The Issue Whether Petitioner was subjected to housing discrimination by Respondent based on Petitioner's national origin, Puerto Rican, in violation of the Florida Fair Housing Act.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner Rosa M. Cabrera is of Puerto Rican descent and, therefore, belongs to a class of persons protected from discrimination based on national origin under the Florida Fair Housing Act, Sections 760.20 through 760.37, Florida Statutes, (2009). On September 17, 2009, she filed a complaint for housing discrimination against the management of Costa del Sol, LLC. Respondent, Monica Londono, is employed by Morgan Whitney, Inc., the company that manages Costa del Sol, a sixteen-unit apartment complex at 7425 Byron Avenue, Miami Beach, Florida 33141. Ms. Cabrera lived at Costa del Sol for 4 years. In her complaint, she alleged discrimination in the conditions and services provided to her as a tenant based on her national origin. The Housing Authority of Miami Beach inspected Ms. Cabrera's unit annually as required for units subsidized under the Housing Choice Voucher Program, also known as Section 8. On March 23, 2009, a notice was mailed to Ms. Cabrera to inform her that her annual inspection was scheduled for April 10, 2009, between 10:00 a.m. and 1:00 p.m. Mr. Cabrera was not there, on April 10, 2009, when the inspector arrived, so a door handle notice and a letter mailed the same day notified her that the inspection was rescheduled for April 13, 2009. About the same time, Ms. Cabrera said she had trouble with her hot water heater. On April 13, 2009, the unit failed inspection. The inspector found that a bedroom air conditioner was not cooling properly, that a sink stopper was missing, and that a closet door mirror was cracked. A re-inspection was scheduled for May 11, 2009. On April 22, 2009, Ms. Cabrera was offended and apparently turned away, what she said was, a group of six people who came to make repairs without giving her prior notice. On May 11, 2009, the same defects were noted and, on May 29, 2009, the Housing Authority abated the rent and terminated its contract for the unit with Costa Del Sol effective June 30, 2009. Ms. Cabrera was scheduled to meet her Section 8 case worker, Housing Authority Specialist Felipe Roloff, to "start the moving process" at 4:00 p.m., on June 5, 2009. Ms. Cabrera did not keep the appointment and it was rescheduled for June 16, 2009. On June 9, 2009, however, an "abate-cure" inspection was conducted and the unit passed. On July 21 and 23, 2009, Ms. Cabrera contacted Mr. Roloff to tell him that her refrigerator was not working and the landlord was given 24 hours to repair or replace it. When a handyman came alone to make repairs, Ms. Cabrera was afraid to let him in her apartment fearing sexual battery. So Ms. Londono accompanied the handyman when they attempted to deliver a refrigerator. They were unable to exchange the refrigerators because Ms. Cabrera had changed the locks without giving the manager a new key a violation of the terms of her lease, and she would not unlock the door. Ms. Cabrera's son arrived home at the same time and he also did not have a new key. At his suggestion, the refrigerator was left in the hallway for him to exchange it with the one in Ms. Cabrera's apartment later. Ms. Cabrera claimed, without any supporting evidence, that Ms. Londono publicly embarrassed her by calling her a "fucking Puerto Rican bitch" and a "ridiculous old lady." Ms. Londono, who is also of Puerto Rican descent, denied the allegation. Someone, Ms. Londono believes it was Ms. Cabrera, called the Miami Beach Code Compliance Division, to report that the refrigerator was left in the hallway and it was hauled away as household waste. Ms. Cabrera said the refrigerator left in the hallway was in poor condition. Ms. Londono, according to Ms. Cabrera, called the police and accused her of stealing the refrigerator. There is no supporting evidence of their accusations and suspicions about each other. When she finally got a replacement refrigerator, Ms. Cabrera said it was missing one of the crisper drawers. Ms. Cabrera believed she was being discriminated against in receiving poor services and also when Ms. Londono required her to move a plant from the hallway, but did not make another tenant move his motorcycle from the area where it was parked. Ms. Londono notified Mr. Roloff of Ms. Cabrera's lack of cooperation, and that she intended to collect August rent and to withhold a portion of the security deposit to cover the cost of the missing refrigerator. On August 5, 2009, the Housing Authority issued to Ms. Cabrera a Notice of Termination of Housing Assistance effective September 30, 2009. The Notice cited her failure to allow the landlord to enter to make necessary repairs and her failure to report the income of her son who was living with her. When the rent was not paid on August 5, 2009, Ms. Londono delivered a three-day notice to pay rent or vacate to Ms. Cabrera's unit. Ms. Cabrera did not vacate. Eviction proceedings were begun in September. Ms. Cabrera was evicted on November 22, 2009. After Ms. Cabrera moved the report of the inspection of the unit indicated that, among other damage, it was infested with fleas, supporting Ms. Londono's previous claim that Ms. Cabrera was leaving her window open to allow cats to come and feed in her unit, in violation of Section 8 rules. Ms. Cabrera's claim of discrimination based on national origin is not supported by the evidence.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Face and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Petition for Relief be denied. DONE AND ENTERED this 12th day of March, 2010, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ELEANOR M. HUNTER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of March, 2010. COPIES FURNISHED: Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Larry Kranert, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Rosa M. Cabrera 7851 Northeast 10th Avenue, Apt. 26 Miami, Florida 33138 Monica Londono Morgan Whitney, Inc. Costa del Sol, LLC 1385 Coral Way, Penthouse 403 Miami, Florida 33145
The Issue Whether Petitioner was subjected to housing discrimination by Respondent based on Petitioner's race, African-American, in violation of the Florida Fair Housing Act.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner Miguel Johnson is an African-American male and, therefore, belongs to a class of persons protected from discrimination under the Florida Fair Housing Act, Sections 760.20 through 760.37, Florida Statutes (2009). He filed a complaint for housing discrimination against Riviera Towers at 6896 Abbott Avenue in Miami Beach. Respondent Riviera Terrace Apartments (Riviera Terrace) was apparently erroneously named Riviera Towers in the complaint and in the style of this case. Notice of that error was given by the owner, Arie Markowitz, and in the absence of any indication that Riviera Terrace is a corporate entity, Mr. Markowitz is also added as a Respondent. The style has been corrected to reflect these corrections. Riviera Terrace, 6890 Abbott Avenue, Miami Beach, Florida, 33141, is a 20-unit apartment complex. Mr. Johnson thought that the complex has 22 units, but there is no evidence to support his thinking. Contrary to his request, the undersigned has no independent investigative powers and must accept the evidence in the record. According to his records, Mr. Johnson, on March 17, 2009, telephoned a number he saw on a "For Rent" sign at Riviera Terrace. A woman identified as Diana Miteff answered the telephone. Mr. Johnson said Ms. Miteff identified herself as the manager of the complex. The telephone records indicate that the conversation lasted one minute. Mr. Johnson testified that Ms. Miteff told him to call back later. Mr. Johnson telephoned Ms. Miteff again on March 21, 2009, and his records indicate that they talked for 8 minutes. Mr. Johnson testified that Ms. Miteff told him about the security deposit, that the rent for a one bedroom apartment was $900 a month, and that she had some vacant efficiencies. Mr. Johnson testified that a friend of his, Pedro Valdes, lives in the same complex and that together they met with Ms. Miteff the day after Mr. Johnson talked to her on the telephone, and saw a vacant efficiency apartment. According to Mr. Johnson, Ms. Miteff told him, after seeing him, that there were no vacancies. Ayesha Azara, Mr. Johnson's wife, testified that she made another unsuccessful attempt to rent a unit in Riviera Terrace in May 2009. She had no information in March 2008, except to say tht Ms. Miteff claimed to be the manager and told her the building was for elderly people. Pedro Valdes testified that he lives in Riviera Towers and gave his address as 6896 Abbott Avenue. He said that the "For Rent" sign for Riviera Terrace is not always posted in front of the complex. Mr. Markowitz is the owner of Riviera Terrace at 6890 Abbott Avenue. He testified that he is also the manager and that Ms. Miteff is a tenant. He uses her telephone number on the "For Rent" sign because he does not speak Spanish. The apartments are government-subsidized Section 8 housing. The only vacant efficiency in March 2008 was a unit for which he already had a written lease, but the tenant could not move in until after a government-required inspection. He also testified that his tenants are not all Caucasians and not all elderly. Ms. Miteff confirmed that she has been a resident of Riviera Terrace for 20 years. She concedes that she told Mr. Johnson's wife that the people in the complex are very quiet and mostly old people. Mr. Johnson's claim of discrimination based on race is not supported by the evidence, which is contradictory with regard to the name and address of the property, and because there were no vacant apartments at Riviera Terrace in March 2008.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that: The Petition for Relief be dismissed. DONE AND ENTERED this 15th day of October, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ELEANOR M. HUNTER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of October, 2009. COPIES FURNISHED: Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Larry Kranert, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Louis A. Supraski, Esquire Louis A. Supraski, P.A. 2450 Northeast Miami Gardens Drive 2nd Floor North Miami Beach, Florida 33180 Miguel Johnson 916 West 42nd Street, Apt. 9 Miami Beach, Florida 33140 Miguel Johnson C/O Robert Fox 1172 South Dixie Highway Coral Gables, Florida 33146 Diana Mittles Riviera Terrace Apartments 6896 Abott Avenue Miami Beach, Florida 33141
The Issue Whether Petitioner was the subject of unlawful discrimination in the provision of services or facilities in connection with her dwelling based on her race or handicap, in violation of the Florida Fair Housing Act, chapter 760, Part II, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a 51-year-old black female who relocated to Leesburg, Florida, from Port Chester, New York, in February 2012. Respondent, Richman Property Services, Inc., is the corporate owner/manager of Laurel Oaks Apartments (Laurel Oaks) located at 131 Bayou Circle in Leesburg, Florida. Amy Lewis is the Community Manager of Laurel Oaks. Petitioner rented a two-bedroom apartment unit from Respondent from February 24, 2012, until she moved to Orlando, Florida, on December 3, 2012. Petitioner?s daughter, Sushon Dillard, occupied the apartment with Petitioner during her tenancy at Laurel Oaks. Petitioner spoke with Ms. Lewis via telephone to inquire regarding the availability of a unit at Laurel Oaks while Petitioner was still residing out of state. Petitioner applied for tenancy at Laurel Oaks by faxing her application to Ms. Lewis. Petitioner?s application was accompanied by a copy of her award letter documenting Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) payments as proof of income. On February 24, 2012, Petitioner signed a lease for Laurel Oaks unit #103, paid a security deposit, and moved into the unit. Petitioner has a current clinical diagnosis of “schizophrenia, paranoid.” She also claims to be diagnosed bi- polar with Tourrete?s Syndrome. While Petitioner presented no documentation of the additional diagnosis, her testimony on this issue is credible and is accepted by the undersigned. Petitioner was first hospitalized for treatment of an unspecified mental illness at Bellevue Hospital in New York in 1982. She apparently lived without significant incident for the next 26 years. Petitioner had a “breakdown” in 2008, while living in Arizona, and another “breakdown” that same year in New York, for which she was hospitalized at Greenwich Hospital in Connecticut, and later transferred to Stamford Hospital in Connecticut. Petitioner reports that since April 2008, she has “spent time in numerous mental institutions in Arizona, Florida, Georgia, Maryland and New York.” Petitioner?s most recent incident occurred in August 2012, while she was living at Laurel Oaks. She was taken by police to a local facility named “Life Stream” where she was treated for a number of days, then returned home to her apartment at Laurel Oaks with her daughter. Petitioner appeared calm and controlled at the final hearing. She testified that she is taking her medications and doing very well. Petitioner claims that when she moved into the unit at Laurel Oaks, it was not cleaned, was “infested with dead roaches,” and the washing machine was filthy. Petitioner?s daughter testified there were dead roaches even in the dishwasher. Petitioner also bases her allegation of discrimination on Respondent?s accusation in April 2012, that Petitioner had not paid a $300 security deposit prior to occupying her apartment. When Petitioner paid her April rent, Trifonia Bradley, an employee in the office at Laurel Oaks, informed Petitioner she still owed a $300 security deposit. Petitioner responded that she had paid the deposit on February 24, 2012. Although the evidence was not clear as to the specific date, Petitioner later met with Ms. Bradley and brought in her receipt showing the $300 had been paid in February. After that meeting, Petitioner received a phone call from Ms. Lewis apologizing for the error and stating something to the effect of “we are all good.” Petitioner believes Respondent was attempting to take advantage of her disability and trick her into paying the deposit again. At final hearing, Petitioner and her daughter presented evidence and testimony regarding additional alleged discriminatory acts by Respondent. Petitioner alleged that someone employed by, or otherwise acting on behalf of Respondent, sabotaged her automobile; harassed her by requesting her daughter fill out a separate rental application in order to live with her; harassed Petitioner about her request for accommodation based on her disability and claimed she had not demonstrated that she was disabled under the Americans with Disabilities Act; threatened to tow away her car because it was inoperable; and stole money from her apartment. Each of these additional alleged acts occurred after September 21, 2012, the date on which FCHR issued its determination of no cause, and was not investigated by FCHR. Petitioner is intelligent and articulate. Her exhibits were well-organized and contained copious documentation of the alleged discriminatory acts occurring after September 21, 2012. Her documentation included correspondence with Laurel Oaks? management, notices which were posted on the apartment door, copies of numerous forms and applications, and a police report. In contrast, Petitioner offered no tangible evidence regarding the condition of the property upon occupancy other than her testimony, which was not persuasive. She introduced no photographs, no written complaint, and no correspondence with the manager or other employees of Laurel Oaks regarding the condition of the apartment. In fact, she offered no evidence that she brought the condition of the unit to the attention of Laurel Oaks? management. Given the totality of the evidence, including the demeanor of the Petitioner and Ms. Dillard, the undersigned finds that either the unit was not unclean or Petitioner did not bring the condition of the unit to the attention of Laurel Oaks upon occupying the unit. Further, the undersigned finds that Laurel Oaks erroneously requested the security deposit in April 2012, and corrected the error after reviewing Petitioner?s documentation. The mistake was not an act of discrimination based either on race or disability.2/
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief filed in FCHR No. 2012H0289. DONE AND ENTERED this 27th day of December, 2012, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S Suzanne Van Wyk Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of December, 2012.
The Issue Whether Respondent discriminated against Petitioner in the terms, conditions, or privileges of rental of a dwelling; or provision of services or facilities in connection therewith, in violation of the Florida Fair Housing Act (“the Act”), section 760.23, Florida Statutes (2019).
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a female residing in Tallahassee, Florida, who purports to have diagnoses of depression, attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder (“ADHD”), and a learning disability. Petitioner offered no evidence regarding how her diagnoses affect her daily life. Petitioner originally signed a lease with Respondent to rent apartment F201 at Sabal Court Apartments, 2125 Jackson Bluff Road, Tallahassee, Florida, from November 1, 2017, to October 31, 2018. Petitioner moved into the apartment with her two minor children on November 2, 2017. Petitioner testified her two minor children also have ADHD. On October 24, 2018, Petitioner renewed her lease for the apartment for the term of November 1, 2018, through October 31, 2019. Petitioner testified that, during the term of both leases, she experienced problems with the apartment; including mold in the bathroom, bed bugs, ants, roaches, spiders, and cracked flooring. Most distressing to Petitioner was the air conditioning unit, which Petitioner alleges was filthy and failed to cool the apartment. Petitioner testified she submitted several requests for the unit to be serviced, but it was never repaired to good working condition. Petitioner complained that the apartment was too hot—frequently reaching temperatures in excess of 80 degrees—for her and her children to sleep at night. On August 7, 2019, Petitioner executed a lease renewal form, requesting to renew her lease for an additional 12 months—through October 31, 2020. On September 23, 2019, Respondent posted a Notice of Non-Renewal of Lease (“Notice”) on Petitioner’s apartment door. The Notice notified Petitioner that her tenancy would not be renewed and that she was expected to vacate the premises on or before October 31, 2019. Petitioner testified that she did not know why her lease was non- renewed, but believed it to be additional mistreatment of her and her family by Respondent. In response to the undersigned’s question why Petitioner believed Respondent’s treatment of her to be related to her handicap, or that of her children, Petitioner replied that she does not believe that the non-renewal of her lease, or other issues with Respondent’s management, was based on either her handicap or that of her children.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a final order dismissing Petition for Relief from a Discriminatory Housing Practice No. 202021115. DONE AND ENTERED this 11th day of May, 2020, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S SUZANNE VAN WYK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of May, 2020. COPIES FURNISHED: Tammy S. Barton, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations Room 110 4075 Esplanade Way Tallahassee, Florida 32399-7020 (eServed) Dastha L. Crews Apartment A 2125 Pecan Lane Tallahassee, Florida 32303 (eServed) Joni Henley, Assistant Manager Sabal Court Apartments 2125 Jackson Bluff Road Tallahassee, Florida 32304 Todd A. Ruderman Green Oaks Tampa, LLC Suite 218 3201 West Commercial Boulevard Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33309 Cheyanne Costilla, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations Room 110 4075 Esplanade Way Tallahassee, Florida 32399-7020 (eServed)
The Issue The issue is whether Respondents committed an act of discrimination based upon disability against Petitioner in violation of the Florida Fair Housing Act.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner claimed to be living in his grandfather’s condominium at Respondent, Oceana II North Oceanfront Condominium Association, Inc. (“Oceana II”), 9900 South Ocean Drive, Apartment 4, Jensen Beach, Florida 34957, pursuant to a month-to-month lease under which he paid $1,000.00 monthly. Petitioner neither produced a written lease nor provided testimony from his grandfather, the putative owner of the condominium, of the existence of such lease. Petitioner also offered no competent evidence (e.g., cancelled checks, receipts, etc.) that he had made any payments under the alleged lease, whether written or oral. At the time of hearing, Petitioner was living in Texas and had no immediate plans to return to Florida or his grandfather’s condominium. Oceana II is a condominium homeowners’ association created and authorized under chapter 718, Florida Statutes. Respondent, Tiffany Ferguson, is the community association manager for Oceana II and the corporate representative for Oceana II for purposes of this hearing. Petitioner testified that his claim of discrimination came about because his car was parked in a disabled space with an expired disability placard. He was informed by Respondents or their agents that his vehicle must be moved to a parking lot away from the entrance to the building in which he was staying. He claims to have told Respondents’ agents that he could not park that far away from “his” unit due to a disability. Petitioner presented no competent evidence that any fine or suspension was ever levied by Respondents on him. Petitioner presented no competent evidence that any of Petitioner’s vehicles were ever towed by Respondents. Petitioner presented no competent evidence that Respondents treated any other person outside of the protected class any more favorably than Petitioner was treated with respect to the rule requiring a current license plate. Petitioner brought several different vehicles, one of which had an expired Maryland tag, onto Oceana II’s premises. Despite the fact that he worked on many of these disabled vehicles, Petitioner presented no competent evidence that Respondents in any way caused Petitioner to purchase such vehicles, which may have needed repair or had issues obtaining a license plate. Petitioner presented no competent evidence that Petitioner attempted to purchase or lease a unit in the condominium and was denied by Respondents due to a disability. Petitioner presented no competent evidence that Petitioner had any lease at any time for his grandfather’s unit which Petitioner testified was a family vacation unit. Petitioner presented no competent evidence that Petitioner provided any information in response to Respondents’ request for information as to an alleged disability, the disability-related need for an accommodation, and how any accommodation was necessary to ameliorate any alleged disability. Petitioner admitted he received Respondents’ email which said no fines would be imposed. Petitioner admitted he received Respondents’ request for additional information to make a meaningful review from Respondents’ counsel. Petitioner admitted he refused to provide the additional information requested by Respondents (through counsel) to make a meaningful review of an accommodation request on October 20, 2020. Petitioner admitted he voluntarily removed the original vehicle (a Pontiac Sunbird) while it had a valid license plate. Petitioner admitted at hearing that he brought in other vehicles at a later time--a green van, a white Saturn, and a gray van--onto the property without plates on purpose to provoke a response and engineer a hearing under section 718.303(3)(b), which pertains to the rights and obligations of condominium associations in levying fines against owners or occupants. He was attempting to set up a claim by intentionally not showing license plates because he wanted a hearing. Petitioner admitted he never tried to register the green van or the gray van with the Florida Department of Motor Vehicles (“DMV”). Petitioner admitted the white Saturn has a current plate, not a Florida plate, and it is currently located in Texas. The white Saturn did not display a plate while on the condominium property. Petitioner admitted he refused to answer on Fifth Amendment grounds whether he ever displayed a plate on any of the vehicles. Petitioner admitted he left Florida in early February and lives in Texas, in San Marco near San Antonio. Petitioner could not renew the Maryland tag on the Sunbird because the VIN (vehicle identification number) on the registration was missing a digit, yet he admitted he has no evidence of any efforts to fix the VIN on the Sunbird with the Maryland DMV.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing Petitioner’s claim for relief, finding both that he has failed to make a prima facie case of housing discrimination and that, because he resides in Texas and has no ownership or legal claim to the condominium in Florida, his claim is moot. DONE AND ENTERED this 10th day of June, 2021, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ROBERT S. COHEN Administrative Law Judge 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of June, 2021. COPIES FURNISHED: Tammy S. Barton, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 4075 Esplanade Way, Room 110 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-7020 J. Henry Cartwright, Esquire Fox McCluskey Bush Robison, PLLC 3461 Southeast Willoughby Boulevard Post Office Drawer 6 Stuart, Florida 34995 John Sebastian Quick Apartment 4 9900 South Ocean Drive Jensen Beach, Florida 34957 Cheyanne M. Costilla, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 4075 Esplanade Way, Room 110 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-7020
The Issue Whether Petitioner was the subject of discriminatory housing practices based on his race or his handicap, in violation of the Florida Fair Housing Act, chapter 760, Part II, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact At all times relevant to this cause, Petitioner was a tenant of a rental apartment located at 284 South First Street, Apartment 6, Macclenny, Florida (the Apartment). Petitioner?s tenancy was established by a lease agreement with a final effective date of November 24, 2009. Petitioner moved out of the apartment on May 3, 2012. Respondent is a Florida Limited Liability Company. Among its other holdings, Respondent owns four 4-plex units located on First Street, Second Street, and Third Street in Macclenny, one of which includes the Apartment. The racial make-up of the tenants occupying Respondent?s apartments in the vicinity is roughly 50 percent African-American and 50 percent Caucasian. Petitioner is African-American. Petitioner has an unspecified mental condition. He takes medications for management of his symptoms, and receives periodic visits from Ms. Gadsby to ensure that he is complying with his medication regimen. Petitioner does not receive disability benefits from the Social Security Administration. Petitioner holds a bachelor?s degree in criminal justice from Benedict College in South Carolina. As part of the application for rental of the Apartment, Petitioner was asked “[h]ave you been arrested or had criminal charges filed against you? (If yes, please list them).” In response to the application question, Petitioner answered “yes Trepass [sic.].” The trespass charge was related to a misdemeanor incident that occurred at an unspecified time in Fort Lauderdale, Florida. Petitioner failed to disclose a felony conviction for an incident that had occurred in South Carolina. Petitioner stated that he thought the requirement to disclose criminal charges applied only to charges arising from incidents having occurred in Florida. However, nothing in the application can be read to support that limitation. As such, Petitioner materially falsified his lease application. Petitioner cut hair for members of his church, neighbors, family, and friends at the Apartment, and had done so for the two-and-one-half years of his tenancy. He equipped the Apartment with a barber chair and a small waiting area. He accepted “donations” of food, clothes, and cash for his services. The cash receipts were used to pay his electric and water bills, among other things. Thus, despite its small scale and limited clientele, Petitioner operated what can only be described as a barbershop from the Apartment. The Lease Agreement between Petitioner and Respondent provides that the Apartment was not to be used “for any other purpose than as a private dwelling unit.” The Lease Agreement also provides that Petitioner was to comply with all applicable building and housing codes. The Macclenny Code of Ordinances, Part III, Section 4-105, provides that home occupations are subordinate and incidental to a residential neighborhood, but that certain occupations, including barbershops, “shall not be considered as home occupations under any circumstance.” Thus, Petitioner?s operation of a barbershop from the Apartment was a violation of the Lease Agreement. There were no apparent landlord/tenant disputes involving Petitioner?s tenancy until late 2011. Mr. Stivender testified that he began to receive periodic complaints from tenants in the area regarding the Apartment, including cars being parked on the grass and in the road, loud music, and people milling about the premises. He testified that at least one tenant advised Respondent that she was afraid to venture out of her apartment due to the number of people in the area. The testimony of Mr. Stivender regarding complaints of other tenants would be hearsay if taken for the truth of the matters asserted. However, the undersigned accepts his testimony as evidence, not of the facts surrounding the alleged complaints, but of a non-discriminatory reason for actions to be described herein, most notably the events of March 6, 2012. At the end of October 2011, Petitioner was cited by Respondent for having more than one car regularly parked at the Apartment. Petitioner?s car was not in running condition. The other cars parked at the Apartment belonged to friends or relatives. Petitioner subsequently sold his vehicle, and would borrow his father?s or his cousin?s car when needed. The incident caused bad feelings between the parties. On November 1, 2011, Respondent sent a notice to each of its tenants in Macclenny. Although the notice was precipitated by the complaints against Petitioner and Respondent?s observations of activities in and around the Apartment, the notice was not limited to Petitioner. The notice cited provisions of the common lease agreement regarding the use of the premises and tenant conduct, and advised that excessive noise, driving on the grass, and “loitering” would be cause for eviction. The notice further advised that the landlord would “be patrolling the area on a regular basis at night to check for violations.” On March 6, 2012, Mr. Ferreria was driving by the Apartment at approximately 10:30 p.m. There were, along with Petitioner and his daughter, three guests at the Apartment, Bianca Gaines-Givens, Jacoby Givens, and Misty Lee. They were playing music on an electronic keyboard. Mr. Ferreria stopped his car on the side of the road. He called his property manager, Mr. Stivender, and advised him that he was going to go speak with Petitioner about the noise coming from the Apartment. Mr. Stivender works for a gas company, and was at work routing gas trucks. Mr. Stivender advised that he was going to come to the Apartment, and asked Mr. Ferreria to wait for him before speaking with Petitioner. Ms. Gaines-Givens and Mr. Jacoby Givens left the Apartment after Mr. Ferreria?s arrival in the neighborhood, and noticed Mr. Ferreria sitting in his vehicle. They drove away from the Apartment, but decided to return shortly thereafter. By the time they returned, Mr. Ferreria and Mr. Stivender were leaving. Thus, they did not witness the confrontation described herein. After Ms. Gaines-Givens and Mr. Jacoby Givens drove off, Mr. Ferreria, disregarding Mr. Stivender?s request, went to the Apartment and knocked on the door. It was, by then, approximately 10:45 p.m. When Petitioner answered the door, the two immediately began a heated discussion over the music and the cars. Ms. Lee went to the back of the Apartment when Mr. Ferreria arrived. She heard yelling, but heard nothing of a racial nature. Shortly after Mr. Ferreria arrived at the Apartment, Mr. Stivender arrived on the scene. Mr. Stivender is a solidly built man, and could be an intimidating presence under the right circumstances. These were the right circumstances. Mr. Stivender physically moved Mr. Ferreria out of the way, and came between Mr. Ferreria and Petitioner. He was primed for a confrontation. He had his hand in his pocket, but testified convincingly that he was not armed.1/ He and Petitioner had a loud and angry exchange of words, and Mr. Stivender forcefully suggested to Petitioner that it would probably be best if he moved out of the Apartment. After Mr. Stivender appeared on the scene, Ms. Lee came out from the back of the Apartment. She recognized Mr. Stivender as Respondent?s “office manager.” She noted that Mr. Stivender had his hand in his pocket, and was talking loudly and pointing his finger in Petitioner?s face. Ms. Lee went outside and spoke with Mr. Ferreria. She testified that Mr. Ferreria indicated that some of the neighbors were afraid of Petitioner because of the noise and the number of people who hung around the Apartment. The confrontation ended with Mr. Ferreria and Mr. Stivender leaving the premises. The police were not called. The next morning, Petitioner called Ms. Gadsby. Petitioner frequently called Ms. Gadsby when he was feeling “stressed.” She went to see him that morning, and testified that he was very upset over the events of the previous evening. She returned that afternoon for a “well-check,” and he was doing better. On March 15, 2012, Petitioner called the Baker County Sheriff?s Office to report the March 6, 2012, incident. A deputy went to the Apartment, spoke with Petitioner and Ms. Lee, took their sworn statements, and prepared an offense report. The description of the incident as reflected in the report, including statements made by Petitioner and Ms. Lee, did not contain any account of racial threats or epithets, or any allegation of discriminatory intent based on race or handicap.2/ Other than Mr. Stivender?s statement made in the heat of the March 6 argument, Respondent made no effort to evict or otherwise remove Petitioner from the Apartment. On March 31, 2012, Petitioner noticed water coming from behind a wall of the Apartment. He called Respondent, and Mr. Stivender came to the Apartment to inspect. Mr. Stivender first suspected that the air-conditioning unit was leaking. The air conditioner was turned off and Mr. Stivender left, intending to contact an air-conditioning repair service. By 6:00 p.m. on March 31, 2012, the rate of the leak was such that it was determined that a water pipe had burst under the foundation of the Apartment. Petitioner did not know where the shut-off valve was located, and was unable to stop the flow, which began to cover the floor in several rooms of the Apartment. Mr. Stivender returned to the Apartment, and determined that a car owned by one of Petitioner?s guests was parked on the grass, and was over the meter box with the shut- off valve. The car was moved, and the water turned off. Respondent called a plumber to fix the pipe. Since the pipe was under the foundation, and in order to avoid breaking up the slab, the repair was accomplished by re-routing the pipe in the wall of the Apartment. The repair entailed cutting an access hole in the drywall. That hole was not immediately repaired. Respondent also called Servpro to perform water cleanup services. The standing water was vacuumed up, and large fans and dehumidifiers were placed in the Apartment to dry it out. While the repairs and drying activities were ongoing, Respondent paid for Petitioner and his daughter to stay in a motel in Macclenny. They were there for three to four days. Respondent paid Petitioner?s power bill for the days that Petitioner was unable to use the Apartment. Petitioner returned to the Apartment, and stayed there for some time. He was upset that the access hole for the pipe repair had not been closed up, and that the baseboards had not been replaced in some areas. On April 9, 2012, Petitioner wrote to Respondent about the effects of the water leak. After thanking Respondent for the “compassion” shown to Petitioner and his family during the event, he complained about the damage to his personal property resulting from the water leak, and an odor “suggesting the presence of mold.” He stated his belief that his daughter?s preexisting asthma was aggravated by the smell in the Apartment. In his April 9, 2012, letter, Petitioner also stated that “due to my mental health condition, I am on prescribed medicine that has now been adjusted to assist me through this stressful situation.” Petitioner?s statement, which was not accompanied by any form of medical evidence, was not sufficient to place Respondent on notice that Petitioner had a record of having, or was regarded as having, any form of mental disability. Mr. Stivender testified that no one ever advised Respondent that Petitioner had a mental disability, and that Respondent had no such knowledge. The April 9, 2012, letter being insufficient on its own to convey such information, Mr. Stivender?s testimony is credited. On May 3, 2012, Petitioner moved out of the Apartment. He had been served with no eviction notice or other written request to vacate. Petitioner gave no notice to Respondent, but dropped off his key at Mr. Ferreria?s business on the day he moved out. Mr. Stivender testified that Petitioner left the Apartment in a filthy, deplorable condition. As a result, Respondent withheld Petitioner?s $400.00 security deposit to offset the costs of returning the Apartment to rentable condition. Petitioner testified that the Apartment was not in poor condition when he moved out, and that some of the damage was the result of the pipe leak. However, Petitioner did not testify, or even suggest, that the decision to withhold the deposit was the result of any racial hostility or animus, or of any reaction to his handicap. Petitioner failed to introduce any evidence that he was treated differently under similar circumstances than were tenants of Respondent who were not African-American, or who did not have comparable mental disabilities. Ultimate Findings of Fact There was no competent, substantial evidence adduced at the hearing that Respondent undertook any act pertaining to Petitioner?s occupancy of the Apartment based on Petitioner?s race. Petitioner failed to prove that Respondent knew of Petitioner?s mental disability or handicap, or that Respondent regarded Petitioner as having any such mental disability or handicap. Petitioner failed to prove that Petitioner?s race or handicap caused or contributed to the March 6, 2012, confrontation. Rather, the evidence demonstrates that the confrontation resulted from noise, issues with cars and parking, and complaints directed to Petitioner by other tenants. Petitioner failed to prove that he was ready, willing, and able to continue to rent the Apartment, but that Respondent refused to allow him to do so. Petitioner failed to prove that Respondent took any action to evict him from the Apartment, or to otherwise intentionally interfere with Petitioner?s occupancy of the premises. To the contrary, the evidence supports a finding that Respondent took reasonable and appropriate steps to repair and remediate the Apartment after the water line break, and provided no-cost accommodations to Petitioner while the Apartment was not habitable. The repairs may not have been completed to Petitioner?s satisfaction, but any such deficiency was not the result of discrimination against Petitioner based on his race or his handicap. Petitioner failed to prove that Respondent?s decision to withhold his security deposit was based on Petitioner?s race or handicap. In sum, the evidence did not establish that Petitioner was the subject of unlawful discrimination in the provision of services or facilities in connection with his dwelling based on his race or his handicap.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief filed in FCHR No. 2013H0034. DONE AND ENTERED this 7th day of February, 2013, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S E. GARY EARLY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of February, 2013.
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent has unlawfully discriminated against Petitioner on the basis of his national origin and in retaliation for his opposing discriminatory practices in connection with his rental of an apartment, in violation of the Florida Fair Housing Act, section 760.23(2), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner was born in Brazil. He resides in an apartment in St. Monica Gardens in Miami Gardens, Florida. St. Monica Gardens provides housing subsidized by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) for low- income, elderly residents. St. Monica Gardens is owned and operated by Respondent, which is a not-for-profit corporation, and managed by Catholic Housing Management, which is a management company owned by the Archdiocese of Miami, Inc. Catholic Housing Management manages 17 buildings accommodating over 2500 persons from all over the world. Residents at St. Monica Gardens, including Petitioner, receive free lunches through the charitable offices of Catholic Charities of the Archdiocese of Miami, Inc. Petitioner has objected to the quality and operation of this free-food program. On one occasion, Petitioner complained that a food server used the same-colored gloves that are used to perform maintenance duties, and an unauthorized person was allowed to remain in the food-preparation and -service areas. However, these complaints do not establish that Catholic Charities fails to serve St. Monica Gardens residents safe food, lawfully prepared. On September 16, 2016, Catholic Charities was conducting an annual verification audit of residents at lunch that day. Petitioner angrily confronted a Catholic Charities food-service worker, demanding that he be given immediate access to his free lunch. Other residents, mostly Cuban, objected to Petitioner's behavior, although, on this record, their objections appear to be based on Petitioner's discourtesy, not national origin. Respondent conducted an informal investigation of the incident and issued a notice to Petitioner that this confrontational behavior was in violation of his lease. There is no evidence of any discrimination against Petitioner, nor is there any evidence that Respondent took any adverse action against Petitioner or his lease or occupancy of his apartment at St. Monica Gardens. Petitioner complained to HUD, but Respondent did not discriminate or take adverse action against Petitioner for this complaint either.
Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief filed on May 1, 2017. DONE AND ENTERED this 2nd day of August, 2017, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S Robert E. Meale Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of August, 2017. COPIES FURNISHED: Tammy S. Barton, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 4075 Esplanade Way, Room 110 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 (eServed) Everdan Sales Correia Apartment 217 3425 Northwest 189th Street Miami Gardens, Florida 33056 (eServed) Thomas H. Courtney, Esquire J. Patrick Fitzgerald & Associates, P.A. 110 Merrick Way, Suite 3-B Coral Gables, Florida 33134 (eServed) Cheyanne Costilla, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 4075 Esplanade Way, Room 110 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 (eServed)
The Issue Whether Respondents engaged in a discriminatory housing practice in violation of the Florida Fair Housing Act, as amended, sections 760.20 through 760.37, Florida Statutes (2011)1/.
Findings Of Fact Background Respondents Hoyt and Nancy Davis (the Davises) own a residential property located at 1856 Cross Pointe Way, St. Augustine, Florida (the Property). The Property is utilized exclusively as a rental. Respondent Florida Coastal Jacksonville Realty, Inc. ("Florida Coastal") and its principal John McMenamy ("McMenamy") acted as listing agents for the Property (collectively, the "Broker Respondents"). Mr. McMenamy and his company have managed the rental of the Property for approximately six years. In association with their listing of the Property, the Broker Respondents were responsible for advertising, showing, accepting applications for and assisting in the selection of tenants for the Property. At the time of the events in question, the Property was being offered for lease at a rate of $1,450 per month. Generally, due to its location within a St. Johns County golf community and proximity to good schools, the Property rents easily and quickly. The Rental Applications On May 14, 2010, Petitioner Jaime Terry (Mrs. Terry) contacted McMenamy regarding the Property. McMenamy instructed Mrs. Terry on the rental application process. On the afternoon of Sunday, May 16, 2010, Petitioners submitted via e-mail their rental application, dated May 15, 2010. On their application, the Petitioners disclosed that they had previously declared bankruptcy. The bankruptcy was entered in December 2007 and discharged in January 2009. Petitioners also disclosed that they were currently living with Mrs. Terry's parents. The application included a statement of the Terrys' monthly income, and also disclosed that they had three children residing with them -- aged eleven, five and two at the time. A memo attached to the application elaborated on the bankruptcy and other details of their employment and financial situation. Mrs. Terry testified that during the application process the Respondents did not solicit additional information concerning her employment history. On May 18, 2010, McMenamy ran a credit check on the Terrys using the "Online Rental Exchange." The credit report for Jaime Terry reflected a credit score of 664, while Steven Terry's assigned score was 649. However, both reports noted "conditional" approval because of the bankruptcy filing. Although the exact date is unknown, at approximately the same time that the Terrys submitted their application, another couple, Rick and Jessica Egger (the Eggers) contacted McMenamy regarding their interest in possibly renting the Property. On the evening of Thursday, May 20, 2010, the Eggers formally submitted an application to rent the Property. The Eggers' application disclosed that, unlike the Terrys', they did not have a bankruptcy in their history. In addition, the Eggers' combined monthly income was higher than the Terrys'2/ and the younger of their two children was nine years old. The credit report obtained for the Eggers reflected a credit score of 672 for Jessica Egger and 696 for Rick Egger, with an unconditional approval rating. Respondents' Tenant Selection Process McMenamy testified that in evaluating applications, potential tenants must meet certain minimum criteria. Factors he considers in assessing applicants include credit checks, criminal background checks, employment status, and rental history. However, he agreed that the evaluation process he uses is subjective. McMenamy acknowledged that bankruptcy would not automatically disqualify a potential tenant, and in fact, confirmed that he has rented to tenants who have a bankruptcy in their history. With regard to credit scores, McMenamy testified that he considered a score below 500 to be unacceptable. Mrs. Davis testified that McMenamy manages the entire process of renting the Property on behalf of herself and her husband. Once McMenamy determines the suitability of a prospective tenant, he discusses that tenant with the Davises. McMenamy does not discuss applicants with the Davises that he does not consider eligible. The Davises do not participate in the background screening process and they do not review applicants' credit ratings. However, Mrs. Davis was aware of McMenamy's process for selecting tenants, and she confirmed her understanding that applicants must meet certain minimum requirements. In selecting a tenant, McMenamy looks not only for a candidate that is financially qualified, but also one who will rent the property for a significant period of time, will take good care of the property, and will make monthly rent payments in a timely manner, according to Mrs. Davis. Denial of Petitioners' Lease Application Mr. Davis testified that he and Mrs. Davis discussed the Petitioners' application with McMenamy. At hearing, Mr. Davis recounted that conversation as follows: Cross-examination by Mr. Organes: Q. Mr. Davis, you stated that you had discussed with Mr. McMenamy the application of Steven and Jaime Terry? A. Yes. Q. And that’s a common practice with Mr. McMenamy as when he receives reasonably qualified applicants, he discusses them with you? A. Yes. Q. And that’s what he did with the Terrys? A. Yes. Q. And you said you did not tell him not to rent to them because of their children? A. That is true, we did not tell him. Q. The issue of children wasn’t discussed at all? A. No. Q. What reason did you give him to tell them why their application was being denied? A. Because of their past rental history and their bankruptcy foreclosure. Q. In general if you don’t approve of an applicant, what reason would you give for denying that applicant? A. I would give that reason, that we didn’t feel that, you know, we probably would get a better applicant and the reason we turned them down is because we didn’t feel that they were suitable for our rental. There is no evidence in this record as to precisely when the above conversation between the Respondents took place, although based upon Mr. Davis's statement that "we probably would get a better applicant" it is reasonable to infer that it was prior to the Eggers submitting their application on the evening of Thursday, May 20, 2010.3/ Early on the morning of Friday, May 21, 2010, McMenamy sent an e-mail to Ms. Terry, which read: Jaime I left a message yesterday but did not hear from you. I spoke to the owner about the application and she was concerned about not really having any rental history and the number of small children. She is a perfectionist and just had the home professionally painted. The one family who lived there had small children and there were handprints all over the walls so that it needed to be repainted. So this was her main concern and therefore does not want to rent to you and the family. If you have any questions please call. Sincerely, John At hearing, Mrs. Davis maintained that the Petitioners' children were not the determining factor in the decision to deny their application. Rather, it was based on their finances and lack of rental history. Consistent with Mr. Davis's testimony, Mrs. Davis also testified that she and her husband did not instruct McMenamy to reject the Petitioners' application because of their children. After being informed that their application was denied, Petitioners immediately began searching for alternate housing. Mrs. Terry testified that their primary concern was to locate a rental in a high quality school district. Within a couple of weeks of receiving the denial e-mail from McMenamy, the Terrys located a home at 983 Lilac Loop, St. Johns, Florida. Petitioners entered into a lease for this property on June 6, 2010; the rent was $ 1,200 per month. Although the Lilac Loop home was acceptable, the Terrys considered it to be inferior to the Property, and Petitioners paid to have the home repainted and wired for cable access. The cable installation fee was $150.00. On September 22, 2010, Petitioners were notified that the Lilac Loop house was in foreclosure. Petitioners appealed to a default-law organization in an attempt to enforce their one-year lease, but were ultimately unsuccessful. As a result of the foreclosure, Petitioners were forced to seek alternative housing within the same school district, and in November 2010, leased a property at 1528 Summerdown Way, Fruit Cove, Florida, 32259. The monthly rent at 1528 Summerdown Way was $1,600 monthly. Petitioners also incurred additional expenses necessitated by hiring a moving service, in the amount of $773.50. At of the hearing, Petitioners continued to reside in the Summerdown Way rental. The Commission Investigation On August 16, 2010, the Terrys filed a Housing Discrimination Complaint with HUD alleging they had been unlawfully discriminated against by Respondents based upon their familial status. Thereafter, the Commission opened an investigation of the allegation. As part of that investigation, Respondents were invited to submit written statements setting forth their version of the events at issue, and any defenses to the allegation they wished to raise. On August 19, 2010, the Davises submitted a written statement to the FCHR. In the first paragraph of that submittal the Davises stated: To Whom it May Concern: We enlisted realtor John MaMenamy to find a new tenant for our rental house at 1856 Cross Pointe Way, St. Augustine, FL 32092. Mr. McMenamy was told that we preferred not to rent to someone with more than one, if any, very small children at this particular time. The reason being we just had to have the interior of the house professionally repainted and repairs made to several areas, the walls in particular. Additionally, in light of the fact there were several highly qualified persons interested in and looking at the house concurrently. The submittal continued by identifying four former tenants of the Property, as well as the current tenants (the Eggers), all of whom had children living with them. It is found that McMenamy's e-mail of May 21, 2010, and the Davises' letter of August 19, 2010, constitute direct evidence that Respondents' decision not to rent to Petitioners was based upon their familial status. The testimony of McMenamy and the Davises that familial status was not the reason for refusing to rent to Petitioners is rejected as not credible.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order finding Respondents guilty of a discriminatory housing practice against the Terrys in violation of section 760.23(1) and (2), and prohibiting further unlawful housing practices by Respondents. DONE AND ENTERED this 30th day of May, 2012, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S W. DAVID WATKINS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of May, 2012.
The Issue Whether the Petitioner has been the subject of a discriminatory housing practice.
Findings Of Fact Several years prior to 2007, Petitioner, Wanda Hutcheson, leased one side of a duplex apartment from LGMS. The apartment was located on 3359 Greenbrier Circle, in Gulf Breeze, Florida. During the time that LGMS owned the property, the property manager found her to be a responsible tenant who paid her rent on time. Indeed, the manager felt that she had improved the look and value of the property because she had done extensive landscaping in her front yard. The increase in value was not shown by the evidence. At the time, Petitioner’s landlord knew that she had a mental disorder known as Obsessive Compulsive Disorder (OCD). In part, the extensive yard work done by Petitioner was due to her OCD. She regularly watered her yard with the shared sprinkler system that served both apartments in the duplex. However, the electricity for the water pump that operated the sprinkler system was hooked into the electrical system for the apartment adjoining Petitioner’s apartment. The sprinkler system was operated by a switch located either by or in the electrical box for the adjoining apartment and the electrical box for her apartment. Petitioner was frequently in the area of those boxes. Respondent, Sand Dunes Property, LLC (Sand Dunes), is a limited liability company owned and operated by Respondents, Robert and Justin MacFarland. In 2006, Sand Dunes purchased several parcels of rental property from LGMS, including the apartment leased by Petitioner. In February 2006, prior to Sand Dunes’ purchase of the property, the MacFarlands visited the premises they were about to purchase and met Petitioner. At that time, Petitioner told the Respondents that she had OCD. She neither requested nor indicated the need for any special accommodations from the Respondents regarding her lease. The evidence did not show that the Respondents knew or were aware that OCD could be a disability that might significantly interfere with a person’s life activities. To them, Petitioner did not seem mentally disabled and appeared able to carry out her daily activities. She appeared to live her life as any other person might. In fact, among other things, Petitioner drove a car, occasionally worked cleaning houses, performed yard work, had the electrical part of her apartment’s sprinkler system transferred to her electrical system, paid her lease and cared for other people’s children. Around March 2006, subsequent to the purchase of the property by the Respondents, Peter Bouchard moved into the apartment next to Petitioner’s apartment. Shortly after he moved in, Petitioner was watering her yard with the sprinkler system. Mr. Bouchard saw her and turned off the sprinkler system. He told her he did not believe in watering the grass and that he did not want his yard watered. He told her that as long as the pump was hooked to his electrical box that she could not use the sprinkler system since he was paying for the electricity used in its operation. He suggested that she could have the pump transferred to her electrical box if she wanted to continue to use the system. Petitioner called Respondents and left a message about the need to transfer the electrical connection for the sprinkler system to her electrical box and to make sure it was alright for her to pay to have the system transferred. The evidence did not show that she related the details of Mr. Bouchard’s actions to Respondent’s. She did not receive a response to her message and eventually paid for the system to be transferred to her electrical box. At some point, even though she did not own the sprinkler systems components, she removed the sprinkler heads from Mr. Bouchard’s side of the yard. She capped the pipe where the heads had been and filled the hole. She did not tell anyone that she had removed the sprinkler heads, but kept the sprinkler heads in her apartment. Additionally, during March 2006, Petitioner complained to Santa Rosa Animal Control about Mr. Bouchard’s two dogs being abused by him and barking. She also complained about the two dogs of the neighbor who lived behind her, Jodi Henning. Both of these incidents were investigated by Animal Control and no abuse was discovered. In fact, the dogs never barked or only barked for a short time when the investigator visited the duplex on two occasions. Petitioner’s actions appeared to be in retaliation for Mr. Bouchard’s refusal to permit her to use the sprinkler system. Finally, at some point, Petitioner while on her front porch saw Mr. Bouchard’s son walking to his apartment. She told the boy that she would cause Mr. Bouchard’s dogs to be removed for abuse and then would have him removed for the same reason. The comment upset both the boy and Mr. Bouchard. On April 3, 2006, Sand Dunes mailed a written offer to enter into a new lease with Petitioner. The offer was made to Petitioner because her lease would terminate on May 30, 2006. The offer was conditioned upon an increase in the monthly rent on Petitioner’s apartment. The offer stated, “Please let us know by May 1st of your decision so that we may set up an appointment to review and sign your new lease agreement.” The intent of the letter’s language was to not be contractually bound until a new lease was signed by the parties. There was no evidence that Respondents treated any other potentially continuing tenant differently. Around April 4, 2006, Mr. MacFarland left a message for Petitioner regarding a maintenance check on her apartment’s air conditioner. Petitioner returned the call and left a message that she could not be present at the time suggested and asked that the work be performed at another time. Petitioner received the written offer of renewal on April 5, 2006, and attempted to accept the offer by leaving a message on Respondent’s telephone. After the first message, Petitioner left town to attend a family function out of state. Around April 6, 2006, air-conditioning maintenance checks were performed on nine of ten units owned by the Respondents in the Greenbrier area. Around April 6 or 7, 2006, Respondents were contacted by Mr. Bouchard. Mr. Bouchard complained about Petitioner to the MacFarlands. He told them that Petitioner had stolen the sprinkler heads out of his side of the yard and that she turned off the electricity to his apartment. He showed them a photograph of the unlocked electrical box to his unit. He also relayed to Respondents that Petitioner had repeatedly accused him of abusing his dogs, not properly vaccinating his dogs and had repeatedly reported him to Animal Control for animal abuse and barking dogs. Apparently, Mr. Bouchard complained enough about Petitioner to Respondents to make them believe that Respondent was a particularly disruptive and vengeful tenant. At some point, Respondents became aware of Jodi Henning’s problems with Petitioner. Ms. Henning lived in a different complex from Petitioner. However, her backyard adjoined Petitioner’s backyard. She called the Sheriff's Department on Ms. Hutcheson on a few occasions for problems she had with Petitioner. None of the incidents amounted to an arrest. During an evening in March 2005, Ms. Henning’s dogs were inside with her. They had not been outside. Ms. Henning answered the door. Petitioner, who was quite angry, complained about Ms. Henning’s dogs and told her that she had made an enemy of Petitioner and that she would make Ms. Henning’s life miserable. Ms. Henning called the Sheriff’s Department. The 911 operator asked if Petitioner was drunk. Ms. Henning said that Petitioner was not drunk, but just crazy and mean. Petitioner was told by law enforcement personnel that Santa Rosa County Animal Control should be contacted if she had an issue with a neighbor's dog. She then filed a complaint with Santa Rosa County Animal Control about Ms. Henning’s dogs. Petitioner made a similar complaint in April 2006. Neither complaint was found to have merit by the investigator for Animal Control. Additionally, Ms. Henning felt that she could not go out in her yard without Petitioner coming out to watch her. Petitioner never engaged in any physically, aggressive behavior. However, Ms. Henning felt she became threatening to the point she was afraid. Petitioner had told both Ms. Henning and Mr. Bouchard that she had OCD. However, based on their observation of her, neither thought that Petitioner was disabled by her condition. They both thought that she was simply nosy and mean. On the other hand, there were former neighbors who thought Petitioner was a nice person and a good neighbor. However, the evidence did not demonstrate that these neighbors’ opinions were known to the Respondents during the time the offer to lease was outstanding. Mr. MacFarland obtained copies of "call reports" received by Animal Control regarding Ms. Henning and Mr. Bouchard's dogs. Those reports consisted of complaints in March 2005 about Ms. Henning's two dogs, and in March 2006 concerning Ms. Henning's two dogs and Mr. Bouchard's two dogs. On April 10, 2006, Respondents sent a letter on Sand Dunes' stationary revoking the earlier offer to lease her apartment after expiration of her lease. Based on the Respondents limited knowledge about Petitioner during the time the offer to lease was outstanding, their conclusion was neither unreasonable nor discriminatory. Thereafter, the Respondents were entitled to rely on the expiration of the lease by its terms and the peaceful return of the premises. Petitioner received the revocation letter around April 12, 2007, when she returned home from out of state. No explanation was given in the letter for the withdrawal of the offer to lease. Petitioner called Mr. MacFarland on the date she received the revocation letter. She was very distraught and tearful. During the long conversation, the only explanation Respondent recalled from Mr. MacFarland as to why Respondents withdrew their offer was that he did not like her. Petitioner also was told to communicate with their lawyer, Keri Anne Schultz, Esquire. Petitioner went to Ms. Schultz's law office to discuss the situation with her. Ms. Shultz was not in the office. Petitioner was told by the receptionist that she could not wait in the office for Ms. Schultz to return. Ms. Hutcheson wanted to write Ms. Schultz a note regarding renting the duplex. Mr. Bordelon, Ms. Schultz's partner, threatened to call the police if Petitioner remained at the office. Petitioner left the office. Thereafter, the only communication from the MacFarlands or their attorney was legal notices to vacate the premises. Petitioner did attempt to send them information on OCD. The evidence was not clear whether the Respondents received the information or reviewed it. Petitioner refused to vacate the premises and an eviction action was filed in June 2006. A hearing was held in the Circuit Court in June and July of 2006. By court order dated August 17, 2006, Respondents were awarded possession of the property on August 31, 2006, at 11:59 p.m. Unfortunately, Petitioner, due to ill health, did not begin to vacate the premises until a few days prior to forcible removal. She was not finished moving on September 5, 2006, five days after the Respondents were to be put in possession of the property. The Respondents had the Sheriff’s Deputy remove Petitioner from the premises, telling her that she should have been out a long time ago. The MacFarlands, with a little help from Mr. Bouchard, removed the rest of Petitioner’s possessions to the curb. During the removal, the bottom of a box Mr. Bouchard was carrying came undone and some of the contents fell onto the pavement. One jar of food was broken. All of these events were very distressful to Petitioner. Upon learning that she would be evicted, Petitioner began seeing Dr. Bingham in May 2006. Eventually, she was involuntarily committed for a short time and has been seeing Dr. Bingham every two or three weeks for the last year. The apartment remained vacant for several months after the eviction. Eventually, Mr. Bouchard moved into the unit at a lower rate of rent than he paid for his old apartment but higher than the amount Petitioner would have paid if the new lease had taken effect. As indicated, between February 2006 and April 2006, Mr. and Mrs. MacFarland's only contact with Petitioner was a visit to her duplex apartment with the realtor selling the property and some voice mails exchanged between them concerning the sprinkler and air conditioning systems. Respondents had little knowledge regarding Petitioner. Even though the evidence demonstrates that Respondents could have acted more kindly and could have better informed themselves about the circumstances of Petitioner, there was no evidence that the withdrawal of the offer to renew was made based on an intent to discriminate against Petitioner because of her mental disability. Therefore, the Petition for Relief should be dismissed.
Recommendation Upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 7th day of December, 2007, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DIANE CLEAVINGER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of December, 2007. COPIES FURNISHED: Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Melissa A. Posey, Esquire Melissa A. Posey, P.A. 201 East Government Street, Suite 36 Pensacola, Florida 32502 Robert and Justyn MacFarland Sand Dune Properties 7173 Blue Jack Drive Navarre, Florida 32566 Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
