The Issue Whether the Respondent committed the violations alleged in the Amended Administrative Complaint filed with the Division of Administrative Hearings on September 15, 2000, and, if so, the penalty that should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Based on the oral and documentary evidence presented at the final hearing and on the entire record of this proceeding, the following findings of fact are made: The Department of Insurance is the state agency responsible for licensing insurance agents in Florida and with regulating their conduct. Section 624.307 and Chapter 626, Part I, Florida Statutes (1999). At the times material to this proceeding, Ingrid Machado was Florida-licensed insurance agent. In March 1999, Teresita Baldor was interested in purchasing health insurance. Ms. Baldor had previously owned a private school and had been insured through the school's group health insurance policy. After she sold the school and began teaching mathematics at Miami-Dade Community College and Saint Thomas University, she no longer had health insurance coverage. On or about March 10, 1999, Ms. Machado met with Ms. Baldor at Ms. Baldor's home. Ms. Baldor knew Ms. Machado only as an insurance agent and did not know whether Ms. Machado was affiliated with an insurance agency. Ms. Machado told Ms. Baldor during the March 10, 1999, visit that she would try to place Ms. Baldor in a group for health insurance purposes but that she did not know at that time the group Ms. Baldor would be placed in or the name of the insurance company that would provide the health insurance coverage. Ms. Machado told Ms. Baldor during the visit that she would let Ms. Baldor know the name of the company providing her coverage and that she would send Ms. Baldor the coverage information. During her March 10, 1999, visit to Ms. Baldor's home, Ms. Machado asked Ms. Baldor for general identification information, such as her name and social security number, and for other information, such as her weight. Ms. Baldor did not sign any document during this visit and cannot recall if Ms. Machado completed any form during their conversation. Ms. Machado asked Ms. Baldor to make out two checks, one in the amount of $175.00 and one in the amount of $100.00, but Ms. Baldor does not remember Ms. Machado's telling her the reason she needed two separate checks. Ms. Machado asked Ms. Baldor to leave the line for the name of the payee blank, again telling Ms. Baldor that she did not yet know which insurance company would ultimately provide health insurance coverage to Ms. Baldor. Ms. Machado told Ms. Baldor that the name of the company would be filled in on the checks at a later time. Ms. Machado told Ms. Baldor that she would have health insurance coverage effective March 15, 1999. On or about March 20, 1999, Ms. Baldor telephoned Ms. Machado because Ms. Baldor had not received any information regarding health insurance coverage. Ms. Machado told Ms. Baldor that she was having complications with her pregnancy and could no longer handle Ms. Baldor's insurance matters. Ms. Machado gave Ms. Baldor the telephone number of the "Durey Agency," told her that this agency would work with her to obtain health insurance coverage, and gave her Ray Gonzalez's name. Ms. Machado had no further contact with Ms. Baldor after the telephone conversation on or about March 20, 1999, during the times material to this proceeding. At some point, Ms. Baldor called the telephone number Ms. Machado had given her to find out why she had not received any information regarding her health insurance coverage. Ms. Baldor told the person who answered the phone, a woman named Maria, that she wanted her checks back if she could not give her any information "right then." Later the same day, Maria called Ms. Baldor and told her that she had been placed in a group for health insurance purposes. A Neighborhood Health Partnership Enrollment Form was submitted to the Neighborhood Health Partnership on behalf of Ms. Baldor. On the form, Ms. Baldor was identified as an employee of "International Marketing." A signature appeared on the bottom of the form purporting to be that of Ms. Baldor, and the date next to the signature was "5/10/99." Ms. Baldor never saw the Neighborhood Health Partnership Enrollment Form. A few weeks after Maria told Ms. Baldor that she had been placed in a group for health insurance purposes, Ms. Baldor received a package from the Neighborhood Health Partnership that contained an identification card indicating that she was enrolled in the "International Marketing Group" and indicating that her insurance coverage with the Neighborhood Health Partnership was effective as of June 15, 1999. During Ms. Baldor's conversations with Ms. Machado, Ms. Machado never mentioned the Neighborhood Health Partnership or International Marketing Group. The checks Ms. Baldor provided to Ms. Machado were made payable to the Durey Insurance Group and were processed by the bank on or about May 17, 1999. In addition, Ms. Baldor wrote checks to the Durey Insurance Group dated July 10, 1999, and August 9, 1999, as payment for her health insurance premiums. Ms. Baldor's insurance coverage with the Neighborhood Health Partnership was eventually cancelled. It was Ms. Baldor's understanding that it was cancelled because the Durey Insurance Group did not remit her premium to the Neighborhood Health Partnership and because the "International Marketing Group" in which she was placed by the Durey Insurance Group did not exist. Summary The evidence presented by the Department is not sufficient to establish with the requisite degree of certainty that Ms. Machado's actions with respect to her dealings with Ms. Baldor demonstrated a lack of fitness or trustworthiness or demonstrated that Ms. Machado lacked reasonably adequate knowledge and technical competence to engage in the transaction of insurance. The Department presented no evidence to establish any standards of skill, ability, knowledge, or competence by which Ms. Machado's acts or omissions can be judged to determine if she committed any of the violations with which Ms. Machado is charged. It is not possible to determine from the evidence presented if Ms. Machado's actions deviated from a standard of fitness or trustworthiness which a reasonably prudent insurance agent would be expected to exhibit under the circumstances or if Ms. Machado's conduct fell below a standard establishing the degree of knowledge and technical competence which a reasonably prudent insurance agent would be expected to exhibit under the circumstances. 2/ The evidence presented by the Department is not sufficient to establish with the requisite degree of certainty that Ms. Machado engaged in any unfair method of competition or deceptive practices or knowingly made any misrepresentations to Ms. Baldor regarding health insurance coverage. The uncontroverted evidence establishes that Ms. Machado took some minimal information from Ms. Baldor and told her she would place her in a group for health insurance coverage. The uncontroverted evidence further establishes that Ms. Machado did not represent to Ms. Baldor that she would place Ms. Baldor in any specific group, that she would place Ms. Baldor with any particular insurance company, 3/ or that Ms. Baldor would be provided with any specific coverage or benefits. The evidence presented by the Department is not sufficient to establish with the requisite degree of certainty that Ms. Machado knowingly collected from Ms. Baldor any sums in excess of premium because, at the time Ms. Machado collected the two checks from Ms. Baldor, Ms. Machado did not know which insurance company would write health insurance coverage for Ms. Baldor and, therefore, did not know what the premium would be. The evidence presented by the Department is not sufficient to establish with the requisite degree of certainty that Ms. Machado knowingly collected from Ms. Baldor any premium for insurance that was not, in due course, provided. The uncontroverted evidence establishes that Ms. Machado initially agreed to procure health insurance coverage for Ms. Baldor; however, because of her pregnancy, Ms. Machado referred Ms. Baldor to the Durey Insurance Group approximately ten days after Ms. Machado's only meeting with Ms. Baldor and advised Ms. Baldor that the Durey Insurance Group would assist Ms. Baldor in obtaining health insurance. There is no persuasive evidence establishing that Ms. Machado knew or should have known that Durey Insurance Group would not, in due course, provide legitimate health insurance coverage to Ms. Baldor. The evidence presented by the Department is not sufficient to establish that Ms. Machado had any involvement, directly or indirectly, in the transaction in which the Durey Insurance Group identified Ms. Baldor as an employee of "International Marketing" and obtained health insurance for Ms. Baldor with the Neighborhood Health Partnership as a member of the "International Marketing Group." 4/ Furthermore, the evidence presented by the Department is not sufficient to establish with the requisite degree of certainty that Ms. Machado's actions made her a source of injury to Ms. Baldor or anyone else. As noted above, the uncontroverted evidence establishes that, soon after Ms. Machado's visit with Ms. Baldor on March 10, 1999, Ms. Machado advised Ms. Baldor that she could not act as Ms. Baldor's agent in placing her with a health insurance company, that she had sent Ms. Baldor's information and checks to the Durey Insurance Group, and that Ms. Baldor should contact the Durey Insurance Group for further assistance. Ms. Baldor's contacts subsequent to the latter part of March 1999 with respect to her health insurance coverage were exclusively with personnel who purported to be affiliated with the Durey Insurance Group. A representative of the Durey Insurance Group notified Ms. Baldor that her health insurance would be provided by the Neighborhood Health Partnership, and Ms. Baldor's premium checks were made payable to the Durey Insurance Group. Finally, the Neighborhood Health Partnership Enrollment Form identifying Ms. Baldor as an employee of International Marketing is dated approximately two months after Ms. Machado's last contact with Ms. Baldor, and the Department failed to present any evidence tending to establish that Ms. Machado had any involvement in the preparation of this form.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Insurance issue a final order dismissing the Amended Administrative Complaint against Ingrid Machado. DONE AND ENTERED this 15th day of November, 2000, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. PATRICIA HART MALONO Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of November, 2000.
Findings Of Fact The Respondent has been licensed by the Department of Insurance as an insurance agent since 1966. Prior to the initiation of this proceeding, he has not been the subject of any disciplinary action by the Department. The Respondent has had a successful career as an insurance agent, and has been an active member of his community. During 1977 the Respondent actively marketed membership in a program known as the National Business Conference Employee Benefit Association (NBCEBA). The program offered by NBCEBA constituted a health insurance plan, and as such was subject to regulation under the Florida Insurance Code. The NBCEBA program operated as if it were exempt from state regulation under the Federal Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), Chapter 18, United States Code, Sections 1001, et seq. Qualified plans under ERISA were not subject to regulation under state insurance codes. The plan offered by NBCEBA did not qualify as an ERISA plan. Such plans could only be offered by employee organizations. NBCEBA solicited members who were employed by diverse employers, and who participated in diverse occupations. Membership in NBCEBA thus lacked the commonality of employment status among members required of employee organizations under ERISA. Since the plan offered by NBCEBA did not qualify as an ERISA plan, it was subject to regulation by the State of Florida as a program of insurance. Indeed, the essence of the NBCEBA plan was to offer a program of insurance to its "members." NBCEBA has never held a certificate of authority to transact an insurance business in the State of Florida. The Department of Insurance became aware of the plan being offered by NBCEBA to Florida citizens. The Department came to the conclusion that the plan constituted Insurance program not subject to exemption from state regulation under ERISA. By letter dated September 26, 1977, the Department advised Florida agents who were selling memberships in the NBCEBA program of its opinion that the program did not qualify for exemption from state regulation under ERISA, and that NBCEBA was acting as an unauthorized insurer in Florida. The letter requested that the agents cease and desist from further solicitation of prospective members of the plan. This letter was sent to the Respondent. The Respondent received it in the ordinary course of the mail. Shortly after sending this letter, the Department requested an opinion from the United States Department of Labor as to whether the NBCEBA program was exempt from state regulation. During March, 1978, the Department received a response in which the United States Department of Labor advised that in its opinion, NBCEBA was not a qualified program under Chapter 18, United States Code, and that the NBCEBA plan was subject to regulation by the State of Florida. After receiving the letter from the Department advising him of its opinion that the NBCEBA plan was not a qualified insurance program, the Respondent discussed the letter with Mr. Robert Klein, the owner of Planned Marketing Systems. Planned Marketing Systems was the general agent for the NBCEBA program in Florida. Mr. Klein advised the Respondent that the plan would eventually be approved in Florida. The Respondent did not cease marketing the NBCEBA plan. On or about October 31, 1977, he completed an application and accepted a premium payment for membership in the plan on behalf of Mr. Rafael Sanchez. Sanchez had been a friend of the Respondent and had used the Respondent as his insurance agent. The premiums on Sanchez's health insurance policy had increased dramatically during 1977. Membership in the NBCEBA plan was considerably cheaper than premiums that Sanchez needed to pay for other health insurance programs. Sanchez did not appear as a witness at the hearing, and the evidence would not support a finding as to what, if any, representations were made by the Respondent to Sanchez respecting the failure of NBCEBA to qualify as an insurance plan under the laws of the State of Florida. The evidence would not support a finding as to whether Respondent advised Sanchez as to his correspondence from the Department relating to NBCEBA. During May, 1978, Sanchez made an application to NBCEBA for benefits. NBCEBA did not honor the claim, and has since filed for bankruptcy in the United States District Court for the District of Oregon. Sanchez has thus been left liable to pay medical expenses that should have been covered under the NBCEBA plan.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner resigned from State Government on July 23, 1987. At the time of his resignation, Petitioner was covered under the Florida State Group Health Insurance Plan. His wife, who is a diabetic, was also covered under Petitioner's insurance. Upon termination Petitioner was eligible for continuation of coverage benefits under the federal COBRA Act. However, prior to receiving any notice of his COBRA rights, Petitioner elected to continue his State Employees' Insurance for two months from July 1, 1987 and then begin coverage under his new employer's insurance plan. 2/ Petitioner made advance payment on the 2 months additional coverage. The payments carried his State Employees' health insurance through September 1, 1987 when it was terminated. DOA notified Petitioner on August 27, 1987, of his right to elect continuation of coverage under the COBRA Act. This notice complied with the notice requirements under the COBRA Act. COBRA provides continued health insurance coverage for up to (18) months, after a covered employee leaves employment. However, coverage does not continue beyond the time the employee is covered under another group health plan. COBRA simply fills the gap between two different employers group health insurance plans so that an employee's group health insurance does not lapse while the employee changes jobs. Petitioner's new employer's health coverage began around September 1, 1987. After Petitioner had begun coverage under his new insurance plan, he discovered that his wife's preexisting diabetic condition would not be covered. However, no evidence was presented that Petitioner, within 60 days of September 1, 1987 requested the Division of State Employee's Insurance to continue his insurance coverage pursuant to COBRA. Moreover, Petitioner's COBRA rights terminated when he began his coverage under his new employer's health plan.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Administration enter a Final Order denying Petitioner's request for continuation of coverage under COBRA. DONE and ENTERED this 5th day of April, 1989, in Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE CLEAVINGER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of April, 1989.
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following relevant facts are found: Prior to the institution of this proceeding, Petitioner had undergone surgical sterilization through a procedure known as a vasectomy. Subsequent to the Petitioner having the vasectomy, Petitioner made a decision to have the procedure surgically reversed. At all times material to this proceeding, Petitioner was a member of the State of Florida Employees Group Health Self Insurance Plan (Plan). At some time prior to having the vasectomy surgically reversed the Petitioner obtained and reviewed the Brochure from the Plan (Petitioner's Exhibit 1). Page 1 of the Brochure advises the members of the Plan (members) that the Brochure is "not a contract since it does not include all of the provisions, definitions, benefits, exclusions, and limitations" of the Plan and that its purpose is to furnish members a summary of the benefits available under the Plan and provides a regular telephone number and a SunCom telephone number for the Office of State Employees Insurance (OSEI) in Tallahassee, Florida for the members to call if there are any questions. Page 4 of the Brochure contains a paragraph entitled "Benefit Inquiries" and provides a regular telephone number and a SunCom telephone number for members to call the OSEI on questions concerning benefits. Page 12 of the Brochure contains a paragraph entitled "Claims Inquiries" and provides a TOLL FREE WATS LINE number for the Jacksonville Office of Blue Cross and Blue Shield for members to use when calling that office on questions concerning claims or claims problems. OSEI interprets "Claims Inquiries" to mean inquiries concerning payment, nonpayment or timeliness of claims as distinguished from whether certain services are covered under the Plan which would be "Benefit Inquiry". Page 9 of the Brochure contains a paragraph entitled "Limitations and Exclusions" wherein surgery to reverse surgical sterilization is listed as one of those procedures that the Plan finds necessary to limit or exclude payment. Immediately above the paragraph entitled "Limitations and Exclusions" on page 9 the Brochure advises the member that exclusions and limitations are contained in the Benefit Document on file in the individual's personnel office and the OSEI in Tallahassee, Florida. The Benefit Document is defined on page 2 of the Brochure as the document containing "the provisions, benefits, definitions, exclusions and limitations of the" Plan. Section VII, EXCLUSIONS, subparagraph P. of the State Employees Group Health Insurance Benefit Document (Document) (Respondent's Exhibit 3) specifically excludes surgery to reverse surgical sterilization procedures from coverage under the Plan. The Department of Administration has been designated by the Florida Legislature as the State agency responsible for the administration of the Plan and to make the final determination as what benefits are covered under the Plan in accordance with the Document. There was no evidence presented to show that this responsibility had been delegated to Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Florida, Inc. (Administrator) who was selected by the competitive bid process to provide claims payment services, actuarial and printing services, and medical underwriting of late enrollee applications. Before having surgery to reverse surgical sterilization, the Petitioner contacted the Jacksonville Office of the Administrator and was advised by an unidentified person in that office that the Plan would cover the hospital costs for reverse surgical sterilization but would not cover the doctor's fee. The Petitioner did not at any time material to this proceeding contact the OSEI in Tallahassee or the local personnel office concerning the Plan's coverage of surgery to reverse surgical sterilization. Petitioner acted on the advice of the unidentified person in the Jacksonville Office of Blue Cross and Blue Shield, plus his reading of the Brochure, to come to the conclusion that there was a limitation on the benefits available under the Plan for surgery to reverse surgical sterilization rather than an exclusion of benefits for that procedure; the limitation being that the Plan would pay for hospital costs but not the doctor's fees. Prior to entering the hospital, the Petitioner's admission, being elective, was certified under the Plan's Preadmission Certification Program. However, the Petitioner was advised that the admission being certified did not mean that the services requested were covered under the Plan and that the services rendered would be subject to the limitations and exclusions listed in the Plan. On or about July 30, 1986, Petitioner was admitted to Fish Memorial Hospital where Dr. Youngman performed surgery to reverse surgical sterilization and was discharged on July 31, 1986. After surgery was performed, claims were made under the Plan and, the State of Florida, through the Administrator, made the following payments in connection with the surgery: (a) Fish Memorial Hospital - $935.10; (b) Southeast Volusia Radiology Associates - $19.10; (c) Clifford Chu, M.D. - $742.00 and; (d) Robert Charles Youngman, M.D. - 742.00 Although claims made by the different health care providers (providers) for the services rendered to the Petitioner indicated a diagnosis of Azoospermia which is defined as the absence of live spermatozoa in the semen, there was insufficient evidence to show that this diagnosis was the primary reason for payments being made in error to the providers by the Administra- tor for the services rendered in connection with Petitioner's surgery to reverse surgical sterilization. Subsequent to the health care providers being paid by the Administrator for services rendered to Petitioner under the Plan, the OSEI made a determination that none of the services rendered to the Petitioner to reverse surgical sterilization were covered under the Plan, and demanded reimbursement from the providers. All of the providers, with the exception of Dr. Youngman, reimbursed the Plan but, since the Petitioner had paid Dr. Youngman prior to the claim being made, the Petitioner had received Dr. Youngman's claim and subsequently reimbursed the Plan. Petitioner made a demand on the State to pay the providers since he had been informed by the Administrator that the services, at least the hospital costs, were covered under the Plan. Respondent, at Petitioner's request, reviewed its denial of coverage and determined that costs incurred for surgery to reverse surgical sterilization was not covered under the Plan. By letter dated September 25, 1987, received by Petitioner on October 1, 1987, Respondent advised Petitioner of that decision and of his right to a hearing should he desire one. Petitioner was also advised that he had twenty-one (21) days to file a petition and failure to timely comply would result in the action contemplated in the letter becoming final. A Petition For Formal Proceedings and Notice of Appearance was received by the Respondent on October 26, 1987 bearing a certificate of service dated October 23, 1987. The petition was mailed by Petitioner and received by the Respondent more than 21 days after receipt of the letter by the Petitioner on October 1, 1987. Respondent's ore tenus Motion For Remand Or, In The Alternative, To Dismiss The Petition citing Petitioner's failure to timely file his petition was filed at the hearing on May 12, 1988 some five and half (5 1/2) months after Respondent's receipt of the petition. Upon the Respondent determining that the Petitioner's surgery to reverse surgical sterilization was not covered under the Plan, Petitioner became responsible for all costs incurred for the surgery rather than just Dr. Youngman's fee which resulted in Petitioner being responsible for $3,057.70, in addition to Dr. Youngman's fee. Had the surgery been covered under the Plan, the Petitioner would have only been responsible for $91.90, plus Dr. Youngman's fee.
Recommendation HAVING considered the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record and the candor and demeanor of the witnesses, it is, therefore, RECOMMENDED that the Department of Administration enter a Final Order DENYING Petitioner payment for the costs incurred for the surgery to reverse surgical sterilization requested in his Petition for Formal Proceedings. RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED and ENTERED this 20th day of July, 1988, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. WILLIAM R. CAVE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of July, 1988. APPENDIX TO THE RECOMMENDED ORDER IN CASE NO. 88-1452 The following constitutes my specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on the proposed findings of fact submitted by the parties in this case. Specific Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by Petitioner Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact were submitted in unnumbered paragraphs but, for clarity, I have numbered them 1 through 18. The first two sentences of paragraph one are rejected as not being supported by substantial competent evidence in the record. Although an employee of the Administrator represented to Petitioner that the procedure was covered, there was no approval in that the Administrator did not have that authority. The last two sentences of paragraph one are adopted in Findings of Fact 15, 16, and 17. The first two sentences of paragraph 2 are adopted in Finding of Fact 19 but clarified. The last two sentences in paragraph two are adopted in Finding of Fact 20. Adopted in Finding of Fact 20 but clarified. (4-7) Rejected as immaterial to irrelevant except the last sentence of paragraph 7 which is adopted in Finding of Fact 11 but clarified to show the 800 number being provided under "Claims Inquiries". Adopted in Finding of Fact 11. Adopted in Finding of Fact 11 but clarified. Adopted in Findings of Fact 11 and 14 but clarified. Adopted in Finding of Fact 16. Rejected as immaterial or irrelevant. Adopted in Finding of Fact 18. Adopted in Finding of Fact 24 but clarified. Rejected as not supported by substantial competent evidence in the record. Adopted in Findings of Fact 9 and 13 but clarified. The first sentence of paragraph 17 is adopted in Finding of Fact 8 and although there is a difference in the meaning of "limitations" and "exclusions", there was no substantial competent evidence in the record that the Brochure and Document were inconsistent in this regard, therefore the last sentence is rejected. Rejected as a restatement of a witness' testimony and not a finding of fact but additionally, rejected as not being supported by substantial competent evidence in the record. Specific Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by Respondent (1-6) Adopted in Findings of Fact 1 through 6, respectively. (7-8) Adopted in Finding of Fact 8. (9-10) Adopted in Finding of Fact 7. (11-14) Adopted in Findings of Fact 15, 12, 11 and 13, respectively. (15-16) Adopted in Finding of Fact 17. (17) Rejected as not supported by substantial competent evidence in the record. See Finding of Fact 17. (18-19) Adopted in Findings of Fact 18 and 19, respectively. (20) Rejected as a restatement of a witness' testimony and not a Finding of Fact. Also, it would be rejected as not being supported by substantial competent evidence in the record. (21-22) Adopted in Finding of Fact 20. (23) Adopted in Finding of Fact 21. (24-25) Adopted in Finding of Fact 22. (26-28) Adopted in Finding of Fact 10. Adopted in Finding of Fact 9. Rejected as a conclusion of law. COPIES FURNISHED: William A. Frieder, Esquire Department of Administration 440 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 Lester A. Lewis, Esquire P. O. Drawer 9670 Daytona Beach, Florida 32020 Adis Vila, Secretary Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550
The Issue The issue in this case is whether the Respondent, the Department of Administration, Division of State Employees' Insurance, administrator of the State of Florida group health insurance policy, should pay all covered medical expenses incurred by the Petitioners for non-PPC providers on behalf of their dependent daughter that exceed $3,000 1/ maximum out-of-pocket expense stop loss provision of the policy, despite the part of the stop loss provision that subjects it to maximum payments for room and board (and some other services) supplied by non-PPC providers.
Findings Of Fact Pertinent History of the Insurance Plan. The State of Florida offers group health insurance to its employees, including employees of the State University System, as an optional fringe benefit. Since 1978, the State has self-insured this coverage. The group health insurance coverage is administered by the Respondent, the Department of Administration, Division of State Employees' Insurance. The Respondent contracts with Blue Cross Blue Shield of Florida as a third party administrator of the insurance coverage. The State pays part of the premium required for the coverage; the balance of the premium is paid by the employee. Depending on their county of residence, state employees can choose membership in one of several approved health maintenance organizations (HMOs) in lieu of coverage under the State's health insurance plan. When an employee joins an approved health maintenance organization in lieu of the state health insurance plan, the State contributes to the cost of membership to the same extent that it contributes to an employee's insurance premium under its group health insurance plan. Since the State began to self-insure in 1978, coverage under the state group health insurance contained limits on the maximum amount the plan would pay for hospital room and board. The plan also differentiated between the amounts that would be paid under the plan for services rendered by pre-approved "preferred providers" (PPCs). From time to time through the years, the Florida Legislature changed the maximum amounts the plan would pay for various services, and the plan was changed accordingly. But in each version of the plan, there was a distinction made between services rendered by a PPC versus services rendered by a non-PPC. When the State began to self-insure its employee group health insurance benefit on May 1, 1978, it mailed a new, 25-page certificate of insurance to each employee covered by the plan. Whenever a change in the coverage under the state group health insurance plan was occasioned by new legislation, a revised certificate of insurance was mailed to each employee covered by the plan. This occurred in July, 1982, (a 40-page booklet), in August, 1983, (an eight-page addendum), in August, 1985, (a 13-page booklet), and in July, 1988 (a 13-page booklet). Consistent with the master group health insurance policy to which they refer, each of these certificates of insurance are clear that the maximum out- of-pocket "stop loss" feature is subject to certain limitations. In particular, all make clear that the feature is subject to a maximum payment for room and board. Each of these certificates of insurance contains language cautioning the employee that the certificate is not a contract of insurance, that the purpose of the certificate is only to summarize the insurance plan, and that the certificate does not include all covered and non-covered benefits. Each also advises that a copy of the complete contract (the master policy), and the administrative rules under which the plan is administered, could be inspected in the office of the Respondent, as well as in the employee's personnel office. Each advises employees to present questions to their agency personel office or to the Office of State Employee's Insurance. The August, 1985, certificate of insurance reflects a change in the policy to differentiate between PPC and non-PPC providers. It also clearly states that the maximum out-of-pocket stop loss feature of the policy is subject to maximum payments for room and board (and some other services) supplied by non-PPC providers. The July, 1988, certificate also clearly provides that the maximum out-of-pocket stop loss feature of the policy is subject to maximum payments for room and board (and some other services) supplied by non-PPC providers. Both of these certificates were entitled the "State of Florida Employees Group Health Self Insurance Plan Brochure." In addition to the certificates of insurance, Blue Cross Blue Shield also printed an abbreviated version of the July, 1988, insurance certificate called the "State of Florida Employees Group Health Self Insurance Plan Benefits." It is a seven-page document intended for distribution, along with information concerning the various available state-approved HMOs, to all new state employees, who have the opportunity to choose to enroll in the state group health plan, in one of the HMOs, or neither. It also was intended for distribution to all employees during open enrollment periods, when employees have the opportunity to change from an HMO to the state group health insurance, or vice versa, or to drop the benefit. The purpose of the "benefits" document was to give employees information on which to make that choice. Since it was anticipated that it would be mailed to many state employees who ultimately would choose against the state group health insurance plan, the information was condensed to shorten the document to save mailing costs. Only if a new employee (or an old employee during the open enrollment period) chose the insurance would the employee get mailed a certificate of insurance in the mail. Among the information contained in the July, 1988, "benefits" document was an item entitled "Maximum Out of Pocket Expense" that simply listed: "$1500 individual coverage" and "$3000 family coverage." Omitted from the "benefits" document were the limitations on the maximum out-of-pocket stop loss feature (Finding 7, above) and the language cautioning that it was not a contract (Finding 6, above). Under the heading "Exclusions and Limitations," it states: "Complete list in employee brochure." The last two pages of the document contains two lists, one entitled "Limitations," and the other entitled "Exclusions." Neither list specifies the limitations on the maximum out-of- pocket stop loss feature (Finding 7, above). On the cover of the document, it states: "This brochure replaces any other brochure or booklet printed prior to July 1, 1988, relative to the Plan and shall remain in effect until further notice." The Saffs' Insurance Decision. Edward B. Saff has been a mathematics professor at the University of South Florida (USF) in Tampa, Florida, for 22 years. The Saffs did not prove that they did not receive copies of the May 1978, July, 1982, August, 1983, August, 1985, and July, 1988, certificates of insurance. The Saffs' daughter Lisa, who was born on April 24, 1970, had been diagnosed in June, 1985, as having acute lymphoblastic leukemia. She was treated at the University of South Florida through June, 1988, and seemed to have been cured. During the summer of 1988, the Saffs had occasion to consider the question whether they should obtain health insurance other than, and in addition to, their family coverage under the State employees' group health insurance. Although the Saffs did not prove that they had not received their copies of the May 1978, July, 1982, August, 1983, August, 1985, and July, 1988, certificates of insurance, they apparently did not retain them or at least did not have them readily available to consult. As a result, Dr. Saff asked his secretary to get information on the state employees' group health insurance coverage from the USF personnel office. The evidence was that the Department of Administration has made a copy of the master group health self-insurance policy, and copies of the certificate of insurance, available in all state agency personnel offices, including in the USF personnel offices, for inspection by state employees. The July, 1988, certificate of insurance states: "The agency personnel office will provide needed assistance to State officers and employees enrolling in the Plan; however, such officers or employees should take care to assure that they receive the coverage applied for and that proper deductions are made." But there was no evidence specifically what Dr. Saff told his secretary to ask of his USF personnel office. Dr. Saff's secretary did not testify, and there was no evidence from which a finding can be made as to what the secretary asked for or what the secretary was told by the USF personnel office. But the secretary returned with a copy of the abbreviated version of the July, 1988, insurance certificate (the "State of Florida Employees Group Health Self Insurance Plan Benefits.") Cf. Findings 8 and 9, above. Based exclusively on the information relayed by Dr. Saff's secretary, i.e., on the abbreviated version of the July, 1988, insurance certificate (the "State of Florida Employees Group Health Self Insurance Plan Benefits"), with its incomplete information under the heading entitled "Maximum Out of Pocket Expense," the Saffs decided that they did not need any additional health insurance coverage for their daughter Lisa. They reasoned that they could afford the maximum out of pocket expense referenced in the document. They did not seek any further information about the policy before making this decision. The Saffs' Insurance Claim. In August, 1990, Lisa Saff underwent a routine gynecological examination, and a pelvic mass was discovered. The mass was removed surgically at Humana Women's Hospital in Tampa. Cancer of the ovaries was diagnosed, but at first the type of cancer was not identified. After more tests, it was determined that Lisa had suffered a recurrence of her previous cancer, but it was highly unusual for that type of cancer to recur in the ovaries. Since the physicians at Humana Women's and at USF were unfamiliar with the recurrence of the cancer in the ovaries, they recommended that Saffs seek medical care at Sloan-Kettering Hospital in New York City, where Lisa began treatment in the early part of September, 1990. Since starting treatment at Sloan-Kettering, Lisa has been under the care of Dr. Timothy Gee. She was hospitalized at Sloan-Kettering three times in 1990 and approximately twice in 1991. Fortunately, she has responded to treatment and is now on the maintenance portion of her protocol, receiving treatment as an outpatient of the hospital. Sloan-Kettering charges $700 a day for a hospital room and also charges for some other medical services in excess of the PPC fee and charge schedule under the State of Florida Group Health Self Insurance policy. In all, the Saffs have incurred $46,870 for medical treatment for Lisa for 1990. As of the date of the final hearing, they incurred $14,439 for medical treatment for Lisa for 1991. They continue to incur medical expenses for Lisa under her maintenance protocol. They have submitted claims for payment under the state group health insurance policy, including all medical expenses during both 1990 and 1991 by which their out-of-pocket expense exceeded $3000 per calendar year. 2/ The Respondent's Position. In response to the Saffs' claims, the Respondent has taken the position that, in accordance with the master policy and the certificate of insurance, the maximum out-of-pocket stop loss feature of the policy is subject to maximum payments for room and board (and some other services) supplied by non-PPC providers. Cf. Finding 7, above. In accordance with that position, the Respondent has paid $18,554 of the Saffs' 1990 claims and $2,162 of the Saffs' 1991 claims. (The Saffs have paid $14,089 of the balance of their 1990 claims and $9,250 of the balance of their 1991 claims.)
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Respondent, the Department of Administration, Division of State Employees' Insurance, enter a final order (1) giving effect to the provision of the group health self-insurance plan that subjects the maximum out- of-pocket stop loss feature of the policy to maximum payments for room and board (and some other services) supplied by non-PPC providers and (2) paying $18,554 of the Saffs' 1990 claims and $2,162 of the Saffs' 1991 claims. RECOMMENDED this 19th day of September, 1991, in Tallahassee, Florida. J. LAWRENCE JOHNSTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of September, 1991.
The Issue The issues are (1) whether certain medical expenses incurred by petitioners' daughter should be covered under the state group health insurance program, and (2) whether the state is estopped from denying the claim based upon erroneous misrepresentations made by its agent.
Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, the following findings of fact are determined: Background Petitioner, Etta Aldridge, is a full-time employee of Sunland Training Center in Marianna, Florida and is a participant in the state group health insurance program (the plan). James Aldridge, her husband and also a petitioner in this cause, and Jerrilyn Aldridge, her daughter, are covered by the plan. On November 3, 1987, Jerrilyn, then around seventeen years of age, was severely injured in an automobile accident near her home in Greenwood, Florida. Among other things, she suffered a skull fracture, abrasions, crushed pelvis and hip, and punctured lungs and stomach. She was initially taken to a Marianna hospital for emergency treatment and then transferred to a Tallahassee hospital for longer-term care. While at the Tallahassee hospital, Jerrilyn was diagnosed by her neurologist as having a closed, diffuse brain injury and brain stem contusions. After Jerrilyn was treated in Tallahassee for two and one-half months, which included one month in the hospital and forty-five days at the hospital's extended care facility, her parents were advised that, due to her poor prognosis, they had a choice of putting her in a nursing facility or taking her to their home. Although Jerrilyn was still in a coma, petitioners decided to take her home and care for her in a bedroom which had been converted into a hospital room setting. After six or seven weeks at home, and contrary to earlier medical expectations, Jerrilyn opened her eyes, made noises and manifested some slight arm movement. Based upon these encouraging signs, petitioners sought further medical advice and were told that, given the foregoing signs of improvement, treatment in a facility that specialized in brain injury rehabilitation would improve their daughter's condition. Petitioners contacted the National Head Injury Foundation and were given a list of health care facilities in the state that provided rehabilitative services for brain injured patients. This list included Manatee Springs Nursing Center, Inc. d/b/a Mediplex Rehab-Bradenton (MRB), a facility licensed by the state as a skilled nursing facility but which specialized in rehabilitating brain injured patients. MRB is the largest brain injury rehabilitation facility in the southeastern united States. Since the Aldridges did not have the financial resources to pay for any additional treatment for Jerrilyn, it was essential that they selected a facility that would be covered by the plan. After James Aldridge spoke with and received information from most of the facilities on the list, and conferred with Jerrilyn's neurologist, he eventually narrowed his choice to several facilities, including MRB, which impressed him because of its good reputation and specialty in head injury rehabilitation. To confirm whether coverage would be provided for further treatment, James Aldridge telephoned the customer service unit of Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Florida, Inc. (BCBS), the plan's administrator. He also contacted MRB and authorized it to make an inquiry with BCBS on his behalf. On March 28, 1989 Aldridge received favorable advice from a BCBS service representative concerning coverage and benefits for Jerrilyn at MRB. This advice was independently confirmed by MBR on the same date, and Jerrilyn was accepted as a patient at the facility effective March 31, 1988. Some three months later, and after some of the bills had been paid, BCBS advised MBR and petitioners that a "computer" error had been made and that the requested benefits applied only when rendered in a licensed hospital and not a skilled nursing facility. BCBS accordingly declined to pay the bills. That prompted petitioners to initiate this proceeding. The bills in question total over $225,000. The Insurance Plan The State has elected to provide a self-insured group health insurance program for its employees and their dependents. The legislature has designated respondent, Department of Administration, Division of Employees' Insurance (Division), as the responsible agency for the administration of the plan. To this end, the Division has entered into an agreement with BCBS to administer the plan. Among other things, BCBS provides verification of coverage and benefits, claims payment services, actuarial and printing services, and medical underwriting of late enrollee applications. Including dependents and retirees, there are almost 300,000 persons who are covered by the plan. Upon enrolling in the plan, all employees, including Etta Aldridge, were routinely given an insurance card with BCBS's telephone number and a brochure entitled "State of Florida Employees Group Health Self Insurance Plan Brochure" (brochure) containing a general description of the plan. The brochure warns the insured that the brochure is not a contract since it does not include all the provisions, definitions, benefits exclusions and limitations of the plan. It also contains advice that if the brochure does not answer an employee's question, he should telephone the Division's customer service section in Tallahassee. In actual practice, however, if an employee contacts the Division number, he is told to telephone BCBS's customer service unit in Jacksonville regarding any questions as to coverage and benefits, claims or other problems concerning the plan. The Division generally becomes involved only when an employee is unable to resolve a claims problem with BCBS. BCBS has established a service unit that deals exclusively with inquiries regarding coverage and benefits under the state group health plan. There are approximately twenty- eight service representatives in that unit. Each representative receives four weeks of training before being certified as a customer service representative. After being certified, a representative's primary responsibility is to respond to inquiries from state employees, health providers and physicians regarding verification of benefits and coverage under the state group policy. It should be noted that a distinction exists between verification of benefits and coverage. To verify coverage means to verify that a person has an active policy at the time services are rendered. To verify benefits means to confirm that a specific service is covered under the policy. In this case, there was an inquiry by the insured and provider regarding both benefits and coverage. In the event a representative is unsure as to the licensing status of a facility or provider, the representative has access to BCBS's master registry department which maintains the provider number and licensure status of every facility in the state. That registry identified MRB as a skilled nursing home. BCBS representatives have the authority to make decisions regarding benefits and coverage. It is only when an inquiry falls within a "grey area" that the final decision is referred from the unit to either the Legal or Medical Division of BCBS. The Division, with the assistance of BCBS, has prepared a seventy-five page benefit document (document) which governs all claims arising under the plan. However, the document is for BCBS in-house use only and is not given to state employees or providers. The document first became effective on May 1, 1978 and has been subsequently amended from time to time. When Jerrilyn was admitted to MRB, the document effective October 1, 1987 was controlling. The document was further amended effective July 1, 1988, which was three months after her admission to MRB. As is pertinent here, the July 1, 1988 amendments increased the deductibles and narrowed the definition of a "hospital". According to the state benefits administrator, the document is "the final word" on any dispute regarding coverage or claims. The BCBS service unit uses this document to verify coverage and benefits. Included in the document are numerous definitions that are used to resolve disputed claims. Relevant to this controversy is the definition of a hospital at the time Jerrilyn was admitted to MRB: "Hospital" means a licensed institution engaged in providing medical care and treatment to a patient as a result of illness or accident on an inpatient/outpatient basis at the patient's expense and which fully meets all the tests set forth in 1., 2., and below: It is a hospital accredited by the Joint Commission on the Accreditation of Hospitals, or the American Osteopathic Association or the Commission on the Accreditation of Rehabilitative Facilities; It maintains diagnostic and therapeutic facilities for surgical or medical diagnosis and treatment of patients under the supervision of a staff of fully licensed physicians; It continuously provides twenty-four (24) hour a day nursing service by or under the supervision of registered graduate nurses. It is undisputed that, while MRB may have provided many services comparable to those rendered by a licensed hospital and is considered to be an atypical nursing home, MRB is still licensed by the state as a skilled nursing facility. Thus, MRB cannot qualify as a hospital under the benefit document. Payment for services in a skilled nursing facility, such as MRB, are much more limited and restrictive than for a hospital. To qualify for payment of benefits in a skilled nursing facility, the insured must have been hospital confined for at least three consecutive days prior to the day of hospital discharge before being transferred, upon a physician's advice, to a skilled nursing facility. Once admitted to such a facility, the insured's room and board reimbursement is limited to a maximum of $76 per day. Further, payment of services and facilities is limited to sixty days of confinement per calendar year. In contrast, benefits for hospital care include, for example, unlimited days of coverage per calendar year and much higher reimbursement rates for room, board and other services. In this case, besides having been admitted to MRB directly from her home, and not a hospital, Jerrilyn had already used up forty- five of the sixty days of annual benefits at the extended care unit of a Tallahassee hospital. BCBS also has a fee schedule that is used in paying all covered claims. However, the schedule was not introduced into evidence. Estoppel Before he made a final decision as to where to send his daughter, James Aldridge spoke by telephone with several BCBS representatives, including Michelle Sahdala and Rhonda Hall, the unit supervisor and considered its most experienced representative. 1/ Aldridge made these telephone calls because he wanted to positively confirm which facilities would be covered by the plan. During one conversation, Sahdala advised Aldridge that the proposed treatment would not be covered in several facilities named by the National Head Injury Foundation, including New Medico Rehabilitation Center of Florida in Wauchula, Florida and Capital Rehabilitation Hospital in Tallahassee. Aldridge advised BCBS that he might want to place his daughter in MRB, but only if such treatment was covered under his wife's insurance plan. He heard nothing further from BCBS until a week later. Aldridge contacted MRB on March 21, 1988 and advised an MRB representative that he wished to place his daughter in the facility if his wife's insurance covered the treatment at MRB. He also gave MRB the BCBS unit supervisor's name (Rhonda Hall) and telephone number. To verify coverage and benefits, MRB's admission coordinator, Patricia Dear, telephoned Hall on March 22, 1988. Such an inquiry is routinely made by the provider on behalf of the insured and before the patient is admitted to the facility. This is to ascertain if the prospective patient is insured, and if so, to verify the amount of benefits. Dear identified herself and advised Hall that she was requesting benefits information on Jerrilyn Aldridge, an insured. She told Hall that MRB was a skilled nursing facility and not a hospital, the nature of services that would be provided to Jerrilyn and her need to determine whether such services would be covered under the plan before Jerrilyn was accepted as a patient. When asked if she would need further information in hand concerning MRB before determining the amount of benefits, Hall responded affirmatively. Accordingly, Dear sent Hall by overnight mail a letter and brochure describing the facility's services. They were received by BCBS the next morning, or March 23. The letter included information concerning MRB, the fact that it was a skilled nursing facility and not a hospital, the type of services that MRB provided, a summary of the expected charges for treating Jerrilyn (from $600 to $850 per day), the average length of stay of a patient (3 to 9 months), and an offer to answer any additional questions that BCBS might have. When Dear heard nothing further from Hall within the next few days, she made a follow-up telephone call to Hall on March 28 to see if Hall had any questions and to verify benefits coverage. Hall acknowledged receiving the letter of March 22 with attachment. After Dear discussed each of the disciplines and types of services to be provided and their expected cost, including physician services, physical therapy, neuropsychology, central supply, pharmacy, laboratory services and a room and board charge of $351 per day, Hall advised Dear that the only policy exclusions on coverage would be occupational and speech/language therapy. She added that all charges would be subject to medical necessity, and ambulance costs to transport Jerrilyn to the facility would be covered. The two also discussed the fact that there were no time limitations under the policy and that almost $475,000 in lifetime coverage still remained. Hall represented that after the Aldridges satisfied their $1500 deductible on which BCBS paid only 80% of the bills, BCBS would thereafter pay 100% of all medically necessary charges. In making that representation, Hall did not disclose the fact that BCBS has a fee schedule and that all payments were subject to the limitations specified in that schedule. After verifying that Hall had cited all policy limitations, and consistent with her longtime experience in verifying benefits with other insurance carriers, Dear properly assumed that if the policy contained a provision which limited payment to something less than 100% of covered services, Hall would have said so. Dear asked Hall if there was any reason not to admit Jerrilyn and Hall replied "no." Dear also asked Hall if she (Hall) was in a position to verify benefits and Hall represented that she was. Dear then told Hall that Jerrilyn would be presented to the admissions committee the next day and, if clinically appropriate, she would be admitted. Dear ended the conversation by advising Hall that a letter confirming their understanding would be sent after Jerrilyn was admitted. After speaking with Hall, Dear had a clear understanding that coverage and benefits had been approved and, except for occupational and speech/language therapy, BCBS would pay 80% of all medically necessary charges until the Aldridge's $1,500 deductible was met, and then to pay 100% of all remaining medically necessary charges. 2/ After receiving the favorable advice, Dear telephoned Aldridge the same day and told him the results of her conversation with Hall. Within a few moments after speaking with Dear, Aldridge received a telephone call from an unidentified female BCBS representative who informed him that BCBS would pay for his daughter's treatment at MRB. Jerrilyn was accepted as a patient by MRB's admissions committee on March 28, 1988. Both the provider and the insured relied upon Hall's representations in admitting Jerrilyn to the facility. Had Jerrilyn not been covered by the plan, the committee would not have approved her admission. Also, if the Aldridges had known that the treatment at MRB was not covered, they would have sent their daughter to another facility covered by the plan. On April 4, 1988, and pursuant to her last telephone conversation with Hall, Dear sent Hall by overnight mail the following letter: This is to confirm the admission of Jerrilyn Aldridge on March 31, 1988, to the specialized head trauma rehabilitation program at Mediplex Rehab-Bradenton, Florida. The following benefits information has been verified by you and Patricia Dear, R. N., Admissions Coordinator on March 28, 1988. Effective date: 10/1/79 Benefits: After $1,500 - out of pocket/yr- 100% coverage Days available: Unlimited days Monies available: $474,533.79 Exclusions: Occupational Therapy, Speech- Language Therapy Limitations: Treatment subject to "Medical Necessity" If I do not hear from you, I will consider you to be in agreement with the above information. Please place this in the client's file. Thank you for your prompt attention to this matter. (Emphasis supplied) Although BCBS's records reflect that Dear's letter was received, Hall did not advise Dear that there were any problems concerning Jerrilyn's coverage and benefits under the plan or that Dear's understanding of the benefits to be paid was inaccurate or in error. Of some note is the fact that Hall is considered one of the most knowledgeable BCBS representatives on state health plan benefits and recognizes that her statements concerning benefits are relied upon by providers. Even though Hall was specifically advised both orally and in writing that MRB was licensed as a nursing home, and she had access to BCBS's master registry to confirm MRB's licensure status, she failed to discern that a nursing home was not a covered facility for the requested services within the meaning of the plan. Indeed, she later acknowledged by deposition that she knew that "the state does not pay for nursing homes" and that she had made a mistake by failing to properly "investigate" the matter more thoroughly. By failing to convey accurate advice to James Aldridge and MRB and to note that the proposed treatment would not be covered if rendered by a nursing home, Hall failed to use reasonable care and competence in responding to the inquiry. Three months after Jerrilyn's admission, James Aldridge received notice that BCBS had changed its position and now asserted it was not going to pay for Jerrilyn's rehabilitation and treatment at MRB. Proposed agency action confirming this decision was later issued by the Division on October 21, 1988. Miscellaneous All medical services received by Jerrilyn were medically necessary within the meaning of the benefit document. The necessity of Jerrilyn's placement in a rehabilitation facility was established by Dr. James D. Geissinger, her Tallahassee neurologist, who based it upon Jerrilyn's improvement after leaving the Tallahassee hospital and made her a candidate for brain rehabilitation. Doctor Geissinger also noted that, as a result of receiving treatment at MRB, Jerrilyn had made "remarkable" improvement and was able to partially regain her language function, use her left arm and hand, and improve her "activities of daily living." There are expectations that she will be able to walk again within a year. Further, based upon the testimony of an MRB staff physician, the services and treatment received by Jerrilyn at MRB were medically necessary to facilitate her neurologic and functional recovery. Given the nature of her injury and MRB's nursing staffing ratios, the required intensive medical rehabilitation and monitoring of Jerrilyn's medical and neurological condition was comparable to care in a hospital intensive care unit. These matters were not contradicted. On April 1, 1988, the Aldridges executed a standard financial agreement with MRB whereby they agreed to indemnify MRB for all charges which were not paid by BCBS. As is normally done, they also authorized MRB to directly bill BCBS for all charges incurred by Jerrilyn while being treated at the facility. Finally, the Aldridges authorized MRB to make inquiries on their behalf with BCBS to verify insurance coverage and benefits for Jerrilyn. MRB submitted to BCBS all bills for services and treatment given to Jerrilyn during her five or six month stay at the facility. A summary of the dates of service, charges, payments made by BCBS and balance due is contained in petitioners' exhibit 17. In all, there are thirty-eight outstanding bills totaling $227,139.27. The parties have stipulated that the bills in exhibit 17 represent services that were actually performed and supplies that were actually received by the patient. As noted in finding of fact 21, all such supplies and services were medically necessary. For the reasons given in the conclusions of law portion of this recommended order, the doctrine of equitable estoppel applies, and petitioners are entitled to be reimbursed for all unpaid bills filed with BCBS in accordance with the representations of agent Hall. These include room and board charges (at the intensive care room rate), physician services, neuropsychology, physical therapy, central supply, pharmacy and laboratory charges as more fully described in petitioners' exhibit 17. Such reimbursement should be not be subject to the limitations prescribed in the fee schedule.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the amended petition of Etta and James Aldridge be GRANTED, and the Division order Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Florida, Inc. to reimburse petitioners $227,139.27 as reflected in petitioners' exhibit 17. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 7th day of August 1989, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of August, 1989.
The Issue This case concerns the issue of whether the Petitioner should be required to pay back premiums for chiropractic coverage under his family health insurance with the State of Florida Employees Group Health Self Insurance Plan for the period August, 1981, to December, 1982. At the formal hearing, the Petitioner testified on his own behalf and the Respondent called one witness, Ms. Barbara Power. Petitioner had marked for identification eight exhibits. Exhibits 1 through 5 and Exhibit 7 were admitted and Exhibit 6 was withdrawn. Petitioner's Exhibit No. 8 was a copy of Rule 22K-1.20, Florida Administrative Code, and it was marked for identification only. The Respondent had marked for identification 10 exhibits. Respondent offered and had admitted Respondent's Exhibit Nos. 2, 3, 7, 8, 9, and 10. Both the Petitioner and Respondent submitted proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law for consideration by the undersigned Hearing Officer. The proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law were considered by the Hearing Officer and to the extent that those proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law are inconsistent with the facts contained herein, they were considered to be not supported by the evidence or were rejected as being unnecessary to the disposition of this cause.
Findings Of Fact In April, 1978, the Petitioner, Owen Sellers, enrolled in the State of Florida Employees Group Health Self Insurance Plan (hereafter referred to as the Plan) . At the time of his enrollment, the Petitioner elected coverage for himself and his eligible dependents, including coverage for chiropractic services. Under the Plan, a portion of the premium for the health insurance coverage is paid by the state agency who employs the individual and the remaining portion is paid by the employee through payroll deduction. In approximately November, 1980, the Petitioner'S spouse also became a full time state employee entitled to the health insurance benefit. As a result of the entitlement of both family members, the state began paying the entire cost of the Plan, except for chiropractic coverage. In order to obtain chiropractic coverage, an employee in 1981 and 1982 was required to pay an additional premium for such coverage. From August, 1981, to December 1, 1982, the Petitioner and his family were covered by the Plan including chiropractic coverage. On or about November 4, 1982, the Petitioner, Owen Sellers, submitted a Change of Information form dropping chiropractic coverage. This change became effective December 1, 1982. At no time prior to this had the Petitioner requested such a change. Because of an error on the part of the employing agency, the premium for chiropractic coverage was not deducted from Mr. Sellers' pay from August, 1981, through October, 1982. The total amount of premiums due for that period for chiropractic coverage is $92.20. The error was discovered in November, 1982, and at that time, the Petitioner was notified of the underpayment. Petitioner refused to pay the $92.20 and requested an administrative hearing. During the time period August, 1981, through October, 1982, the Petitioner did not file a claim for any benefits under the chiropractic coverage. However, claims were submitted for non-chiropractic medical treatment received by the Petitioner or other members of his family.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That Respondent enter a Final Order directing the Petitioner to pay the sum of ninety-two dollars and twenty cents ($92.20) within ninety (90) days of entry of the Final Order. In the event Petitioner fails to make timely payment, that Respondent cancel his coverage under the State of Florida Employees Group Health Self Insurance Plan DONE and ENTERED this 3rd day of August, 1983, in Tallahassee, Florida. MARVIN E. CHAVIS, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of August, 1983. COPIES FURNISHED: Mr. Owen Sellers 1874 Woodleigh Drive West Jacksonville, Florida 32211 Daniel C. Brown, Esquire Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Mr. Nevin G. Smith Secretary Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue Whether Petitioner is entitled to change from individual to family coverage under the State of Florida Employees' Group Insurance Plan retroactively to May 1, 1990.
Findings Of Fact The State of Florida makes available to its employees several group insurance programs. In the area of health insurance, employees may choose to participate in the State of Florida Employees Group Health Self Insurance Plan, or they may enroll in a number of different HMOs depending upon the county in which each employee resides. The State of Florida Employees Group Health Self Insurance Plan (hereinafter "the Plan") is a plan of self insurance established by the State, specifically described in a Benefit Document, and administered, under contract, by Blue Cross/Blue Shield (BCBS). In addition to the provisions of the Plan embodied in the Benefit Document, the self insurance plan is regulated by those rules contained in Chapter 22D, Florida Administrative Code. If an employee voluntarily chooses to participate in the Plan, the State as the employer contributes to the employee's costs by paying a portion of the premium for each employee. At the time that they commence employment with the State, employees may elect to participate in the Plan, in one of the HMOs approved for that particular geographical location, or may choose to not participate in any of the voluntary insurance programs offered through the State. Thereafter, employees may only join one of the insurance programs or switch between programs during an annual open enrollment period, unless an exception applies. An employee may purchase individual coverage, insuring only herself, or an employee may purchase family coverage, insuring that employee and one or more of her eligible dependents. During an open enrollment period, an employee may switch between individual coverage and family coverage for the following year. Under the State Plan, there is an exception to the restriction that employees may only change coverage and health plans during the open enrollment period. An employee having individual coverage may change to family coverage within 31 days after the date of acquisition of any eligible dependent. In that event, coverage for the eligible dependent does not relate back to the date of acquisition but rather will commence on some future date following the payment of the additional premium required for the additional family coverage. Similarly, an employee with only individual coverage may begin family coverage prior to acquiring eligible dependents and may obtain coverage for those dependents effective on the actual date the dependent is acquired by making application in time for a complete month's premium to be deducted prior to the first day of the month during which the dependent(s) will be acquired. At the time a new employee is hired and during open enrollment periods, all employees are given brochures with summary information regarding the various programs in which they are being given an opportunity to participate. Employees are advised, if they have questions regarding the Plan, to contact their personnel officer or the Division of State Employees' Insurance. After the employee makes a selection as to which health plan she wishes to participate in, if any, the employee will subsequently receive more detailed information about that plan. An employee choosing to participate in the Plan will subsequently receive a copy of the State of Florida Employees Group Health Self Insurance Plan Brochure. The first page of the Brochure specifically advises the employee that the brochure does not include all of the provisions, definitions, benefits, exclusions, and limitations of the Plan. The Brochure specifically advises the employee that it is a summary of the benefits and that any questions the employee might have should be presented to the employee's agency personnel offices or the Office of State Employees' Insurance, and provides that office's address and telephone numbers. The Plan itself is not distributed to each individual employee but rather is made available to each agency's personnel office for reference by any interested employee. Under the Plan, a woman with individual coverage is entitled to maternity or pregnancy benefits. As part of those benefits, charges for "well baby care," i.e., the charges for the nursery for the baby, are covered under the Plan as part of the maternity benefit of the mother. In well baby care, charges are not incurred by the baby as a separate patient. On the other hand, if a baby is ill and is admitted to the hospital as a separate patient, well baby care coverage does not apply, and family coverage must be in effect or the infant will be an uninsured individual under the Plan. The University of South Florida (USF) central personnel office is located on its main campus. The Health Sciences Center also maintains an adjunct personnel office for the convenience of employees of the Health Sciences Center at the adjunct personnel office where employees are able to gain assistance on personnel matters and obtain insurance benefit information. However, the employees' actual personnel files are located at the main campus personnel office. Robin Hudson is employed by the University of South Florida in the Health Sciences Center adjunct personnel office as a senior clerk. As part of her duties, Ms. Hudson counsels USF employees on their insurance benefits. Petitioner was employed by the University of South Florida Health Sciences Center on February 19, 1988, and chose to enroll in the State Employees' Group Health Program with family coverage effective March 1, 1988. Subsequently, Petitioner changed from family coverage to individual coverage effective July 1, 1988. Petitioner became pregnant in November 1988, with a due date of August 18, 1989, while she maintained individual coverage with the Plan. Sometime during November 1988, Petitioner telephoned the Health Science Center personnel office and spoke with "someone" regarding maternity coverage. Petitioner was advised that she was covered under the Plan. Also during this same time period, Petitioner referred to the Group Health Self Insurance Plan Brochure and could find no explanation of maternity or new born coverage. She did not seek additional information from the personnel office, nor did she contact the Division of State Employees' Insurance, at that time. The first communication involving Petitioner on the correspondence log maintained by Blue Cross and Blue Shield occurred on January 21, 1989, in a letter that was written to: Santiago and Arocho, M.D., P.A., Family Practice Physicians of Tampa, 5208 D. Fowler Avenue, #1, Tampa, Florida 33617-2152. The second correspondence occurred on May 9, 1989. It as an interpretation on lab work which had been performed on Petitioner. The third correspondence occurred on the same date when Blue Cross and Blue Shield advised provider 77566 was a preferred provided under Preferred Patient Care (PPC). On June 14, 1989, Petitioner enrolled with Tampa General Hospital. Petitioner was advised by hospital personnel that she had well and sick baby coverage at that time. This information was wrong. Sick baby coverage is not included for an employee with individual coverage. Petitioner delivered her daughter Lia at 32 weeks gestation by Cesarean Section on June 20, 1989, at Tampa General Hospital because her pregnancy was complicated by Severe Pre-Eclampsia with HELLP Syndrome. On the date Petitioner delivered her daughter, June 20, 1989, her husband called Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Florida inquiring if pre-admission certification was required for maternity. He was informed that it was not required for maternity. Due to the premature delivery, the child, Lia, was admitted as a patient and remained in the hospital for two weeks in order to gain weight. On February 17, 1989, Respondent's January 30, 1989 Insurance Memorandum 89-001 was received at USF Central Personnel Office. In Respondent's Memorandum 89-001, the Respondent reiterates the provisions of Rule 22K- 1.203(3), Florida Administrative Code, and advises personnel offices to advise "an insured pregnant employee . . . that she should change to family coverage shortly after the pregnancy is diagnosed so that insurance benefits will be available to the employee's child in the event of premature birth." The Personnel Office at USF printed the pertinent portions of Respondent's Memorandum 89-001 and distributed to each employee by placing an individually addressed copy of the Personnel Notes in each employee's mail box. Petitioner doesn't recall receiving the March 24 - April 3, 1989, edition of the news brochure; however, Petitioner asserts that she wouldn't have read it even if it was delivered, because the pertinent information was under the heading "Change in Appointment Status." The entire subject of the article under the heading Change in Appointment Status dealt with insurance benefits offered by Respondent and included a telephone extension number for interested employees to obtain additional information. Petitioner did not request any information of the maternity benefits offered to employees with single coverage from her personnel office or Respondent until after the birth of her daughter. Petitioner changed from single to family coverage, effective August 1, 1989, after consulting with Robin Hudson on July 21, 1989. The Plan has refused coverage for the hospitalization of Petitioner's child, Lia, the expenses of which totaled $9,178.95.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the petition which seeks payment for medical expenses incurred by Petitioner's newborn baby be DENIED. DONE AND ENTERED this 17th day of December, 1990, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DANIEL M. KILBRIDE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904)488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of December, 1990. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER CASE NO. 90-5513 The following constitutes my specific rulings, in accordance with section 120.59, Florida Statutes, on findings of fact submitted by the parties. Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact Petitioner did not submit proposed findings Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact Accepted: paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 (in part), 6, 7 (in substance), 8, 9, 10, 11. Rejected, as against the greater weight of evidence: paragraph 5 (in part). Rejected, as a conclusion of law: paragraph 12. COPIES FURNISHED: Marcela Gutierrez-Mayka 701 East River Drive Temple Terrace, FL 33617 Augustus D. Aikens, Jr., Esquire General Counsel Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 Aletta Shutes Secretary Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550
The Issue Whether Mr. Wills is entitled to reimbursement from the State Group Health Insurance Plan for health services provided by an otolaryngologist and a speech pathologist for vocal therapy.
Findings Of Fact The State of Florida makes available to employees several health insurance programs. One of the options available to employees is the State of Florida Employees Group Health Self Insurance Plan. Employees may also enroll in a number of different health maintenance organizations depending upon the county in which the employee resides. The Employees Group Health Self Insurance Plan was established by the Legislature, and its benefits are described in the Benefit Document. The Plan as a whole is administered by Blue Cross-Blue Shield, which did not write the terms of the Plan. When an employee chooses to participate in the Plan, the State contributes to the employee's insurance cost by paying a portion of the premium for the employee in order to be covered by the Plan. Mr. Wills is employed by the State of Florida as the Chief Assistant Public Defender for the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit in Broward County, Florida. Mr. Wills is a Senior Trial Attorney in the Public Defender's Office and a senior administrator who needs his voice to carry on his professional duties. He was a member of the Plan at all times relevant to this proceeding. The case revolves around whether Mr. Wills is entitled to reimbursement for expenses he incurred when he was diagnosed in June 1990 as having a vocal chord lesion, also known as a contact ulcer or granuloma of the vocal fold, and participated in a course of medical treatment for this condition. For example, Mr. Wills would attempt to speak, but portions of words could not be heard. Mr. Wills ultimately was treated by Dr. W. Jarrard Goodwin. Dr. Goodwin is a specialist in diseases of the ear, nose and throat (i.e., an otolaryngologist), and teaches at the University of Miami School of Medicine. Dr. Goodwin was of the view that the lesion was caused by the mechanical banging together of the vocal chords, and that surgery was not an appropriate treatment for him. Instead, he prescribed an antibiotic and three weeks vocal rest. He had a second consultation with Mr. Wills on August 14, 1990, at which time Dr. Goodwin referred Mr. Wills to Donna S. Lundy, a speech pathologist in the Department of Otolaryngology at the University of Miami Medical School, for voice therapy. A contact ulcer or granuloma can result from the pitch of the voice being too high or too low, from speaking too loudly, or from not breathing from the diaphragm. All of these can be treated with behavioral voice therapy through exercises, either to raise or lower the pitch of the voice, or to breathe from the diaphragm and relax the vocal chords in order to decrease effort and strain near the lesion. Mr. Wills saw Ms. Lundy for sessions of vocal therapy at Dr. Goodwin's office on August 11, September 13, October 5, November 11, and December 27, 1990, and Mr. Willis practiced the exercises he was given between appointments. Even if Mr. Wills had had surgery, i.e., a stripping of the vocal chords, an alternative treatment for the contact granuloma, he still would have had vocal therapy following that surgery to modify his vocal habits to prevent a recurrence of the lesion. As a result of the vocal therapy, Mr. Wills' condition has improved, and he no longer suffers from the contact granuloma. Speech therapy treats abnormalities of speech production, language formulation and processing, such as articulation disorders, stuttering, language delay, and disorders of neuromuscular control. It is not the same as voice therapy. Five claims for health services were submitted on behalf of Mr. Wills by Donna S. Lundy, under procedure code 92507. Code 92507 on the approved fee schedule covers "Speech, Language or Hearing Therapy, with Continuing Medical Supervision, Individual." Dr. Goodwin, also submitted one claim under procedure code 92507 for services provided to Mr. Wills on August 14, 1990. All such claims were rejected by the Department. The State of Florida, Employees' Group Health Self Insurance Plan benefit document contains exclusions. The applicable exclusion, according to the Department, is Section VII(Q): VII. Exclusions The following exclusions shall apply under the plan: * * * * Q. Occupational, recreational, edu-cational, or speech therapy, orthoptics, biofeedback, contra-ceptives, telephone consultation, cardiac rehabilitation exercise programs, or visits for the purpose of exercise by bicycle, ergometer or treadmill. Benefit Document, page 46. There is no further explanation of the term "speech therapy" found in exclusion VII(Q) in any other portion of the Benefit Document. The approved fee schedule for the Group Health Self-Insurance Plan has a procedure code for "speech, language or hearing therapy, with continuing medical supervision, individual." That the approved fee schedule has such an entry at all is an indication that there are circumstances where speech language or hearing therapy is covered. Otherwise, the entry would be wholly inconsistent with the Department's position that Section VII(Q) flatly prohibits any payment for "speech therapy". Ms. Lundy is licensed speech-language pathologist in the State of Florida. Unless a person qualifies for licensure as a speech-language pathologist, a person may not describe him or herself using a number of terms. Among these forbidden terms are "speech pathologist", "speech therapist", "language pathologist", "voice therapist" and "voice pathologist". Section 468.1285(1)(b), Florida Statutes, (1990 Supp.). The Department relies upon the definition for the practice of speech-language pathology in the Professional Practice Act, Chapter 468, Part I, Florida Statutes (1990 Supp.), to argue that any services provided by a licensed speech-language pathologist must necessarily fall within the exclusion found in Section VII(Q) of the Benefit Document. The Department's argument that because the term "speech therapy" is not defined in the Benefit Document, it should determine the meaning of the term by looking to see how the term "speech-language pathology" is defined in Section 468.1125(7)(a), Florida Statutes (1990 Supp.), the professional practice act for speech-language pathology, is unpersuasive. There was no testimony that the Benefit Document was written with all definitions found in various professional practice acts in mind. There is certainly no proof that the Legislature crafted the miscellaneous professional practice acts in Chapter 468 with an eye towards using the definitions in those acts for determinations under the Employees' Group Health Self Insurance Plan. The Benefit Document and the professional practice acts have little or nothing to do with each other, and neither shed light upon terms used in the other.
Recommendation It is recommended that the Secretary of the Department of Administration enter a Final Order requiring the Division of Employees' State Insurance to pay all claims submitted by Donna S. Lundy and the claim of Dr. Goodwin which have been denied. The Benefit Document does not clearly exclude voice therapy for a contact granuloma, and in the absence of a clear exclusion, the law requires that those claims be paid. RECOMMENDED this 24th day of December, 1991, in Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM R. DORSEY Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of December, 1991. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 91-5324 Rulings on findings proposed by the Department: Adopted in Finding 1. Adopted in Findings 2 and 3. Rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in Finding 3. Adopted in Finding 4. Discussed in Finding 5. Rejected as unnecessary. See, Conclusions of Law. Adopted in Finding 9. Adopted in Finding 10. Rejected. See, Conclusions of Law. Adopted in Finding 5. Rulings on findings proposed by Mr. Wills, treated as if the paragraphs had been numbered: Adopted in Finding 3. Adopted in Findings 3 and 4. Adopted in Finding 5. Adopted in Finding 7. Generally adopted in Finding 9. Generally adopted in Finding 5. Adopted in Findings 5 and 9. COPIES FURNISHED: Steven Michaelson, Esquire 9326 Northwest 18th Drive Plantation, FL 33322 John M. Carlson, Esquire Department of Administration 438 Carlton Building Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 John A. Pieno Secretary Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 Augustus D. Aikens, Jr. General Counsel Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550
