Findings Of Fact Respondent, Heartland Private Industry Council (Council), is a thirty- four member council established under an interlocal agreement by five area counties in Central Florida. The counties are Polk, DeSoto, Hardee, Highlands and Okeechobee. The Council's office is located at 300 Parkview Place, Lakeland, Florida. The Council has entered into a contract with petitioner, Department of Labor and Employment Security, Division of Labor, Employment and Training (Division), under which it receives federal grant monies provided by the Job Training Partnership Act (JTPA). As is pertinent here, the Council used the funds to provide summer job training for disadvantaged youths. The Division is charged with the responsibility of ensuring that all grant moneys are properly expended. Under federal regulations, the Council was required to engage the services of an independent public accounting firm to perform a financial and compliance audit on its contract expenditures made during the fiscal period July 1, 1985 through June 30, 1986. During the period in question, the Council had total expenditures of approximately $7.9 million. Under the audit program developed by the accounting firm, the firm sampled and reviewed at random various expenditures. Among those reviewed were two checks dated August 23 and October 10, 1985 in the amount of $239 each payable to one Joyce Barber, a JTPA participant from the City of Auburndale. The expenditure was questioned, but not disallowed, on the ground the first check written to Joyce Barber had apparently been stolen and cashed by another person. A second check in the same amount was then issued to Barber. The auditors questioned whether, under these circumstances, the first expenditure was appropriate. In addition, the auditors noted a $13 mathematical error and recommended that amount be disallowed. Other than these two items, which totaled $252, there were no other proposed adjustments in the audit report. The audit report was forwarded by the Council to the Division on or about June 29, 1987. The report itself is not in evidence. The Division then reviewed the audit report and preliminarily concluded that both expenditures ($239 and $13) should be disallowed. After the matter could not be resolved informally, the Division issued proposed agency action in the form of a "Final Determination" on January 4, 1988. That prompted the Council to request a hearing to contest the action. Barber was one of approximately fourteen hundred youth participants during the summer of 1985 who received job training sponsored by the Council. In addition to their training, these youths were compensated by the Council for their services. There were several hundred employers in the five county area who were involved in the project. Because of the sheer number of participants and employers, the Council mailed its checks directly to the participants, including Barber. According to the Council's in-house certified public accountant (CPA), this was a reasonable manner of disbursing the payroll. The CPA also concluded that the Council's internal controls were adequate. After the checks had been mailed, the Council received a complaint that Barber did not receive her $239 check. It then requested that the Sheriff's office investigate the matter. Based upon that investigation, the Council concluded that the check had been stolen and cashed by another person, and it sent a second check to Barber. From this factual setting, it can be reasonably inferred that the money was either stolen or was not received by Barber. The Council could have obtained insurance to cover this type of loss. However, it would not be economically prudent to do so when comparing the money lost to the cost of a policy. The Council did not deny that a $13 mathematical error was made on one expenditure. Therefore, it is found that such an error occurred, and an adjustment in favor of the Division is appropriate. There are no Division or federal regulations governing the loss of grant monies under the circumstances that occurred here. However, the Division bases its disallowance on the theory that the contractor (Council) received no benefit from the first $239 check sent to Barber. The specific regulation which supports this theory was not cited or offered in evidence. Even so, the Council did not show what benefits, if any, it received from the lost moneys.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered requiring respondent to repay $252 in JTPA funds to petitioner. DONE and ENTERED this 16th day of March, 1989, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of March, 1989.
Findings Of Fact DOT has been engaged for some years in a program to improve U.S. Highway 1, which runs through the Florida Keys. The program has involved highway paving, and reconstruction of most of the bridges. The roadway and bridge construction projects require large amounts of fill material. DOT has experienced an increase in the cost of obtaining fill material in the Florida Keys. To lessen the cost of the fill material DOT is seeking to open a borrow pit on Dudjoe Key. The pit, and an adjoining roadway would cover approximately fourteen acres. DOT initially filed a permit application with DER, seeking approval to construct the pit. DER ultimately issued a notice of intent to deny the application on the grounds that reasonable assurances had not been given that the short-term and long-term effects of the proposed project would not violate water quality standards set out in DER's rules and regulations. DOT thereafter filed a request for variance from the water quality standards so that the pit could be permitted. This proceeding ensued. Petitioner is a Florida corporation which does business in Monroe County, Florida. Petitioner has engaged in numerous public road and bridge construction projects in the Florida Keys and in the selling of fill material for road and bridge construction projects. Petitioner currently owns and operates a "borrow pit" on Cudjoe Key. Petitioner's pit is located within one- half mile of DOT's proposed pit. The purpose of the DOT pit would be to provide fill material which the Petitioner currently provides from its Cudjoe Key pit. DOT originally asserted that operation of a state borrow pit would result in savings of nine million dollars. This assertion has been scaled down to three million dollars, and more recently to 1.5 million dollars. Basically, DOT asserts that fill from a state-owned pit would be cheaper because the operation costs would be approximately the same, but no royalty would need to be paid for the material. DOT sought to establish the amount of potential savings at the hearing through two kinds of analysis: First, DOT offered the testimony of its former cost estimator as to the costs per cubic yard of fill from a state-owned pit as opposed to fill from a private contractor pit; and second, DOT offered bid submissions that have been made by contractors in recently bid projects in the Keys, and which had alternative bids for state-owned and private contractor supplied fill material. DOT's estimator calculated that the State would save approximately 1.5 million dollars through operation of a state-owned borrow pit. The testimony, however, is not of probative value, and cannot serve as the basis for a finding to that effect. In the first place, many of the estimator's figures were determined through private conversations that he had with various unnamed contractors. This hearsay evidence is not cumulative nor corroborative of other evidence, and cannot therefore serve as the basis for a finding of fact (See discussion at Paragraph 2 of the Conclusions of Law, infra.). Furthermore, the estimator underestimated the heavy equipment that would be required to operate the borrow pit; underestimated the cost of the equipment; did not include insurance, social security, and overtime in labor costs; overestimated by twice the number of swings that a dragline would be able to make; and underestimated the cost of moving equipment to the site. Methodology used by the State's estimator would appear to be the best that is available to the State in making initial estimates as to the cost of proposed road-building projects. The State does not have the detailed cost information available to it that private contractors have. While useful for the purpose of making preliminary estimates of the cost of proposed projects, the methodology is not adequate to support a finding of fact based as it is upon hearsay, and containing numerous miscalculations. The second line of analysis offered by DOT to establish the amount of possible savings was a comparison of recent bids submitted by contractors. Special provisions drafted by DOT for the Park and Bow bridge projects using two alternatives for embankment or fill material. Alternate "A" in the bid called for state-furnished material. The low bidder on the project was Atlantic Foundation Company, Inc. Under Alternate "A", Atlantic bid a price of $9.35 per cubic yard for embankment material, and $12.00 under Alternate "B". This would have resulted in a total of $222,574.00 lest using the Alternate "A" bid on the Park and Bow projects. The second low bidder, MCC of Florida, Inc., bid $11.13 for material under Alternate "A", and $14.02 under Alternate "B". Alternate "A" would have been $247,752.00 cheaper under the MCC bid. Petitioner was the next low bidder, and it bid $10.05 per cubic yard under Alternate "A", and $10.25 under Alternate "B". Hardaway Constructors, Inc., was the only other bidder, and it offered $10.00 under Alternate "A", and $10.25 under Alternate "B". The potential savings in favor of Alternate "A" under all of these bids is reduced somewhat by clearing and grubbing costs which were bid separately by the contractors. Clearing and grubbing costs would actually have made Alternate "B" cheaper under the bids submitted by Petitioner and Hardaway. Clearing and grubbing costs would not, however, continue as a cost item in subsequent projects, because once clearing and grubbing is accomplished, it would not need to be done again. DOT seeks to apply bid differentials submitted for the Park and Bow Channel jobs to determine the potential saving the State could realize by using a state-owned landfill for the remaining road and bridge projects in the Keys. Approximately 402,039 cubic yards of embankment material will be needed to complete the remaining projects. Using the high differential between Alternates "A" and "B" submitted for the Park and Bow Channels (that submitted by MCC), which was $2.89 per cubic yard, the potential saving would be $1,161,892.00. Using the low differential (twenty cents per cubic yard as submitted by Petitioner), savings would be $80,407.00. Subsequent to the hearing, DOT awarded the Park and Bow Channel construction to the low bidder, Atlantic Foundation, Inc. The Alternate "B" proposal was accepted. DOT did not accept that proposal because of a preference to do that, but rather so that the otherwise advantageous bid could be accepted despite the pendance of this proceeding. During the hearing, bids were opened for two new road and bridge projects in the Keys: the Kemp and Torch-Ramrod Channel Projects. The apparent low bidder on these projects was the Petitioner. Petitioner bided a price of $11.00 for embankment material if provided by a private contractor, and $10.80 if provided from a state-owned pit for the Kemp project, and $10.40 and $10.20 respectively for the Torch-Ramrod Project. The differences between the two reflect differences in hauling distance. The price differentials for contractor versus state provided embankment material in projects that have already been let cannot be used to determine with any precision the amount of saving that would inure to the State through opening its own borrow pits. Potential savings depend upon many factors. The primary of these factors is which contractor happens to make the lowest bid for the project, and this in turn depends upon the contractor's cost figures for many items other than embankment material will receive the bid only if the total bid is lower than that submitted by other contractors. It is clear that opening a state-owned borrow pit would result in some savings. It appears that $10.00 per cubic yard is the lowest possible price that could be expected for contractor- provided fill material. It appears that state-furnished material could reach a price as low as $7.00 per cubic yard, although none of the bids submitted up to the time of the hearing reflected such a price. It appears that the highest potential saving would be less than the approximately one million dollars that would have been saved if the price differential reflected in the Atlantic Foundation bid on the Park and Bow Channel projects became the differential in all subsequent projects. It also appears that the saving would be somewhat more than the eighty thousand dollar saving that would inure if the price differential reflected in the Petitioner's bid on the Park and Bow projects remained consistent. Beyond these parameters, the evidence would not support a finding as to the amount of savings. The fourteen-acre site of the proposed borrow pit is presently comprised entirely of tidally inundated wetland areas. Approximately two-thirds of the area has average water depths up to six inches. The southeastern portion of the site is dominated by buttonwood, and red, black and white mangrove. All of these species are wetland indicator species under DER's rules and regulations. A large number of mollusks inhabit the area, and it is a feeding area for birds, and for deer. The area of the proposed borrow pit is within the Key Deer Refuge, which is managed by the Refuse Division of the United States Fish and Wildlife Service. There is now a stable herd from 350 to 400 Key deer, an endangered species, and they feed primarily on mangrove. There are 15 to 20 deer in the Cudjoe Key area. The deer do presently feed in the area of the proposed borrow pit. The proposed pit, including the access roads, would comprise approximately fourteen acres. It would be located landward of a berm so that there would not be a constant exchange of waters between the pit and surrounding areas. There would be an initial two-foot drop form the edge of the pit, and then a slope of five-to-one extending into the pit. A ten-to-one slope would be preferable because ultimately vegetation would be ore easily established in such a slope area. The term "Borrow pit" is actually a euphemism for a mining operation. Material would be extracted from the pit to be used as embankment material on the Keys road and bridge projects. The pit would ultimately reach a depth of more than thirty feet. Construction of the borrow pit would result in obliteration of approximately fourteen acres of a natural wetland environment in the Keys. All the flora and fauna presently on the site would be destroyed. During the time that the pit is being constructed and actively operated, violations of DER's standards for turbidity, lead, oils and greases, and transparency would be likely. Once the mining operation terminates, these short-term impacts would lessen; however, violations of the Department's dissolved oxygen standards would be likely as long as the pit exists. A viable biologic community could be established along the fringes of the pit, but in the deeper areas, low dissolved oxygen levels would be a limiting factor. Other mining operations in the Keys and elsewhere in Florida confirm the likelihood of dissolved oxygen violations. Loss of the fourteen acres of feeding ground for the Florida Key deer would be a significant loss in terms of preservation of that species. The proposed borrow pit is located adjacent to U.S. Highway 1. On the other side of the highway, there is a housing development. Operation of the borrow pit, especially blasting activities would inevitably prove a nuisance to residents of that area. One witness testified that blasting would likely cause damage to the residences, but this was not confirmed by competent, scientific evidence.
Findings Of Fact On August 17, 1989, the Executive Board acting for the Local Elected Officials of the Heartland Employment and Training Consortium, voted to terminate Clifton Thomas, Jr., from his position as Executive Director of the Heartland Private Industry Council. At the time of his termination from employment, Mr. Thomas was being paid the sum of $47,528 per annum. Mr. Thomas' salary was established on an annual basis by the Executive Board. On or about December 1, 1989, Mr. Thomas, acting through his attorney, Mr. Robert McKee, notified E. John Dinkel, III, acting as counsel for the Executive Board, that he intended to file a law suit against the Heartland Employment and Training Consortium and its Executive Board. The complaint to be filed in the United States District Court, Middle District of Florida, Tampa, Division, demanded equitable relief and damages and alleged that Mr. Thomas was fired without justification and "was not accorded due process." Mr. Dinkel, acting as counsel for the Executive Board, was able to obtain agreement from Mr. McKee, acting as counsel for Mr. Thomas, that the complaint would be dropped upon payment of $24,096 to Mr. Thomas. At a regularly scheduled meeting of the Heartland Private Industry Council held on December 14, 1989, the Council voted to concur in a payment of $24,096 to Mr. Thomas to avoid the cost of litigation. It was understood and agreed that a statement would be signed by Mr. Thomas denying any liability or wrongdoing by any of the parties to the action. At a specially convened meeting of the Executive Board of the Heartland Consortium held on December 15, 1989, the Board unanimously agreed to the settlement. On December 21, 1989, a check in the amount of $21,598.40 was issued to Mr. Thomas. This amount represented the agreed upon amount minus a levy from the Internal Revenue Service. The check (#010471) was charged to the pooled administrative funds from allocations through State of JTPA formula monies. In consideration of the above payment, Mr. Thomas gave up his threatened law suit and signed a statement, dated December 22, 1989, denying any wrongdoing on the part of the Executive Board, the Heartland Private Industry Council and any officers or employees of the Board or Council. In the annual audit of the Heartland Private Industry Council conducted by Grant Thornton, Accountants and Management Consultants, the use of JTPA monies to pay the former Executive Director was questioned. The auditor stated: "The use of JTPA funds in settlement of legal claims was determined by Florida Department of Labor and Employment Security to be an unallowable cost under State and Federal law as indicated in a letter to the Council's attorney dated November 6, 1989, therefore this is a questioned cost." On September 30, 1991, the Heartland Private Industry Council received notification from Patricia S. Gilbert, Director, DLET that the costs questioned by the auditor were disallowed. No reason other than that cited by the auditor was given. On October 24, 1991, Heartland Private Industry Council, Inc., notified the Department of Labor of their intent to appeal the disallowed cost. On November 1, 1991, Jack E. Lyons, Executive Director of the Heartland Private Industry Council, wrote a letter to Secretary Scruggs, questioning the applicability of the statutes, both State and Federal, that were cited by the auditor in the statement of questioned costs. At a regularly scheduled meeting of the Heartland Private Industry Council held on April 17, 1992, the Council denied any misapplication of Federal JTPA dollars and voted to not permit the Executive Director to settle the disallowed costs by payment from non-JTPA dollars. The attached documentation styled Index of Exhibits, containing fourteen (14) exhibits is incorporated by reference into the proposed Statement of Facts.
Recommendation It is recommended that a Final Order be entered finding the payment to Clifton Thomas, Jr., of $24,096 in settlement of his law suit against the Heartland Private Industry Council Inc. to be a nonallowable cost and improperly charged to federally provided funds. RECOMMENDED this 29th day of July, 1992, in Tallahassee, Florida. K. N. AYERS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Desoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of July, 1992. COPIES FURNISHED: Larry R. Jackson, Esquire 300 Parkview Place Lakeland, FL 33805 Carolyn Cummings, Esquire Hartman Building, Suite 307-2102 Capitol Circle SE Tallahassee, FL 32399 Frank Scruggs, Secretary 303 Hartman Building 2012 Capital Circle SE Tallahassee, FL 32399-2152 Cecilia Renn Chief Legal Counsel 307 Hartman Building 2012 Capital Circle SE Tallahassee, FL 32399-2152
Findings Of Fact On June 22, 1987, Petitioner submitted to Respondent an application for a Class "C" private investigator license. After review of the application and verification of the previous work experience listed in it, Respondent determined the work experience did not meet the statutory requirement of section 493.306 (4), Florida Statutes, that an applicant for the Class "C" license have two years training or experience in private investigative work or related work areas providing equivalent experience. The Respondent denied Petitioner's application on October 5, 1987. The Petitioner is presently employed as a process server. He was employed for varying periods of time between July, 1984, and May of 1987, by four law firms. In the course of this employment, Petitioner sometimes assisted lawyers and witnesses prepare for trial by retrieval of information from records within the particular firm where he was working, or from public records at various public institutions. Among the public records he is accustomed to reviewing are those of Respondent's Division of Corporations. On one occasion, he did, pursuant to instructions from his employer, search through a garage in Tampa, Florida, for certain records. In the course of his work experience, Petitioner has never conducted any kind of surveillance, located a missing person, or investigated a homicide or arson case. He has never testified at a trial or conducted an electronic "debugging" or "bugging" exercise. The Petitioner completed a short prescribed program at the Miami-Dade Community College in August of 1979, and was awarded a "planned certificate" as a legal assistant. To obtain this certificate, he completed various courses at the college during the period stretching from January, 1976, until July, 1979. Among those courses completed by the Petitioner were three hour courses in legal research, business law, legal writing, domestic relations and criminal law, and legal writing. Alan Rollins, assistant director for Respondent's licensing division, testified that Respondent's policy has been to define the statutorily required licensing prerequisite of "[p]rivate investigative work or related fields of work" as a requirement that an applicant for a Class "C" license possess field investigatory experience beyond the mere review of public records. Rollins noted that even law enforcement officers could not be licensed under this policy, unless equipped with investigatory experience. He further stated that the policy is the result of Respondent's desire to be consistent with the perceived legislative intent of the statute to protect the public welfare. Harvey Morse, owner of several private investigator agencies, holder of a law degree and a practicing private investigator, testified as an expert witness for the Respondent. The testimony of Morse establishes that surveillance experience is essential to the conduct of investigations by private investigators. Since the purpose of licensing private investigators is to protect the interest of the public in obtaining competent services from persons holding themselves out as private investigators, the legal research experience and education of the Respondent is not, standing alone, an adequate substitute for the statutory requirement of experience in the areas of "[p]rivate investigative work or related fields of work". Morse, who also serves as chairman of the advisory council which advises the Respondent on licensing of this profession, opined that the Petitioner was qualified only to obtain information from public records. Experience in a related field of work should involve surveillance. Such experience could be obtained by the Petitioner through first obtaining a Class "CC" license and working as an intern to a licensed investigator.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered denying the Petitioner's application for licensure. DONE AND RECOMMENDED this 21st day of June, 1988, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DON W. DAVIS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904)488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of June, 1988. APPENDIX The following constitutes my specific rulings, in accordance with section 120.59, Florida Statutes, on findings of fact submitted by the parties. RESPONDENT'S PROPOSED FINDINGS: Included in finding 1. Included in finding 2. Unnecessary to result reached. Included in finding 1. 5.-14. Unnecessary to result reached. 15. Included in finding 5. 16.-19. Included in finding 6. Included in finding 3. Unnecessary to result reached. Included in finding 2. COPIES FURNISHED: R. Timothy Jansen, Esquire Department of State The Capitol, Mail Station #4 Tallahassee, FL, 32399-0250 Mr. Martin Broyles 985 N.E. 149th Street Miami, Florida 33161 Ken Rouse, Esquire General Counsel Department of State 1801 The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0250 Hon. Jim Smith Secretary of State Department of State The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0250
The Issue The ultimate issue for determination at final hearing was whether Respondents committed the offenses set forth in the administrative complaints, and if so, what disciplinary action should be taken against Respondents' licenses.
Findings Of Fact Frank Wallberg was going through a divorce and wanted a background investigation on his wife's attorney. On June 19, 1992, he went to the office of South Florida Detective Bureau, Inc. (Respondent Bureau) and specifically requested the services of William Polero (Respondent W. Polero) who he had met a few years prior to this. Respondent Bureau's secretary contacted Respondent W. Polero by telephone, and Wallberg explained to him what he wanted. Respondent W. Polero agreed to perform the background investigation on the attorney, requiring Wallberg to first pay a $1,500 retainer which he was to bring to Respondent W. Polero's home, approximately two blocks from Respondent Bureau's office. As agreed, Wallberg met Respondent W. Polero at his home and gave him a check for $1,500 as a retainer, made payable to Respondent Bureau. For the $1,500 Respondent W. Polero indicated that a complete written report on the attorney could be performed. Wallberg provided Respondent W. Polero with the attorney's complete name, address and telephone number. Respondent W. Polero made several telephone calls while Wallberg was at his home, attempting to obtain information on the attorney but all were unsuccessful. Approximately two days later, Wallberg contacted Respondent W. Polero inquiring about the progress of the investigation. Respondent W. Polero indicated that he was waiting for responses from inquiries and to contact him again that following Friday. Wallberg called back as directed. Respondent W. Polero indicated that after searching public records and court records and contacting The Florida Bar and other attorneys, the attorney had nothing irregular in his background. Feeling that he had not gotten his money worth, Wallberg questioned the cost of the investigation. Respondent W. Polero responded that there was nothing else to report, so there was nothing to report in writing and that the cost of the investigation was $1,500. By that time, the $1,500 check had been cashed. Being very disappointed, on or about July 11, 1992, Wallberg contacted another investigative agency, the Wackenhut Corporation, and obtained their services. He provided Wackenhut's investigator, John Rose, with the same information that he had provided Respondent W. Polero, i.e., the attorney's name, address and telephone number. On July 13, 1992, Rose began his investigation. By July 15, 1992, Rose had completed his investigation and prepared an 18 page written report with numerous exhibits attached. His report reflected the numerous sources he utilized, which included researching public records at the Dade County Courthouse, records maintained by the State of Florida, Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles, including vehicle and driver license information, criminal records maintained by Dade County Corrections and Rehabilitation Department and public records of The Florida Bar. Through these sources, Rose was able to obtain a plethora of information on the attorney, including a history of federal and state tax liens having been filed against the attorney's property, criminal arrests and convictions, and disciplinary action against the attorney by The Florida Bar, with the specifics thereon. With his written report, Rose submitted an itemized invoice dated July 15, 1992, for his services, totaling $650.30. The invoice reflected that he had expended 10 hours on the investigation (generally outlining what was done), at a charge of $60 an hour, equalling $600 for the time, and that there were $50.30 in additional costs ($27 document copies, $2 for parking and $21.30 for mileage). By letter dated September 23, 1992, which was mailed and faxed, Wallberg informed Respondents that he had obtained the services of Wackenhut Corporation and requested that they provide Wackenhut with all the information in their file when requested by Wackenhut. By fax transmission on that same date, Jamie Polero (Respondent J. Polero), President of Respondent Bureau and the son of Respondent W. Polero, responded indicating, among other things, that there was no new or different information from what Respondent W. Polero had provided him and that since Wallberg had not contacted them for almost three months, he had assumed that Wallberg did not wish to continue the investigation. This was the first time that Wallberg had had any contact with Respondent J. Polero. By letter dated September 24, 1992, which was mailed and faxed, Wallberg informed Respondent J. Polero of his dissatisfaction with the investigation performed by Respondent Bureau and requested a $1,350 refund of the $1,500 within 24 hours. Wallberg never received any refund. Several communications between Wallberg and Respondent J. Polero failed to resolve the dispute. Finally, Wallberg contacted State of Florida, Department of State, Division of Licensing (Petitioner) and filed a complaint. Respondent Bureau's investigative file for Wallberg consisted of nine pages, most of which were communications back and forth with Wallberg. Approximately eight hours were expended on Wallberg's case. Even though little investigative work was done, Respondent J. Polero admitted that most of it was performed by Respondent W. Polero, and not by himself. The investigative work performed by Respondents failed to meet industry standards in that the minimum investigation was not conducted, public records were not properly researched and false information was provided to Wallberg, their client. At all times material hereto, Respondent W. Polero was unlicensed. At all times material hereto, Respondent J. Polero was a licensed private investigator (Class "C" license) and a licensed recovery agent (repossessor) (Class "E" license). Also, at all times material hereto, Respondent Bureau was a licensed private investigative agency (Class "A" license) and a licensed recovery (repossession) agency (Class "R" license). No prior disciplinary action has been taken against Respondent J. Polero. Both Respondent Bureau and Respondent W. Polero have prior disciplinary history. In 1989, Petitioner filed administrative complaints against both Respondents for, among other things, unlicensed activity which resulted in the parties stipulating to a penalty of an administrative fine totalling $1,800, 2/ which was paid on or about August 30, 1989. 3/ Additionally, in 1989, Petitioner filed an administrative complaint against Respondent Bureau and in 1990 against Respondent W. Polero for unlicensed activity which resulted in the parties stipulating to an administrative fine of $2,000 4/ which was paid by Respondent Bureau on or about May 25, 1990. 5/ As a related issue to the 1990 complaint, on April 27, 1990, Petitioner issued a Notice to Cease and Desist to Respondent W. Polero's unlicensed activity-- performing private investigative work without a license and managing a private investigative agency without a license--and served him on May 8, 1990.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of State, Division of Licensing enter a Final Order: Suspending South Florida Detective Bureau, Inc.'s Class "A" private investigative agency license and Class "R" recovery (repossession) agency license for one year and imposing an administrative fine of $2,000. Suspending Jamie J. Polero's Class "C" private investigator license and Class "E" recovery agent (repossessor) license for one year 6/ and imposing an administrative fine of $2,000. Imposing an administrative fine of $2,000 against William Polero. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 21st day of March 1994. ERROL H. POWELL Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of March 1994.
The Issue Whether the proposed site falls within an "improved commercial or residential area?"
Findings Of Fact Salter seeks a permit to erect a sign on the north side of Interstate Highway 10 about .15 mile west of State Road 291 in Escambia County. The proposed site is outside the city limits of Pensacola in an unzoned area of Escambia County. In the vicinity of the proposed site, commercial and/or industrial facilities are so situated that, if the facility owned and operated by Energy Services of Pensacola, a gas utility owned by a local governmental entity, is also deemed commercial or industrial, a permit should be issued. The parties stipulated to the foregoing facts.
Findings Of Fact At all times material hereto, Respondent has been licensed as a Class "C" private investigator and Class "MA" agency manager, having been issued licenses numbered C-0002856 and NA-8600240, respectively. On or about November 10, 1988, Respondent was engaged in an investigation and surveillance involving Joseph King to determine if King was disabled for purposes of a worker's compensation claim which was being disputed by the insurance carrier. As a result of Respondent's investigation, King was eventually denied certain benefits which he would otherwise have received. Respondent was performing this work through the Hillsborough County branch office of TRACE, Inc., a licensed private investigative agency which he managed. He was accompanied in this investigation and surveillance of King by two other licensed private investigators. During the course of this investigation,and surveillance, King became aware of Respondent and the other two investigators who were following him. He confronted one of the investigators named Tony Hobbs, and after it became apparent that King was preventing Hobbs from leaving, Respondent came to his aid and attempted to calm down the situation. King continued to refuse to allow the investigators to leave, and eventually Deputy Sheriffs arrived and secured Hobbs' release. At hearing, Mr. and Mrs. King both testified that Respondent and the other investigator, Hobbs, falsely identified themselves as federal agents who were allegedly involved in an undercover drug investigation. Respondent denies that he ever made such a representation to the Kings. Hobbs was not present to testify, but in a statement given to the Petitioner's investigator, John Matlack, in the regular course of his investigation of this incident Hobbs stated that he had been told by one of the Deputy Sheriffs that Respondent had made this statement. However, Hobbs was fired from TRACE, Inc., a couple of weeks after this incident, and therefore, has a motive for placing Respondent's license in jeopardy. Based upon the demeanor and testimony of Respondent and the Kings at hearing, as well as the motive which existed for the Kings to try to get back at Respondent for their loss of certain benefits resulting from his investigation, it is found that Respondent did not falsely identify himself as a federal agent at any time during the course of this investigation. Respondent was calm, orderly, logical, coherent and professional in his recollection of events, while Mr. King was aggressive and hostile towards Respondent. It was King who provoked the confrontation with Hobbs by restraining and preventing him from leaving. It was King who was angry with the investigators, including Respondent, and who allowed them to leave only after Deputy Sheriffs arrived. At hearing, it was King who was unclear in his recollection of specific details about the events of November 10, 1988, and he was clearly still angry with Respondent. The Petitioner also alleges that Respondent falsely identified himself as a federal agent to a neighbor of King, but that neighbor was not present to testify and his absence was not explained. Therefore, there is no competent substantial evidence in the record to support this allegation concerning a statement allegedly made by Respondent to King's neighbor. It is against the policy of Respondent's company, TRACE, Inc., for any agent to represent himself to be a federal agent, and such misrepresentation is a basis for termination. Respondent is well aware of this policy, and credibly testified that he did not violate it in his investigation of King.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing, it is recommended that the Petitioner enter a Final Order dismissing the charge that Respondent violated Section 493.319(1)(i) Florida Statutes, as set forth in the Administrative Complaint. DONE AND ENTERED this 5th day of March, 1990 in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD D. CONN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of March, 1990. APPENDIX Rulings on the Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact: Adopted in Finding of Fact 1. Adopted and Rejected in part in Findings of Fact 2-5. Rejected in Finding of Fact 6. Rulings cannot be made on the narrative statement filed by the Respondent on March 1, 1990, since it does not contain separately numbered proposed findings of fact and does not evidence that Respondent has provided a copy to counsel for the Petitioner. COPIES FURNISHED: Henri C. Cawthon, Esquire Department of State The Capitol, Mail Station 4 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0250 Michael R. Heiland P. O. Box 152143 Tampa, FL 33614 Ken Rouse, Esguire General Counsel The Capitol, LL-10 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0250 The Honorable Jim Smith Secretary of State The Captol Tallahassee, FL 32399-0250
Findings Of Fact Home Insurance and Home Indemnity are corporations incorporated under the laws of the State of New Hampshire, and City Insurance is a corporation incorporated under the laws of the State of New Jersey. They are foreign insurers within the meaning of Section 624.06, Florida Statutes. In its Order to Show Cause of July 2, 1993, the Department alleges that Chapter 93-401, Laws of Florida, prohibits the Home from cancelling or nonrenewing policies of insurance pursuant to a plan which was formulated and initiated in 1991, after notice to and without objection by the Department. In 1991, Home Insurance was authorized and licensed to transact the following kinds and lines of insurance in Florida, pursuant to Sections 624.41 and 624.414, Florida Statutes: fire, industrial fire, automobile casualty, homeowners and commercial multi-peril, commercial automobile liability and physical damage, commercial fire, personal and commercial inland and ocean marine, personal and commercial general liability, PPA physical damage, other liability, mobile peril and physical damage, medical malpractice, glass, aircraft, fidelity and surety, commercial multi-peril special package (business owners) and commercial package policies, boiler and machinery, accident and death, livestock, burglary and theft, earthquake and allied lines insurance. In 1991, Home Indemnity was licensed and authorized to transact the following kinds and lines of insurance in Florida pursuant to section 624.14 and 624.414, Florida Statutes: fire, industrial fire, automobile casualty, homeowners and commercial multi-peril, commercial automobile liability and physical damage, commercial fire, personal and commercial inland and ocean marine, personal and commercial general liability, PPA physical damage, other liability, mobile home peril and physical damage, medical malpractice, glass, aircraft, fidelity and surety, credit, commercial multi-peril special package (business owners) and commercial package policies, boiler and machinery, crop hail, accident and death, livestock, burglary and theft, earthquake, and allied lines insurance. In 1991, City Insurance was licensed and authorized to transact the following kinds and lines of insurance in Florida pursuant to Section 624.14 and 624.414, Florida Statutes: fire, industrial fire, automobile casualty, homeowners and commercial multi-peril, commercial automobile liability and physical damage, commercial fire, personal and commercial inland and ocean marine, personal and commercial general liability, PPA physical damage, other liability, mobile home peril and physical damage, medical malpractice, glass, aircraft, fidelity and surety, credit, commercial multi-peril special package (business owners) and commercial package policies, boiler and machinery, crop hail, accident and death, livestock, burglary and theft, earthquake, and allied lines insurance. On October 31, 1991, the Home notified the Department in writing of their complete withdrawal from all personal lines of insurance in all states, including Florida. The Department received the October 31, 1991, letter on November 5, 1991. By means of the October 31, 1991, letter, the Home notified the Department that they would nonrenew personal lines insurance policies issued in Florida and written through a broker or producer, commencing on and after May 1, 1992, and would nonrenew personal insurance policies issued in Florida on and after May 1, 1993, if written through appointed agents. The October 31, 1991, letter satisfied all requirements of Section 624.430, Florida Statutes, for notice to the Department of the Homes' intent to withdraw from personal lines coverage in the State of Florida. No Department approval of the October 31, 1991, letter was required in order for the Home to carry out the plan of withdrawal and begin issuing notices of nonrenewal in accordance with that plan. The Department never objected to the Homes' notice of withdrawal. If the Department had believed that the Homes' plan of withdrawal was not appropriate or was not legal, then the Department would have initiated some legal action against the Home. The Department never instituted such an action with regard to the October 31, 1991, letter. Prior to the issuance of the Order to Show Cause on July 2, 1993, the Department never formally notified the Home that they could not begin or could not continue implementing the plan of withdrawal outlined in the October 31, 1991, letter. From and after October 31, 1991, the Home has implemented the withdrawal from personal lines throughout the United States, including Florida, and has been engaged continually in the routine issuance of notices of non- renewal. They have kept the Department fully and completely apprised of their intent to carry out the withdrawal from personal lines in accordance with the October 31, 1991, letter. The Home has never sought an exemption from the moratorium, but instead has consistently asserted that the moratorium was inapplicable to nonrenewals done in furtherance of the plan of withdrawal. The Home has never nonrenewed a personal lines policy "on the basis of risk of hurricane claims" within the meaning of Chapter 93-401, Laws of Florida. In fact, the Home has always had and followed a policy of not nonrenewing policies on the basis of claims resulting from acts of nature, which would include hurricanes. The decision to withdraw from personal lines throughout the United States was based on the Homes' realization that profitability in the personal lines market would require significant capital expenditures (such as for computer hardware), but that the needed resources would be better allocated to those other lines of business that provided a greater opportunity for profit. The Home implemented the withdrawal from personal lines outlined in its October 31, 1991, letter to the Department. Homes' nonrenewal of personal lines policies in Florida is and will be on the basis of withdrawal from all personal lines insurance in Florida and elsewhere. For homeowner's insurance, underwriting is the process of determining whether to issue a policy based on specific characteristics (such as construction, location, value) of the property proposed to be insured. Because Homes' 1991 decision to withdraw from the personal lines market was based on business considerations not related to the individual risk posed by the properties insured, underwriting played no role in that decision or the subsequent nonrenewals undertaken and proposed to be undertaken pursuant to that decision. Because underwriting involves the assessment of individual risk, it is never a factor in nonrenewing an entire line of insurance. If underwriting guidelines were required for the Homes' withdrawal from personal lines, the Homes' October 31, 1991, letter provided all of the information that would be required in such a guideline. That letter was tacitly "approved" by the Department, because it fulfilled all requirements of law for withdrawal from the market which were in existence at the time the letter was filed. In its Order to Show Cause, the Department sought an order requiring that the Home "cease and desist from any further action to cancel or non-renew personal lines residential property insurance policies in this state during the moratorium" and that it "pay an administrative penalty of $20,000 for each notice of cancellation or nonrenewal effectuated after the effective date of the moratorium." The parties entered into and "Agreed Order" which was entered by the Insurance Commissioner as an Order in this case on July 30, 1993, which was during the pendency of this matter before the Division of Administrative Hearings. By that Agreed Order, the Home agreed to "reinstate and extend coverage, at a prorated premium, until January 1, 1994," for all policies "which had expiration dates between May 19, 1993 and July 6, 1993 or for which nonrenewal notices were mailed between May 19, 1993 and July 6, 1993 " [sic] The Home also agreed to extend coverage to January 1, 1994, at a prorated premium, for all policies that would have been nonrenewed, but for the Order to Show Cause, between July 6, 1993, and November 14, 1993. In consideration for the Homes' agreement, the Department agreed the Home was not restricted by the Agreed Order from beginning to renew policies on November 15, 1993, the date on which the moratorium expires. It further agreed that the Agreed Order constituted "the Department's sole administrative remedy against the Home and . . . [resolved] all issues arising from the Order to Show Cause, including any sanctions or penalties that might otherwise have been imposed." The parties attempted to exclude from the agreement "the issue of determining the applicability of the moratorium contained in Chapter 93-401 to the Home's actions," so as to maintain DOAH's jurisdiction over that limited issue. However, the Agreed Order, which was a final order resolving the issues in the Department's case initiated by the Order to Show Cause, required the parties to carry out their agreed actions "regardless of the outcome of any administrative proceeding."
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Insurance enter a Final Order determining that the Homes' withdrawal from the market does not constitute a violation of the moratorium and dismissing the Order to Show Cause. DONE and ENTERED this 30th day of September, 1993, in Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE K. KIESLING Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of September, 1993. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 93-3929 The following constitutes my specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on the proposed findings of fact submitted by the parties in this case. Specific Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by Petitioner, Department of Insurance Each of the following proposed findings of fact is adopted in substance as modified in the Recommended Order. The number in parentheses is the Finding of Fact which so adopts the proposed finding of fact: 1(1) and 2(3-5). Proposed findings of fact 3-15 are subordinate to the facts actually found in this Recommended Order. Proposed findings of fact 16 and 17 are irrelevant. Specific Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by Respondents, the Home 1. Each of the following proposed findings of fact is adopted in substance as modified in the Recommended Order. The number in parentheses is the Finding of Fact which so adopts the proposed finding of fact: 1-15(1-15). COPIES FURNISHED: Elizabeth J. Gregovits Nancy J. Aliff Attorneys at Law Department of Insurance Division of Legal Services 612 Larson Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Paul R. Ezatoff David A. Yon Attorneys at Law 106 East College Avenue, Suite 1200 Post Office Box 1877 Tallahassee, Florida 32302-1877 Bill O'Neil General Counsel Department of Insurance The Capitol, PL-11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Tom Gallagher State Treasurer and Insurance Commissioner The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following relevant facts are found: State Road Number 688, also known as Ulmerton Road, is a major east- west arterial road in Pinellas County. The Paradyne Corporation owns property south of Ulmerton Road and the intervenors, the Millers and the Benjamins, own property located immediately adjacent and to the west of the Paradyne property. Located on the Paradyne property are six or eight commercial buildings, parking lots and a road which runs between Ulmerton Road and 126th Avenue, a county road. At the present time Paradyne employs approximately 1,700 persons who park approximately 1,400 cars per day in the parking lots located on Paradyne's property. On a form entitled "State of Florida Department of Transportation Driveway Permit," Paradyne requested "permission for the construction of a driveway(s) on Department of Transportation right-of-way" at State Road No. 688, Section No. 15120, Mile Post No. 6.350 in Pinellas County. The request was approved by the Department of Transportation on June 6, 1981. Attached to the approved permit were various conditions and stipulations and a sketch or drawing of the proposed construction. Paradyne constructed the connection with the Ulmerton Road light- controlled intersection, as well as a private road leading to it, in a manner whereby only vehicles utilizing the Paradyne property would have access to the intersection. The actual location or configuration of the connection on the State's right-of-way deviated somewhat from the location or configuration shown on the sketch or drawing attached to the permit. The permit issued to Paradyne in 1981 did not include any provisions regarding or sketches illustrating an access road on private property. The property owners adjacent to Paradyne, the intervenors herein, also desired a means of access to the light- controlled intersection on Ulmerton Road. Paradyne refused to allow intervenors to use the private road on its property. The intervenors' request to DOT for a separate connection to Ulmerton Road was denied for safety reasons. The DOT also denied the intervenors' request that a cease and desist order be issued that would require Paradyne to allow the intervenors the use of Paradyne's road. DOT's reason for refusing such a request was that it was beyond the jurisdiction of the DOT to order a 250- foot access road over the parties' private property. Apparently, the construction of a 250-foot joint use road was the subject of preliminary discussions between Paradyne and persons who had previously held an option to purchase the intervenors' land. However, as noted above, the permit was issued only to Paradyne and there is no mention therein of a 250-foot joint use drive on the private property of either Paradyne or the intervenors. Having failed in their attempts with Paradyne and the DOT to gain access to the Ulmerton Road light-controlled intersection, the intervenors filed an action in the Pinellas County Circuit Court seeking a declaratory judgment and a mandatory injunction requiring Paradyne to participate with them in the construction of a 250-foot joint use drive. The Circuit Court ordered Paradyne to so participate in accordance with the driveway permit and the DOT drawing. On appeal to the District Court of Appeal, Second District, it was concluded that there was substantial evidence to support the Circuit Court's finding that DOT intended that the owners of both parcels would have access to the light- controlled intersection. However, the appellate court found "that the circuit court violated due process of law because it did not have authority to order appellant to participate with appellees in the construction of the 250-foot-connector road. The permit, as issued, did not require a 250-foot connector road. The circuit court is only authorized to enforce the DOT permit under section 120.69. The authority to regulate connectors to state roads has been delegated to DOT pursuant to section 335.18, Florida Statutes (1981). Therefore, we reverse and remand to the circuit court to enforce the DOT permit pursuant to section 120.69, so both parcels will have access to the light-controlled intersection. Upon remand, DOT may intervene as a matter of right pursuant to section 120.69(1)(d), or be joined as an indispensable party based on its duties under section 335.18: It is possible that DOT will find that the intersection, as designed, does not meet the standards in section 335.18, Florida Statutes (1981). In this event, DOT should be allowed to re- design the connector road to meet the standards of section 335.18, and to have minimal impact on the property rights of appellant and appellees. In the event it becomes impossible to provide the parties access to the intersection as contemplated by DOT's permit, DOT has authority under section 335.18(4) to deny access and revoke the permit. Affirmed in part and reversed in part and remanded with instructions." Paradyne Corporation v. Miller, 455 So.2d 432, at 434 (Fla. 2nd DCA, 1984). On remand, the DOT intervened in the proceeding. By Order filed on December 23, 1985, the Circuit Court of Pinellas County noted that the intervenors herein and the DOT sought to present a redesign of the intersection and connector road and that Paradyne objected. The Court denied the proceedings sought by the intervenors herein and the DOT, concluding that "this hearing is premature in view of the fact that a new permit must be issued for a material change of the intersection, and that Defendant (Paradyne), in the issuance of a new permit has all the rights of objection and administrative process that it had under the first permit..." Irvin E. Miller, et al v. Paradyne Corporation, et al, Case No. 82-3441-8 (Circuit Court for Pinellas County, December 23, 1985). The instant "Alleged Violation of the Florida Statutes and Notice to Show Cause" is dated March 31, 1986. That document charges that the highway connection constructed by Paradyne is in violation of Section 335.18(3) and 335.18(1) for the reasons that: it was not constructed in accordance with the permit design plan to provide joint access to Paradyne and the intervenors' adjoining properties, and (b) a material redesign of the existing connection in accordance with an attached drawing is required due to disruption of traffic and safety hazards caused by the greatly increased numbers of vehicles using the road connection. Paradyne was ordered to comply or show cause why its connection permit should not be revoked and access denied to the connection. On the south side of Ulmerton Road, the DOT's right-of-way extends 38 feet from the berm of Ulmerton Road. There is no dispute over the fact, and petitioner so admits, that the connection Paradyne constructed on the State's right-of-way was not in accordance with the drawing attached to its 1991 permit. However, the DOT presented no evidence that it now desires Paradyne to alter the connection so as to be in compliance with the 1981 permit drawing. In late 1984, after the remand from the District Court of Appeal, Second District, the intervenors retained the DSA Group, formerly Diaz-Seckinger & Associates, Inc., to prepare a report on the joint use of improvements at the intersection of Ulmerton Road and the Paradyne entrance. The DSA Group conducted traffic studies and prepared a "Report on Existing Conditions and Joint Use Access Proposal at Ulmerton Road and Entrance to Paradyne." The report recommended a redesign and contained drawings for a major revision of the intersection actually on Ulmerton Road, the connection on the right-of-way and a 250-foot long joint access road on the private property of Paradyne and the intervenors. While DOT employees were consulted regarding this report and its recommendations and had some input during its preparation, there was no showing that Paradyne participated in the report or the recommended redesign of Ulmerton Road, the connection or the joint use drive. Indeed, according to the engineer responsible for the DSA report, the report and redesign were developed and submitted to the intervenors and the DOT "for their use in meeting and negotiating with the Paradyne. At the time we took the contract we were under the opinion that they were hopefully resolving things with the property owners and they wanted something to go to Paradyne as an offering of one alternative, frankly, with the expectation that there may be something coming back saying "Well, we need to modify this and this." As it turns out, this plan as of a year ago or over a year ago, it's the one that stands right now." (Transcript, pages 98 and 99). Apparently, the intervenors, prior to commissioning the DSA report, requested the DOT to perform a survey or study. DOT declined to do so on the ground that "this had to do with private drives, private property and it was DOT's position that we did not fund evaluations for access into private development." (Transcript, page 136). The redesign of the Ulmerton Road intersection and entrance to the Paradyne/Intervenors property, along with the 250-foot joint use road, recommended by the DSA Group is identical to the redesign required under specification (b) of the Notice of Violation and to Show Cause issued by the DOT. The drawing attached to the Notice to Show Cause is the drawing prepared by the DSA Group. Traffic has increased at the intersection of Ulmerton Road and the entrance to the Paradyne property. The traffic signal in the center of Ulmerton Road allows Paradyne employees traveling westward on Ulmerton to turn south into Paradyne's parking lots, allows exiting employees to turn westward or eastward and also allows traffic exiting from a development known as Tall Pines Estates on the north side of Ulmerton to turn east or west. During two peak traffic flow hours in 1981, 780 vehicles traversed the intersection straight through from east to west, and 235 westbound vehicles turned left or southward into the Paradyne parking lot from Ulmerton Road. In 1985, the through vehicles numbered 1,224 and the left-turning vehicles numbered 379 during the peak traffic hours. It was not established by the testimony and evidence that the increase in through traffic from east to west is the result of any increased activity on the part of either Tall Pines Estates on the north side of Ulmerton or Paradyne on the south side. The increased number of westbound, left-turning vehicles into the Paradyne parking lots causes some backup from the existing stacking lane during the morning and afternoon peak hours, thus causing some congestion on the north or westbound half of Ulmerton Road. The single, existing stacking lane for westbound, left-turning vehicles is approximately 120 to 150 feet long. A survey conducted in late 1984 demonstrated that for the morning peak period, the level of service was an "E", indicating forced flow with traffic backing up. In the afternoon peak period, the level of service was a "D", meaning that drivers had to wait two or three cycles to get through the intersection. The desirable or comfortable level of service is a "C", meaning that the motorist has to stop for only one change of lights. The DOT's minimum accepted design standard in an urban area is a level "D" service. In 1985, the actual accident rate in ratio to the critical accident rate slightly exceeded 1 in the area of the subject intersection. The recommendations of the DSA Group, and the redesign required by the DOT in its Notice to Show Cause, calls for the construction of a dual or double stacking area, 350 feet in length, for the westbound approach on Ulmerton Road and a widened receiving approach on the property to the south to accommodate the dual left-turning traffic. The plan also calls for two westbound turning lanes out of Paradyne property. The median barrier for westbound traffic on Ulmerton Road would need modification. In addition to the widened entrance on the private property to the south, the DSA design calls for the private access road to be extended to a point 250 feet south, with a fence or curb barrier to control the flow of traffic from Paradyne's parking lots at designated points into the access road. The access road would require approximately 22,700 square feet for a joint use area, with 13,980 square feet located on Paradyne's property and 8,750 square feet located on the intervenors' property. The joint use road could either be maintained as a private road pursuant to an agreement between the property owners or it could, perhaps, be dedicated to public use. There was no evidence as to whether Pinellas County would be agreeable to accepting the dedication and thereby becoming responsible for the road's maintenance. It is anticipated that this redesign, primarily because of the dual left turn lanes on Ulmerton Road, would improve the level of service in the morning peak hours to a level "D", and in the afternoon peak period to a level "C". The cost for construction on Ulmerton Road is estimated to be $310,000.00 and the cost for the private 250-foot long drive is estimated to be $50,000.000. In the opinion of the designer of the DSA plan, there is no practical method of design that would allow two separate accesses for Paradyne's and the intervenors' use. The provision of separate accesses would create a five-lead intersection which would cause "even more difficulties in traffic operations." (Transcript, page 86). The DOT's traffic engineer would not approve the traffic signal operation which would be required if there were separate access roads ingressing and egressing the two properties south of the subject intersection. All the proposed modifications at the approach to the property south of Ulmerton Road could be located on Paradyne's property. This would cause a slight offset of the intersection and would cause Paradyne to lose some property now used as a parking lot.
Recommendation Based upon the findings of fact and conclusions of law recited herein, IT IS RECOMMENDED THAT the "Alleged Violation of the Florida Statutes and Notice to Show Cause" be dismissed. IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED THAT said dismissal be without prejudice to the Department of Transportation to issue to Paradyne Corporation a new permit specifying the location and design it considers appropriate for Paradyne's connection to Ulmerton Road, said design containing specifications for construction on Ulmerton Road and its right-of-way, as well as any requirements at Paradyne's entrance beyond the DOT's right-of-way deemed necessary to accommodate proper traffic flow and eliminate safety hazards. Should a new permit be issued, Paradyne should be afforded thirty (30) days within which to indicate its intent to either comply with the new permit terms and conditions or forfeit its access rights to Ulmerton Road. Respectfully submitted and entered this 4th day of February, 1987, in Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE D. TREMOR Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of February, 1987. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 86-1709 The proposed findings of fact submitted by each of the parties have been fully considered and have been accepted and/or incorporated in this Recommended Order, except as noted below: Petitioner, Department of Transportation Rejected as irrelevant and immaterial to the issues in dispute. Respondent, Paradyne Corporation NOTE: The respondent's proposed "findings of fact" contain many statements which constitute legal argument or restate the legal positions of counsel for the parties. To that extent, those statements are not proper "findings of fact" and are rejected as factual findings. All but the last sentence is rejected. The documents referenced were not the subject of a proper request for official notice and, therefore, cannot be considered evidence in this proceeding. 4 and 5. Rejected. Under proper circumstances, as discussed in the conclusions of law, the term "connection" may include more than the DOT right-of-way. First sentence rejected as contrary to the evidence. Rejected as irrelevant and immaterial. Accepted only insofar as it correctly states that the responsibility for cost of construction on Ulmerton Road was not made an issue in this proceeding. Intervenors, Miller and Benjamin NOTE: The intervenors have filed a proposed recommended order which is not separated into "findings of fact" and "conclusions of law." To the extent that proposed factual findings are suggested in said filing, they are accepted with the exception of: Page 1, last sentence: Rejected; the document does not cite Paradyne for refusing the redesign. It simply states that a redesign is required. Page 4, next to last paragraph: Rejected as contrary to the evidence and contrary to the law. Page 5, 3rd paragraph: Rejected as erroneous legal conclusion insofar as "joint access" is intended to encompass a "joint use road" on private property. COPIES FURNISHED: Vernon L. Whittier, Esquire Haydon Burns Building M.S. 58 Tallahassee, Florida 32301-8064 John R. Bush, Esquire Bush, Ross, Gardner, Warren & Rudy 220 South Franklin Street Tampa, Florida 33602 Bruce Marger, Esquire Gardner, Reams, Marger, Davis, Piper & Bartlett, P.A. 1700 66th Street North - 501 Post Office Drawer 41600 St. Petersburg, Florida 33743 Kaye Henderson, Secretary Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 =================================================================
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondent is guilty of violating the law regulating private investigators and, if so, what penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Respondent holds a Class "C" Private Investigator License bearing license number is C91-00006. Petitioner's files indicate that this license was issued January 10, 1991. Respondent testified that he has been licensed since December 1990. Despite records indicating that the Class "C" license was issued January 10, 1991, Petitioner, by letter dated May 24, 1991, informed Respondent that his Class "C" license "has been issued and is forthcoming." The May 24 letter adds: File review indicates that you are not currently employed. Chapter 493, Florida Statutes, requires you to either own or be employed by a licensed Class "A" Private Investigative Agency. To work as a private investigator without meeting one of the foregoing conditions is a violation of law and subjects you to administrative action up to and including revocation of your Class "C" license. During 1991, Respondent was employed by A & W Investigations, which holds a Class "A" agency license. However, by July 7, 1991, he had completed his duties for A & W Investigations and was not employed by a Class "A" agency after that date. During the period between the termination of his employment with A & W Investigations and the meeting described below with Petitioner's investigator in October 1991, Respondent performed investigations related to workers' compensation for a company known as FEISCO. Serving as an independent contractor, Respondent also hired and paid James Coady for investigative work that he performed on Respondent's behalf for FEISCO. In August 1991, a new attorney in the area, Darren Young, received a letter from Respondent announcing his availability to serve as a consultant in criminal cases involving allegations of driving under the influence (DUI). Respondent had been employed for a couple of years by the Collier County Sheriff's Office and drew upon his experience in local law enforcement in providing DUI consultation services. Respondent and Mr. Young later met and began a business/social relationship. In October or November, Mr. Young hired Respondent as a DUI consultant in a pending case. Respondent served as an independent contractor, not an employee of Mr. Young. Although Mr. Young did not need Respondent to testify, he paid Respondent for his services. By letter dated September 23, 1991, Petitioner advised Respondent that it had learned that he was no longer employed by A & W Investigations as a Class "C" Private Investigator licensee. The letter contains the same warning as that quoted in the last two sentences of the above-cited May 24 letter. In early October 1991, an investigator of Petitioner met Respondent to discuss informal complaints made by two or three Naples private investigators that Respondent was conducting private investigations without a license. Respondent told the investigator that he was working for a tile company association doing investigations of its members and serving as an expert witness for attorneys in DUI cases. Petitioner's investigator explained that if Respondent intended to do any private investigations, he needed a Class "A" agency license with which to place his Class "C" private investigator's license. At the urging of Petitioner's investigator, Respondent agreed to begin the process of obtaining a Class "A" license, and, on October 3, 1991, Petitioner received Respondent's application for a Class "A" license. On December 26, 1991, Respondent obtained the general liability coverage required for the Class "A" license. By letter dated December 27, 1991, and received by Petitioner on January 6, 1992, Respondent submitted to Petitioner a money order in the amount of $300 in payment of the application fee, proof of liability insurance, and a copy of the fictitious name registration form. The letter states in part: I have contacted your office several times and have been informed that my fingerprints have not returned from FDLE. This is the only thing that I am waiting for before my license can be issued. The 90 days will be up in January and I was wondering if there is some provision that would allow me to start operations before they return. I would appreciate your advice on this matter. Prior to receiving the December 27 letter from Respondent, on January 3, 1992, Petitioner mailed Respondent a letter "to notify you that your application for a Class "A" license had been approved." The letter states that Respondent needed to provide several items "so your license can be issued " The required items were a license fee of $300, certificate of insurance, and proof of filing a fictitious name. On January 8, 1992, Respondent mailed two letters. One was to Petitioner's investigator, stating that Respondent had "received the notice of approval for the issuance of my Agency license" and advising that he had "forwarded all of the required documentation to Tallahassee." The other letter of January 8, 1992, was to Petitioner and accompanies the certificate of liability insurance. The letter states that, on December 30, 1991, Respondent had sent Petitioner the application fee, copy of the fictitious name registration, and copy of the insurance binder. Petitioner received the certificate of liability insurance on January Noting that the certificate was not properly notarized, Petitioner mailed Respondent a letter, on January 15, 1992, advising that the certificate of liability insurance was missing. By letter dated January 16, 1992, Respondent forwarded the certificate of liability insurance with proper notarization. Receiving the letter on January 22, 1992, Petitioner mailed a letter on January 24, 1992, advising Respondent that he had been issued on that date a Class "A" license, which was good from January 24, 1992, through January 24, 1994. Respondent engaged in at least two investigations during December 1991, at which time he clearly knew that he did not have a Class "A" license and needed one for the work in which he was engaged. In one case, he performed two days' surveillance on Kelly Trotta for Ray Trotta on December 6 and 7, 1991. By letter dated December 9, 1991, to Mr. Trotta, Respondent described the investigatory services that he provided and suggested future spot checks in order to avoid "running up the costs of the investigation." In another case, Mr. Young was retained on the day after Thanksgiving 1991 by Lawrence Harrison to provide legal services in connection with pending federal and state litigation. Mr. Young introduced Respondent to Mr. Harrison, who agreed to retain Respondent or allow Mr. Young to retain Respondent, in either case as an independent contractor. According to Respondent's invoice, Mr. Young hired him on December 16, 1991. The following day, Respondent checked corporate records as part of his investigative work and conveyed the information to Mr. Young. In the following days, Respondent researched Chapter 493, Florida Statutes, concerning the state litigation, which involved a legal action brought by Frank Coto against Mr. Harrison for unpaid private investigative services. Respondent drafted a complaint against Mr. Coto to be sent to Petitioner. Still in December, Respondent obtained character information on Mr. Coto and directly communicated it to the client. The complaint against Mr. Coto included allegations that he attempted to extort from Mr. Harrison the balance allegedly owed by Mr. Harrison to Mr. Coto for investigative services rendered. Mr. Harrison sent the complaint, under his signature, to Petitioner, which eventually elected not to prosecute. On January 9 and 10, 1992, according to Respondent's invoice of January 13, 1993, Respondent met with Mr. Harrison. By separate invoice, Respondent requested $1200 for the costs of a trip to Oklahoma in connection with investigative services related to the federal litigation. This sum was paid prior to January 24, 1992, which was when Respondent was to depart. On or about January 18, 1992, Mr. Young terminated his employment with Mr. Harrison. On January 23, 1992, Respondent contacted the FBI and informed them that Mr. Young had proposed a criminal conspiracy with Respondent to kill one or more persons involved with the Harrison matter. Subsequent investigations revealed no basis for criminal prosecution, nor professional discipline, against Mr. Young. The record is insufficient to determine if Respondent's charges were made in good faith. Instead of going himself, Respondent sent Mr. Coady and Mr. Trotta to perform investigative services for Respondent on behalf of Mr. Harrison. They departed either January 24 or 25, 1991, and performed the investigative services. There is no competent evidence as to whether Mr. Coady had a Class "C" license and, if so, when he obtained it. The evidence is unclear as to when Mr. Trotta obtained his Class "C: license, but he obtained or renewed a Class "C" license, possibly as early as January 23, 1994. Respondent allowed Mr. Coady and Mr. Trotta to place their Class "C" licenses, or the Class "C" licenses for which they were applying. The record establishes the date of sponsorship only as to Mr. Trotta. Respondent signed the form on January 5 and it was notarized on January 7, 1992. Respondent used his Class "A" license number, which he obtained by telephone from one of Petitioner's representatives prior to the official issuance of Respondent's Class "A" license. On March 4, 1992, Respondent sent a letter to Petitioner advising that his firm was no longer sponsoring Mr. Trotta, Mr. Coady, or a third person, Heidi Trotta. Except for this letter, there is no evidence that Respondent ever employed Ms. Trotta, and Petitioner has failed to prove that anyone by that name was ever so employed by Respondent. The letter states that, as of January 30, 1992, Respondent's firm would no longer be responsible for their actions. The record does not indicate when Mr. Trotta and Mr. Coady were terminated. On August 11, 1992, Petitioner's investigator visited Respondent's office and demanded his files for the Harrison and Trotta investigation, as well as a third investigation known as Sparkman/Hayes. Respondent offered to drive home and get the Trotta and Sparkman/Hayes files, but declined to provide the Harrison file until he received approval from Mr. Harrison's attorney, through whom he claimed to work. Petitioner's investigator told Respondent not to go home and get the two files, but to provide them to the investigator later. Respondent agreed to mail them, but did not. Petitioner's investigator never gave Respondent a deadline, nor did he ever again demand that Respondent give him the files. The failure to produce the Harrison file is not the subject of any allegations in the present case. During the course of the August 11 interview, Petitioner's investigator asked Respondent about Mr. Coto and the complaint that had been filed with Petitioner against him. Respondent initially lied, denying knowing anything about Mr. Coto or the complaint. But Petitioner's investigator showed Respondent a letter that Respondent had sent to Mr. Young, which effectively contradicted these denials. Respondent then admitted to Petitioner's investigator that he had drafted the complaint against Mr. Coto and that it had been intended to "muddy the waters." The intent of Respondent was to undermine Mr. Coto's civil action against Mr. Harrison.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Department of State enter a final order ordering Respondent to pay an administrative fine of $3550. ENTERED on June 24, 1994, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT E. MEALE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings on June 24, 1994. COPIES FURNISHED: Hon. Jim Smith Secretary of State The Capitol Tallahassee, FL 32399-0250 Phyllis Slater, General Counsel Department of State The Capitol, PL-02 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0250 Henri C. Cawthon Assistant General Counsel Department of State Division of Licensing The Capitol, MS #4 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0250 Attorney Ken Muszynski 850 Fifth Ave. South Naples, FL 33940
