Findings Of Fact 9. The factual allegations contained in the Stop-Work Order and Order of Penalty Assessment issued on February 8, 2011, and the Amended Order of Penalty Assessment issued on Februrary 23, 2011, attached as “Exhibit A” and “Exhibit B” respectively, and fully incorporated herein by reference, are hereby adopted as the Department’s Findings of Fact in this case,
Conclusions THIS PROCEEDING came on for final agency action and Jeff Atwater, Chief Financial Officer of the State of Florida, or his designee, having considered the record in this case, including the request for administrative hearing received from CARLOS ALBERTO RODRIGUEZ, the Stop-Work Order and Order of Penalty Assessment, and the Amended Order of Penalty Assessment, and being otherwise fully advised in the premises, hereby finds that: 1. On February 8, 2011, the Department of Financial Services, Division of Workers’ Compensation (hereinafter “Department”) issued a Stop-Work Order and Order of Penalty Assessment in Division of Workers’ Compensation Case No. 11-047-D5 to CARLOS ALBERTO RODRIGUEZ. The Stop-Work Order and Order of Penalty Assessment included a Notice of Rights wherein CARLOS ALBERTO RODRIGUEZ was advised that any request for an administrative proceeding to challenge or contest the Stop-Work Order and Order of Penalty Assessment must be filed within twenty-one (21) days of receipt of the Stop-Work Order and Order of Penalty Assessment in accordance with Sections 120.569 and 120.57, Florida Statutes, and must conform to Rule 28-106.2015, Florida Administrative Code. 2. On February 8, 2011, the Stop-Work Order and Order of Penalty Assessment was served by personal service on CARLOS ALBERTO RODRIGUEZ. A copy of the Stop-Work Order and Order of Penalty Assessment is attached hereto as “Exhibit A” and incorporated herein by reference. 3. On February 23, 2011, the Department issued an Amended Order of Penalty Assessment to CARLOS ALBERTO RODRIGUEZ. The Amended Order of Penalty Assessment assessed a total penalty of $163,791.63 against CARLOS ALBERTO RODRIGUEZ. The Amended Order of Penalty Assessment included a Notice of Rights wherein CARLOS ALBERTO RODRIGUEZ was advised that any request for an administrative proceeding to challenge or contest the Amended Order of Penalty Assessment must be filed within twenty-one (21) days of receipt of the Amended Order of Penalty Assessment in accordance with Sections 120.569 and 120.57, Florida Statutes, and must conform to Rule 28-106.2015, Florida Administrative Code. 4. On March 7, 2011, the Amended Order of Penalty Assessment was served by personal service on CARLOS ALBERTO RODRIGUEZ. A copy of the Amended Order of Penalty Assessment is attached hereto as “Exhibit B” and incorporated herein by reference. 5. On February 28, 2011, CARLOS ALBERTO RODRIGUEZ timely filed a request for administrative hearing with the Department. The petition for administrative review was forwarded to the Division of Administrative Hearings on March 28, 2011, and the matter was assigned DOAH Case No. 11-1574. A copy of the petition is attached hereto as “Exhibit C” and incorporated herein by reference. 6. On May 9, 2011, the Department served by U.S. mail its First Interlocking Discovery Request (‘discovery requests”) which included requests for admissions, interrogatories, and requests for production on Respondent. Respondent was required to serve its answers upon the Department within 30 days pursuant to Rules 1.340(a), 1.350(b), and 1.370(a), Florida Rules of Civil Procedure. However, pursuant to Rule 128-106.103, Florida Administrative Code, “five days shall be added to the time limits when service has been made by regular U.S. mail.” Therefore, Respondent was required to respond to the discovery on or before June 13, 2011. 7. On June 22, 2011, the Department filed a Motion to Deem Matters Admitted and Relinquish Jurisdiction Pursuant to Section 120.57(1)(i), Florida Statutes after having not received any answer from Respondent to the Department’s discovery requests. 8. On June 23, 2011, the Administrative Law Judge issued an Order Relinquishing Jurisdiction and Closing File. A copy of the Order Relinquishing Jurisdiction and Closing File is attached hereto as “Exhibit D” and incorporated herein by reference.
Conclusions By letter dated March 31, 2010, the Agency for Persons with Disabilities (APD) informed Angels of America, Inc., that it was terminating the Medicaid Waiver Services Agreement that it and Angels of America had entered into. Following the receipt of a request for an administrative hearing, the matter was referred to the Division of Administrative Hearings (DOAH). On May 26, 2010, APD moved to dismiss the proceeding on the basis that Petitioner had not shown that its substantial interests would be affected by the Agency’s action. On June 9, 2010, the Administrative Law Judge entered an Order Relinquishing Jurisdiction and Closing File. THEREFORE, based on the foregoing and being otherwise fully apprised of the premises, it is hereby ORDERED that the hearing request filed in the above-styled case is hereby DISMISSED and this case is CLOSED, DONE AND ORDERED, this 16th day of June, 2011, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. _ . PSY Nt ee Percy W. Mallison, Jr., Esquire Agency Clerk Agency for Persons with Disabilities 4030 Esplanade Way, Suite 380 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0700 APD-11-4859-FO | 1 Filed June 16, 2011 1:04 PM Division of Administrative Hearings CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE Copies provided to: Jeffrey C. Marty, Esa. Juan R. Collins, Esq. Post Office Box 3159 Agency for Persons with Disabilities Zephyrhills, Florida 33539 4030 Esplanade Way, Suite 335B Tallahassee, Florida 34785 APD Area 13 Office | HEREBY CERTIFY that a copy of this Final Order was provided to the above- named individuals at the listed addresses, by U.S. Mail or electronic mail, this 16th day of June, 2011. Percy i Mallison, Jr., Agency Clerk Agency for Persons with Disabilities 4030 Esplanade Way, Suite 380 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950 APD-11-4859-FO | 2
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED that the Request for Administrative Hearing filed by the Petitioner in this case be DISMISSED. DONE AND ENTERED this 7th day of March, 2014, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S WILLIAM F. QUATTLEBAUM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of March, 2014. COPIES FURNISHED: Thomas E. Wright, Esquire Department of Management Services Division of Retirement 4050 Esplanade Way, Suite 160 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 JoAnn Robinson Post Office Box 48409 Sarasota, Florida 34230-5409 Dan Drake, Director Division of Retirement Department of Management Services Post Office Box 9000 Tallahassee, Florida 32315-9000 Josefina M. Tamayo, General Counsel Department of Management Services 4050 Esplanade Way, Suite 160 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950
Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to the issues herein, Respondent, Lykes Brothers, Inc. operated a meat packing plant in Plant City, Florida. Hennis Washington, III was employed by Respondent at that plant as a utility worker. Petitioner, Hillsborough County, through its Human Resources and Equal Opportunity Department, had the authority to investigate and administratively enforce County Ordinances relative to unlawful discrimination in employment. Respondent is 5'1/2" tall and weighs about 114 pounds, much the same as at the time in issue. He is a power lifter and claims to be able to lift 405 pounds in a dead lift. He was employed at the Respondent's plant from July, 1991 to May, 1993, when he was terminated in the action which is the subject of this hearing. On May 24, 1993, while in the performance of his duties, Mr. Washington was carrying a stack of empty boxes from one place to another through the plant's bacon curing department. The stack of boxes he was carrying extended above his head and as a result he was unable to see in front of him. As he proceeded down the aisle, he ran into some resistance which prevented him from going further. He changed direction to the side where he could see, and which, he believed, was clear, and again ran into resistance which, this time, caused him to drop the boxes. After the boxes fell, and he could see in front of him, he observed Mr. Romero, a sanitation worker, in front of him, smiling. There is some question whether or not Mr. Romero took a step toward Mr. Washington. At hearing, Mr. Washington said he did and that he felt threatened by Mr. Romero's advance, though at his grievance hearing he did not indicate that. In response, howevever, Mr. Washington moved toward Mr. Romero, a man approximately 5'8" tall and weighing approximately 175 pounds, picked him up, and dropped him on the floor. As a result of that, Mr. Romero claimed to have injured his back and reported to the medical office by which he was released from duty for the evening. After this action, Mr. Washington was terminated from employment with the company. He is of the opinion it was because of his race, but admits he was advised by his supervisor, Mr. Freeman, it was because it was felt he had over- reacted to the situation with Mr. Romero. Nonetheless, an employee action request initiated by Mr. Freeman, dated May 24, 1993 reflected that Mr. Washington was administratively terminated. Administrative termination deals with unauthorized absences, according to the company's Employee Handbook. Mr. Freeman, himself African-American, was not present at the time of the incident, but was informed of it shortly thereafter, and called Mr. Washington to his office. Mr. Washington admitting picking up Mr. Romero, whom he did not previously know, and thereafter dropping him to the floor. Mr. Freeman, after finding out what happened, referred the matter to Mr. Harris, the employee relations manager, who is also African-American. Mr. Freeman did not interview Mr. Romero. He prepared the administrative termination notice upon direction of his supervisors. He claims the termination was based on Mr. Washington's fighting and not on the basis of his race. Mr. Harris, over a period of the next several days, conducted his independent investigation into the incident which investigation included speaking with Mr. Washington, Mr. Romero, and several other witnesses. During this period, both Mr. Washington and Mr. Romero were suspended. Mr. Harris' investigation confirmed there had been an incident, but he could find no evidence that Mr. Romero had pushed the boxes Mr. Washington was carrying. It was for that reason that Mr. Romero was not disciplined. The termination of Mr. Washington was predicated upon the fact that he had been engaged in a fight with another employee. The Respondent's personnel rules indicate that fighting, as opposed to mere horseplay, is a Class I infraction, the punishment for which can include dismissal. It includes the throwing of punches, the use of weapons, and the threat of injury. Horseplay, on the other hand, usually amounts to no more than pushing, tugging, and actions which are not likely to result in injury. In the instant case, Mr. Washington's actions constituted a direct battery of Mr. Romero which resulted in injury. It was, therefore, properly considered fighting. Mr. Harris concluded that Mr. Washington had reacted to the situation improperly. If, as he claimed, Mr. Washington felt he was being harrassed by Mr. Romero and Mr. Barbosa, who was with Mr. Romero at the time of the incident, he should have reported the matter to his supervisor rather than taking matters into his own hands. Employees are given an Employee Handbook when they begin employment with the company, and they are taught, in a four hour orientation course given to all employees, to back off from incidents of this nature - not to fight. Because he felt Mr. Washington had overreacted, Mr. Harris recommended termination, even though a check of both employees' personnel records indicated neither had any previous incidents. At the time of the incident, Lykes had approximtely 750 production maintenance employees, (Mr. Washington's category). Of this number, between 30 and 35 percent were African-American, 15 percent were Hispanic, 5 percent were other minorities, and between 45 and 50 percent white. Mr. Hampton, Lykes' Vice-President for Employee Relations, was made aware of the situation involving Mr. Washington by Mr. Harris, who recommended termination. Mr. Hampton agreed with this recommendation because Mr Washington had thrown Mr. Romero down and injured him. The recommendation for termination was not based on race and was consistent with discipline taken in prior incidents. Specifically, Mr. Hampton referred to a situation occuring not long before the instant case in which two white employees were initially terminated for an altercation they had. In that case, the investigation showed the employees had been fighting and both initially were fired. However, the union filed a grievance. A hearing was held and the decision to terminate was upheld. Thereupon, the union indicated its intent to take the matter to arbitration, and as a result of a meeting held on that issue, it was determined that the incident was more horseplay than fighting and there was little likelihood the company could prevail at arbitration. That conclusion was based on the fact there were no blows struck, there was no injury, and the incident stopped immediately upon the arrival of the supervisor. The employees thereafter were disciplined and reinstated. Mr. Washington also filed a grievance regarding his case. A hearing was held persuant to the union contract. Based on the information presented at the hearing, the grievance committee, made up of two African-American employees and one white employee, concluded there was insufficient evidence to take the issue to arbitration. This committee included the same individuals who heard the previously noted grievance, regarding the white employees. Mr. Washington asserts that because he had been assigned to a position previously held by Mr. Romero, who, he claimed, was demoted from utility to sanitation, Mr. Romero was angry with him and was looking for trouble. The evidence of record indicates that in March, 1993, Mr. Romero was transferred to another position on a different shift from that he was then occupying. The evidence also indicates the position to which Mr. Washington was assigned cannot be considered to be Mr. Romero's old position. Utility and sanitation jobs are, purportedly, on a par. Mr. Washington was assigned to a job identical to that which Mr. Romero had vacated, but on a different shift. Mr. Romero would have had no reason to think Mr. Washington took his job any more than any other utility employee. Further, there is no evidence, save the claim by Mr. Washington, that Mr. Romero acted in a threatening manner. Mr. Glisson, a witness to the incident, indicated the two "tangled". but there was no indication of aggressiveness by Mr. Romero. Taken together, while Washington may have believed Mr. Romero was threatening him, there was insufficient provocation for him to react in the way he did. Under the terms of the Employee Handbook, he should have retreated, and his actions constituted fighting which is grounds for discipline. It is impossible to conclude, from the evidence of record, that the termination of Mr. Washington resulted from anything other than a reaction to his demonstrated misconduct. Only one question remains unanswered. On June 1, 1993, an Employee Action Request was prepared, purporting to administratively terminate Mr. Washington because of fighting on the job and threats of violence. Counsel for the County claims this is an alteration of that action form prepared on May 24, 1993. Both exhibits were photo copies and it is impossible to tell, with certainty, that an alteration occurred. However, a close comparison of the copies leads to the conclusion that the latter dated form is, in reality, an alteration of the former with the dates changed, and an addition of fighting and threats with a direction to remove Mr. Washington from the payroll. No evidence was presented regarding a reason for the alteration, and nothing improper can be legitimately inferred therefrom. Counsel representing Mr. Washington makes reference to the opinion of an Appeals Referee of the Florida Department of Labor and Employment Security, dated July 30, 1993, which, in reversing the determination of the claims examiner in Mr. Washington's unemployment compensation claim, determines that he was not the aggressor in the incident that led to his discharge, and that his involvment was merely for self-protection. The Referee also finds that Mr. Washington's actions could not be viewed as misconduct connected with his work, and he is, therefore, not disqualified for unemployment compensation benefits. The Referee concludes, as a matter of law, that inefficiency, unsatisfactory conduct, and/or good faith errors in judgement or discretion are not to be deemed "misconduct" "within the meaning of the statute, (Chapter 443, Florida Statutes). The finding of the Appeals Referee is not binding on the undersigned in this action. Mr. Washington was deemed by his employers to have, by fighting, overreacted in the confrontation with Mr. Romero. Overreaction can be equated with poor judgement which, in an industry as hazardous as is meat packing, may well serve as appropriate grounds for discharge even if not classified as misconduct.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, therefore: RECOMMENDED that a Determination of No Cause be entered by the Hillsborough Human Relations Board concerning the termination from employment of Hennis Washington, III by the Respondent, Lykes Brothers, Inc. RECOMMENDED this 31st day of March, 1995, in Tallahassee, Florida. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of March, 1995. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER The following constitutes my specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on all of the Proposed Findings of Fact submitted by the parties to this case. FOR THE PETITIONER: Accepted and incorporated herein. - 5. Accepted and incorporated herein. & 7. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted and incorporated herein. First sentence accepted and incorported herein. Second sentence rejected as a being more a Conclusion of Law than a Finding of Fact. - 12. Accepted and incorporated herein. Irrelevant. Accepted. Accepted. - 17. Accepted. 18. Accepted. FOR THE RESPONDENT: 1. 2. & 3. 4. 5. & 6. Accepted Accepted Accepted Accepted and and and and incorporated incorporated incorporated incorporated herein. herein. herein. herein. 7. - 9. Accepted. 10. & 11. Accepted and incorporated herein. 12. Accepted and incorporated herein. 13. & 14. Accepted and incorporated herein. 15. Accepted and incorporated herein. COPIES FURNISHED: Catherine P. Teti, Esquire Office of the County Attorney Hillsborough County P.O. Box 1110 Tampa, Florida 33601 Michael D. Malfitano, Esquire Malfitano & Campbell, P.A. 101 E. Kennedy Boulevard Suite 1080 P.O. Box 1840 Tampa, Florida 33601-1840 Daniel A. Kleman County Administrator Post Office Box 1110 Tampa, Florida 33601
Conclusions THIS CAUSE came before the Board of Osteopathic Medicine pursuant to Sections 120.569 and 120.57(1), Florida Statutes, on November 6, 2010, in Tampa, Florida, for the purpose of considering the Administrative Law Judge’s Order Relinquishing Jurisdiction and Closing File in the above-styled cause, Petitioner was tepresented by Richard Withers, Esquire. Respondent was represented by Donna Canzano McNulty, Esquire. Neither Petitioner nor Mr. Withers were © Present for the Board’s consideration of the Administrative Law Judge’s Order. Upon review of the Administrative Law Judge’s Order and after a review of the complete record in this case, the Board determined to adopt the Administrative Law Judge’s Order Relinquishing Jurisdiction and Closing File and continue to deny Petitioner’s Petition to Reinstate Licensure. WHEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the Administrative Law Judge Order Relinquishing Jurisdiction and Closing File is ADOPTED and that Dr. Zebranek’s Petition to Reinstate License is DENIED. DONE AND ORDERED this /_ day orhecerh e—__, 2010. BOARD OF OSTEOPATHIC MEDICINE Executive Director for Joél Rose, D.O., Chair
