Conclusions any 212 Poe ap, AS 1g DOAH No. 12-2633 AHCA No. 2012003965 RENDITION NO.: AHCA-12- {tF 27S Ole DOAH No. 12-2865 AHCA No. 2012008077 License No. 11870 File No. 11967907 Provider Type: Assisted Living Facility DOAH No. 12-2866 AHCA No. 2012003189 THIS CAUSE came on for consideration before the Agency for Health Care Administration (“the Agency”), which finds and concludes as follows: 1 The applicant’s fictitious names on the settlement agreement are reversed. 1 Filed December 7, 2012 4:54 PM Division of Administrative Hearings 1. The Agency has jurisdiction over the above-named Provider pursuant to Chapter 408, Part II, Florida Statutes, and the applicable authorizing statutes and administrative code provisions. 2. The Agency issued the attached Administrative Complaint and Notices of Intent to Deny and Election of Rights forms to the Provider. (Composite Ex. 1) The Election of Rights form advised of the right to an administrative hearing. 3. The parties have since entered into the attached Settlement Agreement. (Ex. 2) 4. The Settlement Agreement is adopted and incorporated by reference into this Final Order. The parties shall comply with the terms of the Settlement Agreement. 5. The Provider’s renewal application for Cooper’s Retirement Home and initial application for Cooper’s Residential Home are withdrawn without prejudice to the Provider reapplying for such licensure in the future. The corresponding Notices of Intent to Deny these applications are moot and are thus withdrawn. 6. In accordance with Florida law, the expiration date of the existing license for Cooper’s Retirement Home is extended 30 days for the sole purpose of allowing the safe and orderly discharge of clients. At the conclusion of 30 days or upon the discontinuance of operations, whichever is first in time, the Petitioner shall immediately return the license certificate for the license which is the subject of this action to the appropriate licensure unit in Tallahassee, Florida. 7. The Provider shall pay the Agency $2,500.00. If full payment has been made, the cancelled check acts as receipt of payment and no further payment is required. If full payment has not been made, payment is due within 30 days of the Final Order. Overdue amounts are subject to statutory interest and may be referred to collections. A check made payable to the “Agency for Health Care Administration” and containing the AHCA ten-digit case number should be sent to: Office of Finance and Accounting Revenue Management Unit Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive, MS 14 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 8. Any requests for an administrative hearing are withdrawn. The parties shall bear their own costs and attorney’s fees. This matter is closed. ORDERED in Tallahassee, Florida, on this (“4 day of Qeaertlee.. 52012.
Other Judicial Opinions A party that is adversely affected by this Final Order is entitled to seek judicial review which shall be instituted by filing one copy of a notice of appeal with the agency clerk of AHCA, and a second copy, along with filing fee as prescribed by law, with the District Court of Appeal in the appellate district where the agency maintains its headquarters or where a party resides. Review of proceedings shall be conducted in accordance with the Florida appellate rules. The notice of appeal must be filed within 30 days of rendition of the order to be reviewed. CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy ofthis Final we was served on the below- named persons/entities by the method designated on this 6 day of , 2012. Richard Shoop, Agency Cler Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive, Mail Stop #3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308-5403 Telephone (850) 412-3630 Jan Mills Shaddrick Haston, Unit Manager Facilities Intake Unit Assisted Living Unit Agency for Health Care Administration Agency for Health Care Administration (Electronic Mail) (Electronic Mail) Finance and Accounting Theresa DeCanio, Field Office Manager Revenue Management Unit Area 7 Agency for Health Care Administration Agency for Health Care Administration (Electronic Mail) (Electronic Mail) Katrina Derico-Harris Medicaid Accounts Receivable Agency for Health Care Administration (Electronic Mail) Edwin D. Selby, Senior Attorney Office of the General Counsel Agency for Health Care Administration (Electronic Mail) Shawn McCauley Medicaid Contract Management Agency for Health Care Administration Harvey M. Alper, Esquire Post Office Box 162967 Altamonte Springs, Florida 32716-2967 (U.S. Mail) | Electronic Mail) Lynne A. Quimby-Pennock Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings (Electronic Mail) NOTICE OF FLORIDA LAW 408.804 License required; display.-- (1) It is unlawful to provide services that require licensure, or operate or maintain a provider that offers or provides services that require licensure, without first obtaining from the agency a license authorizing the provision of such services or the operation or maintenance of such provider. (2) A license must be displayed in a conspicuous place readily visible to clients who enter at the address that appears on the license and is valid only in the hands of the licensee to whom it is issued and may not be sold, assigned, or otherwise transferred, voluntarily or involuntarily. The license is valid only for the licensee, provider, and location for which the license is issued. 408.812 Unlicensed activity.-- (1) A person or entity may not offer or advertise services that require licensure as defined by this part, authorizing statutes, or applicable rules to the public without obtaining a valid license from the agency. A licenseholder may not advertise or hold out to the public that he or she holds a license for other than that for which he or she actually holds the license. (2) The operation or maintenance of an unlicensed provider or the performance of any services that require licensure without proper licensure is a violation of this part and authorizing statutes. Unlicensed activity constitutes harm that materially affects the health, safety, and welfare of clients. The agency or any state attorney may, in addition to other remedies provided in this part, bring an action for an injunction to restrain such violation, or to enjoin the future operation or maintenance of the unlicensed provider or the performance of any services in violation of this part and authorizing statutes, until compliance with this part, authorizing statutes, and agency rules has been demonstrated to the satisfaction of the agency. (3) It is unlawful for any person or entity to own, operate, or maintain an unlicensed provider. If after receiving notification from the agency, such person or entity fails to cease operation and apply for a license under this part and authorizing statutes, the person or entity shall be subject to penalties as prescribed by authorizing statutes and applicable rules. Each day of continued operation is a separate offense. (4) Any person or entity that fails to cease operation after agency notification may be fined $1,000 for each day of noncompliance. (5) When a controlling interest or licensee has an interest in more than one provider and fails to license a provider rendering services that require licensure, the agency may revoke all licenses and impose actions under s. 408.814 and a fine of $1,000 per day, unless otherwise specified by authorizing statutes, against each licensee until such time as the appropriate license is obtained for the unlicensed operation. (6) In addition to granting injunctive relief pursuant to subsection (2), if the agency determines that a person or entity is operating or maintaining a provider without obtaining a license and determines that a condition exists that poses a threat to the health, safety, or welfare of a client of the provider, the person or entity is subject to the same actions and fines imposed against a licensee as specified in this part, authorizing statutes, and agency rules. (7) Any person aware of the operation of an unlicensed provider must report that provider to the agency.
The Issue The issue is whether the licensee, Robert Schmidt, should be subject to an administrative fine for failure to meet the background screening requirements at Dixie Lodge, an assisted living facility (hereinafter Respondent), and, if so, the amount.
Findings Of Fact The Agency for Health Care Administration (hereinafter the Agency) is the state agency responsible for the licensing and regulation of assisted living facilities. Respondent is licensed to operate as an assisted living facility in DeLand, Florida. Robert A. Cunningham was called as a witness for the Agency. Mr. Cunningham is a Health Facility Evaluator II. His duties include surveying assisted living facilities, adult family homes and adult day care centers. Mr. Cunningham testified that he was familiar with Dixie Lodge because he has been surveying this facility for approximately 15 years. On or about May 16, 2001, Mr. Cunningham conducted a complaint investigation of Dixie Lodge. Mr. Cunningham identified Petitioner's Exhibit One as a complaint investigation form. This contains a summary of his investigative findings. The last finding was that a care- giving employee, who did not meet the screening requirements, had been retained as an employee in a "contact" position. Mr. Cunningham identified Petitioner's Exhibit Two as a copy of the Agency's letter to the facility administrator outlining the findings of the complaint investigation. It states that the facility was in violation of Section 400.4174(2), Florida Statutes, and Rule 58A-5.019(3), Florida Administrative Code, regarding background screening on employees. The letter dated June 26, 2001, states that the inspection findings have been revised to reflect Tag A 1115, a Class II deficiency, as the result of an amendment in the law, effective May 15, 2001. Mr. Cunningham identified Petitioner's Exhibit Three as a copy of the recommendation for sanction inspection report narrative of the inspection conducted on May 16, 2001. Mr. Cunningham testified that the recommendation for sanction was prepared by Robert Dickson, a Facility Evaluator Supervisor in the area office. Mr. Robert Dickson was called as a witness for the Agency. His duties included supervising the field surveyors, who conduct the surveys of the licensed facilities, and reviewing and approving the survey work findings. Mr. Dickson is familiar with the survey at issue in this proceeding. Mr. Dickson identified Petitioner's Exhibit One through Nine. Mr. Dickson identified Petitioner's Exhibit Three as a copy of the sanction recommendation that he prepared. Mr. Dickson identified Petitioner's Exhibit Five as a copy of Section 400.414, Florida Statutes (2000), which gives the Agency the authority to deny, revoke licenses, and impose administrative fines. Mr. Dickson identified Petitioner's Exhibit Six as a copy of Section 400.4174, Florida Statutes (2000), regarding background screening and exemptions. Mr. Dickson identified Petitioner's Exhibit Seven as a copy of Rule 58A-5.019, Florida Administrative Code, regarding staffing standards and background screening. Mr. Dickson identified Petitioner's Exhibit Eight as a copy of Respondent's assisted living facility (standard) license for Dixie Lodge. Mr. Dickson identified Petitioner's Exhibit Nine as a copy of Respondent's request for a formal administrative hearing. Mr. Walker testified that at the time in question on May 16, 2001, his staff employee, Mr. Michael Roberts, did not have an exemption from background screening.
Recommendation Based upon the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and in consideration of the mitigating factors, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Agency enter a final order imposing a fine of not more than $500.00 against Respondent for failure to remove an employee who failed to meet the background screening requirements from a position working in direct contact with residents. DONE AND ENTERED this _____ day of October, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ___________________________________ STEPHEN F. DEAN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of October, 2001. COPIES FURNISHED: Michael O. Mathis, Esquire Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive Building 3, Suite 3431 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Walker Richardson, Administrator Dixie Lodge 507 South Woodland Boulevard DeLand, Florida 32720 Diane Grubbs, Agency Clerk Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive Building 3, Suite 3431 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 William Roberts, Acting General Counsel Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive Building 3, Suite 3431 Tallahassee, Florida 32308
The Issue The issue is whether Petitioner's applications to renew licenses for two Residential Level II facilities in Davenport, Florida, should be denied and a $2,500.00 fine imposed for the reasons given in the Department of Children and Families' (Department) Amended Denial of Applications & Imposition of Fines issued on February 8, 2018.
Findings Of Fact Background The Department is charged with the responsibility of regulating the licensing and operation of residential treatment facilities pursuant to chapter 397, Florida Statutes (2017). Petitioner is a Delaware limited liability corporation authorized to conduct business in the State of Florida. Subject to the outcome of this proceeding, Petitioner is licensed to operate two Residential Level II facilities in Davenport under the name Cares Treatment. One facility is located at 146 Sunset View Drive (Case No. 18-0230), the other at 389 Sand Ridge Drive (Case No. 18-0234). The licenses were issued on December 15, 2016, and were to expire on December 14, 2017. Each license authorizes Petitioner to "provide substance abuse services for Adults and/or Children/Adolescents for the following component: Residential Level 2 (6 beds)."4/ Resp. Ex. 2. The Torres family home is not a licensed facility and services cannot be provided to residents who reside at that location. Petitioner is not licensed to provide services under the Partial Hospitalization Program (PHP), the Outpatient Program (OP), or the Intensive Outpatient Program (IOP).5/ These services require a separate license from the Department. In December 2017, Petitioner filed with the Department new applications to provide those services. However, the applications were denied and no appeal was taken. According to the renewal applications, Petitioner provides a "residential treatment facility for children and adolescents." Resp. Ex. 3. Each facility "is a free-standing residential facility which provides a structured living environment within a system of care approach for children, adolescents and adult[s] who have a primary diagnosis of mental illness or emotional disturbance and who may also have other disabilities." Id. Petitioner's facilities are a family-run business. Roberto Torres, Jr. (Mr. Torres), is the Chief Executive Officer and manager of the limited liability corporation; Cecilia Torres, his wife, is the Treasurer/Chief Financial Officer; Karla Torres, a daughter, is the Vice President/Chief Administrative Officer; Roberto Torres, III (the son), is the Secretary/Chief Information Officer; and Kristina Torres, a daughter, is the Ambassador/Chief Relationship Officer. Resp. Ex. 4. On November 27, 2017, Petitioner filed its applications for renewal of the two licenses. On December 1, 2017, the Department issued separate, but identical, letters denying both applications on the grounds they were not timely filed and they were incomplete. Resp. Ex. 5. On February 16, 2018, the Department was authorized to amend its letters of denial with a single amended denial document, which combined the original charges in the two letters into Counts I and II and added new Counts III, IV, and V. Resp. Ex. 1. The amended denial letter also seeks to impose a $2,500.00 administrative fine for violating various Class II rules. The specific rules are not identified in the original or amended charging documents, but the Department's PRO cites Florida Administrative Code Rule 65D- 30.003(1)(a) and "rules set forth in 65D-30" as the rules on which it relies. Because proper notice of the specific rules was not given, the rule violations have not been considered. The charges in the amended denial letter can be summarized as follows: Count I - The application for the facility at 146 Sunset View Drive was not timely filed and was incomplete in violation of sections 397.403 and 397.407(8). Count II - The application for the facility at 389 Sand Ridge Drive was not timely filed and was incomplete in violation of sections 397.403 and 397.407(8). Count III - In November 2016, O.G., a 16-year-old female who had been recently discharged from a Baker Act facility, was admitted for treatment of substance abuse and mental health issues. After residing a few months at the Sunset View location, she was moved to the Torres family home, an unlicensed facility, where she remained for one or two months. By providing services at that unlicensed location, Petitioner violated section 397.401(1). She was then moved to the Sand Ridge location for two or three months before being returned to the Torres family home. She continued to receive substance abuse treatment at the family home until her discharge two or three months later. This constitutes a second violation of the same statute. While under the care of Petitioner, O.G. was subjected to actions which resulted in verified abuse reports against Mr. Torres and his son and contributed to the delinquency and exploitation of a child. Such conduct constitutes a threat to the health or safety of O.G. in violation of section 397.415(1)(d). Count IV - On October 19, 2017, J.W., who transferred from a Baker Act facility, was accepted by Petitioner for care and to receive "partial hospitalization program" services, which Petitioner is not licensed to provide. This constitutes a violation of sections 397.401(1) and 397.415(1)(a)2.c. J.W. was later discharged in contravention of his wishes and desires, which resulted in him relapsing and again being Baker Acted. This conduct constitutes a threat to J.W.'s health or safety in violation of section 397.415(1)(d). Count V - On January 23, 2018, the Department attempted to conduct an onsite inspection at both licensed facilities to review J.W.'s files, but was denied access to the premises. Petitioner later failed to respond to a written request by the Department for records relating to J.W. and O.G. This conduct constitutes a violation of section 397.411. The charging document asserts the conduct in Count III violates four Class II rules (not otherwise identified), for which a $500.00 fine should be imposed for each violation; and the conduct described in Count IV violates "applicable" Class II rules (not otherwise identified), for which a single $500.00 penalty should be imposed. Rule 65D-30.003(1)(a), the only rule cited in the Department's PRO, requires in relevant part that "all substance abuse components" be provided "by persons or entities that are licensed by the department pursuant to Section 397.401, F. S." The Charges Counts I and II Section 397.407(8) provides that "the Department may deny a renewal application submitted fewer than 30 days before the license expires." For Petitioner to meet this deadline, license renewal applications were due on or before November 15, 2017. An application is not considered filed until an application with the signature of the chief executive officer is submitted by the applicant. Around 3:30 p.m. on November 27, 2017, Mr. Torres spoke by telephone with Ms. Harmon, the Department System of Care Coordinator, regarding three new licensure applications he was filing. During the conversation, he was reminded that renewal applications for his two existing licenses had not been filed. Mr. Torres responded that he "would have to get on that." Properly signed renewal applications were submitted electronically at 5:00 p.m. and 5:42 p.m. that afternoon. In his cross-examination, Mr. Torres attempted to establish that the Department's website, the Provider Licensing and Designation System (PLADS), was periodically inoperative, and this prevented him from filing his on-line applications in a timely manner. However, there is no credible evidence to support this claim. In fact, after Mr. Torres raised this issue early on in the case, Ms. Harmon reviewed the activity log of Mr. Torres' two on-line applications and found that he began the application process in late August or early September 2017, but did nothing further until he hit the submit button after speaking with her on November 27, 2017. Also, during this same period of time, the PLADS program (to which all applicants have access) indicated that the applications were in "Waiting Approval" status, which meant the applications were "in process" but had never been submitted. Therefore, the applications were not timely filed.6/ Section 397.403(1)(f) requires license applications to include, among other things, "proof of satisfactory fire, safety, and health inspections." Neither application filed on November 27, 2017, included an updated Treatment Resource Affidavit, a current Fire and Safety Inspection form, and a complete and current Health Facility and Food Inspection form. Therefore, the applications filed on November 27, 2017, were incomplete. Count III On November 17, 2016, O.G., then a 16-year-old female, was admitted for treatment at the facility. O.G. had a history of bi-polar episodes, depression, and drug abuse. Before seeking treatment at Petitioner's facility, she had been Baker Acted twice. After learning about Petitioner's facility through another provider, O.G.'s family placed her in the facility to address her substance abuse and behavior problems. Upon admission, a treatment plan was devised by a licensed mental health counselor (LMHC), with a target completion date of May 17, 2017. Resp. Ex. 10. The treatment plan listed four staff members overseeing her case: Karla Torres (case manager); the LMHC; and S.F. and K.V., two "caregivers" or interns. Id. O.G. was discharged from the facility nine months later on August 14, 2017. Petitioner was paid approximately $166,000.00 by O.G.'s parents for her nine-month stay. O.G. was initially placed in the facility located at 146 Sunset Drive, where she remained for approximately three months. She was then moved to the Torres family home at 2347 Victoria Drive in Davenport for two or three months. The Torres home is not a licensed facility. By housing her at an unlicensed location and providing services during that period of time, Petitioner violated section 397.401(1), which makes it unlawful to provide substance abuse services at an unlicensed location. O.G.'s parents were unaware that their daughter was residing in the unlicensed family home. After Mr. Torres and O.G. "got into an argument," she was moved to the facility at 389 Sands Drive for several months. She then returned to the Torres home, where she remained for two or three months until she was discharged. By housing her at an unlicensed location and providing substance abuse services, Petitioner violated section 397.401(1) a second time. During her stay at the Torres home, Mr. Torres discussed "sex" with O.G.; he told her that he cheated on his wife; and he complimented her "quite a few times" for having "a nice body." He also told her that "18" was a special age and if she were 18 years old, things would be different. He added that her parents were "too strict." These highly inappropriate comments were especially egregious in nature, given the fact that O.G. was a minor with mental health and substance abuse issues, and she was living in the licensee's family home. One photograph of O.G. taken in the home shows Mr. Torres standing in the background donned in his pajamas. Resp. Ex. 16. These actions constitute a violation of section 397.415(1)(d)2., which makes it unlawful to commit an intentional or negligent act materially affecting the health or safety of an individual receiving services from the provider. Mr. Torres occasionally escorted O.G. to two local bars (Miller's Ale House and Marrakesh Hooka Lounge) in Champions Gate. On one visit to Miller's Ale House in April or May 2017, he purchased her a Blue Moon beer, even though she was a minor and in a substance abuse program. She consumed the beer in his presence while the two sat at the bar. Although Mr. Torres attempted (through argument) to deny the incident, O.G. filmed the event on her cell phone. Resp. Ex. 13. This action by him also constitutes a violation of section 397.415(1)(d)2. Petitioner argues in its PRO that the whole incident was a fabrication and the result of a conspiracy by O.G.'s father, the Tampa Police Department, and Department counsel. The contention is rejected. When O.G. was discharged from the residential treatment facility in August 2017, Petitioner enrolled her in another program, IOP, which required her to periodically return to the facility on weekends for further treatment. Her first return visit was the weekend of August 26, 2017. During the weekend visit, the son gave her a cell phone. O.G.'s admission document for the IOP program indicated she would be given IOP services for 60 to 90 days, with a goal of her being substance free at the end of that period. Resp. Ex. 24. There is no record of her being discharged from the program. The Department argues in its PRO that by providing IOP services to O.G., Petitioner was providing a service beyond the scope of its license. However, this allegation was not included in the amended charging document and has not been considered. See, e.g., Trevisani v. Dep't of Health, 908 So. 2d 1108, 1109 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005)(a licensee may not be disciplined for an offense not charged in the complaint). After being discharged from her original treatment plan on August 14, 2017, O.G. returned to her mother's home. Except for one weekend visit to Petitioner's facility for IOP services, she remained at home until September 16, 2017. That day, O.G. ran away from home with Preston, a resident she had met at Petitioner's facility. After leaving home, she went to Melbourne, and then to West Palm Beach. A Missing/Endangered Runaway Juvenile bulletin was posted by law enforcement on October 5, 2017. Resp. Ex. 11. During this period of time, Petitioner’s records show that O.G. was still enrolled in the unlicensed IOP program. Resp. Ex. 24. While in the West Palm Beach area, O.G. contacted the son on the cell phone he had given her and told him she had run away from home. She asked him to send her some money so that she could go to Tampa to work in a strip club. Because O.G. was not old enough to accept a wire money transfer, the son wired $600.00 to a friend of O.G., who gave her the money. Using the money provided by the son, O.G. traveled to Tampa and met the son on September 30, 2017. The two went to Todd Couples Superstore, where he purchased several adult entertainment outfits she could wear to audition for a job in a strip club. Resp. Ex. 12. He also purchased her various personal items at a Walgreens. The son then drove her to several clubs to audition for a job. After several auditions, she was hired by Scores Tampa, a local strip joint where "people take off their clothes for money." O.G., who was only 17 years old at the time, signed an employment contract on September 30, 2017, using a borrowed driver's license of S.F., a 21-year-old female. Resp. Ex. 15. S.F. was a former intern at Petitioner's facility and is listed as a member of the team staff on O.G.'s initial treatment plan. By that time, S.F. had left Petitioner's facility and moved back to Tampa. That same evening, O.G. began working in Scores Tampa. O.G. says she took off her clothes while performing. The son remained in the club while she worked. After she got off work at 2:00 a.m., he drove her to S.F.'s house. O.G. continued working at the club for the next few days. With the assistance of local law enforcement, O.G. returned to her mother's home on October 7, 2017. After she ran away from home, and even while working in the club, O.G. maintained contact with Mr. Torres through texts and Facetime and asked him not to report her whereabouts to anyone. Although O.G.'s mother spoke to Mr. Torres on several occasions after O.G. went missing in September 2017, neither Mr. Torres nor the son informed her of the daughter's whereabouts. On November 30, 2017, the Department received a report of alleged human trafficking and sexual exploitation of a child. The alleged perpetrator was the son, while the victim was identified as O.G. Because the son was an employee of Petitioner, an institutional investigation was conducted. The investigation was closed on December 26, 2017, with a confirmed report of Human Trafficking-Commercial Exploitation of a Child against the son. Resp. Ex. 17. During the investigation, Mr. Torres and members of his family declined to be interviewed or answer any questions. Instead, they referred all questions to their attorney. On February 6, 2018, the Department received another report of abuse involving Mr. Torres. The report alleged that in April or May 2017, Mr. Torres transported O.G. to a bar at Miller's Ale House in "Davenport" [sic] and purchased her a beer. After an institutional investigation, the file was closed on March 1, 2018, as verified for Substance Misuse – Alcohol against Mr. Torres. Resp. Ex. 18. See also Finding of Fact 18. Mr. Torres declined to participate in the investigation. By clear and convincing evidence, the Department established that the actions of Mr. Torres and his son presented a threat to the health or safety of O.G. in contravention of section 397.415(1)(d)2. Count IV J.W., who did not testify, is a 42-year-old male who was discharged from a hospital on October 9, 2017 (after being Baker Acted), and admitted to Petitioner's facility the same day to receive PHP services. He was diagnosed as having mental health and substance abuse issues and a history of suicidality. He voluntarily left the facility on November 9, 2017. In its PRO, Petitioner characterizes J.W. as "a disgruntled addict." While a resident at the facility, J.W. received a few video sessions with a Miami Springs psychiatrist, who was identified on the renewal applications as the facility medical director, and he was given online counseling sessions for two weeks by an LMHC, who resided in Palm Bay and worked as an independent contractor with the facility. Neither professional was told by Mr. Torres that Petitioner was not licensed to provide PHP services. By providing PHP services to J.W., Petitioner violated sections 397.401(1) and 397.415(1)(a)2.c. According to the LMHC, on October 24, 2017, she was directed by Mr. Torres, who is not a licensed clinician, to "discharge" J.W. from the PHP program and place him in a lower level of care, Sober Living. Resp. Ex. 25. This would still allow J.W. to remain a resident at the facility but not receive the PHP services. Although the charging document alleges that J.W. did not wish to be discharged from the PHP program, and this caused him to have a relapse in his condition and later Baker Acted again, there is no competent evidence to establish this string of events. Count V Section 397.411 requires all licensees to provide Department representatives access to their facilities and to allow the inspection of pertinent records. Based upon information from a provider in Jacksonville that Mr. Torres had requested its assistance in providing PHP services to J.W., the Department instituted an investigation of Petitioner. In January 2018, the Department attempted to conduct an onsite inspection of Petitioner's facilities and to review the files relating to J.W. The inspectors were denied entry. Thereafter, the Department sent a written request to Petitioner for the records of J.W. and O.G. No records were provided and Petitioner failed to respond to the request. These actions constituted a violation of section 397.411. At hearing, Mr. Torres contended (through argument) that because the Department had already taken preliminary action on December 1, 2017, to deny his applications, there was no requirement that he provide access to the facility or respond to written requests for records. This assertion has been rejected. See § 397.411(1)(c), Fla. Stat. (an application for licensure as a service provider constitutes full permission for an authorized agent of the department to enter and inspect at any time).
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Children and Families enter a final order denying the applications for renewal of Petitioner's two licenses. An administrative fine should not be imposed. DONE AND ENTERED this 27th day of September, 2018, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S D. R. ALEXANDER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of September, 2018.
The Issue Whether or not Respondent has committed an unlawful employment practice by terminating Petitioner due to the "handicap" of manic depression and/or bipolar disorder.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner suffers from bipolar disorder, a psychiatric disorder manifested by mood swings from elation to depression. When experiencing an episode of mania, the Petitioner is incapable of attending to a task for any length of time. She is also overly excited and exercises poor judgment. Dependent upon how expert medical physicians characterize this condition at various stages, it is either a type of manic depression or a psychiatric condition very similar in symptomatology to classic manic depression. Petitioner began working for Respondent Mark III on March 20, 1985 as a seamstress. Her primary job function was running an industrial grade sewing machine for van conversions. She was a very good employee except for the occasions when she suffered bouts of mania. She was never subject to discipline, and during the periods of mania she experienced, her work-related problems were treated by the employer as a disability. The first episode of mania occurred in April 1986. Prior to her hospitalization for mania, the Petitioner was drinking excessively and staying out from work. She was hospitalized in Monroe Regional Hospital from April 22, 1986 to April 29, 1986. Thereafter, she returned to work, but again began to experience problems and had to be hospitalized again from June 7, 1986 to June 13, 1986. After she came-out of the hospital, Respondent employer permitted her to work part-time (that is, fewer hours) for a period of several months until she was able to resume full-time responsibilities. The employer's providing Petitioner part-time employment in 1986 was prompted by several factors. First, Petitioner was accorded the same accommodation any of Respondent's employees would receive under Respondent's general policy of allowing persons who have left for medical reasons to return to work if work is available. Second, this was also done personally and specifically for Petitioner at this time to accommodate her individual situation at that time. Third, the cyclical nature of Respondent's business of van conversions is such that June and July are a wind-down period toward the month of August when Respondent either closes down or lays off personnel for one to three weeks' duration. Fourth, Petitioner's team position had not been filled because "many girls," in the words of Respondent's representative Joe Krim, "float regularly." Respondent's method of payment of seamstresses in Petitioner's category bears some discussion because it does not equate in every respect with the street definition of "full-time" and "part-time" labor. Petitioner worked as part of a group or team on production work. Teams are paid when each van is completed, and payment for each van is then divided among the whole sewing room, based upon hours individually worked. The entire team is needed to construct each vehicle and in Petitioner's absence, if they did not replace her, the rest of the team had to pick up her slack. Petitioner's rate of pay was determined on a weekly basis depending upon the amount of work produced by the team/group she worked with. During her period of full-time employment just prior to November 1987, Petitioner's weekly net pay, if averaged, would be $534.74. Pursuant to the foregoing arrangement, Petitioner received no pay during any of the periods that she was out of work. The Respondent provided no sick leave or disability benefits and did not have a formal procedure for requesting a leave of absence. After the manic episode(s) in 1986, the Petitioner returned to work full-time on or about July 1986 and experienced no problems for over a year. In November 1987, Petitioner again experienced an episode of mania. She began staying away from her job and disrupting her coworkers with overt sexual solicitation and lewd remarks when she was present. Her immediate supervisor, Jon Lanning, requested a meeting with her sometime shortly before December 1, 1987. Petitioner's friend, Mark Wagner, accompanied her to that meeting. At that meeting, Mr. Lanning urged Petitioner to seek hospital treatment for her psychiatric problems. Mr. Lanning was unavailable to testify at formal hearing, having left Respondent's employment in October 1988. Petitioner's impression of Mr. Lanning's representations on behalf of Respondent were that her job would be held for her if she would seek medical help. Mr. Wagner's impression of this so-called "admission" on behalf of Respondent by its agent Lanning was that Lanning was saying Petitioner was a good worker and would be welcome to come back to work when she was able to work. It was obvious to Wagner from this meeting that "if [Petitioner] did not get the situation under control, they would have to let her go." Petitioner was hospitalized from December 1, 1987 to December 6, 1987 at Charter Springs Hospital. Upon her discharge, she continued to take Loxitane, a prescription medication which can cause drowsiness if taken in excess, at the wrong times of day, or with alcohol. The use of alcohol is contraindicated in the presence of Loxitane. Although Respondent established alcohol and drug mixing by Petitioner back in 1986, the uncorroborated hearsay and inconclusive and uncredible repetition by witnesses of so-called "admissions" by Petitioner do not permit or support a finding that Petitioner was abusing alcohol or mixing alcohol with prescription medications in 1987- 1988. Dr. Fred Miley, Petitioner's psychiatrist, signed a release permitting the Respondent to return to work on December 21, 1987. Petitioner returned to work on December 22, 1987 but exhibited signs of drowsiness around the heavy sewing machinery she had to operate and was told by a superior to go home. At formal hearing, Petitioner acknowledged that she "did not need to be on the machine" in that condition. Petitioner stated that after her December 22, 1987 work attempt she had decided that the decision to go back to work was one, "I and I alone would have to make." Petitioner did not report the problem of drowsiness to her psychiatrist at the time she had the Loxitane prescription renewed by him December 30, 1987 or at the time of her next office visit to him on January 12, 1988 except that she did complain to him on that date of being drowsy in the mornings. At formal hearing, Dr. Miley opined that there was really no reason physically or psychiatrically why Petitioner could not have returned to work for Respondent on January 12, 1988; he merely felt pressured by the patient to defer her return-to-work date since she did not want to go back to work then and therefore he felt she could not return to work successfully. Dr. Miley did not know prior to formal hearing in this case that Petitioner's inability to work precluded an award to her of unemployment compensation benefits. On January 12, 1988, Petitioner advised Dr. Miley she wanted to draw unemployment compensation and would receive it until June 1988; that Petitioner did not want to return to work at that time because Respondent had only part- time employment; and that Petitioner was working for herself, sewing free lance. In fact, Petitioner had filed an application for unemployment benefits on December 15, 1987, effective December 13, 1987. She had been denied unemployment benefits on January 4, 1988 because she was deemed by the unemployment compensation reviewer to be unable to work. "Unavailability for work" precludes the award of unemployment compensation benefits pursuant to Chapter 443 F.S. On January 15, 1988, Dr. Miley filled out an unemployment compensation form stating that Petitioner had been unable to work from December 1, 1987 to January 15, 1988 and with the equivocal statement that Petitioner "may possibly be able to return to work in early February 1988" and it should be halftime (20 hours). Petitioner took the January 15 statement by Miley to Jon Lanning because Lanning had advised her he could not hold her job without a statement from her doctor. Sometime in January 1988 Petitioner approached Joe Krim, Mr. Lanning's superior, for help with Mr. Lanning about "getting on up." At some time between the December 1987 hospitalization and February 3, 1988, Petitioner sent her employer a note asking to work night shift instead of day shift. On February 3, 1988, the Petitioner initiated a meeting with Mr. Lanning for the purpose of inquiring whether she could return to work halftime. Mr. Lanning responded that she had been terminated the day before, February 2, 1988. Petitioner had received no prior notice of her impending termination, and Barbara Boos' and Joe Krim's direct testimony confirm Petitioner's understanding that her team position had not yet been filled as of February 3, 1988. At Petitioner's specific request, motivated by her intent at that time to pursue a social security disability claim, Mr. Lanning supplied her with a document dated February 3, 1988 stating: Due to health reasons, [Petitioner] was unable to perform her duties and has not returned to work since late November 1987. Petitioner later abandoned the social security appeal plan. According to Mr. Krim's testimony, Petitioner was actually not rehired because she had not returned to work between November 1987 and February 1988. He was apparently unaware at the time of her termination by Mr. Lanning on February 3, 1988 that she had tried to work for a few hours on December 22, 1987. Nonetheless, he emphasized that although December and January are not heavy production months, February is the month the Respondent must "gear up" for its heaviest production of the season and that he had to "get production up" at that time for that reason. Further, the purpose of Respondent's recent move to new quarters had been partly to eliminate a night shift which in 1986 had done little real production work and did mostly clean up and preparation for the day sewing teams. In February 1988, he had put all teams on full-time day work. He did not, therefore, have available part-time work (fewer hours) with which to accommodate Petitioner as he had in 1986. Respondent had full-time work available for Petitioner in January and February of 1988. By February of 1988, the new "season" had commenced, Respondent had moved into a new plant, and Respondent could no longer accommodate halftime or part-time work arrangements. On March 15, 1988 Dr. Miley completed an additional form stating that the Petitioner had been unable to work from December 1, 1987 to February 14, 1988. Petitioner admitted that in February 1988, she wanted to go back to work only part-time but that Respondent had not established a part-time crew, as such. Petitioner also admitted not knowing if there were any part-time work available then. In light of her several conflicting representations under the circumstances related supra., the undersigned is not persuaded by Petitioner's representations at the formal hearing in the instant case that if she had been told by Mr. Banning directly that part-time employment was unavailable, she would have agreed to full-time employment on February 3, 1988. Petitioner eventually received unemployment compensation from approximately March 1988 until September 1988. In November 1988, Petitioner secured employment very similar to that she previously held with Respondent, which employment she has continuously held with no further episodes of mania requiring psychiatric treatment.
Recommendation Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is recommended that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a Final Order dismissing Petitioner's charge of discrimination against Respondent DONE and ENTERED this 4th day of January, 1990, at Tallahassee, Florida. ELLA JANE P. DAVIS, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of January, 1990. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER CASE NO. 89-0985 The following constitute specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2) F.S. upon the parties' respective proposed findings of fact (PFOF): Petitioner's PFOF: 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 and 10 are accepted. 4 is accepted with the exception of the last sentence, which rejected as not supported by the record. See FOF 7. 11 is rejected. This is legal argument which mischaracterizes both the burden to go forward and the burden of proof in this type of case. Except for sentence 1 of 12 which is rejected as not supported by the record for the reasons set forth in the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Thaw, 12 and 13 are accepted as modified to more clearly reflect the record evidence as a whole. Respondent' s PFOF: 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 8, 10, 11, 14, 15, 16, 17 and 18 are accepted. 3 and 9 are rejected as stated as not supported by the record as a whole. 7 is immaterial. See FOF 8. 12 and 13 are subordinate and unnecessary to the facts as found. COPIES FURNISHED: Frank C. Amatea Attorney at Law 500 Northeast Eighth Avenue Ocala, Florida 32670 Carla Franklin Attorney at Law Post Office Box 694 Gainesville, Florida 32601 Donald A. Griffin Executive Director Florida Commission on Human Relations Building F, Suite 240 325 John Knox Road Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1570 Dana Baird, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations Building F, Suite 240 325 John Knox Road Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1570
Findings Of Fact Respondent Pat McComb is the operator of a group home in Broward County, Florida. The home operated under a license issued to Happy People, Inc. Through some unspecified channel, a report of possible abuse was received and Gloria Taylor, a Human Services Counselor II with DHRS, investigated on May 18, 1984. The investigation consisted of interviews with both former and current clients of the group home. A summary of these interviews is found in Petitioner's Exhibits 2, 3, 5, 8 and 9. The former clients and clients are all mentally retarded with secondary disabilities. The interviews were conducted in a group setting with Taylor addressing leading type questions to the group and the group responding in the negative or affirmative. Two clients were interviewed separately, with one being interviewed away from the group home. At least two of the clients changed their statements regarding whether any abuse had ever occurred. No client stated when or where or how often or how severe the alleged abuse was. Taylor saw no bruises or other physical signs of abuse at the time she interviewed the clients. There had never been any other reports or any medical treatment required for these clients. Taylor's testimony was based solely on what she was told by the clients and former clients. Based upon the written reports prepared by Taylor, Rhonda Miklic prepared and signed a letter revoking the licenses of Pat McComb and Happy People, Inc. The clients were moved from the home. The acts of Miklic in revoking the license are not discretionary. Instead, Miklic is required to revoke the license if a finding of abuse is made by the investigator. Pat McComb denied any knowledge that any client was ever hit with a belt at the facility. Instead, discipline consisted of such things as loss of privileges or having a client stand in the corner.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the charges against Respondent be DISMISSED and that the license of Respondent be reinstated. DONE and ENTERED this 11th day of January, 1985, in Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE K. KIESLING Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 FILED with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of January, 1985. COPIES FURNISHED: Harold Braynon, Attorney 201 West Broward Boulevard Ft. Lauderdale, Florida 33301 Mark Perlman, Attorney 1820 E. Hallandale Beach Boulevard Hallandale, Florida 33009 David Pingree, Secretary Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32301
