in the record as a laminectomy. By a physician's note on a prescription pad dated October 29, 2003, the treating physician authorized Petitioner to return to work on November 2, 2003. The physician's note did not prescribe any limitations for Petitioner. Petitioner returned to work on the prescribed date. On November 10, 2003, a director for Respondent required Petitioner and a co-worker to close the security gate to the facility. The electric motor for the gate was not functioning, and the two co-workers had to close a heavy security gate by manually pulling until the facility was secure. By a physician's note on a prescription pad dated November 14, 2003, the treating physician prescribed "light duty" for Petitioner. The light-duty restrictions were limited to "no pulling." A preponderance of evidence does not support a finding that Respondent required Petitioner to perform any "pulling" after November 10, 2003. Petitioner's back condition is an impairment within the meaning of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. Section 12112, et seq. (ADA), and the Florida Civil Rights Act, Chapter 760, et seq., Florida Statutes (2003) (FCRA). After surgery, Petitioner continued to experience pain in her right side and, due to inactivity, gained approximately 100 pounds. Petitioner's resulting impairment has limited her ability to work by impairing her ability to sit for long periods, pull, lift, bend to retrieve files from lower file drawers, and drive. Petitioner's impairment is permanent. The surgery did not eliminate Petitioner's impairment, and Petitioner is relegated to physical therapy and pain medication as the sole medical treatment for her condition. After more than two years of such treatment, Petitioner's impairment persists. Petitioner's impairment did not prevent her from satisfactorily performing her job duties other than attendance. Disputed requests for accommodations in the form of a particular chair that was comfortable for Petitioner and in the form of the location of files in higher drawers for easier access by Petitioner were not necessary for Petitioner to perform the essential functions of her job. It is undisputed that Petitioner satisfactorily performed her job duties without those accommodations. Petitioner's impairment caused her to be absent from work six of 20 workdays between November 2 and 30, 2003, and nine of 52 workdays between December 4, 2003, and February 2, 2004. The first six absences were excessive pursuant to Respondent's written Policy HR 103. In addition, Petitioner did not provide a supervisor with prior notice or cause of absences. However, each absence was required for Petitioner to either attend physical therapy or for Petitioner to recover from physical therapy. After the first absence, Respondent knew the causes of the absences. On December 3, 2003, Petitioner and Respondent executed a Corrective Action Plan (CAP) in which Petitioner agreed there would be no further unscheduled absences. Respondent agreed to reduce the time required in HR 103 for prior notice from eight to six hours. After executing the CAP, Petitioner had nine unscheduled absences during approximately 52 workdays between December 3, 2003, and February 2, 2004. Petitioner was unable to call in to her supervisors because of problems with telephones and voicemails, including those at the facility and cellular telephones maintained by supervisors. However, Petitioner knew of the telephone problem and knew her therapy schedule. A preponderance of evidence does not support a finding that Petitioner requested Respondent either to utilize an alternative method of communication or to arrange her work schedule to accommodate Petitioner's therapy schedule. On January 30, 2003, Respondent notified Petitioner that Respondent was changing Petitioner's employment status to "on-call" because Petitioner was unable to satisfy the attendance requirements of an RSA. Petitioner refused to accept the change in status due to the uncertainties of pay and the loss of benefits. On February 2, 2004, Respondent terminated Petitioner from her employment. Petitioner's impairment is neither a "disability" nor a "handicap" within the meaning of the ADA and FCRA, respectively. The impairment did not substantially limit Petitioner's ability to perform the major life activity of working. Petitioner's impairment did not prevent her from satisfactorily performing her job duties other than attendance. A preponderance of evidence does not support a finding that Petitioner's impairment precludes her from either a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs. Petitioner showed that she has made a reasonable effort to secure other employment without success. However, a preponderance of evidence does not support a finding that Petitioner's impairment is the cause of her inability to obtain employment. The Social Security Administration denied Petitioner's disability claim. The agency found that Petitioner has received treatment for her impairment and that the impairment does affect her ability to work. However, the agency found that Petitioner is "still capable of performing" the duties of an RSA.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Commission enter a final order finding that Respondent did not discriminate against Petitioner on the basis of a disability or handicap. DONE AND ENTERED this 31st of January, 2006, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DANIEL MANRY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of January, 2006. COPIES FURNISHED: Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Phyllis J. Towzey, Esquire Law Office of Phyllis J. Towzey, P.A. The Kress Building, Suite 401 475 Central Avenue St. Petersburg, Florida 33701 Theresa A. Deeb, Esquire Deeb & Brainard, P.A. 5999 Central Avenue, Suite 202 St. Petersburg, Florida 33710
The Issue Whether the Respondent committed an unlawful employment practice by terminating the Petitioner’s employment on the basis of handicap.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner, John Tadlock, (Tadlock) is a white male, age 46, and a resident of Panama City, Bay County, Florida. The Respondent, Westinghouse Electric Company, d/b/a Bay County Energy Systems, Inc. (Energy Systems), was and is a corporation organized and existing under the laws of the State of Florida. Energy Systems maintains a facility that collects garbage and burns it as fuel. The operation serves two basic functions. First, it disposes of unwanted garbage. Second, it produces energy by creating steam that in turn drives a turbine and produces electricity. From January, 1987, until September, 1993, Tadlock was employed by Energy Systems. Tadlock began as a B-class maintenance mechanic and advanced to the position of A-class maintenance mechanic. Subsequently, Tadlock moved to the operations portion of the company where he worked on boilers. Tadlock testified that he suffered injuries while at work during the years 1987, 1991, and 1993. Tadlock further testified that after each injury he recovered fully and resumed work at Energy Systems. As a result of the injuries sustained in his accidents at Energy System, Tadlock never testified that he was informed by any physician that he would have any permanent restrictions. In addition, at no time did Tadlock inform his employer, Energy Systems, that he suffered from any disability or restrictions relating to his ability to perform his job. During the period from October, 1991 through September, 1993, Tadlock had been cited for numerous violations of company policy and provided written warnings or reprimands. The first such violation occurred on October 24, 1991, when Tadlock was cited for violating company policy by failing to wear appropriate safety gear. Specifically, Tadlock failed to wear his indirect venting goggles. The memorandum memorializing the complaint noted that just two days prior to the complaint, Tadlock had received emergency training and, in response to a direct question raised by Tadlock, was informed that he must wear venting goggles. On September 17, 1992, Tadlock was cited for a safety violation for failing to wear appropriate hearing protection devices. As a result of this violation, Tadlock was given an oral warning. On June 3, 1993, Tadlock was cited for failing to wear gloves while on the floor of the facility. As a result of this violation of safety procedure, Tadlock was orally counseled on the correct policy and informed that such departure from set safety procedures would not be acceptable. On June 14, 1993, Tadlock was cited for failing to wear a personal respirator while in specific areas of the facility in violation of published safety procedures. On June 25, 1993, Tadlock received a written warning regarding his “unsatisfactory” safety record. Specifically, Tadlock was informed that he had a total of eleven accidents since his employment and that five of them were reportable to OSHA. The memorandum warned Tadlock that if he failed to show “immediate and sustained” improvement in his accident rate that he would be subject to disciplinary action. On July 30, 1993, Tadlock was verbally warned for failing to properly replace “pig pans” under an air dryer that resulted in oil running into a water drain. On August 31, 1993, Tadlock was verbally warned for failing perform his duties as an outside operator by failing to properly read his turnover log. As a result of his lack of action, Tadlock placed 55 gallons of bleach into a drainage basin. On September 19, 1993, Tadlock was informed, for a second time, that his safety record continued to be unsatisfactory. The letter referenced two accidents that occurred in August, 1993, that could have been avoided by practicing proper safety measures. As a result of those accidents and for his many past safety violations, Tadlock was suspended for three working days. Tadlock was offered employee assistance to help him perform his work in a more satisfactory and safe manner. On September 28, 1993, Tadlock was cited for a safety violation for failing to wear the appropriate shields on his prescription glasses. On October 10, 1993, Tadlock was cited for failing to properly maintain a boiler operator sheet log. This was the second time that Tadlock had been cited for improper maintenance of a log. Tadlock was also informed that if this type of action happened again, it would result in discipline. On October 15, 1993, Tadlock was observed urinating on the Boiler Room floor of the facility. Tadlock was cited for violating several rules of company conduct. A result of violating this company policy, coupled with the countless verbal and written warnings he had received, Tadlock was dismissed for cause. At the hearing, Tadlock admitted that he urinated on the floor of the facility but countered that he had no choice because Energy Systems failed to properly maintain its restroom. Tadlock was unable to support his assertion that there were no operating restroom facilities. First, in spite of every witness called by Tadlock, there was no testimony, even from Tadlock himself, that any of the bathrooms were not in working order.4 Energy Systems maintained that it had operational restroom facilities throughout its facilities. In addition, no competent evidence was presented that indicated that any of the restroom facilities were inoperable thus requiring someone to urinate in the middle of the facility. After being fired for the numerous safety violations and for violating company policy, Tadlock filed a complaint with the Commission on Human Relations alleging that he was discriminated against because of his handicap. Specifically, Tadlock asserted that he had suffered several on-the-job injuries that rendered him disabled and that he was discriminated because of the type injury or the lack of adequate medical treatment that he received. Such allegations were never proven and appear irrelevant to these proceedings. Specifically, any issues relating to his medical treatment and his injuries are more appropriately resolved in a worker’s compensation forum. At no time during his employment with Energy Systems did Tadlock inform his employer that he suffered from a handicap. Furthermore, there is no evidence that Energy Systems was aware that Tadlock suffered a disability or handicap. For example, Mr. James M. Leddy, the plant manager for Energy Systems testified that he was not aware of any condition which prevented Tadlock from functioning in a normal manner. The record is void of any evidence by a physician to indicate that Tadlock was considered disabled or handicapped. Mr. Dale J. McKeand, Manager of Plant Operations for Energy Systems, stated that Tadlock was not disabled and never asked for any accommodation for his “condition.” In addition, Mr. Richard S. Brookins, an industrial hygiene, safety and environmental coordinator for Energy Systems, stated that Tadlock worked full-time with no medical or duty restrictions and that he was terminated for his safety violations including urinating on the boiler room floor. Assuming that Tadlock could prove that he was handicapped, his actions after he was dismissed do not indicate a person with a handicap. Specifically, immediately after Tadlock’s dismissal, Tadlock opened a skinning shop for the purpose of skinning wild game (alligators, etc.). Skinning is a very physical job and it requires an individual to handle large game animals for the purpose of skinning hides from the carcasses of the animals. For the reasons stated above, there is no evidence to support that Tadlock was dismissed for any reason other than cause.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that this matter be dismissed with prejudice. DONE and ORDERED this 27th day of March, 1997, at Tallahassee, Florida. ` WILLIAM A. BUZZETT Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of March, 1997.
The Issue Whether Petitioner was eligible for membership in the Florida Retirement System (FRS) during the effective dates of the Client Service Agreement (Agreement) between Petitioner and ADP TotalSource Services, Inc. (TotalSource).1 Whether Respondent is estopped to deny Petitioner’s request to purchase retirement credit for the subject employees during the seven-month period during which the Agreement was in effect.
Findings Of Fact TCT is an independent special taxing district of local government established pursuant to Section 1.01(A)(11) of the Miami-Dade County Home Rule Charter; Ordinance No. 02-247, Sections 1-11 (adopted December 3, 2002); and Section 125.901, Florida Statutes, et. seq., for the provision of children’s services. TCT is devoted to funding “improvements for the children of Miami-Dade County in the areas of health, safety, parental responsibility, community responsibility and other necessary and important services.” Miami-Dade County Code Art. CIII, §§ 2-1521-2-1531. Other special taxing districts for services in the State of Florida participate in the FRS. On July 23, 2003, officials from TCT contacted DOR to communicate TCT’s desire to participate in FRS and request instructions on how to enroll its employees for FRS retirement benefits. On July 24, 2003, Ms. Smith, acting in her capacity as a benefits administrator employed by Respondent, forwarded to TCT an FRS membership package which included a Resolution relating to FRS membership to be approved by TCT’s Board and two accompanying FRS Agreements. On July 30, 2003, Resolution #2003-01, Resolution Relating to Membership into the FRS, was adopted by TCT’s Board. On September 1, 2003, after receiving TCT’s Notice of Employer Identification Number from the Internal Revenue Service on August 27, 2003, Mr. Abety, in his capacity as the president and CEO of TCT, signed the two FRS Agreements. On September 9, 2003, Mr. Abety sent a letter to Ms. Smith enclosing the two FRS Agreements, TCT’s Resolution Relating to Membership into the FRS, and the IRS Notice of Employer Identification Number, fully expecting that FRS coverage would be initiated on October 1, 2003. Mr. Abety again corresponded with Ms. Smith on September 17, 2003, to advise that TCT would make its retirement contributions to FRS by check and asked if FRS preferred bi- weekly or monthly payments. On September 5, TCT entered into the Agreement with TotalSource to provide TCT with payroll, health insurance, life insurance, short and long-term disability insurance, and dental and vision coverage. TotalSource did not provide TCT employees with any retirement benefits. After reviewing TCT’s Agreement with TotalSource, FRS advised TCT on September 23, 2003, that because it appeared the employees covered under the Agreement would be under the control and direction of TotalSource, they were employees of a private company and thus ineligible for FRS benefits. Following Respondent’s denial of participation in FRS, TCT began the process of entering into a new agreement for the provision of personnel services with a vendor other than TotalSource. On February 18, 2004, TCT emailed DOR a new proposed agreement between TCT and AlphaStaff for the provision of payroll, insurance and other human resources services in order to determine if the agreement would permit FRS benefits to begin for TCT employees. On April 20, 2004, FRS determined that the agreement between TCT and AlphaStaff would not bar the workforce of TCT from participating in FRS because AlphaStaff provided only “routine personnel services” to TCT.3 After approving the agreement between TCT and AlphaStaff, DOR accepted TCT as an FRS member effective May 1, 2004. On April 22, 2004, TCT transmitted to DOR the County Ordinance creating TCT, two FRS Agreements, a Resolution Relating to Membership in FRS, TCT’s federal employer tax identification number, and a notification that a fully executed agreement between TCT and AlphaStaff would be forwarded on April 26, 2004. The two FRS Agreements, the Resolution, and the employer tax identification number were identical to those sent to FRS in September 2003. The agreement between TCT and AlphaStaff that had been approved by FRS was fully executed on April 26, 2004. On April 29, 2004, DOR signed and approved the FRS Agreement to commence FRS benefits effective May 1, 2004. Per letter dated May 7, 2004, DOR advised TCT that “since your agency did not qualify for FRS membership until May 1, 2004, past service cannot be purchased prior to the amendment date.” Per letter dated May 27, 2004, Mr. Abety requested the FRS effective date be changed to October 1, 2003. Throughout the period TCT attempted to secure FRS membership. TCT did not participate in any other retirement plan. After being informed in September 2003 that its contract with TotalSource precluded participation in FRS, TCT was engaged in the process of entering into an agreement for personnel services that DOR would find acceptable. On June 23, 2004, TCT received notice of a final agency action from DOR in which DOR rejected TCT’s request to purchase past service and advised TCT of its appeal rights. TCT filed its Petition to review final agency action requesting an evidentiary proceeding on July 15, 2004. Past FRS benefits are being requested for the seven- month period beginning October 1, 2003 and ending May 1, 2004. The 18 TCT employees affected are:4 Modesto E. Abety Lilia R. Abril Emily Cardenas Dwight Danie Robin J. Douglas David C. Freeman Lisete Fuertes K. Lori Hanson Andrea Harris Chareka Hawes Christine Muriel Jeanty Jolie C. Jerry Jean S. Logan Susan B. Marian Eric R. Pinzon Diana Ragbeer Deborah Robinson Margaret L. Santiago The six employees who are vested in the FRS are: Modesto E. Abety Dwight Danie Andrea Harris Jolie C. Jerry Diana Ragbeer Deborah Robinson. TotalSource is a licensed employee leasing company under Part XI of Chapter 468, Florida Statutes. “Employee leasing” is defined by Section 468.520(4), Florida Statutes, as being “. . . an arrangement whereby a leasing company assigns its employees to a client and allocates the direction and control over the leased employees between the leasing company and the client ”5 TCT is referred to as the “client” in the Agreement between TotalSource and TCT. Section (1) of the Agreement, styled “The Parties Relationship,” provides as follows: The parties intend to create an arrangement so that TotalSource, as the Professional Employer Organization (PEO), can provide human resource services to Client. As provided by the Florida legislature, TotalSource shall have sufficient authority so as to maintain a right of direction and control over Worksite Employees (defined in Section 2) assigned to Client’s location, and shall retain the authority to hire, terminate, discipline, and reassign Worksite Employees. Client shall, however, retain sufficient direction and control over the Worksite Employees as is necessary to conduct Client’s business and without which Client would be unable to conduct its business, discharge any fiduciary responsibility that it may have, or comply with an applicable licensure, regulatory, or statutory requirement of Client. Such authority maintained by Client shall include the right to accept or cancel the assignment of any Worksite Employee. Additionally, Client shall have sole and exclusive control over the day to day job duties of Worksite Employees and over the job site at which, or from which, Worksite Employees perform their services. Client expressly absolves TotalSource of liability which results from control over the Worksite Employee’s day-to-day job duties and the job site at which, or from which, Worksite Employees perform their services. Further, Client retains full responsibility for its business products and services, worksite premises, property, and any actions by an third party, contractor, independent contractor or non-Worksite Employee. Client acknowledges that TotalSource has the right to retain and reassign a Worksite Employee who has been terminated by Client. Section 2 of the Agreement, styled “TotalSource Relationship to the Worksite Employees,” provides as follows: The term “Worksite Employees” means individuals hired by TotalSource, assigned to Client’s worksite, after the individuals [have] satisfactorily completed TotalSource pre-employment paperwork [and] background screens as necessary. Client agrees to submit to TotalSource the completed TotalSource pre-employment paperwork no later than two (2) business days after the Client selects the person for employment. The term excludes 1) those employees hired by TotalSource to perform services for TotalSource and not assigned to any Client Worksite (i.e., TotalSource Corporate Employees), and 2) Independent contractors or individuals who may be providing services to Client through any other arrangement entered into solely by Client. TotalSource will notify all Worksite Employees in writing about the PEO arrangement at the beginning and end of this Agreement. During the Agreement, both Client and TotalSource will employ each Worksite Employee. This Agreement does not change the underlying employment relationship between any Worksite Employee and Client that existed prior to or may be created after the Effective Date. Further, this Agreement does not create any rights for any Worksite Employee that did not previously exist (e.g., creating an employment contract with the Worksite Employee). In Section 5(F) of the Agreement, the parties acknowledge that the Client exercises control over the primary terms and conditions of employment for the subject employees. Miguel Masedo was the General Manager for the Southeastern operations for TotalSource when it entered into the Agreement with TCT. Mr. Masedo did not negotiate the Agreement between his company and TCT, but he did sign the Agreement, and he testified as to the manner in which his company operated with TCT. Mr. Masedo’s deposition was admitted as Joint Exhibit 17. On page 22, beginning at line 12, the following Questions from Ms. Arista-Volsky and Answers from Mr. Masedo appear: Q. Okay. Earlier you told me and we discussed that The Trust employees in fact were hired by The Trust before they contracted with your services, correct? A. Yes. Q. So basically when they entered into this contract and were put on the payroll for the purposes of payroll processing, that’s when you make the determination, or you’re saying that they became . . . [sic] A. We actually hired them into ADP TotalSource, they signed new documentation, I-9s, W-4s, they gave us their employment information, so we literally hired them on to ADP TotalSource.[6] On page 23, beginning at line 13, the following Questions from Ms. Arista-Volsky and Answers from Mr. Masedo appear: Q. And the Client Services Agreement did not change the underlying employment relationship between The Trust and its employees; correct? A. What the Client Services Agreement did was it defined us as another employer for these employees, so we are under a co- employment relationship, so certain employment responsibilities would have been the responsibilities of The Trust and would have remained, and other employment responsibilities would have transferred over to ADP TotalSource. TotalSource was the named employer on each employee’s W-2 forms. For each subject employee, TotalSource also paid social security taxes and provided workers’ compensation coverage. TotalSource issued salary warrants to each employee. These payments were to be from funds TCT was required by the Agreement to pay to TotalSource. TotalSource was, by the terms of the Agreement, responsible for the payment of the subject employees even if TCT failed to make its required payments to TotalSource. Although by the terms of the Agreement, TotalSource had legal authority to hire, supervise, and discipline the subject employees, TotalSource rarely exercised those rights in dealing with a client and it did not do so in its dealings with TCT. TotalSource never attempted to control or run the affairs of TCT. It never attempted to exercise any direction or control over Mr. Abety or any other subject employee. TCT initially recruited and hired all of the subject employees. At no time during the period at issue did a TotalSource corporate employee come to the TCT worksite for the purposes of supervising or monitoring the activities of the subject employees. TCT controlled the daily activities of the subject employees at all times relevant to this proceeding. At all times relevant to this proceeding, Mr. Abety and his staff set the terms and conditions of employment for the subject employees and supervised the day-to-day operations of TCT. At no time relevant to this proceeding did Mr. Abety, acting on behalf of TCT, intend for TotalSource to exercise any control over the subject employees. Mr. Abety intended only that TotalSource provide human resources services in the forms of payroll services, worker’s compensation coverage, and a benefits package (excluding a retirement plan). Mr. Abety testified that he did not construe the Agreement as being a contract to lease the subject employees from TotalSource. Based on the findings that follow, it is found that Mr. Abety knew or should have known that he was entering into an employee leasing agreement with TotalSource. As set forth above, in the Agreement, TotalSource refers to itself as a Professional Employer Organization, which is a term for an employee leasing company. The Agreement provides that TotalSource shall have “. . . sufficient authority so as to maintain a right of direction and control over Worksite Employees . . . and shall retain the authority to hire, terminate, discipline, and reassign Worksite Employees. ” Moreover, in the final paragraph of the Agreement, under the heading of “Additional Client Representation” the following appears: “Client understands that, pursuant to Florida law, it may not enter into a PEO (sometimes referred to as an employee leasing) agreement with TotalSource if Client owes a current or prior PEO any money pursuant to any service agreement which existed between that current or prior PEO and Client, or if Client owes a current or prior insurer any premium payments. . . . DOR denied TCT’s request for past service because, under the terms of the Agreement, and Part XI of Chapter 468, Florida Statutes, the subject employees appeared to be employees of TotalSource. In its letter dated June 23, 2004, with the style of “Final Agency Action”, DOR advised Mr. Abety that TCT “. . . joined the FRS effective May 1, 2004 and is ineligible to purchase past service since prior to that date the employees were employed by ADP TotalSource Services, Inc., a private company.” While the Agreement was in effect, the subject employees were employees of both TCT and TotalSource for certain purposes. Under the Agreement between TotalSource and TCT, TotalSource and TCT were dual or joint employers. There was a co-employment relationship. DOR agrees that TCT and TotalSource were co-employers or joint employers. In paragraph 25 of its Proposed Recommended Order, DOR submitted the proposed finding of fact that during the effective dates of the Agreement, the subject employees were “. . . dual or joint employers. There [was] a co-employment arrangement.” In paragraph 53 of its Proposed Recommended Order, DOR proposed the following conclusion of law: 53. However, the totality of the evidence establishes that TotalSource and Children’s Trust are, as Mr. Masedo testified, ‘under a co-employment relationship.’ Children’s Trust and TotalSource were inextricably linked as co-employers, or joint or dual employers. They both shared attributes of being an ‘employer.’ Prior to entering into the Agreement, staff of TCT contacted staff of DOR to inquire what needed to be done for TCT employees to become members of the FRS. DOR staff advised that a membership package would be mailed and that the TCT employees would become part of the FRS after the membership package was processed. For service performed by TCT employees prior to the date TCT became part of the FRS, DOR staff advised that TCT employees could purchase credit for that prior service period if TCT did not participate in another retirement plan. TCT maintains that the information provided by DOR staff that TCT could participate in FRS as long as TCT did not participate in another retirement plan was misleading. TCT further maintains that it detrimentally relied on that misleading information from DOR and that DOR should be estopped to deny the right to purchase credit for the seven-month period at issue in this proceeding. TCT did not disclose to DOR that they were contemplating entering into the Agreement with TotalSource prior to doing so. Consequently, DOR had no reason to discuss with TCT its position that the Agreement would preclude TCT’s membership in FRS. DOR staff gave TCT staff accurate advice based on the information provided to DOR by TCT. TCT would not have executed the Agreement had it known that the terms of the Agreement would disqualify it from membership in FRS. Most of the subject employees were initially recruited by TCT because they were experienced government employees. It was important to TCT from its inception that its employees continue to be eligible for FRS benefits. TCT made diligent efforts to locate a suitable human resources provider to replace TotalSource after it learned from DOR that the terms of the Agreement disqualified the subject employees from membership in FRS. It took TCT almost the entire seven-month period at issue in this proceeding to locate the replacement provider (AlphaStaff).
Recommendation Based upon the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent enter a Final Order providing that TCT be granted membership in FRS effective October 1, 2003, and that it be permitted to purchase retirement credit for the subject employees for the seven-month period beginning October 1, 2003, and ending April 30, 2004. DONE AND ENTERED this 28th day of April, 2006, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S CLAUDE B. ARRINGTON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of April, 2006.
The Issue The issues are whether Respondent is guilty of pleading nolo contendere to three counts of uttering a forged instrument, three counts of forgery, and three counts of grand theft so as to constitute a demonstrated lack of fitness or trustworthiness to engage in the business of insurance, in violation of Section 626.611(7), Florida Statutes; willful failure to comply with any provision of this Code, in violation of Section 626.611(13), Florida Statutes; a finding of guilty or pleading of guilty or nolo contendere to a felony involving a crime of moral turpitude, in violation of Section 626.611(14), Florida Statutes, any cause for which issuance of the license or permit could have been refused or denied by Petitioner, pursuant to Section 626.621(1), Florida Statutes; and a finding of guilty of pleading of guilty or nolo contendere to a felony, in violation of Section 626.621(8), Florida Statutes. An additional issue is whether Respondent failed to notify Petitioner of her plea of nolo contendere within 30 days, as required by Section 626.621(11), Florida Statutes. If Petitioner prevails on any of these issues, another issue is the penalty that should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact At all material times, Respondent has been licensed as a Customer Representative. On February 23, 2001, Respondent pleaded no contest to three counts of uttering a forged instrument--i.e., a bank check--on August 10, 2000, in violation of Section 831.02, Florida Statutes; three counts of forgery of a public record on August 10, 2000, in violation of Section 831.01, Florida Statutes; and three counts of third-degree grand theft on August 10, 2000, in violation of Section 812.014, Florida Statutes. She also agreed to pay restitution of $1892.87 and court costs. By Community Supervision Order entered February 27, 2001, the court accepted the plea, withheld adjudication, placed Respondent on two years' probation, required Respondent to pay restitution of $1892.87, and required Respondent to pay court costs. Respondent entered the plea of no contest to avoid the expense of a trial. She relied on the advice of her criminal attorney that this disposition of the criminal case would have no effect on her insurance license. She was unaware of her obligation to inform Petitioner of her entry of a no contest plea to these nine charges. Respondent finished paying restitution in March 2003 and has successfully completed her probation. One of her witnesses testified that he has worked with Respondent in the past and is aware of the conduct described above. He testified that he is establishing a new insurance agency in January 2004 and, if her licensing situation permits, he intends to employ her in that office.
Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Financial Services enter a final order finding Respondent guilty of violating Sections 626.611(14) and 626.621(11) and suspending her Customer Representative license for five months. DONE AND ENTERED this 27th day of August, 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ROBERT E. MEALE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of August, 2003. COPIES FURNISHED: Honorable Tom Gallagher Chief Financial Officer Department of Financial Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Mark Casteel, General Counsel Department of Financial Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 R. Terry Butler, Senior Attorney Division of Legal Services Department of Financial Services 200 East Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0333 Karen Marie Maldonado 701 Southwest Ravenswood West Port St. Lucie, Florida 34983
The Issue At issue in this proceeding is whether Respondent committed the offenses set forth in the Administrative Complaint, as amended,1 and, if so, what penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Department of State, Division of Licensing (Department), is a state agency charged, inter alia, with the duty and responsibility to license and regulate private security, investigative, and repossession services pursuant to Chapter 493, Florida Statutes. Respondent, Jonas Mercier, is now, and was at all times material to this case, licensed by the Department as a Class "D" Security Officer, having been issued license number D97-00533. From January 9, 1997, until March 3, 1997, Respondent was employed as a security officer by Borg-Warner Protective Services (Borg-Warner), a business which provides security services. Among Borg-Warner's clients during the period of Respondent's employment were Hertz Rent-A-Car (Hertz) and Shaw Trucking. On February 1, 1997, Respondent's assignment was to provide security services at the Hertz maintenance facility in Broward County, Florida. At 7:30 a.m., during the course of his shift, Respondent was found sleeping on duty by the client's director of security. For this offense, Respondent received an "official reprimand" from his employer. On Sunday, March 2, 1997, Respondent's assignment was to provide security services at Shaw Trucking in Broward County, Florida. His shift was to begin at 9:00 p.m. Respondent telephoned the Borg-Warner dispatcher, and reported for duty at the appointed time. During the course of that conversation, the dispatcher apprised Respondent that the road supervisor, Moses Osgood (Osgood), would not arrive until approximately 11:00 p.m. to open the padlocks. Osgood arrived at Shaw Trucking at 10:28 p.m. on March 2, 1997, and found that Respondent had left his assigned post without notice to, or permission from, Borg-Warner. Osgood remained at the post until Respondent returned at 11:08 p.m., and resumed his post. Respondent's explanation for his absence was that, since Osgood was not scheduled to arrive until 11:00 p.m., he had gone to get something to eat. In his absence, however, the client's premises were without security. Respondent was discharged by his employer on March 3, 1997, for having left his post without notice or authorization.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered finding Respondent guilty of Counts I and II of the Administrative Complaint and that, as a penalty for such offenses, Respondent's Class "D" Security Officer License be revoked. DONE AND ENTERED this 23rd day of March, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. WILLIAM J. KENDRICK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of March, 1998.
