The Issue Whether the Hernando County Housing Authority (Respondent) unlawfully engaged in a discriminatory housing practice against Peggy Troiano (Petitioner) on the basis of her disability by refusing to provide Section 8 funding for a housing unit being occupied by Petitioner and the housing unit's owner, Petitioner’s daughter, Julia Williams.
Findings Of Fact At all relevant times, Petitioner was an individual participant in a tenant-based voucher arrangement under the Section 8 Housing Program funded by HUD and administered by Respondent. Petitioner is an individual claiming that she is disabled because of a toxic injury that requires her to live isolated in a non-toxic environment. Respondent does not contest Petitioner’s claim of disability and it is, therefore, found that Petitioner is disabled or handicapped within the meaning of applicable law. Julia Williams is Petitioner’s daughter who, at all relevant times, owned the house located at 15141 Pomp Parkway, Weeki Wachee, Hernando County, Florida (“15141 Pomp Parkway unit”). Ms. Williams is specially trained to deal with toxic injury and is paid through a federally-funded, consumer-directed program to provide assistance to Petitioner. Respondent is a public housing agency that administers the Section 8 Housing Program as part of the Housing and Community Development Act of 1974, which recodified the U.S. Housing Act of 1937. As a recipient of funding from HUD for its Section 8 Program, Respondent is required to comply with HUD Section 8 regulations, as well as all Federal, State, and local fair housing laws and regulations. In order to receive funding from HUD, Respondent is required to sign an annual contributions contract (ACC) wherein it agrees to follow the Code of Federal Regulations (C.F.R.). If Respondent does not follow the C.F.R. or HUD’s guidelines, HUD has the right to terminate Respondent’s Section 8 program funding. In addition, HUD could make Respondent repay any funding used for ineligible housing. On March 17, 2014, during the annual reexamination for her Section 8 voucher, Petitioner signed, under the penalty of perjury, a summary report which identified her as the only household member permitted to live in any unit under her Section 8 voucher. Around the time of the annual reexamination, Petitioner was living at a unit on Philatelic Drive with plans to move into and rent a unit at 15141 Pomp Parkway. The Pomp Parkway unit was owned, but not being occupied, by Petitioner’s daughter Julia Williams. In April of 2014, Petitioner asked Respondent for permission to rent the unit from her daughter. Petitioner and her daughter spoke with Respondent’s officials about her request. Generally, a public housing agency, such as Respondent, cannot approve a unit for participation in the Section 8 program if it is owned by a parent, child, grandparent, grandchild, sister, or brother of any member of the participant’s family. See 24 C.F.R. § 982.306. Respondent, however, ultimately approved Petitioner’s rental of the Pomp Parkway unit under the Section 8 program, even though it was owned by Petitioner’s daughter, pursuant to a limited exception under 24 C.F.R. § 982.306(d), which provides an express exception to the rule if “the [public housing agency] determines that approving the unit would provide reasonable accommodation for a family member who is a person with disabilities.” 24 C.F.R. § 982.306(d). Also, during April of 2014, Petitioner and Ms. Williams were working on constructing a caregiver suite for the 15141 Pomp Parkway unit and had discussions with Respondent’s staff about it. There are documents purportedly created during this time frame summarizing several conversations between Respondent, Petitioner, and Ms. Williams. The documents state that Respondent’s officials had a conversation with Petitioner and her daughter wherein they discussed the requirements for a live- in aide and that Petitioner and Ms. Williams were warned that Ms. Williams could never live in the 15141 Pomp Parkway unit. Respondent also contends that Petitioner and Ms. Williams were warned that, even if Ms. Williams was approved as a live-in aide, Ms. Williams could not live in the 15141 Pomp Parkway unit. On the other hand, Petitioner contends that the alleged conversations warning her that her daughter could not reside in the home did not occur during this time frame, and that she and her daughter continued to renovate the house to specifications suitable to accommodate Petitioner's disability with the expectation that her daughter would ultimately be able to reside in the home after renovations were complete. Upon consideration of the credibility of the witnesses and timing of the purported documents, the undersigned finds that the testimony and documents regarding these alleged April conversations are unreliable and do not support a finding that the conversations and warnings actually occurred during the April time frame. The evidence is also insufficient to support Petitioner's contention that Respondent was somehow responsible for Petitioner's expectation that her daughter would be able to both act as Petitioner's caregiver and live in the home while Petitioner was receiving rent vouchers under the Section 8 program. Petitioner was the only person that Respondent approved to live in the 15141 Pomp Parkway unit under her Section 8 voucher. In May of 2014, Petitioner’s daughter entered into a one-year residential lease with Petitioner and a Housing Assistance Payment Contract (HAP Contract) with Respondent. According to the HAP Contract, Petitioner was the only person able to reside in the 15141 Pomp Parkway unit without the express, written consent of Respondent. At the time the HAP Contract was signed, Petitioner advised Respondent that she would be the only person living in the unit. Ms. Williams, as the landlord, signed a check cashing agreement with Respondent wherein she agreed Petitioner would be the only person occupying the 15141 Pomp Parkway unit. Also, Petitioner’s income verification summary report provides that Petitioner is the only person allowed to live in a unit covered by her Section 8 voucher. In early May of 2014, Ms. Williams moved into the 15141 Pomp Parkway unit without notice to Respondent. Petitioner has never received written approval from Respondent to have Ms. Williams live and occupy the 15141 Pomp Parkway unit under the Section 8 voucher program. By letter dated June 17, 2014, Petitioner submitted an HCHA Live-in Aide Request Verification Form, along with letters from her doctor. Petitioner also requested that her daughter Julia Williams serve as her live-in aide. Approval for a live-in aide is a different process than the approval process to have someone added to the household. While Petitioner's request for a live-in aide stated that Petitioner was living at 15141 Pomp Parkway, it did not mention that Petitioner's daughter was the owner of the dwelling, nor did it include a specific request that Ms. Williams be allowed to move into and occupy the 15141 Pomp Parkway unit that she owned. Upon receipt of the written request for a live-in aide by Petitioner, Respondent began its investigation to determine whether Petitioner met the qualifications for a live-in aide and whether Ms. Williams met the qualifications to serve as a live- in aide. Respondent has implemented 24 C.F.R. § 5.403 into its written policy regarding live-in aides, which provides: LIVE-IN ATTENDANTS A family may include a live-in aide provided that such live-in aide: Is determined by the [public housing agency] to be essential to the care and well-being of an elderly person, a nearly-elderly person, or a person with disabilities, Is not obligated for the support of the person(s), and Would not be living in the unit except to provide care for the person(s). Under the C.F.R., a public housing agency is required to approve a live-in aide, if needed, as a reasonable accommodation for an elderly or disabled person. 24 C.F.R. § 982.316 (“The PHA must approve a live-in-aide if needed as a reasonable accommodation” to a family with an elderly or disabled person.). By letter dated June 27, 2014, Respondent notified Petitioner of the approval of her request for her daughter to serve as her live-in aide. Although Respondent was aware that a home occupied by an owner was not eligible for a Section 8 voucher at the time it gave its permission for Petitioner's daughter to serve as Petitioner's live-in aide, the letter did not speak to that issue. Rather, the June 27, 2014, letter, signed by Donald Singer, stated: Pursuant to your letter dated June 17, 2014 requesting a reasonable accommodation for a live in aide. Your letter also ask [sic] that the live in aide be your daughter, Julia Williams based upon her qualifications as presented. After reviewing the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development's (HUD) regulations for Live-in Aides and the Housing Authority's Section 8 Program Administrative Plan for Live in Aides our office has determined that your daughter, Julia Williams meets the program qualification(s) to act as your Live in Aide. Therefore our office is approving Julia E. Williams as your Live in Aide effective immediately. Should you have any questions regarding this action/letter please contact our office at 352-754-4160. By email on August 11, 2014, Petitioner notified Mr. Singer that she and her live-in aide, Julia Williams, intended to live at the 15141 Pomp Parkway unit. On August 11, 2014, Petitioner’s daughter Julia Williams was still the owner of the 15141 Pomp Parkway unit. Under 24 C.F.R. § 892.352, a unit being occupied by its owner is deemed “ineligible” and a public housing agency is prohibited from providing funding for such unit. The C.F.R. provides a limited exception for shared housing that allows an owner to occupy a unit funded by Section 8. Under that limited exception, however, the Section 8 participant cannot be a blood relative of the resident owner. 24 C.F.R. § 982.615(b)(3). Based upon the prohibition under the C.F.R. which forbids a public housing agency from funding a unit occupied by an owner who is a blood relative of the Section 8 participant, by letters dated August 22, 2014, Respondent notified Petitioner and Ms. Williams that the 15141 Pomp Parkway unit was “ineligible housing” that could not be funded. The letters also informed Petitioner that Julia Williams' approval as a live-in aide did not supersede HUD regulations and that, because Julia Williams was occupying the unit, Respondent was terminating the HAP contract effective September 30, 2014. The only reason Respondent terminated the funding for the 15141 Pomp Parkway unit was because the C.F.R. does not allow Respondent to continue funding a unit occupied by its owner. Prior to the August 22nd letters, Respondent was advised by HUD that Respondent did not have any discretion in funding “ineligible housing.” HUD approved the draft of the August 22nd letters. The evidence does not support a finding that either Respondent or HUD waived or should otherwise be prevented from applying the limitations and requirements of the law that a Section 8 participant cannot be a blood relative of the resident owner. Respondent would have been willing to continue Petitioner’s housing assistance as long as Petitioner met program requirements and the housing was deemed eligible housing under the C.F.R. through the issuance of a new three-bedroom voucher for a different unit, or by having Petitioner live in the 15141 Pomp Parkway unit without Ms. Williams both owning and occupying the unit. By letter dated August 27, 2014, Respondent provided Petitioner with a new Section 8 voucher and voucher packet information so that Petitioner could start searching for a new rental unit where Ms. Williams could continue to serve as Petitioner’s live-in aide under Petitioner’s Section 8 voucher. The new voucher was required to be returned to Respondent by September 30, 2014. There was no testimony that Petitioner returned the new Section 8 voucher to Respondent by September 30, 2014, or that Ms. Williams moved out of 15141 Pomp Parkway by that date. On September 4, 2014, before the funding was terminated for the 15141 Pomp Parkway unit, Petitioner filed a complaint for discrimination. Petitioner emailed a signed three-bedroom voucher on October 30, 2014, a month after funding under the new voucher expired, for the rental of the 15141 Pomp Parkway unit that had already been deemed ineligible housing as defined by 24 C.F.R. § 982.316. That voucher is not valid and the facts fail to support a finding that Respondent’s refusal to allow Petitioner to participate in the Section 8 voucher program while occupying a unit owned and occupied by her daughter was because of Petitioner’s disability.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the Complaint and Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED the 22nd day of May, 2015, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JAMES H. PETERSON, III Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of May, 2015.
The Issue Whether Respondent committed a discriminatory housing practice against Petitioner as alleged in the Petition for Relief dated September 15, 2005, and if so, what relief should the Florida Commission on Human Relations provide.
Findings Of Fact Because no evidence was offered at the final hearing held in the instant case, no findings of fact are made.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Commission issue a Final Order dismissing Petitioner's Petition. DONE AND ENTERED this 30th day of November, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S FLORENCE SNYDER RIVAS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of November, 2005.
The Issue Whether Petitioner was the subject of unlawful discrimination in the provision of services or facilities in connection with her dwelling based on her race or handicap, in violation of the Florida Fair Housing Act, chapter 760, Part II, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a 51-year-old black female who relocated to Leesburg, Florida, from Port Chester, New York, in February 2012. Respondent, Richman Property Services, Inc., is the corporate owner/manager of Laurel Oaks Apartments (Laurel Oaks) located at 131 Bayou Circle in Leesburg, Florida. Amy Lewis is the Community Manager of Laurel Oaks. Petitioner rented a two-bedroom apartment unit from Respondent from February 24, 2012, until she moved to Orlando, Florida, on December 3, 2012. Petitioner?s daughter, Sushon Dillard, occupied the apartment with Petitioner during her tenancy at Laurel Oaks. Petitioner spoke with Ms. Lewis via telephone to inquire regarding the availability of a unit at Laurel Oaks while Petitioner was still residing out of state. Petitioner applied for tenancy at Laurel Oaks by faxing her application to Ms. Lewis. Petitioner?s application was accompanied by a copy of her award letter documenting Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) payments as proof of income. On February 24, 2012, Petitioner signed a lease for Laurel Oaks unit #103, paid a security deposit, and moved into the unit. Petitioner has a current clinical diagnosis of “schizophrenia, paranoid.” She also claims to be diagnosed bi- polar with Tourrete?s Syndrome. While Petitioner presented no documentation of the additional diagnosis, her testimony on this issue is credible and is accepted by the undersigned. Petitioner was first hospitalized for treatment of an unspecified mental illness at Bellevue Hospital in New York in 1982. She apparently lived without significant incident for the next 26 years. Petitioner had a “breakdown” in 2008, while living in Arizona, and another “breakdown” that same year in New York, for which she was hospitalized at Greenwich Hospital in Connecticut, and later transferred to Stamford Hospital in Connecticut. Petitioner reports that since April 2008, she has “spent time in numerous mental institutions in Arizona, Florida, Georgia, Maryland and New York.” Petitioner?s most recent incident occurred in August 2012, while she was living at Laurel Oaks. She was taken by police to a local facility named “Life Stream” where she was treated for a number of days, then returned home to her apartment at Laurel Oaks with her daughter. Petitioner appeared calm and controlled at the final hearing. She testified that she is taking her medications and doing very well. Petitioner claims that when she moved into the unit at Laurel Oaks, it was not cleaned, was “infested with dead roaches,” and the washing machine was filthy. Petitioner?s daughter testified there were dead roaches even in the dishwasher. Petitioner also bases her allegation of discrimination on Respondent?s accusation in April 2012, that Petitioner had not paid a $300 security deposit prior to occupying her apartment. When Petitioner paid her April rent, Trifonia Bradley, an employee in the office at Laurel Oaks, informed Petitioner she still owed a $300 security deposit. Petitioner responded that she had paid the deposit on February 24, 2012. Although the evidence was not clear as to the specific date, Petitioner later met with Ms. Bradley and brought in her receipt showing the $300 had been paid in February. After that meeting, Petitioner received a phone call from Ms. Lewis apologizing for the error and stating something to the effect of “we are all good.” Petitioner believes Respondent was attempting to take advantage of her disability and trick her into paying the deposit again. At final hearing, Petitioner and her daughter presented evidence and testimony regarding additional alleged discriminatory acts by Respondent. Petitioner alleged that someone employed by, or otherwise acting on behalf of Respondent, sabotaged her automobile; harassed her by requesting her daughter fill out a separate rental application in order to live with her; harassed Petitioner about her request for accommodation based on her disability and claimed she had not demonstrated that she was disabled under the Americans with Disabilities Act; threatened to tow away her car because it was inoperable; and stole money from her apartment. Each of these additional alleged acts occurred after September 21, 2012, the date on which FCHR issued its determination of no cause, and was not investigated by FCHR. Petitioner is intelligent and articulate. Her exhibits were well-organized and contained copious documentation of the alleged discriminatory acts occurring after September 21, 2012. Her documentation included correspondence with Laurel Oaks? management, notices which were posted on the apartment door, copies of numerous forms and applications, and a police report. In contrast, Petitioner offered no tangible evidence regarding the condition of the property upon occupancy other than her testimony, which was not persuasive. She introduced no photographs, no written complaint, and no correspondence with the manager or other employees of Laurel Oaks regarding the condition of the apartment. In fact, she offered no evidence that she brought the condition of the unit to the attention of Laurel Oaks? management. Given the totality of the evidence, including the demeanor of the Petitioner and Ms. Dillard, the undersigned finds that either the unit was not unclean or Petitioner did not bring the condition of the unit to the attention of Laurel Oaks upon occupying the unit. Further, the undersigned finds that Laurel Oaks erroneously requested the security deposit in April 2012, and corrected the error after reviewing Petitioner?s documentation. The mistake was not an act of discrimination based either on race or disability.2/
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief filed in FCHR No. 2012H0289. DONE AND ENTERED this 27th day of December, 2012, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S Suzanne Van Wyk Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of December, 2012.
The Issue Whether Respondent unlawfully discriminated against Petitioner by failing to reasonably accommodate her handicap, in violation of Florida?s Fair Housing Act.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the owner of Unit No. 710 (“Unit”) in the Sixth Moorings Condominium, located in Miami, Florida. Petitioner lived there for approximately 11 years. She is not currently living in the Unit. Respondent is the condominium association responsible for the operation and management of the Sixth Moorings Condominium. In early 2010, Petitioner suffered a stroke and underwent heart surgery. It is undisputed that as a result of her illness, Petitioner is “handicapped” for purposes of the Fair Housing Act.4/ Petitioner spent several months in hospitals and nursing homes recovering from her stroke and surgeries. When she was released from these facilities, she did not resume living in the Unit. She testified that this was because she could not go up a curb or steps, and because the condominium?s elevator frequently was out of order.5/ She moved into a ground floor apartment a few blocks away from the Sixth Moorings Condominium. Petitioner is not able to perform many basic tasks, such as grocery shopping, driving, cleaning her apartment, taking out the garbage, or retrieving her mail. Consequently, she decided to invite her nephew, Charles Alsberg, to move into the Unit, where he would be only a few minutes away from the apartment in which she was residing, and thus could serve as her caretaker. Alsberg moved into the Unit in or around August 2010. Petitioner did not reside in the Unit with Alsberg. She testified that even though he is a family member, she would not live in the Unit with him because she is “an elderly woman from a different generation and [she] would not live with a young man unless he was [her] biological son.” In late 2010, Respondent?s President, John Koble, contacted Petitioner about Alsberg living in her Unit. Petitioner asked Koble to allow Alsberg to reside in the Unit so that he could serve as her caretaker, but Koble told her that because she was not residing there, Alsberg was considered an unauthorized guest in violation of the condominium?s restrictive covenants, and that he therefore must move out. Nonetheless, Alsberg continued to reside in the Unit for several more months, until he became ill and was hospitalized. Following his release in August 2011, Alsberg returned to live in the Unit. At this point, Respondent——this time, through counsel——sent Petitioner a letter stating that she was violating the restrictive covenant prohibiting unauthorized guests, and demanding that Alsberg vacate the unit. On September 13, 2011, Petitioner?s attorney sent a response letter requesting that, due to restrictions on Alsberg?s activity as a result of his illness, he be allowed to remain in the Unit for approximately 60 days. By correspondence dated September 15, 2011, Respondent agreed to allow Alsberg to remain in the Unit through November 12, 2011. At hearing, Petitioner acknowledged that Respondent granted her request to allow Alsberg to stay there during his recuperation. Notwithstanding this agreement, Alsberg did not vacate the Unit until sometime in early 2012, several months after the November 12, 2011 deadline. During this time, Respondent sent numerous pieces of correspondence that Petitioner characterized as “harassing” and “threatening,” regarding enforcement of the condominium?s covenants and rules. Alsberg finally vacated the Unit after Respondent sent a “final notice” letter. Currently, Alsberg is residing in an apartment approximately four blocks from Petitioner?s apartment and is serving as her caretaker. Koble testified that he was sympathetic to Petitioner?s circumstances, but it was imperative that Respondent consistently enforce the restrictive covenants for the benefit of all unit owners. Koble noted that other unit owners also wanted to allow unauthorized guests to live in their units, and that if Respondent relaxed enforcement of the covenant for Petitioner, it would be forced to do so for others. The undersigned credits this testimony. Koble also testified, credibly, that if Petitioner were residing in her unit, Respondent would have granted an accommodation of the covenant to allow Alsberg to live there for the purpose of serving as her caretaker.6/ The evidence establishes that Petitioner did not request any accommodation from Respondent that was necessary for her equal opportunity to use and enjoy the Unit; rather, the purpose of Petitioner?s request that Respondent not enforce the restrictive covenant against her was to enable her nephew to live in the Unit.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a Final Order finding no unlawful discrimination by Respondent and dismissing the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 29th day of May, 2012, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S CATHY M. SELLERS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of May, 2012.
The Issue The issue is this case is whether the Respondent, Beacon Hill, Ltd., discriminated against Yvonne Malone (Petitioner) based on her religion in violation of the Florida Fair Housing Act (the Act).
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner is a resident at an apartment complex owned and operated by the Respondent. At the hearing, the Petitioner recited a litany of complaints related to her apartment unit and to the services she has received from the Respondent's staff. Although the Petitioner has previously asserted that the Respondent has discriminated against her based on her religion, the Petitioner testified at the hearing that she had been "harassed" and "abused" by the Respondent's employees and that she did not know the basis for her treatment. The evidence failed to establish that the Respondent, or any person employed by the Respondent, has discriminated against the Petitioner based on her religion. The evidence failed to establish that the Respondent, or any person employed by the Respondent, has treated the Petitioner any differently than any other resident of the apartment complex has been treated. The evidence failed to establish that the Respondent, or any person employed by the Respondent, has "harassed" or "abused" the Petitioner in any manner.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief filed by Yvonne Malone. DONE AND ENTERED this 7th day of January, 2014, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S WILLIAM F. QUATTLEBAUM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of January, 2014.
The Issue Whether Respondent, Assad F. Malaty, discriminated against Petitioners, Dr. James E. Townsend and his niece, Contessa Idleburg (formerly, Ms. Rogers), in violation of the Florida Fair Housing Act and, if so, the appropriate remedy therefor.
Findings Of Fact Based on the weight of the credible evidence, Dr. Townsend has a qualifying handicap under the FFHA. He suffered a stroke in May 2014, upon which the requested modifications and accommodations were based. The stroke substantially limited one or more major life activities, given his need for using a wheelchair and walker. § 760.22(7)(a), Fla. Stat. Mr. Malaty conceded as much at the hearing.3/ Based on the weight of the credible evidence, Ms. Idleburg has a qualifying handicap under the FFHA. She has a shunt to drain fluid from her brain, has received Supplemental Social Security Income since at least 2014, and also has used a walker. That said, the evidence is undisputed that Petitioners requested the modifications and accommodations solely to assist Dr. Townsend after he suffered the stroke. Thus, Ms. Idleburg’s handicap is not relevant to the claims at issue. Based on the weight of the credible evidence, Petitioners informed Mr. Malaty in May 2014 that Dr. Townsend suffered a stroke and requested that he make several modifications to the Unit, including handrails in the bathroom, and handrails and a ramp at the front door, and to accommodate them by assigning them a parking spot outside the Unit. There is no dispute that the requested modifications and accommodation were never made. Importantly, however, the evidence does not establish that Petitioners’ renewed those requests again before they filed complaints with the Department of Justice in late 2016 and HUD in early 2017.4/ Although Dr. Townsend reminded Mr. Malaty in a December 2016 letter that he had failed to make the requested the modifications, the undersigned finds that letter to be more in the nature of a response to Mr. Malaty’s threat of eviction rather than a renewed request to accommodate them. The weight of the credible evidence also confirms that Petitioners never offered to pay for the handrails, ramp, or signage for the requested parking spot. Indeed, Dr. Townsend testified that he believed Mr. Malaty was responsible for making such modifications as the owner of the Unit. Based on the weight of the credible evidence, the undersigned finds that Mr. Malaty did not evict Petitioners because of their handicaps or their requests for modifications or an accommodation. Mr. Malaty initially threatened to evict them for failing to pay rent in January 2013, reducing their rent in September and December 2016, and failing to take care of the lawn as required in the lease. It had been three years since Petitioners requested the modifications and accommodation due to Dr. Townsend’s stroke and they did not re-raise those issues again until after Mr. Malaty threatened to evict them for failing to pay the rent. The evidence also is clear that Petitioners could have avoided eviction by paying the missed rent by December 29, 2016. But, they failed to do so and then did not pay their rent in January 2017, which ultimately led to Mr. Malaty filing the eviction action.
Conclusions For Petitioners: James E. Townsend, Sr., pro se Contessa Idleburg, pro se Apartment 2101 140 Aida Street Lakeland, Florida 33805 For Respondent: Charlann Jackson Sanders, Esquire Law Office of Charlann Jackson Sanders 2225 East Edgewood Drive, Suite 8 Lakeland, Florida 33803
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a final order dismissing Petitioners’ Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 19th day of December, 2019, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ANDREW D. MANKO Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of December, 2019.
The Issue The issue to be determined is whether Respondents engaged in prohibited conduct against Petitioner by discriminating against him based on his race and/or national origin in the terms and conditions, privileges, or provision of services or facilities in the sale or rental of real property in violation of Section 760.23, Florida Statutes (2009).
Findings Of Fact Based on the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the final hearing and the entire record in this proceeding, the following Findings of Fact are made: The Florida Commission on Human Relations is the state agency charged with investigating complaints of discriminatory housing practices and enforcing the Fair Housing Act. It is also charged with investigating fair housing complaints filed with the federal Department of Housing and Urban Development under the Federal Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. Section 3601, et seq. Petitioner, Emmanuel Agbara, is an adult, black male, who is of Nigerian decent. On or about September 18, 2008, Petitioner submitted an offer to purchase Condominium 406 in Orchid Springs Village. Because the real property sought to be purchased was a part of a condominium, there were several contingencies imposed by the declaration of condominium and associated house rules. Respondent, Orchid Springs Condominium, No. 200, Inc., is a non-profit corporation charged with the management of the condominium. Incidental to this responsibility, in conjunction with Bay Tree Management Company, the board of directors has the responsibility to approve or disapprove of the sale of a condominium to a third party. In the event the board of directors or Bay Tree Management Company disapproves of the sale, the condominium documents outline a procedure wherein the proposed sale can be pursued by the property owner and prospective buyer (Petitioner herein). After Orchid Springs advised Petitioner that it had not approved his sale, this alternative was not pursued. Orchid Springs is a part of a mixed-use development of condominiums, patio homes, and private [single-family] residences and is diverse in terms of religion, national origin and income. Prospective buyers, and the Petitioner herein, were required to complete an application that inquired into the prospective buyer's background, intended use of the property, and required three character references. In addition, prospective buyers were required to pay for a "background" check. On September 20, 2008, Petitioner traveled from his home in Maryland to meet with Respondent, John Carroll, president of the condominium board of directors. As they met, an inspection of the condominium unit was being conducted by a home inspection professional. Petitioner anticipated that he would meet with Carroll and two other board members for the personal interview required by the condominium documents as a prerequisite for board approval. The two board members were not available to meet with Petitioner during his September 20, 2008, visit. During the course of the discussion between Petitioner and Carroll, it became apparent that Petitioner anticipated being an "absentee landlord." Carroll advised Petitioner that the owner/residents had various problems with renters, including recent police activity incidental to a drug laboratory in one of the rented condominium units. Carroll also related that four of the absentee owner units were in foreclosure and that placed an economic burden on the remaining owners. During the discussion between Petitioner and Carroll, Petitioner inquired as to whether he could do the three-board member interview by telephone. Mr. Carroll advised him that a telephone conference might be arranged, but that one board member could not do it alone. On October 8, 2008, Petitioner submitted his Association Application. As a part of the application process, Petitioner certified that he had been supplied copies of the Articles of Declaration of Condominium Ownership and By-Laws of Orchid Springs Village, No. 200, Inc.; the Service and Maintenance Agreement; and the manual, "Condominium Living--The Seville." The Association Application includes the following language: "[A]pplicant purchasing Condominium certifies that he/she has . . . read [and] agrees to abide by" the foregoing documents. The Association Application states that "[i]mmediately after submission of the application, Applicant is requested to arrange with the President for a personal interview with at least [three] Board Members present. Such personal interview is a firm requirement [and] may not be waived." Following receipt of a prospective buyer or renter's Association Application, the tasks of conducting the customary background and criminal checks are divided among board members. In this instance, Mrs. Thibodaux, now deceased, did the background check; and Mrs. Douglas did the criminal background check, which, apparently, was a local records check utilizing the county records available through the internet. Testimony reveals that Mrs. Thibodaux reported that she had some problems with two of Petitioner's character references and that the Social Security number he provided was incorrect. This testimony is discounted as Mrs. Thibodaux is dead and not available to testify, and there is no indication that Petitioner's Social security number is incorrect. In addition, two of Petitioner's character references testified at the final hearing. Mrs. Douglas' local criminal background check revealed a January 13, 1997, arrest for battery--domestic violence. The case was "nolle prossed" after the Petitioner was placed in pre-trial diversion. Orchid Spring's critical examination and appraisal of prospective buyers and renters is apparently "slipshod," but not atypical when the prospective cost of a thorough examination that would involve an investigation of an individual's credit history and a thorough criminal and background check. Concern raised by the background and criminal check prompted Carroll to contact Petitioner and request that he come to Florida and meet with three board members for the interview required by the condominium documents. Petitioner was unable to meet with the interview committee. On November 7, 2008, Petitioner was advised by Respondents that his application had been denied. No evidence of damages was advanced by Petitioner.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 22nd day of November, 2010, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JEFF B. CLARK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of November, 2010. COPIES FURNISHED: Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Lawrence F. Kranert, Jr., General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Emmanuel Agbara 1822 Metzerott Road, No. 206 Adelphi, Maryland 20783 Rex P. Cowan, Esquire Post Office Box 857 Winter Haven, Florida 33882-0857
The Issue Whether Respondent committed a discriminatory housing practice by denying Petitioners the opportunity to rent or purchase and ordering them to vacate their unit immediately and, if so, what relief should the Florida Commission on Human Relations provide Petitioners.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Commission issue a Final Order dismissing Petitioners' Petition. DONE AND ENTERED this 29th day of July, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S STUART M. LERNER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of July, 2005. COPIES FURNISHED: Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Remberto Gomez Marta Gonzalez 15220 Southwest 300th Street, Lot 534 Miami, Florida 33033 Robert E. Paige, Esquire 9500 South Dadeland Boulevard, Suite 550 Miami, Florida 33156
