The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondents unlawfully discriminated against Petitioner on the basis of her race, religion, or disability in violation of the Florida Fair Housing Act.
Findings Of Fact Parklife is the owner of a mobile home community known as St. Lucie Mobile Village (the “Village”), which comprises approximately 220 homes. For the last 21 years, McGrath has leased a lot in the Village, upon which her double-wide mobile home sits. She is a white woman, approximately 60 years old, who claims to suffer from post-traumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”) and other unspecified anxiety disorders, and to be a practicing Jehovah’s Witness. This is a case of alleged housing discrimination brought under Florida’s Fair Housing Act (the “Act”). McGrath alleges that Parklife has discriminated against her in several ways, which can be classified as selective enforcement, disparate treatment, and retaliation. Specifically, McGrath alleges that Parklife required her to upgrade the skirting around, and also to re-level, her home, while excusing other (predominately Hispanic) residents, whose homes were in comparable condition, from making similar improvements. McGrath alleges that Parklife issued warnings to her for violating the “two vehicle” rule, while allowing other (predominately Hispanic) residents to keep three or more cars on their lots. She alleges that Parklife permitted Hispanic residents to shoot off fireworks and make noise in violation of park rules, depriving her of the peaceful enjoyment of her premises. Finally, McGrath alleges that Parklife commenced a retaliatory eviction proceeding against her for being a whistle blower. McGrath does not dispute that her home needed new skirting and to be leveled, and she admits having violated the two vehicle rule. She claims, nevertheless, that Parklife took action against her on the basis of her race (white), religion (Jehovah’s Witness), disability (PTSD), or some combination of these, as shown by its more lenient treatment of residents outside the protected categories. McGrath’s allegations are legally sufficient to state a claim of housing discrimination. That is, if McGrath were able to prove the facts she has alleged, she would be entitled to relief. She failed, however, to present sufficient, persuasive evidence in support of the charges. It is not that there is no evidence behind McGrath’s claims. She and her witness, Kassandra Rosa, testified that other residents have violated park rules regarding skirting, leveling, and allowable vehicles––seemingly without consequence. To determine whether the circumstances of these other residents were truly comparable to McGrath’s, however, so as to conclude that she was singled out for different treatment, requires more information than the evidence affords. Taken together, McGraths’s testimony and that of Ms. Rosa was simply too vague and lacking in relevant detail to support findings of disparate treatment or selective enforcement on the basis of race, religion, or handicap. Indeed, the persuasive evidence fails to establish that Parklife declined to take appropriate action with regard to similarly-situated violators, or that it otherwise condoned, or acquiesced to, the rulebreaking of such residents. At most, the evidence shows that other residents violated the same rules as McGrath––not that they got off scot-free, which is a different matter. As for the eviction proceeding, which was pending in county court at the time of the final hearing, there is insufficient evidence (if any) to support McGrath’s contention that Parklife is retaliating against her or using the legal process as a pretext for unlawfully depriving her of a dwelling in violation of the Act. In terms of timing, Parklife initiated the eviction proceeding before it became aware that McGrath had filed a complaint of housing discrimination, which tends to undermine the assertion that the eviction was brought to retaliate against McGrath for exercising her rights under the Act. More important is that Parklife has articulated and proved nondiscriminatory grounds for seeking to terminate McGrath’s lease. Residents have complained to the Village’s management that McGrath has harassed her neighbors at various times, in various ways. While there is insufficient nonhearsay evidence in the instant record for the undersigned to make findings as to whether McGrath did, in fact, harass other residents in violation of park rules, Parklife proved by a preponderance of the competent substantial evidence that it was on notice of such alleged misconduct on McGrath’s part. The fact that Parklife had such notice is sufficient to show that its bringing an action to evict McGrath was not merely a pretext for unlawful discrimination against her. Of course, the question of whether Parklife is entitled to terminate McGrath’s tenancy is one that need not, and cannot, be decided in this proceeding. It is determined as a matter of ultimate fact that McGrath has failed to establish by the greater weight of the evidence that Parklife or any of the Respondents, jointly or severally, committed an unlawful housing practice.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order finding Parklife not liable for housing discrimination and awarding McGrath no relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 2nd day of November, 2020, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JOHN G. VAN LANINGHAM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of November, 2020. COPIES FURNISHED: Tammy S. Barton, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 4075 Esplanade Way, Room 110 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-7020 (eServed) Laney H. McGrath 11500 Southwest Kanner Highway, Lot 317 Indiantown, Florida 34956 (eServed) Teresa Schenk St. Lucie Village Parklife, LLC 11500 Southwest Kanner Highway Indiantown, Florida 34956 (eServed) Cheyanne Costilla, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 4075 Esplanade Way, Room 110 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-7020 (eServed)
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondent unlawfully discriminated against Petitioner on the basis of her national origin or ethnicity in violation of the Florida Fair Housing Act.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner Fabiola Heiblum ("Heiblum") is a Hispanic woman who, at all times relevant to this action, has owned Unit No. 5C in the Carlton Bay Condominium, which is located in North Miami Beach, Florida. She purchased her unit in 2004 and has resided there continuously since some time in 2005. Respondent Carlton Bay Condominium Association, Inc. ("Association") is the entity responsible for operating and managing the condominium property in which Heiblum's unit is located. In March 2008, the Association's Board of Directors ("Board") approved a special assessment, to be levied against all unit owners, the proceeds of which would be used to pay insurance premiums. Each owner was required to pay his share of the special assessment in full on April 1, 2008, or, alternatively, in three equal monthly installments, due on the first of April, May, and June 2008, respectively. Heiblum's share of this special assessment was $912.81. At or around the same time, the Board also enacted a procedure for collecting assessments, including the special insurance assessment. According to this procedure, owners would have a grace period of 15 days within which to make a required payment. After that period, a delinquent owner would be notified, in writing, that the failure to pay his balance due within 15 days after the date of the notice would result in referral of the matter to an attorney for collection. The attorney, in that event, would file a Claim of Lien and send a demand letter threatening to initiate a foreclosure proceeding if the outstanding balance (together with costs and attorney's fees) was not paid within 30 days after receipt of the demand. This collection procedure applied to all unit owners. Heiblum did not make any payment toward the special assessment on April 1, 2008. She made no payment on May 1, 2008, either. (Heiblum concedes her obligation to pay the special assessment and does not contend that the Association failed to give proper notice regarding her default.) The Association accordingly asked its attorney to file a Claim of Lien against Unit No. 5C and take the legal steps necessary to collect the unpaid debt. By letter dated May 8, 2008, the Association's attorney notified Heiblum that a Claim of Lien against her property had been recorded in the public records; further, demand was made that she pay $1402.81 (the original debt of $912.81 plus costs and attorney's fees) to avoid foreclosure. On or around May 10, 2008, Heiblum gave the Association a check in the amount of $500, which the Association returned, under cover of a letter dated May 16, 2008, because its attorney was now in charge of collecting the overdue debt. Heiblum eventually paid the special assessment in full, together with costs and attorney's fees, thereby obviating the need for a foreclosure suit. Heiblum believes that the Association prosecuted its claims for unpaid special assessments more aggressively against Hispanics such as herself than persons of other national origins or ethnicities, for which owners the Association allegedly showed greater forbearance. Specifically, she believes that the Association did not retain its attorney to undertake collection efforts against non-Hispanic unit owners, sparing them the costs and fees that she was compelled to pay. There is, however, no competent, persuasive evidence in the record, direct or circumstantial, upon which a finding of any sort of unlawful housing discrimination could be made. Ultimately, therefore, it is determined that the Association did not commit any prohibited discriminatory act vis-à-vis Heiblum.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order finding the Association not liable for housing discrimination and awarding Heiblum no relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 27th day of February, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. JOHN G. VAN LANINGHAM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of February, 2009.
The Issue Whether Respondent discriminated against Petitioner in the terms, conditions, or privileges of rental of a dwelling; or provision of services or facilities in connection therewith, in violation of the Florida Fair Housing Act (“the Act”), section 760.23, Florida Statutes (2019).
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a female residing in Tallahassee, Florida, who purports to have diagnoses of depression, attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder (“ADHD”), and a learning disability. Petitioner offered no evidence regarding how her diagnoses affect her daily life. Petitioner originally signed a lease with Respondent to rent apartment F201 at Sabal Court Apartments, 2125 Jackson Bluff Road, Tallahassee, Florida, from November 1, 2017, to October 31, 2018. Petitioner moved into the apartment with her two minor children on November 2, 2017. Petitioner testified her two minor children also have ADHD. On October 24, 2018, Petitioner renewed her lease for the apartment for the term of November 1, 2018, through October 31, 2019. Petitioner testified that, during the term of both leases, she experienced problems with the apartment; including mold in the bathroom, bed bugs, ants, roaches, spiders, and cracked flooring. Most distressing to Petitioner was the air conditioning unit, which Petitioner alleges was filthy and failed to cool the apartment. Petitioner testified she submitted several requests for the unit to be serviced, but it was never repaired to good working condition. Petitioner complained that the apartment was too hot—frequently reaching temperatures in excess of 80 degrees—for her and her children to sleep at night. On August 7, 2019, Petitioner executed a lease renewal form, requesting to renew her lease for an additional 12 months—through October 31, 2020. On September 23, 2019, Respondent posted a Notice of Non-Renewal of Lease (“Notice”) on Petitioner’s apartment door. The Notice notified Petitioner that her tenancy would not be renewed and that she was expected to vacate the premises on or before October 31, 2019. Petitioner testified that she did not know why her lease was non- renewed, but believed it to be additional mistreatment of her and her family by Respondent. In response to the undersigned’s question why Petitioner believed Respondent’s treatment of her to be related to her handicap, or that of her children, Petitioner replied that she does not believe that the non-renewal of her lease, or other issues with Respondent’s management, was based on either her handicap or that of her children.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a final order dismissing Petition for Relief from a Discriminatory Housing Practice No. 202021115. DONE AND ENTERED this 11th day of May, 2020, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S SUZANNE VAN WYK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of May, 2020. COPIES FURNISHED: Tammy S. Barton, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations Room 110 4075 Esplanade Way Tallahassee, Florida 32399-7020 (eServed) Dastha L. Crews Apartment A 2125 Pecan Lane Tallahassee, Florida 32303 (eServed) Joni Henley, Assistant Manager Sabal Court Apartments 2125 Jackson Bluff Road Tallahassee, Florida 32304 Todd A. Ruderman Green Oaks Tampa, LLC Suite 218 3201 West Commercial Boulevard Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33309 Cheyanne Costilla, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations Room 110 4075 Esplanade Way Tallahassee, Florida 32399-7020 (eServed)
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondent unlawfully discriminated against Petitioner on the basis of his national origin or race in violation of the Florida Fair Housing Act.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner Manuel Rodriguez ("Rodriguez") is a middle- aged white man of (in his words) "Spanish and Italian" descent who at all times relevant lived in Vero Beach, Florida. Respondent Indian River County Habitat for Humanity, Inc. ("Habitat"), is a nonprofit charitable corporation that makes interest-free loans to qualified applicants for the purchase of affordable housing, which the buyers, in return, must help build or renovate. In or around December 2018, Rodriguez submitted a "pre- screening" application for a Habitat home. By letter dated January 3, 2019, Habitat informed Rodriguez that, according to the information he had provided, he fell "within the income guidelines." This meant that Rodriguez could progress to the next step (group orientation) of the multi-step application process. As it happened, however, he did not make it all the way. In a letter dated February 19, 2019, Habitat told Rodriguez that his application could not be approved because his monthly income was insufficient to cover the estimated debt service. Rodriguez presented no evidence at hearing suggesting that Habitat had denied his application for any reason other than the one given to him, namely that "you [Rodriguez] do not earn enough to support a mortgage." Rodriguez was not satisfied with this rationale and arranged to meet with a Habitat employee named David Willis to discuss the matter. Rodriguez believes that Mr. Willis was rude and disrespectful to him. Further, Rodriguez testified that, during their conversation, Mr. Willis used the phrase, "you people." Clearly, this is a potentially offensive remark, and Rodriguez was, in fact, offended by it. When pressed, however, Rodriguez admitted that he did not consider the comment to have been a slur against Spanish or Italian people; rather, he took it as a more focused insult——against, for example, disputatious people. In any event, there is no evidence that Mr. Willis intended to disparage an ethnic or racial group. Determinations of Ultimate Fact There is no persuasive evidence that any of Habitat's decisions concerning, or actions affecting, Rodriguez, directly or indirectly, were motivated in any way by discriminatory animus. Thus, there is no competent, persuasive evidence in the record, direct or circumstantial, upon which a finding of any sort of unlawful housing discrimination could be made. Ultimately, therefore, it is determined that Habitat did not commit any prohibited act.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order finding Habitat not liable for housing discrimination and awarding Rodriguez no relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 15th day of August, 2019, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JOHN G. VAN LANINGHAM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of August, 2019.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondent, Hardin Hammock Estates (hereinafter referred to as "Hardin"), discriminated against Petitioner, Ms. Celeste Washington (hereinafter referred to as Ms. Washington), on the basis of her race in violation of the Florida Fair Housing Act, Sections through 760.37, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact The Parties. Celeste Washington is a black adult. Hardin is a housing rental complex with 200 single- family residences. Hardin is located in Miami-Dade County, Florida. Hardin provides "affordable housing" to lower-income individuals and, therefore, its residents are required to meet certain income requirements in order to be eligible for a residence at Hardin. At the times material to this proceeding, Hardin was managed by Reliance Management Incorporated (hereinafter referred to as "Reliance"). At the times material to this proceeding, Salah Youssif, an employee of Reliance, acted as the property manager at Hardin. Mr. Youssif is himself black, having been born in Sudan. Ms. Washington's Charge. On or about August 29, 2002, Ms. Washington filed a Complaint with the Commission. After investigation of the Complaint, the Commission issued a Determination of No Reasonable Cause, concluding that "reasonable cause does not exist to believe that a discriminatory housing practice has occurred" and dismissing the Complaint. On or about May 5, 2003, Ms. Washington filed a Petition with the Commission. Ms. Washington alleged in the Petition that Hardin had violated the Florida Fair Housing Act, Sections 760.20 through 760.36, Florida Statutes. In particular, Ms. Washington alleged that Hardin had "violated the Florida Fair Housing Act, as amended, in the manner described below": Washington was told that the waiting list at Hardin Hammock Estates was closed. She visited this development twice and was told the waiting [sic] was close [sic]. At that time she viewed the wating [sic] list and the majority of the names are [sic] Hispanic. Islanders do not consider themselves as Black Americans. The "ultimate facts alleged & entitlement to relief" asserted in the Petition are as follows: Hardin Hammocks has willful [sic] and [knowingly] practice [sic] discrimination in there [sic] selection practice and a strong possibility that the same incomes for Blacks & others [sic]. Black Americans rent is [sic] higher than others living in these [sic] developments. At hearing, Ms. Washington testified that Hardin had discriminated against her when an unidentified person refused to give her an application and that she believes the refusal was based upon her race. Management of Hardin; General Anti-Discrimination Policies. The residence selection policy established by Reliance specifically precludes discrimination based upon race. A human resource manual which describes the policy has been adopted by Reliance and all employees of Reliance working at Hardin have attended a workshop conducted by Reliances' human resource manager at which the anti-discrimination policy was addressed. An explanation of the Federal Fair Housing Law of the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development is prominently displayed in the public area of Hardin's offices in both English and Spanish. As of July 1, 2002, approximately 52 of Hardin's 200 units were rented to African-American families. Hardin's Application Policy. When Mr. Youssif became the property manager at Hardin, there were no vacancies and he found a disorganized, outdated waiting list of questionable accuracy. Mr. Youssif undertook the task of updating the list and organizing it. He determined that there were approximately 70 to 80 individuals or families waiting for vacancies at Hardin. Due to the rate of families moving out of Hardin, approximately one to two families a month, Mr. Youssif realized that if he maintained a waiting list of 50 individuals it would still take approximately two years for a residence to become available for all 50 individuals on the list. Mr. Youssif also realized that, over a two-year or longer period, the individuals on a waiting list of 50 or more individuals could change drastically: their incomes could change; they could find other affordable housing before a residence became available at Hardin; or they could move out of the area. Mr. Youssif decided that it would be best for Hardin and for individuals interested in finding affordable housing that Hardin would maintain a waiting list of only 50 individuals and that applications would not be given to any person, regardless of their race, while there were 50 individuals on the waiting list. Mr. Youssif instituted the new waiting list policy and applied it regardless of the race of an applicant. If there were less than 50 names on the waiting list, applications were accepted regardless of an individual's race; and if there were 50 or more names on the waiting list, no application was accepted regardless of an individual's race. Lack of Evidence of Discrimination. The only evidence Ms. Washington presented concerning her allegations of discriminatory treatment is that she is black. Although Ms. Washington was refused an application for housing at Hardin,3 the evidence failed to prove that Ms. Washington's race played any part in the decision not to give her an application.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the Florida Commission on Human Relations dismissing Celeste Washington's Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 20th day of November, 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LARRY J. SARTIN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of November, 2003.
The Issue Whether Petitioners were subject to discrimination in the rental of a dwelling, or in the terms, conditions, or privileges of rental of a dwelling, based on their race or familial status, in violation of the Florida Fair Housing Act, chapter 760, Part II, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Petitioners, Rolstan and Leticia Hodge, are African- American and currently reside in Virginia Beach, Virginia. Petitioners have six children. Respondent, Watson Realty Corp.,1/ is a real estate and property management company with offices throughout the state of Florida and an office in Georgia. Wendell Davis is the company’s Executive Vice President in charge of Watson Realty Management Division, including its Jacksonville office located at 4456 Sunbeam Road, Jacksonville, Florida 32257. On June 3, 2013, Petitioners completed applications to rent a property from Respondent located at 2314 Creekfront Drive in Green Cove Springs, Florida (the Property). Petitioners’ applications were taken by Gayle Aljets, Secretary at Respondent’s Westside office. Ms. Aljets sent, via facsimile transmission, Petitioners’ applications, along with copies of their photo identification, social security cards, and proof of income, to Anne Fletchall, Application Specialist in Respondent’s Sunbeam office.2/ Ms. Fletchall entered pertinent information from Petitioners’ applications, including personal identification and income information, into a system run by LexisNexis, a company with which Respondent contracted to conduct background, criminal, and financial screening of applicants.3/ LexisNexis screens applicants based on criteria selected by Respondent. For example, Respondent requires applicants to establish income of three times the rental amount, applies the combined income of multiple applicants for the same property (roommates), and requires criminal background checks on applicants 18 years of age and older. On debt issues, Respondent screens applicants for legal debts (e.g., judgments) of $1,000 or more within the most recent 48 months; as well as tax liens, landlord debt, and utility debt within the most recent 24 months. The screening system allows for exceptions, or “overrides,” on negative results for specified criteria. For example, if an applicant has a legal debt of $1,000 or more in the most recent 48 months, or a tax lien, landlord debt, or utility debt within the most recent 24 months, the system will return an override code of “800,” allowing approval of the applicant with a co-signor, or guarantor. The override determinations were made by Respondent at the time Respondent contracted with LexisNexis. Ms. Fletchall entered Petitioners’ information separately as two roommates applying for the Property. LexisNexis reported to Ms. Fletchall that Mr. Hodge had a legal debt of $1,000 or more within the last 48 months, thus failing one of the screening criteria. However, the program assigned an override code of “800,” meaning the application could be approved if Mr. Hodge obtained a guarantor. Mrs. Hodge passed all the LexisNexis screening criteria. LexisNexis further reported Petitioners’ rent-to- income ratio as 24.73 percent, based on a monthly rent of $1,195.00 and a combined income of $5,055.00. According to the criteria established by Respondent when setting up the screening process, a guarantor must establish an income of three and one-half times the amount of the monthly rent. Mrs. Hodge’s individual verified income was approximately $1,400.00, less than three and one-half times the monthly rental amount. Ms. Fletchall sent an email to Heather Cornett, property manager in the Westside office, informing her that Mr. Hodge was approved conditioned upon obtaining a guarantor. Ms. Cornett informed Mr. Hodge by phone that he would need a guarantor in order to qualify to rent the Property. Mr. Hodge asked why a guarantor would be required, but Ms. Cornett was unable to explain. Ms. Cornett informed Mr. Hodge that he would receive a letter from the third-party screening company that explained the details. During that telephone conversation, Mr. Hodge requested a telephone number for LexisNexis. Ms. Cornett did not have the LexisNexis telephone number and informed Mr. Hodge she would have to call him back with the number. Ms. Cornett obtained the number and made a return call to Mr. Hodge with the telephone number the same day. Through contact with LexisNexis, Mr. Hodge learned that a judgment against him by Freedom Furniture and Electronics had caused him to fail the applicable screening criteria, thus triggering the need for a guarantor. Mr. Hodge contacted Ms. Cornett and informed her that the debt had been satisfied. Ms. Cornett asked Mr. Hodge to obtain a letter from the debtor on the debtor’s letterhead verifying the debt had been satisfied. Mr. Hodge subsequently met with Ms. Cornett in her office and presented a letter from Freedom Furniture and Electronics. The letter represented that Mr. Hodge had entered into a payment agreement to satisfy the debt and that, thus far, payments had been made on time. Ms. Cornett faxed the letter to Ms. Fletchall to submit to LexisNexis as additional information. Ms. Fletchall called Ms. Cornett and told her the letter was only proof that payments were being made on the debt, not that the debt had been satisfied. Ms. Cornett called Mr. Hodge and informed him that the letter did not change the status of his application, and a guarantor was still required. Mr. Hodge requested Ms. Cornett submit the matter to a manager for review. Ms. Cornett took the Hodge’s applications, the letter, and the LexisNexis report to Terri Brown, Respondent’s Regional Manager. Ms. Cornett spoke to Ms. Brown via telephone, who confirmed that a guarantor would still be required for approval. Ms. Cornett again called Mr. Hodge with this information. Mr. Hodge did not obtain a guarantor and did not make another application, or otherwise arrange with Respondent to rent the Property. On June 10, 2013, Respondent received an application from a different set of applicants to rent the Property. The applicants were white and listed on their application that they had three children.4/ Ms. Fletchall processed two separate applications for the applicants as roommates, just as she did with Petitioners’ applications. The LexisNexis report showed that the male applicant failed three of the screening criteria, while the female applicant passed all the criteria. The system assigned an override code of “800” for the male applicant’s prior landlord debt, triggering the requirement for a guarantor. The system also assigned an override code of “920” based on the male applicant’s prior issue with a personal check, triggering a requirement that the male applicant pay monthly rent by certified funds. On June 21, 2013, the new applicants entered into a lease for the Property. The tenants obtained a guarantor who signed a lease guarantee which was incorporated into the lease.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief filed in FCHR No. 2014H0082. DONE AND ENTERED this 25th day of September, 2014, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S Suzanne Van Wyk Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSotoBuilding 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of September, 2014.
The Issue The issue for determination is whether Respondent discriminated against Petitioners in violation of the Fair Housing Act by failing to release them from a 20-year affordable housing deed restriction.
Findings Of Fact No dispute exists that Mr. Discher is handicapped, as indicated in his medical records, for purposes of the Fair Housing Act. John and Ruth Discher own the property located at 22916 Bluegill Lane, Cudjoe Key, Florida, with the following legal description: Lot 32, Block 10, Cudjoe Ocean Shores, as recorded in Plat Book 6, Page 76, of the Public Records of Monroe County, Florida. At the time of hearing, the Dischers did not live in the residential home on the property but rented it. No dispute exists that Monroe County is a political subdivision of the State of Florida having regulatory jurisdiction over the Dischers’ property. Since around 1979, Monroe County has been designated as an Area of Critical State Concern (ACSC). As an ACSC, increased State oversight of and involvement in local planning decisions is required by the Governor and Cabinet, sitting as the Florida Administrative Commission, and the Department of Community Affairs (DCA), as the State land planning agency. The Florida Legislature imposed a series of “principles for guiding development” in the Florid Keys. § 380.0552(7), Fla. Stat. One of the principles for guiding development imposed by the State is “to make available adequate affordable housing for all sectors of the population of the Florida Keys.” § 380.0552(7)(j), Fla. Stat. In 1992, the Rate of Growth Ordinance (ROGO) was adopted by the Florida Administrative Commission on behalf of Monroe County in order to limit growth in the Keys. The purpose and intent of ROGO was to facilitate implementation of goals, objective and policies set forth in Monroe County’s comprehensive plan relating to many areas of concern, including the protection of the environment (including endangered species and species on the concerned list), residents, and visitors; hurricane evacuation; road improvement; property and property development. ROGO consists of a competitive point system, based on a complex scoring system, and those who obtain the top points receive allocations. Point values are accessed on and using a number of criteria. Under the ROGO system, property owners, who wish to build houses on vacant land, must compete to receive a limited number of residential allocations. The yearly number of building allocations is limited by state administrative rule. Property owners seeking building allocations compete against each other in order to receive one of the limited number of allocations. In 1996, Monroe County’s comprehensive plan was effective. Prior to 1996, Monroe County received very few applicants for ROGO; however, after the comprehensive plan became effective the competition under ROGO increased tremendously. Developers and persons with high economic means became the majority of those able to receive points in order to obtain the majority of the limited allocations. With the increase in competition, affordable housing became a concern. The ultimate goal of Monroe County under the ACSC program is for it (Monroe County) to get into the position of being able to protect the environmental resources, provide for hurricane evacuation, and do everything that is required in Chapter 380, Florida Statutes, and be removed or “de-designated” as an ACSC. Applicable to the instant matter, affordable housing was defined in Monroe County Code, Land Development Regulations, Section 9.5-4, which provided in pertinent part: (A-5) Affordable housing means housing which: * * * With respect to a housing unit to be occupied by moderate-income persons, that monthly rents, or monthly mortgage payments, including taxes and insurance, do not exceed thirty (30) percent of that amount which represents one hundred twenty (120) percent of the median adjusted gross annual income for households within Monroe County, divided by 12 for a period of twenty (20) years. The dwelling unit must also meet all applicable requirements of the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development minimum property standards as to room sizes, fixtures, landscaping and building materials, when not in conflict with applicable laws of Monroe County. For the purposes of this section, “adjusted gross income” means all wages, assets, regular cash or noncash contributions or gifts from persons outside the household, and such other resources and benefits as may be determined to be income by rule of the department of community affairs, adjusted for family size, less deductions allowable under section 62 of the Internal Revenue code; and In which, if permitted by law, preference is given to local contractors. The threshold for a household’s income to qualify for affordable housing was set by this regulation. Further, Monroe County Code, Land Development Regulations, Section 9.5-266, applicable to the instant matter, provided in pertinent part: (a) Affordable Housing: (1) Notwithstanding the density limitation in section 9.5-262, the owner of a parcel of land shall be entitled to develop affordable housing as defined in section 9.5-4(A-5). . . . * * * Before any certificate of occupancy may be issued for any structure, portion or phase of a project subject to this section, restrictive covenant(s), limiting the required number of dwelling units to households meeting the income criteria described in paragraph (4)(a)-(f) of this subsection (a) running in favor of Monroe County and enforceable by the county, shall be filed in the official records of Monroe County. The covenant(s) shall be effective for twenty (20) years but shall not commence running until a certificate of occupancy has been issued by the building official for the dwelling unit or units to which the covenant or covenants apply. In order for the owner of a parcel of land to be entitled to the incentives outlined in this section, the owner must ensure that: a. The use of the dwelling is restricted to households that derive at least seventy (70) percent of their household income from gainful employment in Monroe County; and * * * e. The use of the dwelling is restricted for a period of at least twenty (20) years to households with an income no greater than one hundred twenty (120) percent of the median household income for Monroe County . . . . This regulation sets the limitation for covenants at 20 years, with the time period beginning to run at the issuance of the certificate of occupancy by the building department. Under the ROGO plan, a person was awarded additional points if the person agreed to the imposition of an affordable housing deed restriction. Being awarded the additional points meant that a person would receive an allocation in a shorter period of time. At that time, Mrs. Discher was an employee of the Monroe County Sheriffs Department. The Dischers completed a ROGO application. They wanted to be awarded additional points to reduce the period of time for them to receive an allocation for the construction of their home. The Dischers completed an Annual Affidavit of Qualification for Affordable Housing (Residential Dwelling Unit). The Affidavit provided, among other things, an acknowledgement by the Dischers that the Affidavit was a waiver of payment of the required impact fees; that Mrs. Discher was an employee of the Monroe County Sheriff’s Department and at least 70 percent of the household’s income was derived from that employment; that the single family home was restricted for 20 years to household’s with adjusted gross income of a certain amount; that the Dischers would file an approved deed restriction indicating “that, either (1) the deferred impact fees shall become due and owing if the unit no longer qualifies as Affordable Housing, or, (2) that the dwelling unit shall be restricted by the affordable housing criteria for twenty years commencing from the issuance of the certificate of occupancy”; and that the Dischers understood that, if affordable housing was used to gain points in the allocation system, the single-family home would be restricted by the covenants for 20 years. Mr. Discher prepared an affordable housing deed restriction for a residential dwelling unit in 1997. The Affordable Housing Deed Restriction, prepared by Mr. Discher, was executed by the Dischers on July 2, 1997. Provision II of the Affordable Housing Deed Restriction provided, among other things, an acknowledgement that “fair share impact fees” shall be paid by any person prior to receiving a building permit for any new land development. Provision III of the Affordable Housing Deed Restriction provided, among other things, an acknowledgement by the Dischers that they were being exempt from payment of their fair share impact fees for the single family home to be constructed by them on their property. Provision IV of the Affordable Housing Deed Restriction provided, among other things, that the sale, transfer or rental of their single family home shall only be to persons who qualify under Monroe County’s current affordable housing eligibility requirements as established and amended from time to time. Provision V of the Affordable Housing Deed Restriction provides, among other things, that the covenants shall be effective for 20 years and shall begin to run at the issuance of certificate of occupancy by the building department. Provision VI of the Affordable Housing Deed Restriction provides, among other things, that the Dischers used the affordable housing program to gain additional points in the permit allocation system. The Affordable Housing Deed Restriction contains no provision for removal of the affordable housing deed restriction. The Dischers were given additional points. Their wait-time for an allocation was reduced, and they received an allocation to build their single family home. The Dischers attempted to pay impact fees on or about October 2, 1997. They were informed by the building department that they were not required to pay the impact fees and their check for the impact fees was returned to them. They obtained a mortgage loan and completed their single family home. A certificate of occupancy was issued on June 30, 1999. Mr. Discher testified at hearing that the only reason that he and his wife applied for the ROGO program and that he prepared and he and his wife executed the Affordable Housing Deed Restriction was because an employee of the Monroe County Building Department informed him that they (the Dischers) could be released from the affordable housing deed restriction simply by paying the fair share impact fee at any time. Before ROGO, Monroe County had an affordable housing ordinance that permitted the removal from affordable housing by paying the impact fees. A household benefited by not initially paying impact fees; but, the household could later decide to pay the impact fees, come forward and pay the impact fees, and be removed from affordable housing. However, after ROGO was adopted, the option to later pay the impact fees and be removed from affordable housing no longer existed. ROGO contained no mechanism for a person to pay the impact fees and be removed from affordable housing before the time limit expired or to be removed from affordable housing before the time limit expired. At hearing, the building official was identified but did not testify. Insufficient evidence was presented to ascertain whether the building official had the apparent authority to allow the Dischers to pay the impact fees and remove them from the affordable housing restrictions prior to the 20 years. Consequently, the evidence is insufficient to demonstrate that the Dischers reasonably relied upon the building official’s representation to support a release from the affordable housing restrictions. No copy of any release from the affordable housing deed restrictions recorded in the official records of Monroe County was presented at hearing. The evidence is insufficient to demonstrate that Monroe County had released any persons from affordable housing deed restrictions. In 2005, the Dischers made a request to Monroe County for removal of the affordable housing deed restrictions. The Dischers were notified by Monroe County that no provision existed in the Monroe County Code or Monroe County’s Comprehensive Plan for removal of the affordable deed restrictions prior the effective date of their expiration or termination and that its Comprehensive Plan provided that affordable housing projects shall be required to maintain the project as affordable housing on a long-term basis in accordance with deed restrictions. Furthermore, the Dischers were notified by Monroe County that prospective occupant(s) of the affordable housing must meet the qualifications for affordable housing. The Dischers attempted to pay the impact fees in order to be released from the affordable housing deed restrictions. They attempted to pay the impact fees on at least two occasions— March 20, 2006, and February 20, 2007. On each occasion, their payment was refused by Monroe County. Monroe County determined that payment of the impact fees would not release the Dischers from the affordable housing deed restrictions, and, therefore, refused and returned the Dischers’ payments. Moreover, no provision in the Monroe County Code permitted the removal of the affordable housing deed restrictions. Monroe County admits that, under the guidelines in place when the Dischers obtained affordable housing, the Dischers are not restricted to a selling or renting price for their single family home. However, they are restricted as to the income of prospective buyer(s) or renter(s), i.e., the prospective buyer(s) or renter(s) must meet the income guidelines set forth in the Monroe County Code. Prior to and during the entire process involving the ROGO program, Mr. Discher was disabled. A copy of a letter written by the Dischers in September 1997, in which Mr. Discher indicated his disability, was forwarded to Monroe County. After the completion of the Dischers’ home, Mr. Discher’s health deteriorated. At hearing, Mr. Discher admitted that, prior to filing the discriminatory fair housing complaint, he had never mentioned his disability to Monroe County in relation to having the affordable housing deed restrictions removed. Moreover, at hearing, he admitted that Monroe County had not discriminated against him on the basis of his disability by refusing to remove the affordable housing deed restrictions. Mr. Discher’s physicians recommended to him that he move away from the Keys to improve his health. Furthermore, eventually, Mr. Discher needed to be closer to the locations where he was receiving his medical treatments, which were outside of the Keys. The Dischers finally moved away from the Keys to be closer to the locations where Mr. Discher was receiving his medical treatments. They rented their single-family home in Monroe County. Mrs. Discher was forced to return to work. If the Dischers are released from the affordable housing deed restrictions or if the affordable housing deed restrictions are removed, the Dischers would sell the single-family home. A Senior Planner with DCA, Ada Mayte Santamaria, testified at hearing as an expert in community planning. Ms. Santamaria testified that neither Monroe County’s Comprehensive Plan nor its Land Development Regulations allow for the removal of the Dischers’ affordable housing deed restrictions; and that, if the affordable housing deed restrictions were released, DCA would probably issue a notice of violation against Monroe County for not properly implementing its Comprehensive Plan and Land Development Regulations and probably recommend to the Administration Commission that Monroe County’s allocations for the year following such release be reduced because of the failure of Monroe County to enforce and implement its Comprehensive Plan and Land Development Regulations. Ms. Santamaria further testified that Monroe County is allowed to submit two proposed comprehensive plan amendments per year; and that, because of the process involved in proposed amendments, including review by DCA, a proposed amendment by Monroe County to release affordable housing deed restrictions would take a minimum of six months and could take up to a year and a half to complete the process. At a Monroe County Commission meeting held on January 17, 2007, the Dischers requested to be released from their affordable housing deed restrictions based on hardship due to Mr. Discher’s medical conditions. At the meeting, copy of his medical documents, identifying his disability, was distributed to the Commissioners. The Commissioners denied the Dischers’ request. However, the Commissioners also decided that they wanted to address extreme hardship situations and unanimously voted to direct its staff to begin work on an “exit strategy” for affordable housing deed restrictions on the basis of extreme hardship situations. The Commission staff represented at the meeting that such a process would take at least three months and indicated that Monroe County’s Comprehensive Plan may have to be amended in conjunction with what the Commission wanted. At the time of the final hearing in the instant matter, approximately a year and a half later, no “exit strategy” had been brought before the Commission. No evidence was presented that the Commission had decided that it no longer wanted to develop an “exit strategy.” No evidence was presented as to why the process had not begun. The Dischers are convinced that Monroe County wants to take their property. The evidence is insufficient to demonstrate that Monroe County wants to take the Dischers’ property.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order finding that Monroe County Commissioners did not commit a discriminating housing practice against John and Ruth Discher in violation of the Fair Housing Act by failing to release or remove the affordable housing deed restrictions. DONE AND ENTERED this 31st day of December, 2008, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ERROL H. POWELL Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of December, 2008.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondent unlawfully discriminated against Petitioner on the basis of her religion or national origin in violation of the Florida Fair Housing Act.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner Tal Simhoni ("Simhoni"), a Jewish woman who identifies the State of Israel as her place of national origin, at all times relevant to this action owned Unit No. 212 in Mimo on the Beach I Condominium (the "Condominium"), which is located in Miami Beach, Florida. She purchased this unit in 2009 and a second apartment (Unit No. 203) in 2010. Simhoni has resided at the Condominium on occasion but her primary residence, at least as of the final hearing, was in New York City. The Condominium is a relatively small community consisting of two buildings comprising 28 units. Respondent Mimo on the Beach I Condominium Association, Inc. ("Association"), a Florida nonprofit corporation, is the entity responsible for operating and managing the Condominium and, specifically, the common elements of the Condominium property. Governing the Association is a Board of Directors (the "Board"), a representative body whose three members, called "directors," are elected by the unit owners. Simhoni served on the Board for nearly seven years. From July 2010 until April 2011, she held the office of vice- president, and from April 2011 until June 1, 2017, Simhoni was the president of the Board. Simhoni's term as president was cut short when, in May 2017, she and the other two directors then serving with her on the Board were recalled by a majority vote of the Condominium's owners. The Association, while still under the control of the putatively recalled directors, rejected the vote and petitioned the Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Division of Condominiums, Timeshares, and Mobile Homes ("DBPR"), for arbitration of the dispute. By Summary Final Order dated June 1, 2017, DBPR upheld the recall vote and ordered that Simhoni, Marisel Santana, and Carmen Duarte be removed from office, effective immediately. The run-up to the recall vote entailed a campaign of sorts to unseat Simhoni, which, as might be expected, caused friction between neighbors. Without getting into details that aren't important here, it is fair to say that, generally speaking, the bloc opposed to Simhoni believed that she had poorly managed the Condominium, especially in connection with the use of Association funds. Some of Simhoni's critics were not shy about voicing their opinions in this regard, which—— understandably——led to hard feelings. Simhoni vehemently disputes the charges of her critics and, clearly, has not gotten over her recall election defeat, which she blames on false, unfair, and anti-Semitic accusations against her. This is a case of alleged housing discrimination brought under Florida's Fair Housing Act (the "Act"). Specifically, Simhoni is traveling under section 760.23(2), Florida Statutes, which makes it "unlawful to discriminate against any person in the terms, conditions, or privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling, or in the provision of services or facilities in connection therewith, because of race, color, national origin, sex, handicap, familial status, or religion." (Emphasis added). The applicable law will be discussed in greater detail below. The purpose of this brief, prefatory mention of the Act is to provide context for the findings of fact that follow. The principal goal of section 760.23(2) is to prohibit the denial of access to housing based on discriminatory animus. Simhoni, however, was not denied access to housing. She is, in fact, a homeowner. Contrary to what some might intuit, the Act is not an all-purpose anti-discrimination law or civility code; it does not purport to police personal disputes, quarrels, and feuds between neighbors, even ugly ones tinged with, e.g., racial or religious hostility. To the extent the Act authorizes charges based on alleged post-acquisition discrimination, such charges must involve the complete denial of services or facilities that are available in common to all owners as a term or condition of ownership——the right to use common areas, for example, pursuant to a declaration of condominium. Moreover, the denial of access to common services or facilities logically must result from the actions of a person or persons, or an entity, that exercises de facto or de jure control over access to the services or facilities in question. This is important because, while Simhoni believes that she was subjected to anti-Semitic slurs during her tenure as Board president, the fact is that her unfriendly neighbors——none of whom then held an office on the Board——were in no position to (and in fact did not) deny Simhoni access to common services and facilities under the Association's control, even if their opposition to her presidency were motivated by discriminatory animus (which wasn't proved). As president of the Board, Simhoni wound up on the receiving end of some uncivil and insensitive comments, and a few of her neighbors seem strongly to dislike her. Simhoni was hurt by this. That impolite, even mean, comments are not actionable as unlawful housing discrimination under section 760.23(2) is no stamp of approval; it merely reflects the relatively limited scope of the Act. Simhoni has organized her allegations of discrimination under six categories. Most of these allegations do not implicate or involve the denial of common services or facilities, and thus would not be sufficient to establish liability under the Act, even if true. For that reason, it is not necessary to make findings of fact to the granular level of detail at which the charges were made. The Mastercard Dispute. As Board president, Simhoni obtained a credit card for the Association, which she used for paying common expenses and other Association obligations such as repair costs. In applying for the card, Simhoni signed an agreement with the issuer to personally guarantee payment of the Association's account. It is unclear whether Simhoni's actions in procuring this credit card were undertaken in accordance with the Condominium's By-Laws, but there is no evidence suggesting that Simhoni was forced, encouraged, or even asked to co-sign the Association's credit agreement; she seems, rather, to have volunteered. Simhoni claims that she used personal funds to pay down the credit card balance, essentially lending money to the Association. She alleges that the Association has failed to reimburse her for these expenditures, and she attributes this nonpayment to anti-Semitism. There appears to be some dispute regarding how much money, if any, the Association actually owes Simhoni for common expenses. The merits of her claim for repayment are not relevant in this proceeding, however, because there is insufficient persuasive evidence in the record to support a finding that the Association has withheld payment based on Simhoni's religion or national origin. Equally, if not more important, is the fact that Simhoni's alleged right to reimbursement is not a housing "service" or "facility" available in common to the Condominium's owners and residents. Nonpayment of the alleged debt might constitute a breach of contract or support other causes of action at law or in equity, but these would belong to Simhoni as a creditor of the Association, not as an owner of the Condominium. In short, the Association's alleged nonpayment of the alleged debt might give Simhoni good legal grounds to sue the Association for, e.g., breach of contract or money had and received——but not for housing discrimination. The Estoppel Certificate. On September 20, 2017, when she was under contract to sell Unit No. 212, Simhoni submitted a written request to the Association for an estoppel certificate, pursuant to section 718.116(8), Florida Statutes. By statute, the Association was obligated to issue the certificate within ten business days——by October 4, 2017, in this instance. Id. The failure to timely issue an estoppel letter results in forfeiture of the right to charge a fee for preparing and delivering the certificate. § 718.116(8)(d), Fla. Stat. The Association missed the deadline, issuing the certificate one-week late, on October 11, 2017; it paid the prescribed statutory penalty for this tardiness, refunding the preparation fee to Simhoni as required. Simhoni attributes the delay to anti-Semitism. It is debatable whether the issuance of an estoppel letter is the kind of housing "service" whose deprivation, if based on religion, national origin, or another protected criterion, would support a claim for unlawful discrimination under the Act. The undersigned will assume for argument's sake that it is such a service. Simhoni's claim nonetheless fails because (i) the very statute that imposes the deadline recognizes that it will not always be met and provides a penalty for noncompliance, which the Association paid; (ii) a brief delay in the issuance of an estoppel letter is not tantamount to the complete deprivation thereof; and (iii) there is, at any rate, insufficient persuasive evidence that the minimal delay in issuing Simhoni a certificate was the result of discriminatory animus. Pest Control. Pest control is not a service that the Association is required to provide but, rather, one that may be provided at the discretion of the Board. During Simhoni's tenure as Board president, apparently at her urging, the Association arranged for a pest control service to treat all of the units for roaches, as a common expense, and the apartments were sprayed on a regular basis. If the exterminator were unable to enter a unit because, e.g., the resident was not at home when he arrived, a locksmith would be summoned to open the door, and the owner would be billed individually for this extra service. After Simhoni and her fellow directors were recalled, the new Board decided, as a cost-control measure, to discontinue the pest control service, allowing the existing contract to expire without renewal. Owners were notified that, during the phaseout, the practice of calling a locksmith would cease. If no one were home when the pest control operator showed up, the unit would not be sprayed, unless the owner had left a key with the Association or made arrangements for someone else to open his door for the exterminator. By this time, Simhoni's principal residence, as mentioned, was in New York. Although she knew that the locksmith option was no longer available, Simhoni failed to take steps to ensure that the pest control operator would have access to her apartment when she wasn't there. Consequently, Simhoni's unit was not sprayed on some (or perhaps any) occasions during the phaseout. Simhoni blames anti-Semitism for the missed pest control visits, but the greater weight of the evidence fails to support this charge. Simhoni was treated the same as everyone else in connection with the pest control service. Moreover, Simhoni was not completely deprived of access to pest control, which would have been provided to her if she had simply made arrangements to permit access to her unit. Short-term Rentals. Article XVII of the Condominium's Declaration of Condominium ("Declaration"), titled Occupancy and Use Restrictions, specifically regulates leases. Section 17.8 of the Declaration provides, among other things, that the Association must approve all leases of units in the Condominium, which leases may not be for a term of less than one year. In other words, the Declaration prohibits short-term, or vacation, rentals, which are typically for periods of days or weeks. Short-term rentals can be lucrative for owners, especially in places such as Miami Beach that attract tourists who might be interested in alternatives to traditional hotel lodgings. On the flip side, however, short-term rental activity is not necessarily welcomed by neighboring residents, who tend to regard transients as being insufficiently invested in preserving the peace, quiet, and tidy appearance of the neighborhood. At the Condominium, the question of whether or not to permit short-term rentals has divided the owners into competing camps. Simhoni is in favor of allowing short-term rentals. Accordingly, while she was Board president, the Association did not enforce the Declaration's prohibition of this activity. (It is possible, but not clear, that the Association was turning a blind eye to short-term rentals even before Simhoni became a director.) This laissez-faire approach did not sit well with everyone; indeed, dissatisfaction with short-term rentals provided at least some of the fuel for the ultimately successful recall effort that cost Simhoni her seat on the Board. After Simhoni and the rest of her Board were removed, the new directors announced their intent to enforce the Declaration's ban on short-term rentals. Simhoni alleges that the crackdown on short-term rentals was an act of religion-based housing discrimination. Her reasoning in this regard is difficult to follow, but the gist of it seems to be that the Association is selectively enforcing the ban so that only Simhoni and other Jewish owners are being forced to stop engaging in short-term rental activity; that the prohibition is having a disparate impact on Jewish owners; or that some owners are harassing Simhoni by making complaints about her to the City of Miami Beach in hopes that the City will impose fines against her for violating municipal restrictions on short-term rentals. The undersigned recognizes that a neutral policy such as the prohibition of short-term rentals conceivably could be enforced in a discriminatory manner, thus giving rise to a meritorious charge under the Act. Here, however, the evidence simply does not support Simhoni's contentions. There is insufficient evidence of disparate impact, disparate treatment, selective enforcement, harassment, or discriminatory animus in connection with the Association's restoration of the short-term rental ban. To the contrary, the greater weight of the evidence establishes that the Association is trying to stop short-term rentals at the Condominium for a perfectly legitimate reason, namely that a majority of the owners want section 17.8 of the Declaration to be given full force and effect. The Feud with Flores. Simhoni identifies Mr. and Ms. Flores as the worst of her antagonists among her neighbors. As advocates of the recall, these two were fierce critics of Simhoni. The Floreses reported Simhoni to the City of Miami Beach for engaging in short-term rentals without the required business tax receipt, in violation of the municipal code. At a code enforcement hearing, Mr. Flores gave Simhoni the finger. None of this, however, amounts to housing discrimination because the Floreses' actions did not completely deprive Simhoni of common facilities or services, even if such actions were motivated by anti-Semitism, which the greater weight of the evidence fails to establish. Indeed, there is no persuasive evidence that the Floreses ever had such control over the Condominium's facilities or services that they could have denied Simhoni access to them. Simhoni argues in her proposed recommended order, apparently for the first time, that the Floreses' conduct created a "hostile housing environment." Putting aside the legal problems with this belatedly raised theory, the Floreses' conduct was not sufficiently severe and pervasive, as a matter of fact, to support a "hostile environment" claim. Nor is there sufficient persuasive evidence in the record to support a finding that the Floreses acted in concert with the Board to harass Simhoni, or that the Board acquiesced to the Floreses' conduct. Roof Repairs. Simhoni alleges that the Association failed to repair the area of the roof over her unit, which she claims was damaged in Hurricane Irma, and that the Association has refused to make certain repairs inside her unit, which she asserts sustained interior water damage as a result of roof leaks. Simhoni asserts that, using Association funds, the Association not only repaired other portions of the roof, but also fixed interior damages similar to hers, for the benefit of non-Jewish owners. The greater weight of the persuasive evidence shows, however, that the roof over Simhoni's unit is not damaged, and that the Association never instructed the roofing contractor not to make needed repairs. Simhoni, in short, was not denied the service of roof repairs. As for the alleged damage to Simhoni's unit, section 7.1 of the Declaration provides that repairs to the interior of a unit are to be performed by the owner at the owner's sole cost and expense. The evidence fails to establish that the interior damage of which Simhoni complains falls outside of her duty to repair. Because this is a housing discrimination case, and not a legal or administrative proceeding to enforce the terms of the Declaration, it is neither necessary, nor would it be appropriate, for the undersigned to adjudicate fully the question of whether the Association is obligated to repair Simhoni's unit as a common expense. Here, it is sufficient to find (and it is found) that section 7.1 of the Declaration affords the Association a legitimate, nonpretextual, nondiscriminatory reason to refuse, as it has, to perform the interior repairs that Simhoni has demanded.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order finding the Association not liable for housing discrimination and awarding Simhoni no relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 26th day of February, 2019, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JOHN G. VAN LANINGHAM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of February, 2019.
