The Issue The issue in this case is whether, pursuant to section 112.3172, Florida Statutes, the pension rights and privileges of Petitioner, Joseph Anthony Fuller, in the City of Jacksonville Retirement System should be forfeited.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Joseph Anthony Fuller, was employed by the JEA as a Senior Vehicle Coordinator in the Fleet Services Department. Mr. Fuller worked for the JEA for approximately 20 years. In 2013, the JEA received reports from fellow employees that Mr. Fuller was stealing gasoline from JEA fleet pumps. Mark Beebe was a JSO detective assigned as full-time liaison to the JEA. Pursuant to a contract between JSO and the JEA, Det. Beebe investigated all criminal allegations related to the JEA. Most of his investigations involved customer theft of electricity, but he also investigated allegations of theft by JEA employees. Det. Beebe investigated the allegations against Mr. Fuller. During his investigation, Det. Beebe found evidence that Mr. Fuller had stolen from the JEA spools of copper wire and other items that he then sold to metal recyclers. These thefts began in 2012 and carried on until late 2013. After he was satisfied that he had proof sufficient to establish Mr. Fuller’s guilt, Det. Beebe interviewed Mr. Fuller on January 21, 2014. Det. Beebe gave Mr. Fuller his Miranda warnings. Mr. Fuller signed a waiver and voluntarily submitted to the interview. During the interview, Mr. Fuller denied stealing gas but admitted to taking and reselling the recyclable items. Mr. Fuller denied taking the recyclable items from anywhere other than the “trash pile,” “the big dumpsters,” and the recycling bins. Det. Beebe was understandably skeptical that such a large quantity of unused copper wire and electrical items could have been retrieved from the trash and the recycling bins at JEA. After the interview, Det. Beebe placed Mr. Fuller under arrest and charged him with grand theft in violation of section 812.014(2)(c)2., Florida Statutes, a third-degree felony; giving false verification of ownership of pawned items in violation of section 539.001(8)(b)8.a., Florida Statutes, a third-degree felony; and dealing in stolen property in violation of section 812.019(1), Florida Statutes, a second-degree felony. Det. Beebe’s arrest report noted that Mr. Fuller received $3,097.10 for all of his illegal transactions, but that the replacement cost of the lost items to JEA was $6,082.21. The replacement cost was Det. Beebe’s estimate, based on information provided by JEA. Thomas Wigand is a Labor Relations Specialist with the JEA. Mr. Wigand is responsible for JEA’s relations with unionized employees, including civil service and disciplinary matters. Mr. Wigand is the JEA’s primary contact with the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers (“IBEW”), Local 2358, of which Mr. Fuller was a member during his employment with the JEA. IBEW Local 2358 and JEA have entered into a collective bargaining agreement (the “Agreement”).1/ Under the Agreement, Mr. Fuller had collective bargaining rights and was subject to the Agreement’s rules on discipline, which provided that union member employees could be disciplined only for “just cause.” As an employee of the JEA, Mr. Fuller was governed by the City of Jacksonville’s Civil Service System, including the City of Jacksonville’s Civil Service and Personnel Rules and Regulations (“Civil Service Rules”). Chapter Nine of the Civil Service Rules covers disciplinary actions, grievances, and appeals. Rule 9.05 provides that an employee with permanent status in the Civil Service may only be dismissed “for cause.” “Cause” includes, among other things, “willful violation of the provisions of law or department rules,” “conduct unbecoming a public employee which would affect the employee’s ability to perform the duties and responsibilities of the employee’s job,” and “willful falsification of records.” An employee facing disciplinary action is entitled to a hearing before the Civil Service Board. Petitioner was also subject to the JEA’s company-wide guidelines for disciplinary action, which generally prescribed progressive discipline. However, the guidelines also provided that theft is a ground for immediate termination. After Det. Beebe submitted his investigative report to the JEA, Mr. Wigand convened a fact-finding meeting on January 29, 2014. Mr. Wigand testified that such a meeting was standard procedure under the JEA’s disciplinary process and was designed to allow Mr. Fuller an opportunity to dispute the report or explain his actions. Mr. Wigand explained that, given the “compelling nature” of Det. Beebe’s report, it seemed likely that the JEA would be seeking immediate termination of Mr. Fuller’s employment after the fact-finding meeting, unless Mr. Fuller came forward with “exonerating evidence.” Prior to the fact-finding meeting, Mr. Wigand prepared a “notice of dismissal and immediate suspension” and a “letter of intent to discipline” Mr. Fuller. The letter of intent to discipline Mr. Fuller did not specify the nature of the discipline being sought by the JEA. Mr. Wigand presented this letter to Mr. Fuller for his signature at the outset of the fact-finding meeting, in compliance with the Agreement. The notice of dismissal and immediate suspension was more forthright, commencing with the statement “Your conduct as an employee of JEA has been unacceptable and requires terminal disciplinary action” before reciting the specific factual allegations and rule violations forming the basis of the termination. There was no evidence indicating that Mr. Fuller was shown this notice at the meeting. The fact-finding meeting was attended by Mr. Wigand, Mr. Fuller, two IBEW union representatives, and JEA audit manager Linda Schlager, who kept detailed notes of the meeting. During the fact-finding portion of the meeting, Mr. Fuller initially denied remembering much about his interview with Det. Beebe. When he was specifically asked about the copper and other materials allegedly sold to the scrap recycler, Mr. Fuller continued to insist that he took the metal from a JEA dumpster. He denied taking it from either the JEA’s recycling areas or from JEA trucks. He conceded only that he engaged in “dumpster diving” while on the clock for JEA. At this point, Mr. Wigand began showing Mr. Fuller photos of specific items sold to the recycler.2/ Mr. Wigand also stated that it is not JEA’s practice to throw new spools of copper wire into the dumpster. After viewing some of these photos, Mr. Fuller requested a private conference with his union representatives. Mr. Wigand and Ms. Schlager stepped out of the conference room. After approximately 15 minutes, one of the union representatives emerged from the conference room and made a proposition to Mr. Wigand to resolve the matter. Mr. Fuller would be willing to resign and use his accumulated annual leave to pay restitution to the JEA, in return for JEA’s agreement not to prosecute. After some internal caucusing, the JEA agreed to allow Mr. Fuller to resign, contingent on his making full restitution to the JEA and providing an accurate account of how he stole JEA property. If Mr. Fuller complied with these conditions, the JEA would inform the state attorney that it had been made whole by Mr. Fuller and did not wish to prosecute. Mr. Wigand made it clear to Mr. Fuller that the JEA could not control whether the state attorney decided to go forward with the case. One of the union representatives asked about the post- resignation status of Mr. Fuller’s pension. Mr. Wigand stated that the JEA does not control the pension or make pension decisions. Mr. Fuller agreed to the conditions and then admitted the thefts. He detailed where and how he stole the materials, and satisfied the JEA that he acted alone. He admitted to stealing gas on several occasions. At the JEA representatives’ request, Mr. Fuller even offered advice on how the JEA could improve controls in order to prevent such thefts in the future. At the conclusion of Mr. Fuller’s statement, the union representatives, Mr. Fuller, and Mr. Wigand agreed that the effective date and time of Mr. Fuller’s resignation was the current date, January 29, 2014, at 1:00 p.m. An irrevocable letter of resignation was submitted by Mr. Fuller on the following day. The letter stated the date and time of his resignation and his agreement to reimburse the JEA in the amount of $6,248.00. The letter also stated that the JEA “has agreed to accept this resignation in lieu of proceeding with disciplinary action.” On a date unspecified in the record, the state attorney declined to prosecute that case against Mr. Fuller, in part due to the JEA’s notice that it had received restitution and did not wish for the matter to proceed. On January 24, 2014, Mr. Fuller had submitted a “Retirement Information Request” to the City of Jacksonville Retirement System, asking for a computation of the benefits he would receive if he retired on that date. Counsel for Mr. Fuller argues that this document establishes that Mr. Fuller resigned on January 24, five days prior to the fact-finding meeting. The document is not a resignation letter under any common understanding of that term. As titled, the document is an information request. The Board argues, for reasons explained in the following Conclusions of Law, that Mr. Fuller’s resignation was in fact a constructive discharge. The Board contends that the JEA would have proceeded to terminate Mr. Fuller’s employment if the allegations against him were proven, and therefore that his resignation under pressure was the functional equivalent of termination. Central to the Board’s argument is the assertion that Mr. Fuller “voluntarily admitted” to Det. Beebe that he had stolen materials from the JEA, and that an evidentiary finding of theft was thus a foregone conclusion. The evidence of this “admission” is ambiguous at best. The interview with Det. Beebe consisted mostly of long monologues by the detective followed by monosyllabic responses by Mr. Fuller. In his own words, Mr. Fuller admitted only to taking materials from the “trash pile,” “the bin,” and the “big dumpsters.” He described his takings as “stuff they throw away over there.” Mr. Fuller’s counsel pointed out that there was no evidence establishing that materials contained in the recycling bins or trash dumpsters of the JEA remained the property of the JEA or retained any value for the JEA. Even assuming that the JEA could have established the value of the items and that Mr. Fuller could not have obtained them from the trash, there was no guarantee that a hearing before the Civil Service Board would have inevitably led to Mr. Fuller’s termination. Mr. Wigand conceded under cross-examination that the outcome might have been some lesser form of discipline such as suspension. It is clear that as of January 29, 2014, the JEA entertained doubts about its chances of success in a termination hearing, else it would not have allowed Mr. Fuller to resign. The only full and unambiguous admission of guilt made by Mr. Fuller was pursuant to the resignation deal brokered by his union representatives on January 29, 2014. Mr. Fuller did not resign his position as the result of an admitted commission of a specified felony; rather, he admitted the thefts only after the JEA agreed to allow him to resign. The resignation letter itself, which the January 29 meeting notes indicate was at least partially drafted by the JEA, states that the JEA “has agreed to accept this resignation in lieu of proceeding with disciplinary action.” Even accepting that Mr. Fuller’s statements to Det. Beebe were not credible and that the JEA would likely have prevailed at an evidentiary hearing before the Civil Service Board to terminate Mr. Fuller’s employment on the ground of theft, there remains the problem of the quid pro quo that was part of the resignation agreement. By accepting Mr. Fuller’s resignation, the JEA was spared the time and expense of litigating his termination and was afforded the certainty of Mr. Fuller’s immediate and permanent removal from the workplace. Mr. Fuller was not the only party to benefit from the agreement that the Board now seeks to nullify. It appears to the undersigned that if the Board were to be allowed to effectively rescind Mr. Fuller’s letter of resignation and treat him as a terminated employee, then Mr. Fuller should be entitled to go back to square one and invoke his right to challenge that termination before the Civil Service Board. It is doubtful that anyone involved in these events would desire such an outcome. The Board’s position that Mr. Fuller’s resignation from the JEA was tantamount to termination is implausible on its face and lacks record support. The JEA was under no pressure to settle the case with Mr. Fuller. It presumably made the deal with its eyes open and aware of all the possible ramifications. The JEA allowed Mr. Fuller to retain his accumulated annual leave despite the fact that section 11.6 of the Agreement calls for forfeiture of unused annual leave by employees “who are discharged for stealing.” The JEA plainly did not consider Mr. Fuller to have been “discharged” or “terminated.” Though Mr. Wigand told the union representative that the JEA does not make pension decisions, the JEA in fact made such a decision when it allowed Mr. Fuller to resign. The JEA benefitted from making a deal with Mr. Fuller. The Board should not be permitted to step in and rewrite the deal after Mr. Fuller has given up his hearing rights and fully performed his end of the bargain.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Board of Trustees of the City of Jacksonville Retirement System enter a final order withdrawing the Notice of Proposed Final Agency Action. DONE AND ENTERED this 19th day of November, 2014, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LAWRENCE P. STEVENSON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of November, 2014.
The Issue The issue is whether, pursuant to section 112.3173, Florida Statutes, Respondent has forfeited his rights and benefits under the City of Tampa General Employees Retirement Plan (Fund).
Findings Of Fact The Fund is a public retirement system as defined by Florida law and is charged with administering and managing a pension fund for employees of the City. Respondent was employed by the City from February 2, 2000, until April 18, 2012, when he was terminated. He worked in various positions, most recently as Acting Lead Specialty Equipment Operator in the Solid Waste and Environmental Program Management/Quality Control program. By reason of his employment with the City, Respondent was enrolled in the pension plan administered by the Fund and was a vested participant. On April 18, 2012, the City terminated Respondent based on a violation of three items in the City's Personnel Manual: neglect of duty by using a City vehicle for an unauthorized purpose; moral turpitude involving the violation of the City Code relating to use of public property; and moral turpitude by engaging in an illegal enterprise. The events leading to his termination are described below. On July 11, 2011, City of Tampa Detective DeGagne was investigating environmental crimes (illegal dumping) in the East Tampa area. After being alerted that illegal dumping had occurred on a vacant lot in the Highland Pines neighborhood, and the debris was immediately picked up by a City vehicle, Detective DeGagne located the City truck involved. Because the truck was under the supervision of Respondent, Detective DeGagne spoke to Respondent who initially explained that code enforcement had told him to pick up the debris. Because Respondent could not identify anyone in code enforcement who gave him that instruction, he was arrested. During a recorded interview with Detective DeGagne later that day, Respondent admitted that on at least two occasions, he was paid $40.00 to pick up the illegally-dumped debris as a favor to a friend. This conduct is a violation of section 838.016(1), which makes it unlawful for a public employee to receive compensation for performing an illicit act. Based on his admission of guilt, the City terminated Respondent effective April 18, 2012.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the City of Tampa General Employees Retirement Fund enter a final order determining that Respondent has forfeited his rights and benefits in the pension fund. DONE AND ENTERED this 28th day of July, 2017, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S D. R. ALEXANDER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of July, 2017. COPIES FURNISHED: Luis A. Santos, Esquire Ford & Harrison LLP Suite 900 101 East Kennedy Boulevard Tampa, Florida 33602-5133 (eServed) Natasha Wiederholt, CPA, GE Pension Plan Supervisor General Employees Retirement Fund City of Tampa 7th Floor East 306 East Jackson Street Tampa, Florida 33602-5208 Dwight Rivera 3324 West Kathleen Street Tampa, Florida 33607-1840
The Issue Whether Petitioner is entitled to the retirement benefits of her late husband, Frederick Griffith.
Findings Of Fact Frederick Griffith was employed with the Broward County School System from January 4, 1971, until his death on June 9, 1996. Frederick Griffith was enrolled with the State of Florida Retirement System at the time of his death. Frederick Griffith separated from his first wife, Ruth Griffith, in 1976, and they were divorced on October 25, 1989. Frederick Griffith and Petitioner, Joyce Griffith, were married on November 25, 1989, after having been together for approximately 12 years. Joyce and Frederick Griffith were married at the time of his death. Joyce Griffith applied for her husband's benefits as the surviving spouse. The Respondent, Division of Retirement (Division), denied Joyce Griffith benefits as surviving spouse, stating that the beneficiary of record was Ruth Griffith. The Division advised Joyce Griffith that they would recognize her as surviving spouse and pay her a monthly benefit if Ruth Griffith would disclaim her rights as the designated beneficiary. Ruth Griffith refused to disclaim her rights and applied for the benefits as the designated beneficiary. The Division paid her $4,373.94. Because Ruth Griffith was not dependent on Frederick Griffith at the time of his death, she was entitled only to the lump sum amount that Mr. Griffith had paid into the retirement system. On February 2, 1992, Mr. Griffith submitted Retirement Information Request, Form FR-9, to the Division for a calculation of total years of creditable service and the amount due to purchase his creditable military service. On June 15, 1995, the Division replied to the FR-9 request by issuing Form FRS-40, Estimate of Retirement Benefits. The information provided to Mr. Griffith was calculated based on the assumption that Mr. Griffith would retire with a retirement effective date of February, 1997. The Estimate of Retirement Benefits advised Mr. Griffith that there was an apparent discrepancy with the beneficiary listed on his FR-9 and his named beneficiary listed in the Division's official records. Specifically, Mr. Griffith was advised: The spouse listed on the Retirement Information Request, FR-9, and used for this estimate is not your primary beneficiary. If you intend to change your beneficiary designation, please complete a personal history record, FRS-M10, in your personnel office. Mr. Griffith did not file a revised FRS-M10 in response to the advice given by the Division in the June 15, 1995, FRS-40. After Mr. Griffith received the FRS-40, Joyce Griffith insisted that he call the Broward County School Board to verify that she was the designated beneficiary. Joyce Griffith gave her husband the number to call. The school board personnel assured Mr. Griffith that Joyce Griffith was his beneficiary. Apparently, Mr. Griffith called the department which dealt with life insurance benefits and not retirement benefits. Joyce Griffith was the beneficiary of her husband's employer-provided life insurance policy for $150,000. Mr. Griffith had designated her as his beneficiary on a change of beneficiary form dated August, 1990. Mr. Griffith had completed a form entitled Application for Service Retirement designating Joyce Griffith as his primary beneficiary. The form was notarized on November 25, 1995. Mr. Griffith did not indicate a retirement date on the form and never filed the form with either the Division or his employer. After Mr. Griffith's death, Joyce Griffith found an employee copy of a FRS-10 form among Mr. Griffith's military papers. The form was dated November 19, 1991, and signed by Mr. Griffith. The form was not filed with either the School Board of Broward County or the Division. Neither the school board nor the Division have any record of the form being filed. The form was not correctly completed. In the area of the form entitled Designation of Beneficiaries, the employee is supposed to complete only one of three sections. On the form signed by Mr. Griffith, the first section was checked, and the other two sections were filled out with the names of Joyce Griffith and the children of Mr. Griffith.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered denying Petitioner's request for the retirement benefits of Frederick T. Griffith. DONE AND ORDERED this 11th day of July, 1997, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. COPIES FURNISHED: Connie L. Hiaasen, Esquire Regina S. Bushkin, Esquire SUSAN B. KIRKLAND Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of July, 1997. 707 Southeast Third Avenue, Suite 101 Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33316 Augustus D. Aikens, Jr., Esquire Department of Management Services Division of Retirement 2639-C North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1560 A. J. McMullian, III, Director Department of Management Services Division of Retirement Cedars Executive Center, Building C 2639 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1560 Paul A. Rowell, General Counsel Department of Management Services Division of Retirement 4050 Esplanade Way Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950
The Issue Whether the Petition has forfeited his rights and benefits under the Florida Retirement System (FRS) as a result of a guilty plea in the United States District Court, Southern District of Florida, for acts committed in connection with Petitioner's employment with the Broward County Sheriff's Department.
Findings Of Fact From the Joint Stipulation of Facts: The Florida Retirement System (FRS) is a public retirement system as defined by Florida law. Respondent is charged with managing, governing, and administering the FRS on behalf of the Department of Management Services. Petitioner was employed as an Assistant State Attorney by the State Attorney's Office from December 1972 to January 1974. During this time, Petitioner was a member of the FRS and this service is credited as service under the FRS. Petitioner was employed as Executive Director of the Broward County Charter Commission from January 1974 to November 1974. During this time, Petitioner was a member of the FRS and this service is credited as service under the FRS. Petitioner was employed by the Broward County Board of County Commissioners from March 1975 to November 1978. During this time, Petitioner was a member of the FRS, and this service is credited as service under the FRS. In November 1978, Petitioner was elected to serve as a member of the Florida Legislature; he continued to serve as a state legislator for approximately 18 years. As a state legislator, Petitioner was a member of the FRS class of State Elected Officers, and this service is credited service under the FRS. Most recently, Petitioner was the elected Sheriff of Broward County. By reason of his service as Sheriff, Petitioner was a member of the FRS. Petitioner was initially appointed Sheriff in January 1998 by then-Governor Lawton Chiles. Petitioner was subsequently elected Sheriff in 1998 and reelected in 2000 and 2004. As Sheriff of Broward County, Petitioner was Broward County's chief law enforcement officer and was responsible for directing the Broward County Sheriff's Office ("BSO"), a law enforcement agency that currently employs over 6,000 employees. The office of Sheriff is a constitutional office established under Article VIII, Section 1(d), Constitution of Florida. Upon assuming his duties as Sheriff of Broward County, Petitioner took an oath to support, protect, and defend the Constitution and Government of the United States and the State of Florida and to faithfully perform the duties of sheriff pursuant to Article II, Section 5(b), Constitution of Florida. On or about September 4, 2007, Petitioner wrote a letter to Governor Charlie Crist notifying him of his resignation from the office of Sheriff of Broward County. By reply letter of the same date, Governor Crist accepted Petitioner's resignation. Petitioner is not retired from the FRS and currently does not receive FRS retirement benefits. On or about September 4, 2007, Petitioner was charged, by information, in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida, in case number 0:07-cr-60209-WPB, with one count of conspiracy to commit mail fraud, in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 371, and three counts of filing a false tax return, in violation of Title 26, United States Code, Section 7206(1). The same four-count information is filed in U.S. District Court (S.D. Fla.) case number 0:07-cr- 60209-WPB as document 1. At all times relevant to the information, Petitioner was the Sheriff of Broward County. The section of the information entitled "General Allegations" contains numerous references to Petitioner's service as Sheriff of Broward County and the power and authority vested in that position. The "Objects of the Conspiracy" contained in count one of the information states: An object of the conspiracy was for JENNE to unlawfully enrich himself by obtaining monies from P.P. and L.N., who were Broward Sheriff's Office vendors, by making false representations, omitting to state material facts, and concealing material facts concerning, among other things, the ultimate destination of monies that JENNE asked P.P. and L.N. to give to his secretaries, A.V. and M.Y. It was further an object of the scheme for JENNE to perpetuate and conceal the scheme and the actions taken in furtherance of it by, among other things, making false, misleading, and incomplete statements in public filings and to investigators. The "Manner and Means of the Conspiracy" contained in count one of the information states: JENNE and M.Y. arranged for JENNE to receive $20,000 from P.P. by having the money transferred from P.P. through JENNE's secretary, M.Y., to JENNE. JENNE and M.Y. did this in order to conceal that JENNE was the true recipient of the funds. JENNE provided L.N. with access to off- duty Broward Sheriff's Office deputies, who L.N. hired to do work for his companies. On two different occasions, in exchange for the access to the deputies, JENNE instructed L.N. to pay money to JENNE's secretary, A.V., purportedly to compensate A.V. for work done for L.N. JENNE instructed A.V. to cash checks given to her by L.N. and to have the cash deposited into JENNE's bank account. JENNE and A.V. did this in order to conceal that JENNE was the true recipient of the funds, which totaled $5,500. JENNE perpetuated this fraud and attempted to prevent its detection by mailing incomplete and misleading annual financial disclosure forms, which did not list his receipt of the payments from P.P. and L.N., to the Florida Commission on Ethics. On or about September 5, 2007, after being advised of the nature of the charges against him, the above-referenced information, and of his rights, Petitioner waived in open court prosecution by indictment and consented to proceeding by information. The same waiver of indictment is filed in U.S. District Court (S.D. Fla.) case number 0:07-cr-60209-WPB as document 13. On or about September 5, 2007, Petitioner entered into an agreement with the United States of America to plead guilty as charged in the four-count information. The same plea agreement is filed in U.S. District Court (S.D. Fla.) case number 0:07-cr-60209-WPB as document 3. Paragraph 7.c. of the plea agreement provides: 7. The United States and the defendant agree that, although not binding on the probation office or the court, they will jointly recommend that the court make the following findings and conclusions as to the sentence to be imposed: * * * c. Advisory sentencing range on the conspiracy to commit mail fraud count: That, pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2X1.1, the applicable guideline to be used in calculating the defendant's advisory sentencing range on the conspiracy to commit mail fraud count is § 2B1.1; that under § 2B1.1(a)(1), the Base Offense Level is 7; that under § 2B1.1(b)(1)(C), four levels are added because the loss was between $10,000 and $30,000; that under § 3B1.3, two levels are added because of the defendant's abuse of his position of public trust; and that under § 3E1.1(b), two levels are subtracted for acceptance of responsibility . . . The United States Sentencing Guide, Section 3B1.3, referenced in paragraph 7.c of the plea agreement, provides in relevant part that "[i]f the defendant abused a position of public . . . trust . . . in a manner that significantly facilitated the commission or concealment of the offense, increase by 2 levels." USSG § 3B1.3. Paragraphs 10. and 12. of the plea agreement provide: 10. The defendant confirms that he is guilty of the offenses to which he is pleading guilty; that his decision to plead guilty is the decision that he has made; and that nobody has forced, threatened, or coerced him into pleading guilty. The defendant affirms that he has discussed this matter thoroughly with his attorneys. The defendant further affirms that his discussions with his attorneys have included discussion of possible defenses that he may raise if the case were to go to trial, as well as possible issues and arguments that he may raise at sentencing. The defendant additionally affirms that he is satisfied with the representation provided by his attorneys. The defendant accordingly affirms that he is entering into this agreement knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently, and with the benefit of full, complete, and effective assistance by his attorneys. * * * 12. This is the entire agreement and understanding between the United States and the defendant. There are no other agreements, promises, representations, or understandings. On or about September 5, 2007, Petitioner entered a statement of factual basis for guilty plea with the United States of America (hereinafter "factual proffer"), wherein he agreed that, if the case went to trial, the government would have been able to establish the facts recited therein beyond a reasonable doubt. The same factual proffer is filed in U.S. District Court (S.D. Fla.) case number 0:07-cr-60209-WPB as document 8. On or about September 5, 2007, a hearing was held in which Petitioner pled guilty as charged in the information. At the hearing, Petitioner admitted to committing the acts set forth in the charges and to which he pled guilty. In addition, at the hearing Petitioner admitted to the following facts and to committing the following actions: At no point in time did Petitioner ever disclose to the public that he received an $8,130 benefit from P.P. in November 2001 in connection with the demolition of a house he owned in Lake Worth, Florida. Within P.P.'s internal accounting system, the $8,130 check was attributed to the "HIDTA project" (i.e., a lease committing BSO and HIDTA as tenants of an office building owned by P.P.). Petitioner never reported the $8,130 benefit on any of his state ethics disclosure forms, nor did he ever make a disclosure in any other fashion. At no point in time did Petitioner ever disclose to the public that, in September 2002, he had received $10,000 from P.P. as a reward for his work concerning a new company called SuperTech Products, Inc. Petitioner never reported the $10,000 payment on any of his state ethics disclosure forms, nor did he ever make a disclosure in any other fashion. Prior to becoming Sheriff, Petitioner was a partner in Conrad, Scherer & Jenne, a law firm located in Fort Lauderdale. Petitioner was with the firm from 1992 through the beginning of 1998, when he left to become Sheriff. While Petitioner was at the firm, he, like some other partners, drove a car paid for by the firm's investment arm, CSJ Investments. In October, 1997, at Petitioner's request, the law firm, through CSJ Investments, bought a used 1994 Mercedes E320 convertible for Petitioner to drive. The price of the Mercedes was $61,297. Rather than pay for the car all at once, the firm financed the car with a 60-month loan. When Petitioner left the firm in early 1998 following his appointment as Sheriff, he took the Mercedes with him. Despite the fact that Petitioner no longer worked for the firm, the firm continued to pay off the Mercedes loan for the balance of the loan term, making the final payment in 2003. The loan payments were $1,320 per month, resulting in a total eventual cost to the firm of approximately $79,234 in loan payments, all but approximately $1,320, of which were made after Petitioner had already left the firm to become Sheriff. In addition, after Petitioner left the law firm, the firm continued to pay for the insurance on the Mercedes. The insurance payments continued even unto September 2007. At that time, the firm had made a total of approximately $30,961 in insurance payments on Petitioner's behalf, all but approximately $880, of which were made after Petitioner had already left the firm to become Sheriff. Petitioner never disclosed any of the loan payments or insurance payments made by the firm on his behalf on any state ethics filing. During the time that Petitioner was receiving these undisclosed payments from Conrad, Scherer, the firm was billing BCSO for legal work that it was doing on its behalf. At the hearing, Petitioner did not take any exception or make any objections to the facts as summarized in the factual proffer. In fact, with the exception of one non-substantive addition, Petitioner accepted the factual proffer as indicated. On or about November 16, 2007, a judgment was entered on the aforesaid guilty plea, wherein Petitioner was adjudicated guilty of all counts charged in the four-count information. The same judgment is filed in U.S. District Court (S.D. Fla.) in case number 0:07-cr-60209-WPB as document 59. By certified letter dated January 24, 2008, Petitioner was notified of Respondent's proposed action to forfeit his FRS rights and benefits as a result of the aforesaid guilty plea. The notice set forth the basis for the Division's decision and informed Petitioner of his right to an administrative hearing. Petitioner, by and through counsel, timely requested a formal administrative hearing to challenge said proposed agency action. [End of Stipulated Facts] The parties agreed that the following exhibits would be considered in this cause: Petitioner's resignation letter dated September 4, 2007; Governor Crist's letter accepting Petitioner's resignation dated September 4, 2007; The Information filed against Petitioner on September 4, 2007, in United States of America v. Kenneth C. Jenne, Case No. 0:07-cr-60209-WPB, United States District Court, Southern District of Florida; The Plea Agreement offered in United States of America v. Kenneth C. Jenne, Case No. 0:07-cr-60209-WPB, United States District Court, Southern District of Florida; The Statement of Factual Basis for Guilty Plea of Defendant Kenneth C. Jenne in United States of America v. Kenneth C. Jenne, Case No. 0:07-cr-60209-WPB, United States District Court, Southern District of Florida; The Transcript of the Plea of Guilty before the Honorable William P. Dimitrouleas, U.S. District Judge, United States of America v. Kenneth C. Jenne, Case No. 0:07-cr-60209- WPB, United States District Court, Southern District of Florida; The Waiver of Indictment from United States of America v. Kenneth C. Jenne, Case No. 0:07-cr-60209-WPB, United States District Court, Southern District of Florida; The Judgment in a Criminal Case from United States of America v. Kenneth C. Jenne, Case No. 0:07-cr-60209-WPB, United States District Court, Southern District of Florida; The Agency Action letter dated January 24, 2008; Form 6 Full and Public Disclosure of Financial Interests 2001 (with attachments and amendments), Ken Jenne, Sheriff, Broward County, Elected Constitutional Officer, June 27, 2002; Form 6 Full and Public Disclosure of Financial Interests 2002 (with attachments), Ken Jenne, Sheriff, Broward County, Elected Constitutional Officer, July 7, 2003; and Form 6 Full and Public Disclosure of Financial Interests 2004 (with attachments), Ken Jenne, Sheriff, Broward County, Elected Constitutional Officer, July 1, 2005. Petitioner did not have a trial on the merits of the charges against him. Instead, he voluntarily accepted and admitted to the factual allegations set forth in the charging and plea documents. The factual statements set forth in those documents are not subject to interpretation or conjecture. They must be considered facts of this case based upon the stipulation of the parties. Petitioner was notified of the Department's preliminary decision to forfeit the FRS benefits and rights and Petitioner timely challenged that decision.
Recommendation Based upon the Findings of Fact and the Conclusions of Law set forth above, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent enter a final order finding Petitioner was convicted of crimes that require the forfeiture of his rights and benefits under the FRS, pursuant to Florida law. DONE AND ENTERED this 3rd day of March, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. J. D. PARRISH Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of March, 2009. COPIES FURNISHED: Sarabeth Snuggs, Director Division of Retirement Department of Management Services Post Office Box 9000 Tallahassee, Florida 32315-9000 John Brenneis, General Counsel Department of Management Services 4050 Esplanade Way Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950 Mark Herron, Esquire Thomas M. Findley, Esquire Messer, Caparello & Self, P.A. 2618 Centennial Place Post Office Box 15579 Tallahassee, Florida 32317-5579 Clifford A. Taylor, Esquire Barbara M. Crosier, Esquire Geoffrey M. Christian, Esquire Department of Management Services 4050 Esplanade Way, Suite 160D Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950
Findings Of Fact Eugene L. Borus began employment with the Department of Transportation (DOT) in February, 1962, and was enrolled in the Florida Retirement System (FRS) as a mandatory member. In April, 1976, he terminated employment and applied for retirement. He was retired effective May 1, 1976, with 12.33 years of credible service (Exhibit 2). Mr. Borus was reemployed on May 23, 1977, by DOT. During 1977 and under the provisions of the "Reemployment After Retirement" provisions of Section 121.091(9), Florida Statutes, Petitioner received both his salary and his retirement benefit up to 500 hours of employment at which point his retirement benefits ceased. Beginning January 1, 1978, and on each January 1 thereafter Petitioner was again paid his retirement benefit up to 500 hours of employment after which the retirement benefit was discontinued. In early 1984, Mr. Borus applied to the Division to have his 1976 retirement cancelled and his employment service with DOT since 1976 included in his creditable service so that at such time as he would again retire, his total creditable service would include all his employment time. If this transpired, his future retirement benefits would be greater than those currently paid. His request was denied by the Respondent by letter dated April 5, 1984 (Exhibit 1). No member of FRS who has retired and drawn retired pay, except for those excepted in Section 120.091(4)(e) and 121.091(9)(d) have ever been "unretired" and allowed to rejoin the FRS.
Findings Of Fact At all times material to the allegations of this matter, Respondent was licensed to operate an assisted living facility at 817 Eleventh Street, West Palm Beach, Florida. The Department is the state agency charged with the responsibility of regulating, and assuring compliance with state laws governing, assisted living facilities. Joseph Narkier, a human services surveyor employed by AHCA, was assigned to perform an appraisal of the Respondent's facility in September, 1995. He visited the facility on September 27, 1995, along with Polly Weaver, chief of field operations. In accordance with his instructions, Mr. Narkier did not perform a full survey but only looked at certain items, "tags," which had historically been out of compliance at the facility. Based upon his review, Mr. Narkier found the following deficiencies at the Aries Retirement Living facility: Respondent failed to display its current license inside the facility as required by state standard A 003. This deficiency had been cited on an earlier survey, March 14, 1995. Fiscal records were not on the premises, thus Respondent could not identify income and expenses as required by state standard A 100. This deficiency had also been cited on March 14, 1995. Since fiscal records were not on the premises, it could not be determined that the facility was administered on a sound financial basis as required by state standard A 101. This deficiency had also been cited on March 14, 1995. The Respondent did not produce an accurate written admission and discharge record as required by state standard A 201. This deficiency had also been cited on March 14, 1995. The Respondent did not produce an executed contract for each resident dated at the time of admission as required by state standard A 300. There were three residents for whom no evidence of a contract, executed at admission, could be produced. This deficiency had also been cited on March 14, 1995. State standard A 301, which relates to the content of the resident contract, was also deficient. Since there were no contracts for three residents, the contract content did not exist. This deficiency had also been cited on March 14, 1995. The Respondent did not have medical records or other support documentation to show that one resident had had a medical examination either within sixty days prior to admission or within thirty days after admission to the facility. Such exams are required to verify the residents are free of signs and symptoms of any communicable disease which is likely to be transmitted to other residents and is required by state standard A 406. The Respondent also could not produce documentation regarding admissions criteria as required by state standard A 408. According to records for one resident, medications were to be administered by a licensed professional. Since records did not verify the medications were administered according to the physician's orders, state standard A 601 was not met. Electrical outlets in the kitchen were not maintained in a safe condition in violation of state standard A 901. Hot and cold water faucets were not identified by use of the "H" and "C" initials as required by state standard A 1023. The records needed to verify the facility was in compliance with the state standards were not made available to the surveyors prior to their departure from the facility. Moreover, fiscal records were not made available to Mr. Narkier at the follow-up review on November 21, 1995. The fiscal records were not available until a third survey date, February 13, 1996, the second follow-up date. Based upon the foregoing, at the time of the survey Respondent had at least six class III deficiencies. None of the excuses suggested by Respondent to explain the survey findings has been deemed credible. This Respondent has a history of deficient performance. Two prior contested administrative complaints resulted in findings of numerous violations. Those violations were fully addressed in DOAH Case Nos. 94-5078 and 94-6908. On April 5, 1995, a recommended order was entered in DOAH Case Nos. 94-5078 and 94-6908. That order was adopted and incorporated by reference in the final order entered by AHCA on May 15, 1995. The final order entered in DOAH Case Nos. 94-5078 and 94-6908 imposed an administrative fine in the amount of $8,000.00 which Respondent has not paid. In addition to this outstanding administrative fine, Respondent has a history of two other administrative actions which also resulted in administrative fines. In DOAH Case No. 92-2415, the parties entered into a stipulation wherein Respondent agreed to pay a fine in the amount of $1,125.00. The Respondent did not timely remit that administrative fine. The second administrative action also resulted in an administrative fine. That case was not referred to the Division of Administrative Hearings. The final order (AHCA Exhibit 4), entered on August 8, 1991, imposed an administrative fine in the amount of $750.00. Respondent eventually paid this fine on April 22, 1992. Respondent has consistently failed to honor the state standards set for this type facility.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is, hereby, RECOMMENDED: That the Agency for Health Care Administration enter a final order dismissing Case No. 95-0128 since the applicant has withdrawn the request to increase capacity of the ALF; denying the renewal of licensure sought in Case No. 95-0129; and imposing an administrative fine in the amount of $1,200.00 in Case No. 95-5678. DONE AND ENTERED this 30th day of September, 1996, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. JOYOUS D. PARRISH, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of September, 1996. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER Rulings on the proposed findings of fact submitted by the Petitioner: Paragraphs 1, 3, 11, 12, 13, and 14 are accepted. With regard to paragraphs 2, and 4 through 10, such paragraphs reiterate findings of fact made in DOAH Case Nos. 94-5078 and 94-6908 which have been adopted by final order and are not at issue in this proceeding. As a matter of law, unless set aside such findings remain in effect. Paragraph 15 is rejected as hearsay. Notwithstanding that Respondent's proposed findings of fact failed to comply with Rule 60Q-2.031(3), Florida Administrative Code, and contained multiple facts per paragraph (some of which could not be accepted while others could), to the extent possible, the following rulings on the proposed findings of fact submitted by the Respondent are made: The first sentence of paragraph 1 is accepted; the remainder is rejected as irrelevant or inaccurate. An administrative proceeding related to two complaints against this Respondent which found numerous violations resulted in a final order being entered by the Department. With regard to paragraph 2, the last sentence is accepted; the remainder of the paragraph is rejected as irrelevant or inaccurate or procedural issues unrelated to this matter. Further, as to the unannounced survey conducted by Mr. Narkier, notice of an intended survey is not required as a matter of law. With regard to paragraph 3, it is accepted a current license was not displayed. Otherwise rejected as contrary to the weight of the credible evidence. Paragraph 4 is rejected as irrelevant or contrary to the weight of the credible evidence. The violation stems from the failure to display the current license. Paragraph 5 is rejected as mischaracterization of the testimony or contrary to the weight of the credible evidence. Paragraphs 6 through 8 are rejected as no record cited supported the findings or irrelevant or contrary to the weight of the evidence in its entirety. COPIES FURNISHED: Sam Power, Agency Clerk Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive, Suite 3431 Fort Knox Building 3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308-5403 Douglas M. Cook, Director Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive, Suite 3431 Fort Knox Building 3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308-5403 Jerome W. Hoffman, General Counsel Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive, Suite 3431 Fort Knox Building 3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308-5403 Linda L. Parkinson, Esquire Agency for Health Care Administration Division of Health Quality Assurance 400 West Robinson Street, Suite S-309 Orlando, Florida 32801 Esther A. Zaretsky, Esquire 1655 Palm Beach Lakes Boulevard Forum III, Suite 900 West Palm Beach, Florida 33401
The Issue The issues are whether Petitioner became an employee of an FRS employer within a calendar month after completing his participation in the Deferred Retirement Option Program (DROP) in violation of Subsection 121.091(13)(c)5.d., Florida Statutes (2006)1; whether Respondent's interpretation of relevant statutes is an unadopted rule; and whether Respondent's interpretation of relevant statutes is an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority.
Findings Of Fact The parties stipulated to several facts in this proceeding. Respondent is the state agency responsible for administering the FRS. Petitioner was employed as an equipment operator (street sweeper) by the City of Venice, Florida (the City), for more than 35 years until he completed his participation in DROP on January 11, 2007. At that time Petitioner was earning approximately $38,000.00 annually. The City revoked its participation in the FRS effective January 1, 1996, and established a new City retirement plan. The new City retirement plan applies to all employees hired after January 1, 1996. However, the City continued its participation in the FRS for all employees who were members of the FRS prior to January 1, 1996. Petitioner elected to participate in DROP on March 31, 2002. At the conclusion of DROP, Petitioner received a lump-sum payment of approximately $84,279.00 and received monthly benefits until Respondent ceased paying benefits in accordance with the proposed agency action. Petitioner's efforts at reemployment were unsuccessful. On January 31, 2007, the City employed Petitioner to perform the same work he previously performed at a base salary as a "new hire."2 The City assured Petitioner that reemployment would not adversely affect Petitioner's FRS retirement benefits because the City does not consider itself an FRS employer. A member of the City's human resources department contacted a representative for Respondent to verify the City's statutory interpretation. The conversation eventually led to this proceeding. Petitioner was not employed by an employer under the FRS during the next calendar month after completing his participation in DROP on January 11, 2007. Judicial decisions discussed in the Conclusions of Law hold that the issue of whether Petitioner is an employee of an FRS employer is a factual finding. When Petitioner began employment with the City on January 31, 2007, Petitioner was not a member of the FRS within the meaning of Subsection 121.021(12). He was not an employee covered under the FRS because he was hired after January 1, 1996, when the City revoked its participation in FRS. On January 31, 2007, Petitioner was not an employee within the meaning of Subsection 121.021(11). Petitioner was not employed in a covered group within the meaning of Subsection 121.021(34). Petitioner did not become a member under Chapter 121, and the City was not a "city for which coverage under this chapter" was applied for and approved for Petitioner. On January 11, 2007, Petitioner ceased all employment relationships with "employers under this system" within the meaning of Subsection 121.021(39). When Petitioner resumed employment on January 31, 2007, Petitioner did not fail to terminate employment with an employer under the FRS system. Petitioner's new employer was not an employer under the FRS system and had not been such an employer after January 1, 1996. After January 1, 1996, the City was not a covered employer for any employees employed after that date, including Petitioner. On January 31, 2007, Petitioner was not an employee of an employer within the meaning of Subsection 121.021(10). The City did not participate in the FRS system for the benefit of Petitioner. The employment of Petitioner by the City on January 31, 2007, had no financial impact on the FRS, and Petitioner did not begin to accrue new benefits with the FRS. Respondent did not demonstrate in the record why the agency's proposed statutory interpretation requires special agency insight or expertise and did not articulate in the record any underlying technical reasons for deference to agency expertise. Nor did the agency explain in the record or its PRO why the issue of whether Petitioner is an employee of an FRS employer is not an issue of fact that is within the exclusive province of the fact-finder. Respondent proposes a literal interpretation of selected statutory terms without explaining legislative intent for the prohibition against reemployment within the next calendar month.3 Respondent's proposed statutory interpretation also fails to distinguish the economic impact in situations involving what may be fairly characterized as a dual-purpose employer; that is one like the City which is part covered employer and part non-covered employer.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent enter a final order reinstating Petitioner's monthly retirement benefits, paying all past due amounts to Petitioner, with interest, and dismissing its request for reimbursement of past FRS benefits from Petitioner. DONE AND ENTERED this 3rd day of June, 2008, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DANIEL MANRY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of June, 2008.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Petitioner has forfeited his rights and benefits under the Florida Retirement System pursuant to Section 112.3173, Florida Statutes (2008).
Findings Of Fact Based on the record in this proceeding, including the evidence presented at the formal hearing and the joint pre- hearing stipulation1 of the parties, the following Findings of Fact are made: The Florida Retirement System (FRS) is a public retirement system as defined by Florida law. Respondent, Department of Management Services, Division of Retirement (Respondent or Division), is charged with managing, governing, and administering the FRS. Petitioner, Mr. Johnson Holsberry, Jr. (Petitioner or Mr. Holsberry), was formerly employed as a teacher at the West Area School of Choice by the Palm Beach County School Board (PBCSB). By reason of his employment with the PBCSB, Mr. Holsberry became a member of the FRS. As a teacher, Mr. Holsberry was subject to the Code of Ethics of the Education Profession in Florida found in Rule 6B- 1.001, Florida Administrative Code. As a teacher, Mr. Holsberry was subject to the Principles of Professional Conduct for the Education Profession in Florida found in Florida Administrative Code Rule 6B-1.006. On or about December 5, 2000, Mr. Holsberry resigned his teaching position with PBCSB. On or about October 24, 2001, Mr. Holsberry was charged, by amended information, in the Circuit Court of the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit, in and for Palm Beach County, Florida, with one count of child abuse, a third degree felony, in violation of Section 827.03(1), Florida Statutes. The same amended information is filed in the Circuit Court of the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit, in and for Palm Beach County, Florida, in State of Florida v. Johnson Leo Holsberry, Jr., Case No. Ol-CF-001185. The victim of the alleged crime, R.D., was a female student at the Area School of Choice. In Palm Beach County, Florida, between the dates of January 1, 1999, and December 31, 1999, Petitioner, while teaching in a position of parental responsibility, was alleged to have had contact with R.D. and to have acted in such a manner as to cause mental injury to said child. On or about October 24, 2001, Mr. Holsberry entered an agreement with the State Attorney's Office wherein he agreed to plead guilty as charged in the amended information. The same plea agreement is filed in the Circuit Court of the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit, in and for Palm Beach County, Florida, in State of Florida v. Johnson Leo Holsberry, Jr., Case No. Ol-CF- 001185. Mr. Holsberry's guilty plea was made freely and voluntarily. Mr. Holsberry pled guilty because he was in fact guilty. On or about October 24, 2001, Mr. Holsberry was adjudicated guilty. The same judgment is filed in the Circuit Court of the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit, in and for Palm Beach County, Florida, in State of Florida v. Johnson Leo Holsberry, Jr., Case No. Ol-CF-001185. On or about January 8, 2001, Mr. Holsberry applied to the Division for early service retirement from the FRS and began receiving retirement benefits. The Division suspended payment of Mr. Holsberry's monthly retirement benefits in June 2008. By certified letter dated June 13, 2008, Mr. Holsberry was notified of the Division's intended action to forfeit his FRS rights and benefits as a result of his guilty plea in the case styled and numbered State of Florida v. Johnson Leo Holsberry, Jr., Case No. Ol-CF-001185. At the hearing, Mr. Holsberry testified that R.D. was in his classroom a few times, but that he was not sure of the year, frequency, or why she was there. He testified that he does not remember taking a picture of R. D. sitting at his desk, but that might have taken place. Mr. Holsberry also testified that he does not recall permitting R. D. to access her email from his classroom, or inviting her to join him on trips, to come to his home, or otherwise to meet him any place outside of the school. Mr. Holsberry testified that he does not recall giving R. D. his home telephone number. He recalls having an email screen name of Sameagle1, but does not recall whether he emailed R. D. from that email address or whether he had another screen name, Gutster. He testified that he does not recall referring to himself as H-Man (although he said some students called him "Mr. H.") or referring to R.D. as "Dukey Dufus." In general, Mr. Holsberry's testimony that he does not recall his actions that ultimately ended his career as a teacher is not credible. Mr. Holsberry noted that R.D. was not officially assigned to any of his classes, so that he was not responsible for her education, nor was he involved with her in any after school program that would have made him responsible for her welfare. Mr. Holsberry testified that he probably would not have met R.D. but for his position as a teacher at her school. He also recalled having being interviewed by an investigator named Green. Angelette Green, an employee of the Palm Beach County School District for 15 years, was the investigator assigned to Mr. Holsberry's case. Detective Green testified that Mr. Holsberry admitted that he helped R. D. set up an email account, communicated with her by email, including having sent by internet a picture of her taken in his classroom. She also testified that she remembers emails inviting R. D. to go somewhere. She said Mr. Holsberry called R. D. "Dukey Dufus" after he sent her an email and she questioned who it was from. On July 30, 2002, an Administrative Complaint was filed by the Commissioner of Education seeking disciplinary sanctions against Mr. Holsberry's license based on allegations of professional misconduct. Mr. Holsberry did not contest the disciplinary matter, having already agreed to surrender permanently his teaching certificate as a part of his plea agreement. The Education Practices Commission entered a final order permanently revoking his teaching certificate. On October 24, 2001, a plea conference was held on the following charge: Amended Information For: CHILD ABUSE In the Name and by the Authority of the State of Florida: BARRY E. KRISCHER, State Attorney for the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit, Palm Beach County, Florida, by and through his undersigned Assistant State Attorney, charges that JOHNSON LEO HOLSBERRY JR. on or between January 01, 1999 and December 31, 1999, in the County of Palm Beach and State of Florida, did knowingly or willfully, intentionally inflict physical or mental injury upon R.D., a child, {or} did an intentional act or actively encourage another to do an act that results or could reasonably be expected to result in physical or mental injury to R.D., a child, contrary to Florida Statute 827.03(1). (3 DEG FEL) At the plea conference, the following exchange occurred: [By Mr. Jaegers, Assistant State Attorney:] The defendant will be adjudicated guilty of the offense; he will be placed on five years probation. There will be no early termination contemplated. The defendant will be required to pay Court costs in the amount of $261.00, $50.00 to the Drug Trust Fund, $50.00 cost of prosecution. The defendant must undergo a psychological evaluation and successfully complete any recommended treatment. * * * The defendant is to surrender all and not seek at any time in the future any teaching certificates in any jurisdiction in the world. There will be no contact with children under 18 unless they're in the presence of an adult who is aware of these charges. And those are the terms of the negotiated settlement. The facts in this case, Judge, are that the defendant, Johnson Leo Holsberry, Jr., did in Palm Beach County, Florida, on, between the dates of January 1, 1999 and December 31st, 1999, while teaching in a position of parental responsibility, in that capacity had contact with a juvenile female by the name of, or by the initials of SRD, I think it's on the plea sheet. MR. WILINSKEY [Counsel for Mr. Holsberry] That's right. MR. JAEGERS: -- RD, and did act in a manner such as to cause mental injury to said child. The -- those are the facts that occurred in Palm Beach County. THE COURT: Sir, raise your right hand, please. JOHNSON LEO HOLSBERRY, JR. BEING FIRST DULY SWORN BY THE COURT, TESTIFIED AS FOLLOWS: THE COURT: Your name? THE DEFENDANT: Johnson Leo Holsberry, Jr. THE COURT: How old are you? THE DEFENDANT: 62 * * * THE COURT: Do you understand what the things are you have to do? THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. THE COURT: Are you pleading guilty because you are guilty? THE DEFENDANT: Yes. THE COURT: Do you agree with the facts the State Attorney gave me as the basis for your plea of guilty? THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent enter a final order finding that Petitioner was convicted of a specified offense pursuant to Section 112.3173, Florida Statutes, and directing the forfeiture of his FRS rights and benefits. DONE AND ENTERED this 24th day of July, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ELEANOR M. HUNTER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of July, 2009.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner, Robert Gilmour, was employed by the Dade County School Board until July 2, 1984, when he terminated his employment effective June 15, 1984. Mr. Gilmour terminated his employment by placing a telephone call to his supervisor. At the time of the telephone call, Mr. Gilmour was out of the Miami area on vacation. Mr. Gilmour did not return from vacation until August 8, 1984. On August 9, 1984, Mr. Gilmour went to the Office of Personnel Retirement Section, of the Dade County School Board, where he executed an application for early retirement. Mr. Gilmour's application for retirement was received by the Benefits Calculation Section of the Division of Retirement on August 15, 1984, in Tallahassee, Florida. The Division of Retirement assigned to Mr. Gilmour an effective date of retirement of September 1, 1984, the first day of the month following the date on which the Division of Retirement received his application for retirement. In May, 1984, Mr. Gilmour, placed a telephone call to Louise Syrcle, an employee of the School Board in the Office of Personnel, Retirement Section. Mr. Gilmour was considering retirement and wanted to discuss the matter with Ms. Syrcle. At the time of the telephone call, Ms. Syrcle was on her vacation and then was subsequently on sick leave because of a broken back. Ms. Syrcle was absent from employment from April 23, 1984 until June 25, 1984. In the course of the telephone call, Mr. Gilmour was told of Ms. Syrcle's broken back and was told that appointments were being made only for those teachers who had already decided to retire. Because he had not yet made that decision, he did not make an appointment. Further Mr. Gilmour did not seek to speak with any other personnel in that office. Art Miles Ms. Syrcle's supervisor, and other personnel were available in the Dade County School Board's Office of Personnel to respond to retirement requests and they did process numerous retirement requests during Ms. Syrcle's absence. At no time did Mr. Gilmour seek, read or receive a copy of the Summary Plan Description brochure which was admitted as Respondent's Exhibit C. Additionally, at no time did Mr. Gilmour make inquiry of anyone at the Division of Retirement regarding his retirement options. Instead, Mr. Gilmour relied on information gleaned from casual conversations with colleagues, which information was not correct. At all time relevant hereto, the Division of Retirement has maintained a staff of counselors who are available to consult with members and agencies on matters concerning retirement, including deadlines for filing applications. As a result of Mr. Gilmour's July 2, 1984, telephone call, in which he terminated his employment, the Dade County School Board sent a certification of service and earnings, Form FT4A, on July 2, 1984. This form was received by the Division of Retirement on July 9, 1984. While this form may have indicated that Mr. Gilmour had terminated his employment with the Dade County School Board, no information contained in that form indicated his intent to retire. When Mr. Gilmour went to the Office of Personnel, Retirement Section, of the Dade County School Board on August 9, 1984, he first learned that the rules of the Division of Retirement required that the application for retirement be filed within 30 days of the termination date in order for the retiree to receive retirement benefits retroactive to the date of termination. Because Mr. Gilmour failed to file his application for retirement until August 15, 1984, he did not receive retirement benefits for the months of July and August, 1984.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Division of Retirement enter a Final Order denying Robert Gilmour retirement benefits for the months of July and August, 1984, and establishing Mr. Gilmour's effective date of retirement to be September 1, 1984, the first day of the month following his application for retirement. DONE and ENTERED this 17th day of May, 1985, in Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE K. KIESLING Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of May, 1985.
Findings Of Fact The facts here involved are largely undisputed. Callie Grier was employed by the Polk County Hospital as a nurses aide from 1966 until July of 1972. She did not have 10 years employment for retirement purposes at the time of her death in 1976, hence her retirement had not vested. In 1966, and again in 1969, Callie Grier designated her husband, Timothy Grier, as beneficiary of her retirement benefits. At the beginning of her employment Callie Grier was covered under the City and County employees retirement system. In 1970 retirement provisions were modified to establish a Florida Retirement System to cover all city, county and state employees. Those employees covered under a previous retirement system were given the option of transferring to the new system or staying with their existing retirement system. In 1970 Mrs. Grier elected to transfer to the Florida Retirement System (Exhibit 7). On 18 September 1970 Callie Grier obtained a final judgment of divorce from Timothy Grier, Jr., which judgment provided for the payment of child support. (Exhibit 1) On 23 March 1971 an Order of Contempt was issued adjudging Timothy Grier, Jr. in contempt of court and sentencing him to IS days in jail for failure to pay child support. (Exhibit 2) . On 1 November 1971 Timothy Grier was adjudged to be in contempt of court and sentenced to jail for 90 days for being in arrears on child support payments (Exhibit 3) . Also on 1 November 1971 an order relinquishing jurisdiction over Timothy Grier to the Criminal Court was issued (Exhibit 4). On or about this time Timothy Grier departed Bartow and his present whereabouts is unknown to Petitioner. Callie Grier married Aaron Spencer after her divorce from Grier and was so married at the time of her death. Petitioner has custody of the minor child of Callie Grier and has had custody since the death of Callie Grier. On 10 February 1971 Callie Grier executed a change of beneficiary form for her insurance with The Travelers Insurance Company designating Willie Mae Barnes as beneficiary (Exhibit 6) At this time Callie Grier was suffering from a kidney disorder which later required the use of dialysis. Following a kidney transplant in 1976 Callie Grier died in a Gainesville hospital. In 1970 many of the employees in Polk County were not aware of all of their retirement benefits and little effort was expended by local employers to insure the employees had all information. The State Division of Retirement has held numerous seminars and workshops throughout Florida, including Polk County, for both supervisors and employees from time to time since the Division of Retirement was formed. In addition, at least annually brochures were prepared in sufficient numbers to provide one for each employee and sent to the various employers. These brochures explained the various retirement benefits to which employees are entitled. In these brochures. as well as he seminars and workshops, the requirement of having currently designated beneficiaries was stressed.
