The Issue The issues in this case are whether Respondent applied the proper reimbursement principles to Petitioners' initial Medicaid rate setting, and whether elements of detrimental reliance exist so as to require Respondent to establish a particular initial rate for Petitioners' facilities.
Findings Of Fact There are nine Petitioners in this case. Each of them is a long-term health care facility (nursing home) operated under independent and separate legal entities, but, generally, under the umbrella of a single owner, Tzvi "Steve" Bogomilsky. The issues in this case are essentially the same for all nine Petitioners, but the specific monetary impact on each Petitioner may differ. For purposes of addressing the issues at final hearing, only one of the Petitioners, Madison Pointe Rehabilitation and Health Center (Madison Pointe), was discussed, but the pertinent facts are relevant to each of the other Petitioners as well. Each of the Petitioners has standing in this case. The Amended Petition for Formal Administrative Hearing filed by each Petitioner was timely and satisfied minimum requirements. In September 2008, Bogomilsky caused to be filed with AHCA a Change of Licensed Operator ("CHOP") application for Madison Pointe.1 The purpose of that application was to allow a new entity owned by Bogomilsky to become the authorized licensee of that facility. Part and parcel of the CHOP application was a Form 1332, PFA. The PFA sets forth projected revenues, expenses, costs and charges anticipated for the facility in its first year of operation by the new operator. The PFA also contained projected (or budgeted) balance sheets and a projected Medicaid cost report for the facility. AHCA is the state agency responsible for licensing nursing homes in this state. AHCA also is responsible for managing the federal Medicaid program within this state. Further, AHCA monitors nursing homes within the state for compliance with state and federal regulations, both operating and financial in nature. The AHCA Division of Health Quality Assurance, Bureau of Long-Term Care Services, Long-Term Care Unit ("Long-Term Care Unit") is responsible for reviewing and approving CHOP applications and issuance of an operating license to the new licensee. The AHCA Division of Health Quality Assurance, Bureau of Health Facility Regulation, Financial Analysis Unit ("Financial Analysis Unit") is responsible for reviewing the PFA contained in the CHOP application and determining an applicant's financial ability to operate a facility in accordance with the applicable statutes and rules. Neither the Long-Term Care Unit nor the Financial Analysis Unit is a part of the Florida Medicaid Program. Madison Pointe also chose to submit a Medicaid provider application to the Medicaid program fiscal agent to enroll as a Medicaid provider and to be eligible for Medicaid reimbursement. (Participation by nursing homes in the Medicaid program is voluntary.) The Medicaid provider application was reviewed by the Medicaid Program Analysis Office (MPA) which, pursuant to its normal practices, reviewed the application and set an interim per diem rate for reimbursement. Interim rate-setting is dependent upon legislative direction provided in the General Appropriations Act and also in the Title XIX Long-Term Care Reimbursement Plan (the Plan). The Plan is created by the federal Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS). CMS (formerly known as the Health Care Financing Administration) is a federal agency within the Department of Health and Human Services. CMS is responsible for administering the Medicare and Medicaid programs, utilizing state agencies for assistance when appropriate. In its PFA filed with the Financial Analysis Unit, Madison Pointe proposed an interim Medicaid rate of $203.50 per patient day (ppd) as part of its budgeted revenues. The projected interim rate was based on Madison Pointe's expected occupancy rate, projected expenses, and allowable costs. The projected rate was higher than the previous owner's actual rate in large part based on Madison Pointe's anticipation of pending legislative action concerning Medicaid reimbursement issues. That is, Madison Pointe projected higher spending and allowable costs based on expected increases proposed in the upcoming legislative session. Legislative Changes to the Medicaid Reimbursement System During the 2007 Florida Legislative Session, the Legislature addressed the status of Medicaid reimbursement for long-term care facilities. During that session, the Legislature enacted the 2007 Appropriations Act, Chapter 2007-72, Laws of Florida. The industry proposed, and the Legislature seemed to accept, that it was necessary to rebase nursing homes in the Medicaid program. Rebasing is a method employed by the Agency periodically to calibrate the target rate system and adjust Medicaid rates (pursuant to the amount of funds allowed by the Legislature) to reflect more realistic allowable expenditures by providers. Rebasing had previously occurred in 1992 and 2002. The rebasing would result in a "step-up" in the Medicaid rate for providers. In response to a stated need for rebasing, the 2007 Legislature earmarked funds to address Medicaid reimbursement. The Legislature passed Senate Bill 2800, which included provisions for modifying the Plan as follows: To establish a target rate class ceiling floor equal to 90 percent of the cost- based class ceiling. To establish an individual provider- specific target floor equal to 75 percent of the cost-based class ceiling. To modify the inflation multiplier to equal 2.0 times inflation for the individual provider-specific target. (The inflation multiplier for the target rate class ceiling shall remain at 1.4 times inflation.) To modify the calculation of the change of ownership target to equal the previous provider's operating and indirect patient care cost per diem (excluding incentives), plus 50 percent of the difference between the previous providers' per diem (excluding incentives) and the effect class ceiling and use an inflation multiplier of 2.0 times inflation. The Plan was modified in accordance with this legislation with an effective date of July 1, 2007. Four relevant sentences from the modified Plan are relevant to this proceeding, to wit: For a new provider with no cost history resulting from a change of ownership or operator, where the previous provider participated in the Medicaid program, the interim operating and patient care per diems shall be the lesser of: the class reimbursement ceiling based on Section V of this Plan, the budgeted per diems approved by AHCA based on Section III of this Plan, or the previous providers' operating and patient care cost per diem (excluding incentives), plus 50% of the difference between the previous providers' per diem (excluding incentives) and the class ceiling. The above new provider ceilings, based on the district average per diem or the previous providers' per diem, shall apply to all new providers with a Medicaid certification effective on or after July 1, 1991. The new provider reimbursement limitation above, based on the district average per diem or the previous providers' per diem, which affects providers already in the Medicaid program, shall not apply to these same providers beginning with the rate semester in which the target reimbursement provision in Section V.B.16. of this plan does not apply. This new provider reimbursement limitation shall apply to new providers entering the Medicaid program, even if the new provider enters the program during a rate semester in which Section V.B.16 of this plan does not apply. [The above cited sentences will be referred to herein as Plan Sentence 1, Plan Sentence 2, etc.] Madison Pointe's Projected Medicaid Rate Relying on the proposed legislation, including the proposed rebasing and step-up in rate, Madison Pointe projected an interim Medicaid rate of $203.50 ppd for its initial year of operation. Madison Pointe's new projected rate assumed a rebasing by the Legislature to eliminate existing targets, thereby, allowing more reimbursable costs. Although no legislation had been passed at that time, Madison Pointe's consultants made calculations and projections as to how the rebasing would likely affect Petitioners. Those projections were the basis for the $203.50 ppd interim rate. The projected rate with limitations applied (i.e., if Madison Pointe did not anticipate rebasing or believe the Plan revisions applied) would have been $194.26. The PFA portion of Madison Pointe's CHOP application was submitted to AHCA containing the $203.50 ppd interim rate. The Financial Analysis Unit, as stated, is responsible for, inter alia, reviewing PFAs submitted as part of a CHOP application. In the present case, Ryan Fitch was the person within the Financial Analysis Unit assigned responsibility for reviewing Madison Pointe's PFA. Fitch testified that the purpose of his review was to determine whether the applicant had projected sufficient monetary resources to successfully operate the facility. This would include a contingency fund (equal to one month's anticipated expenses) available to the applicant and reasonable projections of cost and expenses versus anticipated revenues.2 Upon his initial review of the Madison Pointe PFA, Fitch determined that the projected Medicaid interim rate was considerably higher than the previous operator's actual rate. This raised a red flag and prompted Fitch to question the propriety of the proposed rate. In his omissions letter to the applicant, Fitch wrote (as the fourth bullet point of the letter), "The projected Medicaid rate appears to be high relative to the current per diem rate and the rate realized in 2006 cost reports (which includes ancillaries and is net of contractual adjustments). Please explain or revise the projections." In response to the omissions letter, Laura Wilson, a health care accountant working for Madison Pointe, sent Fitch an email on June 27, 2008. The subject line of the email says, "FW: Omissions Letter for 11 CHOW applications."3 Then the email addressed several items from the omissions letter, including a response to the fourth bullet point which says: Item #4 - Effective July 1, 2007, it is anticipated that AHCA will be rebasing Medicaid rates (the money made available through elimination of some of Medicaid's participation in covering Medicare Part A bad debts). Based on discussions with AHCA and the two Associations (FHCA & FAHSA), there is absolute confidence that this rebasing will occur. The rebasing is expected to increase the Medicaid rates at all of the facilities based on the current operator's spending levels. As there is no definitive methodology yet developed, the rebased rates in the projections have been calculated based on the historical methodologies that were used in the 2 most recent rebasings (1992 and 2002). The rates also include the reestablishment of the 50% step-up that is also anticipated to begin again. The rebasing will serve to increase reimbursement and cover costs which were previously limited by ceilings. As noted in Note 6 of the financials, if something occurs which prevents the rebasing, Management will be reducing expenditures to align them with the available reimbursement. It is clear Madison Pointe's projected Medicaid rate was based upon proposed legislative actions which would result in changes to the Plan. It is also clear that should those changes not occur, Madison Pointe was going to be able to address the shortfall by way of reduced expenditures. Each of those facts was relevant to the financial viability of Madison Pointe's proposed operations. Madison Pointe's financial condition was approved by Fitch based upon his review of the PFA and the responses to his questions. Madison Pointe became the new licensed operator of the facility. That is, the Long-Term Care Unit deemed the application to have met all requirements, including financial ability to operate, and issued a license to the applicant. Subsequently, MPA provided to Madison Pointe its interim Medicaid rate. MPA advised Madison Pointe that its rate would be $194.55 ppd, some $8.95 ppd less than Madison Pointe had projected in its PFA (but slightly more than Madison Pointe would have projected with the 50 percent limitation from Plan Sentence 1 in effect, i.e., $194.26). The PFA projected 25,135 annual Medicaid patient days, which multiplied by $8.95, would equate to a reduction in revenues of approximately $225,000 for the first year of operation.4 MPA assigned Madison Pointe's interim Medicaid rate by applying the provisions of the Plan as it existed as of the date Madison Pointe's new operating license was issued, i.e., September 1, 2007. Specifically, MPA limited Madison Pointe's per diem to 50 percent of the difference between the previous provider's per diem and the applicable ceilings, as dictated by the changes to the Plan. (See Plan Sentence 1 set forth above.) Madison Pointe's projected Medicaid rate in the PFA had not taken any such limitations into account because of Madison Pointe's interpretation of the Plan provisions. Specifically, that Plan Sentence 3 applies to Madison Pointe and, therefore, exempts Madison Pointe from the new provider limitation set forth in Plan Sentences 1 and 2. However, Madison Pointe was not "already in the Medicaid program" as of July 1, 2007, as called for in Plan Sentence 3. Rather, Madison Pointe's commencement date in the Medicaid program was September 1, 2007. Plan Sentence 1 is applicable to a "new provider with no cost history resulting from a change of ownership or operator, where the previous operator participated in the Medicaid program." Madison Pointe falls within that definition. Thus, Madison Pointe's interim operating and patient care per diems would be the lesser of: (1) The class reimbursement ceiling based on Section V of the Plan; (2) The budgeted per diems approved by AHCA based on Section III of the Plan; or (3) The previous provider's operating and patient care cost per diem (excluding incentives), plus 50 percent of the difference between the previous provider's per diem and the class ceiling. Based upon the language of Plan Sentence 1, MPA approved an interim operating and patient care per diem of $194.55 for Madison Pointe. Plan Sentence 2 is applicable to Madison Pointe, because it applies to all new providers with a Medicaid certification effective after July 1, 1991. Madison Pointe's certification was effective September 1, 2007. Plan Sentence 3 is the primary point of contention between the parties. AHCA correctly contends that Plan Sentence 3 is not applicable to Petitioner, because it addresses rebasing that occurred on July 1, 2007, i.e., prior to Madison Pointe coming into the Medicaid system. The language of Plan Sentence 3 is clear and unambiguous that it applies to "providers already in the Medicaid program." Plan Sentence 4 is applicable to Madison Pointe, which entered the system during a rate semester, in which no other provider had a new provider limitation because of the rebasing. Again, the language is unambiguous that "[t]his new provider reimbursement limitation shall apply to new providers entering the Medicaid program. . . ." Madison Pointe is a new provider entering the program. Detrimental Reliance and Estoppel Madison Pointe submitted its CHOP application to the Long-Term Care Unit of AHCA for approval. That office has the clear responsibility for reviewing and approving (or denying) CHOP applications for nursing homes. The Long-Term Care Unit requires, as part of the CHOP application, submission of the PFA which sets forth certain financial information used to determine whether the applicant has the financial resources to operate the nursing home for which it is applying. The Long-Term Care Unit has another office within AHCA, the Financial Analysis Unit, to review the PFA. The Financial Analysis Unit is found within the Bureau of Health Facility Regulation. That Bureau is responsible for certificates of need and other issues, but has no authority concerning the issuance, or not, of a nursing home license. Nor does the Financial Analysis Unit have any authority to set an interim Medicaid rate. Rather, the Financial Analysis Unit employs certain individuals who have the skills and training necessary to review financial documents and determine an applicant's financial ability to operate. A nursing home licensee must obtain Medicaid certification if it wishes to participate in the program. Madison Pointe applied for Medicaid certification, filing its application with a Medicaid intermediary which works for CMS. The issuance of a Medicaid certification is separate and distinct from the issuance of a license to operate. When Madison Pointe submitted its PFA for review, it was aware that an office other than the Long-Term Care Unit would be reviewing the PFA. Madison Pointe believed the two offices within AHCA would communicate with one another, however. But even if the offices communicated with one another, there is no evidence that the Financial Analysis Unit has authority to approve or disapprove a CHOP application. That unit's sole purpose is to review the PFA and make a finding regarding financial ability to operate. Likewise, MPA--which determines the interim Medicaid rate for a newly licensed operator--operates independently of the Long-Term Care Unit or the Financial Analysis Unit. While contained within the umbrella of AHCA, each office has separate and distinct duties and responsibilities. There is no competent evidence that an applicant for a nursing home license can rely upon its budgeted interim rate--as proposed by the applicant and approved as reasonable by MPA--as the ultimate interim rate set by the Medicaid Program Analysis Office. At no point in time did Fitch tell Madison Pointe that a rate of $203.50 ppd would be assigned. Rather, he said that the rate seemed high; Madison Pointe responded that it could "eliminate expenditures to align them with the available reimbursement." The interim rate proposed by the applicant is an estimate made upon its own determination of possible facts and anticipated operating experience. The interim rate assigned by MPA is calculated based on the applicant's projections as affected by provisions in the Plan. Furthermore, it is clear that Madison Pointe was on notice that its proposed interim rate seemed excessive. In response to that notice, Madison Pointe did not reduce the projected rate, but agreed that spending would be curtailed if a lower interim rate was assigned. There was, in short, no reliance by Madison Pointe on Fitch's approval of the PFA as a de facto approval of the proposed interim rate. MPA never made a representation to Madison Pointe as to the interim rate it would receive until after the license was approved. There was, therefore, no subsequent representation made to Madison Pointe that was contrary to a previous statement. The Financial Analysis Unit's approval of the PFA was done with a clear and unequivocal concern about the propriety of the rate as stated. The approval was finalized only after a representation by Madison Pointe that it would reduce expenditures if a lower rate was imposed. Thus, Madison Pointe did not change its position based on any representation made by AHCA.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by Respondent, Agency for Health Care Administration, approving the Medicaid interim per diem rates established by AHCA and dismissing each of the Amended Petitions for Formal Administrative Hearing. DONE AND ENTERED this 23rd day of February, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. R. BRUCE MCKIBBEN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of February, 2009.
The Issue Whether the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services improperly determined the Petitioners' rate of Medicaid reimbursement for the period January 1, 1990, through June 30, 1990?
Findings Of Fact The Emergency Rule and the Permanent Rule have been determined to be valid in a Final Order entered simultaneously with this Recommended Order. The Department's action in freezing the Medicaid reimbursement rate of the Petitioners in these cases was taken pursuant to the Emergency Rule and the Permanent Rule.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department enter a Final Order in these cases dismissing the Petitioners' amended petitions. DONE and ENTERED this 26 day of May, 1992, in Tallahassee, Florida. LARRY J. SARTIN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this day of May, 1992. APPENDIX Case Numbers 91-4893, 91-4894, 91-4895, 91-4914, 91-4929, 91-5837 and 91-6191 The parties have submitted proposed findings of fact. It has been noted below which proposed findings of fact have been generally accepted and the paragraph number(s) in the Recommended Order where they have been accepted, if any. Those proposed findings of fact which have been rejected and the reason for their rejection have also been noted. The Petitioners' Proposed Findings of Fact Proposed Finding Paragraph Number in Recommended Order of Fact Number of Acceptance or Reason for Rejection 1 1 and 4. 2 5-6. 3 13. 4 7. 5 3 and 13-14. 6 15. 7 17-19. 8 20. 9 21. 10 22. 11 23. 12 8. 13 12. 14 11. 15 24. 16 25-27. 17 28-29. 18 29. 19 30-32. 20 34-37. See 39. The last three sentences are not relevant. The determination of compliance with specific federal requirements for the Department's action was the responsibility of HCFA. HCFA presumably determined that the Department complied with all federal requirements since it approved the Department's plan amendment. 39. The last two sentences are not relevant. The determination of compliance with specific federal requirements for the Department's action was the responsibility of HCFA. HCFA presumably determined that the Department complied with all federal requirements since it approved the Department's plan amendment. 23 40-41. 24 43. 25 45. 26 46. 27 47. 28 48. The last two sentences are argument. 29 49. 30 42. 31 29 and 32. The weight of the evidence failed to prove the Department's motive for providing assurances to HCFA were anything other than to meet federal requirements. 32 28. 33 55. 34 34-35. See 59-60 and 63. The detailed findings of fact concerning the nature of the Department's inflationary analysis are not necessary. HCFA rejected this analysis and based its decision on other information provided by the Department. Additionally, the determination of compliance with specific federal requirements for the Department's action was the responsibility of HCFA. HCFA presumably determined that the Department complied with all federal requirements since it approved the Department's plan amendment. 35 See 60-63. 36 52-54. 37 54. 38 55 and hereby accepted. 39 59 and hereby accepted. 40 See 60-65. HCFA did not "reject" the Department's proposed plan amendment. 41 See 63. 42-43 See 60-66. 44-46, 50-54 Although the proposed findings of fact concerning what the Department told HCFA are generally correct, these proposed findings of fact are not relevant to this proceeding. As previously stated, the determination of compliance with specific federal requirements for the Department's action was the responsibility of HCFA. HCFA presumably determined that the Department complied with all federal requirements since it approved the Department's plan amendment. 47 Hereby accepted. 48-49 Hereby accepted except for the proposed findings that the Department "misled", "misrepresented" or provided "inaccurate and misleading information." The last sentence of proposed finding of fact 49 is not relevant. 55 67. 56 Hereby accepted. 57 Not relevant. 58 69. 59 70. 60 71. 61 50 and 73. The Department's Proposed Findings of Fact Proposed Finding Paragraph Number in Recommended Order of Fact Number of Acceptance or Reason for Rejection 1 1. 2 4. 3 5. 4 6. 5 3 and 13-14. 6 15. 7 17-19. 8 20. 9 21. 10 22. 11 23. 12 8. 13 11. 14 24. 15 25-26. 16 Hereby accepted. 17 27 and 29-32. 18 34-37. 19 39-41. 20 41. 21 43. 22 33. 23 42. 24 52-53 and 58. 25 54. 26 55. 27 56. 28 57. 29 60-65. 30 67. 31 68. 32 69. 33 70. 34 71. 35 50 and 73. 36 72. 37 73. 38 Hereby accepted. COPIES FURNISHED: Sam Power Agency Clerk Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Building One, Room 407 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 John Slye General Counsel Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Building One, Room 407 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Thomas C. Fox, Esquire Michael D. Smith, Esquire 1200 18th Street, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20036 Alfred W. Clark, Esquire Post Office Box 623 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 W. David Watkins, Esquire Post Office Box 6507 Tallahassee, Florida 32314-6507 David Pius Medicaid Counsel Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1317 Winewood Boulevard Building 6, Room 230 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700
Findings Of Fact The rule at issue has been variously codified, but will be referred to for purposes of the present case as Rule 10C-7.39(6), Florida Administrative Code. The pertinent language, which was first adopted as part of Rule 10C- 7.03(5), Florida Administrative Code, on March 30, 1976, and which was repealed on July 28, 1981, provides: Reimbursement for services provided is in accord with the standards and principles of reasonable cost as defined and applied under the Social Security Act, Title XVIII, Medicare Program. In lieu of retroactive adjustment, 6 percent shall be added to a participating hospital's costs to determine a current reimbursement rate. Respondent adopted this rule on the claimed authority of Section 409.266, Florida Statutes. In its 1969 legislative session, the Florida Legislature enacted Section 409.266, Florida Statutes, entitled "Medical Assistance for the Needy," providing the original State legislative basis and authority for Florida's entry into the Medicaid program. Section 409.266(2), Florida Statutes, as enacted, authorized the Florida Department of Social Services or any other department that the Governor might designate to: Enter into such agreement with other state agencies or any agency of the federal government and accept such duties with respect to social welfare or public aid as may be necessary to implement the provisions of subsection (1) and to qualify for federal aid including compliance with provisions of Public Law 86-778 and the "Social Security Amendments of 1965" [estab- lishing Title XIX of the Social Security Act.] Section 409.266(3), Florida Statutes, as enacted, stated that: The department of social services is authorized and directed to prepare and operate a program and budget in order to implement and comply with the provisions of public law 86-778 and the "Social Secu- rity Amendments of 1965." Chapter 69-265, Laws of Florida (1969). No provisions of Florida law other than Section 409.266, Florida Statutes, as enacted, authorized any agency to perform any function specifically to implement the Medicaid program. The State of Florida formally commenced participation in the Medicaid program effective January 1, 1970. At all times pertinent to this controversy, respondent, Florida Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services or its predecessor agencies (referred to as "HRS") , has been and continues to be the "State Agency" identified in 42 U.S.C. Section 1396a (a) (5), and charged under Section 409.266, Florida Statutes, as amended, with the formulation of a State Plan for Medical Assistance ("State Plan"), 42 U.S.C. Section 1396a, and with the ongoing responsibility for the administration of the Medicaid program in the State of Florida. Since Florida's entry into the Medicaid program in 1970, HRS has been authorized essentially to "[e]nter into such agreements with appropriate agents, other State agencies, or any agency of the Federal Government and accept such duties in respect to social welfare or public aid as may be necessary or needed to implement the provisions of Title XIX of the Social Security Act pertaining to medical assistance." Section 409.266(2)(a), Fla. Stat., as amended. HRS has never been authorized to enter into any agreements, accept any duties, or perform any functions with respect to the Medicaid program that are in contravention of or not authorized by Title XIX of the Social Security Act and implementing Federal regulations and requirements. As a prerequisite for Florida's entry into the Medicaid program, HRS prepared and filed with the United States Department of Health, Education, and Welfare ("HEW") a State Plan, pursuant to Title XIX of the Social Security Act, and pursuant to its delegated legislative authority set forth in Section 409.266(2)(a), Florida Statutes. (In May, 1980, HEW was redesignated the United States Department of Health and Human Services, but for purposes of this action both shall be referred to as HEW.) C.W. Hollingsworth was the HRS official who had the responsibility for supervising the preparation, the filing, and for obtaining the approval of HEW of Florida's initial State Plan Florida's initial State Plan was approved by HEW effective January 1, 1970. At the time that Florida received approval of its initial State Plan, Title XIX of the Social Security Act required state plans to provide for the payment of the reasonable cost of inpatient hospital services. At the time that Florida received approval of its initial State Plan, HEW regulations governing reimbursement for inpatient hospital services under Medicaid required the State Plan to provide for reimbursement of Medicaid inpatient hospital services furnished by those hospitals also participating in the Medicare program, applying the same standards, cost reimbursement principles, and methods of cost apportionment used in computing reimbursement to such hospitals under Medicare. 45 C.F.R. Section 250.30(a) and (b), 34 Fed. Reg. 1244 (January 25, 1969). At the time that Florida entered the Medicaid program, Medicare cost reimbursement principles in effect governing reimbursement for the cost of inpatient hospital services required payment of a participating hospital's actual and reasonable costs of providing such services to Medicare beneficiaries, and, moreover, that such payment be made on the basis of the hospital's current costs rather than upon the costs of a prior period or upon a fixed negotiated rate. 42 U.S.C. Section 1395x (v) (1)(A) 20 C.F.R. Section 405.451(c) (2), 405.402(a) [later renumbered 42 C.F.R. Section 405.451(c)(2) and Section 405.402(a)]. Such Medicare principles and standards also provided for interim payments to be made to the hospital during its fiscal year. At the conclusion of the subject fiscal year, the hospital was required to file a cost report wherein the hospital included all of its costs of providing covered inpatient services to Medicare beneficiaries. A settlement or "retroactive adjustment" process then was required to reconcile the amount of interim payments received by the hospital during the fiscal period with its allowable costs incurred during that period. If the hospital had been overpaid during the year, it was required to refund the amount of that overpayment to the Medicare program. Conversely, if the hospital had been underpaid during the year, the Medicare program was required to make an additional payment to the hospital, retroactively, in the amount of the underpayment. 20 C.F.R. Section 405.402(b)(2), 405.451(b)(2). Essentially the same Medicare principles and standards governing reimbursement of inpatient hospital services described in the two preceding paragraphs have been in effect at all times pertinent to this controversy. 42 C.F.R. Section 405.401, et seq. Florida's approved State Plan as of January 1, 1970, governing reimbursement of inpatient hospital services under the Medicaid program, committed HRS to reimburse hospitals that also participated in the Medicare program for their reasonable costs of providing inpatient hospital services to Medicaid patients, applying Medicare cost reimbursement principles and standards. The only versions of Florida's State Plan provisions that have been approved by HEW and that have governed HRS's reimbursement of inpatient hospital services prior to July 1, 1981, each commit HRS to reimburse hospitals that also participated in the Medicare program for their reasonable costs of providing inpatient hospital services to Medicaid patients, applying Medicare cost reimbursement principles and standards. Attached as an appendix to the final order is the form agreement drafted under the supervision of C.W. Hollingsworth, which has been in use from January 1, 1970, until July 1, 1981. From the inception of the Florida Medicaid program, and as a prerequisite for participation therein, a hospital has been required to execute a copy of the form agreement. A hospital may not participate in the Medicaid program without having executed such an agreement, nor may it propose any amendments thereto. The intent and effect of the form agreement is to require HRS to reimburse hospitals that also participated in the Medicare program for their reasonable costs of providing inpatient hospital services to Medicaid patients, applying Medicare cost reimbursement principles and standards. The form agreement requires HRS to compute a percentage " allowance in lieu of the retroactive adjustments ("percentage allowances") in determining the rates that hospitals will be paid for providing inpatient hospital services to Medicaid patients. The form agreement requires HRS to compute a new percentage allowance each year based on hospital cost trends. The meanings of the terms "allowance in lieu of retroactive adjustments" in all pertinent state plans and "percentage allowance for the year in lieu of retroactive payment adjustment" contained in the form agreement are identical. In drafting the form agreement, HRS intended that the "percentage allowance for the year in lieu of retroactive payment adjustment" be set at a level sufficient to ensure that hospitals participating in the Medicaid program would be reimbursed their "reasonable costs" of providing inpatient hospital services to Medicaid patients, applying Medicare cost reimbursement principles and standards. At all times pertinent to this controversy, participating hospitals, like petitioner, have been reimbursed by HRS for inpatient hospital services provided to Medicaid patients in the following manner: Within ninety (90) days following the close of its fiscal year, the partici- pating hospital files a Form 2551 or 2552 Annual Statement of Reimbursable Costs, as applicable, with both Blue Cross of Florida, Inc., the major fiscal intermediary respon- sible for the administration of Part A of the federal Medicare program in the State of Florida, and with HRS. This document, also referred to as a "cost report" details various hospital and financial statistical data relating to the patient care activities engaged in by the hospital during the sub- ject fiscal period. Upon receipt of the participating hospital's cost report for a fiscal period, HRS makes an initial determination based upon Medicare cost reimbursement principles and standards of the hospital's total allow- able inpatient costs, charges, and total patient days during the subject fiscal period, and then determines an inpatient per diem reimbursement rate for the period. To the inpatient per diem reimburse- ment rate is then added a percentage allow- ance in lieu of making any further retroactive corrective adjustments in reimbursement which. might have been due the hospital applicable to the reporting period. The adjusted in- patient per diem reimbursement rate is applied prospectively, and remains in effect until further adjustments in the rate are required. If HRS determines that total inpa- tient Medicaid reimbursement to a partici- pating hospital during a fiscal period exceeds the hospital's allowable and rea- sonable costs of rendering such covered inpatient services applying Medicare cost reimbursement principles and standards, then the hospital is required to remit to HRS the amount of such overpayment. If, however, HRS determines that the total inpatient Medicaid reimbursement received by a participating hospital is less than the hospital's actual and reason- able costs of rendering such covered inpa- tient services to Medicaid patients during the period applying Medicare cost reimburse- ment principles and standards, no further retroactive corrective adjustments are made; provided, however, that should an overpayment occur in a fiscal period, it may be offset and applied retroactively against an under- payment to the participating hospital which occurred during the next preceding fiscal period only. HRS has used the following "percentage allowances" in determining Medicaid reimbursement rates for inpatient hospital services: January 1, 1970-June 30, 1972 ...12 percent July 1, 1972-approximately March 30, 1976 ... 9 percent Approximately March 31, 1976-June 30, 1981... 6 percent Since at least January 1, 1976, HRS has not recomputed the "percentage allowance" on an annual basis. Since at least January 1, 1976, HRS has not based the "percentage allowance" that it has applied in determining Medicaid inpatient hospital reimbursement rates upon hospital cost trends. HRS has used no technical methodology based upon hospital cost trends to develop any of the "percentage allowances." At least since January 1, 1974, HRS's "percentage allowances" have been less than the corresponding average annual increases in the costs incurred by Florida hospitals of providing inpatient hospital services. Prior to March 30, 1976, all of HRS's published regulations addressing reimbursement of participating hospitals for their costs of providing inpatient hospital services to Medicaid patients required HRS to reimburse such hospitals in accordance with Medicare cost reimbursement principles and standards. In certain internal documents, Petitioner's Exhibits P-44 and P-12, HRS states that the average costs of providing inpatient hospital services in the State of Florida rose at least 18 percent during calendar year 1975. In November, 1975, the Secretary of HRS was informed by HRS officials that HRS faced a projected budgetary deficit for its fiscal year ended June 30, 1976. A decision memorandum presented options to the HRS Secretary for reducing the projected deficit. Among such options presented to and approved by the HRS Secretary was to reduce the "percentage allowance" from 9 percent to 6 percent. The reduction of the "percentage allowance" by HRS from 9 percent to 6 percent was effected in response to HRS's projected deficit, and was not based upon an analysis of hospital cost trends. HRS incorporated the 6 percent "percentage allowance" into its administrative rules which were published on March 30, 1976. In response to objections raised by the Florida Hospital Association to the reduction in the percentage allowance by HRS from 9 percent to 6 percent, HRS officials reexamined that reduction. During HRS's reexamination of its previous "percentage allowance" reduction, HRS was aware of and acknowledged the fact that Florida hospital costs were increasing at an average annual rate in excess of both the earlier 9 percent and the resulting 6 percent "percentage allowance." In a memorandum dated September 13, 1976, from HRS official Charles Hall to the Secretary of HRS, Petitioner's Exhibit P-45, Charles Hall informed the Secretary that the methods and standards then used by HRS to reimburse participating hospitals for their costs of providing inpatient hospital services to Medicaid patients was out of compliance with federal requirements. Charles Hall further informed the Secretary that the reason HRS had not theretofore been cited by HEW for noncompliance was the manner in which the Florida State Plan had been drafted, i.e., that the State Plan required HRS to reimburse hospitals under Medicaid for the reasonable costs that they would have been reimbursed applying Medicare cost reimbursement principles and standards. In a letter dated September 20, 1976, Petitioner's Exhibit P-31, HEW informed HRS that HEW had received a complaint from the Florida Hospital Association that the methods HRS was actually using to reimburse hospitals for the costs of providing inpatient hospital services to Medicaid patients were in violation of federal regulation 45 C.F.R. Section 250.30(a). A proposed amendment to Florida's State Plan submitted by HRS to HEW in November, 1976, Petitioner's Exhibit P-49, if approved, would have allowed HRS to reimburse hospitals for the cost of providing inpatient hospital services to Medicaid patients under methods differing from Medicare cost reimbursement principles and standards (an "alternative plan"). "Alternative plans" have been permitted under applicable federal regulations since October 21, 1974. A state participating in the Medicaid program may elect to establish an "alternative plan," but may not implement such "alternative plan" without the prior written approval of HEW. Florida has not had in effect an "alternative plan" of reimbursing participating hospitals for their costs of providing inpatient hospital services to Medicaid patients that was formally approved by HEW at any time prior to July 1, 1981. By letter dated January 7, 1977, Petitioner's Exhibit P-32, HEW notified HRS that it had formally cited HRS for noncompliance with federal regulations governing reimbursement of inpatient hospital services under Medicaid. HRS acknowledged their noncompliance and between November, 1976, and October 30, 1977, HRS attempted to revise its proposed "alternative plan" on at least two occasions in an attempt to obtain HEW approval. In October, 1977, HRS withdrew its proposed "alternative plan" then pending with HEW. HRS then contracted with an outside consultant, Alexander Grant & Company, to assist in the formulation of a new "alternative plan" proposal. In January, 1978, Alexander Grant & Company delivered its draft of an "alternative plan" to HRS. In October, 1978, HRS submitted a draft "alternative plan" to HEW for review and comment, and HEW expected HRS to submit a formal "alternative plan" proposal to HEW for its approval by November 1, 1978. HRS did not submit the formal "alternative plan" proposal to HEW until August 12, 1980. In a letter dated February 21, 1979, from Richard Morris, HEW Regional Medicaid Director, Region IV, to United States Senator Richard Stone of Florida, Mr. Morris advised Senator Stone: For more than two years the Florida Medicaid Program has not met Federal Requirements for inpatient hospital services reimbursement. Their payment methodology under-reimburses certain hospitals year after year. The pros- pective interim per diem rate paid by Florida to hospitals includes a percentage allowance to cover increased costs during the forthcom- ing year that is consistently less than increased costs in some hospitals. If the payments are less than costs, the difference is not reimbursed. This results in underpay- ments. We have worked closely with Florida to develop an acceptable alternative system that would meet Federal requirements. To date, Florida has not implemented such a system despite having received informal HEW agreement on a draft plan developed more than a year ago. It is our understanding that this alternative plan is not a high priority item at this time. We will con- tinue to work with HRS staff to secure Florida compliance regarding this require- ment. Petitioner's Exhibit P-46. Since August 12, 1980, HRS has submitted to HEW for its approval at least four more versions of an "alternative plan." Petitioner's Exhibits P-120, P-121, P-123, and P-152. Each of these versions were approved by the Secretary of HRS, and HRS believes each to comply with applicable Florida law. Mr. Erwin Bodo, Ph.D., was and is the HRS official responsible for the development and drafting of Exhibits P-120, P-121, P-123, and P-152. In June, 1981, HEW approved an "alternative plan" for the State of Florida (Exhibit P-152) , and such "alternative plan" was implemented effective July 1, 1981. Until July 1, 1981, HRS continued to use the 6 percent percentage allowance" to compute inpatient hospital reimbursement under Medicaid. Even after its repeal, Rule 10C-7.39(6), Florida Administrative Code, is applied by respondent in calculating reimbursement for Medicaid services provided between March 30, 1976, and July 1, 1981. From November 20, 1976, until July 1, 1981 the period in which HRS was attempting to secure HEW approval for an alternative plan--HRS was aware that the costs of inpatient hospital services were increasing at an average annual rate in excess of the 6 percent "percentage allowance." From September 1, 1976, through July 1, 1981, HRS has been out of compliance with its approved State Plan provisions, and HEW regulations governing reimbursement for inpatient hospital services under Medicaid because HRS's methods for reimbursing hospitals for the cost of providing those services to Medicaid patients have resulted in a substantial number of hospitals including petitioner--being reimbursed at a lower rate than the hospitals would have been reimbursed applying Medicare cost reimbursement principles and standards. Since the quarter ending December 31, 1976, until July 1, 1981, HEW has formally cited HRS as being in contravention of its approved State Plan provisions, and HEW (now HHS) regulations, governing reimbursement for inpatient hospital services under Medicaid because HRS's methods for reimbursing hospitals for the cost of providing those services to Medicaid patients have resulted in a substantial number of hospitals--including petitioner--being reimbursed at a lower rate than the hospitals would have been reimbursed applying Medicare cost reimbursement principles and standards. PAN AMERICAN HOSPITAL CORPORATION Petitioner, Pan American Hospital Corporation, is a not-for-profit corporation, duly organized and existing under the laws of the State of Florida. Petitioner is a tax-exempt organization as determined by the Internal Revenue Service pursuant to Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, as amended. At all times pertinent to this controversy, petitioner has operated and continues to operate a duly licensed 146-bed, short-term acute care general hospital, located at 5959 Northwest Seventh Street, Miami, Florida 33126. At all times pertinent to this controversy, petitioner has been and continues to be a duly certified provider of inpatient hospital services, eligible to participate in the Florida Medicaid program since January 27, 1974. The Appendix to this Final Order is a true and correct copy of the "Participation Agreement" entered into between petitioner and HRS, whereunder, inter alia, petitioner became eligible to receive payment from HRS for covered inpatient hospital services provided to Medicaid patients. At all times pertinent to this controversy, petitioner has been a certified "provider of services" participating in the Medicare program. During the fiscal periods in dispute in this action, petitioner did provide covered inpatient hospital services to Medicaid patients, and became eligible for payment by HRS of its reasonable costs of providing such services, determined in accor- dance with Medicare cost reimbursement principles and standards. With respect to each of the fiscal periods in dispute in this action, petitioner timely filed all cost reports and other financial data with HRS or its contracting agents, including Blue Cross of Florida, Inc., to enable HRS to determine petitioner's reasonable costs of providing covered inpatient hospital services to Medicaid patients. During each of the fiscal periods in dispute in this action, HRS failed to reimburse petitioner for its reasonable costs of providing covered inpatient hospital services to Medicaid patients, determined in accordance with applicable Medicare cost reimbursement principles and standards. Such costs incurred by petitioner were reasonable, necessary, related to patient care, and less than customary charges within the meaning of those Medicare principles and standards. With respect to each of the fiscal periods in dispute, HRS and/or its contracting agent, Blue Cross of Florida, Inc. , reviewed and audited the cost reports filed by petitioner, and as a result of such review and audits set or adjusted, as applicable, the Medicaid inpatient per diem reimbursement rate at which petitioner would be paid during the next succeeding fiscal period or until that rate was again adjusted. MOTION TO DISMISS RULE CHALLENGE DENIED Respondent sought dismissal of petitioner's challenge to Rule 10C- 7.39(6), Florida Administrative Code, on grounds that the challenged rule provision has now been repealed (effective July 28, 1981). By this motion, respondent raises the question whether petitioner remains "substantially affected" notwithstanding the repeal. The parties are in agreement that respondent still applies Rule 10C-7.39(6) , Florida Administrative Code, in calculating reimbursement for providers like petitioner who furnished Medicaid services during the time between adoption of the rule and its repeal. The present case resembles State Department of Transportation v. Pan American Construction Company, 338 So.2d 1291 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976), app. dism. 345 So.2d 427 (Fla. 1977). The rule challenged in that case had been promulgated pursuant to a statute that was later amended by legislation which took effect after the Section 120.56 hearing, but before entry of a final order invalidating the rule. In response to the statutory amendment, moreover, the agency whose rule was under challenge adopted an emergency rule superseding the challenged rule. On appeal, the agency argued that the rule challenge was moot. The court ruled: While normally the law as it exists at the time of review will be applied to a pending case, in this proceeding, begun under the old law and rules adopted pursuant to it, we consider that respondents are entitled to construction of such law and rules. Their rights under contracts with peti- tioner which were in existence during the life of the former statute and rules may be affected by the construction of that statute and the rules adopted pursuant to it. State Department of Transportation v. Pan American Construction Co., 338 So.2d 1291, 1294 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976) In the present case there has been no statutory amendment, but here as in State Department of Transportation v. Pan American Construction Co., the proceedings pursuant to Section 120.56, Florida Statutes, began before the repeal of the challenged rule; and the parties' "rights under contracts . . . which were in existence during the life of the former . . . [rule] may be affected by the construction of that . . . [rule]." 338 So.2d at 1294. Simultaneously with the present proceedings, petitioner and respondent are litigating the question of what moneys, if any, respondent owes petitioner as reimbursement for Medicaid services furnished during periods which include the entire time that Rule 10C- 7.39(6) was in effect. No. 80-112. Even though Rule 10C-7.39(6), Florida Administrative Code, stands repealed, petitioner remains "substantially affected by" the rule, within the meaning of Section 120.56(1), Florida Statutes (1979). MOTION TO DISMISS DENIED Respondent contends that these proceedings are defective "for failure to join an indispensable party," viz., the federal government, because it "is Respondent's intention, should any liability result from this action, to make a claim for federal financial participation as to approximately fifty-nine percent of such liability [See generally] 42 U.S.C. Section 1320b-2(a)(2)." Motion to Dismiss, p. 2. This motion is also addressed to the petition in the companion substantial interest case, No. 80-112, and discussed in the recommended order in that case. For present purposes, it suffices to state the self-evident: No agency can avoid an administrative challenge to a rule it alone has promulgated on grounds that some other party's interest may be adversely affected by invalidation of the rule. CONSTITUTIONAL GROUNDS Among other things, petitioner contends that Rule 10C-7.39 (6), Florida Administrative Code, should be invalidated as violative of state and federal constitutional prohibitions against impairment of contractual obligations. Article I, Section 10 of the Constitution of the State of Florida proscribes "law[s] impairing the obligation of contracts," and the federal constitution also forbids any "State . . . [to] pass any . . . law impairing the obligation of contracts." Article I, Section 10. See United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 975 (1977). Challenges to administrative rules brought pursuant to Section 120.56, Florida Statutes (1979), cannot, however, be predicated on constitutional grounds. State Department of Administration, Division of Personnel v. State Department of Administration, Division of Administrative Hearings, 326 So.2d 187 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976). See Department of Environmental Regulation v. Leon County, 344 So.2d 290, 295 n. 2 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977). INVALID EXERCISE OF DELEGATED LEGISLATIVE AUTHORITY The main thrust of petitioner's challenge to Rule 10C-7.39 (6), Florida Administrative Code, is its contention that respondent adopted the challenged rule not to implement Section 409.266, Florida Statutes, but in an attempt to avoid obligations imposed by Section 409.266, Florida Statutes, and the provisions of federal law incorporated by reference in that State statute. The challenged rule pertains to agreements made between respondent and providers of medical services in accordance with the provisions of Title XIX of the Social Security Act. The statute authorizes respondent to "[e]nter into . . . agreements as may be necessary or needed to implement the provisions of Title XIX of the Social Security Act pertaining to medical assistance." Section 409.266(2)(a) , Florida Statutes (1979). No party suggests that any other State statutory provision furnishes substantive authority for promulgation of Rule 10C-7.39(6), Florida Administrative Code, and the parties have stipulated that "HRS has never been authorized to . . . perform any functions with respect to the Medicaid program that are in contravention of or not authorized by Title XIX of the Social Security Act and implementing Federal regulations and requirements." Agency rules must conform to enabling statutes and may not repeal, amend, or modify any statute. State Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services v. McTigue, 387 So.2d 454 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980); Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services v. Florida Psychiatric Society, 382 So.2d 1280 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980); State Department of Transportation v. Pan American Construction Co., 338 So.2d 1291 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976) app. dism. 345 So.2d 427 (Fla. 1977) Incorporated by reference into Section 409.266, Florida Statutes, was the federal statutory requirement that hospitals providing Medicaid services be reimbursed by respondent for reasonable costs incurred in accordance with an approved State Plan. 42 U.S.C. Section 1396a (a)(13)(B) , Pub. L. 89-97, Section 121(a), redesiquated 42 U.S.C. Section 1396a (a) (13)(D), Pub. L. 90- 248, Section 224(a). At the time of its incorporation into State law, this federal statute had been definitively explicated by federal regulations requiring that reasonable cost for Medicaid purposes be calculated in accordance with applicable Medicare principles for purposes of reimbursing hospitals like petitioner that furnished both Medicaid and Medicare services. 2/ 42 C.F.R. Section 50.30(b), 34 Fed. Reg. 1244 et seq. (January 25, 1969). In addition, all Florida "State Plan provisions . . . approved by HEW and. . govern[ing] HRS's reimbursement of inpatient hospital services prior to July 1, 1981, . . . commit HRS to reimburse hospitals that also participated in the Medicare program for their reasonable costs of providing inpatient hospital services to Medicaid patients, applying Medicare cost reimbursement principles and standards." Pre-hearing Stipulation, 19. Even before adopting Rule 10C-7.39(6), Florida had begun setting Medicaid reimbursement rates by adjusting the previous year's rates upward to reflect inflation, as a matter of policy. As the parties have stipulated, in November of 1975, a budgetary deficit was projected for HRS; and, even though HRS was aware that inflation was substantially higher than 6 percent, HRS eventually decided to promulgate the rule now under challenge, setting the adjustment at 6 percent. HRS promulgated Rule 10C-7.39(6), Florida Administrative Code, not in furtherance of its statutory charge to reimburse Medicaid providers for costs reasonably incurred, but in order expediently to cut its own costs by disregarding the statutory scheme and reimbursing Medicaid providers less than the costs they had reasonably incurred. Cf. Patricia Godboldt v. David Pingree, Secretary, Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, State of Florida, No. 81-2862 (2d Cir.; Prelim. Inqy., Nov. 25, 1981). UNCODIFIED POLICY CHALLENGED AS RULE Petitioner challenges not only Rule 10C-7.39(6), Florida Administrative Code, but also, as "an illicit rule," HRS's prior practice of setting reimbursement rates by adjusting the previous year's rates. The percentage allowances under preexisting practice were higher (9 and 12 3/ percent) but the methodology was the same as that codified in Rule 10C-7.39(6), Florida Administrative Code. The parties stipulated to the existence of a practice that reflected a policy that changed over time, see McDonald v. Department of Banking and Finance, 346 So.2d 569 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977) , but did not stipulate that this practice reflected a hard and fast "rule." The parties stipulated that "HRS used [12 percent from January 1, 1970, to June 30, 1972, and 9 percent from July 1, 1972, to approximately March 30, 1976] . . . in determining Medicaid reimbursement rates for inpatient hospital services," but did not prove or stipulate to the existence of any formal document or other written statement "issued by the agency head for implementation by subordinates with little or no room for discretionary modification." State Department of Administration v. Stevens, 344 So.2d 290, 296 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977). In the absence of such a stipulation or proof, the agency's practice of requiring a 9 percent "percentage allowance, has not been shown to amount in itself to an illicit rule. Department of Corrections v. McCain Sales of Florida, Inc., 400 So.2d 1301 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981). ATTACHMENT 4.19A Petitioner's challenge to Attachment 4.19A of the Florida State Plan for Medical Assistance was conditioned by the words "to the extent that Attachment 4.19A . . . Is interpreted in a manner different than that set forth in Paragraph 15" of the petition. Since the parties stipulated, in substance, to the allegations of paragraph 15 of the petition, the condition for the challenge never occurred. In any event, it is very clear that Attachment 4.19A did not have the force of a rule, inasmuch as its key pronouncement, viz., that "retroactive adjustments are prohibited by skate statute" was completely disregarded by respondent. Rule 10C-7.39(6), Florida Administrative Code, the policies which preceded that rule, and every contract respondent entered into with providers of Medicaid services contemplated retroactive adjustments. It is, accordingly, ORDERED: The final sentence of respondent's Rule 10C-7.39(6), Florida Administrative Code, is hereby declared to be an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority. Petitioner's challenge to the percentage allowance policies that preexisted Rule 10C-7.39(6), Florida Administrative Code, is dismissed. Petitioner's challenge to Attachment 4.19A of the Florida State Plan for Medical Assistance is dismissed. DONE AND ENTERED this 4th day of December, 1981, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT T. BENTON, II Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of December, 1981.
The Issue Whether Ronald M. Marini, D.M.D., P.A. (Respondent), received Medicaid overpayments that the Agency for Health Care Administration is entitled to recover; and whether sanctions and costs should be imposed against Respondent.
Findings Of Fact The Medicaid program (Medicaid) is a federal and state partnership that funds health care services for qualified individuals. Petitioner is the state agency charged with administering Medicaid in Florida. Petitioner is legally authorized to monitor the activities of Medicaid providers and to recover “overpayments.” Overpayments include reimbursement for services that are not medically necessary, as verified by records existing at the time of service. Petitioner is also empowered to impose sanctions and recover costs against offending providers. During all times relevant hereto, Respondent was a Florida Medicaid provider authorized to provide dental care to Medicaid beneficiaries and to receive reimbursement for covered services. The dental practice of Ronald M. Marini, D.M.D., P.A., is owned by Ronald M. Marini, D.M.D. Dr. Marini has continuously practiced dentistry since graduating in 1967 from the University of Pittsburgh School of Dental Medicine. Dr. Marini’s practice focuses primarily on the treatment of children who have dental coverage through Medicaid. Dr. Marini is not board-certified in any specialty. Pursuant to what is commonly referred to as the “pay- and-chase” system, Petitioner pays Medicaid providers under an honor system for services rendered to Medicaid recipients. If Petitioner subsequently determines that the provider was paid for services rendered which were not in compliance with Medicaid requirements, then Petitioner seeks reimbursement from the provider. The Medicaid Provider Agreement is a voluntary contract between Petitioner and a Medicaid provider. Paragraph 3 of the Medicaid Provider Agreement states that “[t]he provider agrees to comply with local, state, and federal laws, as well as rules, regulations, and statements of policy applicable to the Medicaid program, including the Medicaid Provider Handbooks issued by AHCA.” During the audit period, Respondent was an enrolled Medicaid provider and had a valid Medicaid Provider Agreement with Petitioner. By correspondence to Respondent dated February 27, 2014, Petitioner requested records related to claims billed to Medicaid by Respondent for the audit period March 1, 2010, through August 31, 2012. Respondent provided documents in response to Petitioner’s request for records. Petitioner completed a review of the records that Respondent submitted, and on July 9, 2014, issued a Preliminary Audit Report (PAR). Petitioner advised in the PAR that it believed Respondent was overpaid in the amount of $590,008.15. In response to the PAR, Respondent submitted additional information to the Agency. After receipt and evaluation of Respondent’s additional information, Petitioner issued its FAR finding that Respondent was overpaid $590,008.15 during the audit period (later reduced to $513,246.91). The FAR also informed Respondent that Petitioner was imposing a fine of $118,001.63 as a sanction for violation of Florida Administrative Code Rule 59G-9.070(7)(e), and was seeking reimbursement of costs in the amount of $2,223.64. The FAR states six grounds on which Petitioner seeks to recoup monies paid to Respondent, and provides as follows: The 2007 and 2011 Dental Services Coverage and Limitations Handbooks, page 2-2, specify that Medicaid reimburses for services that are individualized, specific, consistent with symptoms or confirmed diagnosis of the illness or injury under treatment, not in excess of the recipient's needs, and reflect the level of services that can be safely furnished. A review of your records by a peer consultant revealed that the level of service for some claims submitted was not supported by the documentation. The appropriate code was applied and the payment adjusted. Payments made to you for these services, in excess of the adjusted amount, are considered an overpayment. The 2008 Florida Medicaid Provider General Handbook, pages 5-8 and 2-57, defines incomplete records as records that lack documentation that all requirements or conditions for service provision have been met. A review of your records revealed that documentation for some services for which you billed and received payment was incomplete or not provided. Payments made to you for these services are considered an overpayment. The 2008 Florida Medicaid Provider General Handbook, page 5-4, states that when presenting a claim for payment under the Medicaid program, a provider has an affirmative duty to present a claim for goods and services that are medically necessary. A review of your records revealed that the medical necessity for some claims submitted was not supported by the documentation. Payments made to you for these services are considered an overpayment. The 2008 Florida Medicaid Provider General Handbook, page 5-4, requires that when presenting a claim for payment under the Medicaid program, a provider has an affirmative duty to present a claim that is true and accurate and is for goods and services that have actually been furnished to the recipient. A review of your records revealed that some services were double billed. Payments made to you for these services are considered an overpayment. The 2008 Florida Medicaid Provider General Handbook, page 5-4, requires that when presenting a claim for payment under the Medicaid program, a provider has an affirmative duty to present a claim that is true and accurate and is for goods and services that have actually been furnished to the recipient. A review of your records revealed that some services rendered were erroneously coded. The appropriate code was applied and the payment adjusted, if applicable. Payments made to you for these services, in excess of the adjusted amount, are considered an overpayment. The 2007 and 2011 Dental Services Coverage and Limitations Handbooks, pages 2- 34 and 2-35 respectively, limit reimbursement for restorative services to essential services necessary to restore and maintain dental health; one restoration per tooth surface except for the occlusal surface of permanent maxillary 1st and 2nd molars; one resin restoration for a mesial or distal lesion; and one posterior one-surface resin restoration every three years per tooth number or letter per tooth surface. A review of your dental records revealed that you billed and received payment for a restoration in excess of the maximum. Payment made to you for this service is considered an overpayment. Mark Kuhl, D.M.D., was offered and accepted as Petitioner's expert in the areas of rendering dental care and dental medical necessity with respect to Medicaid overpayment cases. Dr. Kuhl was also offered and accepted as a peer reviewer pursuant to section 409.9131, Florida Statutes. Since 1985, Dr. Kuhl has been continuously licensed to practice dentistry in the State of Florida. Dr. Kuhl is not board-certified in any specialty and operates a general dentistry practice where he treats pediatric patients. W. Michael Ingalls, D.D.S., was offered and accepted as Respondent's “expert in dentistry with a focus on pediatric dentistry.” Dr. Ingalls was not, however, recognized as an expert as to matters pertaining to Medicaid coding for services rendered. Dr. Ingalls has practiced dentistry continuously since graduating from the University of Washington School of Dentistry in 1984. Dr. Ingalls has been board-certified by the American Board of Pediatric Dentistry since 1997. Dr. Ingalls has owned and operated his own pediatric dental practice in Lake Mary, Florida, since 1987. During the audit period, there were two versions of the Florida Medicaid Provider General Handbook in effect. As applied to the instant dispute, there are no material differences between the two General Handbooks so, unless otherwise indicated, they will collectively be referred to as the General Handbook. During the audit period, there were also two versions of The Florida Medicaid Provider Dental Services Coverage and Limitations Handbook in effect. As applied to the instant dispute, there are no material differences between the two Dental Handbooks so, unless otherwise indicated, they will collectively be referred to as the Dental Handbook. Missing or Incomplete Documentation The General Handbook provides, in part, as follows: When presenting a claim for payment under the Medicaid program, a provider has an affirmative duty to . . . present a claim . . . that is for goods and services that . . . [a]re documented by records made at the time the goods or services were provided demonstrating the medical necessity for the goods or services rendered. Medicaid goods or services are excessive or not medically necessary unless both the medical basis and the specific need for them are fully and properly documented in the recipient’s medical record. The General Handbook also provides that “[m]edical records must state the necessity for and the extent of services provided [and] the following requirements may vary according to the service rendered: Description of what was done during the visit; History; Physical assessment; Chief Complaint on each visit; Diagnostic tests and results; Diagnosis; Treatment plan, including prescription; Medications, supplies, scheduling frequency for follow-up or other services; Progress reports, treatment rendered; The author of each (medical record) entry must be identified and must authenticate his entry by signature, written initials or computer entry; Dates of service; and Referrals to other services. The General Handbook does not define what constitutes a medical record. The General Handbook further provides that a Medicaid provider has an affirmative duty to provide services “in accord with applicable provisions of all Medicaid rules, regulations, handbooks, and policies and in accordance with federal, state and local law.” For the applicable audit period, section 466.018(3), Florida Statutes (2011), required, in part, that “[e]very dentist shall maintain written dental records and medical history records which justify the course of treatment of the patient.” Additionally, section 466.028(1)(m) subjects a dentist to disciplinary action for “[f]ailing to keep written dental records and medical history records justifying the course of treatment of the patient.” Section 466.018(3) makes clear that dental records and medical history records must justify, or explain why, a particular course of treatment was undertaken by a dental care provider. Respondent utilizes software to capture the services provided to his patients. The software has a “patient notes master” section, which allows the user to post narrative information about a patient, including information related to patient evaluation and insurance claims status. The software also has a “patient chart” section which reflects information such as dates of service, a description of services provided (with Current Dental Terminology codes, hereinafter CDT code(s)), the tooth and surface involved, and the treatment status of the affected tooth. The patient chart section also has a colorized tooth chart that visually depicts information found in the description, tooth, and surface sections of the patient chart. The “patient notes master” section and all parts of the “patient chart,” collectively and substantively, comprise the patient medical record contemplated by the General and Dental Handbooks, respectively. There is nothing in Petitioner’s rules, regulations, General or Dental Handbooks, or section 466.018(3), that requires patient treatment information to be gleaned only from the patient notes section of a patient’s dental record. Recipient 1 (Not in Patient Notes) On January 14, 2011, patient K.A., who at the time was an existing patient, was treated by Respondent. According to the dental records, Respondent performed a “periodic oral evaluation [CDT code 0120],” took several x-rays, and removed “plaque, calculus and stains from the tooth structures in the primary and transitional dentition [CDT code 1120].” The results of the evaluation revealed that K.A. had “decay” in teeth “S” and “A.” K.A. was given a topical fluoride treatment (CDT code 1203) and oral hygiene instructions (CDT code 1330). Petitioner denied treatment related to CDT codes 1203 and 1330 on the basis that there is no documentation in the “patient notes” to warrant payment for these services. While it is true that the “patient notes” portion of Respondent’s dental record for K.A. offers no justification or otherwise documents the need for CDT codes 1203 and 1330, the “patient chart” portion of K.A.’s dental record clearly documents that these services were provided to K.A. Payment for these services should be allowed. On February 15, 2012, K.A. was treated by Respondent. According to the dental record, Respondent performed a “periodic oral evaluation [CDT code 0120],” took several X-rays, and removed “plaque, calculus and stains from the tooth structures in the primary and transitional dentition [CDT code 1120].” The results of the evaluation revealed that K.A. had “decay” in teeth 14, 19 and 30. K.A. was given a topical fluoride treatment (CDT code 1203) and oral hygiene instructions (CDT code 1330). Petitioner denied treatment related to CDT codes 0120, 1203 and 1330 on the basis that there is no documentation in the “patient notes” to warrant payment for these services. While it is true that the “patient notes” portion of Respondent’s dental record for K.A. offers no justification or otherwise documents the need for CDT codes 0120, 1203 and 1330, the “patient chart” portion of K.A.’s dental record clearly documents that these services were provided by Respondent to K.A. Payment for these services should be allowed. On March 9, 2012, K.A. was treated by Respondent. According to the patient chart, Respondent applied a resin-based composite to K.A.’s teeth 14, 19 and 30 (CDT codes 2391 and 2392). Petitioner denied payment for treatment related to these services on the basis that there is no documentation in the “patient notes” to warrant payment. While it is true that the “patient notes” portion of Respondent’s dental record for K.A. fails to mention that these services were provided, the “patient chart” portion of K.A.’s dental record clearly documents that these services were provided by Respondent to K.A. and payment for these services should be allowed. Recipient 2 (Not in Patient Notes) On April 5, 2011, E.B. was treated by Respondent. According to the dental record, Respondent performed a “comprehensive oral evaluation [CDT code 0145]” and removed “plaque, calculus and stains from the tooth structures in the primary and transitional dentition [CDT code 1120].” E.B. was given a topical fluoride treatment (CDT code 1203) and oral hygiene instructions (CDT code 1330). Petitioner denied payment for the fluoride treatment on the basis that there is no documentation in the “patient notes” for these services. While it is true that the “patient notes” portion of Respondent’s dental record for E.B. fails to mention the fluoride treatment, the “patient chart” portion of E.B.’s dental record clearly documents that these services were provided by Respondent to E.B. and payment for these services should be allowed. Recipient 11 (Not in Patient Notes) On April 26 and May 23, 2012, P.D. was treated by Respondent. According to the dental record, Respondent, during these visits, applied “resin-based composite – two surface, posterior [CDT code 2393],” to the distal and occlusal surfaces of teeth 4 and 5, and the mesial and occlusal surfaces of tooth 3. Petitioner denied payment for treatment related to these services on the basis that there is no documentation in the “patient notes” to warrant payment. While it is true that the “patient notes” portion of Respondent’s dental record for P.D. fails to mention that these services were provided, the “patient chart” portion of P.D.’s dental record clearly documents that these services were provided and payment for these services should be allowed. Recipient 20 (Not in Record) On February 7, 2012, M.J. was treated by Respondent. According to the dental record, Respondent performed an “extraction, erupted tooth or exposed root [CDT code 7140]” for teeth D and E. Petitioner denied payment for treatment related to these services on the basis that there is no documentation in the patient record to warrant payment. The “patient chart” portion of M.J.’s dental record clearly documents that these services were provided and payment for the same should be allowed. Recipient 23 (Not in Patient Notes) On July 5, 2012, M.M. was treated by Respondent. According to the dental record, Respondent applied a “resin-based composite – three surfaces, anterior [CDT code 2393]” to teeth E and F. The dental record also reflects that behavior management techniques (CDT code 9920) were applied during the procedure. Petitioner denied payment for treatment related to these services on the basis that there is no documentation in the “patient notes” to warrant payment. While it is true that the “patient notes” portion of Respondent’s dental record for M.M. fails to mention that these services were provided, the “patient chart” portion of M.M.’s dental record clearly documents that these services were provided and payment for these services should therefore be allowed. Recipient 24 (Not in Patient Notes) On October 19, 2010, A.M. was treated by Respondent. According to the dental record, Respondent applied a “resin-based composite – two surfaces, posterior [CDT code 2392],” to teeth A and J. The dental record also shows that a “pulp cap – indirect [CDT code 3120]” was applied to tooth A. Petitioner denied payment for treatment related to the application of the pulp cap on the basis that there is no documentation of the same in the patient “notes.” While it is true that the “patient notes” portion of Respondent’s dental record for A.M. fails to mention the application of a pulp cap, the “patient chart” portion of A.M.’s dental record clearly documents that this service was provided and payment for should therefore be allowed. Recipient 25 (Not in Patient Notes) On February 16, 2011, I.O. was treated by Respondent. According to the dental record, Respondent applied a “resin-based composite – two surfaces, posterior [CDT code 2392],” to the occlusal/lingual and distal/buccal surfaces of tooth A. Petitioner denied payment for these services on the basis that there is no documentation of the same in the “patient notes.” While it is true that the “patient notes” portion of Respondent’s dental record for I.O. fails to mention that these services were provided, the “patient chart” portion of I.O.’s dental record clearly documents that these services were provided and payment for the same should be allowed. Recipient 26 (Not in Patient Notes) On November 1, 2010, C.R. was treated by Respondent. According to the dental record, Respondent, during these visits, applied “resin-based composite – one surface, posterior [CDT code 2391],” to the occlusal surfaces of teeth L and S, and both the occlusal and buccal surfaces of teeth K and T. Petitioner denied payment for treatment related to the application of the resin- based composite to the occlusal surface for tooth S on the basis that there is no documentation of this service in the “patient notes.” While it is true that the “patient notes” portion of Respondent’s dental record for C.R. fails to mention that this service was provided, the “patient chart” portion of C.R.’s dental record clearly documents that this service was provided and payment for the same should be allowed. Services Billed at Lower Level The Dental Handbook provides in part that “[a] comprehensive oral evaluation is used by a dentist when evaluating a patient comprehensively. This applies to new patients and to established patients who have a significant change in health conditions or who have been absent from treatment for three or more years.” The Dental handbook also states that “[a] provider may only be reimbursed for a comprehensive oral evaluation once every three years for the same recipient.” Respondent contends that Petitioner erroneously adjusted payment for this service because the comprehensive evaluations were conducted more than three years apart. Recipient 20 – J.M. On February 2, 2012, Respondent treated J.M. For this service date, Respondent billed for a comprehensive oral evaluation (CDT code 0150). According to J.M.’s dental record, Respondent previously performed a comprehensive evaluation on January 5, 2009. J.M.’s dental record also indicates that between these dates, Respondent treated her on seven different occasions. While it is true that the time between comprehensive evaluations is more than three years, Petitioner properly adjusted payment for the February 2, 2012, service because J.M. was not absent from treatment during this interval. Recipient 22 – S.M. On July 18, 2011, Respondent treated S.M. For this service date, Respondent billed for a comprehensive oral evaluation (CDT code 0150). According to S.M.’s dental record, Respondent previously performed a comprehensive evaluation on January 14, 2011. Petitioner adjusted the July 18, 2011, service to a “periodic oral evaluation [CDT code 0120],” which reimburses at a lower rate. Respondent does not dispute that Petitioner properly adjusted the reimbursement rate for this service. Not Medically Necessary Applicable Medicaid regulations require that “medical necessity” be documented by specific records made at the time the services were provided, and that the records fully identify the medical basis and the need for the services. In other words, a provider must document the rationale for conducting a particular service at the time of making the decision to perform the same. Petitioner asserts that Respondent failed to submit sufficient documentation to establish that the disputed charges were for "medically necessary" services. FAR Finding No. 3 involves CDT codes 0240, 0250 and 0260. These codes reflect services for radiograph/diagnostic imaging procedures that “[s]hould be taken only for clinical reasons as determined by the patient’s dentist.” According to the Dental Handbook, these radiographs will not, however, be reimbursed for caries (decay) detection. The Dental Handbook also states that “[r]eimbursement for a complete series of intraoral radiographs is limited to once in a three (3) year period, per recipient.” Petitioner asserts that Respondent failed to establish that the use of CDT codes 0240, 0250, and 0260 was medically necessary for certain claims related to patients 1, 5, 8, 9, 10, 14, 20, 22, 26, 31, and 32. Respondent contends that services related to the disputed charges were necessary to monitor growth and development and screen for oral pathology because children’s dentition is rapidly changing during early adolescence. In other words, Respondent suggests that medical necessity exists for the radiographs essentially for no other reason than because the child is of a particular age. According to Dr. Kuhl, the ADA Guidelines, which are authoritative and instructive, provide that for radiographs to be medically necessary there should be sufficient documentation in the dental record to indicate the specific, individualized indication for why Respondent billed for the radiograph procedure and any results that were obtained pursuant to that procedure. Dr. Kuhl testified that Respondent’s dental records for each of the disputed claims provide no indication for or need as to why the X-rays were taken. According to Respondent’s expert, Dr. Ingalls, the standard of care for taking occlusal X-rays is that they are to be taken “when there was decay present or trauma had occurred” and that they are not taken simply as screening X-rays. The following testimony from Dr. Ingalls is instructive: Q: Okay. If you were to take an intraoral occlusal radiograph, would you document why you took it? A: I would have a description of what was found from taking it, which would say why you took it. You’d have a reason to take it to begin with and then you write a comment of what was found. Q: And do you write that in the narrative form? A: I have it in the narrative form. Sometimes, again, if I gave you an example, a child comes who’s fallen and hit their front teeth on the floor at home and displaced or broken a tooth or even the parent was concerned with bleeding from the gumline, I would take an occlusal radiograph to record what was there, partly to assure that there was nothing that required treatment and also to provide a baseline for future comparison where I would take future occlusal radiographs to monitor any changes over time. And I would have a record of that traumatic incident, every part of it; where it occurred, how it occurred, all of the examination findings around it on a trauma evaluation and the outcome of the findings in the x-ray and any treatment plan and instructions given to the parent. Q: Would you say that approach to medical records is standard? A: Within my specialty, that is the guideline that is taught to us that we follow so that we do not miss anything. Hearing Transcript pp. 411-413. The opinions of Dr. Kuhl and Dr. Inglass are consistent and provide that a medical basis and need for the X-rays at issue must be established and documented, and that the X-rays in question are not to be used as a screening device as suggested by Respondent. Recipient 1 Recipient 1, K.A., had four claims that were denied as to CDT codes 0240, 0250, and 0260. The dental records for this recipient provided no indication why the X-rays needed to be taken. Accordingly, Petitioner properly denied payment of these claims. Recipient 5 Recipient 5, S.C., had a single claim that was denied as to CDT code 0240. The dental records for this recipient provided no indication why the X-rays needed to be taken. Accordingly, Petitioner properly denied payment of this claim. Recipient 8 Recipient 8, D.C., had a single claim that was denied as to CDT code 0240. The dental records for this recipient provided no indication why the X-rays needed to be taken. Accordingly, Petitioner properly denied payment of this claim. Recipient 9 Recipient 9, D.D., had two claims that were denied as to CDT code 0240. The dental records for this recipient provided no indication why the X-rays needed to be taken. Accordingly, Petitioner properly denied payment of these claims. Recipient 10 Recipient 10, G.D., had two claims that were denied as to CDT code 0240. The dental records for this recipient provided no indication why the X-rays needed to be taken. Accordingly, Petitioner properly denied payment of these claims. Recipient 14 Recipient 14, E.E., had a single claim that was denied as to CDT code 0240. The dental records for this recipient provided no indication why the X-rays needed to be taken. Accordingly, Petitioner properly denied payment of this claim. Recipient 20 Recipient 20, M.J., had six claims that were denied as to CDT codes 0240, 0250, and 0260. The dental records for this recipient provided no indication why the X-rays needed to be taken. Accordingly, Petitioner properly denied payment of these claims. Recipient 22 Recipient 22, K.A., had two claims that were denied. Each claim was billed using CDT code 0250. The dental records for this recipient provided no indication why the X-rays needed to be taken. Accordingly, Petitioner properly denied payment of these claims. Recipient 26 Recipient 26, C.R., had a single claim that was denied as to CDT code 0240. The dental records for this recipient provided no indication why the X-rays needed to be taken. Accordingly, Petitioner properly denied payment of this claim. Recipient 31 Recipient 31, J.R., had two claims that were denied. Each claim was billed using CDT code 0240. The dental records for this recipient provided no indication why the X-rays needed to be taken. Accordingly, Petitioner properly denied payment of these claims. Recipient 32 Recipient 32, J.R., had a single claim that was denied as to CDT code 0240. The dental records for this recipient provided no indication why the X-rays needed to be taken. Accordingly, Petitioner properly denied payment of this claim. Erroneous Coding According to the Dental Handbook, “[s]ealants are applied to pits and fissures of permanent teeth to prevent caries [and] [t]he enamel surface of the tooth may be mechanically or chemically[,] or mechanically and chemically prepared.” The Dental Handbook also states that “[s]ealants applied to deciduous (primary) teeth will not be reimbursed by Medicaid.” CDT code D1351 (sealant – per tooth) describes this service as “[mechanically and/or chemically prepared enamel surface sealed to prevent decay.” As for resin restorations, the Dental Handbook provides that “Medicaid may reimburse for . . . [r]esin restorations . . . [and that] [t]he fee for resin restorations includes local anesthesia, tooth preparation, routine lining and base, polishing, and the use of any adhesive, such as amalgam bonding agents.” As a restriction on the use of resin restorations, the Handbook provides that “[r]esin restorations may be used to restore carious lesions that extend into the dentin or areas that are deeply eroded into dentin.” CDT codes 2391/2392 provide that the resin composite is “[u]sed to restore a carious lesion into the dentin or a deeply eroded area into the dentin.” In comparing sealant and resin restoration services, it is evident that sealants are for the enamel surface of the tooth whereas restorations, when undertaken to eliminate carious lesions, are appropriate only when the lesions extend into the dentin. In understanding the sealant and restoration provisions of the Dental Handbook, it is also evident that in order to be reimbursed for either CDT code 2391 or 2392 there must be sufficient justification of carious intrusion into the dentin and in the absence of such justification it may be appropriate to adjust the service to CDT code 1351, unless, of course, the service relates to a deciduous tooth. FAR finding No. 5 involves CDT codes 2391, 2392 and 1351 and applies to recipients 8, 13, 19, 22, 23, 24, 26, 28, 29, and 32. Petitioner, based on Dr. Kuhl’s analysis, adjusted reimbursement for CDT codes D2391 and D2392 downward to CDT code D1351 when the following criteria were present: X-rays did not show any decay, Respondent’s dental record for the recipient did not specifically indicate that any decay was removed, Respondent’s dental record for the recipient stated that only a “flowable” resin was used, and Respondent’s dental record for the recipient did not indicate that anesthesia was used. Dr. Kuhl evaluated the criteria and, when all four were met, he concluded that it was very likely that any decay present did not extend into the dentin as required for CDT code descriptions and applicable Florida Medicaid Handbooks. Dr. Kuhl’s protocol for identifying claims that do not meet the requirements for codes 2391 and 2392 is consistent with the requirements of Florida Medicaid Handbooks and is credited. There are, however, instances where Dr. Kuhl made downward adjustments for claims when, according to the requirements of the Dental Handbook, the claims should not have been paid. Recipient 8 For recipient 8, Dr. Kuhl determined that Respondent’s dental record for this patient does not support the use of either CDT code 2391 or 2392 for claims 6 through 11. This opinion is credited. Dr. Kuhl erred, however, in adjusting these claims to CDT code 1351 because the teeth involved in these claims (A, J, K, L, S, and T) are deciduous teeth that are not eligible for reimbursement when sealants are applied. In accordance with the Dental Handbook, these claims should be denied. Recipient 13 For recipient 13, Dr. Kuhl determined that Respondent’s dental record for this patient does not support the use of either CDT code 2391 or 2392 for claims 8 through 13, 18, 20, 21, and 24 through 26. This opinion is credited. Dr. Kuhl erred, however, in adjusting claims 8, 9, 12, 13, and 24 through 26 to CDT code 1351 because the teeth involved in these claims (A, I, J, K, S, and T) are deciduous teeth that are not eligible for reimbursement when sealants are applied. In accordance with the Dental Handbook, these claims should be denied. As for claims 10, 11, 18, 20, and 21, Dr. Kuhl correctly adjusted these claims downward to CDT code 1351 because the permanent teeth involved in these claims are eligible for reimbursement when sealants are applied under appropriate circumstances. Recipient 19 For recipient 19, Dr. Kuhl determined that Respondent’s dental record for this patient does not support the use of either CDT code 2391 or 2392 for claims 1 through 5. This opinion is credited. Dr. Kuhl erred, however, in adjusting these claims to CDT code 1351 because the teeth involved in these claims (A, B, J, K, and T) are deciduous teeth that are not eligible for reimbursement when sealants are applied. In accordance with the Dental Handbook, these claims should be denied. Recipient 22 For recipient 22, Dr. Kuhl determined that Respondent’s dental record for this patient does not support the use of either CDT code D2391 or D2392 for claims 10, 11, 13, 15, and 16. This opinion is credited. As for claims 10, 11, 13, and 16, Dr. Kuhl correctly adjusted these claims downward to CDT code 1351 because the permanent teeth involved in these claims are eligible for reimbursement when sealants are applied under appropriate circumstances. Claim 15 involved tooth 20, which is not identified in the Dental Handbook as a tooth that is eligible for reimbursement when a sealant is applied. Accordingly, claim 15 should be denied. Recipient 23 For recipient 23, Dr. Kuhl determined that Respondent’s dental record for this patient does not support the use of either CDT code D2391 or D2392 for claims 13 through 15, and 17. This opinion is credited. Dr. Kuhl erred, however, in adjusting these claims to CDT code 1351 because the teeth involved in these claims (K, L, S, and T) are deciduous teeth that are not eligible for reimbursement when sealants are applied. In accordance with the Dental Handbook, these claims should be denied. Recipient 24 For recipient 24, Dr. Kuhl determined that Respondent’s dental record for this patient does not support the use of either CDT code 2391 or 2392 for claims 13, 17, and 21. This opinion is credited. Dr. Kuhl erred, however, in adjusting claims 13 and 17 to CDT code 1351 because the teeth involved in these claims (A and J) are deciduous teeth that are not eligible for reimbursement when sealants are applied. In accordance with the Dental Handbook, these claims should be denied. As for claim 21, Dr. Kuhl correctly adjusted this claim downward from CDT code 2392 to CDT code D2940 because the patient record reflects that a sedative filling was applied and not a resin-based composite restoration as billed. Recipient 26 For recipient 26, Dr. Kuhl determined that Respondent’s dental record for this patient does not support the use of either CDT code 2391 or 2392 for claims 9 through 11. This opinion is credited. Dr. Kuhl erred, however, in adjusting these claims to CDT code 1351 because the teeth involved (K, L, and T) are deciduous teeth that are not eligible for reimbursement when sealants are applied. In accordance with the Dental Handbook, these claims should be denied. Recipient 28 For recipient 28, Dr. Kuhl determined that Respondent’s dental record for this patient does not support the use of either CDT code 2391 or 2392 for claims 8, 9, and 11. This opinion is credited. Dr. Kuhl correctly adjusted these claims downward to CDT code 1351 because the permanent teeth involved (3, 14, and 30) are eligible for reimbursement when sealants are applied under appropriate circumstances. Recipient 29 For recipient 29, Dr. Kuhl determined that Respondent’s dental record for this patient does not support the use of either CDT code 2391 or 2392 for claims 4, 5, 8, and 10. This opinion is credited. Dr. Kuhl erred, however, in adjusting claims 8 and 10 to CDT code 1351 because the teeth involved in these claims (K and T) are deciduous teeth that are not eligible for reimbursement when sealants are applied. In accordance with the Dental Handbook, these claims should be denied. As for claims 4 and 5, Dr. Kuhl correctly adjusted these claims downward to CDT code 1351 because the permanent teeth involved in these claims (3 and 19) are eligible for reimbursement when sealants are applied under appropriate circumstances. Recipient 32 For recipient 32, Dr. Kuhl determined that Respondent’s dental record for this patient does not support the use of either CDT code 2391 or 2392 for claims 9 through 12, 28, 30, and 32. This opinion is credited. Dr. Kuhl erred however in adjusting claims 11 and 32 to CDT code 1351 because the teeth involved in these claims (J and S) are deciduous teeth that are not eligible for reimbursement when sealants are applied. In accordance with the Dental Handbook, these claims should be denied. As for claims 12 and 28, Dr. Kuhl correctly adjusted these claims downward to CDT code 1351 because the permanent teeth involved in these claims (14 and 30) are eligible for reimbursement when sealants are applied under appropriate circumstances. As for claim 30, Dr. Kuhl erred in adjusting this claim downward to CDT code 1351 because it involves tooth 30 which was addressed in claim 12. The Handbook provides that “[s]ealants may be reimbursed once per three years, per tooth.” The date of service for claim 12 is October 19, 2010, and the date of service for claim 30 is March 28, 2012. Claim 30 was not submitted more than three years after claim 12, and it should therefore be denied. Duplicate Claims Certain claims were denied by Petitioner as being duplicates of other claims. These claims relate to FAR finding No. 4, which involves CDT Codes 2391, 2392, and 1351. Recipient 8 For recipient 8, claims 12 and 13 were billed and reimbursed under CDT code 2391 for teeth K and T. As previously noted, Dr. Kuhl correctly opined that Respondent improperly used CDT code 2391 for services related to these teeth. Because tooth K was addressed in claim 8 (as previously discussed) and tooth T was addressed in claim 11 (as previously discussed), Dr. Kuhl correctly opined that claims 12 and 13 are duplicate claims that should be denied. Recipient 13 For recipient 13, claims 14 through 17, and 19, were billed and reimbursed under CDT code 2391 for teeth K, T, 3 and 30. As previously noted, Dr. Kuhl correctly opined that Respondent improperly used CDT code 2391 for services related to these teeth. Because tooth K was addressed in claim 12 (as previously discussed), tooth T was addressed in claim 13 (as previously discussed), tooth 3 was addressed in claim 18 (as previously discussed), and tooth 30 was addressed in claim 11 (as previously discussed), Dr. Kuhl correctly opined that claims 14 through 17, and 19 are duplicate claims that should be denied. Recipient 19 For recipient 19, claim 6 was billed and reimbursed under CDT code 2391 for tooth K. As previously noted, Dr. Kuhl correctly opined that Respondent improperly used CDT code 2391 for services related to this tooth. Because tooth K was addressed in claim 8 (as previously discussed), Dr. Kuhl correctly opined that this claim is a duplicate claim that should be denied. Recipient 22 For recipient 22, claims 12 and 14 were billed and reimbursed under CDT code 2392 for teeth 14 and 15. As previously noted, Dr. Kuhl correctly opined that Respondent improperly used CDT code 2391 for services related to these teeth. Because the patient record does not support the use of code 2391, it also does not support the use of code 2392. Because tooth 14 was addressed in claim 11 (as previously discussed) and tooth 15 was addressed in claim 13 (as previously discussed), Dr. Kuhl correctly opined that claims 12 and 14 are duplicates that should be denied. Recipient 23 For recipient 23, claim 16 was billed and reimbursed under CDT code 2391 for tooth T. As previously noted, Dr. Kuhl correctly opined that Respondent improperly used CDT code 2391 for services related to this tooth. Because tooth T was addressed in claim 15 (as previously discussed), Dr. Kuhl correctly opined that this claim is a duplicate that should be denied. Recipient 26 For recipient 26, claims 13 and 14 were billed and reimbursed under CDT code 2391 for teeth K and T. As previously noted, Dr. Kuhl correctly opined that Respondent improperly used CDT code 2391 for services related to these teeth. Because tooth K was addressed in claim 9 (as previously discussed) and tooth T was addressed in claim 10 (as previously discussed), Dr. Kuhl correctly opined that claims 13 and 14 are duplicates that should be denied. Recipient 28 For recipient 28, claim 10 was billed and reimbursed under CDT code 2391 for tooth 3. As previously noted, Dr. Kuhl correctly opined that Respondent improperly used CDT code 2391 for services related to this tooth. Because tooth 3 was addressed in claim 8 (as previously discussed), Dr. Kuhl correctly opined that this claim is a duplicate that should be denied. Recipient 29 For recipient 29, claims 6 and 7 were billed and reimbursed under CDT code 2392 for teeth 3 and 14. As previously noted, Dr. Kuhl correctly opined that Respondent improperly used CDT code 2391 for services related to these teeth. Because the patient record does not support the use of CDT code 2391, it also does not support the use of CDT code 2392. Because tooth 3 was addressed in claim 4 (as previously discussed) and tooth 14 was addressed in claim 15 (as previously discussed), Dr. Kuhl correctly opined that claims 6 and 7 are duplicates that should be denied. Recipient 32 For recipient 32, claims 13 and 31 were billed and reimbursed under CDT code 2391 for teeth 19 and 30, and claim 29 was billed and reimbursed under CDT code 2392 for tooth 14. As previously noted, Dr. Kuhl correctly opined that Respondent improperly used CDT code 2391 and 2392 for services related to these teeth. Because tooth 14 was addressed in claim 28 (as previously discussed) tooth 19 was addressed in claim 10 (as previously discussed), and tooth 30 was addressed in claims 12 and 30 (as previously discussed), Dr. Kuhl correctly opined that claims 13, 29, and 31 are duplicates that should be denied.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner, Agency for Health Care Administration, enter a final order that: Revises the Final Audit Report consistent with the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law set forth herein; Recalculates the total overpayment consistent with the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law set forth herein; Requires Respondent to pay interest at the statutorily mandated rate on the recalculated overpayment; and Requires Respondent to pay a fine in the amount of 20 percent of the recalculated overpayment. Pursuant to section 409.913(23)(a), Petitioner is entitled to recover all investigative, legal and expert witness costs. Petitioner has documented costs of $2,223.64, but advises that “[a]dditional costs have been incurred in preparing for and attending the final hearing.” Jurisdiction is retained to determine the amount of appropriate costs, if the parties are unable to agree. Within 30 days after entry of the final order, either party may file a request for a hearing on the amount. Failure to request a hearing within 30 days after entry of the final order shall be deemed to indicate that the issue of costs has been resolved. DONE AND ENTERED this 29th day of August, 2017, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LINZIE F. BOGAN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of August, 2017.
The Issue Whether Medicaid overpayments were made to Petitioner and, if so, what is the total amount of these overpayments.
Findings Of Fact Based upon the evidence adduced at hearing, and the record as a whole, the following findings of fact are made to supplement and clarify the stipulations of fact set forth in the parties' March 5, 2002, Joint Prehearing Stipulation: Petitioner Petitioner was incorporated in 1989 by Mr. Taylor. It operated Choice Pharmacy, a pharmacy located at 9920 Northwest 27th Avenue in Miami, Florida, from around the time of its incorporation until approximately 1999. The Provider Agreement During the period from September 10, 1997, through August 31, 1998, Petitioner was authorized to provide pharmacy services and goods to eligible Medicaid recipients in Florida. Petitioner provided such services and goods pursuant to a Medicaid Provider Agreement Mr. Taylor had signed, on behalf of Petitioner, on February 21, 1997. The Provider Agreement contained the following provisions, among others: The Provider agrees to participate in the Florida Medicaid program under the following terms and conditions: * * * Quality of Service. . . . The services or goods must have been actually provided to eligible Medicaid recipients by the provider prior to submitting the claim. Compliance. The provider agrees to comply with all local, state and federal laws, rules, regulations, licensure laws, Medicaid bulletins, manuals, handbooks and Statements or Policy as they may be amended from time to time. Term and signatures. The parties agree that this is a voluntary agreement between the Agency and the provider, in which the provider agrees to furnish services or goods to Medicaid recipients. This provider agreement shall become effective the date the provider's Florida Medicaid Enrollment Application is received by the state or its fiscal agent. It shall remain in effect until July 1, 1999, unless otherwise terminated. . . . Provider Responsibilities. The Medicaid provider shall: * * * (b) Keep and maintain in a systematic and orderly manner all medical and Medicaid related records as the Agency may require and as it determines necessary; make available for state and federal audits for five years, complete and accurate medical, business, and fiscal records that fully justify and disclose the extent of the goods and services rendered and billings made under the Medicaid. The provider agrees that only records made at the time the goods and services were provided will be admissible in evidence in any proceeding relating to the Medicaid program. * * * (d) Except as provided by law, the provider agrees to provide immediate access to authorized persons (included but not limited to state and federal employees, auditors and investigators) to all Medicaid-related information, which may be in the form of records, logs, documents, or computer files, and all other information pertaining to services or goods billed to the Medicaid program. This shall include access to all patient records and other provider information if the provider cannot easily separate records for Medicaid patients from other records. . . . Prescribed Drug Services Coverage, Limitations and Reimbursement Handbook, and the Medicaid Provider Reimbursement Handbook The Prescribed Drug Services Coverage, Limitations and Reimbursement Handbook (referenced in the "Facts Not in Dispute" section of the parties' Joint Prehearing Stipulation) at all times material to the instant case contained the following "record keeping " provisions, among others: The provider must retain all medical, fiscal, professional and business records on all services provided to a Medicaid recipient. Records may be kept on paper, magnetic material, film, or other media. In order to qualify as a basis for reimbursement, the records must be signed and dated at the time of service, or otherwise attested to as appropriate to the media. Rubber stamp signatures must be initialed. The records must be accessible, legible and comprehensible. Records must be retained for a period of at least five years from the date of service. The following types of records, as appropriate for the type of service provided, must be retained (the list is not all inclusive): . . . . Business records, such as accounting ledgers, financial statements, purchase/acquisition records, invoices, inventory records, check registers, canceled checks, sales records, etc.; Tax records, including purchase documentation; . . . . Providers who are not in compliance with the Medicaid documentation and record retention policies described in this chapter may be subject to administrative sanctions and recoupment of Medicaid payments. Medicaid payments for services that lack required documentation or appropriate signatures will be recouped. . . . The Medicaid Provider Reimbursement Handbook (referenced in the "Facts Not in Dispute" section of the parties' Joint Prehearing Stipulation) at all times material to the instant case contained similar provisions. The Prescribed Drug Services Coverage, Limitations and Reimbursement Handbook (referenced in the "Facts Not in Dispute" section of the parties' Joint Prehearing Stipulation) at all times material to the instant case further provided that "[r]eimbursement for prescribed drug services is based on the cost of the drug to the pharmacy plus a dispensing fee." The Audit and Aftermath In July of 1998, AHCA's Medicaid fiscal agent contractor (Unysis Corporation) conducted a "desk audit" of Medicaid claims submitted by Petitioner. Following the completion of the "desk audit," the matter was referred to AHCA's Office of Medicaid Program Integrity to conduct "a more in depth" audit (involving an examination of invoices and other documentation to determine whether Petitioner had available during the period under review sufficient quantities of goods to support its billings to the Medicaid program). The audit, which covered the period from September 10, 1997, through August 31, 1998 (Audit Period), was conducted by Kathryn Holland, with the assistance of an accounting firm retained by AHCA, Krause, Humphress, Pace & Wadsworth, CPA (Krause). Ms. Holland is a Florida-registered pharmacist who has been a senior pharmacist with AHCA for the past 12 years. She has no formal education or training in accounting, but does have 12 years of experience "doing the kind of audits" she conducted in the instant case. In an effort to obtain information needed for the audit, Krause requested that Petitioner fill out and return a Questionnaire for Medicaid Providers. The questionnaire was filled out and returned by Mr. Taylor, on behalf of Petitioner, on or about October 30, 1998. Mr. Taylor indicated on the questionnaire that, during the Audit Period, the "percentage of [Petitioner's] prescription business that [was] Medicaid" was approximately 90 percent. He further indicated on the questionnaire that Petitioner's "total dollar sales volume of prescription drugs" during the Audit Period was $5,732,028.84; Petitioner's "cost of prescription drugs sold during [the] Audit Period" was $5,220,200.27; Petitioner's "prescription drug inventory at cost, [at the] beginning of [the Audit] Period" was $180,721.00; and Petitioner's "prescription drug inventory at cost, [at the] end of [the Audit] Period" was $306,081.00. The questionnaire requested the name(s) of Petitioner's "major drug suppliers during the review period." All suppliers that "provided more than 10% of [Petitioner's] drug purchases" were to be listed. Mr. Taylor listed on the questionnaire the following "major drug suppliers": "McKesson Inc.," "Quality Medical," "Pharma Plus Wholesale Inc.," and "Quest Medical Supply." IV Pharmaceutical Wholesalers, Inc., was not among the "major drug suppliers" named by Mr. Taylor. According to the information provided on the questionnaire by Mr. Taylor, the purchases made by Petitioner from "McKesson Inc.," "Quality Medical," "Pharma Plus Wholesale Inc.," and "Quest Medical Supply" represented approximately 20 percent, 20 percent, 40 percent, and 10 percent, respectively, of Petitioner's "total [drug] purchases" during the Audit Period. By letter dated November 9, 1998, Krause requested Pharma Plus Wholesale, Inc. (Pharma Plus) to provide it "with a download of all transactions (all accounts) for the period September 1, 1997 through August 31, 1998," between Pharma Plus and Choice Pharmacy. Pharma Plus, in a letter dated January 18, 1999, provided the following response to Krause's request: [A]s per our conversation I am submitting this document to formally inform you and your office that Pharma Plus Wholesale, Inc. has never done any business with Choice Pharmacy (Legal Name: OKAN, Inc) 9920 N.W. 27th Avenue Miami, FL 33147.) By letter dated January 20, 1999, Ms. Holland requested McKesson Drug Company (McKesson) to provide her "with a download of all transactions for the period July 1, 1997, through August 31, 1998" between McKesson and Choice Pharmacy. On February 16, 1999, McKesson provided Ms. Holland with a "paper printout" containing the requested information. The material submitted by McKesson revealed that there were a considerable number of transactions between McKesson and Choice Pharmacy during the period in question. On April 2, 1999, Ms. Holland sent a letter to Mr. Taylor, which read, in part, as follows:: On or around July 16, 1998, an auditor from Unisys Corporation, the fiscal agent contractor for the Florida Medicaid program, conducted an audit of your pharmacy department. The audit is being reviewed by Medicaid Program Integrity. In order for us to complete our review, we are requesting and must receive the following: Documentation that identifies all purchases/acquisitions by Choice Pharmacy for the products listed on "Attachment A" for the period from July 1, 1997, through August 31, 1998. Documentation that identifies all credits/returns for the period stated above for the products listed on "Attachment A." . . . You have 30 days from the receipt of this letter to submit the requested information. . . . The "products" listed on "Attachment A" did not include "every single drug Petitioner had billed to Medicaid. Only the 50 "highest paid" drugs were listed on "Attachment A." Mr. Taylor responded to Ms. Holland's letter by providing her with, on May 13, 1999, a three-inch stack of documents reflecting transactions between Petitioner and "quite a few different [drug] wholesalers." Ms. Holland attempted (successfully in some instances and unsuccessfully in others) to contact wholesalers whose names appeared on the documentation provided by Mr. Taylor to obtain from them documentation regarding their transactions with Petitioner. After analyzing the documentation with which she had been provided by Petitioner and by the drug wholesalers she had been able to contact, and examining AHCA's records of the claims filed by Petitioner during the Audit Period, Ms. Holland determined that there was insufficient documentation to demonstrate that, during the Audit Period, Petitioner had available sufficient inventory to support $4,248,262.37 of its billings to the Medicaid program. By letter dated July 28, 1999, Ms. Holland advised Mr. Taylor of this "provisional finding." The letter read, in part, as follows: Medicaid Program Integrity has reviewed your paid Medicaid claims with dates of service from September 10, 1997, through August 31, 1998. We have also reviewed your product purchase/acquisition documentation received on May 13, 1999. Some of the purchase/acquisition documents that you furnished could not be substantiated by the distributor/wholesaler and were therefore not included in the review. You have failed to provide adequate documentation to the effect that the available quantity of certain drugs of given strength was as great as the quantity of those drugs billed to and reimbursed by Medicaid. Based on this review, we have made a provisional determination that you were overpaid $4,248,262.37 for claims that in whole or in part are not covered by Medicaid. The amount due for the overpayment is $4,248,262.37. This is, however, a provisional finding and we encourage you to submit any additional information or documentation that you may have that you feel may serve to change the overpayment. * * * Based on the above, we have reason to believe that you have been overpaid by the Medicaid program. The overpayment identified in the summary sheet attachment is with regard only to the 45 drugs listed and comprehends only the period audited, namely September 10, 1997, through August 31, 1998. A printout identifying all relevant claims involved in the overpayment and a copy of the drug purchase/acquisitions are attached. The overpayment calculation is based upon the assumption that all stock demonstrated as available during the audit period was exclusively dispensed to Medicaid recipients; this is undoubtedly not the case and the assumption serves to reduce the amount of the overpayment. Medicaid payments that have been substantiated by documented inventory are assumed to be valid; and payments in excess of that amount are regarded to be invalid. Accordingly, as shown in the summary sheet attachment, we have determined at this time that you have been overpaid by the Medicaid program in the amount of $4,248,262.37. If additional overpayments are found subsequently, you will be notified. * * * If you have any additional invoices or other relevant documentation that you wish to submit that you feel would alter these findings, please submit your written explanation and legible copies of the documentation to us immediately. . . . If you have not submitted documentation or made payment within 30 days, we will send you notice regarding the agency's final determination, taking into consideration any information or documentation that you submit within this time period. On August 16, 1999, Mr. Diamond, on behalf of Petitioner, telephonically requested a 21-day extension of time to submit additional documentation for Ms. Holland's consideration. By letter dated August 17, 1999, Ms. Holland advised Mr. Diamond that the requested extension of time had been granted. Mr. Diamond, on behalf of Petitioner, on September 14, 1999, provided Ms. Holland with an "additional package of documentation." Ms. Holland reviewed these documents. "Most everything in this package was a duplicate" of documents that Ms. Holland had already been provided by Mr. Taylor. The following day, Ms. Holland, by facsimile transmission, requested Mr. Diamond to provide her with cancelled checks evidencing Petitioner's payment of eight, specified invoices included in the "additional package of documentation" she had received from Mr. Diamond. Mr. Diamond provided Ms. Holland with five cancelled checks on October 8, 1999. Ms. Holland determined, in light of the additional documentation she had received following her "provisional finding" that Petitioner had been overpaid $4,248,262.37 by the Medicaid program, that the amount of that overpayment should be reduced by $764.67. She advised Mr. Taylor of this "final agency audit" determination, by letter dated October 27, 1999, which read, in part, as follows: Medicaid Program Integrity has completed a review of your paid Medicaid claims with dates of service from September 10, 1997, through August 31, 1998. We have also reviewed your product purchase/acquisition documentation received on May 13, 1999, September 14, 1999, and October 8, 1999. You have failed to provide adequate documentation to the effect that the available quantity of certain drugs of given strength was as great as the quantity of those drugs billed to and reimbursed by Medicaid. You are hereby notified that Okan, Inc. d/b/a Choice Pharmacy was overpaid $4,247,497.70 for claims that in whole or in part are not covered by Medicaid. The total amount due for the overpayment is $4,247,497.70. The above action and your right or appeal are discussed below. * * * We have required that you submit invoices from your suppliers to substantiate the availability of drugs that you billed to Medicaid. You have not fully substantiated such availability. Section 409.913(10), F.S., states in part that the Agency may require repayment for inappropriate, medically unnecessary, or excessive goods or services. Section 409.913(14)(n), F.S., states that "The agency may seek any remedy provided by law, including but not limited to, the remedies provided in subsection (12) and (15) and s. 812.035, if: * * * (n) The provider fails to demonstrate that it had available during a specific audit or review period sufficient quantities of goods, or sufficient time in the case of services, to support the provider's billings to the Medicaid program." Billing Medicaid for drugs that have not been demonstrated as available for dispensing is a violation of Medicaid laws and regulations and has resulted in the finding that you been overpaid by the Medicaid program. The overpayment identified in the summary sheet attachment is with regard only to the 45 drugs listed and comprehends only the period audited, namely September 10, 1997, through August 31, 1998. A printout identifying all relevant claims involved in the overpayment and a copy of the drug purchase/acquisition review are attached. The overpayment calculation is based upon the assumption that all stock demonstrated as available during the audit period was exclusively dispensed to Medicaid recipients; this is undoubtedly not the case and the assumption serves to reduce the amount of the calculated overpayment. All Medicaid payments sufficient to cover documented inventory have been assumed to be valid, and payments in excess of that amount are regarded to be invalid. Accordingly, as shown in the summary sheet attachment, we have determined at this time that you have been overpaid by the Medicaid program in the amount of $4,247,497.70. If additional overpayments are found subsequently, you will be notified. * * * If you accept or concur with these finding, please send your check in the amount of $4,247,497.70, made payable to the Florida Agency for Health Care Administration, to: . . . . You have the right to request a formal or informal hearing pursuant to section 120.569, F.S. . . . [I]f a request for a hearing is made, the request or petition must be received within twenty-one (21) days of receipt of this letter. Failure to timely request a hearing shall be deemed a waiver of your right to a hearing. . . . Mr. Diamond, on behalf of Petitioner, filed with AHCA a Petition for Formal Hearing on December 7, 1999. The Petition for Formal Hearing was accompanied by 50 "invoices" purporting to reflect sales of prescription drugs (totaling approximately $4 million dollars) made by IV Pharmaceutical Wholesalers, Inc., to Choice Pharmacy during the Audit Period, as well as the following cover letter from Mr. Diamond to Ms. Holland: Consistent with our prior discussions regarding our above referenced client, you will find enclosed the final documentation from [IV] Pharmaceutical Wholesalers, Inc. As I indicated in our prior discussions it would appear at this time that our independent audit has concluded. Our accounting reveals, based on all invoices provided, our above referenced client has correctly accounted for all medications billed through Medicaid. I also enclose consistent with our prior discussion a copy of our request for a formal hearing in the event that you are not in agreement with our conclusions. In the event that you are satisfied with the conclusions, please advise Mr. John A. Owens, Chief, Medicaid Program Integrity, that we will withdraw our request for formal hearing. Prior to the submission of these "invoices," AHCA had not received any information (in the form of documentation or otherwise) indicating that Petitioner had purchased or otherwise acquired drugs from IV Pharmaceutical Wholesalers, Inc. Ms. Holland examined the "invoices." "They did not look like forms [she had] seen from this wholesaler before, and . . . after years of looking at invoices they just appeared not right" to her. On January 28, 2000, Ms. Holland sent the following letter to Mr. Diamond: Thank you for the documents received on December 7, 1999. As they were received after the Final Agency Action, the Agency will consider them as possible evidence for trial or hearing. Once the hearing date and discovery schedule are set, we will propound interrogatories and take depositions in conjunction with these documents. If you have any question, please contact Mr. L. William Porter, II, senior attorney . . . . Ms. Holland's suspicions regarding the genuineness of the IV Pharmaceutical Wholesalers, Inc., "invoices" submitted by Petitioner were correct. Petitioner had never purchased or otherwise acquired any drugs from IV Pharmaceutical Wholesalers, Inc. The "invoices" were fabricated. They were created by Mr. Pinkoff, for a fee ($800,000.18, which he was paid, in two installments, in November of 1999), at the request of Mr. Taylor and a Betty Bills. 13/ Mr. Pinkoff was told that the "invoices" were needed for an audit to "substantiate the purchases of [certain] product[s]." 14/ Mr. Pinkoff was subsequently charged with criminal wrongdoing for his participation in this fraudulent scheme and "voluntarily surrendered" to the authorities. 15/ The charges were filed after Mr. Pinkoff's place of business had been searched by law enforcement authorities on December 1, 1999, pursuant to a search warrant obtained by the Florida Attorney General's Medicaid Fraud Control Unit, which was conducting a criminal investigation of another matter unrelated to Choice Pharmacy. 16/ The computer that Mr. Pinkoff used to create the falsified "invoices" for Petitioner was seized during the search. Mr. Pinkoff entered into a Plea Agreement with the State of Florida in his criminal case. The Plea Agreement was filed in Leon County Circuit Court (Case No. 2000-4310) on November 8, 2000. Section II of the Plea Agreement contained the "Factual Predicate for this Plea Agreement." It provided as follows: The Defendant and the State agree that the following is the factual basis for the entry of plea in this matter, (hereafter "SUBJECT MATTER"): In June of 1999, the Defendant was approached by Louis A. Petrillo ("Petrillo"),[17/] who told the Defendant that Choice Pharmacy (Okan, Inc. d/b/a Choice Pharmacy ("Choice") and "Betty," an owner, needed certain invoices. Specifically, Choice and Betty needed to demonstrate that Choice had purchased a number of prescription drugs with a value of $4,000,000 dollars dating back to the period of 1997 through 1998. Choice was owned and operated by Raufu ("Ralph") Taylor and Betty (Last Name Unknown). The Defendant owned a 1/2 interest in IV Pharmaceuticals, Inc., a Florida corporation that was a licensed prescription drug wholesale company. IV Pharmaceuticals had not sold any prescription drugs to Choice in 1997 or at any other time. Petrillo knew this fact but asked the Defendant if he could produce invoices for a specific list of drugs; the understanding was that the invoices would be false. The Defendant told Petrillo, Betty and Ralph that he could create or otherwise produce invoices from IV Pharmaceutical[s] to give to Choice for prescription drugs that IV Pharmaceutical[s], Inc. had previously purchased from manufacturers or other licensed wholesalers. This was necessary in case IV Pharmaceutical[s] was asked to produce its records to substantiate the invoices from IV Pharmaceutical[s] to Choice. All of the drugs Betty and Ralph requested invoices for were oncology or HIV prescription drugs, largely Neup[o]g[e]n and Procrit. IV Pharmaceutical[s] had invoices to substantiate its own purchases of those drugs. A meeting was arranged by Petrillo. In attendance were the Defendant, Petrillo, Betty, and Ralph. After making introductions, Petrillo left the meeting.[18/] Before leaving, Petrillo told the Defendant that it was up to him whether or not to create the invoices. The Defendant discussed with Betty and Ralph what specific prescription drug invoices were required. Betty and Ralph provided the Defendant with a list of drugs, including dates of purchase and quantities. The Defendant believed that the invoices were to be used for some unlawful purpose, presumably involving AHCA, since the Defendant was familiar with the AHCA audit process and knew that AHCA required such invoices when conducting an audit. Betty and Ralph told the Defendant that the invoices were needed for drugs they had actually purchased but had no invoices for. The Defendant had at least one conversation with Petrillo related to the production following the meeting. Six months after the meeting, the Defendant drafted invoices under the IV Parmaceutical[s] name based upon the list provided by Betty and Ralph. The Defendant gave the invoices to Petrillo to give to Betty and Ralph. Each false invoice produced by Defendant was submitted to AHCA. The foregoing assertions of fact made in this section of the Plea Agreement are true and accurate. Section III of the Plea Agreement indicated that Pinkoff understood that "pursuant to this plea agreement his minimum potential exposure under the Sentencing Guidelines [was] 55.5 months of imprisonment" and "[h]is maximum potential exposure under the Sentencing Guidelines [was] the statutory maximum of thirty-five years in State Prison and a $25,000.00 fine." Section IV of the Plea Agreement set forth the "Defendant's Obligations." It read as follows: The Defendant agrees to plead Guilty to the following charges contained in the information filed in the above-styled criminal case: one count of "Racketeering activity" in violation of Florida Statutes, Section 895.03(3), a first degree felony; and one count of Medicaid Provider Fraud in violation of Florida Statutes, Section 409.920(2)(a), a third degree felony. The Defendant agrees to make himself accessible upon notice to receive and testify truthfully pursuant to any subpoena lawfully issued compelling such testimony pursuant to §914.04, Florida Statutes, However, by this AGREEMENT Defendant does not and shall not waive his Fifth Amendment privilege as to any statement or testimony except and only as to the specific facts set forth as the SUBJECT MATTER of this AGREEMENT; Defendant shall maintain his Fifth Amendment rights as to all other allegations of facts, including those facts related to the charges alleged in the Information not included in the factual predicate herein. The Defendant understands that if lawfully compelled to provide testimony, any perjury committed by him would constitute a violation of the ordinary terms and conditions of Defendant's community control and probation even if related to the charges alleged in the Information. Section V of the Pleas Agreement contained the "sentence the State will recommend," which was as follows: Seven (7) years of probation with the following special conditions: Defendant with will serve 24 months of community control under the terms and conditions set by the Department of Corrections. . . . Defendant shall pay a total of $3,475,000 to the State of Florida as compensation to the State of Florida for its losses, both known and unknown. Such reimbursement shall not be deemed or otherwise construed as a fine or similar penalty. . . . At the entry of this plea, Defendant agrees to provide the State of Florida with sufficient security to guarantee the payment of one million dollars ($1,000,000.00). This security shall be in the form of two Notes secured by two mortgages to be held by the State of two properties. The first property is located at 5721 Oakview Terrace, Hollywood, Florida. The Note on this property shall be in the amount of $400,000.00. The second property secured by a Note is located at 6001 North Ocean Drive, PHS, Hollywood, Florida [and the note on this property] shall be in the amount of $600,000.00.[19/] . . . Defendant shall pay a fine in the amount of $25,000.00 which is the Statutory maximum; Defendant shall be Adjudicated Guilty on all counts; Defendant shall be precluded from working or having a business interest in or receiving remuneration or payment of any kind from any health care related facility that receives any funds or participates in any way with the Medicare and/or Medicaid programs under Titles XVIII and XIX of the United States Code. However, this does not preclude the Defendant from receiving proceeds from the divestment of his interests or assets through the sale or transfer of said assets or interest to an entity that receives any funds or participates in any way with the Medicare and/or Medicaid programs of the United States. Defendant shall pay court costs; The monetary obligation under the AGREEMENT shall be paid over the course of probation and community control. However, the STATE and the Defendant agree that there is a value to the STATE in terms of economics and deterrence to receive swift and complete payment and the commitment of the Defendant to attempt to do so reflects his willingness to accept responsibility for his acts. Therefore, in the event that the Defendant pays $3,000,000.00 within 15 months of sentencing and has satisfied all other terms and conditions of community control and probation, the State agrees to the following: the community control portion of the defendant's sentence shall be reduced to 15 months; the term of probation shall be reduced to five (5) years; The STATE agrees to return to court for an Order reducing the total obligation by $500,000.00. Thus, the Defendant's total obligation under this Agreement would become Three Million dollars ($3,000,000.00). . . . The State has no objection to the entry of any Order by the court to permit travel outside of the United States for business purposes upon at least 2 weeks notice to the probation department and the permission of the defendant's probation officer. The Defendant understands that he may not travel outside the United States during the course of the community control portion of his sentence. Section VI was entitled "Withdrawal of Guilty Plea and Vacation of Sentence." It read as follows: In the event that the State files additional charges against the Defendant for matters currently under investigation, but not charged in the Information described in this AGREEMENT, the Defendant shall have the right and full entitlement to vacate the sentence imposed pursuant to this AGREEMENT and to withdraw his plea of guilty. The only condition to the Defendant's right and entitlement to vacate (as just described) shall be that the Defendant must not have breached this AGREEMENT prior to the additional charges being filed. If the Defendant does vacate and withdraw, all monies paid pursuant to this AGREEMENT shall be returned to the Defendant. The Plea Agreement also contained a "Waiver of Rights," which provided, in pertinent part, as follows: My entering into the AGREEMENT is not the result of force, threats, assurances or promises other than the promises contained in the attached agreement. I agree to the provision of this agreement as a voluntary act on my part, rather than at the discretion of or because of the recommendation of any other person, and I agree to be bound by its provisions. I agree that this written plea agreement contains all the terms and conditions of my plea and that promises made by anyone that are not contained within this written agreement are without force and effect and are null and void. . . . The Plea Agreement was signed by Mr. Pinkoff (on September 26, 2001), his attorneys (on September 26, 2001 and November 8, 2000), and the Special Counsel of Health Care Fraud Prosecution (on September 26, 2000). Mr. Pinkoff is currently under "house arrest" at his residence (which he owns) located at 5721 Oakview Terrace in Hollywood, Florida; however, he is allowed to leave his home to work at his office (which is also located in Florida). Mr. Pinkoff is still in the "pharmaceutical wholesaling" business. His business is licensed "out of Georgia." Mr. Pinkoff has paid approximately $200,000.00 of the amount that he owes the State of Florida pursuant to the terms of his Plea Agreement. He sold the 6001 North Ocean Drive property referenced in the Plea Agreement for $1.2 million. The state received approximately $192,000.00 of the proceeds from the sale Mr. Pinkoff is presently paying the state $1,000.00 a month.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that AHCA enter a final order finding that Petitioner received $4,247,497.70 in Medicaid overpayments for claims covering the period from September 10, 1997, through August 31, 1998, and requiring Petitioner to repay this amount to AHCA. DONE AND ENTERED this 3rd day of October, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. STUART M. LERNER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of October, 2002.
