The Issue The issue is whether respondent's certified public accountant's license should be disciplined for the alleged violations set forth in the administrative complaint.
Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, the following findings of fact are determined: Respondent, Flanagan & Baker, P. A. (respondent or firm), was a certified public accounting firm having been issued license number AD 0006179 by petitioner, Department of Professional Regulation, Board of Accountancy (Board). When the events herein occurred, the firm's offices were located at 2831 Ringling Boulevard, Suite E-118, Sarasota, Florida, and John R. Flanagan and Michael L. Baker, both certified public accountants (CPA), were partners in the firm. In addition, Thomas A. Menchinger, also a CPA, was a junior partner. The firm has since been dissolved, and Flanagan and Menchinger have now formed a new firm known as Flanagan & Menchinger, P. A., at the same address. It is noted that Flanagan, Baker and Menchinger are not named as individual respondents in this proceeding, and at hearing respondent's representative assumed that only the firm's license was at risk. Whether license number AD 0006179 is still active or valid is not of record. In 1987, respondent, through its partner, Flanagan, accepted an engagement to prepare the 1986 calendar year financial statements for Ballantroe Condominium Association, Inc. (BCA or association), an owners' association for a fifty unit condominium in Sarasota. Financial statements are a historical accounting of what transpired for an entity during a particular period of time as well as the status of its assets, liabilities and equity on a given date. They are prepared for a variety of persons who rely upon them to see what transpired during that time period. If the statements are not properly prepared, the possibility exists that harm or other problems may accrue to the users of the statements. After the statements were prepared and issued, a unit owner made inquiry with respondent in August 1987 concerning two items in the statements. When he did not receive the desired response, the owner wrote the Department in September 1987 and asked for assistance in obtaining an opinion regarding the two items. Eventually, the matter was turned over to a Board consultant, Marlyn D. Felsing, and he reviewed the statements in question. Although Felsing found no problems with the two items raised by the owner, he noted what he perceived to be other errors or irregularities in the statements. This led to the issuance of an administrative complaint on September 29, 1988 charging the firm of Flanagan & Baker, P. A., with negligence in the preparation of the statements and the violation of three Board rules. That precipitated the instant controversy. The engagement in question represented the first occasion that the firm had performed work for BCA. The association's annual financial statements from its inception in 1980 through calendar year 1983 had been prepared by Touche Ross & Company, a national accounting firm, and for the years 1984 and 1985 by Mercurio and Bridgford, P. A., a Sarasota accounting firm. Some of these statements have been received in evidence. As a part of the Board investigation which culminated in the issuance of a complaint, Felsing visited respondent's firm, interviewed its principals, and reviewed the work papers and financial statements. A formal report reflecting the results of his investigation was prepared in June 1988 and has been received in evidence as petitioner's exhibit 1. In preparing his report, Felsing relied upon a number of authoritative pronouncements in the accounting profession which underlie the concept of generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP). These included various opinions issued by the Accounting Principles Board (APB), Statements on Auditing Standards (SAS) issued by the Auditing Standards Board, and Accounting Research Bulletins (ARB) issued by the Committee on Accounting Procedure. The three organizations are a part of the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA). With regard to the concept of materiality, which requires an accountant to consider the relative importance of any event, accounting procedure or change in procedure that affects items on the statements, Felsing did not exclude any matters on the ground they were immaterial. Rather, he included all possible irregularities, regardless of their materiality, on the theory that the probable cause panel (for which the report was initially prepared) should consider all items in the aggregate. According to Felsing, a number of irregularities or errors were found in the financial statements prepared by respondent. These are discussed separately in the findings below. The first alleged deficiency noted by Felsing concerned a change by the association from accelerated to the straight-line method of depreciation. According to APB 20, such a change is considered to be significant, and "the cumulative effect of changing to a new accounting principle on the amount of retained earnings at the beginning of the period in which the change is made should be included in net income of the period of the change." In other words, APB 20 requires the cumulative effect of the change to be reported in the net income of the current year. However, respondent accounted for the change as a prior period adjustment on the statement of members' equity. Respondent justified its treatment of the item on the ground the prior year's statements prepared by Mercurio and Bridgford, P. A., did not show any accumulated depreciation. Thus, respondent asserted it was merely correcting an error because the other firm had not reported depreciation on the balance sheet. In addition, respondent noted that the effect on the balance sheet was only $721, deemed the item to be immaterial, and concluded its treatment of the item was appropriate. However, APB 20 requires the auditor to address the cumulative effect of the change ($2,072) rather than the effect of only the current year ($721), and therefore the cumulative effect should have been reported in current income. By failing to do so, respondent deviated from GAAP. The association had designated several cash accounts as being reserve accounts for deferred maintenance and replacements. Under ARB 43, such accounts must be segregated in the balance sheet from other cash accounts that are available for current operations. This would normally be done in a separate classification called "other assets" so that the user of the statements would be aware of the fact that the reserves were not available for current operations. However, the statements reflect that three such reserve accounts were placed under the classification of current assets. It is noted that these accounts totaled $25,514, $18,550 and $30,927, respectively. While respondent recognized the difference between cash available for current operations and reserves for future use, and the requirements of ARB 43, it noted that the association's minute book reflected the association regularly withdrew funds from the accounts throughout the year to cover current operations. Also, the prior year's statements prepared by Mercurio and Bridgford, P. A., had classified the item in the same fashion. Even so, if respondent was justified in classifying the accounts as current assets, it erred by identifying those accounts as "reserves" under the current assets portion of the balance sheet. Therefore, a deviation from GAAP occurred. One of the most important items in a condominium association's financial statements is how it accounts for the accumulation and expenditure of reserves, an item that is typically significant in terms of amount. The accounting profession does not recommend any one methodology but permits an association to choose from a number of alternative methods. In this regard, APB 22 requires that an entity disclose all significant accounting policies, including the choice made for this item. This disclosure is normally made in the footnotes to the financial statements. In this case, no such disclosure was made. Respondent conceded that it failed to include a footnote but pointed out that when the statements were prepared by Touche Ross & Company, one of the world's largest accounting firms, that firm had made no disclosure on the basis of immateriality. However, reliance on a prior year's statements is not justification for a deviation from GAAP. It is accordingly found that APB 22 is controlling, and footnote disclosure should have been made. The financial statements contain a schedule of sources and uses of cash for the current fiscal year. According to APB 19, all transactions in this schedule should be reported at gross amounts irrespective of whether they utilize cash. However, respondent reported all transactions in the schedule at their net amount. In justifying its action, respondent again relied upon the prior years' statements of Touche Ross & Company and Mercurio and Bridgford, P. A., who reported the transactions in the same manner. It also contended the item was immaterial and that a detailed explanation of the item is found in the statement of members' equity. Despite these mitigating factors, it is found that the schedule was inconsistent with APB 19, and a deviation from GAAP occurred. Felsing's next concern involved the language used by respondent in footnote 6 to the statements. That footnote pertained to the unfunded reserve and read as follows: NOTE VI - UNFUNDED RESERVE As of December 31, 1986, the Association reserves amounted to $103,953 consisting of $18,931 as a reserve for depreciation and statutory reserves of $85,022. The amount funded was $95,422 leaving an unfunded balance of $8,531 due to the reserves from the operating funds. Felsing characterized the footnote as "confusing" because it referred to depreciation as a part of a future reserve for replacements. Felsing maintained the footnote contained inappropriate wording since depreciation relates to assets already placed in service and not to their replacements. Respondent agreed that the footnote, taken by itself, might be confusing. However, it contended that if the user read the preceding footnote, which he should, there would be no possible confusion. That footnote read as follows: NOTE V - RESERVE FOR DEPRECIATION The Association funds the reserves for depreciation through its operating budget. These funds are to be used for the replacement of property and equipment as the need arises. As previously noted, the Association changed its method of computing depreciation to conform with generally accepted accounting principles. As of December 31, 1986, the reserve for depreciation totaled $18,931. According to respondent, the above footnote made clear to the user that the firm was not referring to depreciation as a reserve but rather was setting aside funds equal to depreciation in an effort to have sufficient cash to purchase assets in the future. While the deficiency here is highly technical and minute in nature, it is found that the footnote is not sufficiently clear and that the user might be confused. Felsing next observed that the footnotes did not disclose how the association accounted for lawn equipment or other capital assets. According to APB 22, such a choice is considered a significant accounting policy and, whatever policy is utilized, the same must be disclosed in the footnotes to the statements. In response, Flanagan pointed to a footnote in Note I of the statements which read in part as follows: Property and Equipment and Depreciation Property and equipment capitalized by the Association is stated at cost. During 1986, the Association changed its method of depreciation from the accelerated cost recovery method to a straight line method in which property and equipment is depreciated over its estimated useful life in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles. According to respondent, this footnote was adequate in terms of explaining the method of depreciation. Also, a number of other statements were introduced into evidence to show that other entities routinely used a corresponding footnote. Flanagan's testimony is accepted as being the most credible and persuasive evidence on this issue, and the footnote is accordingly deemed to be adequate disclosure on this policy. In the statement of members' equity, there is an item in the amount of $1,730 described as "capitalization of lawn equipment expensed in previous year." Although Felsing did not question the amount shown, he faulted respondent for not properly describing whether the item was a change in accounting principle or an error correction. According to APB 20, the disclosure of an error correction is required in the period in which the error was discovered and corrected. Although respondent considered the footnote described in finding of fact 11 to constitute adequate disclosure, it is found that such disclosure falls short of the requirements of APB 20. Work papers are records and documentary evidence kept by the accountant of the procedures applied, tests performed, information obtained and pertinent conclusions reached in the engagement. They serve the purpose of documenting the work performed and provide verification for the accountant. In addition, another important, required tool is the audit program, a written plan for how the auditor intends to perform the audit. The plan serves the purpose of documenting the accountant's mental process of deciding what procedures are necessary to perform the audit and to communicate those procedures to the persons actually conducting the audit. The audit plan should include in reasonable detail all of the audit procedures necessary for the accountant to perform the audit and express an opinion on the financial statements. Although a variety of checklists have been prepared by the AICPA and other organizations, each audit program must be tailored to fit the needs of a particular client. Felsing noted what he believed to be a number of deficiencies with respect to respondent's work papers, audit program, and engagement planning. In reaching that conclusion, Felsing relied upon various SAS pronouncements which govern that phase of an auditor's work. Those pronouncements have been received in evidence as petitioner's exhibits 7-14. Although the work papers themselves were not introduced into evidence, Felsing stated that his review of them reflected they were "deficient" in several respects. For example, he did not find a planning memorandum, time budget, checklist or other evidence that planning procedures were performed as required by SAS 22. In this regard, Flanagan corroborated the fact that no formal planning memorandum to the file was prepared. Although respondent's audit program was written for a condominium association, Felsing found it "extremely brief" and was not tailored to this particular client. He opined that such a program should have included reasonable detail of all audit procedures necessary to accomplish the audit and to express an opinion on the financial statements. In particular, it was noted that some required procedures were not on the list while some procedures actually used by respondent were not included. Through conversations with respondent's members, Felsing learned that much of the audit work was performed by Menchinger, the junior partner in the firm. In addition, "a few" other work papers were prepared by an unknown assistant. Although Menchinger reviewed all work performed by the assistant, Felsing found no evidence that the papers were reviewed by the supervising partner, Flanagan. Such review, which is a required step in the audit process, is generally evidenced by the supervising partner placing check marks or initials on the individual work papers. Felsing noted further that the decision to rely on the testing of internal controls was not documented in the work papers by respondent. He added that the amount of time budgeted by respondent for this engagement (around thirty hours) was inadequate given the fact that it was the first year the firm had prepared this client's statements. Finally, Felsing concluded that the violations were not peculiar to a condominium association but were applicable to all enterprises. Respondent pointed out that the association was a small client with less than five hundred line items, and the audit program and engagement planning were planned within that context. Respondent introduced into evidence its audit program which contained the steps taken by the firm in planning for the engagement. Testimony that all steps contained therein were followed was not contradicted. Similarly, Flanagan testified without contradiction that he reviewed all work performed by Menchinger but did not evidence his review with tick marks on each page. According to Flanagan, on a small audit such as this, he considered the signing of the tax return and opinion letter evidence that he had reviewed the work papers. However, Flanagan acknowledged that someone examining the papers would not know they had been reviewed by the supervising partner. Based upon the above findings, and after reconciling the conflicting testimony, it is found that respondent violated GAAP by failing to have a planning memorandum, time budget, and evidence of testing of internal controls within its work papers. All other alleged violations are found to without merit. Respondent has continued to represent the association since the Board issued its complaint. Indeed, Flanagan noted that the association is pleased with the firm's work, and this was corroborated by a letter from the association's board of directors attesting to its satisfaction with the firm. There was no evidence that the association or any other third party user of the statements was injured or misled by relying on the statements.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that respondent be found guilty of the violations discussed in the conclusions of law portion of this Recommended Order, and that license number AD 0006179 be given a reprimand. All other charges should be dismissed. DONE and ENTERED this 30th day of October 1989, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of October 1989.
The Issue Whether the Department of Revenue, Child Support Enforcement Program, may levy bank accounts held jointly by Petitioner and Donald F. Ziesmer and apply the funds to reduce or satisfy Mr. Ziesmer's past due child support obligation.
Findings Of Fact On September 4, 1992, an Order and Judgment was filed in the case of Shirley Skubish v. Donald F. Ziesmer (Skubish v. Ziesmer), Case No. 85-1368-CA, in the Circuit Court of the 19th Judicial Circuit, in and for Martin County, Florida. Pursuant to this Order and Judgment, Donald F. Ziesmer was ordered to pay $48.00 per week in current child support for two minor children, and an additional $5.00 per week on a child support arrearage of $4,571.00, which was established as being owed by Mr. Ziesmer as of August 19, 1992. (Joint Stipulation). On May 19, 1994, an Order of Contempt was filed in Skubish v. Ziesmer, under which, inter alia, Mr. Ziesmer's child support obligations as set out in the September 4, 1992, Order and Judgment were continued, and a child support arrearage of $6,108.37, was established as being owed by Mr. Ziesmer as of May 5, 1994. (Joint Stipulation). On May 14, 1998, an Enforcement of Child Support Agreement and Order on Stipulation was filed in Skubish v. Ziesmer, under which Mr. Ziesmer's child support obligation, as set out in the September 1992 Order and Judgment were continued, and a child support arrearage of $1,246.08, was established as being owed by Mr. Ziesmer as of May 6, 1998. (Joint Stipulation). On January 29, 1999, a Recommended Order and Order on Motion for Enforcement, Contempt and Income Deduction was filed in Skubish v. Ziesmer, in which Mr. Ziesmer's child support obligation, as set out in the September 1992 Order and Judgment was continued, and a child support arrearage of $2,686.08, was established as being owed by Mr. Ziesmer as of December 2, 1998. (Joint Stipulation). On December 28, 1999, a Recommended Order and Order on Motion for Enforcement, Civil Contempt and IBO was filed in Skubish v. Ziesmer, under which, inter alia, Mr. Ziesmer's child support obligations as set out in the September 4, 1992 Order and Judgement were continued, and a child support arrearage of $5,182.08, was established as being owed by Mr. Ziesmer as of December 1, 1999. (Joint Stipulation). The official payment records of the Martin County Clerk of Court established that Mr. Ziesmer owed past due child support in Skubish v. Ziesmer, in the amount of $7,534.08, as of November 9, 2000. (Joint Stipulation). On or before November 9, 2000, Petitioner and her boyfriend, Donald Ziesmer, opened a joint checking account (account number: 262746-8), and a joint savings account (account number: 262746-0), (hereafter, "the FCU joint accounts") with the Florida Credit Union, Gainesville, Florida. (Joint Stipulation). At the time that the accounts were opened and at all times material, Petitioner and Mr. Ziesmer were living together on Petitioner's Social Security disability income and gifts from her father, and Mr. Ziesmer's Veterans Administration disability income and gifts from his mother and other relatives. At no time material were either Petitioner or Mr. Ziesmer working for a living or earning any income. Petitioner was receiving Social Security disability benefits of about $530.00, per month, during the period of September 2000 through November 2000. Her benefits were deposited into an EBT account in her name, only, with Citicorp Electronic Financial Services, Inc., Tampa, Florida. (Joint Stipulation). Petitioner made a one-time deposit in September 2000, of a lump sum disability payment of $659.00. Her Social Security disability payments were made to Petitioner monthly by an EBT card in an uneven amount which was not a multiple of $20.00. An EBT card works like an ATM card for purposes of withdrawals. Most ATMs only permit withdrawals of cash in 20-dollar increments, with fees attaching to each withdrawal. Because Petitioner's EBT monthly credit was in an amount which was not a multiple of 20-dollars, she could not access the balance of approximately $13.00 each month unless she had a checking account. Also, she needed to write checks so she could prove she had paid certain domestic bills. The accounts were opened primarily to allow Petitioner to access her last $13.00 each month. The accounts were opened as joint accounts because Petitioner's bad credit kept her from being able to open a checking account in her name alone. Petitioner and Mr. Ziesmer both intended that the accounts be used only by Petitioner, and Petitioner is the only one who used the accounts. Petitioner and Mr. Ziesmer have never been married to each other. On November 9, 2000, Respondent mailed a Notice of Freeze to the Florida Credit Union, Gainesville, Florida, by certified mail, return receipt requested, regarding any accounts held by Mr. Ziesmer. The Notice was received by the credit union on November 13, 2000. (Joint Stipulation). Pursuant to the Notice of Freeze, the Florida Credit Union froze the FCU joint accounts on November 13, 2000. On November 16, 2000, Respondent mailed a Notice of Intent to Levy on Mr. Ziesmer, by certified mail, return receipt requested. Mr. Ziesmer received the Notice after November 16, 2000. (Joint Stipulation). The Notice of Freeze and Notice of Intent to Levy satisfied Respondent's statutory notice requirement in Section 409.25656, Florida Statutes. Petitioner filed a timely Petition for Administrative Hearing on November 29, 2000. (Joint Stipulation). Respondent Department's agency representative, Pamela Ellingsworth, Revenue Specialist II, testified that it is the Department's standard procedure to give any joint account holders, who do not owe the back child support, the opportunity to show the source of accounts frozen by the Department. She further testified that the Department normally releases back to the non-debtor/non-obligor joint account holder those funds which the non-debtor can establish are his or her own funds, separate and apart from those of the child support debtor/obligor. According to Ms. Ellingsworth, if a percentage of contributions to the account(s) can be determined, the Department's standard procedure is to release back that percentage of proven funds to the non-debtor/non-obligor. Between October 1, 2000 and November 13, 2000, thirteen deposits were made into the FCU joint accounts. Twelve deposits were of cash only. One deposit, on October 6, 2000, was from a check for $150.00 ($130.00 "net" deposit) written to Petitioner by her father. (Joint Stipulation, modified by testimony as to "father"). Petitioner testified, without refutation, that the funds deposited came only from the two sources: Petitioner's Social Security benefits and gifts by cash or check from Petitioner's father. Petitioner and Mr. Ziesmer testified, without refutation, that no deposits to the accounts were made by Mr. Ziesmer. Although both witnesses have mental disabilities and take heavy medication, they were credible on this issue because credit union statements and other documents regarding the FCU accounts were admitted into evidence, which documents materially mirror their testimony regarding amounts received, deposited, and disbursed. (Petitioner's Exhibits A, B, C, and D). Mr. Ziesmer's income from disability payments at all times material was only $101.00 per month, with one slightly larger one-time lump sum payment. The amounts he received in gifts varied. He did not recall exact amounts. He gave Petitioner cash for food and no monies of his were deposited into the joint accounts. The Department established that in September 2000, the couple signed a lease together on a house for $550.00 per month. However, their testimony shows they were evicted less than two months later for failure to pay, and they no longer live together.
Recommendation Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is
Findings Of Fact The Florida State Board of Accountancy authorized the publication of Florida Accounting News and in May 1977 the first issue appeared in newspaper format. The publication was intended to provide information of interest to the accounting profession and principally to those certified by the Board. The Executive Director of the Board served the general function of editor of this publication. Among the items considered of interest to the profession and included in this edition of the paper were several Declaratory Statements of the Board promulgated pursuant to Section 120.565 Florida Statutes. The Executive Director of the Board of Accountancy is a full-time employee who runs the day-to-day operations of the Agency, processing applications for certification and renewal of certification, responding to inquiries addressed to the Board, and in general maintaining the records required to be kept by the Agency. He has no authority to formulate Board policies or to make policy decisions on behalf of the Board. Among the Declaratory Statements contained in the May 1977 issue of the News was D.S. 75-01 and D.S. 76-02. The former held that "a person who does not profess to the public that he is a certified public accountant, and thus is more qualified to render these services than unlicensed persons performing similar services, is not a person 'practicing as a certified public accountant or as a public accountant.'" D.S. 76-02, on the other hand, and despite a disclaimer that a Petition for Declaratory Statement is not applicable, held that even though the Petitioner does not hold himself out to the public as a CPA, nor does his business card or letterhead reflect the fact that he is a CPA, and that financial statements are issued without certificate of expression or disclaimer of opinion, nevertheless the holding out as an accounting service available for accounting, bookkeeping and tax work in newspaper ads and in mailings to new and existing business notices constituted the practice as a CPA or as a public accountant. The Executive Director, aware of the existence of D.S. 76-02 inserted a note following D.S. 75-01 reading as follows: NOTE: The interpretation that a person practicing as a certified public accountant must be construed to mean "a person who is holding himself out as a CPA and offering to perform, performing, etc." has been subse- quently reversed to later matters. The current position of the Board is a certified public accountant offering, on his own behalf or through a firm of which he has ownership interest, only services involving the use of accounting skills will be deemed to be engaging in the practice of public accounting and would be subject to all provisions of Chapter 473, Florida Statutes and Chapter 21A Florida Administrative Code, whether or not said person holds himself out as a certified public accountant. It is this NOTE which petitioner claims is a rule and invalid because not adopted in accordance with the provisions of Chapter 120 Florida Statutes. One other significant difference between the facts in D.S. 75-01 and 76-02 was that in the former one principal function performed by the association, in addition to accounting work, was the sale of insurance while in the latter the party performed only those services generally performed by accountants, such as accounting, bookkeeping and tax work.
Findings Of Fact The Respondent, Robert E. Hough, holds Florida Teacher's Certificate Number 313219, which is a Rank III certificate covering the area of substitute teaching. From September, 1975, until his dismissal on May 20, 1982, the Respondent had been employed with the Duval County School System as a substitute teacher. He was never employed in a full-time position. During the times relevant to this proceeding, the Respondent was employed with First Federal Savings and Loan Association of Jacksonville, as a manager of the Mandarin Branch, until his termination on May 29, 1981. While the Respondent was employed with First Federal Savings and Loan, one of his associates was Mr. Frazier Dughi. Mr. Dughi was employed with First Federal Savings and Loan as an officer in the Real Estate Department until he left that employment in August, 1980. On or about October 29, 1981, Mr. Dughi secured a loan in the amount of $4,500 from First Federal Savings and Loan, and assigned a certificate of deposit he held with First Federal Savings and Loan as collateral. This loan was obtained for the purpose of purchasing an automobile which Mr. Dughi had negotiated to buy from a private individual. After Mr. Dughi had inspected the automobile and decided that it was not to his liking, he met the Respondent on his way home. He had known the Respondent through their employment and had developed a friendship with him. The Respondent went to Mr. Dughi's home where Mr. Dughi informed him what had occurred regarding the automobile purchase. In an effort to avoid any interest expense on the loan, Mr. Dughi gave to the Respondent the $4,500 check from First Federal Savings and Loan, which represented the loan proceeds, and asked the Respondent to deposit it as repayment of the loan through the Respondent's Mandarin Branch office. Mr. Dughi first became aware that his loan had not been repaid approximately 18 months later when he received a notice from First Federal Savings and Loan that he must pay $1,000 in interest in order to renew the loan. In response to this notice, Mr. Dughi contacted Don Perry, a vice-president of First Federal Savings and Loan, and requested the matter be investigated. Mr. Perry testified and produced the original documents involving the transaction between Mr. Dughi and First Federal Savings and Loan. The check initially payable to Mr. Dughi in the amount of $4,500 shows that part of the initial endorsement was removed from the check and subsequently signed and endorsed by the Respondent, as follows: "Pay to the Order of Robert E. Hough". The check was deposited at the Respondent's Mandarin Branch office, into the Respondent's personal account. Subsequently, a check was drawn on the Respondent's account in the amount of $4,200 and deposited in an account with the American National Bank which was owned by the Respondent. At no time did Mr. Dughi authorize the Respondent to deposit his funds or to convert the funds to his personal use. Hazel M. Smith is an individual who maintained a savings account with the Mandarin Branch of the First Federal Savings and Loan Association. On or about November 15, 1979, the Respondent entered into a transaction with Mrs. Smith in which he obtained $10,000 from her account on his representation to her that a special program was being offered to certain preferred customers of First Federal Savings and Loan. However, the money from Mrs. Smith's account was immediately deposited into the personal account of the Respondent. He then obtained a loan in the amount of $10,000 from First Federal Savings and Loan, using the deposit from Mrs. Smith's account as collateral. Thereafter, monthly payments in the amount of $132.16 drawn on the Respondent's account at the American National Bank were deposited in Mrs. Smith's account at First Federal Savings and Loan, in keeping with the terms of the agreement in which Mrs. Smith was to receive repayment over a ten-year period at a ten percent interest rate. As a result of this transaction between the Respondent and Hazel Smith, the Respondent was arrested, and by information filed on October 29, 1981, he was charged with grand theft in violation of Section 812.014, Florida Statutes. On May 3, 1982, the Respondent pled guilty to this criminal charge. Thereafter, the Respondent was adjudicated guilty and sentenced to Florida State Prison for a period of 30 months. Mr. Perry testified regarding the investigation that had been conducted by First Federal Savings and Loan concerning a check "kiting" scheme involving the Respondent, going back to April 25, 1978. This scheme continued until the Respondent resigned from First Federal Savings and Loan in May, 1981, by which time it was determined that the Respondent had secured the sum of $20,100. The Respondent had "kited" checks through three financial institutions, First Federal Savings and Loan, Atlantic National Bank, and the American National Bank. The scheme was uncovered on May 27, 1981, when a check for $20,100 was returned because of insufficient funds. As a result of these transactions, the Respondent was arrested and an Information was filed by the Office of the State Attorney on October 29, 1981, charging the Respondent with grand theft in violation of Section 812.014, Florida Statutes. On May 3, 1982, the Respondent pled guilty to these offenses; subsequently he was adjudicated guilty and sentenced to a five- year period of probation to be served consecutive to the prior 30-month sentence in the Florida State Prison. The Respondent's employment with the Duval County School System was terminated on May 20, 1982.
Recommendation From the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Teaching Certificate Number 313219 held by the Respondent, Robert Edwin Hough, be REVOKED permanently. THIS RECOMMENDED ORDER entered this 25th day of July, 1983, in Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM B. THOMAS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 904/488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of July, 1983. COPIES FURNISHED: L. Haldane Taylor, Esquire 1902 Independence Square Jacksonville, Florida 32202 Mr. Robert E. Hough Post Office Box 229 Lawtey, Florida Donald L. Greisheimer Director Education Practices Commission 125 Knott Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Petitioner has been the subject of an unlawful employment practice as defined in Chapter 760, Florida Statutes (2006).1
Findings Of Fact Family Dollar Services operates distribution centers for Family Dollar Stores, Inc., which is a large nationwide chain of self-service stores selling basic, lower-priced goods for family and home needs. At all times relevant to this case, Ms. Byers was a forklift area manager at Family Dollar Services’ distribution center in Marianna, Florida. Ms. Byers’ supervisors were Craig Moore, who was the operations manager, and Chris Miller, who was the department manager. On August 23, 2006, Ms. Byers met with Angel Anderson,2 who was the human resources manager for Family Dollar Services, to discuss an issue that involved Mr. Moore. Ms. Byers advised Ms. Anderson that she felt that Mr. Moore was “talking down to her,” but Ms. Byers was unable to give any specific instances in which Mr. Moore had talked down to her. Ms. Anderson told Ms. Byers that she could relay the information to Don Braun, who, at the time, was regional vice president for Family Dollar Services. Ms. Byers indicated that she did not want Ms. Anderson to do anything then, but wanted to see if she could handle it on her own. Ms. Byers did not mention that she felt that she was being discriminated against because she was a woman. Ms. Byers claims that she spoke to Ms. Anderson about Mr. Moore on three other occasions, but Ms. Anderson does not recall those conversations. If Ms. Anderson had received a complaint from Ms. Byers, alleging that she was being discriminated against based on her sex, Ms. Anderson would have taken a written statement from Ms. Byers and sent it to the corporate office in North Carolina. An investigation would have been initiated based on the complaint. No written statement was taken from Ms. Byers, and no investigation was initiated. Ms. Byers never complained to Ms. Anderson at any time that she was being discriminated against based on her sex. On August 28, 2006, Mr. Moore, Mr. Miller, and Ms. Anderson met with Ms. Byers to discuss Ms. Byers’ interaction with some of her subordinate employees. Ms. Byers had been observed taking breaks and eating lunch with the same subordinate employees each day. During the meeting, Mr. Moore and Mr. Miller advised Ms. Byers that it was not a good management practice to take breaks and eat lunch with the same subordinate employees each day because the practice could create a perception of favoritism and advised Ms. Byers to refrain from such practice. At the end of the meeting on August 28, 2006, Mr. Miller and Mr. Moore made it clear to Ms. Byers that the matters discussed in the meeting were to be considered confidential and were not to be discussed with other employees. About an hour after the meeting, Mr. Miller overheard Ms. Byers and another employee, Jackie Hodges, talking about the meeting. Mr. Miller could not tell exactly what was being said. Later, Ms. Hodges came to Mr. Miller’s office and indicated that Ms. Byers was upset and distressed by the meeting. Mr. Miller took Ms. Hodges’ comments to mean that Ms. Byers had told Ms. Hodges about the meeting, despite Mr. Miller’s and Mr. Moore’s admonitions to keep the meeting confidential. Mr. Miller confronted Ms. Byers about her discussion with Ms. Hodges. Ms. Byers denied telling Ms. Hodges about the meeting and claimed that Ms. Hodges had merely seen that Ms. Byers was upset by what had been said to her in the meeting. Mr. Miller went to Ms. Anderson and Mr. Moore to discuss Ms. Byers’ failure to abide by her supervisor’s direction of confidentiality. Mr. Miller and Mr. Moore also discussed the issue with Mr. Braun, and it was decided that Ms. Byers should be issued an initial written counseling for her failure to follow her supervisors’ direction. Mr. Miller directed Ms. Anderson to draft the initial written counseling. According to the Distribution Center Disciplinary Policy of Family Dollar Services, an initial written counseling is the lowest level of discipline that can be given to a Family Dollar Services’ employee. On August 29, 2006, Mr. Miller and Mr. Moore called Ms. Byers to a meeting in Mr. Moore’s office to issue Ms. Byers the initial written counseling. Ms. Byers came to the meeting and became upset. She told them that it was unfair to give her the initial written counseling and that she was quitting. She accused Mr. Moore of hating her because she was a white woman and left Mr. Moore’s office. On her way back to the warehouse area where her workstation was located, Ms. Byers stopped at Ms. Anderson’s office and told Ms. Anderson: “I quit, Angel. They finally did this to me and I’ve had enough. I quit.” Ms. Byers went to her workstation and gathered her things. Mr. Miller followed her to her work area. Because Ms. Byers was upset, Mr. Miller had a security officer escort Ms. Byers from the facility. Ms. Byers was not terminated from her employment. Neither Mr. Miller nor Mr. Moore had the authority to terminate Ms. Byers because she was a manager. Termination of managers had to be authorized by corporate headquarters. No authorization was sought from the corporate headquarters, and no authorization was given by corporate headquarters to terminate Ms. Byers. Ms. Byers applied for and received unemployment compensation benefits after she left the employment of Family Dollar Services. She argues that her receipt of unemployment benefits is evidence that she was terminated from her employment. The evidence established that unemployment compensation claims against Family Dollar Services were handled for Family Dollar Services by a third party. Ms. Anderson received notice from the third party contractor that Ms. Byers had been awarded unemployment compensation benefits, and Ms. Anderson instructed the contractor to appeal the decision on the basis that Ms. Byers voluntarily left her employment, but the contractor failed to do so.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entering dismissing Susan Byers’ Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 24th day of July, 2008, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S SUSAN B. HARRELL Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of July, 2008.
Findings Of Fact Respondent met Sibley Dennis Carpenter, Jr. (Carpenter) in 1974 or 1975, in connection with a land sale that is not otherwise relevant to this matter. In the summer of 1975, Carpenter asked respondent for assistance in obtaining financing for another, separate land transaction. On that occasion, Carpenter furnished respondent an unaudited, personal financial statement, prepared by an accounting firm, which put the net worth of Carpenter and his wife at slightly less than a half million dollars. On November 19, 1975, respondent became affiliated with Dennis Carpenter Realty, Inc., as a real estate salesman. Because he had other irons in the fire, he only appeared at the office of Dennis Carpenter Realty, Inc., once every month or two. Not until the spring of the following year, after he had been licensed as a real estate broker, did respondent have access to the company's books. In November of 1975, respondent met one Charles W. Van Cura, a hog farmer from Minnesota who expressed an interest in buying land in Florida, and referred Mr. Van Cura to Carpenter. Carpenter, possibly in the company of respondent, showed Mr. Van Cura certain real property belonging to Harvey H. Westphal and Margaret Westphal. Mr. Van Cura made an offer of one hundred fifteen thousand dollars ($115,000.00) for the property and deposited seven thousand five hundred dollars ($7,500.00) with Carpenter towards the purchase price, as evidenced by a binder receipt and deposit, dated December 31, 1975, and signed by Carpenter. Respondent's exhibit No. 1. Carpenter presented the offer to the Westphals, who refused Mr. Van Cura's offer but made a counteroffer of one hundred thirty-five thousand dollars ($135,000.00), by crossing out Mr. Van Cura's figures, substituting their own and signing their names. Both the offer and the counteroffer were "subject to receiving Federal Land Bank Loan of 70 percent of purchase price . . ." Van Cura told Carpenter he was unwilling to accept the Westphals' counteroffer. Carpenter persuaded respondent to buy the property himself, and, on January 6, 1976, Carpenter, respondent and Van Cura met in respondent's office. After some discussion, respondent drew two checks aggregating seventy- five hundred dollars ($7,500.00) to Van Cura's order. Petitioner's composite exhibit No. 6. Van Cura executed a receipt, respondent's exhibit No. 2, reciting that he had received seventy-five hundred dollars ($7,500.00) from respondent. At the time of this transaction, Carpenter could not have refunded Van Cura's deposit from the escrow account of Dennis Carpenter Realty, Inc., because there were insufficient funds in the account. Unbeknownst to respondent, Carpenter had never deposited Van Cura's money in the escrow account. On January 30, 1976, Carpenter drew up a written offer on behalf of respondent to purchase the Westphal property for one hundred thirty-five thousand dollars ($135,000.00). Petitioner's exhibit No. 1. The binder receipt and deposit recited that respondent "and or assigns" had deposited seventy-five hundred dollars ($7,500.00) with Carpenter in earnest money. Although the Westphals accepted this offer, the transaction never closed, for reasons which were not developed in the evidence. The Westphals never made demand for the seventy-five hundred dollar ($7,500.00) deposit, and respondent never got the money back from Carpenter. Respondent has since decided to "treat it . . . as a loan, or write it off." (R119) At no time did respondent relate to the Westphals the history of the earnest money deposit. In May of 1976, respondent was licensed as a real estate broker, and became secretary-treasurer of Dennis Carpenter Realty, Inc. Respondent and Carpenter agreed between themselves that the corporation should open an escrow account on which each could draw individually. This is reflected by a corporate resolution, dated May 4, 1976. Respondent's exhibit No. 7. Such an account was opened. When the first bank statement revealed to respondent that Carpenter had drawn improper checks against the escrow account, however, a second corporate resolution was drafted, dated July 23, 1976, respondent's exhibit No. 9, which authorized respondent, but not Carpenter, to draw against the escrow account.
Recommendation Upon consideration of the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That the administrative complaint be dismissed. DONE and ENTERED this 15th day of September, 1977, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT T. BENTON, II Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Mr. Bruce I. Kamelhair, Esquire 2699 Lee Road Winter Park, Florida 32789 Mr. W. O. Birchfield, Esquire 3000 Independent Square Jacksonville, Florida 32201
The Issue The issue in this case is whether the real estate license issued to the Respondent, James P. Hudson, should be revoked or otherwise disciplined based upon the acts alleged in the Administrative Complaint.
Findings Of Fact Based upon my observation of the witnesses and their demeanor while testifying, the documentary evidence received and the entire record compiled herein, I make the following findings of fact: At all pertinent times, Respondent, James P. Hudson, was a licensed real estate broker in the State of Florida having been issued license No. 0148841 in accordance with Chapter 475, Florida Statutes. Respondent has been operating as a broker from an office at 413 South Federal Highway, Boynton Beach, Florida 33435. Respondent maintains an escrow account No. 018200602689 at Sun Bank in Boynton Beach, Florida into which he deposits trusts funds received in his capacity as a real estate broker. Sometime in the early part of September 1989, Petitioner initiated a random audit of Respondent's business. Prior to the audit, Petitioner's investigator advised the Respondent that he would need to produce all the records related to his escrow account. An investigator for Petitioner visited Respondent's office on or about September 18, 1989 to conduct an audit of Respondent's escrow accounts. Based upon the investigator's review of the records, five different transactions were identified as allegedly involving delays or mishandling of escrow funds by Respondent. Those transactions are the basis for several of the allegations in the Administrative Complaint. Each transaction is addressed separately below. The first transaction involved a contract for the sale and purchase of real property between Fitz as buyer and Kerstin as seller (the "Fitz Contract"). Included in Respondent's files on this transaction was a copy of a contract for sale and purchase that was dated and signed by the buyer on September 6, 1989 and dated and signed by the seller on September 9, 1989. The buyer in the Fitz Contract gave Respondent a check for $1000 as a deposit to be held in escrow in connection with the transaction. The Respondent's written receipt for that check is dated September 7, 1989. The evidence established that this initial deposit check was delivered to Respondent on Thursday evening, September 7, 1989. Respondent was out of town on Friday, September 8 and returned on Monday evening, September 11. The check was deposited on the afternoon of September 12 and is reflected in the bank records as a deposit on September 13. The sellers (the Kerstins) signed the contract on September 9, 1989. However, in executing the contract, they crossed out the $900,000 sales price submitted by the buyer and increased the price to $1,400,000. In other words, the sellers made a counteroffer with respect to this contract. The initial deposit was timely returned to the sellers when the counteroffer was rejected. Petitioner's investigator erroneously assumed that Respondent did not timely collect the additional deposit required under this contract. While Petitioner's investigator considered this signed contract in Respondent's files to be a binding agreement on the parties, it is clear that the change in sales price was only initialed by the sellers and, therefore, there was no enforceable agreement. The parties to the Fitz Contract subsequently executed another written contract. This second agreement provided for a sales price of $1,100,000. That contract was executed by the buyer on September 20, 1989 and by the sellers on September 24, 1989. This second contract called for a $49,000.00 deposit upon acceptance. The buyers gave Respondent a check dated September 25, 1989 in the amount of $49,000.00. That check was deposited by Respondent in his escrow account on the afternoon of September 26, 1989. The $49,000 deposit is reflected in the bank records as being deposited on September 27, 1989. Under the circumstances, there was no undue delay by Respondent in collecting or depositing the funds into escrow. The second transaction identified by Petitioner's investigator involved a contract for the sale and purchase of real property between Campanis as buyer and Hoffman as seller. The buyer in this transaction gave Respondent a check dated September 6, 1990 to be held as a deposit for this contract. A photocopy of the check presented to Petitioner's investigator included a handwritten note that states "hold until Friday 9/8/89." The evidence did not establish who wrote this note. The evidence established that the check was received by one of Respondent's sales associates on September 7 and left on the Respondent's desk on September 8. Respondent is the only company employee authorized to deposit checks or otherwise handle transactions involving the escrow account. As indicated above, Respondent was out of town from September 8 through the evening of September 11. The check was deposited on the afternoon of September 12 and is reflected in the bank records as being credited to the escrow account on September 13. Under the circumstances, the Respondent was not delinquent in depositing these funds. The third transaction involved a contract for the purchase and sale of real property between White as buyer and Adkins as seller (the "White Contract.") The White Contract was executed by the buyer on July 26, 1989 and by one of the sellers on July 27 and by the other seller on Friday, July 28. The contract called for an initial deposit of $500.00 with an additional deposit of $1,700 upon acceptance. The initial deposit check was dated July 26, 1989. That deposit check was attached to the contract executed by the purchaser and presented to a cooperating real estate agent who was to present the proposed contract to the seller. The executed contract was not returned to Respondent until sometime during the weekend of July 29 and 30. The initial deposit check along with the additional deposit were then deposited into Respondent's escrow account on Monday, July 31, 1989. Under the circumstances, the evidence established that there was no undue delay in depositing the escrow money. The next transaction identified by Petitioner's investigator involved a contract for sale and purchase of real property between Milera as buyer and Twillie as seller (the "Milera Contract.") The Milera Contract provided for an additional deposit due upon acceptance. The contract was accepted by Twillie on August 23, 1989. The parties to the contract agreed that the time for making the additional deposit would be extended for two days. The check for the additional deposit was dated and received by Respondent on Friday, August 25, 1989. The check was deposited into Respondent's escrow account on Tuesday, August 29, 1989. Under the circumstances, there was no undue delay in depositing the escrow money. The final transaction involved a contract with the sale and purchase of real property between Gerrety as buyer and the estate of John Walsh as seller (the "Gerrety Contract.") The Gerrety Contract was executed by the purchaser on August 10, 1989. The deposit check was given to one of the Respondent's associates on that Thursday evening. The deposit check was not delivered to Respondent until after business hours on Friday, August 11. The check was deposited into Respondent's escrow account on Monday, August 14. Under the circumstances, there was no undue delay in depositing the escrow money on this transaction. During the audit, Petitioner's investigator determined that Respondent was holding deposits on two separate rental properties in his escrow account. At the time of the audit, Petitioner's investigator was not provided with any leases or other documentation regarding these transactions even though Respondent was supposed to produce records for all sums in the escrow account. Respondent contends that he did not realize he was supposed to produce his rental files, was never specifically asked to produce these files and did not know that Petitioner was questioning these transactions until he received the Administrative Complaint in this action. While there was apparently some miscommunication at the time of the audit, adequate documentation for these rental deposits was produced at the hearing. Therefore, Petitioner's allegation that Respondent did not maintain adequate documentation regarding these deposits is without merit. Petitioner has also charged that Respondent did not produce all of the deposit slips in connection with the escrow account and did not produce any evidence of reconciliation of the escrow account. The evidence at the hearing established that all deposit slips are available even though they were not all kept with the bank statements. Moreover, the evidence failed to substantiate the allegation that Respondent did not reconcile his escrow account. Thus, these charges were not substantiated. At the time of the audit, Respondent advised Petitioner's investigator that the escrow account included some commission money that had not yet been removed. In the past, Respondent would sometimes collect his commissions at the close of a transaction from the funds held in escrow. (Respondent no longer collects commissions in this manner.) In auditing Respondent's escrow account, Petitioner's investigator determined that there was an overage of approximately $8,178.17 in the account. Within thirty days of the completion of the audit, Respondent removed $7,500 of the overage which represented his commission on two previously closed transactions. While Respondent believed that the remaining amount of the overage was also his commission money, he refrained from removing any more money until completion of a year-end audit by his accountant. Respondent's records reflected a slight difference in the amount of the overage than the amount calculated by Petitioner during the audit. Respondent wanted to be absolutely certain that only the proper amount was removed from the escrow account. At the conclusion of the audit on September 18, 1989, Respondent signed an office inspection report form prepared by Petitioner which contained the following pre-printed statement: ...I certify that to the best of my knowledge all records pertaining to my sales escrow/trust account(s) and my rental property management account(s) have been provided to the investigator. The above violations are brought to my attention this date and thoroughly explained. I will take corrective action within thirty days and furnish photo/sketches of corrections and documents on the same... There is some confusion as to what additional documentation Respondent was expected to provide following the completion of the September, 1989 audit. Respondent did not believe he was required to provide any additional evidence to Petitioner or its investigator and no further documentation was provided by Respondent until Petitioner's investigator returned to his office in January of 1990. Petitioner's investigator returned to Respondent's office on January 17, 1990. At that time, $7500.00 of the overage had been removed from the escrow account. The remaining amount of the overage was removed later in January. It does not appear that Respondent provided Petitioner's investigator with copies of the rental agreements or the second contract in the Kerstin transaction during the January visit by Petitioner's investigator. Respondent contends that this information was never specifically requested. It is clear that communication between Respondent and Petitioner's investigator had deteriorated from bad to worse by the time of this January visit. There is no indication that Respondent ever used the escrow account for improper purposes or withdrew money from the escrow account for his own personal or business use. The Florida Real Estate Commission adopted new record keeping requirements regarding escrow accounts in July of 1989. The new rules require a written monthly reconciliation of a broker's escrow account. At the time of the audit, Respondent was not keeping the minimum written statement comparing broker's total liability with the reconciled bank balance of all trust accounts as required by the new rules. Even after the audit in September, Respondent did not keep the written reconciliations in the format required by the new rules. Respondent was reconciling the account on his computer.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Petitioner enter a Final Order finding Respondent not guilty of the allegations contained in Counts I and II of the Administrative Complaint, finding Respondent guilty of Counts III and IV and reprimanding him for minor and techinical violations of those counts and imposing a fine of $100.00. RECOMMENDED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 31st day of December, 1991. J. STEPHEN MENTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of December, 1991. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 90-3589 Both parties have submitted Proposed Recommended Orders. The following constitutes my rulings on each of the parties' proposed findings of fact. The Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact Proposed Finding Paragraph Number in the Findings of Fact of Fact Number in the Recommended Order Where Accepted or Reason for Rejection. Addressed in the preliminary statement. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 1. Adopted in pertinenet part in Findings of Fact 3. Rejected as irrelevant. Rejected as irrelevant. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 4. 7. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 5. 8. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 6. 9. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 7 and 8. 10. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 6. 11. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 6. 12. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 8 and 9. 13. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 8 and 9. 14. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 8 and 9. 15. Subordinate 23. to Findings of Fact 8, 9 and Subordinate to Findings of Fact 23. This subject is also addressed in paragraph 9 of the conclusions of law. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 10. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 10. 19. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 11. 20. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 13. 21. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 13. 22. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 13. 23. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 14. 24. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 14. 25. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 15. 26. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 15. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 16. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 17. Rejected as not established by competent susbstantial evidence. The subject matter is addressed in Findigns of Fact 17. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 19 and 20. Rejected as not established by competent substantial evidence. The subject matter is addressed to some degree in Findings of Fact 21. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 21 and 22. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 21 and 25. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 20. Rejected as irrelevant. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 21. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 21. The Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact The Respondent's proposed findings of fact are not numbered. The numbers below refer to the numerical sections contained in the findings of fact section of Respondent's Proposed Recommended Order. Proposed Finding Paragraph Number in the Findings of Fact of Fact Number in the Recommended Order Where Accepted or Reason for Rejection. The first two sentences are adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 6-9. The second two sentences are rejected as irrelevant. This subject matter is addressed in some degree in Findings of Fact 21. The last sentence is rejected as constituting argument rather than a finding of fact. The first two sentencess are subordinate to Findings of Fact 10. The next two sentences are adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 11. The last sentence is rejected as constituting argument rather than a finding of fact. The first two sentence are adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 13. The third sentence is rejected as constituting argument rather than a finding of fact. The first three sentences are adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 14. The last sentence is rejected as constituting argument rather than a finding of fact. The first two sentences are adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 15. The last sentence is rejected as constituting argument rather than a finding of fact. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 16. The first sentence is adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 17. The second sentence is rejected as vague. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 17 and 25. The first three sentences are adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 18, 19 and 22. The fourth sentence is rejected as not established by competent substantial evidence. This subject matter is addressed in part in Findings of Fact 19. The fifth and sixth sentences are rejected as constituting argument rather than a finding of fact. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 25. COPIES FURNISHED: Janine B. Myrick, Esquire Senior Attorney Department of Professional Regulation Division of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street P. O. Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802 James P. Hudson 413 South Federal Highway Boynton Beach, Florida 33435 Darlene F. Keller Executive Director Department of Professional Regulation Division of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street P. O. Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802 Kenneth E. Easley, Esquire General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Suite 60 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792
The Issue Whether Respondent failed to preserve and maintain broker records in violation of Section 475.5015, Florida Statutes. Whether Respondent committed culpable negligence or breach of trust in any business transaction in violation of Subsection 475.25(1)(b), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a state licensing and regulatory agency charged with the duty to prosecute administrative complaints pursuant to the laws of the State of Florida, in particular, Section 20.30, Chapters 120, 455, and 475, and the rule promulgated thereto. Respondent is and was at all times material hereto a licensed real estate broker in the State of Florida, having been issued License No. 600642 in accordance with Chapter 475. The last license was issued to Respondent as a broker of Cascade Referral Service, Inc., 2439 Bee Ridge Road, Sarasota, Florida. At all times material, Respondent was the president and registered agent of Knightsbridge Park International (KPI), a corporation under the laws of Florida. At all times material, Respondent was the registered agent of an entity called Knightsbridge Vacation Homes (KVH). Between August 14, 1999, through May 21, 2001, Respondent was an active broker/officer of Knightsbridge Realty, Inc. (KRI). In the Fall of 1999, Sharon Malecki (Malecki), a resident of Wisconsin, met with Respondent's wife, Janet Wilkes, who was vice-president of KPI, to discuss engaging KPI's services in managing Malecki's property in Kissimmee, Florida. On or about February 14, 2000, as a result of this initial contact, Malecki entered into a contract with KPI to manage her property. Respondent signed the contract as president of KPI. The contract required Respondent and KPI to provide general management services to Malecki and to provide a monthly accounting showing all income and expenses for a period of one year commencing on March 1, 2000. The contract also required Malecki to keep a balance of $500 as a "management reserve balance." Respondent and KPI were required to deposit any amounts held in excess of the reserve amount in Malecki's bank account. Implicit in the monthly accounting requirement was that KPI and Respondent would collect the rental proceeds from Malecki's property and remit the proceeds to Malecki. At the same time the parties executed the contract, Malecki sent KPI a check for $500 to be kept in the escrow account for incidental maintenance and repairs of the property. Between August 10, 2000, and August 24, 2000, KPI placed a tenant by the name of "Plant" in Malecki's property and collected $1,214.29 in rent from the tenant. Between August 29, 2000, and September 12, 2000, KPI placed a tenant by the name of "Lusted" in Malecki's property and collected $1,309 in rental income funds from the tenant. The monthly accounting for August of 2000, purports to represent that KPI paid Malecki $616.42 toward the balance owed. Malecki never received this payment. Respondent failed to remit any of the above-referenced funds to Malecki. Respondent sent Malecki a letter dated November 7, 2000, in which he terminated the management contract and promised to send Malecki a final accounting "as soon as possible." On or about January 2, 2001, Respondent sent Malecki a letter, in which he acknowledged that there had been a "major accounting breakdown." In the letter, Respondent promised to make an interim payment within the next week. Subsequent to receipt of the two letters, Malecki made various attempts to obtain an accounting of the rental proceeds due. Respondent never remitted nor accounted for the funds. At all times material, Respondent failed to account for the $500 deposit he held for the benefit of Malecki. In June of 1999, a real estate broker by the name of John Young (Young) referred Isabel Benitez (Benitez) to Respondent after she bought a home through Young. On or about June 23, 1999, Benitez signed a contract with Respondent to manage her property located at 7981 Magnolia Bend Court, Kissimmee, Florida. The contract period was for one year and was renewed for an additional year in June of 2000. Although structured in the form of a lease, there was a clear understanding that KPI and Respondent were performing property management services and were obligated to pay a guaranteed amount to Benitez every month. The contract required Benitez to place a $500 deposit with Respondent and KPI as a "management deposit" to be used for incidental expenses associated with the management of the property. In approximately August of 2000, Benitez stopped receiving monthly payments from KPI. During the latter part of 2000, Benitez made various attempts to contact Respondent to determine the whereabouts of the monies due her. On or about December 14, 2000, Benitez sent Respondent a letter, in which she requested the monies due her under the contract. On or about December 15, 2000, Respondent faxed to Benitez a response to her letter, in which he accepts her termination of the contract and confesses that he had "not been involved in property management matters, let alone accounting aspects " On or about January 2, 2000, Respondent mailed to Benitez a letter informing her that there had been an "accounting breakdown," and promising to make an interim payment within a week. A review of an accounting provided to Benitez, dated February 9, 2001, indicates that Respondent owes Benitez funds in excess of $8,473. At all times material, Respondent has failed to remit the funds due or otherwise account for said funds. Around February of 2001, Thirza Neal (Neal), a resident of Washington, D.C., engaged the services of KRI to manage her property located at 114 Dornock Street, Davenport, Florida. Neal delivered a check for $1,000 to a Chris Turner (Turner), who was an agent of KRI, for the "start-up of utility costs." At some point, Neal decided not to engage the services of KRI, and on March 12, 2001, Neal sent an e-mail to Turner, in which she terminated the management contract and requested a return of her deposit. The above e-mail contains an indication that it was copied to the attention of Respondent. On or about March 26, 2001, Neal sent a certified letter to Respondent demanding a return of the deposit. On or about March 28, 2001, Neal received a letter from a gentleman by the name of B.C. Murphy, referencing her letter to Turner, denying that the check had been deposited into KRI's account and informing Neal that he had purchased KRI during the previous year. Eventually, Neal determined that the bank had inadvertently deposited the check into KVH's account. Neal made several attempts to contact Respondent personally and through his attorney and received no response. Neal was eventually able to obtain a reimbursement from the bank. Respondent neither provided assistance to Neal, nor did he remit the funds on his own accord. At some point later, Petitioner began an investigation and David Guerdan (Guerdan) was assigned to investigate the case. During the course of his investigation, Guerdan conducted interviews of the complaining witnesses and Respondent. On or about September 26, 2001, Guerdan conducted an interview of Respondent. During the course of the interview, Respondent was unable to address the specifics of the complaints. Respondent told Guerdan that he was not involved in the day-to-day operations of the business. He stated that his wife and son actually ran the business and that they had "poor accounting practices, overspent and ran out of the money." During the interview, Respondent could not be specific as to the amounts due each owner. Guerdan was unable to determine whether Respondent paid the funds due to each owner.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that The Florida Real Estate Commission issue a final order finding Respondent guilty of violating Subsections 475.25(1)(a) and (e) and Section 475.5015, as charged in the Administrative Complaint; and Impose a fine of $1,000 and suspend Respondent's license for a period of two years and require Respondent to make restitution to his former clients and complete a 45-hour salesperson's post-licensure course, as prescribed by the Florida Real Estate Commission. DONE AND ENTERED this 22nd day of August, 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DANIEL M. KILBRIDE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of August, 2003. COPIES FURNISHED: Christopher J. De Costa, Esquire Department of Business and Professional Regulation 400 West Robinson Street, Suite N801 Orlando, Florida 32801-1772 Brian John Wilkes 55 Pacific Close Southampton, England SO143TY Nancy P. Campiglia, Acting Director Division of Real Estate Department of Business and Professional Regulation 400 West Robinson Street Suite 802, North Orlando, Florida 32801 Hardy L. Roberts, III, General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2202
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following relevant facts are found: On July 31, 1973, petitioner submitted to respondent its application to organize and operate a new banking facility in St. Cloud, Osceola County, Florida. A filing date of August 20, 1973, was assigned by respondent. Accompanying the application was a long and detailed Economic Survey dated June, 1973, containing economic information and statistics pertaining to the City of St. Cloud and its environs. By letter dated October 26, 1973, the management of the Sun Bank of St. Cloud, the only bank existing in St. Cloud, opposed the establishment of petitioner's proposed bank, citing as grounds therefore the present economic conditions and the limited economic growth prospects for the St. Cloud area. By letter dated February 20, 1974, The First National Bank of Kissimmee protested the granting of a charter for any new bank in Osceola County, contending that "additional banks could only dilute the deposits of the existing banks, and this would not be in the areas' interest." An investigation of petitioner's application was conducted by Frank C. Dobson, a state bank examiner for respondent, on February 19, 1974. By a report dated February 22, 1974, Mr. Dobson recommended disapproval of the application on the ground that three of the five factors were considered unfavorable. Mr. Dobson considered the factor of "financial history, condition of the bank, and fixed assets" to be favorable, as well as the factor of "adeqeacy of capital." Considered unfavorable were future earnings prospects," "general character of management" and "convenience and needs of the community." In contrast to the petitioner's original estimate of total deposits in the amount of $10,000,000.00 at the end of its third year of operation, Examiner Dobson projected deposits of only $6,000,000.00 at the end of the third year and therefore concluded that petitioner would not achieve a profitable position. Based upon his observation that the originally proposed chief executive officer, Mr. John J. Jenkins, might possibly he unable to await favorable action on petitioner's application and that the proposed Vice President and Cashier, Mr. Robert J. McTeer, would need supervision and guidance, Mr. Dobson considered the factor of "general character of management" unfavorable. After a brief resume of each of the proposed directors and officers, Dobson concluded that each was considered "satisfactory" with the exception of McTeer, who was considered only "fair." The unfavorable rating on the factor of "convenience and needs of the community" was based upon Dobson's opinion that the proposed site did not appear conducive to convenient service, the existing bank in St. Cloud was completing a new facility which would provide adequate service for its customers and a national bank application was pending. On October 16, 1974, Fred O. Dickinson, Jr., then State Commissioner of Banking, issued his conditional approval order on petitioner's application. This order indicates that a change in location of petitioner's proposed bank was made and that M. Raymond Daniel was designated as president. Mr. Daniel accepted the conditions on October 18, 1974. In January of 1975, present Comptroller Gerald A. Lewis revoked the conditional approval of Mr. Dickinson. An updated economic survey dated April of 1975 was submitted to respondent on behalf of petitioner. An update investigation was conducted by State Bank Examiner Fred H. Brannen, Jr. on May 21, 1975. Mr. Brannen reviewed the file and found as favorable the factors of "financial history, condition of the bank and fixed assets" and "adequacy of capital." Listed as "borderline-favorable" was the factor of "general character of management." Brannen agreed with the projected figures of the original examiner, Mr. Dobson, and thus reported the factor of "future earnings prospects" as unfavorable. Mr. Brannen found the factor of "convenience and needs of the community" to be unfavorable, noting that the proposed site appeared to be somewhat removed from the existing businesses, Sun Bank of St. Cloud had completed its new facility and planned to use its old building as a remote facility and that the proposed national bank was rejected by regulatory authorities. Based upon his examination, Mr. Brannen concurred with the original recommendation of disapproval. On April 1, 1975, the Sun Bank of St. Cloud filed with respondent its application for authority to open a remote facility at 1001 New York Avenue in St. Cloud. A Comptroller's Conference was held in regard to this application on August 8, 1975, and respondent granted approval for the remote facility on or about September 25, 1975. On June 10, 1975, a Comptroller's Conference was held for the purpose of updating and culminating the investigation of petitioner's application. By a supplement dated June, 1975, petitioner presented additional data concerning existing financial institutions in Osceola County and in six other counties with similar populations as Osceola County. No protestants of the application appeared at this conference. On June 20, 1975, respondent received from the Sun Bank of St. Cloud a 37-page booklet containing comments relating to petitioner's application. It was Sun Bank's conclusion that public convenience and advantage would not be promoted by the establishment of petitioner's bank and that local conditions did not assure reasonable promise of successful operation for petitioner and those banks already established in the community. It appears that petitioner has changed the proposed location of its bank several times since submitting its original application. At the Comptroller's Conference on June 10th, the proposed site was described to be at the intersection of New York Avenue with U.S. Highway 192/441 In its Comments regarding petitioner's application, Sun Bank describes the location formerly proposed the intersection of Neptune Road and U.S. Highway 192/441. This is also the site discussed in the reports of both examiners. 13.. In August of 1975, petitioner presented to respondent a Supplemental Summary relevant to petitioner's application versus the Sun Bank's application for authority to open a remote facility in St. Cloud. On November 17, 1975, Comptroller Lewis concluded that petitioner's proposal did not meet the requirements of F.S. s659. 03(2). As grounds therefore, the Comptroller cited the following: ... The primary service area had a 1970 population of 10,000; the applicants estimate that the service area has a current population of 16,000. The proposed bank's site is approximately .4 of a mile from the existing bank in St. Cloud. The proposed bank would not appear to be any more convenient for the residents of St. Cloud than the existing bank. The applicants have made some showing that the proposed bank would have some pro-competitive advantage for the residents of St. Cloud. However, the banks in Kissimmee are accessible by some of the St. Cloud residents. For this reason, the issue of a monopoly in the existing St. Cloud bank is not as compelling as it might otherwise be. On balance, it appears that the public convenience and advantage would be promoted to some extent by the establishment of the proposed bank, although the case is not an overwhelming one. As shown above, the population base of the service area is fairly small and future growth is not expected to be significant. The population of St. Cloud increased by less than 1,000 persons between 1960 and 1970. The existing bank in St. Cloud had total deposits, as of June 30, 1975, of less than $20 million and its total deposits during the last two calendar years increased by less than $4 million. It appears that local conditions do not assure reasonable promise of successful operation of the proposed bank and the existing banks. On the basis of the foregoing, the Comptroller has concluded that, while the first criterion may be met in this case, the second criterion is not met. Therefore, the application is denied. Since the conclusion renders the other four criteria moot, the Comptroller has not reached any conclusions with respect to those other four criteria." Four banks, all members of various statewide holding companies, presently exist in Osceola County. There is one bank, the intervenor herein, in St. Cloud, which bank also has a remote facility in St. Cloud, and there are three banks in Kissimmee, which is eight to ten miles west of St. Cloud. Petitioner's proposed primary service area is defined to be the City of St. Cloud and its environs. Its general service area is defined to be all of Osceola County. Population estimates by witnesses for petitioner and for the intervenor differed. Petitioner estimated the present population of the general service or trade area to be slightly in excess of 41,000, while figures contained in the booklet entitled "Florida Estimates of Population" show Osceola County to have an estimated population of 36,668 as of July 1, 1975. The petitioner estimates the primary service area population to be in excess of 16,000, and this figure was not disputed by the intervenor. In fact, in its application for a remote facility, the intervenor stated that the "Osceola Planning Commission is projecting that the population of the St. Cloud trade area will increase to approximately 45,000 by 1990." As of the 1975 year end, the intervenor Sun Bank, the existing bank In St. Cloud, had total deposits of $21,210,955.50. During the first quarter of 1976, total deposits increased by over $1,600,000.00 at Sun Bank. Over the past five years, deposits at Sun Bank have doubled. The three Kissimmee banks have a combined total of over $40,000,000.00 in deposits. Net profits at the end of 1975 for the existing four banks in the County were as follows: approximately $286,000.00 for the First National Bank of Kissimmee; $216,198.87 for Sun Bank of St. Cloud; $22,359.66 for the Exchange Bank of Osceola; and a figure of minus $56,231.32 for the Flagship Bank of Kissimmee. The Flagship Bank opened in 1974 in a modular unit and moved into a new facility in its second year Using twenty-four factors to measure the economic growth rating of Osceola County, Mr. William C. Payne, a bank marketing consultant, rated said County along with six other counties of similar size. Osceola was rated second, preceded only by Citrus County. The Comparative Figures Report for December 31 1975, as compared with December 31, 1974, shows the following percentages for Osceola County and statewide: OSCEOLA STATEWIDE TOTAL LOANS 12.8+ 4.7- TOTAL TIME DEPOSITS 20.1+ 7.5+ TOTAL DEMAND DEPOSITS 0.4- 2.0- TOTAL DEPOSITS 10.1+ 3.3+ The presidents of three of the four existing banks appeared and testified as protestants to petitioner's application. The presidents of Flagship and First National in Kissimmee felt that a new bank in St. Cloud would have an adverse effect upon them because they each have a number of customers who are residents of St. Cloud. First National estimates that it has 200 customers from St. Cloud representing approximately $500,000.00 in deposits. Sun Bank recognized than most of petitioner's customers would be derived from Sun's bank, and estimated that probably one million dollars in deposits would be lost to petitioner, thus reducing Sun's profit figures. Sun opened its remote facility in St. Cloud in December of 1975 and First National submitted its application for a remote or branch facility in St. Cloud in January of 1976. Due to financial backing and management expertise and assistance, all three presidents felt that a holding company bank, as opposed to an independent bank, would have a better chance of success in St. Cloud. Flagship pays over $14,000.00 per year as a member of a holding company, while Sun and First National each pay approximately $90,000.00 per year. Sun Bank felt that a certain bank could exist in St. Cloud and that it would, in fact, promote competition. All three presidents noted that 1974 and 1975 were lean years for banking, but that loan demands and total deposits were now increasing. As noted above, petitioner's proposed new bank is to be independently owned and operated at the corner of U.S. Highway 192/441 and New York Avenue in St. Cloud. This downtown intersection provides the only permanent stop light on the main thoroughfare through St. Cloud, and the site provides easy access from either the east/west direction of the main highway or the north/south direction of New York Avenue. It should be noted again that this proposed site is not the same site reviewed by the two state bank examiners in their reports nor by the Sun Bank in its Comments submitted to respondent in June 1975. There was no evidence that the proposed name of petitioner's new bank -- Public Bank of St. Cloud -- would create any conflict or confusion with the name of any other existing bank. There is no evidence in the record that petitioner's proposed capital structure is other than adequate. Its total capitalization is proposed to be $1,000,000.00 and its deposits are estimated to be $7,000,000.00 at the end of the third year of operation. Mr. Payne's updated June, 1976, survey (Exhibit 13) contains drawings and details of petitioner's proposed banking house quarters. The physical structure will promote convenience to customers and the proposed costs are sufficient and reasonable. Security and Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation requirements have been met. Petitioner's proposed Board of Directors consists of ten men. Included therein are attorneys, bankers, cattlemen, a physician, a pharmacist, a University of Florida athletic director and those engaged in real estate development and sales. While some directors do not reside in St. Cloud, others have lived there for years, with one director claiming to have some 1,200 blood relatives in the area. Two of the proposed directors, one of which is the proposed chief executive office, has previously been involved with newly chartered banks. At least three of the proposed directors presently serve as directors of other banks in Florida. The proposed president, Mr. Raymond Daniel, will move to St. Cloud and will devote all his time to his duties as president and director. Two of the proposed directors, one of which is the largest shareholder and the other of which is the proposed vice president and cashier, have suits pending against them for considerable amounts of money. One has a judgment against him in the amount of approximately $40,000.00, and the presidents of two banks in Osceola County testified that his reputation in the community as a businessman was not good.
Recommendation Based upon the findings of fact and conclusions of law recited above, it is recommended that respondent disapprove petitioner's application to organize and operate a state banking facility in St. Cloud for the reason that petitioner, while showing that it satisfies all other criteria, has failed to illustrate that all its officers and directors possess sufficient ability and standing to assure a reasonable promise of successful operation. It is further recommended that such disapproval be without prejudice to petitioner to file with the respondent, if it so desires, within fifteen days of respondent's final order, an amended list of directors and/or officers and that respondent render a decision upon this criterion within twenty days from the filing thereof. Respectfully submitted and entered this 30th day of July, 1976, in Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE D. TREMOR Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Honorable Gerald A. Lewis Comptroller State of Florida The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32304 Mr. Clyde M. Taylor TAYLOR, BRION, BUKER & GREENE, P.A. P.O. Box 1796 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Attorney for Petitioner Mr. Nicholas Yonclas AKERMAN, SENTERFITT & EIDSON Box 231 Orlando, Florida 32802 Attorney for Intervenor Mr. Earl Archer The Comptroller's Office State of Florida The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32304 Attorney for Respondent ================================================================= AGENCY FINAL ORDER ================================================================= STATE OF FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF BANKING AND FINANCE DIVISION OF BANKING PUBLIC BANK OF ST. CLOUD (proposed new bank), Petitioner. vs. CASE NO. 76-088 STATE OF FLORIDA, DIVISION OF BANKING, Respondent, SUN BANK OF ST. CLOUD, Intervenor. /
