The Issue Whether Petitioner was an employee of Respondent's at the time of the alleged unlawful employment practices described in the employment discrimination complaint Petitioner filed with the Florida Commission on Human Relations (FCHR).
Findings Of Fact Based on the evidence adduced at hearing, and the record as a whole, the following findings of fact are made to supplement and clarify the extensive factual stipulations set forth in the parties' Joint Prehearing Stipulation and their October 13, 2008, pleading2: Petitioner is a college graduate with a communications degree. She has held a Florida life, variable annuity, and health insurance agent (2-15) license issued by the Department of Financial Services since March 8, 2005. Respondent's home office is located in Omaha, Nebraska. At all times material to the instant case, Respondent had a divisional office located at 2240 Woolbright Road, Suite 400, Boynton Beach, Florida (Boynton Beach Office) staffed by a general manager (Michael Chojnacki), a district sales manager (Ronald Green), and two secretaries (Victoria Hughes and Carolyn Mickley). Mr. Chojnacki, Mr. Green, Ms. Hughes, and Ms. Mickley were salaried employees of Respondent's paid by check issued by the home office. They enjoyed employee benefits that included vacation time; sick leave; health, vision, and dental coverage; disability and life insurance; and a retirement plan. These benefits were described in an employee handbook that were given to each of Respondent's employees. Mr. Chojnacki was responsible for overseeing the day- to-day operations of the Boynton Beach Office, including insurance application review and processing and agent recruitment. In late March 2005, Petitioner contacted Mr. Chojnacki by telephone to inquire about the possibility of her becoming an insurance agent for Respondent. Thereafter, on April 1, 2005, Petitioner went to the Boynton Beach Office and met with Mr. Chojnacki. Mr. Chojnacki talked to Petitioner about what she needed to do to become an agent for Respondent and how agents were compensated. He explained that Respondent paid its agents on a commission-only basis, based on the amount of business they produced for Respondent. During her April 1, 2005, visit to the Boynton Beach Office, Petitioner executed a Statement of Qualifications-Agent Candidate form (referenced in the parties' Stipulations of Fact 9 and 10) with which Mr. Chojnacki had provided her. The form, which sought "[j]ust basic information" about the candidate, contained the following disclaimer and acknowledgement: This is a statement of qualifications to become contracted as an agent and is not an application of employment. * * * I understand that if contracted as an agent, this document, the agent's contract, the training materials I may receive, and any other manuals and documents, are not contracts of employments. Further, if contracted with the Mutual of Omaha Insurance Company as an independent contractor, I may terminate the agent’s contract with or without cause, at any time, as may Mutual of Omaha Insurance Company. Mr. Chojnacki subsequently e-mailed Petitioner and requested that she complete a career profile test (designed to measure how Petitioner "would do in the insurance and in the sales industry"). Petitioner scored a ten out of 19 on the test, sufficient to keep her candidacy for an agent position alive. Mr. Chojnacki thus sent the Statement of Qualifications-Agent Candidate form Petitioner had executed on April 1, 2005, to the home office for processing. A background check on Petitioner was then done. The background check revealed nothing in Petitioner's past that would disqualify her from becoming an agent for Respondent. After learning that the home office had cleared her, Mr. Chojnacki gave to Petitioner for her to study various booklets Respondent had developed for its agents to educate them about its product offerings. At the beginning of each booklet was the following statement: As an independent contractor, the ultimate decision regarding your participation in these programs is yours and yours alone. Neither Mutual of Omaha nor its representatives can dictate the time or place and manner by which you sell its products and acquire the knowledge and skills necessary to effectively sell its products. Therefore, the Career Development Program is voluntary. However, due to the complexity and sophistication of the companies' products, you must be able to demonstrate a mastery of the material contained in this program to be able to offer these products to prospective clients. This program has been developed to offer a structured methodology which has proven to be a highly effective way to master the knowledge and skills to sell our products. In addition, it is our judgment that this method provides an efficient approach to achieve the required mastery and, therefore, we recommend it. Discussion and follow-up from your manager does not change the voluntary nature of your participation, but only serves to assist you in mastering the material and enables the companies to fulfill [their] public obligation to ensure that all representatives are fully trained and knowledgeable. Each booklet Mr. Chojnacki provided to Petitioner had a unique identifying serial number and included a corresponding tear-out test answer sheet with the same unique identifying serial number to be used to answer questions concerning material covered in the booklet. After reading the booklets and answering the questions posed therein, Petitioner furnished Mr. Chojnacki with her completed test answer sheets (which she had torn from the booklets). Mr. Chojnacki then faxed these answer sheets to the home office to be graded. He subsequently received an e-mail from the home office advising him that Petitioner had received passing grades on all of the tests. After receiving this e-mail, Mr. Chojnacki met with Petitioner "to get her ready" to become an agent. During the meeting, he again discussed with Petitioner Respondent's commission-only, production-based compensation program for agents, including the opportunities available to agents to receive bonuses in addition to their base commissions. He further informed her that, as an agent, she would be an independent contractor who "gets paid off a 1099." On April 11, 2005, Petitioner received a copy of Respondent's Agency Sales Compliance Manual (Manual), which gave an overview of the legal requirements applicable to the activities of agents in the sale of Respondent's products. On page 9 of the Manual was the following discussion regarding "Continuing Education": Mutual of Omaha encourages the professional development of producers through training and participation in industry organizations that promote ethical sales practices, as well as through the continuing education required to maintain a license. It is the policy of Mutual of Omaha to provide producers with insurance-related training, including training that qualifies for continuing education. Mutual of Omaha provides continuing education courses and makes continuing education courses available through a variety of methods. These methods include self-study courses through vendors, industry designation courses such as CLU, CFP, ChFC, LUTC and specialized training provided by Mutual of Omaha. As an independent contractor, it is your responsibility to ensure that continuing education requirements are satisfied, whether through training provided by Mutual of Omaha or independently taken training. If a license lapses or is cancelled, commission payments may be stopped until such time as the license is reinstated or a new license is obtained. Questions regarding continuing education should be directed to your Manager or the Home Office at (402)351-4949. Page 27 of the Manual contained the following advisement: In order to help ensure ethical market conduct practices, integrity and fair competition on the part of its producers, producers are prohibited from engaging in solicitation, marketing and sales practices that are illegal, unethical or contrary to the requirements established by Mutual of Omaha Insurance Company and its affiliates. At no time did Mr. Chojnacki give Petitioner a copy of Respondent's employee handbook. On April 11, 2005, Petitioner signed a W-9 (Request for Taxpayer Identification Number and Certification) form, an Internal Revenue Service (IRS) tax form that Respondent's agents are routinely given to sign. Petitioner also executed on that date Respondent's Errors and Omissions Agent Insurance Program form (referenced in the parties' Stipulations of Fact 15 and 16). The following statement appeared immediately above the signature line on the form: All agents are reminded that they are independent contractors under contract with the Company. As such, they are personally responsible for any claims, demands or lawsuits made by third parties arising from allegations of breach of contract, negligence or other wrongdoing on the part of the agent. The undersigned affirms that the foregoing is true, correct, and complete, and has read the "Enrollment Form Instructions" and understands same. On April 12, 2005, Petitioner was formally appointed as an agent for Respondent and United World Life Insurance Company, an affiliate of Respondent's. Petitioner and Mr. Chojnacki (on behalf of Respondent) signed an Agent's Contract (referred to in the parties' Stipulations of Fact 11 through 13 and 27 as the "Agent Agreement"), which had an effective date of April 27, 2005. Ms. Mickley then submitted the contract to the home office for signature. This was the only Agent's Contract that Petitioner signed. At no time did she sign another contract. Section B. of the Agent's Contract was entitled, "General Provisions," and provided, in pertinent part, as follows: Appointment. The Company [Respondent] appoints the Agent [Petitioner] to personally solicit and procure applications for Products and provide such service as may be required. This appointment is not exclusive. * * * 5. License. The Agent is responsible for securing and keeping in effect any licenses and appointments required to represent the Company. The Agent agrees not to solicit for Products unless the proper license has been obtained. * * * Section C. of the Agent's Contract described the "Agent's [d]uties" as follows: The Agent shall, in accordance with applicable Company rules: Procure Applications. Solicit and procure applications for Products. Submit Applications. Immediately submit to the Company applications procured. Collect Moneys. Collect all Moneys as trust funds and immediately turn them over to the Company without deduction. All Moneys are the property of the Company. Service Clients. Render all service incidental to the development and conservation of the Company's business which may be deemed necessary by the Company. Obtain Bond and Insurance. If requested by the Company, obtain and maintain in force: a bond covering fidelity losses; and errors and omissions insurance. The amount and nature of both must be satisfactory to the Company. Protect Proprietary Materials. Agent shall: Use Proprietary Material for authorized business purposes only. Agent is only authorized to obtain and use Proprietary Material which is necessary to perform [his or her] duties; Hold in the strictest confidence all Proprietary Material received and shall not disclose any Proprietary Material to any third party or parties without the prior written consent of the Company; Use appropriate safeguards commonly available, such as anti-virus, firewalls and encryption, to prevent use or disclosure of Proprietary Material. This shall include compliance with all existing and enacted laws and regulations; Report any incidents involving Proprietary Material to Mutual of Omaha's Field Assistance Center within 24 hours of discovery. All details of the incident should be provided so that Company can assess the scope and impact and take additional action as necessary to safeguard the information. Return any Proprietary Material received from the Company to the Company immediately upon termination of this Contract. Adequately brief [his or her] staff, if any, on the conditions documented in this Section. Follow Company Practices. Adhere to and comply with all Company practices and procedures. Act Ethically. At all times act in an ethical, competent and professional manner, including without limitation, with respect to any compensation disclosure obligations it may have governing its relationships with Clients. Comply with Laws. Comply with applicable laws and regulations. "Office [p]rivileges" were addressed in Section E. of the Agent's Contract, which provided as follows: The Company may provide for the Agent's use office facilities, supplies, clerical support and other property or services. The Company may withdraw or charge for these privileges at any time. In Section F. of the "Agent's Contract" was the following discussion regarding "[c]compensation": Attachments. The compensation of the Agent for all acts performed hereunder or otherwise during the term of this Contract, and for expenses incurred or property acquired, is specified in the Attachments. No compensation shall be payable until the Project on which compensation is claimed is actually issued. Compensation Continuance. The Company is obligated to pay compensation due under this Contract only while: this Contract is in effect; and the Agent is performing the duties specified in the Section entitled AGENT'S DUTIES; provided, however, compensation indicated as "vested" or "deferred" in the Attachments shall not be withheld pursuant to this provision. Agent's Account. Compensation payable under this Contract shall be subject to an offset for any indebtedness of the Agent to the Company and shall not be due until such indebtedness is satisfied. Such indebtedness shall include, but not be limited to: Chargeback of any compensation paid or credited to the Agent under this or any other contract, if the Moneys on which such compensation was based are not collected or are refunded by the Company; Any amount paid by the Company which, in the Company's determination, resulted from any fraud, misrepresentation or other improper conduct on the part of the Agent; Any expenses incurred by the Company on behalf of the Agent; Any advances made by the Company to the Agent; and Any other amounts which the Agent owes the Company. The Agent, shall upon request by the Company, immediately repay in full any indebtedness. Any amount remaining unpaid shall be subject to collection by such legal means as are available to the Company. The Company shall have the right to withhold payment of any credit balance in the Agent's account for not more than 13 months after termination of this Contract to assure that funds are available to reimburse the Company for any indebtedness. Thereafter, any net credit balance shall become due and payable. "Termination" was discussed in Section H. of the Agent's Contract, which provided as follows: With Notice. The Company or the Agent shall have the right at any time to terminate this Contract, with or without cause, by written notice to the other party. Without Notice. This Contract shall be automatically terminated should the Agent fail to submit an application for a Product for a period of 180 days. Procedural Guidelines. The Company may from time to time adopt procedural guidelines applicable to agent contract terminations. Adoption of these guidelines and any failure to observe them shall neither grant any rights to the Agent, nor impose any duties upon the Company and shall not be deemed to limit the Company's rights as set forth in this Contract. Return of Material. Upon termination of this Contract, the Agent shall immediately return to the Company all: Proprietary Material, material identifying the Agent as a representative of the Company, and property owned by the Company. Forfeiture. If the Agent is notified in writing that the Agent has: Committed a fraudulent or illegal act in conjunction with any transaction under this Contract; or violated any provisions of the Section entitled LIMITATIONS or UNACCEPTABLE PRACTICES; then the Company shall not be obligated to pay any compensation otherwise payable while this Contract is effect, or after its termination. Section I. of the Agent's Contract contained "[m]iscellaneous" items, including the following: * * * 4. Determination of Issuance and Product Type. The determination to issue a Product and the type of Product to be issued shall be at the Company's sole discretion. * * * Award, Recognition and Incentive Programs. If eligible, the Agent may participate in award, recognition and incentive programs of the Company. The Agent agrees to abide by the rules of each program. The Company reserves the right to change, limit or cancel any program, rule or award at any time. In such event, the Agent may not be able to obtain certain awards. Beneficiary Designation. The Agent designates as beneficiary for payment of any benefits becoming due after the Agent's death the beneficiary specified on the signature page of this Contract or such other party or parties as the Agent may designate by written notice delivered to and acknowledged by the Company. Independent Contractor. The Agent is an independent contractor and not an employee. None of the terms of this Contract shall be construed as creating an employer-employee relationship and the Agent shall be free to exercise the Agent's own judgment as to the persons from whom the Agent will solicit and the time, place and manner and amount of such solicitation. "[T]he beneficiary specified on the signature page of [Petitioner's Agent] Contract" was her mother. Petitioner's Agent's Contract included an Interim Sales and Marketing Amendment, also effective April 27, 2005, signed by Petitioner and Mr. Chojnacki, which, on its first page, provided as follows: The Company and Agent agree to place Agent in an "Interim Sales and Marketing" status. The terms and conditions are as follows: PURPOSE The Company and Agent agree to the terms and conditions of this Amendment in order that both the Company and Agent may determine whether to continue their association under the terms of the Contract. EFFECTIVE DATE This Amendment shall become effective on the date the Contract becomes effective. TERMINATION This Amendment shall remain in effect a minimum of seven days. Thereafter, this Amendment shall automatically terminate upon: Cancellation of the Contract; Notice given from the Company to Agent; or, The acceptance of the Career Financing Plan Amendment (211) or (235). TERM If this Amendment has not been terminated in accordance with Section III of this Amendment within 90 days after the effective date of the Contract, the Contract, and all other Amendments, shall automatically terminate. MISCELLANEOUS While this Amendment is in effect, Agent is not eligible for any other compensation, except as specifically set forth in the Schedules which are a part of the Contract. The Agent's Contract and Interim Sales and Marketing Amendment that Petitioner executed are standard instruments used by Respondent in contracting with its agents. During the time that the Interim Sales and Marketing Amendment is in effect, an agent engages in "real job sampling" by observing a mentor make sales, and he or she may also make sales of his or her own. Petitioner was mentored initially (for the first seven to ten days) by Mr. Green and thereafter by Mr. Chojnacki. The Interim Sales and Marketing Amendment remained in effect until June 10, 2005, when Petitioner and Respondent executed a Career Financing Plan Amendment (as part of Petitioner's Agent's Contract). The Career Financing Plan is a three-year program devised by Respondent to help its new agents "build their business[es]." It provides for bonus payments "on top of the base commission that an agent gets," if monthly production requirements are met. An agent not wanting "to be tied to any of [these] production requirements" can decline to participate in the program. Other attachments, in addition to the Career Financing Plan Amendment, that were made a part of Petitioner's Agent's Contract, included an Agent Prospecting Amendment, a New Agent Computer Equipment Allowance Schedule, an Agent Production Bonus Schedule, and a 2005+ Deferred Compensation Schedule. The Agent Prospecting Amendment was signed by Petitioner and Mr. Chojnacki and had an effective date of June 10, 2005. It read, in pertinent part, as follows: SOURCES OF CREDIT In order to provide the Agent with prospect information, the Agent and Company agree that credits to acquire prospecting related materials and services may be accumulated in an Agent Prospecting Account. The Company may discontinue or modify the sources and amounts of credit provided by the Company upon notice to the Agent. Credits may be used only for prospecting activities authorized by the Company. Any credits which remain unused at the time the Contract or this Amendment are cancelled shall be forfeited by the Agent. NON-REFUNDABLE PARTICIPATION FEE The Agent authorizes the Company to deduct a non-refundable Participation Fee directly from compensation due the Agent in an amount and frequency as set forth in the Agent Prospecting Schedule. Company may deduct the Participation Fee up to 30 days following written notice by Agent to the Company to terminate this Agreement. The New Agent Computer Equipment Allowance Schedule provided for the receipt of, for a maximum of 12 months, "a [monthly] credit [of either $75 or $100] to help the Agent defray computer equipment and other start-up expenses incurred based on the Agent's performance." Under the schedule, if minimum monthly production requirements were not met, no credits would be received. The "purpose" of the Production Bonus was "to reward Agents based on their Manufactured Product production." The Agent Production Bonus Schedule set forth the applicable Production Bonus Rates for different levels of production over a threshold amount. The 2005+ Deferred Compensation Schedule implemented Respondent's Deferred Compensation program, pursuant to which Respondent made "contributions . . . dependent on the production that an agent ha[d] during a given calendar year." On October 19, 2005, Petitioner signed a Coventry Medicare Part D Plan Addendum form (referenced in the parties' Stipulation of Fact 31) and faxed the form to Respondent's "Sales Support" for processing. Among the form's provisions was the following: Independent Contractor. Nothing in this Addendum will be construed to create a relationship of employer-employee between Producer [Petitioner] and Coventry or Distributor [Respondent]. Producer will be free to, and is required to, exercise his/her independent judgment in performance of this Addendum and with respect to which Medicare Part D plans Producer will offer to Medicare Part D enrollees and potential enrollees based upon Producer's judgment as to the needs of such enrollee or potential enrollee. The termination of Petitioner's Agent's Contract (referenced in the parties' Stipulation of Fact 40) was accomplished by Petitioner's submitting the following letter, dated February 10, 2006, to Mr. Chojnacki: It is with deep regret that I resign as of February 10, 2006. I have to move on with my career. I want to sincerely thank you for all your help. Mr. Chojnacki responded by sending Petitioner the following letter, also dated February 10, 2006: This is to acknowledge receipt of your letter terminating your Mutual of Omaha Insurance Company Agent's Contract effective February 10, 2006. Your authorizations to represent Mutual of Omaha Insurance Company and its affiliated companies have also been cancelled effective February 10, 2006. The balances of your agent's statement may be affected by additional entries necessary to finalize pending business. You will continue to receive statements on a regular basis as in the past. As soon as the balances have stabilized, any net credit balance will be released in accordance with the provisions of Paragraph F3(c) of your contract. If your agent's statements presently reflect a debit balance or if a debit balance arises in the future, you are required to repay this amount immediately. Failure on your part to repay any debt balance will result in further action to collect debit balance. All client and prospect information, materials and supplies are the property of Mutual of Omaha Insurance Company. You are required by Paragraph H4 of your contract to return such material immediately. At no time during the period that her Agent's Contract was in effect (April 27, 2005, through February 10, 2006, hereinafter referred to as the "Contract Period") did Petitioner receive a salary or any of the employee benefits enjoyed by Mr. Chojnacki, Mr. Green, Ms. Hughes, and Ms. Mickley. Although she had Respondent-issued life and disability insurance policies, these policies were not given to her as an employee benefit. She had to pay for this coverage. On her application for the disability insurance policy she obtained from Respondent, in response to the question, "Are you Self-Employed, a Sole Proprietor, or a partner in a Partnership," she answered "yes." The only compensation Petitioner received from Respondent was in the form of commissions and other payments (including computer allowances) based solely on her production. The compensation checks she received from Respondent were prepared and signed at the Boynton Beach Office, not at Respondent's home office (where employee checks are cut). The amounts of these checks reflected deductions that were made by Respondent for items that Respondent had provided Petitioner or had paid for on her behalf, including postage, agent licenses, voicemail, errors and omissions insurance coverage, folders, business cards, and certain leads. The leads she paid for cost anywhere from ten to 25 dollars a lead. Petitioner did not have to pay for everything that she received from Respondent. Although it had a right to do so under Section E. of her Agent's Contract, Respondent did not charge Petitioner for the use of cubicle space and equipment at the Boynton Beach Office, nor for the company brochures and letterheads that were available to agents at the office. The 2005 and 2006 federal tax returns that Petitioner filed with the IRS were prepared by a Certified Public Accountant. For the 2005 tax year, on her IRS Form 1040, Petitioner reported $0 for "[w]ages, salaries, and tips" (line 7), and $7,220 in "[b]usiness income" (line 12), and she deducted from her "total income" $510 for "[o]ne-half of self- employment tax" (line 27) and $1,243 for "[s]elf-employed health insurance" (line 29). She included a Schedule C (Profit and Loss From Business-Sole Proprietorship) and a Schedule SE (Self- Employment Tax) with her IRS Form 1040. On her Schedule C, Petitioner identified her "[p]rincipal business or profession" as "[i]nsurance [a]gencies & [b]rokerages"; represented that her business address was the same as her home address (which was on her IRS Form 1040); and reported that her "[g]ross income" was $18,758 (line 7), and that she had "[c]ar and truck expenses" of $6,305 (line 9), an "[o]ffice expense" of $1,488 (line 18), and "[o]ther expenses" of $3,745 (line 27), for a total of $11,538 in business expenses (line 28). The "[o]ther expenses" she reported (on line 27) were broken down as follows: "Business Telephone"- $3,549; and license fees and dues- $196. The IRS Form 1099 that Petitioner received from Respondent for the 2005 tax year reflected that she had received $18,757.99 in "nonemployee compensation" (which matches the "rounded up" amount of "[g]ross income" Petitioner reported on the Schedule C she filed for that tax year). For the 2006 tax year, on her IRS Form 1040, Petitioner reported $0 for "[w]ages, salaries, and tips" (line 7), and "1099 MISC OTHER INCOME" of $1,615. No entry was made for "[b]usiness income" (line 12). Petitioner deducted $114 from her "total income" for "[o]ne-half of self-employment tax" (line 27). She included a Schedule SE with her IRS Form 1040. The IRS Form 1099 that Petitioner received from Respondent for the 2006 tax year reflected that she had received $1,615.43 in "nonemployee compensation" (which matches the "rounded down" amount of "1099 MISC OTHER INCOME" Petitioner reported on the IRS Form 1040 she filed for that tax year). During the Contract Period, Petitioner was not required to work out of the Boynton Beach Office or to adhere to any Respondent-imposed work schedule. Training sessions were held by Mr. Chojnacki (usually on Mondays) at the office, but attendance at these meetings was not mandatory. Agents had to be present at the office to enjoy what was referred to as "floor time," where the agent would receive incoming telephone phone calls made to the office from prospects, without having to pay for these leads. "Floor time" was a privilege that agents could turn down. Petitioner averaged approximately two to three days of "floor time" a month. As an essential part of the work she performed for Respondent, Petitioner made sales calls to prospects in the field. At Petitioner's request, Mr. Chojnacki accompanied her on approximately four sales calls during the beginning of the Contract Period. After a while, Petitioner "start[ed] going on sales calls by herself." During the Contract Period, she went on more than 40 or 50 such solo sales calls. At no time was Petitioner required to go on sales calls with Mr. Chojnacki or any other company representative, nor did she need the approval of any company representative before she could make a sales call. There were occasions, when Petitioner was out on a sales call alone, that she telephoned Mr. Chojnacki to ask him a question about a technical matter or to express her excitement about having made a sale. Petitioner, however, was never told she had to maintain telephonic contact with Mr. Chojnacki or any other company representative while on sales calls. Petitioner and the other agents were allowed to advertise Respondent's products, but any advertisement they used had to be approved by the company. Respondent had "pre-approved advertising material that[] [was] on [its] company [intranet] website." Petitioner did not have an exclusive arrangement with Respondent that prevented her from representing other insurers during the Contract Period. She was not, what is referred to in the insurance business as, a "captive agent." While associated with Respondent, Petitioner was also appointed to act as an agent on behalf of John Alden Life Insurance Company, Humana Health Insurance Company, and Humana Medical Plan, Inc. (companies that were separate and distinct from Respondent).
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the FCHR issue a final order dismissing Petitioner's Complaint because she was not an employee of Respondent's at the time of the alleged unlawful employment practices described in the Complaint. DONE AND ENTERED this 29th day of December, 2008, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S STUART M. LERNER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of December, 2008.
Findings Of Fact Twenty-five feet high, 20 feet west of the right of way of State Road 79, about a half mile north of Interstate 10 in Holmes County, stands a sign advertising Simbo's Restaurant and Truck Stop. Because the sign is on the premises of the business it advertises, no sign permit is required. Since March 23, 1985, when the present owner acquired the property, it has spent substantial sums to operate the sign, which was originally erected some 15 years ago. It would cost about $100.00 to modify the sign so that all lights remained on the whole time the sign was lighted. Only when a DOT quality assurance team from Tallahassee raised the question did the present proceedings arise. As a result of the team's visit to northwest Florida, some 200 notices of violations went out to owners of "flashing" signs. On either side of the top (and largest) of five panels, neon script proclaims "Simbo's" in large letters rising diagonally from left to right. In smaller letters "STEAK" appears above and "SEA FOOD" below the name. While the sign is on, "Simbo's" remains lit, but "STEAK" and "SEA FOOD" are illuminated only intermittently. First "STEAK" but not "SEA FOOD" shines for two seconds, then "SEA FOOD" but not "STEAK" is on for two seconds, then both are lit for two seconds, then neither. Both are off for no more than two seconds. While this sequence repeats, blue bulbs bordering the top panel go on and off at intervals of unspecified duration. Milford C. Truett, DOT's acting outdoor advertising supervisor with responsibility for Holmes County, testified that a light is "flashing" if it is on or off for less than five seconds.
Recommendation It is, accordingly recommended that DOT dismiss the violation notice. RECOMMENDED this 20th day of July, 1990, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT T. BENTON, II Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of July, 1990. COPIES FURNISHED: Ben G. Watts, Secretary Attn: Eleanor F. Turner, MS #58 Dept. of Transportation Haydon Burns Building 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0458 Thornton J. Williams General Counsel Dept. of Transportation Haydon Burns Building 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0458 Vernon L. Whittier, Jr., Attorney Dept. of Transportation 605 Suwannee Street, MS #58 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0458 Frank G. Young Simbo's Restaurant & Truck Stop Bonifay, FL 32425
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondent, Margaret Louise Herget, committed the offenses alleged in an Amended Administrative Complaint issued by Petitioner, the Department of Financial Services, on December 9, 2005, and, if so, what penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact The Parties. Petitioner, the Department of Financial Services (hereinafter referred to as the "Department"), is the agency of the State of Florida charged with the responsibility for, among other things, the investigation and prosecution of complaints against individuals licensed to conduct insurance business in Florida. Ch. 626, Fla. Stat.1 Respondent Margaret Louise Herget was, at the times relevant, licensed in Florida as a general lines (property and casualty) insurance agent. Ms. Herget's license number is A117083. At the times relevant to this matter, the Department has had jurisdiction over Ms. Herget's insurance licenses and appointments. At the times relevant to this matter, Ms. Herget was the president and a director of A & M Insurance, Inc. (hereinafter referred to as "A&M"). A&M was incorporated in 1991 and has been operating as an insurance agency in Broward County, Florida. At the times relevant to this matter, A&M had a business bank account with Bank Atlantic of Ft. Lauderdale. Ms. Herget has been an authorized signatory on the account since 1998. At the times relevant to this matter, Ms. Herget maintained a contractual relationship with Citizens Insurance Company (hereinafter referred to as "Citizens"), an insurer. Pursuant to this contractual relationship, all applications and premiums for Citizens's products received by Ms. Herget were to be submitted to Citizens within five business days. Albert Herget. Albert Herget,2 Ms. Herget's husband until their marriage was dissolved in September 2003, also maintained a contractual relationship with Citizens. Mr. Herget, who was licensed as a general lines agent by the Department, was appointed by Citizens to write Citizens' property and casualty insurance. Mr. and Ms. Herget were both authorized signatories on A&M's bank account from 1998 until June 2003. Ms. Herget continued as the sole authorized signatory on the account after June 2003. Mr. Herget was also an officer of A&M until October 6, 2003, when he resigned. A&M was named after "Albert" & "Margaret" Herget. The evidence failed to prove that Mr. Herget was under the direct supervision and control of Ms. Herget. The evidence also failed to prove that Ms. Herget knew or should have known of any act by Mr. Herget in violation of Chapter 626, Florida Statutes. Count I: The Camp Transaction. In June 2002 Michael Camp and Rosemary Mackay-Camp went to A&M to purchase hazard, windstorm, and flood insurance. The Camps met with and discussed their needs with Mr. Herget. On or about June 11, 2002, the Camps paid $2,273.97 by check number 365 made out to "A & M Insurance" for "Flood, Wind & Home Insurance." The premium for the windstorm insurance amounted to $1,026.00. The check was given to Mr. Herget and was deposited in A&M's bank account on or about June 12, 2002. On or about June 11, 2002, the Camps were given a document titled "Evidence of Property Insurance," which indicated that they had purchased insurance on their home for the period June 14, 2002, through June 14, 2003. The windstorm insurance was to be issued by Citizens. Initials purporting to be those of Ms. Herget and a stamp of Ms. Herget's name and insurance license number appear in a box on the Evidence of Property Insurance form titled "Authorized Representative." Ms. Herget testified credibly that the initials were not placed there by her.3 There is also a notation, "Paid in Full Ck # 365" and "Albert," written in Mr. Herget's handwriting on the Evidence of Property of Insurance form. Mr. Herget also gave the Camps the note evidencing the receipt of their payment. The Camps, merchant marines, left the country after paying for the insurance they desired on their home and did not return until sometime in 2003. Upon their return they inquired about why their windstorm insurance had not been renewed and discovered that they had never been issued the windstorm insurance coverage they had paid A&M for in 2002. The Camps attempted several times to contact Ms. Herget by telephone. Their attempts were unsuccessful. They wrote a letter of inquiry to Ms. Herget on October 29, 2003. Ms. Herget did not respond to their inquiry. Having received no response to their inquiry of October 29, 2003, Mr. Camp wrote to Ms. Herget on or about December 5, 2003, and demanded that she either provide proof of the windstorm policy the Camps had paid for or refund the premium paid therefor. By letter dated December 11, 2003, Ms. Herget informed Mr. Camp of the following: We have determined that your policy was submitted to Citizen's (Formerly FWUA) and was never issued due to a request for additional information which was not received. Ultimately the application and funds were returned to our agency. Enclosed please find our agency check for 1026.00 representing total refund of premium paid. Please advise if we can be of further assistance. Enclosed with the letter was a full refund of the premium which the Camps had paid for the windstorm insurance they never received. The Camps accepted the refund. While the hazard and flood insurance purchased by the Camps had been placed by A&M, the windstorm insurance had not been placed, as acknowledged by Ms. Herget in her letter of December 11, 2003. A&M's bank records indicate that a check for the windstorm insurance in the amount of $1,026.00 was written to Citizens on or about June 14, 2002, but that the check had never been cashed. Although this explanation appears contrary to the explanation given by Ms. Herget to the Camps in her letter of December 11, 2003, neither explanation was refuted by the Department. More importantly, regardless of why the windstorm insurance purchased by the Camps was not obtained by A&M, the weight of the evidence suggests that the fault lies not with Ms. Herget, but with Mr. Herget, who actually dealt with the Camps. The evidence also proved that it was not until sometime in late 2003 that Ms. Herget learned of the error and, upon investigating the matter, ultimately refunded in-full the amount paid by the Camps. The evidence failed to prove that any demand was made by Citizens for the premium for windstorm paid by the Camps or that she willfully withheld their premium. Count II: The Cipully Transaction. Carol Cipully began purchasing homeowner's insurance from A&M in 1999. In July 2003 Ms. Cipully refinanced her home. She believed that her homeowner's insurance would continue after the refinancing with her current insurance carrier, Citizens, through A&M. First American Title Insurance Company (hereinafter referred to as "First American") handled the closing of the refinancing. First American was responsible for issuing a check to A&M after closing in payment for the homeowner's insurance policy. Closing took place July 23, 2003. By check dated July 30, 2003, First American paid $1,658.00 to A&M for Ms. Cipully's insurance coverage.4 Of this amount, $1,435.00 was for hazard insurance with Citizens and $223.00 was for flood insurance from Omaha Property and Casualty Insurance Company (hereinafter referred to as "Omaha Insurance"). The check was received and deposited in the bank account of A&M on August 4, 2003. An Evidence of Property Insurance form was issued by A&M for Ms. Cipully's insurance on or about July 25, 2003. The form was initialed by Ms. Herget. A month or so after the closing, a water leak, which had caused property damage, was discovered in Ms. Cipully's home. When she attempted to contact her homeowner's insurer she ultimately discovered that the premium payment made by First American had not been remitted to Citizens or Omaha Insurance by A&M and, therefore, she had no homeowner's insurance. Ms. Cipully contacted Ms. Herget by telephone and was assured by Ms. Herget that she had insurance.5 Ms. Cipully's daughter, Tina Cipully, attempted to resolve the problem with Ms. Herget on behalf of her mother. In response to Tina Cipully's inquiries, Ms. Herget, rather than look into the matter herself, informed Tina Cipully that proof need to be provided to her by or on behalf of Ms. Cipully that would prove that a premium check had been sent to A&M from First American. Tina Cipully attempted to comply with Ms. Herget's request, contacting First American. An employee of First American faxed a copy of the cancelled check for $1,658.00 to Tina Cipully.6 A copy of the Evidence of Property Insurance dated July 25, 2003, from A&M was also faxed by First American to Tina Cipully. Tina Cipully sent a copy of the check she received from First American to Ms. Herget. She also sent a copy of a HUD-1 statement. When she later spoke to Ms. Herget, however, Ms. Herget told her she could not read the documents. The evidence failed to prove that Ms. Herget received a legible copy of the check. The copy of the HUD-1 form, while not totally legible, did evidence that $1,658.00 was to be withheld for payment of insurance premiums. Despite the fact that the check in the amount shown on the HUD-1 statement had been deposited in A&M's bank account, Ms. Herget continued to insist that Ms. Cipully prove her entitlement to redress. Had she made any effort, Ms. Herget should have discovered that a check in the amount of $1,658.00 had been deposited in A&M's bank account on August 4, 2003. Three and a-half months after having received the First American check, Citizens, after verifying that First American had paid for hazard insurance on behalf of Ms. Cipully, contacted Ms. Herget and requested payment of Ms. Cipully's insurance premium. Six months after being notified by Citizens, Ms. Herget paid Citizens the $1,435.00 insurance premium A&M had received in August 2003. The payment was made by check dated May 28, 2004. Ms. Herget did not explain why it took six months after being notified that Ms. Cipully had indeed paid her insurance premium to pay Citizens. Omaha Insurance had not been paid the $223.00 premium received by A&M in August 2003 at the time of the final hearing of this matter. Ms. Herget failed to explain why. Count IV: The Parker Transaction. On March 20, 2004, Elric Parker, who previously purchased homeowner's insurance from Citizens through A&M, went to A&M to renew his policy. He gave Ms. Herget a check dated March 20, 2004, for $1,064.00 in payment of six months of coverage.7 Ms. Herget gave Mr. Parker a receipt dated March 20, 2004, for the payment. The check was endorsed by Ms. Herget and deposited into the banking account of A&M on or about March 22, 2004. After waiting approximately three months for the arrival of a renewal policy which Ms. Herget told Mr. Parker he would receive, Mr. Parker became concerned and decided to contact A&M. He was repeatedly assured, at least on one occasion by Ms. Herget, that the renewal policy would be received. Mr. Parker subsequently contacted representatives of Citizens directly and was informed by letter dated January 8, 2005, that his insurance with Citizens had been cancelled in April 2004 for non-payment of the $1,064.00 premium Mr. Parker had paid to A&M. Rather than attempt to resolve the problem with Ms. Herget and A&M, Mr. Parker continued to deal directly with Citizens. After providing proof to Citizens of his payment of the premium to A&M, Citizens offered to issue a new policy effective April 2004 upon payment by Mr. Parker of the second six-month premium or, in the alternative, to apply his payment in March 2004 to a new policy for 2005. Mr. Parker opted to have his payment applied toward the issuance of a new policy providing coverage in 2005. This meant that he had no coverage for most of 2004 and part of 2005. Citizens notified Ms. Herget that the payment she had received from Mr. Parker should be remitted to Citizens. Ms. Herget investigated the matter and, when she confirmed that she had received his payment, paid Citizens $1,064.00 on or about February 10, 2005. Ms. Herget and A&M failed to remit Mr. Parker's insurance premium payment received in March 2004 until payment was made to Citizens in February 2005. That payment was made only after inquires from Mr. Parker and, ultimately, Citizens. While Ms. Herget speculated that Mr. Parker's file was misfiled and not properly processed, the failure to remit Mr. Parker's premium payment for almost a year was not explained by either party. The evidence failed to prove, however, that Ms. Herget failed to remit the premium to Citizens willfully or that she failed to remit the premium once it was determined that A&M had failed to so and demand was made by Citizens.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the Department finding that Margaret L. Herget violated the provision of Chapter 626, Florida Statutes (2003), described, supra, and suspending her license for six months. DONE AND ENTERED this 29th day of June, 2006, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LARRY J. SARTIN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of June, 2006.
The Issue Whether Respondent's sign displays lights in violation of Section 479.11(5), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact The sign that is the subject of the notice of violation issued by the Department is a "sign" as defined by 479.01(14), Florida Statutes. The sign is located within 100 feet of the right-of-way of U.S. Highway 17. The sign is visible from U.S. Highway 17. U.S. Highway 17 is part of the State Highway System. U.S. Highway 17 is part of the federal-aid primary highway system. The lights in question are contained in a panel at the top of the sign. The lights in question are visible through openings in a panel at the top of the sign. The lights in question are visible from U.S. Highway 17. Prior to September 25, 1992, the lights in question were being automatically turned on and off on a regular cycle. The lights in question were flashing at regular two-second intervals. After September 25, 1992, Central Florida changed the lights in question to remain lighted in a steady manner. Subsequently, Central Florida returned the lights to their earlier state and they are now flashing as they were before. The lights in question are not part of, nor do they illuminate, a written message on the sign. The lights in question have never been part of, nor have they illuminated, a written message on the sign. The photograph of the sign attached to the joint motion is an accurate photograph of the sign in question.
Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered finding Respondent's sign to be in violation of Section 479.011(5), Florida Statutes, and directing Respondent to remove those intermittent lights forthwith from his sign or change the lights to fixed instead of flashing. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 9th day of April 1993. K. N. AYERS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of April 1993. COPIES FURNISHED: Paul Sexton, Esquire Florida Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building, Mail Station 58 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458 Robert L. Valentine, Esquire Post Office Box 2538 Lakeland, Florida 33806-2538 Ben G. Watts, Secretary Florida Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building, Mail Station 58 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458 Thornton J. Williams General Counsel Florida Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building, Mail Station 58 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458
Findings Of Fact Lamar acquired permits AA-634 and 7504 from Peterson Outdoor Advertising Company for a double-faced sign located on U.S. 98, South, approximately one-half mile north of Crystal Lake Drive on a site leased from Mary D. and Billy Allred. The lease (Exhibit 1.), executed in 1978, was for a three-year term with automatic renewal for an additional five year period and thereafter from year to year on the same terms and conditions unless terminated by lessee by giving 30-days notice prior to the end of the lease year. By warranty deed dated June 14, 1983, (Exhibit 2.) Sun State acquired the property on which this sign was located from Allred. Rent on this lease for 1984 was sent to Allred by Lamar, endorsed over to Sun State and cashed by Sun State. A check for rent for 1985 sent by Lamar to Sun State was never negotiated. By letter dated April 3, 1985, (Exhibit 4.) Sun State Homes told Lamar to immediately remove the sign from its property on U.S. 98, South. On May 16, 1985, Sun State applied for a permit for a sign on U.S. 98, 550-feet north of North Crystal Lake Drive. This application was disapproved by DOT on June 7, 1985, in Exhibit 3 because it was in conflict with the sign for which Lamar held tags for the proposed site. On or about the same time, Sun State applied to Polk County for a building permit to erect a sign at this site. Polk County disapproved the application because DOT had denied the permit. By letter dated May 29, 1985, Sun State appealed the denial of their application. On or about May 27, 1985, Lamar removed their sign from Sun State's property. On May 28, 1985, Lamar submitted an application for a permit to erect a sign on U.S. 98, 1,200 feet north of N. Crystal Lake Drive (Exhibit 5.) and simultaneously surrendered tags no. AA-634 and 7504. Lamar had obtained permission from the owner of that property to erect a sign at this site. This application was denied by DOT because of the appeal by Sun State from its denial. DOT will not approve an application for a sign permit when the right of occupancy of the site is contested. Lamar appealed this denial and the two cases were consolidated for hearing. The two applications are mutually exclusive as only one can be granted without violating spacing requirements.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether the Florida Department of Transportation (Respondent) committed an act of unlawful employment discrimination against Stephen G. Leslie (Petitioner) in violation of the Florida Civil Rights Act (FCRA) of 1992.
Findings Of Fact In 1986, the Petitioner began his employment with the Respondent as a "Safety Specialist." Beginning in 2001, and at all times material to this case, the Petitioner was employed by the Respondent as an "Outdoor Advertising Regional Inspector." As an outdoor advertising regional inspector, the Petitioner's responsibilities included patrolling state roads in his assigned counties to ascertain the status of permitted outdoor advertising signs and to remove signs that were illegally placed on state right-of-way. The Respondent's duties required extensive driving, which he did in a state-supplied vehicle. The Petitioner was based at the Respondent's Tampa headquarters, but was supervised by employees located in Tallahassee. In 2007, the Petitioner began to experience neurological health issues, but he continued to work and was able to perform the responsibilities of his employment. From September 2008 to June 2011, the Petitioner was supervised by Robert Jessee. In 2009, the Petitioner's health issues got worse. He began to take more sick leave, which the Respondent approved upon request of the Petitioner. The Respondent also provided equipment to accommodate the Petitioner's health issues, including a laptop computer and larger mirrors on the Petitioner's state vehicle. The Respondent also assigned another employee to ride with the Petitioner and to remove signs illegally placed on state right-of-way so that the Petitioner did not have to exit the vehicle. In 2010, the Petitioner was involved in two automobile accidents while driving the state vehicle. In January, he ran into a vehicle that was stopped for a school bus. In February, while transporting a group of other employees on I-75, the Respondent struck rode debris and the vehicle was damaged. In April 2010, the Petitioner's presence in the Tampa headquarters building was restricted for reasons that were unclear. Although the restrictions caused embarrassment to the Petitioner, there was no evidence presented at the hearing to suggest that such measures were related in any way to the Petitioner's disability. Following an investigation of the traffic incidents by the Respondent's inspector general, the Petitioner received a written reprimand dated August 18, 2010, and was directed to take the Respondent's online driving course. Beginning in June 2011 and through the remainder of the Petitioner's employment by the Respondent, the Petitioner was supervised by Michael Green. The Respondent collects statistical data to measure the productivity of persons employed as outdoor advertising regional inspectors. The Petitioner's productivity statistics were significantly lower than those of other inspectors, and he was behind in his assignments. Accordingly, Mr. Green rode along with the Petitioner for three consecutive days in September 2011 to observe the Petitioner's work. At the hearing, Mr. Green testified that the Petitioner arrived late to pick him up at his hotel on all three days. On one of those days, the Petitioner accomplished an employment- related task prior to picking up the supervisor. Mr. Green testified that the Petitioner's driving made him feel unsafe during the observation. Mr. Green observed that the Petitioner accelerated and slowed the vehicle in an abrupt manner, and that he failed to use turn signals at appropriate times. Mr. Green also testified that the Petitioner was preoccupied as he drove by electronic devices, including a cell phone. Mr. Green testified that the Petitioner appeared to have difficulty entering and exiting the vehicle, and with hearing certain noises in the vehicle, including the click of the turn signal. Mr. Green testified that he felt so unsafe that he asked the Petitioner to alter his driving practices while Mr. Green was in the vehicle. Mr. Green testified that during the observation ride, the Petitioner discussed his physical condition and admitted that medical appointments during the week made it difficult to maintain the routine work schedule. The Petitioner also advised Mr. Green that he was considering filing for disability retirement. After returning to the Tallahassee headquarters, Mr. Green prepared a memorandum dated September 19, 2011, to memorialize his observations about the Petitioner's job performance. Mr. Green's memorandum was directed to Juanice Hughes (deputy director of the Respondent's right-of-way office) and to the Respondent's outdoor advertising manager. In the memo, Mr. Green recommended that the Petitioner be required to provide medical verification of his continued ability to perform the responsibilities of his position. In a letter to the Petitioner dated September 23, 2011, Ms. Hughes restated Mr. Green's observations and directed the Petitioner to obtain medical verification that the Petitioner was able to perform the responsibilities of his position safely. The letter specifically directed the Petitioner to provide medical information related to his ability to work his normal schedule, the existence of any work restrictions or required accommodations, and the impact of any medications prescribed for the Petitioner. The letter established a deadline of September 30, 2011, for the Petitioner's compliance with its requirements, and advised that he would not be permitted to resume his employment duties until the medical verification information was provided and any required accommodations were in place. The Petitioner apparently did not become aware of the letter until September 29, 2011. On that date, both Mr. Green and Ms. Hughes attempted to contact the Petitioner via his work cell phone and by email to advise him of the letter and to direct that he retrieve the letter from the district headquarters. Shortly after 4:00 p.m., contact was made with the Petitioner by calling his personal cell phone. At that time, the Petitioner was advised that he needed to return to the district headquarters to pick up the letter. He was further advised that he was being placed on leave until the requirements of the letter were met and that he needed to turn in his state vehicle when he arrived at the headquarters. The Petitioner advised Mr. Green and Ms. Hughes that he was attempting to obtain documentation required to file for disability retirement, and he asked for an extension of time during which to do so. His request for an extension was denied. The Petitioner, clearly unhappy with the circumstance, made a statement during the conversation that was considered by Mr. Green and Ms. Hughes to suggest that the Petitioner could cause damage to himself or to the state vehicle. The actual words spoken were disputed at the hearing, and the evidence fails to establish that the Petitioner would have actually damaged the vehicle or himself. Nonetheless, it was clear after the conversation that the Petitioner was resistant to the Department's instructions. The Respondent immediately directed James Moulton, the director of Transportation Operations for the Tampa district, to check on the Petitioner's condition and to retrieve the vehicle assigned to the Petitioner. Mr. Moulton did so, accompanied by local law enforcement personnel, at approximately 7:00 p.m. on September 29, 2011. In a letter to the Petitioner dated September 30, 2011, Ms. Hughes recounted the events of the day before and again directed the Petitioner to obtain medical verification that he was able to perform the responsibilities of his position safely. No deadline was set for the Petitioner's compliance, and he was advised that he could use leave for any absence related to obtaining the medical documentation. A few days later, the Petitioner advised the Respondent that he would be unable to obtain the requested medical verification and that he would be filing an application for medical disability retirement. In November 2011, the Petitioner filed the application accompanied by medical documentation establishing that the Petitioner had a "total and permanent disability," as defined by section 121.091(4)(b), Florida Statutes (2011).1/ His application was approved.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief filed by the Petitioner against the Respondent in this case. DONE AND ENTERED this 13th day of August, 2013, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S WILLIAM F. QUATTLEBAUM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of August, 2013.
The Issue Whether Respondent committed the violations of Emerald Coast Utility Authority’s Human Resources Manual as alleged in the agency action letter dated July 17, 2017.
Findings Of Fact At the outset of the hearing, Mr. Ward’s attorney announced that Mr. Ward no longer wished to challenge ECUA’s intent to terminate his employment. In other words, Mr. Ward withdrew his request for a hearing. Furthermore, Mr. Ward made a statement consistent with his attorney’s announcement. The undersigned finds that Mr. Ward’s decision to withdraw his hearing request was voluntarily made and uncoerced.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Executive Director of Emerald Coast Utilities Authority find that Mr. Ward violated Section B-13 A (4)(conduct unbecoming an ECUA employee), Section B-13 A (13)(falsification of records), Section B-13 A (18) (loafing), Section B-13 A (26)(substandard quality or quantity of work), and Section B-13 A (33)(violation of ECUA rules or guidelines or state or federal law) of the ECUA’s Human Resources Manual.3/ DONE AND ENTERED this 28th day of September, 2017, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S G. W. CHISENHALL Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of September, 2017.
