The Issue The issue is whether the Respondent discriminated unlawfully against the Petitioner by discharging him because of a handicap contrary to Chapter 760, Florida Statutes, and, if so, the nature and extent of financial loss suffered by the Petitioner.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner, Shannon M. Spence, was employed from March 1993 until May 1, 1993 by the Respondent. The Respondent is an employer as defined by Chapter 760, Florida Statutes. The Petitioner, who earned on average $125/week, was employed by the Respondent as a bouncer and "bar backer", a person who assisted the bartender. On or about April 29, 1993, the Petitioner suffered an on the job injury which was duly reported to the employer and for which the Petitioner was treated at a local hospital pursuant to arrangements made by the employer. The Petitioner's injury was determined to be a right inguinal hernia, and the Petitioner was cautioned against lifting more than 25 pounds and standing for long periods of time. The Petitioner reported for work the following day, and communicated to his supervisor his inability to lift and to stand for long periods of time. His supervisor, Jess Wall or J.W., placed the Petitioner on security detail for the parking lot and entrance. There were additional light duties available for security personnel within the employer's business in which the employee could have been placed. The Petitioner's employment was terminated later that evening. The testimony is conflicting regarding whether the Petitioner was discharged because he was dating another employee, or because he was injured, or quit in sympathy with Jess Wall, who was also terminated on that evening. The most credible evidence is that the Petitioner was discharged because of his injury, but was told it was because he was dating another employee. The prohibition against dating was a new rule, it was applied against the Petitioner without any prior warning, the female employee was not discharged, and the Petitioner was the only person discharged for this activity although there were others who dated employees. The alternative theory that Petitioner quit in sympathy with the head bouncer, Mr. Wall, is specifically rejected for lack of credibility of the various witnesses. The Petitioner subsequently settled his workman's compensation claim arising from this injury with the Respondent for $15,000. No details were received regarding the allocation of moneys for medical and wages. The Petitioner is entitled to back wages from his discharge until the hearing on April 27, 1995, less any mitigation, including any portion of the settlement of his workman's compensation claim attributable to lost wages, occurring after surgical repair of the hernia when the Petitioner was reemployed. The Petitioner is entitled to reasonable costs and attorneys fees.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law set forth herein, it is, RECOMMENDED: That the Commission find that the Petitioner was unlawfully discriminated against by the Respondent, and that the Respondent be ordered to pay the Petitioner his lost wages from May 1, 1993 until April 27, 1995 less any amounts the Petitioner earned during this period and any amounts included in the workman's compensation settlement specifically provided for wages; that the Commission retain jurisdiction for the award of damages and attorney's fees and costs; and the Commission remand the matter for a determination of the attorney's fees and costs and to permit the Respondent to present any evidence in mitigation of its damages. DONE and ENTERED this 20th day of June, 1995, in Tallahassee, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of June, 1995. APPENDIX The parties filed proposed findings which were read and considered. The following states which of their findings were adopted and which were rejected and why: Petitioner's Recommended Order Findings Paragraph 1,2 Subsumed in Paragraph 1 and 2. Paragraph 3-5 Subsumed in Paragraphs 3-5. Paragraph 6-8 Subsumed in Paragraphs 6-9. Paragraph 9 Subsumed in 3 and 11. Respondent's Recommended Order Findings Paragraphs 1-3 Paragraphs 1-3 Paragraph 4 Rejected because the date was April 29, 1993. Paragraph 5 Subsumed in Paragraphs 4,5. Paragraph 6,7 Rejected as contrary to more credible evidence. Paragraph 8,9 Subsumed in Paragraphs 10,11. COPIES FURNISHED: James P. Tarquin, Esquire Michael B. Staley, Esquire P.O. Box 906190 Ocala, FL 34478 John Daley, Esquire 201 E. Pine Street 15th Floor Orlando, FL 32801 Sharon Moultry, Clerk Human Relations Commission 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, FL 32303-4113
The Issue Whether Respondent committed the unlawful employment practice as alleged in the Petition for Relief filed with the Florida Commission on Human Relations (FCHR) and, if so, what relief should Petitioner be granted.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a black male and is part of a group of persons protected from unlawful discrimination. Petitioner was formerly employed by Respondent and served initially as an usher for Respondent’s business. Respondent operates theaters and concessions in Florida, and employs a number of individuals, none of whom are employed on a “full-time” schedule. Only the manager, Cindy Palmer, is considered a full-time employee. During the school year when attendance at the theaters may be presumed to be down, Respondent offers fewer hours to its employees. Conversely, during the summer months, employees may be offered more hours. Respondent’s employees are asked to fill out a form that indicates the amount of hours they are available to work and the days upon which those hours may be assigned. Pertinent to this case, Petitioner advised Respondent that he was available to work only on Fridays, Saturdays, Sundays, and Tuesdays. Petitioner asked that he be given 40 hours per week. When Petitioner applied for employment with Respondent he was required to answer a number of questions. One of the questions, aimed at addressing the seasonal aspect of Respondent’s work demands, asked: “During slow periods when school is in session, there may be only 10 to 15 hours a week to work. Is this ok?” Petitioner answered “yes.” Petitioner failed to show that any employee was given more hours than he during the slow work periods. Respondent did not cut Petitioner’s hours during his employment at the theater. Respondent did not fail to consider Petitioner for any promotion or wage increase that he applied for during his employment. Petitioner presented no evidence that any employee was more favorably treated in the assignment of hours or promoted over him. Petitioner did not apply for any promotions. Petitioner’s verbal interest in seeking additional skills was never formalized or written to management. Despite postings of methods to complain to upper management regarding the theater operations, Petitioner never notified Respondent of any problems at the theater that would have suggested racial discrimination on Respondent’s part. In fact, when he completed an investigative form on an unrelated matter, Petitioner did not disclose any type of inappropriate behavior by any of Respondent’s employees. Petitioner’s response to the question, stated that he “hadn’t seen anything inappropriate, just bad attitude.” During the period July 2010 through November 2011, Petitioner received a number of “write-ups” citing performance deficiencies. Similar “write-ups” were issued to non-black employees. Petitioner did not establish that he was written up more than any other employee. More important, Petitioner did not establish that the deficiencies described in the write-ups were untrue. Respondent’s Employee Handbook (that Petitioner received a copy of) prohibits discrimination on the basis of race. Methods to complain to upper management, including a toll-free number, were open to Petitioner at all times material to this case. Except for the filing of the instant action, Petitioner never availed himself of any remedy to put Respondent on notice of his claim of discrimination, nor the alleged factual basis for it. Petitioner was directed to leave the theater after a verbal disagreement with his supervisor, Ms. Palmer. Petitioner’s take on the matter is that he was fired by Respondent. Respondent asserts that Petitioner voluntarily quit based upon his actions and verbal comments to Ms. Palmer. Regardless, Petitioner’s race had nothing to do with why he ultimately left employment with Respondent.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission Human Relations issue a final order finding no cause for an unlawful employment practice as alleged by Petitioner and dismissing his employment discrimination complaint. DONE AND ENTERED this 9th day of July, 2012, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S J. D. PARRISH Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of July, 2012.
The Issue Whether Respondent committed the unlawful employment practice alleged in the Employment Complaint of Discrimination filed with the Florida Commission on Human Relations (FCHR) and, if so, what relief should Petitioner be granted.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner began his employment with the Respondent on or about April 9, 2004. The Petitioner worked as a houseman. This job description was within the Respondent's housekeeping section. His original schedule required him to work a shift that ran from 6:00 a.m. until 2:00 p.m. In October or November of 2004, the Petitioner's work schedule changed and he was directed to work the overnight shift. The overnight shift personnel reported for duty from 11:00 p.m. until 7:30 a.m. The Petitioner accepted this re-assignment. The change in shift assignment was requested by Elizabeth Cortes' predecessor. Some time after December 2004, the Petitioner's supervising manager changed and Elizabeth Cortes became the director or manager for housekeeping. The Petitioner asked Ms. Cortes if he could return to the 6:00 a.m. to 2:00 p.m. shift. That request was not approved. The Petitioner accepted this decision and continued to work as scheduled. Ms. Cortes told the Petitioner at that time that she did not have another employee who would be available to take the night shift. In 2007 the Petitioner enrolled in school and requested that his shift be changed to a 9:00 p.m. to 5:00 a.m. shift so that he could attend school at Miami Dade. That request was approved. From the time of approval, the Petitioner was permitted to work three days from 9:00 p.m. to 5:00 a.m. (his school days) and two days from 11:00 p.m. to 7:30 a.m. The modification of the schedule allowed the Petitioner sufficient time to get to school in the morning. The Petitioner continued to work these shift times without complaint or issue. In November or December of 2006, the Petitioner made an application to become a banquet server for the Respondent's restaurant. He alleged that he gave the application to Elizabeth Cortes who was to sign it and forward it to Human Resources. According to Esther Sandino, the Petitioner did not file an application for restaurant server. Further, Ms. Cortes did not recall the matter. The Petitioner did not file a claim of discrimination for this alleged incident but presumably alleged that this incident demonstrates an on-going disparate treatment. There was no evidence that a non- Haitian was hired for the job as banquet server. There was no evidence any banquet servers were hired. Ms. Cortes did not hire banquet servers. Her responsibilities were directed at housekeeping. During the time Ms. Cortes was the housekeeping supervisor, the Respondent employed approximately 90 employees within the housekeeping section. Of those employees approximately 70 were Haitian. The remainder were Hispanic, Jamaican, Filipino, and other. Of the five persons who held supervisory positions, one was Haitian, two were Hispanic, one was from Czechoslovakia, and the country of origin of the fifth supervisor was unknown to Ms. Cortes. Ms. Cortes did not have the authority to terminate the Respondent's employees. Standard procedure would cause any allegation of improper conduct to be referred to the Human Resources office for follow up and investigation. There were two incidents referred for investigation regarding the Petitioner prior to the incident of April 22, 2007. Neither of them resulted in suspension or termination of the Petitioner's employment with the Respondent. On April 22, 2007, a security officer reported to the hotel manager on duty, Bingina Lopez, that the Petitioner was discovered sleeping during his work shift. Based upon that report, Ms. Lopez sent an e-mail to the housekeeping department to alert them to the allegation. When the Petitioner next reported for work, Mr. Saldana told the Petitioner to leave the property and to report to the Human Resources office the next day to respond to the allegation. The Petitioner did not report as directed and did not return to the property. Mr. Saldana did not have the authority to suspend or terminate the Petitioner's employment. Moreover, the Respondent did not send a letter of suspension or termination to the Petitioner. In fact, the Respondent assumed that the Petitioner had abandoned his position with the company. Ms. Cortes presumed the Petitioner abandoned his position because all of his uniforms were returned to the company. To avoid having the final paycheck docked, the Respondent required that all uniforms issued to an employee be returned upon separation from employment. The Petitioner acknowledged that he had his brother return the uniforms to the Respondent for him. The Respondent considered turning in uniforms to be an automatic resignation of employment. To fill the Petitioner's position (to meet housekeeping needs), the Respondent contacted an agency that provides temporary staffing. The person who came from the agency for the assignment was a male Hispanic. The male (who may have been named Lewis Diaz) arrived at the Trump Resort for work about ten days after the Petitioner left. The replacement employee's schedule was from 4:00 p.m. to midnight or 1:00 a.m. The temporary replacement remained with the Respondent until a permanent replacement for the Petitioner could be hired. It is unknown how long that was or who the eventual permanent employee turned out to be. Because the Petitioner never returned to the Trump Resort as directed, he was not disciplined for any behavior that may have occurred on April 22, 2007. The Petitioner's Employee Return Uniform Receipt was dated April 25, 2007. Prior to the incident alleged for April 22, 2007, the Petitioner had been investigated in connection with two other serious charges. Neither of those incidents resulted in discipline against the Petitioner. Both of the incidents claimed improper conduct that was arguably more serious than the allegation of April 22, 2007. Of the 400 plus employees at the Respondent's resort, the majority are Haitians. The Respondent employs persons from 54 different countries. The Petitioner's claim that he was referred to as a "fucking Haitian" by a security guard has not been deemed credible. The Petitioner was unable to indicate when the comment was made. Moreover, the Petitioner did not complain to anyone at the time the comment was allegedly made. Finally, no other employee could corroborate that the comment was made. One former employee testified that the Petitioner told him about the alleged comment. At best it was one offensive statement made on one occasion. There is no evidence that the Petitioner was treated in a disparate or improper manner based upon his national origin.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the FCHR issue a final order finding no cause for an unlawful employment practice as alleged by the Petitioner, and dismissing his employment discrimination complaint. DONE AND ENTERED this 27th day of February, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. J. D. PARRISH Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of February, 2009. COPIES FURNISHED: Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Erwin Rosenberg, Esquire Post Office Box 416433 Miami Beach, Florida 33141 Warren Jay Stamm, Esquire Trump International Beach Resort 18001 Collins Avenue, 31st Floor Sunny Isles, Florida 33160 Larry Kranert, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Derick Daniel, Executive Director Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue The issue is whether Petitioner's Charge of Discrimination should be dismissed as untimely pursuant to Section 760.11, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner's Charge of Discrimination dated June 2, 1998, alleges that Respondent discriminated against him because of his age and in retaliation for opposing illegal behavior. FCHR received the Charge of Discrimination on June 18, 1998. For purposes of this Recommended Order of Dismissal, it is assumed that the Charge of Discrimination was timely filed with FCHR. As of December 15, 1998, 180 days after Petitioner filed his Charge of Discrimination, FCHR had not assigned an investigator to investigate Petitioner's complaint or taken any other action related to the complaint. As of January 19, 1999, 35 days after December 15, 1998, Petitioner had not requested an administrative hearing. By letter dated June 2, 1999, Petitioner requested FCHR to forward his complaint to the Division of Administrative Hearings. FCHR received the request for an administrative hearing on June 7, 1999. This request was filed 354 days after June 18, 1998, 174 days after December 15, 1998, and 139 days after January 19, 1999. Petitioner does not argue or present any facts to support a finding that the doctrines of equitable tolling or excusable neglect apply in this case.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is
The Issue Whether Petitioner was wrongfully terminated from her position as a custodial worker with Respondent because of her race, in violation of Section 760.10(1)(a), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, the following findings of fact are determined: Petitioner, an African-American female, was hired by Respondent in the fall of 1994, as a custodial worker and she continued in that position until October 17, 1995, when she was terminated. On or about October 12, 1995, Rollins College (Respondent) received two letters of complaint regarding Petitioner's conduct and work performance. One of these was from a group of students living in a dorm which Petitioner was assigned to clean. The other letter was from the parent of a student living in another dorm assigned to Petitioner. These letters were not the first complaints Respondent had received regarding Petitioner's work performance. After receiving the letters, Petitioner was placed on a three-day suspension by Tom Waters, Director of Respondent's Facilities Management Department. After investigating the complaints, Respondent, on October 17, 1995, terminated Petitioner's employment. Prior to the termination of her employment, Petitioner attended a training and safety meeting of custodial workers. During that meeting, Petitioner's immediate supervisor, Frank Pravdik placed his hand on Petitioner's uniform shirt and stated words to the effect that the shirt was "nasty." Pravdik was generally known to be a difficult person to work under. He was eventually terminated by Respondent because of his abrasive management style. Fredrick Wooden, called as Petitioner's witness, assisted with the management of the custodial workers prior to his retirement. He often disagreed with Pravdik's style of management. In the case of Petitioner, he did not believe that any disciplinary actions taken against her were unwarranted, and Respondent had legitimate grounds to terminate her employment. Wooden further believed that Pravdik treated all subordinate employees equally, if not with respect. On November 20, 1995, Petitioner filed a Charge of Discrimination with the Orlando Human Relations Department. The Charge of Discrimination indicated that Petitioner believed that Respondent discriminated against her because of her race. Petitioner testified that the Charge of Discrimination was incorrect. Petitioner did not actually believe that the termination of her employment was related to her race. However, she permitted a representative of the Orlando Human Relations Commission to complete for her the Charge of Discrimination. The Charge does not allege a claim of retaliation nor does it allege that Petitioner ever complained about Pravdik's behavior to Respondent. While Petitioner testified that she first visited the Orlando Human Relations Department prior to the date of her termination, the Charge is signed, dated and notarized on November 20, 1995, three days after the effective date of her termination. After the Commission issued a No Cause Determination in this matter, Petitioner filed a Petition for Relief. The Petition for Relief alleges that Respondent terminated her employment in retaliation for complaining about Pravdik. Petitioner again testified that the Petition for Relief was also incorrect stating her case was not about whether Respondent had a right to terminate her employment, but instead was about whether Pravdik violated her civil rights for impermissibly touching her person and calling her shirt "nasty."
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing Petitioner's Petition for Relief with prejudice. DONE AND ENTERED this 26th day of December, 2000, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DANIEL M. KILBRIDE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of December, 2000. COPIES FURNISHED: Gloria J. Holloway 397 Chaucer Lane, South Lake Mary, Florida 32746 Sharon Moultry, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Suite 240, Building F Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149 Mark Van Valkenburgh, Esquire Winderweedle, Haines, Ward & Woodham 250 Park Avenue South, 5th Floor Winter Park, Florida 32789 Dana A. Baird, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations Building F, Suite 240 325 John Knox Road Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149
The Issue Whether the Respondent discriminated against Ruby D. Johnson on the basis of a handicap in violation of the Human Rights Act of 1977, as amended?
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner began employment with the Respondent at its Lake City, Florida, plant during 1977 or 1978. The Respondent manufactures metal parts for automobiles. The Petitioner was employed by the Respondent as a parts assembly worker. At the time the Petitioner began employment with the Respondent, she informed the Respondent that she did not have any handicap. On June 28, 1984, the Petitioner was accidently struck on the head with a broom by another employee while at work. She was struck with the straw end of the broom. The Petitioner did not return to her job for approximately two months after being struck on the head. The Petitioner was treated by George G. Feussner, M.D. When Dr. Feussner authorized the Petitioner's return to work, he recommended that she not be required to perform any work requiring standing or leaning, climbing or operation of dangerous equipment for approximately three to four weeks. In September, 1985, the Petitioner experienced dizziness and fell while at work. In a letter dated October 2, 1985, Dr. Feussner informed the Respondent of the following: Despite and [sic] extensive evaluation of this lady, I cannot find objective findings to go along with her symptoms. I believe that she should be able to return to work at her regular job, but I still think that it would be dangerous considering her emotional dedication to her symptoms she is likely to injure herself if she works around dangerous equipment or at heights. She should therefore find a job that does not involve these activities... The Petitioner, when she tried to return to work, was not allowed to work because she had filed a workmen's compensation claim as a result of her alleged condition. This claim was being disputed by the Respondent's workmen compensation insurance carrier. On October 31, 1985, the Respondent laid off several employees with seniority equal to or greater than the Petitioner's seniority. Employees were laid off because of a lack of work. The Petitioner would have been laid off also, but was not because of the disputed claim over workmen's compensation. In November, 1985, the Petitioner's workmen compensation claim was denied. At that time the Petitioner was informed that she was also being laid off. In October, 1986, the Respondent began recalling the employees it had laid off in November, 1985. The Petitioner was not recalled, however, because of the restrictions on the Petitioner's ability to work. The Petitioner filed a Petition for Relief from an Unlawful Employment Practice with the Commission in October, 1986. On November 13, 1987, the Commission issued a Notice of Determination: No Cause.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Commission on Human Relations enter a final order denying the Petitioner's Petition for Relief. DONE and ENTERED this 7th day of September, 1988, in Tallahassee, Florida. LARRY J. SARTIN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of September, 1988. COPIES FURNISHED: Ruby D. Johnson 1802 North Georgia Street Lake City, Florida 32055 William B. Hatfield Supervisor of Human Relations ITT Thompson Industries - Metal Division Post Office Box 928 Valdosta, Georgia 31603-0928 Donald A. Griffin Executive Director Commission On Human Relations, Florida 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1925 Dana Baird General Counsel Commission On Human Relations, Florida 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1025 =================================================================
The Issue Whether Respondent committed the unlawful employment practice alleged in the Employment Complaint of Discrimination filed with the Florida Commission on Human Relations (FCHR) and, if so, the appropriate relief for such action.
Findings Of Fact For purposes of this case, the Petitioner began his employment with the Respondent in July of 2007. Although the Petitioner had worked for the Respondent in prior years (at another location), he had voluntarily left the company to pursue other opportunities. When the Petitioner returned to employment with the Respondent in connection with this case, it was ten years after a heart transplant. At the time of hiring, the Respondent knew the Petitioner's medical condition and age. The Petitioner is approximately 61 years of age. The Respondent is a national corporation with several sites for engineering and manufacture of its products. The Respondent is an equal opportunity employer and maintains policies prohibiting unlawful discrimination. One of the Respondent's facilities, Sykes Creek, is located in Brevard County, Florida. The Petitioner was hired to work at the Sykes Creek facility in the role of engineering supervisor. The Sykes Creek site builds luxury power yachts ranging from 50–to-60 feet in length. The price of these yachts runs from approximately $900,000 to $2,000,000 each. Typically, the yacht is ordered and customized to the buyer's specification. The Petitioner was responsible for supervising and directing work at Sykes Creek and reported to Kevin Shaw, his immediate supervisor. Mr. Shaw in turn reported to the plant manager, Steven Fielder. The Petitioner reviewed the work and attendance of approximately 21 hourly employees. When the Petitioner was hired (2007), the Sykes Creek facility produced 116 yachts and employed approximately 575 people. Within the Petitioner's department (engineering) there were 26 people; four others like Petitioner were salaried employees. The economic crunch that struck most of the nation drastically reduced the Respondent's business. In 2008 the Respondent instituted unpaid furloughs and layoffs due to the lack of business. By 2009 the economic condition in the industry had not improved. Accordingly, the Respondent had to make additional cuts to its staff. To that end, Mr. Fielder advised Mr. Shaw that the Petitioner's department would have to be cut to reduce the number of hourly employees and one salaried employee. To determine who should be cut, the Respondent looked to the number of years of service with the company and the skill set/education they provided for the facility. The Petitioner had the shortest length of service with the Respondent except for an employee named Julie Halesma. That person was not chosen for lay-off because she was a credentialed industrial engineer. The Petitioner did not have those credentials. The Petitioner was not offered a lower, hourly paid position because he did not have the skill set to perform the work as well as the hourly employees who were already doing the jobs. A number of employees were laid off the same day the Petitioner was dismissed. The Petitioner's job position was eliminated and has not, as of the date of hearing, been restored. The Respondent has continued to lay off workers. In 2009 the Sykes Creek facility was down to 175 employees. The engineering department was down to 15 people. Absent a return to more prosperous times, it is not expected that the facility will be able to rehire employees. The job tasks that the Petitioner performed are now shared by other employees at the facility. Throughout his time at the Sykes Creek facility, the Petitioner was allowed to take time off as needed to attend to medical issues. Based upon the frequency of the medical leave, the Respondent knew or should have known that the Petitioner's medical condition required monthly treatment. The extent of the medical treatment, however, was unknown to the Respondent. As a salaried employee the Petitioner did not have to "punch the clock." The Respondent allowed the Petitioner to complete his work as he might dictate so that he was free to leave the facility to attend to his medical needs. Clearly, the Respondent knew the Petitioner had had the heart transplant at the time of hiring but that medical condition did not impede the Petitioner's ability to perform his job assignments. The medical situation required that he be absent, but there is no indication that Petitioner could not perform his job. The cost of the Petitioner's medical care was unknown to the persons charged with making the lay-off decisions. The cost of the Petitioner's medical care played no part in the decision to eliminate the Petitioner's job. Similarly, the Petitioner's age did not play a part of the Respondent's decision to eliminate the Petitioner's job. The Respondent articulated legitimate business reasons for eliminating the Petitioner's job position. Clearly the Respondent knew of the Petitioner's age at the time of hiring. The Respondent did not replace the Petitioner with a younger employee. The Respondent's explanation for whom it chose to retain in employment was not based upon an employee's age but rather legitimate business interests. Episodes during which the Petitioner required medical attention at the facility did not rise to a level to cause the Respondent to be concerned for Petitioner's medical well-being. Incidents of the Petitioner being light headed or with low blood sugar did not cause the Respondent to seek to eliminate the Petitioner's job position.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a final order finding no cause for an unlawful employment practice as alleged by the Petitioner, and dismissing his employment discrimination complaint. DONE AND ENTERED this 9th day of March, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S J. D. PARRISH Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of March, 2009. COPIES FURNISHED: Rolf J. Bierman 1035 Palmer Road Rockledge, Florida 32955 Brian W. Koji, Esquire Bona M. Kim, Esquire Allen, Norton & Blue, P.A. 324 South Hyde Park Avenue, Suite 225 Tampa, Florida 33606 Larry Kranert, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue The issues to be resolved in this proceeding concern whether the Respondent imposed an unlawful employment practice upon the Petitioner, whether the Petitioner has a disability and was subjected to disability discrimination in the course of the purported unlawful employment practice or event.
Findings Of Fact The Respondent Willstaff Crystal, Inc., (Willstaff) is engaged in the business of employee staffing for client companies who need employees. The process essentially concerts of prospective employees submitting employment applications for job placement to Willstaff. Willstaff then seeks to place that person as a hired employee with a firm or company which is one of its clients, (i.e., has requested that Willstaff assist it in finding employees for its business). On or about August 18, 2003, the Petitioner, Janet Shaffer, made application with Willstaff for employment placement. The application was not for employment as an employee of Willstaff, but rather for placement in a job with a company which might be a client of Willstaff. After placing Ms. Shaffer in two temporary job assignments with two different employers, she was assigned a job placement with Moldex Inc., on about October 27, 2003. Her duties at Moldex consisted of performing assembly line-type duties including cutting rubber hoses using an "air Knife." The placement and job assignments that Willstaff had secured for Ms. Shaffer during 2003 were designed to be temporary employment assignments. At some point during her shift, while employed with Moldex, Ms. Shaffer was required to place a box on a shelf above her head. She had some difficulty doing so, she says, because of her arm or shoulder injury, and requested assistance from a co-worker. Ms. Shaffer testified at hearing that due to a previous shoulder injury she is unable to lift her right arm above shoulder level. Her shoulder causes her pain, but she was not currently under a doctors care and her injury did not limit any major life activities. In any event after working only two days with Moldex, Inc., she was released from employment at Moldex, Inc.'s request due to low job productivity. Ms. Shaffer believes according to her testimony, that Moldex, Inc., terminated her as a proximate result of her requesting assistance from a co-worker due to her inability to reach above shoulder level because of her pre- existing shoulder injury. Her testimony establishes that if she an unlawful employment practice it was at the hands of Moldex, Inc.; not Willstaff. She indicated quite clearly in her testimony that she had no intent to pursue a claim against Willstaff, but only against Moldex, Inc.; because she believed that Moldex, Inc.; had terminated her, due to her limitation because of her shoulder injury. She stated that she named Willstaff as the Respondent in this case by her Petition for Relief because she was instructed to do so by some unknown individual who helped her prepare the Petition for Relief. Ursula Maurice testified as a representative of Willstaff. Her testimony establishes that Willstaff had no knowledge that Ms. Shaffer suffered from a disability. No adverse employment action was ever taken by Willstaff against the Petitioner. In fact, the Petitioner was never an employee of Willstaff. Moreover, Willstaff has an "EEO policy" in place and properly noticed its employees and Ms. Shaffer had never availed herself of it or made any formal complaint to anyone at Willstaff regarding discrimination, whether by Moldex, Inc. or any other entity. In any event, the Petitioner's own testimony establishes that she has no physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of her major life activities. She also failed to established that she was qualified for the job in question with or without reasonable accommodations, that is, the job she briefly occupied at Moldex, Inc. She did establish that she suffered an adverse employment action or decision because she was "let go" from her employment at Moldex, Inc. She did not establish clearly that Moldex, Inc., had any knowledge of her disability. Finally, and most to the point, the Petitioner has not established, and freely admits, that she was not an employee of Willstaff. Therefore, she did not suffer an adverse employment action or decision made by Willstaff. She clearly stated in her testimony that her complaint is properly against Moldex, Inc. Nonetheless, Moldex, Inc., has not been served with a petition, has not been made a party respondent, and has not been noticed of this proceeding, including the hearing. Therefore it is not legally charged with having to defend itself at this juncture, as to any employment decision it may have made regarding the Petitioner in this proceeding.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing findings of fact, conclusions of law, the evidence of record, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses and the pleadings and arguments of the parties, it is, therefore, RECOMMENDED: That a final order be entered by the Florida Commission on Human Relations denying the Petition its entirety. DONE AND ENTERED this 17th day of June, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S P. MICHAEL RUFF Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of June, 2005. COPIES FURNISHED: Janet Shaffer 6401 Da Lisa Road Milton, Florida 32583 John T. Bender, Esquire McFadden, Lyon & Rouse, L.L.C. 718 Downtowner Boulevard Mobile, Alabama 36609 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue The issue is whether Petitioner was subject to an unlawful employment practice by Respondent, Meals on Wheels, Etc., Inc., on account of his race and disability, as a result of Respondent's maintenance of a hostile work environment, or as retaliation to his opposition to an unlawful employment practice, in violation of section 760.10, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact As its name implies, Respondent is a non-profit charitable organization engaged in the business of providing free meals, transportation services, and related assistance to senior citizens in the Sanford, Florida, area. Petitioner is a 64-year-old black male of Jamaican origin. He worked as a driver for Respondent from August 13, 2012, until October 23, 2014, when he was discharged for violating a company policy. As a condition of employment as a driver, Petitioner was required to submit a medical fitness form regarding his current medical condition. In the form filed on July 30, 2012, he denied having any medical issues except non-insulin dependent diabetes, which is controlled by diet. See Ex. 21. An updated form was submitted on August 25, 2014, reflecting no change in his medical condition. Id. No other medical records were submitted to substantiate any other medical condition. When he interviewed for the position, Petitioner did not tell Respondent that he needed an accommodation for his diabetes or that he had any work restrictions. As such, management never considered Petitioner to have a disability. Petitioner also provided a post-employment medical questionnaire on August 8, 2012, which stated that he had diabetes but that it was controlled by diet. Id. No other injuries, illnesses, or health abnormalities were reported. As a driver, Petitioner was expected to adhere to Respondent's safety rules. To ensure compliance with the rules, shortly after being hired, Petitioner was required to read, and then sign a statement acknowledging that he understood, the organization's General Policies. See Ex. 1, p. 4. He was also required to acknowledge receipt of its Employee Handbook containing the Safety Policies and Procedures. See Ex. 3. In addition, Respondent's Transportation Coordinator, Mark Taylor, conducted periodic refresher training sessions with all drivers, including Respondent. One of Respondent's most significant safety rules, if not the most significant, is a rule that requires drivers to provide door-to-door service. It provides in relevant part that "[u]pon arrival at a client's home, [a driver must] go to [the] door and knock. If the client needs help, you will be right there to assist." Ex. 1, p. 1, ¶ 6. This rule is intended to promote client safety and to ensure, to the extent possible, that Respondent will not face legal exposure because, for example, a client falls down while walking unassisted to or from the vehicle. To comply with the above rule, drivers are required to get out of the van, go to the front door, knock, and then assist the client walking to the van. This is because the clients are elderly, some use walkers, and they need assistance from the driver while getting to and from the van. On August 21, 2014, Petitioner signed another statement acknowledging that he understood the policy, he agreed to follow it at all times, and he understood that "[t]ermination will result in not following this important safety rule." Ex. 7. As a corollary to the above safety rule, drivers are instructed that they should never honk the vehicle's horn when they arrive at a client's home. Instead, they should get out of the vehicle and go to the front door of the residence. Petitioner was specifically told about the no-honking rule at two safety meetings. The incident underlying Petitioner's discharge occurred on the morning of October 23, 2014. Petitioner was told to pick up Angelo Rosario and transport him to an appointment. The client is in his 80s, suffers from Alzheimer's disease, and uses a walker. He resides in a mobile home-type community with his daughter; and the driveway in front of the mobile home is unpaved with exposed roots making it easy to trip or fall. Although Mr. Rosario was not one of his regular clients, Petitioner had picked him up at least 12 times in the previous 30 days and was familiar with his condition and the area in which he lived. The testimony describing the incident is conflicting. However, the accepted testimony shows that Petitioner arrived at the Rosario residence while Petitioner was on a personal cell phone call to his sister. When he finished the call, Petitioner blew the horn to alert the client that he was there. The honking was loud enough to annoy Rosario's neighbor who approached Petitioner's vehicle complaining about the noise. Suspecting that the neighbor's concern might cause a problem, Petitioner immediately telephoned Mr. Taylor and told him that he had blown the horn and anticipated that someone might be calling him with a complaint. Mr. Taylor told Petitioner that honking the horn was inappropriate, it violated an important safety rule, and he could not just sit in the van waiting for the client. Petitioner admits that during the telephone call, he shouted at Mr. Taylor and claimed he was unaware of the rule. After Mr. Taylor instructed Petitioner to go to the front door to pick up the client, Petitioner exited the vehicle and escorted the client to the van. After speaking with Petitioner, Mr. Taylor immediately telephoned the client's daughter to get her version of events. Mr. Taylor learned that honking had recently occurred rather frequently at the client's home, and he believed that Petitioner was the responsible driver, as Petitioner had transported the client at least 12 times during the previous 30 days. Mr. Taylor immediately reported the incident to the Executive Director, Sherry Fincher, who evaluated the matter, and then decided to terminate Petitioner for violating the organization's most important safety rule. Notwithstanding Petitioner's claim to the contrary, it is the Executive Director alone, and not Mr. Taylor, who makes the decision to terminate an employee. A memorandum was prepared by Ms. Fincher that day indicating that Petitioner was being terminated "due to not following agency policies regarding door-to-door pick up of clients[,] . . . one of the most important policies to ensure the safety of all clients." Ex. 20. This was consistent with Respondent's policy, and one that Petitioner clearly understood. Petitioner's race and diabetic condition played no role in the decision. Petitioner's Employment Charge of Discrimination was filed one month later. Prior to that time, there is no competent evidence that Petitioner had ever complained to Taylor or Fincher about any discriminatory practices by the organization. Since the inception of this case, Petitioner has contended that he has a disability within the meaning of the law. At hearing, however, he acknowledged that his diabetic condition does not affect any major life activity. To support his disability discrimination claim, he testified that on an undisclosed date in 2014, he asked Mr. Taylor if he could eat meals or snacks at designated times because of his diabetic condition but was told he could not. The accepted testimony shows, however, that Mr. Taylor advised him that he could eat whenever necessary, as lunch and break hours are not set in stone. To avoid a drop in his blood sugar, Petitioner was told that he was free to eat or drink something at any time, or even bring a bag lunch with him while driving his routes. Even assuming arguendo that Petitioner had a disability, which he does not, the contention that a disability formed the basis for an unlawful employment practice must fail. Petitioner also contended that Belinda Stum, a white female lead driver, was treated differently than he and was given more "leeway" when she violated a rule. However, the only evidence concerning a rule violation by Ms. Stum involved a different rule. After a client accidentally slipped while being assisted out of the van, Ms. Stum immediately reported the incident to Mr. Taylor and then filed a completed incident report. Other than Ms. Stum, Petitioner was unable to specifically identify any other similarly-situated employees outside his protected class (or even ones within his own class) who were allegedly treated differently than he. Although a client testified at hearing that on several occasions she had observed Ms. Stum sitting in her van when picking up clients, even if this is true, the client admitted that she never reported this to anyone at Respondent's organization so that the alleged violation could be investigated and disciplinary action taken, if appropriate. Petitioner also contends he was subjected to a hostile working environment due to his race and disability. He claimed that Mr. Taylor, a white male, called him "boy," required him to answer "yes sir," and would gesture a "cut throat" sign towards him, threatening him to keep his mouth shut. This assertion was not corroborated by any other evidence, and Mr. Taylor denied the charge. The testimony of Mr. Taylor is accepted as being more credible on this issue. Assuming arguendo that he had a disability, there is no evidence whatsoever that Petitioner was subjected to a hostile working environment due to his diabetic condition. Finally, there is no evidence regarding the charge that Petitioner was terminated in retaliation for engaging in a protected activity. Indeed, Petitioner submitted no credible proof that he complained to management regarding any discriminatory practices that precipitated the alleged retaliation, other than "standing up for his rights" on the day he was terminated, and Taylor and Fincher credibly testified that they were unaware of any such complaints. Complaints made at hearing that he is still owed money and was never paid for training are not germane to this dispute. Petitioner is now working part-time as a driver for a retirement center in the Sanford area. He says he is also employed as a substitute teacher for the Seminole County School Board. Both jobs equate to full-time employment. According to evaluations and testimony at hearing, Petitioner was considered a "good worker," "likeable," and someone who "did a pretty good job." While his evaluations showed he met expectations, his last evaluation noted that he needed improvement in following orders. Except for being "written up" one time for being late to work, Petitioner had no other disciplinary action.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief, with prejudice. DONE AND ENTERED this 24th day of November, 2015, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S D. R. ALEXANDER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of November, 2015.
The Issue Whether Petitioner was discriminated against by the Respondent based on race and/or subjected to a hostile work environment based on race in violation of Chapter 760, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Alphonso Williams, Jr., is an African- American male (Petitioner). Respondent, L. Pugh & Associates (Respondent), is a closely held company in the business of designing, constructing and maintaining fire safety equipment and systems. The company is owned by Larry Pugh and his wife Sharon Pugh. Andy Pugh, the brother of Larry Pugh, is employed by the company as a construction supervisor and spends most the day in the field away from the company’s shop and warehouse. Soni Sully is the company’s office manager and bookkeeper. In 1997, Petitioner was hired by Larry Pugh to run errands for him and to maintain the shop. Petitioner had learned of the job opening from Johnny James, an African-American employee of Respondent’s. Prior to being hired, the employee warned Petitioner about Andy Pugh. The employee intended to communicate that Andy Pugh was a hard, irascible person to work for who did not tolerate mistakes, did not cut anyone any slack, and did not speak in socially polite terms. At hearing, Andy Pugh was described as an ex-marine sergeant. The employee did not intend to communicate that Andy Pugh was a racist. However, Petitioner interpreted the employee’s remarks as such. Throughout this process, Petitioner’s allegations regarding Andy Pugh’s racial slurs towards him have grown initially from three incidents of Mr. Pugh calling Petitioner a "nigger" to, by the time of the hearing, daily racial disparagement. Other than Petitioner’s testimony, there was no evidence of such name calling or such racial disparagement being reported by Petitioner. Contrary to Petitioner’s allegations, there was no evidence from either Petitioner or Respondent that Soni Sully ever issued any racial slurs against Petitioner. Given the lack of corroborative evidence regarding racial slurs and their increasing frequency, Petitioner has failed to establish that he was subjected to such racial slurs while he was employed by Respondent. Petitioner also charged that Andy Pugh would deliberately take the company vehicle assigned to him and assign it to someone on one of the construction crews Mr. Pugh supervised. However, the evidence demonstrated that none of the company’s fleet of vehicles were assigned to any one employee. The company’s vehicles were for use as needed by the company and could be assigned by Andy Pugh as he needed. This policy was explained to Petitioner many times. However, he never seemed to understand the explanation or accept it. Indeed, Petitioner continued to complain to Ms. Sully and Andy Pugh about "his" vehicle being taken. Petitioner’s constant complaints on the subject irritated Andy Pugh who did not always respond politely to Petitioner’s complaints. Petitioner received an hourly wage and mileage for the number of miles he drove. Initially, his hourly wage was $7.00. Over time, his hourly wage was increased to $8.50. By his choice, he received mileage even though he usually drove a company vehicle because it benefited him financially to claim mileage. No employee, including Petitioner, received both mileage and a vehicle allowance. At some point, Respondent instituted a company-wide policy limiting the amount of overtime an employee could work. Larry Pugh felt overtime billing was out-of-control and therefore created the policy. All employees, including Petitioner, were affected by the limitation. When Petitioner complained of the reduction the limitation of overtime caused in his pay, Petitioner was treated more beneficially than other employees and was permitted to work five hours of overtime per week. There was no evidence that Petitioner did not receive the mileage or the hourly pay he was entitled to receive. Likewise, there was no evidence that Petitioner was the only employee required to sign in and out. On June 7, 2001, Petitioner again complained to Andy Pugh about "his" vehicle being taken. At some point, words were exchanged between Andy Pugh and Petitioner. Petitioner alleged that Andy Pugh grabbed him by throat, called him a "nigger" and threatened to kill him. However, the details of this exchange are unclear due to the changing story of Petitioner about those details, the irreconcilable testimony and statements of Petitioner and Mr. Pugh, witnesses to the altercation and the surveillance tape of the premises during the altercation. Other than words being exchanged, there was insufficient evidence to show that this altercation was based on Petitioner’s race or occurred in the physical manner alleged by Petitioner. After talking with Sharon Pugh, Petitioner filed a criminal complaint with the Sheriff’s Department. The details of Petitioner's conversation with Ms. Pugh are unclear. After an investigation, including interviewing witnesses and reviewing the surveillance tape, no arrest or criminal charges were filed against Andy Pugh. Petitioner was placed on paid administrative leave until Larry Pugh, who was away, could investigate the incident. Upon his return, Larry Pugh looked into the matter and decided to terminate Petitioner mostly for filing criminal charges against his brother, but also, in part, for other more minor personality conflicts Petitioner had had in dealing with others while on company business. The evidence did not show that Larry Pugh’s reasons for terminating Petitioner were pretextual, retaliatory for Petitioner engaging in a protected activity or based on race. Therefore, the Petition for Relief should be dismissed.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 3rd day of July, 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DIANE CLEAVINGER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of July, 2003. COPIES FURNISHED: Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Frederick J. Gant, Esquire Allbritton & Gant 322 West Cervantes Street Pensacola, Florida 32501 Michael J. Stebbins, Esquire Michael J. Stebbins, P.L. 504 North Baylen Street Pensacola, Florida 32501 Alphonso Williams, Jr. 2415 North "E" Street Pensacola, Florida 32501
