The Issue The issues are whether Petitioner overpaid Medicaid reimbursements to Respondent for inpatient hospital services due to the lack of medical necessity for such services and, if so, the amount of the overpayment.
Findings Of Fact Respondent is a 226-bed community hospital in Sanford. It is an acute-care hospital with an emergency department. At all material times, Respondent has been an authorized Medicaid provider. For inpatient services, Respondent receives, under Medicaid, an all-inclusive per diem rate for all goods and services provided during a 24-hour period, less any third-party payments. Petitioner is the state agency responsible for the regulation of the Medicaid program in Florida. Petitioner is required to perform Medicaid audits of providers and to recover any overpayments. Pursuant to this authority, Petitioner conducted an audit of Respondent for the period from January 1, 2001, through March 31, 2002. Pursuant to its procedures, Petitioner duly informed Respondent of the audit, obtained from Respondent relevant medical and hospital records, issued a Provisional Agency Audit Report on January 24, 2006, obtained additional information from Respondent pertinent to the provisional findings, and issued a Final Agency Audit Report on October 19, 2006, which claimed a total overpayment of $286,357.54 based on Medicaid payments made to Respondent on behalf of 35 different recipients. (The report indicates two separate denials for each of four recipients, so 39 total transactions are listed.) The dispute in this case concerns the medical necessity of the inpatient hospitalization of each recipient. The Florida Medicaid Hospital Services Coverage and Limitations Handbook (Handbook) states that the purpose of the Medicaid program is "to provide medically necessary inpatient and outpatient services to recipients in the hospital." Handbook, page 1-1. This case involves paid claims for inpatient, not outpatient, services. The Handbook defines inpatient services as those services "rendered to recipients who are admitted to a hospital and are expected to stay at least 24 hours and occupy a bed, even though a bed is not actually utilized because the recipient is discharged or transferred to another hospital." Handbook, page 1-1. The Handbook provides that the day of admission is covered, but the day of discharge is not covered, unless it is also the day of admission. Handbook, page 2-22. The Handbook defines "grace days" as non-medically necessary days following the day of formal discharge when the recipient continues to occupy a hospital bed until an outside facility or residence can be found. These days are not reimbursable by Medicaid except for children under 21 years of age on "Department of Children and Families hold . . .." Medicaid will pay up to 48 hours of inpatient stay beyond the formal discharge day for these children while an alternative placement is located. The Handbook incorporates the limitation of medical necessity as follows: Medicaid reimburses for services that are determined medically necessary, do not duplicate another provider's service, and are: individualized, specific, consistent with symptoms or confirmed diagnosis of the illness or injury under treatment, and not in excess of the patient's needs; not experimental or investigational; reflective of the level of services that can be safely furnished, and for which no equally effective and more conservative or less costly treatment is available statewide; furnished in a manner not primarily intended for the convenience of the recipient, the recipient's caretaker, or the provider. The fact that a provider has prescribed, recommended, or approved medical or allied care, goods, or services does not, in itself, make such care, goods or service medically necessary or a covered service. Note: See Appendix D, Glossary, in the Florida Medicaid Provider Reimbursement Handbook, UB-92, for the definition of medically necessary. Handbook, pages 2-1 to 2-2. The Florida Medicaid Provider Reimbursement Handbook, UB-92, Appendix D, defines "medically necessary" as follows: Means that the medical or allied care, goods, or services furnished or ordered must: Meet the following conditions: Be necessary to protect life, to prevent significant illness or significant disability, or to alleviate severe pain; Be individualized, specific, and consistent with symptoms or confirmed diagnosis of the illness or injury under treatment, and not in excess of the patient's needs; Be consistent with generally accepted professional medical standards as determined by the Medicaid program, and not experimental or investigational; Be reflective of the level of service that can be safely furnished, and for which no equally effective and more conservative or less costly treatment is available; statewide; and Be furnished in a manner that is not primarily intended for the convenience of the recipient, the recipient's caretaker, or the provider. "Medically necessary" or "medical necessity" for inpatient hospital services requires that those services furnished in a hospital on an inpatient basis could not, consistent with the provisions of appropriate medical care, be effectively furnished more economically on an outpatient basis or in an inpatient facility of a different type. The fact that a provider has prescribed, recommended, or approved medical or allied care, goods, or services does not, in itself, make such care, goods or services medically necessary or a medical necessity or a covered service. The Florida Medicaid Provider Reimbursement Handbook, UB-92, Appendix D, page D-10. E. A. was admitted on January 6, 2001. Petitioner does not contest the medical necessity of inpatient services to treat E. A.'s acute exacerbation of chronic bronchitis from January 6-8. The parties' dispute concerns the medical necessity of the remaining ten days of E. A.'s hospitalization. (All calculations of duration of hospitalizations omit the day of discharge, pursuant to the above-cited provision from the Handbook. In this case, for instance, E. A. was discharged on January 19.) E. A., a 60-year-old male, presented to the emergency department with shortness of breath and a history of chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD), emphysema, and hypertension. He had been unable to eat for the preceding four days due to respiratory distress. At the time of his admission, E. A. had been living for a short while with his sister, who was suffering from cancer. His relevant history included a shotgun wound to the left lung 30 years earlier. Respondent states in its proposed recommended order that E. A.'s chest X-rays showed acute infiltrate demonstrating pneumonia, although the discharge summary reveals that chest X-rays fail to reveal this condition, but acknowledged that sputum grain stains revealed a polymicrobial infection. More to the point, the X-ray reports dated January 6 and 8 note: "no focal infiltrate." However, the discharge summary described E. A.'s prognosis as poor because he was in "end-stage lung disease." In the emergency department, after treatment with bronchodilators, E. A.'s oxygen saturation rate was only 87 percent--not 94-100 percent, as mistakenly stated by Petitioner's expert, Dr. Ellen Silkes, an otolaryngologist whose practice is largely limited to outpatients. This low rate of oxygen saturation evidences hypoxia. E. A.'s arterial blood gases bore a pH of 7.28, evidencing, on the facts of this case respiratory acidosis, which results from excessive retained carbon dioxide due to poor lung function. E. A. was started on Albuterol and Atrovent by nebulizer at four-hour intervals, as well as a corticosteroid intravenously every six hours to relieve the swelling in the lungs. He received oxygen by nasal cannula. On January 10, the physician's notes state that E. A. still suffered from "severe COPD" secondary to smoking with bronchospasms. According to the notes, the first day that E. A. showed any improvement was January 12. On January 14 and 16, E. A. was still retaining excessive carbon dioxide and remained hypoxic, but showed some improvement by January 16 in terms of arterial blood gases. The physician's note for January 17 states that E. A. could be discharged as soon as arrangements for home health care were completed. E. A.'s hospitalization was medically necessary from January 6-17. His hospitalization after January 17 was not medically necessary. Petitioner improperly denied January 9-16, given that the day of discharge is excluded. Thus, for E. A., Petitioner should have denied two days, not all ten days. A. A. was admitted on June 19, 2001. Petitioner does not contest the medical necessity of inpatient services to treat A. A.'s gastrointestinal bleeding from June 19-20. The parties' dispute concerns the medical necessity of the remaining 12 days of A. A.'s hospitalization. (Some of Petitioner's calculations are incorrect. For instance, in this case, Petitioner does not deny July 2-5, even though, undoubtedly, its position as to the lack of medical necessity as to the earlier dates would mandate the same position as to the later dates. This recommended order does not disturb Petitioner's implicit acceptance of the medical necessity of any dates, even when it appears to be in error.) A. A., a 51-year-old male, presented to the emergency department with abdominal pain, diarrhea, and black tarry stools. His recent history included bloody vomit and a diagnosis, a few months earlier, of a pulmonary embolism. A. A. had discontinued taking Coumadin, a blood thinner, due to nosebleeds. A. A. had been diagnosed with AIDS in 1998 and had lost 30 pounds in one month. At admission, A. A.'s hemoglobin and hematocrit levels were critically low at 5.1 and 15.5, respectively, and remained critically low the following day when, after A. A. received transfusions of two units of packed red blood cells, his hemoglobin and hematocrit levels were only 6.8 and 20.0, respectively. Dr. Silkes denied the hospitalization after June 20 because an upper gastrointestinal endoscopy revealed, on June 19, no acute bleeding, and a bleeding scan the following day was negative. However, according to the physician's notes, A. A. was continuing to experience diarrhea on June 20, even though he was starting to feel better. The course of treatment of A. A. was complicated by his recent history of pulmonary embolism and his inability to report an accurate history. By June 21, A. A.'s severe anemia had been corrected, but he was diagnosed with candida, an opportunistic fungal infection common in AIDS patients. This diagnosis would explain the vomiting of blood. Generally, the treatment dilemma posed by A. A. was that efforts to increase his clotting time to stop the bleeding raised the risk of pulmonary embolism. The physicians debated whether to install a Greenfield filter to stop the passage of a blood clot. The filter is introduced under X-ray control through the femoral vein into the inferior vena cava, where it is anchored, so that it allows the passage of blood, but not the passage of a blood clot. But the Greenfield filter is contraindicated in the presence of A. A.'s fever of 101 degrees and elevated white blood counts. Physicians introduced Coumadin to minimize the risk of clots, but A. A.'s low platelet count required the discontinuation of Coumadin on June 30. A. A.'s International Normalization Ratio (INR) was 4.2, which is well above the range of 2.0-3.0 and thus indicative of the fact that A. A.'s blood was taking too long to clot. The standard of care in 2001 precluded safe outpatient management of a complicated patient such as A. A., given his twin risks of pulmonary embolism and bleeding, either of which could result in his death. A. A.'s Coumadin could not safely have been adjusted on an outpatient basis. The physicians restarted the Coumadin on June 24 and doubled its dosage the following day. As they were working on adjusting the blood thinner, though, A. A. continued to suffer nightly fevers of 103 degrees, and the physicians needed to monitor him closely for the next week for this reason too. On June 28, A. A. reported that he was feeling better, but the physicians needed to monitor him for a recent reduction in his Coumadin dosage. A. A. was reported as "alert and comfortable" on July 2. A. A.'s hospitalization was medically necessary from June 19 through at least July 2. Petitioner improperly denied all ten days of this hospitalization. T. B. was admitted on May 15, 2001. Petitioner does not contest the medical necessity of inpatient services to treat T. B.'s esophageal cancer and tuberculosis from May 15-17 and The parties' dispute concerns the medical necessity of the ten days that Dr. Silkes denied of the remaining 14 days of T. B.'s hospitalization. (It is unclear why Petitioner denied only ten days when Dr. Silkes denied May 18-20 and May 22-June 1--a total of 14 days, or 13 days exclusive of the day of discharge. But, as noted above, in cases such as this, the recommended order will consider only whether up to ten days within this period are allowable as medically necessary.) T. B., a 47-year-old male, presented to the emergency department with difficulty swallowing. He had visited a physician in February 2001 with the same complaint, and the physician had recommended an upper gastrointestinal series. Due to financial constraints, T. B. did not undergo this procedure until late April, when he was found to have a high-grade obstruction consistent with a tumor. T. B.'s recent history included the loss of 25 pounds. An endoscopy with biopsy performed on May 16 revealed a high-grade carcinoma of the esophagus. The physician planned to commence preoperative chemotherapy and radiation therapy to shrink the lesion, but, based on sputum collected on May 18, it was discovered that T. B. had mycobacterium tuberculosis. Physicians had suspected the tuberculosis from the time of admission when they placed T. B. in a negative airflow isolation room. Treatment of the tuberculosis necessarily preceded the preoperative chemotherapy recommended for T. B.'s carcinoma. The sputum sample revealed rare acid-fast bacilli, for which the standard of care in 2001 typically required two to three weeks of treatment before isolation precautions could be discontinued. T. B. remained in isolation at least through May 31. In addition, T. B. suffered significant pain from the carcinoma. By May 23, he was on patient-controlled analgesia in the form of a morphine pump, which is not available outside of an acute-care hospital. T. B.'s hospitalization was medically necessary from May 15 through at least June 1. Petitioner improperly denied all ten days of this hospitalization that it denied. R. B. was admitted on December 3, 2001. Petitioner does not contest the medical necessity of inpatient services to treat R. B.'s respiratory failure from December 3, 2001, to January 2, 2002, and January 8, 2002. Based on Petitioner's prehearing stipulation, the dispute concerns only seven days' hospitalization. R. B., a 59-year-old female, presented to the emergency department with acute respiratory distress and respiratory failure. She was immediately intubated. Her family insisted upon aggressive treatment of, among other things, her bilateral pneumonia caused by a virulent staph infection. R. B. required a tracheotomy on December 20 due to the difficulty in weaning her from the ventilator. She required the placement of a percutaneous endoscopic gastrostomy (PEG) tube on January 1. The discharge summary describes R. B. as "very frail and fragile" and her hospitalization as "very prolonged and complicated." On December 23, when R. B. was finally weaned from the ventilator, her family agreed to a do-not-resuscitate (DNR) code for her. The dispute arises from an incident on January 3 when R. B. fell when trying to get out of bed. Her mental status deteriorated, probably due to malignant disease. Physicians ruled out sepsis in the bloodstream, but X-rays revealed multiple nodules in the lung and liver. On January 8, a CT- guided lung biopsy of one of the nodules confirmed malignant disease. Two days later, the physician stated that a consultation with hospice was indicated. Upon the agreement of the family, R. B. was discharged to her home under hospice care on January 12. Dr. Silkes is substantially correct in her opinion. The diagnostic work after January 2 only supported the poor prognosis that had become obvious to R. B.'s family ten days earlier and certainly was not palliative in nature. R. B.'s hospitalization after January 2, 2002, was not medically necessary--except for January 8, which Dr. Silkes initially conceded, and an additional two days, which Petitioner conceded in its prehearing stipulation. Petitioner properly denied seven days of this hospitalization. J. B. was admitted on January 5, 2002. Petitioner does not contest a 23-hour observation on January 5, but this would generate a reimbursement considerably smaller than that sought by Respondent for inpatient services for that day, so Petitioner has essentially denied the entire hospitalization, which consists of 16 days. J. B., a 59-year-old male, presented to the emergency department with shortness of breath and atrial fibrillation with fast ventricular rate. He had been diabetic for 25 years. He had been laid off from construction work in August 2001, and had arthritic knees which prevented his return to work. Since losing his job, J. B. had been feeling poorly and had lost 20 pounds. J. B.'s pulse at the time of his arrival was 165, and it dropped to 105 within his first six hours at the hospital. J. B.'s relevant history included congestive heart failure, edema of the extremities, and nocturnal dyspnea. A chest X-ray on the day of admission revealed a dense mass in the left lobe. Physicians started a calcium channel blocker to regulate J. B.'s rapid heart beat and a diuretic to eliminate his excess fluids and swelling. J. B. was feeling much better by January 7, as the physicians had controlled his rapid heart beat. On that day, J. B. underwent a stress test, which was negative. However, a CT scan performed on January 8 and reported the following day revealed a left hilum mass that proved to be advanced carcinoma. The physicians decided that J. B. needed a bronchoscopy to biopsy the lung mass and a thoracentesis, in which a needle is inserted between the ribs to extract fluid for the purpose of determining the fluid's source. However, J. B.'s atrial fibrillation complicated their plans. On January 8, J. B. remained in atrial fibrillation, and the physicians were considering starting him on Coumadin because patients with atrial fibrillation are at high risk of clotting due to the poor expulsion of blood into the ventricle. Introduction of this blood-thinning agent before other invasive procedures requires first that the physicians stabilize the patient. This dilemma delayed the introduction of the blood- thinning agent and prevented treating J. B. as an outpatient. Once stabilized on Coumadin, J. B. underwent the two diagnostic procedures on January 11. They revealed that he was suffering from stage IV squamous cell carcinoma, according to a physician's report dictated on January 14 and transcribed the following day. The physician ordered additional CT scans to determine the extent of the metastatic disease before deciding on a course of treatment. A whole body bone scan was performed on January 15 and was essentially negative. However, the carcinoma had metastasized to the left hilum and, by report dated January 15, a physician noted that J. B. would not benefit from surgery, chemotherapy, or radiation, although palliative radiation could offer him some relief. An IV port for chemotherapy (not radiation) was placed on January 16--not January 6, as noted by Dr. Silkes in her report. Coumadin had been discontinued in advance of the procedure and resumed on the day of the procedure, but required adjustment for the next several days, as J. B.'s INR was too low, indicative of excessive clotting. Although the administration of the chemotherapy through the IV port could have been done on an outpatient basis, J. B. was comfortable at all times after January 15, and with no effective treatment possible, his hospitalization remained medically necessary until the physicians were able to adjust his Coumadin so that his INR reached the normal range. J. B.'s hospitalization was medically necessary from January 5 through January 22, on which date he was discharged. Petitioner improperly denied the 16 days of inpatient services. N. C. was admitted on February 8, 2002. Petitioner does not contest the medical necessity of inpatient services to treat N. C.'s intracranial hemorrhage from February 8-10. The parties' dispute concerns the medical necessity of the remaining 21 days of N. C.'s hospitalization. N. C., a 40-year-old female, presented to the emergency department with a complaint of passing out and no significant medical history. N. C. was a single mother of a developmentally disabled child. Her father resided in a nursing home and suffered from dementia, so her siblings were her decisionmakers concerning care. At admission, N. C. was already in a vegetative state, suffering from a massive intracranial hemorrhage. Her blood pressure was 213/107. She was immediately intubated and given Mannitol to reduce intracranial pressure and Dilantin to prevent seizures. On February 8, a neurologist evaluated N. C. and found her a poor candidate for surgery to evacuate the intracranial hematoma due to the likelihood of extensive consequent neurological deficits. The neurologist discussed the possibilities and the "extremely poor" prognosis with the siblings, who decided not to pursue surgery and instead allow N. C. to be "managed medically." The physicians asked the siblings to consider a DNR code for N. C. N. C. made no meaningful progress in the following days. Respondent was unable to contact her siblings until February 19, and they asked for two days within which to make the decision whether to place N. C. on a DNR code. On February 22, they decided to place N. C. on a DNR code and withdraw the ventilator. Three days later, the physician discussed with the siblings the possibility of placement in a nursing home. Three days after this discussion, the siblings agreed on inpatient hospice care for N. C. On March 4, IV fluids and medications and the nasogastric feeding tube were withdrawn, and N. C. was transferred to a nursing home under hospice care. N. C.'s hospitalization was medically necessary through February 22 because a nursing home cannot accept a patient on a ventilator, N. C.'s course following the stroke could reasonably be observed for a couple of weeks to determine if improvement--however unlikely--might take place, and the siblings reasonably required this long to make this difficult decision. From February 23 through discharge, the inpatient services provided N. C. were no longer medically necessary, so Petitioner properly denied nine days of the 21 days that it denied for this recipient. N. Ch. was admitted on May 23, 2001. Petitioner does not contest the medical necessity of inpatient services to treat N. Ch.'s cellulitus and osteomyelitis from May 23 to June 24. The parties' dispute concerns the medical necessity of the remaining 46 days of N. Ch.'s hospitalization. N. Ch., a 38-year-old male, presented to the emergency department with wounds to both legs and loss of feeling in both feet and a history of fractures to both tibias 20 years ago followed by osteomyelitis four years ago. Despite considerable hospital treatment to both legs, consisting of antibiotics, hyperbaric oxygen, debridement, and skin grafts, drainage of the wounds persisted. Four grainy wounds on both legs penetrated to the bone, and N. Ch. had suffered some bony damage from the persistence of these infected wounds. A physician performed a surgical debridement of the wounds on May 26, and a vacuum- assisted closure device was applied to the wound on the following day. This device produces negative air pressure to stimulate a chemical change in the tissues to enhance the migration of new blood vessels and granulation tissue over the area of the wound. The pump was changed often. On June 22, N. Ch. underwent a second debridement and a pump was reapplied to the wounds on June 24. The issue in this case involves the use of hyperbaric oxygen treatment on an inpatient basis. On June 7, a physician reasonably recommended 20, 90-minute hyperbaric oxygen treatments. The treatments, which accelerate wound healing, began the next day. Dr. Silkes correctly finds no medical necessity after N. Ch. became stable after the second debridement. Although he later suffered some fever, apparently from his reaction to an antibiotic, and gastroesophagael reflux, as well as some adverse reactions to IV and peripherally inserted central catheter lines, N. Ch. could have been managed as an outpatient after June 24. Nothing suggests that the vacuum-`assisted closure device requires hospitalization, and hyperbaric oxygen treatment clearly does not require hospitalization. Respondent contends that inpatient services remained medically necessary after June 24 because Medicaid would not pay for hyperbaric oxygen treatment on an outpatient basis. Medical necessity is driven by medical, not legal, considerations. If the sole reason for hospitalization is to obtain a medically necessary good or service that Respondent has restricted to the inpatient setting, then the provider community improperly circumvents Petitioner's restriction. If there is no other reason to continue to hospitalize a recipient, such as N. Ch., the decision to do so in order to obtain for him a concededly medically necessary service--that does not otherwise require hospitalization--is unwarranted. Petitioner properly denied the 46 days of inpatient services for N. Ch. after June 24. J. C. was admitted on February 24, 2002. Petitioner does not contest the medical necessity of inpatient services to treat J. C.'s coronary artery disease and lymphoma on February 24 and March 3-8. In its proposed recommended order, Respondent does not contest Petitioner's denial of the "last two days," which apparently are March 9-10. The parties' dispute concerns the medical necessity of the remaining six days of hospitalization from February 25 through March 2. J. C., a 61-year-old female, presented to the emergency department with worsening chest pain over the past two weeks and a history of coronary artery disease. She also had an undiagnosed mass on her neck. She had previously failed outpatient treatment and was admitted to the hospital. Two weeks earlier, J. C. was to have had an outpatient biopsy of the neck mass, but the anesthesiologist declined to administer anesthesia until her unstable angina was addressed. J. C. went to her primary care physician, who referred her to a cardiologist, but, prior to seeing him, J. C. went to the emergency department. On February 25, the physician's notes indicate that J. C. was stable and without chest pain. The cardiologist performed a cardiac catheterization on February 26 and found 100 percent blockage of the left anterior descending artery, 80 percent blockage of the proximal circumflex, and other narrowings that were not amenable to angioplasty and stenting, so he recommended coronary artery bypass grafting. Heart surgery could not proceed until physicians learned the nature of the neck mass. A biopsy was performed on February 28, which revealed B-cell malignant lymphoma. The oncologist preferred to commence chemotherapy after the bypass operation, so this was performed on March 3. J. C. was extubated on March 4, but developed acute respiratory distress on March 5 and required a transfusion the following day. However, Dr. Silkes is correct in finding the hospitalization from February 25 through March 2 medically unnecessary. The procedures performed during this period could have been done on an outpatient basis. The record does not support Respondent's argument that her unstable angina required inpatient management. Petitioner properly denied these six days of inpatient services. R. LaB. was admitted on April 2, 2001. The parties' dispute concerns the medical necessity of the last day of inpatient service on April 12. This is the first case considered in this recommended order handled by Dr. Alan Yesner, an internist whose practice is more evenly divided between inpatients and outpatients than is Dr. Silkes' practice. R. LaB., a 47-year-old female, presented to the emergency department with abdominal pain of two days' duration and a history of COPD, hypertension, and diabetes. She was rushed to abdominal surgery to reduce an incarcerated hernia. The surgery was long. R. LaB. suffered respiratory failure and required intubation. Dr. Yesner is correct in opining that R. LaB.'s hospitalization after April 11 was not medical necessary. She was stable and on appropriate medication, so Petitioner properly denied one day of inpatient service for R. LaB. J. L. was admitted on June 12, 2001. The parties' dispute concerns the medical necessity of the seven days of inpatient services. J. L., a 47-year-old male, presented to the emergency department with complaints of a gradual increase of abdominal girth and was found to have blood in his stool. Lab work indicated an elevated INR, elevated bilirubin, and bacteria in his urine. The physician concluded that J. L. suffered from primary biliary cirrhosis, for which he had been treated since at least 1998. J. L. admitted that he had become noncompliant with his medication after a divorce. A CT scan revealed a probable stone obstructing the right ureter, causing urine to back up and flood the right kidney. A successful laser lithotripsy was performed on June 17 with the complete fragmentation of the stone and the installation of a stent, which would facilitate drainage, to be removed a few days later. J. L. tolerated the procedure well, and on the next day he reported feeling better without any pain in his flank. Dr. Yesner notes the "late schedule" of the lithotripsy, but Respondent did not have a lithotripter in 2001 and had to schedule it for use at the hospital. The hospitalization was medically necessary through June 17 due to the pain, advanced kidney disease, and potential kidney problems presented by the blockage, prior to its surgical fragmentation. Petitioner should have denied two days, not seven days. C. M. was admitted on April 2, 2001. Petitioner does not contest the medical necessity of admission for 23-hour observation only on April 2 for end-stage sarcoidosis, pneumonia, and gastrointestinal bleeding. The parties' dispute concerns the medical necessity of the remaining 31 days of C. M.'s hospitalization, which concluded with her death. C. M., a 55-year-old female, presented to the emergency department with shortness of breath and weakness. She is a Jehovah's Witness, so she declines blood transfusions on religious grounds. By April 4, C. M.'s blood gases, although not within normal ranges, were out of critical ranges. C. M. suffered respiratory failure and required intubation on April 16. Her hemoglobin gradually dropped after this, but treatment was limited to iron and vitamins due to the refusal of the patient to accept a blood transfusion. This treatment was unsuccessful. The family supported C. M.'s decision not to accept a blood transfusion, but insisted on full, aggressive treatment, including CPR. C. M. went into cardiac arrest on May 3 and CPR failed to revive her. Dr. Silkes states that Respondent should have arranged for hospice care during the first day of hospitalization. C. M. was not then on a ventilator, so a hospice would not have objected to taking C. M. on that ground, but her respiration was critically impaired for the first three days of her hospitalization and her prognosis was not such as to render hospital care medically unnecessary. It was medically necessary to stabilize C. M.'s respiration during these first three days, but her hemoglobin issues could have been addressed by home health care for the next 11 days. The medical necessity of inpatient services resumes, though, after C. M.'s respiratory failure of April 16 and continues to the end of her hospitalization. The first three days of inpatient services were medically necessary, the next 11 days of inpatient services were not medically necessary, and the last 17 days of inpatient services were medically necessary, so Petitioner should have denied 11 days, not 31 days. M. M. was admitted on March 3, 2001. Petitioner does not contest the medical necessity of inpatient services to treat acute asthmatic bronchitis with a history of coronary artery bypass graft, asthma, sarcoidosis of the lung, and diabetes from March 3-12, which Petitioner later extended to March 13. The parties' dispute concerns the medical necessity of the remaining three days of M. M.'s hospitalization, which Respondent's expert frankly conceded was difficult to justify. As Dr. Yesner noted, M. M. was stabilized on oral medication by March 11, and he allowed a couple of additional days to monitor her. M. M. experienced hypoglycemia on March 16, but this is a condition that, according to Dr. Yesner, is not unusual with the Prednisone that M. M. was taking, and hypoglycemia is typically managed on an outpatient basis. Petitioner properly denied the last three days of M. M.'s hospitalization. J. P. S. was admitted on January 4, 2001. Petitioner does not contest the medical necessity of inpatient services to treat J. P. S.'s obstruction of the common bile duct. The parties' dispute concerns the medical necessity of the last three days of his hospitalization. J. P. S., a 54-year-old male, presented to the emergency department with severe jaundice and a history of diabetes, congestive heart failure, and triple coronary artery bypass graft performed in 1997, although he displayed no significant cardiac abnormalities during this hospitalization. During the initial examination, J. P. S. went into respiratory arrest and required intubation. The gastroenterologist found J. P. S. ready for discharge, from a gastroenterological perspective, on January 13. but J. P. S. immediately developed COPD symptoms, including shortness of breath and edema. According to the physician notes, J. P. S. was sufficiently stable for discharge on January 15, but a note for the next day says to hold the discharge pending cardiac evaluation. Respondent discharged J. P. S. three days later, after physicians could monitor the level of Digoxin to ensure that J. P. S. was safe for discharge. P. S.'s entire hospitalization was medically necessary. Petitioner improperly denied the last three days of inpatient services. J. P. was admitted on December 8, 2001. Petitioner does not contest the medical necessity of services to treat J. P.'s fever from December 8-12. The parties' dispute concerns the medical necessity of the remaining 14 days of J. P.'s hospitalization. J. P., a 27-year-old male, presented to the emergency department with high-grade fevers and severe headaches and a history of AIDS. Dr. Silkes approved the treatment of the fever until it ended on December 12. The fever was likely caused by J. P.'s toxoplasmosis of the central nervous system. This is an opportunistic condition not unusual in immunocompromised patients. Candida fungal infection likely caused J. P.'s complaints of pain on swallowing, as this too is an opportunistic condition. Additionally, a blood culture revealed a staph infection. Through December 18, J. P. was continuing to experience fevers of up to 101 degrees. At the same time, it was necessary to address the toxoplasmosis before it extended to other organs. This required the sequential administration of IV antibiotics and careful, continual monitoring of the patient for his clinical response to treatment. On December 20, J. P. underwent a bone marrow biopsy to rule out the extension of toxoplasmosis in the bone marrow or the presence of tuberculosis. This test was negative, which was a precondition for discharge. The pathology report was "received" on December 21, but not "printed" until December 27. However, J. P. did not complete his IV administration of Doxycycline until December 23, when the medical necessity for his inpatient services ended. Petitioner should have denied three days, not 14 days. W. P. was admitted on June 18, 2001. Dr. Silkes would allow only a 23-hour observation on the day of admission for the treatment of lung cancer and tuberculosis. The parties' dispute concerns the medical necessity of 13 days of his hospitalization from June 18 through July 1 (even though he was not discharged until July 13). W. P., a 59-year-old male, presented to the emergency department with severe coughing up of blood and a recent loss of 40 pounds. A chest X-ray at admission revealed a large mass in the upper left lobe of the lungs. Lab work suggestive of anemia correlated with a malignancy as its source. Sputum to test for acid fast bacillus was taken, and a consult was immediately arranged with a pulmonary specialist to consider a bronchoscopy and to take a biopsy. A CT scan of the chest on June 18 revealed abnormal soft tissue density filling the right upper lobe, two tumors, and numerous nodes. The bronchoscopy on June 19 revealed 80 percent obstruction of the right main bronchus secondary to an endobronchial lesion and 100 percent obstruction of the right upper lobe. A biopsy of the right mainstem bronchus revealed a squamous cell carcinoma. A physician noted in his consultation report that W. P. was to complete his metastatic survey on the day of the report--June 22--after which they would discuss palliative treatment. The report states that the patient understands that he will unlikely live more than six months. Subsequently, acid fast bacillus, which had originally not been detected, was found, so W. P. was placed in isolation on June 26. He had been experiencing elevated white blood counts and fevers. He was placed on antituberculosis treatment, which, as noted above, typically takes two or three weeks until the patient can be removed from isolation. July 10 was W. P.'s first day without fever. On this date, Respondent sent his records to the Health Department to facilitate a transfer to a tuberculosis hospital. He was discharged on July 13. W. P.'s entire hospitalization was medically necessary. Petitioner should not have denied any of the 13 days that it denied. M. Pr. was admitted on December 18, 2001. Petitioner does not contest the medical necessity of inpatient services to treat M. Pr.'s coronary artery disease from December 18-27. The parties' dispute concerns the medical necessity of the remaining seven days of M. Pr.'s hospitalization. M. Pr., a 58-year-old male, presented to the emergency department with a recent cardiovascular accident while out of state. A cardiac catheterization revealed severe triple vessel coronary artery disease. On December 19, M. Pr. underwent a four-vessel bypass. Post-operatively, however, M. Pr. fell while on the commode. The dispute in this case arises due to the unavailability of rehabilitation facilities that would take M. Pr. after his fall. He was suitable for discharge on December 28, but no facility could be found to receive him. These are "grace days," as noted in the Handbook and are available, on a limited basis, for persons under 21 years of age, but, by negative implication, are unavailable for adults. Thus, medical necessity dictated that Respondent discharge M. Pr. on December 27, so the inpatient services are not reimbursable after December 28, given that the day of discharge is not allowable. Dr. Silkes' determination was correct in this case. Petitioner properly denied seven days' inpatient services for M. Pr. A. R. was admitted on December 30, 2001. Petitioner has denied the entire 14 days of A. R.'s hospitalization, although Dr. Silkes approved one day's inpatient services, on the day of admission, for the treatment of ovarian cancer. A. R., a 63-year-old female, presented to the emergency department with vomiting on the day of admission, progressive abdominal distension, anorexia, weight loss over the past month, and a 15-year history of bronchial asthma. A CT scan of A. R.'s thorax at the time of admission revealed a large collection of fluid in the abdominal cavity. At this time, a physician removed 4.5 liters of fluid from the cavity, and A. R., not surprisingly, began to feel much better. A report on January 3--delayed probably due to the holidays-- indicated the presence of scattered malignant cells in the withdrawn fluid compatible with carcinoma. Metastatic ovarian cancer was subsequently confirmed. A. R.'s case was complicated by the withdrawal of this large volume of fluids, which required continual monitoring of her electrolytes, and the sudden exacerbation of her dementia on January 2, which would impede outpatient services, as well as the initiation of chemotherapy. The dementia, which had been progressive for the past six months, was likely a reaction to the carcinoma. By January 11, a physician recommended hospice placement given A. R.'s incurable tumor. A. R.'s daughter agreed on this day to hospice placement. This is the day that medical necessity for inpatient services ended. Petitioners should have denied three days, not 14 days. The remaining days were medically necessary. E. S. was admitted on May 4, 2001. Petitioner does not contest the medical necessity of inpatient services to treat E. S.'s pancreatitis and multisystem failure from May 4-23. The parties' dispute concerns the medical necessity of the remaining 24 days of her hospitalization, which ended with her death. E. S., a 64-year-old female, presented to the emergency department with nausea and abdominal pain and a history of hypertension and abuse of alcohol and tobacco. She was found to have elevated pancreatic enzymes. On May 8, E. S. underwent a laparoscopic removal of her gallbladder, which she tolerated well, but soon afterwards suffered respiratory failure. E. S. was then placed on a ventilator. Problems with malnourishment and then kidney failure precluded a successful weaning her off the ventilator. On May 23, the family agreed to a DNR code. May 23 marks the last day that Dr. Silkes found that E. S.'s hospitalization was medically necessary. Care after this date was entirely supportive and not medically necessary; however, no hospice or skilled nursing facility would take E. S. because she could not be weaned off the ventilator. The unavailability of an alternative, less costly setting does not automatically render the inpatient care of a recipient medically necessary. The circumstances dictate whether inpatient services to such a patient are medically necessary. Here, it is impossible to find that services after May 23 were medically necessary. Dr. Silkes was correct in her opinion. Petitioner properly denied all 24 days of inpatient services for E. S. D. S. was admitted on March 24, 2001. Petitioner does not contest the medical necessity of inpatient services to treat D. S.'s osteomyelitis of the right foot from March 24-25 and March 30-April 10. (Originally, Dr. Silkes allowed only March 24-25 and March 30-April 6, but, on February 7, 2007, she revised her opinion to allow the additional four days to April 10.) In its prehearing statement, Petitioner conceded that only three of the original ten denied days remained at issue, as it was agreeing that an additional seven days were medically necessary. The parties' dispute concerns the medical necessity of the remaining three days, although it is not clear what three days Petitioner is contesting. D. S., a 57-year-old female, presented at the emergency department with a "hole in the right foot" and a history of diabetes. She dropped a can of juice on her foot on January 1, and the foot had become progressively infected since that time. On the day of admission, she underwent surgery for the removal of fourth and fifth metatarsal bones and toes of the right foot. She did not heal properly and required followup surgery on April 7 to trim some of the necrotic flap, as the physicians considered the possibility of a below-knee amputation. On April 13, the surgeon probed the wound, found no hidden pockets, and discharged D. S. Regardless what three days that Petitioner continues to find were not medically necessary, the entire hospitalization was medically necessary. J. W. was admitted on August 20, 2001. Petitioner does not contest the medical necessity of inpatient services to treat J. W.'s multiple organ failure from August 20 to September 14. The parties' dispute concerns the medical necessity of the remaining two days of J. W.'s hospitalization, at which time he died. J. W., a 48-year-old male, presented to the emergency department with a two or three-day history of progressive congestive heart failure with pulmonary edema, atypical chest pain, and increasing abdominal girth. His history included nonischemic cardiomyopathy with minimal coronary artery disease, chronic alcohol abuse, pulmonary hypertension, chronic atrial fibrillation requiring anticoagulation therapy, hepatitis B and C, chronic renal insufficiency, and chronic congestive heart failure with multiple hospitalizations. On admission, his INR was 6.6, indicative of very slow clotting. Despite the care of numerous consultants, J. W. suffered increased respiratory failure on September 5, at which time he was intubated. He received a Greenfield filter on September 7 to prevent further pulmonary clots. Starting September 10, and continuing everyday thereafter, J. W. required dialysis due to renal failure. J. W. was on total parenteral feeding as of September 14. The family, whose availability had been a problem, agreed to a DNR code on September 17. Respondent claims in its proposed recommended order that a DNR code is a precondition to hospice care, but no competent evidence establishes this fact. Dr. Silkes and Petitioner properly denied the last two days because they were not medically necessary. M. W. was admitted on June 10, 2001. Petitioner does not contest the medical necessity of inpatient services to treat M. W.'s ventricular fibrillation and complications from June 10- The parties' dispute concerns the medical necessity of the remaining seven days of M. W.'s hospitalization. M. W., a 31-year-old male, presented to the emergency department with cardiopulmonary arrest after his wife found him slumped on the sofa, seizing. On arrival, he was found to be in ventricular fibrillation, and he was intubated. Physicians restored a normal rhythm, but M. W. suffered a seizure in the emergency department, so he was given large doses of Dilantin. M. W. had suffered brain damage from cerebral anoxia. M. W. was extubated on June 13, and his breathing remained stable. He remained in normal sinus rhythm. M. W. began to receive Librium on June 13 to sedate him. The cardiologist proposed a cardiac catheterization, but M. W. refused. An EKG on June 15 found a conduction defect in M. W.'s heart that was suggestive of Wolff Parkinson White syndrome. The cardiologist then determined, on June 16, that M. W. required an electrophysiology study to rule out Wolff Parkinson White syndrome. In 2001, Respondent lacked the equipment to perform this study, for which M. W. remained too confused to participate on June 18 anyhow. Physicians continued to monitor M. W.'s cardiac rhythm, and, when a bed opened at Florida Hospital, Orlando, which had the necessary equipment, Respondent promptly transferred M. W. on June 22. During the transfer, the cardiac monitor continued to check M. W.'s rhythm due to the risk of another cardiac incident until the underlying cardiac abnormality was assessed and treated. Petitioner improperly denied the final seven days of M. W.'s hospitalization. M. W. had suffered a serious cardiac event. Physicians had not yet ruled out all possible reasons for the event and needed to address a promising possibility of Wolff Parkinson White syndrome, so M. W. remained at risk for another event. He was confused from the brain damage. All of these factors militate in favor of finding that the remaining seven days of inpatient services were medically necessary. E. A. $1666.62 R. B. $5703.18 N. C. $7332.66 N. Ch. $38,332.26 J. C. $4888.44 R. LaB. $833.31 J. L. $1666.62 C. M. $9166.41 M. M. $2499.93 The total overpayment is $104,309.97, which breaks down as follows: J. P. $2444.22 M. Pr. $5703.18 A. R. $2444.22 E. S. $19,999.44 J. S. $1629.48
Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that the Agency for Health Care Administration enter a final order finding overpayments totaling $104,309.97 during the audit period and requiring that Respondent repay this amount, imposing an administrative fine of $1000, requiring Respondent to prepare a corrective action plan, and reserving jurisdiction to remand the case to the Division of Administrative Hearing for a determination of Petitioner's entitlement to statutory costs, if any. DONE AND ENTERED this 6th day of June, 2007, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ROBERT E. MEALE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of June, 2007. COPIES FURNISHED: Richard J. Shoop, Agency Clerk Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive, Mail Stop 3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Craig H. Smith, General Counsel Agency for Health Care Administration Fort Knox Building, Suite 3431 2727 Mahan Drive, Mail Stop 3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Dr. Andrew C. Agwunobi, Secretary Agency for Health Care Administration Fort Knox Building 3116 2727 Mahan Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Richard M. Ellis, Esquire Rutledge, Ecenia, Purnell & Hoffman, P.A. 215 South Monroe Street, Suite 420 Post Office Box 551 Tallahassee, Florida 32304-0551 William Blocker, Esquire Agency for Health Care Administration Fort Knox Building III, Mail Stop 3 2727 Mahan Drive, Building 3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Daniel Lake, Esquire Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive, Suite 3431 Fort Knox Building III, Mail Stop 3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Tracy Cooper, Esquire Agency for Health Care Administration Fort Knox Building III, Mail Stop 3 2727 Mahan Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32308
The Issue The issues in this case are whether the statement contained in Respondent's letter dated September 9, 1997 (1997 Letter), establishing a $24.00 payment for hospital outpatient services billed as revenue code 451 constitutes a rule as defined by Subsection 120.52(15), Florida Statutes (2010),1 and, if so, whether Respondent violated Subsection 120.54(1), Florida Statutes, by not adopting the statement in accordance with applicable rulemaking procedures.
Findings Of Fact AHCA is the state agency responsible for the administration of the Florida Medicaid Program. § 409.902, Fla. Stat. Petitioners are acute care hospitals that are and were enrolled as Medicaid providers of outpatient services in Florida, at all times relevant to this proceeding. On September 9, 1997, AHCA issued a letter to hospital administrators, which provided the following: This letter is to inform you that Medicaid coverage for hospital emergency room screening and examination services is now in effect. Hospitals will be reimbursed a $24.00 flat fee for providing these services to Medipass and Medicaid fee-for-service recipients who do not require further treatment beyond the screening and examination services. This policy is retroactive to July 1, 1996. The letter further provides that the $24.00 reimbursement would be billed under the revenue code 451. The statement in the letter applies to hospitals which are Medicaid providers and, therefore, is a statement of general applicability. The statement meets the definition of a rule. AHCA concedes that the statement, which provides "payment of a $24 rate for Medicaid Hospital Outpatient Services billed under Revenue Code 451, constitutes a rule under s. 120.52(16), Fla. Stat." AHCA concedes that the statement has not been adopted as a rule by the rule adoption procedures provided in Section 120.54, Florida Statutes. AHCA has discontinued all reliance on the challenged statement.
The Issue Whether the Agency for Health Care Administration (Petitioner) is entitled to recover certain Medicaid payments made to Cape Memorial Hospital, Inc., d/b/a Cape Coral Hospital (Respondent).
Findings Of Fact Title XIX of the Social Security Act establishes Medicaid as a collaborative federal-state program in which the state receives federal funding (also known as “federal financial participation” or “FFP") for services provided to Medicaid- eligible recipients in accordance with federal law. The Florida statutes and rules relevant to this proceeding essentially incorporate federal Medicaid standards. The Petitioner is the state agency charged with administering the Medicaid provisions relevant to this proceeding. Section 409.902, Florida Statutes (2015)1/, states that the Petitioner is the “single state agency authorized to make payments” under the Medicaid program. The referenced statute limits such payments to “services included in the program” and only on “behalf of eligible individuals.” The Respondent is enrolled in the Florida Medicaid Program as a Medicaid Hospital Provider. The Respondent's participation in the Florida Medicaid Program is subject to the terms of a Medicaid Provider Agreement. The Respondent's Medicaid Provider Agreement requires compliance with all state and federal laws governing the Medicaid program, including the state and federal laws limiting Medicaid payments for services provided to undocumented aliens. Eligibility for Medicaid services is restricted to United States citizens, and to specified non-citizens who have been lawfully admitted into the United States. Pursuant to section 409.902(2)(b), Medicaid funds cannot be used to provide medical services to individuals who do not meet the statutory eligibility criteria "unless the services are necessary to treat an emergency medical condition" or are for pregnant women. The cited statute further provides that such services are “authorized only to the extent provided under federal law.” The relevant federal law (42 U.S.C. section 1396b(v)(3)) defines an "emergency medical condition" as: medical condition (including emergency labor and delivery) manifesting itself by acute symptoms of sufficient severity (including severe pain) such that the absence of immediate medical attention could reasonably be expected to result in-(A) placing the patient's health in serious jeopardy, (B) serious impairment to bodily functions, or (C) serious dysfunction of any bodily organ or part. The Florida definition of “emergency medical condition” set forth at section 409.901(10)(a) mirrors the federal definition. Pursuant to section 409.904(4), the Petitioner can make payments to a Medicaid provider on behalf of "a low-income person who meets all other requirements for Medicaid eligibility except citizenship and who is in need of emergency medical services" for “the period of the emergency, in accordance with federal regulations." The Florida Medicaid program requirements relevant to this proceeding were identified in the Florida Hospital Services Coverage and Limitations Handbook (incorporated by reference in Florida Administrative Code Rule 59G-4.160(2),), and in the Florida Medicaid Provider General Handbook (incorporated by reference in Florida Administrative Code Rule 59G-5.020.) The applicable Florida Hospital Services Coverage and Limitations Handbook provided as follows: The Medicaid Hospital Services Program reimburses for emergency services provided to aliens who meet all Medicaid eligibility requirements except for citizenship or alien status. Eligibility can be authorized only for the duration of the emergency. Medicaid will not pay for continuous or episodic services after the emergency has been alleviated. Similar provisions were contained in the Florida Medicaid Provider General Handbook. Section 409.913 requires that the Petitioner monitor the activities of Medicaid providers and to “recover overpayments.” The Petitioner’s Bureau of Medicaid Program Integrity (BMPI) routinely conducts audits to monitor Medicaid providers. Section 409.913(1)(e) defines “overpayment” to include “any amount that is not authorized to be paid by the Medicaid program whether paid as a result of inaccurate or improper cost reporting, improper claiming, unacceptable practices, fraud, abuse, or mistake.” The BMPI conducted a review of the Respondent's claims for services rendered to undocumented aliens during the period January 1 through December 31, 2006. The Respondent provided all documentation requested by the Petitioner necessary to review the claims addressed herein. As to each claim, the designated reviewing physician made a determination, based on the medical records, as to whether the claim was related to an emergency medical condition, and, if so, when the emergency medical condition was alleviated. Based on the evidence, and on the testimony of the physicians identified herein, the determinations of the physicians are fully credited as to the existence of emergency medical conditions and as to when such conditions were alleviated. CLAIM #1 Dr. Thomas Wells reviewed Claim #1, which involved a length of stay from March 31 through April 10, 2006. Based upon his review of the medical records, Dr. Wells determined that an emergency medical condition existed on March 31, 2006, and that it had been alleviated as of April 6, 2006. CLAIM #3 Dr. Michael Phillips reviewed Claim #3, which involved a length of stay from May 27 through June 12, 2006. Based upon his review of the medical records, Dr. Phillips determined that an emergency medical condition existed on May 27, 2006, and that it had been alleviated as of May 28, 2006. CLAIM #4 Dr. Michael Phillips reviewed Claim #4, which involved a length of stay from January 15 through January 20, 2006. Based upon his review of the medical records, Dr. Phillips determined that an emergency medical condition existed on January 15, 2006, and that it had been alleviated as of January 17, 2006. CLAIM #5 Dr. Michael Phillips reviewed Claim #5, which involved a length of stay from March 4 through April 10, 2006. Based upon his review of the medical records, Dr. Phillips determined that an emergency medical condition existed on March 4, 2006, and that it had been alleviated as of March 7, 2006. CLAIM #6 Dr. Steve Beiser reviewed Claim #6, which involved a length of stay from June 15 through June 18, 2006. Based upon his review of the medical records, Dr. Beiser determined that an emergency medical condition existed on June 15, 2006, and that it had been alleviated as of June 16, 2006. CLAIM #7 Dr. Thomas Wells reviewed Claim #7, which involved a length of stay from June 15 through July 6, 2006. Based upon his review of the medical records, Dr. Wells determined that the emergency medical condition existed on June 15, 2006, and that it had been alleviated as of June 28, 2006.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Agency for Health Care Administration enter a final order finding a Medicaid overpayment of $57,350.67 related to the six claims identified herein. Pursuant to section 409.913(23), Florida Statutes, the Petitioner is entitled to recover certain investigative, legal, and expert witness costs. Jurisdiction is retained to determine the amount of appropriate costs if the parties are unable to agree. Within 30 days after entry of the final order, either party may file a request for a hearing on the amount. Failure to request a hearing within 30 days after entry of the final order shall be deemed to indicate that the issue of costs has been resolved. DONE AND ENTERED this 27th day of July, 2016, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S WILLIAM F. QUATTLEBAUM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of July, 2016.
The Issue Whether Petitioner's application for a Certificate of Need for a 50-bed addition to the Ormond Beach Hospital should be approved, pursuant to Chapter 381, Florida Statutes. This case involves petitioner's application for a certificate of need to expand, renovate, and consolidate ancillary service areas, and a 50-bed addition to its hospital. Respondent approved the application and issued a certificate of need for all aspects of the project except the 50-bed addition which it found would be inconsistent with the current health systems plan of Health Systems Agency of Northeast Florida, Inc., and because it determined that there was not a need for the additional beds in Volusia County. Petitioner filed its request for a Chapter 120 hearing. Thereafter, Intervenor Daytona Beach General Hospital, Inc., an orthopedic hospital located in Daytona Beach, petitioned for and was granted intervention in the proceeding over the objection of petitioner. During the course of the extensive hearing in this case, 15 witnesses testified in behalf of Petitioner, two were called by respondent, and four by the Intervenor. Eighty-seven exhibits were admitted in evidence. Exhibit 68 was withdrawn by stipulation of the parties.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a licensed 81-bed non-profit osteopathic general acute care hospital located at 264 South Atlantic Avenue, Ormond Beach, Florida. It is located on a site of approximately 4.6 acres bordered by Highway A1A on the east and Ormond Parkway on the north. The hospital plant consists of three buildings which have been joined together. One is a one-story dietary building that was originally a restaurant. A two-story building was built in 1970, and a one-story structure was built in 1954 and added to in 1960 and 1967. Other buildings owned by the hospital are adjacent residential homes on the premises which are used for storage, laundry, and other purposes. (Testimony of Hull, Exhibits 1-2, 13, 30, 59, 70) By a series of letters commencing on January 25, 1979, Petitioner advised Respondent's Office of Community Medical Facilities and the Health Systems Agency of Northeast Florida Area 3, Inc. (HSA) of its intent to expand and modernize its hospital and increase bed capacity. The last letter of intent was dated July 24, 1979. On September 21, 1979, Petitioner submitted its Certificate of Need Project Review Application to Respondent which included a request to increase the hospital's bed capacity from 81 to 161 beds. By letter of September 25, 1979, Respondent requested further information and, on December 11, 1979, Petitioner complied with the request and revised its application to seek only 50 additional beds. The proposed expansion and modernization plan included construction of a two-story addition to provide approximately 39,500 additional square feet, and renovation of approximately 22,000 square feet. Completion of the project would raise the hospital's total square footage of 39,350 to approximately 79,000 square feet. Incident to its request for additional beds, Petitioner proposes to initiate a 6-bed obstetrical unit at the hospital. (Exhibits 1-2, 7, 45-48) Petitioner's application was considered by various components of the HSA in January 1980, which resulted in a report and recommendations on the application which was filed with Respondent on February 25, 1980. During the course of the HSA's consideration of Petitioner's application at its several levels, representatives of Petitioner and the Intervenor appeared at the various meetings and presented their respective views regarding the application. The HSA report recommended approval of Petitioner's application for the renovation of its existing facilities and ancillary services, and approval of 44 additional beds. It further recommended that the state should take actions necessary to delicense a like number of beds within Petitioner's service area. The recommendation of 44 instead of 50 beds resulted from a finding that the proposed 6-bed obstetrical unit was not needed in the community in view of the probability that osteopathic physicians would likely be granted obstetric privileges in the future at allopathic facilities as a result of the enactment of legislation prohibiting the discrimination by particular provider professions against osteopathic physicians. The HSA found that although "Goal" DTS 1 in its Health Service Plan (HSP) which is used as a "guide" for health planning called for less than 4.3 acute care hospital beds per 1000 population with an overall average annual occupancy rate of at least 80 percent by 1984 in Health Service Area 3, it could approve additional beds for opening prior to 1984 if "extraordinary circumstances" exist as identified in "Goal" EA 2. It further found that Area 3 then had 5255 civilian acute care hospital beds, or a rate of 5.4 beds per 1000 population, with an average occupancy of 61 percent, and that, therefore, approval of additional beds, without cause, would be contrary to "Goal" DTS 1. However, the agency determined that extraordinary circumstances existed in Petitioner's case due to the fact that it had been operating for the past several years at an average occupancy of near or above 90 percent and that within its service area there existed in excess of 200 licensed medical surgical beds which were not staffed or used. The HSA therefore concluded that the situation denied ready access to acute care facilities to the citizens residing in Petitioner's service area. The HSA also considered that approval of the project would improve the effective and geographic distribution of beds and patient and physician accessibility in Volusia County because it was the only hospital located on the beach peninsula. It further found that the great number of elderly patients living in Volusia County and seasonal population fluctuations due to large numbers of tourists living in the area could be denied access to inpatient facilities if the project was not approved. As other extenuating factors, the HSA report stated that Petitioner had been granted prior certificates of need to expand its bed capacity, but that they had expired prior to implementation, that its inpatient facilities were antiquated, that denial of the beds would serve to deny access to patients of osteopathic facilities, and that federal law (PL 96-79) recognized that the need for additional or expanded osteopathic facilities should be determined on the basis of the need for and availability in the community for such services and facilities. (Testimony of Floyd, Hull, Exhibits 4, 8-12, 14, 59) By letter of March 28, 1980, Respondent's Administrator, Office of Community Medical Facilities, informed Petitioner that its application for certificate of need to expand, renovate and consolidate ancillary service areas at a total project cost of four million dollars was approved, and Certificate of Need Number 1236 was attached. The letter further advised petitioner that the proposed 50-bed addition was denied as being inconsistent with the current Health Systems Plan of the HSA, that there was not a need for the additional 50 beds in Volusia County as evidenced by facts contained in an attached State Agency Action Report, and that the extraordinary circumstances upon which the HSA recommended approval were not valid as evidenced by the same report. However, the referenced report was not submitted in evidence at the hearing, nor was any testimony adduced as to the rationale for the agency decision. By letter of May 28, 1980, Petitioner requested Respondent to increase the amount of the issued certificate of need to ten million dollars due to anticipated additional costs of construction and, by letter of July 24, 1980, Respondent advised Petitioner that the "cost over-run" had been approved and an amended copy of the Certificate of Need Number 1236 reflecting the additional cost was attached. (Testimony of Hull, Exhibits 57-58) Volusia County has eight hospitals of which six are allopathic and two are osteopathic. There are five hospitals in the Daytona Beach/Ormond Beach "coastal area" of the county which include Petitioner, Intervenor Daytona Beach General Hospital, Inc. (osteopathic), Ormond Beach Memorial Hospital, Daytona Community Hospital, and Halifax Hospital Medical Center. Two other hospitals in the county are Fish Memorial and West Volusia located in Deland. The remaining hospital is Fish Memorial at New Smyrna Beach. Petitioner is the only hospital on the beach peninsula which is connected to the mainland by several drawbridges. Daytona Beach General Hospital and Ormond Beach Memorial Hospital are located on the mainland in the northern "coastal area" several miles in distance from Petitioner. The remaining two hospitals in the area are within an average of 30 minutes driving time from Petitioner except during the peak tourist season of February to July each year, or when undue delays are experienced at the drawbridges. The HSA recognizes Petitioner's health service area to be Volusia County. In June 1979, the eight hospitals in Volusia County had a total of 1675 licensed beds, of which 1395 were open and staffed for use. Of the 378 osteopathic beds, only 178 were open and staffed. Occupancy of the licensed beds during the period July 1978 to June 1979 ranged from a low of 13.8 percent for Daytona Beach General Hospital to a high of 92 percent for Petitioner. The average occupancy of all licensed hospital beds was 51.2 percent. For the month of July, 1980, 1418 beds were open and staffed with 65.2 percent occupancy. Fish Memorial Hospital of New Smyrna Beach has a certificate of need for an additional 45 beds. In June 1979, all of Petitioner's licensed beds were staffed, but only 97 of Daytona Beach General Hospital's 297 licensed beds were staffed and available for use. Its patient population, however, has increased during the past year. In July 1978, Volusia County had a population of approximately 230,000 and therefore had about 7 acute care beds per 1,000 population. The 1980 preliminary census figures for the county showed the population to be 249,434 and it is projected that the final census figures will increase from one to two percent which would place the county population at between 252,000 and 254,000. If the higher figure is utilized, the bed ratio for the county at the present time would still be over 6 beds per 1,000 population. It is projected that the population of Volusia County will increase to 275,900 by 1984. If the current 1675 licensed beds remain the same, there would then be approximately 6 beds per 1,000 population. Approximately 25 percent of the Volusia County population consists of individuals who are 65 years of age or older whereas only some 9 percent of the population in the other six counties in HSA Area 3 are in that category. Although the HSA's plan arrived at its goal of 4.3 beds per 1,000 population for Area 3 in accordance with federal guidelines which allowed for adjustments in areas with referral hospitals, high tourism rates, and areas with greater than 12 percent of the population being 65 years of age or older, no further adjustment was made for Volusia County in spite of the fact that the Area 3 rate of about 13 percent of elderly population is about half that of the county. Further, the seasonal fluctuation as a result of tourists was not quantified on the basis of available statistics. However, in its justification for the 4.3 beds goal, the HSP makes note of the fact that Volusia County has 22 percent more patients per day during the high tourist months than during the lowest occupancy months of he year. On an average day in 1979, 73,000 tourists were in Volusia County which equated to approximately an additional 30 percent of the county population of 240,421. During the year 1979-80, about 22 percent of Petitioner's patients were residents of places other than Volusia County. However, there are no available statistics on the numbers of such persons who were inpatients. Most of the tourists seek only outpatient treatment for sunburn and minor injuries, although some undergo surgery during the months they are visiting the coastal area. (Testimony of Schwartz, Floyd, Smith, Hull, Clapper, Exhibits 3, 5-6, 18-26, 29, 51) Petitioner's application reflected that its 81 licensed beds were then utilized as medical/surgical (69 beds), intensive care (6 beds), and pediatrics (6 beds). The proposed additional 50 patient beds would be utilized as medical/surgical (29), intensive care (6), progressive care (4), pediatrics (3), obstetrical (6), and isolation (2). However, subsequent to filing its application, Petitioner discontinued its pediatric ward, and created 3 additional medical/surgical beds from the 6 former pediatric beds. (Testimony of Hull, Exhibit 2) The need for six additional intensive care beds and the initiation of a four-bed progressive care unit is to eliminate the past practice of prematurely transferring intensive care patients to other patient beds due to an insufficient number of intensive care beds. Such transfers required the conversion of semi-private into private rooms with additional equipment and nursing care which also reduced the total number of available beds within the hospital. Transfers of this nature were made extensively during the past fiscal year. (Testimony of Hull, Schwartz, Nargelovic, D'Assaro, Exhibit 2) The request in the application for two beds to serve as isolation rooms is based upon the fact that petitioner does not maintain any such rooms at the present time and it requires them to meet acceptable standards of health care. Currently, when isolation is necessary, a semi-private room is converted for the single patient requiring isolation, thus reducing the number of available beds. (Testimony of Schwartz, Hull, Nargelovic, Exhibit 2) Petitioner's request to establish a six-bed obstetrical unit is based upon its claim that such a unit is necessary to properly provide patients of osteopathic physicians with such a service and to provide full health care services which would not only attract new physicians to the hospital, but also enable Petitioner to conduct an intern training program. In addition, Petitioner is of the opinion that such a unit is necessary to provide service to patients living on the peninsula because the closest hospital providing obstetrical care is Halifax Hospital which is located on the mainland. The other obstetrical units are located at Fish Memorial Hospital at New Smyrna Beach and West Volusia Hospital at Deland which are some thirty miles away and do not conduct approved intern or residence programs for osteopathy. Halifax Hospital restricts staff privileges to those physicians who have met American Medical Association criteria and, therefore, osteopathic physicians generally are not eligible to utilize the obstetrical unit there. The HSA found that Petitioner projected 375 deliveries in its proposed obstetrics department during the third year of operation. The agency's HSP goal DTS 4.2 provides that no additional obstetrical departments should be approved in Volusia County until each existing department in the county is performing at least 1,000 deliveries annually. Only Halifax Hospital exceeds the 1,000 annual delivery standard. The HSA disapproved the requested obstetrical beds based upon its view that obstetrical beds at Halifax Hospital would eventually become available for use by osteopathic physicians. (Testimony of Schwartz, Hull, Rees, Exhibit 2-3, 6, 14, 54-55) Petitioner primarily bases its request for the additional 29 medical/surgical beds on the fact that it is the only hospital on the peninsula, has extreme seasonal demands placed on it by tourist population, and that the hospital census has been over 92 percent average occupancy during the past fiscal year. At times, the hospital has been filled to capacity, and has found it necessary to use "hall beds" to meet the need for emergency admissions. The crowded conditions have necessitated frequent delays in patient admissions or the referral of patients to other hospitals. A patient occupancy rate averaging 80-85 percent is normally acceptable, but Petitioner experiences a certain amount of inefficiency and lessened quality of care when over 80 percent of its beds are occupied. This is reflected in the difficulty of staffing and providing support services, and possible premature patient discharge. (Testimony of Schwartz, Hull, D'Assaro, Draper, Mason, Shoemaker, Exhibits 2, 51, 69) Although approximately 80 percent of Petitioner's patients reside in the coastal area of Volusia County, only some 29 percent reside in the northeastern part of the county where Petitioner's hospital is located. Petitioner currently has 27 osteopathic physicians on its staff, 18 of whom admit their patients principally to Ormond Beach Hospital and 7 admit there exclusively. Nineteen of the osteopathic physicians have staff privileges at other hospitals. Twenty-four allopathic physicians have staff privileges at Ormond Beach Hospital, but most are specialty consultants who admit less than one percent of Petitioner's patients. (Testimony of Schwartz, Floyd, Hull, D'Assaro, Exhibits 16-17, 60, 67) The quality of care provided patients at Ormond Beach Hospital is excellent, particularly in view of the antiquated physical plant and prevailing crowded conditions. These problems have led to the existence of a number of existing beds which do not conform to state fire, safety and other standards. It is planned that the majority of the existing beds will be located in a new building to provide room in the present buildings for expansion of ancillary and support facilities. The hospital is accredited by the American Osteopathic Association and by the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals. Accreditation by the Joint Commission indicates that a hospital provides an excellent standard of Health care. (Testimony of Draper, Boxx, Hull, Wisely, Mason, Shoemaker, D. Smith, Exhibits 1-2, 28-42, 49-50, 71-77) Petitioner is an osteopathic hospital whose Board of Directors is composed of osteopathic physicians. There are no physical differences between allopathic and osteopathic hospitals with the minor exception that the latter utilizes a table for manipulative therapy for some 20 to 30 percent of the patients. The primary difference between the two concepts is philosophical in nature. Osteopathy emphasizes a "wholistic" approach to medicine which stresses the importance of the musculoskeletal structure and manipulative therapy in the maintenance and restoration of health. It is family practice-oriented with about 75 percent of osteopathic physicians engaged in general practice rather than specialty medicine. Emphasis is placed upon personal attention by the physician to the patient. These factors produce a certain amount of patient preference for treatment in an osteopathic facility. (Testimony of Floyd, Schwartz, Wisely, Hull, Mason, Shoemaker, D. Smith, D'Assaro, Exhibit 78) Although the bylaws of two of the three allopathic hospitals located in the coastal area of Volusia County have recently been amended to permit osteopathic physicians to obtain staff privileges, certain vestiges of prior discrimination still exist due to the fact that hospital control is exercised by allopathic physicians, and that board certification is required which excludes many osteopathic physicians. The third hospital, Halifax, requires board certification in an American Medical Association approved specialty or residence program. As a consequence, only one osteopathic physician is on its staff. (Testimony of Draper, Hull, Porth, Helker, Rees, D. Smith, Exhibits 54, 63, 66) Daytona Beach General Hospital, Inc. is the other osteopathic hospital in the area which is located on the mainland several miles away from Ormond Beach Hospital. It has 297 licensed beds, but only 107 were staffed and open for use in July 1980. Its rate of occupancy in June 1979 was 13.8 percent of the licensed beds. The hospital has experienced past difficulties due to a substandard physical plant and inadequate staffing in certain areas. Although many osteopathic physicians decline to admit patients to the hospital, they generally agree that the standard of care is adequate, except for critical care cases. The hospital has sought in the past to attract additional patients by accepting staff applications from qualified area physicians. Daytona Beach General is accredited by The American Osteopathic Association and has pending an application for accreditation by the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals. (Testimony of Draper, Wisely, Boxx, Hull, D. Smith, Clapper, Solomon, Exhibits 27, 29-80) Petitioner has exerted efforts to acquire licensed hospital beds from other area hospitals to alleviate its shortage, but has been unsuccessful. Hospitals are reluctant to give up licensed beds even though they are not currently being utilized because they normally anticipate a need for them in future years. Although Daytona Beach General Hospital has been the subject of negotiations for sale with various entities, including Petitioner, in recent years, they have not been successful. None of the hospitals, including Petitioner, desires to share space in other hospitals due to the resulting lack of control over operations and procedures. Petitioner held a certificate of need for 84 beds in 1976 which it was forced to relinquish when it received a certificate of need for the proposed purchase of Daytona Beach General Hospital. (Testimony of Boxx, Hull, Porth, Hilker, Clapper, Rees, Draper, Exhibits 15, 28, 21-37, 43-44, 55-56) It is estimated that the renovation and expansion of Ormond Beach Hospital will take from 18 to 24 months to complete. Approval of additional beds will result in dividing construction expenses among a greater number of patients, thus lowering costs of health care. On the other hand, without the addition of hospital beds, an increase in patient costs is to be expected. The addition of new beds will be a positive factor in Petitioner's recruitment of osteopathic physicians to the area and in initiating an intern training program. It should also serve to increase Petitioner's competitive position among other area hospitals and provide a better quality of care for its patients. (Testimony of Draper, Boxx, Hull, D. Smith, Clapper)
Recommendation That the application of Petitioner for a certificate of need for a 50 acute-care bed addition to its facility be approved in part for 38 additional acute-care beds. DONE and ENTERED this 6th day of April, 1981, in Tallahassee, Florida. THOMAS C. OLDHAM Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of April, 1981. COPIES FURNISHED: Eric J. Haugdahl, Esquire Department of HRS 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Bernard H. Dempsey, Jr., Karen L. Goldsmith, Esquires Suite 610 Eola Office Center 605 East Robinson Street Orlando, Florida 32801 L. LaRue Williams, and Glenn R. Padgett, Esquires Kinsay, Vincent, Pyle, Williams and Tumbleson 52 South Peninsula Drive Daytona Beach, Florida 32018 Honorable Alvin Taylor Secretary, Department of HRS 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32301 =================================================================
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent failed to maintain a service plan for each of four residents, in violation of the Florida Medicaid Assistive Care Services Coverage and Limitations Handbook. If so, an additional issue is the sanctions that should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Respondent owns and operates an assisted living facility known as Izquierdo Home Care I. At all material times, Respondent was enrolled in the Medicaid program as a provider authorized to supply assistive living services to Medicaid recipients at Izquierdo Home Care I. At all material times, Respondent was subject to the Florida Medicaid Assistive Care Services Coverage and Limitations Handbook. The handbook imposed upon Respondent the duty to develop a service plan for each Medicaid recipient not less often than annually. On March 27, 2012, Petitioner's inspector conducted a site visit of Izquierdo Home Care I. At the time of the site visit, the facility had six beds, but only four residents. According to a letter from Petitioner dated March 27, 2012, and delivered to Respondent's representative at the time of the inspection, the following four residents were Medicaid recipients: E. C., R. R., J. H., and A. R. However, according to the questionnaire completed by Respondent's representative at the time of the inspection, only two of the four current residents were Medicaid recipients, although the questionnaire does not identify these residents. In fact, A. R. had been discharged from Izquierdo Home Care I in September 2011. At the hearing, Petitioner's inspector confirmed that Respondent had not billed Medicaid for services for A. R. after the date of discharge. The second resident whose Medicaid status is in question was identified, in Respondent's proposed recommended order, as E. C. Respondent contends in its proposed recommended order that E. C. was not receiving Medicaid at the time of the inspection. If the Proposed Recommended Order were the only notice to Petitioner of Respondent's claim that a second resident was not a Medicaid recipient, the Administrative Law Judge would ignore this assertion because it is not evidence, and, as a defense, it was raised too late. However, the questionnaire, which was admitted as one of Petitioner's exhibits, is evidence that two of the four residents were not receiving Medicaid at the time of the inspection. In assessing the evidentiary record in terms of whether it establishes a third Medicaid recipient, the Administrative Law Judge notes: a) Petitioner has alleged a violation concerning A. R., even though A. R. was no longer a Medicaid recipient at the time of the inspection; b) at hearing, Petitioner's inspector was readily able to read the "query" to confirm that Respondent had not submitted a Medicaid billing on account of A. R. after September 2011 (Transcript 49); and c) as discussed in the Conclusions of Law, Petitioner bears the burden of proof by clear and convincing evidence. Under these circumstances, Petitioner has proved only that two residents of the facility were Medicaid recipients at the time of the inspection. There is no dispute that current service plans for two Medicaid recipients did not exist at the time of the March 2012 inspection.
Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that the Agency for Health Care Administration enter a final order imposing a fine of $2000 against Respondent. DONE AND ENTERED this 26th day of October, 2012, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ROBERT E. MEALE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of October, 2012. COPIES FURNISHED: Jeffries H. Duvall, Esquire Office of the General Counsel Agency for Health Care Administration Fort Knox Executive Center, Building 3 2727 Mahan Drive, Mail Station 3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308-5403 Julia Arrendell, Qualified Representative 13899 Biscayne Boulevard North Miami Beach, Florida 33181 Elizabeth Dudek, Secretary Office of the General Counsel Agency for Health Care Administration Fort Knox Executive Center, Building 3 2727 Mahan Drive, Mail Station 3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308-5403 Stuart Williams, General Counsel Office of the General Counsel Agency for Health Care Administration Fort Knox Executive Center, Building 3 2727 Mahan Drive, Mail Station 3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308-5403 Richard J. Shoop, Agency Clerk Office of the General Counsel Agency for Health Care Administration Fort Knox Executive Center, Building 3 2727 Mahan Drive, Mail Station 3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308-5403
The Issue The issues in this case are whether Respondent violated Subsection 458.331(1)(t), Florida Statutes (2001),1 and, if so, what discipline should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact The Department is the state agency charged with the regulation of the practice of medicine pursuant to Section 20.43, Florida Statutes; Chapter 456, Florida Statutes; and Chapter 458, Florida Statutes. At all times material to the allegations in the Second Amended Administrative Complaint, Dr. Rivera was a licensed physician in the State of Florida, having been issued license number ME 0054619. Dr. Rivera is an anesthesiologist. On May 11, 2002, Patient A.V., an 82-year-old male, presented to the emergency room of Gulf Coast Hospital (Gulf Coast) with complaints of shortness of breath. A.V. had a history of chronic obstructive pulmonary disease. A.V. was admitted to the hospital by Michele Candelore, D.O. Gulf Coast is a small community hospital with approximately 150 beds. Southwest Florida Regional Medical Center (Southwest), a larger tertiary care hospital, is located three to five miles away from Gulf Coast. On May 16, 2002, Dr. Rivera provided anesthesia services to A.V. in association with a bronchoscopy. As a result of providing services to A.V., Dr. Rivera was familiar with A.V.’s medical conditions and risk factors for anesthesia. On May 18, 2002, Tracy Vo, D.O., was the physician on call at Gulf Coast. She was providing coverage for A.V.’s physician, and, around noon on that date, she discharged A.V. Dr. Vo left Gulf Coast and received a call between 5:00 and 5:15 p.m. that A.V. was complaining of abdominal pain and nausea. Dr. Vo ordered tests for A.V., including an abdominal ultrasound. Dr. Vo arrived at Gulf Coast between 5:15 and 5:30 p.m. She found A.V. to be hypotensive with rapidly decreasing systolic blood pressure. The results of the ultrasound showed that A.V. had a 5.3 centimeter abdominal aortic aneurysm (AAA) with a surrounding collection of fluid. An AAA is a life- threatening condition. Dr. Vo transferred A.V. to the intensive care unit (ICU), where she began infusions of fluids and dopamine in an attempt to elevate A.C.’s blood pressure and to resuscitate him. Dr. Vo requested a surgical consult. Dr. Harry Black, the on-call surgeon was not available, and the consult was referred to Dr. DeMoya, a general surgeon who was covering for Dr. Black. Dr. DeMoya was in surgery at another hospital and could not come to Gulf Coast. He was advised that A.C. had an AAA. Dr. DeMoya recommended that A.C. be transferred to Southwest, which was better equipped to handle an AAA. Dr. Vo felt that A.C. was too unstable to transfer at that time. In order to rapidly pump fluids into A.C., Dr. Vo asked the supervising nurse to contact the on-call anesthesiologist for a consult for placing a central line. A central line is a catheter that is passed through a vein, ending up in the thoracic portion of the vena cava or in the right atrium of the heart. Dr. Rivera was an employee of Dr. John Patrick, who was the chief of Anesthesiology at Gulf Coast. Dr. Patrick was out of town on May 18, 2002, and Dr. Rivera was the on-call anesthesiologist. Being on call means that the physician gets called when anesthesia services are needed. Dr. Rivera was contacted concerning the placement of a central line for A.V. Dr. Rivera got to Gulf Coast between 6:00 and 6:30 p.m. He went to the bedside of A.V. and recognized A.V. from having provided anesthesia services to A.V. earlier in A.V.'s admission. Dr. Rivera told Dr. Vo that he did not feel comfortable placing a central line and refused to do so. Although he had been taught as a resident to place a central line, he had not placed a central line since his residency in 1983. Dr. Vo asked the supervising nurse, Ellen Haviland, to continue her efforts to locate a vascular surgeon. Nurse Haviland contacted Dr. Brian Kurland, a vascular surgeon. Dr. Kurland agreed to come to Gulf Coast. Nurse Haviland told Dr. Rivera that Dr. Kurland was on his way to the hospital, and Dr. Rivera said that if Dr. Kurland was on his way that Dr. Kurland could place the central line. Dr. Kurland told the nurse to make sure that the patient and his family wanted the patient to undergo the surgery because of the severity of the operation and the risk of not having a successful outcome. He also ordered that the operating team be mobilized. After speaking with Dr. Kurland, Nurse Haviland went to the surgical supply room to make sure that the grafts needed for the operation were available. Dr. Vo told Dr. Rivera that Dr. Kurland was coming and that she was going to transfer A.V. to the operating room. General anesthesia is necessary for an AAA repair. Dr. Rivera recommended that A.C. be transferred to another hospital and refused to provide anesthesia to A.C. because he felt that the risk of giving anesthesia at Gulf Coast was unacceptable. Dr. Rivera noted his recommendation in the progress notes for A.V. at 7:00 p.m. Dr. Rivera then left the hospital and went home. He did not attempt to contact Dr. Kurland directly to advise Dr. Kurland of his concerns and that he was not going to provide anesthesia services. Dr. Kurland arrived at the hospital and went directly to the operating room, where he expected to find the patient and the operating team. However, no one was in the operating room. Dr. Kurland went to the ICU, where A.C. was. Dr. Kurland was advised that A.V. was not in the operating room because Dr. Rivera had refused to do the anesthesia. Dr. Kurland telephoned Dr. Rivera and told Dr. Rivera that although A.V. was a high-risk patient and would probably die, the best chance for saving A.V.’s life was to perform the surgery at Gulf Coast rather than transferring A.V. to another hospital. Dr. Rivera refused to come to the hospital to provide the anesthesia services. Dr. Kurland told the nursing staff to try to get another anesthesiologist and the chief of surgery. Dr. Kurland spoke with Dr. Patrick and told him that A.V. needed to have emergency surgery. Dr. Kurland placed a central line in A.V. to facilitate the giving of medications and fluids. Dr. Kurland told A.V.’s family that because they could not get an anesthesiologist that they had two options, either not to operate and let A.V. pass away or transfer him to another hospital for surgery. It was decided to transfer A.V. to Southwest. The Emergency Medical Services (EMS) personnel were called to transfer the patient. When the EMS staff arrived, A.V. was intubated. Shortly thereafter, A.V. went into cardiac arrest and unsuccessful efforts were made to resuscitate A.V. A.V. was pronounced dead at 8:16 p.m. After talking with Dr. Kurland, Dr. Patrick called Dr. Rivera and told him to go to the hospital and provide the anesthesia because Dr. Kurland had declared an emergency and was going to perform surgery. Dr. Rivera obeyed Dr. Patrick because Dr. Patrick “was paying his paycheck” and left his home to go to the hospital. Shortly after his conversation with Dr. Rivera, Dr. Patrick was advised that A.V. had died. Dr. Patrick called Dr. Rivera and told him not to go to the hospital because A.V. had died. John Downs, M.D., testified as an expert witness for Dr. Rivera. He is a professor at the University of South Florida. Dr. Downs is a nationally recognized expert in anesthesiology, but the last time that he was an on-call anesthesiologist in a small community hospital similar to Gulf Coast was in 1985. It was Dr. Down’s opinion that Dr Rivera did not violate the standard of care by leaving the hospital, by refusing to perform anesthesia services, and by not telling Dr. Kurland that he was not going to do the anesthesia prior to Dr. Kurland’s telephone call to him. It was Dr. Down’s opinion that Dr. Rivera was not required to give the anesthesia because the patient would die. Dr. Down’s opinion misses the mark. A.V. was in a life or death situation. Without surgery, A.V. was going to die. A.V. was not stable enough to transfer to another hospital; thus, emergent surgery was necessary if there was going to be any chance for survival. Dr. Down’s opinion that Dr. Rivera was not required to perform the anesthesia services is not credited. Minnea B. Kalra, M.D., testified as the Department’s expert. Dr. Kalra has practiced for approximately 30 years and has practiced as an on-call anesthesiologist in small community hospitals similar to Gulf Coast. In 2002, she was practicing as an on-call anesthesiologist in a 150-bed community hospital comparable to Gulf Coast. She has been the on-call anesthesiologist called to treat emergency AAA’s in small facilities such as Gulf Coast. It was Dr. Kalra’s opinion that Dr. Rivera should have tried to get someone else to place the central line if he was unable to do so. Dr. Kalra opined that Dr. Rivera violated the standard of care by not staying at the hospital when he knew that Dr. Kurland, a vascular surgeon, was on his way to the hospital. An AAA calls for surgery, and it was Dr. Rivera’s duty to stay with the patient and provide the necessary anesthesia. Dr. Kalra testified that Dr. Rivera’s last chance to do his duty and agree to provide anesthesia was when Dr. Kurland advised Dr. Rivera by telephone that he was taking A.V. to surgery. Dr. Rivera failed to perform his duty when he told Dr. Kurland that he was not going to do the anesthesia. Dr. Kalra opined that Dr. Rivera had a duty to remain at the hospital until Dr. Kurland arrived so that he could discuss his concerns and the risks of providing anesthesia to A.V. directly with Dr. Kurland. Dr. Rivera failed to perform his duty. Dr. Kalra opined that Dr. Rivera had a duty to help find someone to provide anesthesia services such as placing the central line when Dr. Rivera could not place the central line because of lack of competence and would not provide surgical anesthesia services. Dr. Rivera was the on-call anesthesiologist, and it was his responsibility to provide the services or assist in finding an anesthesiologist who could provide the services. Dr. Rivera failed to do his duty. Dr. Kalra’s opinions that Dr. Rivera did not provide care to A.V. at a level a reasonably prudent physician under similar conditions and circumstances is expected to meet are credited.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered finding that Dr. Rivera violated Subsection 458.331(1)(t), Florida Statutes; suspending his license for one year followed by a two- year probation on whatever terms the Board of Medicine sees fit; imposing a fine of $10,000; requiring that Dr. Rivera complete three hours of continuing medical education in medical ethics and five hours in risk management; and requiring that Dr. Rivera complete 100 hours of community service. DONE AND ENTERED this 13th day of March, 2008, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S SUSAN B. HARRELL Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of March, 2008.
The Issue The basic issue is whether the applicant meets the relevant statutory and regulatory criteria for award of a CON. In its prehearing statement and in its proposed recommended order, HRS stipulates that the following criteria are met: Section 381.705(1)(a), F.S., regarding compliance with the district health plan; Section 381.705(1)(c), F.S., regarding the applicant's capability and record of providing quality of care; Section 381.705(1)(h), F.S., regarding the sufficiency of applicant's resources; Section 381.705(1)(m), F.S., regarding the reasonableness of proposed costs and methods of construction; and Section 381.705(2)(c), F.S., regarding the consideration of alternatives to new construction. The following statutory criteria are deemed by HRS to be inapplicable to the proposed project: Section 381.705(1)(f), F.S., regarding the need for special equipment or services not available in an adjacent district; Section 381.705(1)(g) and (h), F.S., relating to the need for research, educational and training facilities; Section 381.705(1)(j), F.S., regarding the needs of health maintenance organizations. Section 381.705(1)(k), F.S., regarding entity providing most of its services to individuals residing beyond the service district; and Section 381.705(2)(e), F.S., regarding nursing homes. HRS also concedes the numeric need formulae found in the rules do not apply, and that no HRS rule is applicable to the need in this case. (HRS proposed Recommended Order, p. 2; transcript, pp 13-14.) The remaining criteria which HRS contends are not fully met relate to accessibility, efficiency, financial feasibility and cost effectiveness. HRS states in the SAAR and argued at the hearing that Holmes' application lacked information, and that attempts to supply the information were improper amendments to the application.
Findings Of Fact The Applicant Holmes Regional Health Care Systems, Inc. is a nonprofit corporation having among its subsidiaries a 528-bed acute-care, tertiary care non-profit hospital: Holmes Regional Medical Center (HRMC) located in Melbourne, Brevard County, Florida. HRMC is the largest hospital in the Brevard subdistrict of HRS planning district 7. It employs approximately 1900 full and part-time staff; approximately 210 physicians serve on the medical staff. It offers a wide range of services, including comprehensive cardiovascular programs, pediatrics, psychiatry, all specialties in internal medicine and surgery, and a high-risk neonatal intensive care unit. HRMC is the oldest hospital in Brevard County. It opened in 1937 with 27 beds. Although the figure fluctuates frequently, at the time of hearing approximately 480 of its licensed beds were in service. Holmes is governed by a 13-member board comprised of local business professionals who serve without compensation. The Project Holmes proposes to reduce the licensed capacity of HRMC by 60 beds and to transfer those beds to a satellite facility to be constructed south of Melbourne in Palm Bay, still within Brevard County. Total project costs for the new facility, including land (already purchased), construction and equipment is $11,656,812. The 60 beds will be acute care, "medical/surgical", in 36 private rooms and 12 semi-private rooms. Pediatric, obstetric, intensive care, and other speciality services will remain at HRMC. Access Melbourne, the site of HRMC, is in the southern end of Brevard, an elongated county on Florida's central east coast. The satellite hospital is proposed for a site approximately seven miles south and slightly west of HRMC. Palm Bay is a city which grew from five square miles to sixty-five square miles in the 1960's, when General Development Corporation (GDC) platted and began developing vast subdivisions west of the once-sleepy village lying along the Indian River. Wuesthoff, the next nearest hospital in the planning district is located north of HRMC, in Rockledge, in central Brevard County. The GDC development currently includes 74,000 or 75,000 platted lots throughout the city, although only approximately 15,000 have been built. The estimated population at full build-out in the year 2050 is projected at 257,000. In the meantime, the City of Palm Bay is the second largest city in Brevard County, population-wise, and is projected to be the largest city in the county by 1992. In 1980 the city had 18,560 persons; in 1988, the population is over 53,000. A water and sewer service agreement between Brevard County and General Development Utilities is contributing to the sprawl, as the agreement limits buildout to thirty percent of the lots on a block with wells and septic tanks. This has pushed growth from the northern and eastern boundaries of the subdivisions into the southern and western reaches of the city limits, and farther away from HRMC in Melbourne. The Palm Bay area suffers with congested traffic, as does most of South Brevard. The labyrinthine system of roads throughout the new section (the GDC development) is characterized by circles and dead end lanes calculated to promote residential integrity. An elaborate system of canals further limits access to a few through streets. The only planned major improvement to road capacity in Palm Bay is the four-laning of an approximate mile and a half strip of Babcock Street, a major north-south artery. Dr. Stanley K. Smith, an Associate Professor of Economics and Population Program Director at the University of Florida Bureau of Economic and Business Research, was qualified, without objection, as an expert in demographics, including population studies and projections. Dr. Smith and William Tipton, Holmes' traffic and transportation engineering expert, compiled data establishing that by the horizon year 1992, 14.4 percent of Palm Bay's population would live beyond a thirty minute drive to HRMC. Utilizing trips from HRMC in peak afternoon traffic, Mr. Tipton's traffic study found four 30 minute drive time points in the Palm Bay, South Brevard area, fanning out southward from HRMC along the primary roadways. Using census data and population projections developed by Brevard County planning staff, Dr. Smith calculated the population in Palm Bay that will be living beyond the 30 minute drive times in 1992. Although the drive times were established at peak hours, those hours in Palm Bay are unusually long because of the staggered work hours for Harris Corporation, which with 9,000 employees, is the largest industrial employer in Palm Bay. The Tipton study is also considered a reasonably conservative predictor of accessibility in 1992. By that horizon year the population will have expanded, and the 30-minute drive points will be closer to HRMC as a result of increased congestion and deterioration of traffic conditions. HRS' position that access to HRMC was not a problem for Palm Bay residents was based on a personal visit to the area by its staff CON reviewer, Dennis Halfhill. Mr. Halfhill drove from his motel, north along US1 to HRMC, around midmorning, and determined that his drive time was only twenty-five minutes. U.S. 1 runs north-south along the Indian River on the eastern edge of Palm Bay and South Brevard County. Unlike most of the main roads in South Brevard, US 1 is four-laned. It also is in the old established section of Palm Bay, rather than in the newer population center in the south and west. Mr. Halfhill did not travel in the southwest area and erroneously believed he was in the center of Palm Bay along its eastern edge. He estimated the circumference of the main part of the city to be approximately five miles and believed the western city limits were east of Interstate 95, when, in fact, a vast portion, approximately 80 percent of the city's 65 square mile area, lies west of Interstate 95. Geographical access by Palm Bay residents is decidedly enhanced by the creation of a satellite hospital in that community. Efficiency Holmes can provide acute-care services in its proposed 60 bed satellite more efficiently than another free-standing facility could, and more efficiently than Holmes is currently providing those same services in its large facility. The proposed facility will share with HRMC various support and ancillary services as purchasing, patient accounts, dietary, plant engineering, data processing, pharmacy, laboratory and radiology. All of Holmes' management systems will be shared with its satellite. Some equipment and staff will be transferred to the new facility. Because some wings of HRMC are old and outdated, the relocation to a newer, better-designed facility will result in improved utilization of nursing staff and a slightly lower staffing level overall. Holmes is considering converting the transferred beds into an observation unit for outpatient surgery and increasing its number of private rooms. In addition, if the beds are transferred, Holmes anticipates the ability to move back into the hospital certain activities for which it is paying over $100,000 per year in outside rent and utilities. Financial Feasibility/Cost Effectiveness Based on its long range planning conducted in 1981, Holmes determined there would be a future need for an acute care facility in Palm Bay. It purchased land for $315,800, and is currently operating an ambulatory care center and diagnostic center at the site. The total funds required for completion of the satellite facility will come from reserves established from the operation of Holmes, the corporate holding company. No borrowing will be necessary. Initially, in the first two years of operation of the satellite, there will be a slight negative impact on HRMC, but not on Holmes, the parent company, as the negative impact will be offset by the revenues at the satellite and by the cost savings shared by the two facilities. Holmes anticipates net revenue at the satellite will be $404,891 the first year of operation and $2,052,911 for the second year. Rick Knapp, a health care consultant, was qualified without objection as an expert in hospital and health care finance. In his opinion, the pro- forma/operating statement is realistic and achievable and the financial management of the existing facility is good. This latter opinion is based on his experience that relatively low-charge hospitals which generate an attractive bottom line, such as HRMC, are well managed hospitals. HRS has acknowledged that HRAC has done well in serving medicaid patients and indigents, typically considered chronically underserved. Holmes has committed that it will continue that service with the satellite facility. John Stephen Eavenson, Vice-President of Finance at HRMC and chief operating officer for Holmes, was qualified without objection as an expert in hospital and health care finance, hospital financial administration and hospital business venture analysis. In his opinion, the Palm Bay satellite hospital proposed by Holmes represents a sound financial decision. Holmes considers South Brevard, including Melbourne and Palm Bay, as its service area. Approximately 92 percent of the population of the service area in need of hospitalization currently utilize HRMC. This figure is likely slightly lower for Palm Bay, alone, as some patients in that area use a hospital in Sebastian, in Indian River County, south of Palm Bay, and beyond the HRS planning district VII. Other patients go to Orlando. Aside from the economies already discussed relating to the new streamlined facility, Holmes' willingness to expend $11 million to transfer beds is motivated by a desire to preserve its market share by enhancing access to an expanding community. Application Content The principal reason for HRS' denial, perhaps 75 percent, according to HRS Supervisor Reid Jaffe, was the lack of documentation in Holmes' application to support the proposed transfer. This reason is reflected in the cover latter to the SAAR and in comments throughout the SAAR. HRS objected throughout the formal hearing to the introduction of evidence relating to access, arguing that transportation studies were not part of the original application and would be an inappropriate amendment to the application. Holmes provided all information requested on the CON application form; in addition it responded in full to the three brief questions in HRS' May 15, 1987, omissions letter. Holmes' application was deemed "complete" by HRS, effective June 29, 1987. With regard to availability and access, the SAAR states: ...the applicant did not present any information about the future traffic and growth management plans to determine if accessibility to services would be impaired.... Yet, the SAAR found enough information to determine compliance with the following priority of the District 7 Health Plan: Priority 4 Priority for needed acute care services should be given to those applicants who transfer unutilized beds/or establish hospital facili- ties in regions of the District where access to service can be substantially improved by at least 25 minutes for 10 percent of the popula- tion of the subdistrict or a minimum of 35,000 residents. Joint Exhibit #1, p. 3 The SAAR comments provides: Priority 4-Applicant complies, Holmes Regional proposes to transfer underutilized beds. Although the area might now be within 25 minutes of Holmes and Humana Sebastian, increased congestion is expected as Palm Bay and the area along US1 are developed. Joint Exhibit #1, p. 4 The foregoing comment possibly reflects Mr, Halfhill's personal tour of Palm Bay, a tour which the record amply reveals missed the truly congested and developed areas of this deceptively vast community. An HRS reviewer with personal knowledge of a geographical area will bring his or her experience to the application review process and will not question the lack of such information in the packet, according to Reid Jaffe. In other instances the reviewer uses the omissions process to question presumptions or to flesh out the necessary information. For example, in March 1988, HRS approved a CON for the transfer of 100 beds from Martin Memorial Hospital in Martin County to create a satellite facility in Port Salerno. Prior to that approval Martin Memorial submitted a revised application, responding to at least 17 omission questions, including such questions as: Omission #10 What accessibility problems were experienced by residents of the proposed satellite area in obtaining acute inpatient services? How far is it to Okeechobee and Stuart? Northern Palm Beach County? and Omission #11 What is the breakdown of the 100 med/surg beds to be transferred from Martin Memorial and the breakdown established at the satellite facility; i.e. ICCU, pediatrics, OB, etc.? How will the transfer affect health services at Martin Memorial? How will vacated space be utilized? Petitioner's Exhibit #15 In another similar case involving a transfer of beds by Lee Memorial Hospital, which CON application was in the same batching cycle as Holmes, HRS permitted the applicant to submit an extensive packet of information in March 1988, addressing the questions and issues raised by the SAAR. The packet included a travel time study completed well after the SAAR was issued. The Lee Memorial project was approved. Holmes also attempted to present additional information, including its travel time study prepared in December 1987. It was told that additional information would be considered an inappropriate amendment to the application. Although the travel time study was not included in Holmes' application, access was discussed throughout the application with references to the high growth portions of the service area, the inadequate roads and traffic congestion, and Dr. Smith's projections of population increases. The application was complete, as its narrative, tables and attachments sufficiently addressed the relevant criteria of the statute and rules. Weighing the Criteria The parties agree that numerical need is not an issue when no net increase in beds is proposed. HRS has no rule specifically governing the transfer of beds and, according to Sharon Gordon-Girvin, the HRS Administrator of Community Health Services and Facilities, the agency policy was still under consideration at the time that Holmes' current application was being reviewed. A policy framework had been discussed, but HRS conceded that the policy required patient origin data that was not available to the applicant or the department. In the absence of a specific rule or policy, HRS' review and comments on the Holmes application reflect a general concern that, if no additional services are being offered, and no additional beds are needed or proposed, there must be some direct, positive health care benefit to be derived from the expenditure of $11 million to transfer beds. Concomitantly, there should also be no negative effect on the existing services. These general concerns must still be translated into the statutory criteria found in section 381.705, F.S. The SAAR found that Holmes' proposal at least partially met every relevant criteria. In its evidence explaining and supporting its application, Holmes proved that its satellite project will significantly improve access to the population of a phenomenally fast-growing community. The reduction in beds at HRMC will increase the utilization rate at that facility, which, although underutilized at less than 80 percent, is experiencing a constant increase and a better rate than the other area hospitals. The loss of revenue will not negatively impact HRMC in the long-term and will positively impact the parent company, Holmes. HRMC and Holmes have a reputation for quality care, reasonable costs and a commitment to serve the indigent and underserved patients in South Brevard. The same management will assure these attributes are maintained at the satellite facility. Holmes' forecasts for patient mix and utilization rates are based on a long experience in providing wide range health care services in South Brevard. Its management decision to utilize $11 million of on hand resources to create the satellite is a sound business decision based on a projected need for the horizon year 1992, the growth patterns in the south west county, and a calculated desire to maintain its market share. The shared services and resources make the satellite facility economically preferable to a new separate free-standing facility of 60 beds. The removal of beds from HRMC will result in more efficient use of space in that hospital. In summary, there is a need for the facility proposed by Holmes.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is, hereby RECOMMENDED: That HRS award a Certificate of Need to Holmes Regional Healthcare Systems Inc., for a 60-bed satellite hospital in Palm Bay, Florida, by virtue of a transfer of 60 licensed beds from Holmes Regional Medical Center in Melbourne, Florida. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 8th day of November, 1988, in Tallahassee, Florida. MARY CLARK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of November, 1988. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 88-0394 The following constitute my specific rulings on the findings of fact proposed by the parties. Petitioner's Proposed Findings Adopted in paragraphs 1 and 5. Adopted in paragraph 22. 3-7. Rejected as unnecessary. 8. Adopted in the background statement and in summary in paragraph 21. 9-10. Rejected as unnecessary. 11-13. Adopted in substance in paragraph 26, although the fact that the Lee application was originally denied was not clearly established. 14-15. Addressed in the background statement. 16. Addressed in the statement of issues. 17-18. Adopted in paragraph 31. Adopted in paragraph 9. Adopted in substance in paragraph 7. Adopted in paragraph 8. 22-24. Adopted in substance in paragraph 9. 25. Adopted in substance in paragraph 23. 26-28. Adopted in paragraph 10 and paragraph 24. Rejected as argument. Rejected as unnecessary. Addressed in the statement of issues. Adopted in paragraph 31. Addressed in the statement of issues. Rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in substance in paragraphs 15 and 18. 36-37. Rejected as unnecessary. 38. Adopted in paragraph 16. 39-40. Rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in substance in paragraph 20. Rejected as cumulative and unnecessary. Rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in substance in paragraphs 12 and 13. Adopted in paragraph 21. 46-47. Rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in substance in paragraph 22. Rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in paragraph 25. 51-52. Rejected as argument. 53-55. Rejected as unnecessary. 56. Adopted in part in paragraph 26, otherwise rejected as unnecessary. 57-59. Rejected as argument. Respondents Proposed Findings 1. Adopted in Paragraphs 1 and 3. 2-3. Addressed in background statement. 4-5. Addressed in statement of issues. Rejected as unnecessary, although the access issue is addressed in paragraphs 6-11 and paragraph 23. Rejected as unsubstantiated by the evidence. Rejected in part as unnecessary. No criteria requires proof that the population is not predominately located within an average 30-minute drive time. Also rejected as inconsistent with the evidence. The study involved two-way drives (see transcript pp 309-310). The cited portion of the transcript does not support the finding suggested, that the study was manipulated. 9-10. Rejected as unnecessary. Rejected as unnecessary. This was not an issue in the proceeding. Adopted in part in paragraph 5. 13-19. Rejected as unnecessary or irrelevant. 19-21. Rejected as contrary to the weight of evidence. 22-23. Rejected as unnecessary. Rejected as immaterial. The application was not amended at hearing. Addressed in conclusions of law, paragraph 4. Rejected as immaterial. Occupancy rates are not at issue. 27-28. Rejected as contrary to the weight of evidence. Rejected as unnecessary. Rejected as cumulative and unsupported by the evidence. Rejected as immaterial. The witness was credible. 32-34. Rejected as unnecessary. 35. Rejected as contrary to the weight of evidence. 36-39. Rejected as immaterial. 40. Rejected as contrary to the weight of evidence. COPIES FURNISHED: Lee Elzie, Esquire MacFarlane, Ferguson, Allison & Kelly 215 South Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32302 E. G. Boone, Esquire Jeffrey A. Boone, Esquire Boone, Boone, Klingbeil & Boone, P. A. Post Office Box 1596 Venice, Florida 34284 Sam Power, Clerk Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Building One, Suite 407 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Gregory L. Coler, Secretary Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 John Miller, Esquire Acting General Counsel Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Building One, Suite 407 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700
