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DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION vs WILBERT DUDLEY, 98-005285 (1998)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Chattahoochee, Florida Dec. 02, 1998 Number: 98-005285 Latest Update: Apr. 26, 1999

The Issue The issue for determination is whether Respondent’s lottery prize is subject to an outstanding debt owed to the Department of Education.

Findings Of Fact Respondent is Wilbert Dudley. His address is 1962 Willow Bends, Apt 2-D, Sneads, Florida 32460. Petitioner is the Florida Department of Education. In an application dated September 25, 1981, Respondent applied for a federally guaranteed student loan for the 1981-82 academic year. The loan, in the amount of $2,500, was issued by the Ellis Bank of Blountstown (the lender) in two equal disbursements: One on or after November 9, 1981, and one on or about January 29, 1982. The loan accrues interest at the rate of 7 percent per year unless Respondent is in deferment status, such as attending school on a minimum part-time basis. Respondent’s loan, number 114103, was guaranteed by Petitioner. Respondent and the lender agreed to a repayment schedule for the loan with the first payment beginning November 15, 1984. The lender received no payment from Respondent after March 25, 1985. Subsequently, the lender declared Respondent in default and filed a claim with Petitioner. On August 8, 1986, Petitioner, as guarantor of the loan, paid the lender $2,612.67 in principal and interest for Respondent’s loan. After Petitioner acquired Respondent’s loan, the following payments were applied to Respondent’s loan: May 10, 1989 $25.00 June 13, 1990 $25.00 December 6, 1991 $50.00 March 9, 1992 $391.66 (1991 Federal Income Tax Return) May 5, 1992 $50.00 In a letter dated May 1, 1998, Petitioner notified Respondent that his salary was subject to administrative wage garnishment for the defaulted student loan in accordance with provisions of Section 112.175, Florida Statutes. Petitioner advised Respondent that the total principal and interest due on the loan at that time was $5,335.15 not counting legal fees or collection costs. Thereafter Respondent agreed to voluntary administrative wage garnishment in the amount of $25 biweekly through payroll deduction. The agreement was confirmed by Petitioner’s letter dated June 16, 1998. Based on this agreement, regular payments of $25 biweekly have been received since July 17, 1998, and credited to Respondent’s account by Petitioner. By letter dated October 14, 1998, Respondent was informed by Petitioner that a claim again Respondent’s lottery winnings of $2,500 had been made in accordance with provisions of Section 24.115(4), Florida Statutes. At that time, Respondent owed Petitioner $5,268.09 in outstanding principal and interest. Respondent’s lottery winnings were transferred to Petitioner on November 25, 1998, and applied to Respondent’s outstanding balance in accordance with federal requirements. Respondent was informed of his right to review of this action per Chapter 120, Florida Statutes. Respondent timely sought such review.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner enter a final order certifying that the Department of Lottery should pay Respondent's $2,500 lottery prize to Petitioner for application to Respondent’s outstanding defaulted student loan balance. DONE AND ENTERED this 31st day of March, 1999, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DON W. DAVIS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of March, 1999. COPIES FURNISHED: Ronald G. Stowers, Esquire Department of Education The Capitol, Suite 1701 400 South Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400 Wilbert Dudley 1962 Willow Bends, Apt 2-D Sneads, Florida 32460 Michael H. Olenick, General Counsel Department of Education The Capitol, Suite 1701 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400 Tom Gallagher Commissioner of Education Department of Education The Capitol, Plaza Level 08 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400

Florida Laws (4) 112.175120.5724.115335.15
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FACES PRIVATE SCHOOL vs DR. ERIC J. SMITH, AS COMMISSIONER OF EDUCATION, 10-000845 (2010)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Melbourne, Florida Feb. 16, 2010 Number: 10-000845 Latest Update: Jun. 10, 2011

The Issue The issue in this case is whether Petitioner properly and timely re-enrolled students from her private school so they would be eligible for McKay Scholarship Program payments from the Department of Education.

Findings Of Fact FACES is a private school which has participated in the McKay Scholarship Program since 2005. FACES is owned by Tori Wilson and Toni Ranier, who are sisters. Wilson and Ranier are both actively involved in the School as teachers and administrators. FACES caters to children with autism or autistic-related conditions. It is the duty of the School to re-enroll its students into the McKay Scholarship Program each year in order for them to be eligible to receive McKay Scholarship payments from the Department. McKay Scholarships afford disabled students an opportunity to receive funds to defray the costs of attending private schools, such as FACES. The State of Florida, Department of Education, administers the McKay Scholarship Program through its Office of Independent Education and Parental Choice. For the 2009-2010 school year, there were 12 students to be enrolled at the School. Due to certain disabilities, each of the students was eligible to receive a McKay Scholarship. FACES relies upon the scholarships to fund the cost of operating the School. In some instances, FACES accepts the McKay Scholarship funds for a student as the sole payment for that student's attendance, even though the scholarship is not equal to the cost of educating the student. In such instances, the School will allow the student's parent to provide some sort of alternative payment. That might be in the form of buying provisions needed by the School, e.g., paper products, food, and school supplies, etc; or the School might allow the parent to provide volunteer in-kind services, such as, cleaning, helping with classroom activities, etc. Each year Wilson would log on to the Department website in order to re-enroll her students. (Each returning student would have to be re-enrolled every year. At the same time, any student who was not returning would be withdrawn using the same process.) The process involved creating a Master Fee Schedule and, then, plugging each student's scholarship information into their individual fee schedule. For example, some students may be in need of tutoring services for which additional scholarship funds are available. Others may need a summer program or some technology assistance. Once the Master Fee Schedule was completed, the school could then enter the individual students into the system. The Department established definite guidelines to be followed by schools wishing to enroll students for scholarship purposes. For the 2009-2010 school year, all students had to be re-enrolled no later than August 2, 2009 (a Sunday). The re-enrollment process could have begun as early as April 10, 2009, for that school year. That is, any school could have re-enrolled its students as early as April 10, 2009, but not later than August 2, 2009. On July 13, 2009, Wilson accessed the Department website to re-enroll her students. She had been through the process each of the past four years and was generally familiar with how it worked. However, on that date, when she logged in using her school Code No. 4809 and password (FACES 5525), she experienced problems. Wilson sent a request to the Department website for a new password, which was sent to her via email within a short time. Using the new password, FACES 101, Wilson was able to log on to the website. The first screen Wilson opened contained the normal directive (accompanied by a red exclamation mark) to "Please complete a Fee Schedule Update for the 2009-2010 School Year." But when Wilson clicked on the Update Fee Schedule link, she was only given the option to update the 2008-2009 school year, rather than the upcoming school year (2009-2010). After encountering this problem, Wilson called an undisclosed person at the Department to find out what was going on with the system. She was presumably told that the system had a glitch of some sort, that if no changes to the fee schedule were being made, she could use the previous year's schedule to do re-enrollment or that she could try the process again later. This statement was not corroborated, however. The Department provided contrary evidence saying that other schools had done their re-enrollments on the same day (July 13, 2009) and time that Wilson was experiencing trouble. One school had experienced some problems saving individual fee schedules for four students, but had not experienced problems re-enrolling students. Wilson does not have any records concerning her phone call to the Department due to the fact that she changed telephone providers, and records from the prior provider were not available. Wilson possesses a printout from her computer showing her browser history for July 13, 2009. It is clear that Wilson accessed the Department website on that date. There are a number of references to the re-enrollment portion of the Department's website, including the "student_enroll.asp" and the "student_enroll1.asp," "student_enroll3.asp," and "student_withdraw.asp" URL address segments. Each of those asps is part of the enrollment process, but unless the entire process is completed, those intermediate steps will not effectuate a student enrollment. Wilson believes she was able to "submit" each of her re-enrollments for students on that date, resulting in a prompt saying, "the student has been successfully enrolled, would you like to enroll another student." However, the Department's IT experts opine that it is impossible to have received that prompt without having gone through the entire enrollment process. Department computer logs indicate that Wilson did not click on the link required to save the Master Fee Schedule, a prerequisite to enrolling students for the 2009-2010 school year. Thus, while Wilson may believe she was properly enrolling her students, computer records indicate she did not actually accomplish her goal on that date. On July 20, 2009, Wilson logged on to the website again to see if she could complete the Master Fee Schedule and get her students re-enrolled. She attempted to log on using her new password, FACES 101, but was not able to do so. She finally logged on using her old password, FACES 5525, the same one she had been using for four years. When she was logged on to the website, she was able to update the Master Fee Schedule. She did not attempt to re-enroll her students at that time, because she believed they had already been re-enrolled on July 13, 2009. Unfortunately, she did not check to verify the enrollment on July 20, 2009. Wilson believes she completed the entire enrollment process for her students on July 13 and 20, 2009. Her testimony is entirely credible as to that belief, but she has no corroborating verification of the facts. The Department computer logs indicate that the enrollment process had begun, but had not been completed. The Department sent out an email on July 31, 2009, to a number of schools who had McKay Scholarship students. The email advised the schools that as of the date of the email, "Our records indicate that one or more McKay Scholarship students enrolled in your school during the 2008-2009 school year has not been re-enrolled for the 2009-2010 school year. McKay students must be re-enrolled by August 2, 2009, in order to be eligible for a first period scholarship payment on September 1st." The email was sent to HAPPYFACES@BELLSOUTH.NET, which was FACES' email address of record at the Department as of the date of the email. FACES had actually stopped using that email address regularly in April or May of 2009, but did not notify the Department of that fact until some time later. However, as of July 2009, when the email was sent out, FACES was still using the address as a contact source for parents of potential new students. It was, therefore, still being used for some purpose. FACES' contention that it did not receive the July 31, 2009, email is not credible. Based upon the changes FACES was going through with its communications systems at that time, however, it is very possible the email was never accessed by Wilson. On August 5, 2009, Wilson logged on to the website to withdraw a student, only to find that none of her students' re-enrollments (which she verily believed to have been accomplished previously) appeared on the website. She immediately sent an email to the Department regional manager (Hyle) assigned to her geographic area. The email advised Hyle about the students not showing up as re-enrolled and inquired about receiving payments for those students. Hyle told her that other schools were having problems as well (although that statement was not true),1 asked Wilson to send him information concerning her students, and said he would speak to his supervisor. Several exchanges between Wilson and Hyde ensued. Thereafter, Wilson received an email from Laura Harrison, director of the scholarship programs, saying the information submitted by Wilson was not sufficient to establish re-enrollment of the students at FACES. Harrison reiterated what Wilson had already heard from other persons within the Department, i.e., the evidence shows a visit to the website to change her password on July 13, 2009, but no re-enrollment of students was accomplished on that date. Following notification to Wilson that the student enrollment was deemed untimely by the Department, there were three disturbing events: First, the Department erroneously advised Wilson that FACES did not have a current fire inspection; in fact, FACES did. Second, the Department erroneously advised FACES that it did not have a current health certificate; in fact, FACES did. Third, the Department took several months to issue its final agency action (despite requests by FACES' attorney) so that FACES could challenge the decision. These events reflect unfavorably on the Department, but do not affect the outcome of this case. They are noted only because they were raised by Wilson as part of her case-in-chief. The Department's database analyst and web application developer established the following facts: Wilson logged on to the Department website on July 13, 2009, using IP address 70.152.251.108 with school code 4809; On that same date, other schools logged into the website and made student changes, including re-enrollment and withdrawals; Wilson, on behalf of FACES, did attempt to engage in the re-enrollment process on that date, starting at 6:54 p.m; There were a number of entries by FACES on that date, but none of the entries went beyond phase three of the enrollment process, identified as reenroll3.asp by the server; Wilson logged on to the Department website again on July 20, 2009, on behalf of FACES; The server log shows that other schools logged in on that same date and at the same time; FACES completed its Master Fee Schedule on that date beginning at 2:52 p.m., but upon completing the schedule, FACES logged out of the website; FACES logged on to the Department website on August 5, 2009, at 11:24 a.m., at 4:36 p.m., at 6:15 p.m., and at 7:40 p.m; Other users logged on to the website at the same time FACES was on-line; FACES re-enrolled its students on that date, although it was three days after the deadline for doing so; and The re-enrollment of students by Wilson on August 5, 2009, ultimately, resulted in a computer code called "studentenroll=true" at 3:25 p.m. Clearly, no matter what Wilson attempted to do on July 13, 2009, regarding the enrollment of her students, she did not fully accomplish that task. The computer records and testimony of the Department's witnesses are clear and unequivocal. The enrollment process was not completed prior to the deadline of August 2, 2009. FACES school does not generate a surplus of income from which it might operate without the McKay Scholarships. Loss of the scholarships would be a significant financial strain on the School. Both Wilson and Ranier appear willing to suffer financial shortfalls in order to keep the School running, but cannot do so without scholarship funds. However, due to the technical failure to meet the enrollment deadline, FACES does not appear to be entitled to the scholarships for the 2009-2010 school year. Despite the findings herein, it is abundantly clear that Wilson's testimony was honest and sincere. She was simply mistaken concerning the completion of her enrollment process.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by Respondent, Dr. Eric Smith, as Commissioner of Education, denying the claim by Petitioner, FACES Private School, for the September 2009 McKay Scholarship Program awards. DONE AND ENTERED this 23rd day of September, 2010, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S R. BRUCE MCKIBBEN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of September, 2010.

Florida Laws (3) 1002.39120.569120.57
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COCOA BEACH WOMAN'S CLUB FOUNDATION, INC. vs DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, 97-000699 (1997)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Melbourne, Florida Feb. 11, 1997 Number: 97-000699 Latest Update: Oct. 24, 1997

The Issue The issue for consideration in this case is whether the Cocoa Beach Woman’s Club Foundation, Inc., should be granted an exemption from Florida sales tax under the provisions of Section 212.08(7)(n), Florida Statutes.

Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to the issues herein the Respondent, Department of Revenue, was the state agency responsible for the collection of a sales tax on goods in Florida, and for granting exemptions therefrom to appropriate agencies. The Petitioner, Cocoa Beach Woman’s Club Foundation, Inc. (Foundation) was a charitable organization granted an exemption from federal income tax under Section 501(c)(3) of the United States Internal Revenue Code. The Foundation was formed in May 1995 as a separate organization, but a part of the Cocoa Beach Woman’s Club, by members of the Club. The Foundation was established to raise funds for charitable projects and scholarships for high school graduates and the tutoring of elementary school students. Prior to the formation of the Foundation, its activities were carried out by the Cocoa Beach Woman’s Club from the Club’s founding in 1965 until the formation of the Foundation in 1995. The Foundation is headed by an elected executive officer. On October 11, 1996, Jeanne Zophi, the Foundation’s treasurer, submitted an Application For Consumer’s Certificate of Exemption from Sales and Use tax to the Florida Department of Revenue. Enclosed with the application were the previously mentioned determination of exemption from federal income tax, a statement of purpose required by the Department’s rule, the organization’s Articles of Incorporation, the most current year statement of income, a financial statement for the fiscal year ending April 30, 1996, and the Foundation’s annual financial statement dated April 30, 1997. On December 31, 1996, after review of the application, the Department of Revenue issued its Notice of Intent to Deny, alleging that, based on the information provided, it appeared that while the organization may have provided scholarship money, the funds were given directly to the students and not to the school for the school’s use. A second basis for denial was the Department’s contention that that primary purpose of the Foundation’s charitable activities was not directed toward minors, seventeen and younger. The overall purposes of the Foundation’s activities are to raise funds for the area schools’ wish lists, for Alzheimer’s Disease research and treatment, for the payment of certified teachers to provide a tutor program to students in the local elementary and middle schools, and, since 1965, for college scholarships to any high school senior from Brevard County. Each year the Foundation sponsors a contest to afford area students the opportunity to raise funds for the Foundation’s scholarship and charitable programs. The operation culminates in a Ball, a dinner dance to which tickets are also sold to the public for $35.00. The day before the Ball, the candidates turn their funds in to the Ball chairman. The candidate who raises the most money is named Queen of the Ball. The Ball expenses are paid from the funds raised by the sale of the tickets to the public, not from the money raised by the candidates. The scholarships, in the amount of $3,000 to the Queen and $1,500 to each of the others, are paid from the money raised by the candidates as supplemented by other funds supplied by the Foundation. The scholarship recipients can select their own college, and the money for the scholarship is paid by the Foundation directly to the school. The candidates are chosen from applications submitted by individuals through their respective schools. The Foundation works closely with high school counselors to publicize the opportunity and to encourage applicants. When the applications are received by the Foundation, the scholarship chairman and staff redact the names and gender of the applicants, and the selection of candidates to participate in the fund-raising portion of the procedure is based on the applicants’ SAT scores, their grades, their leadership their extra-curricular activities, and the like. By far the largest number of applicants comes from Cocoa Beach High School. Whereas the scholarship program is the largest user of qualifying funds, another program is the tutoring program wherein certified teachers are hired by the Foundation to provide necessary tutoring to appropriate students in selected public and private schools. The tutoring program is clearly a benefit to minors, and the Department so admits. In addition, each Spring, the Foundation presents a number of $50.00 government bonds, and plaques to deserving students in the Brevard County school system for academic excellence. During the 1995-1996 school season, the Foundation awarded five college scholarships totaling $6,500.00. Though at the time each check was issued, some of the recipients had reached their eighteenth birthday, the determination of recipients, and the notification to them of their selection, were made prior to their eighteenth birthday. In addition to the five scholarships, the Foundation also spent $4,210.50 on the tutor program and $943.70 for other qualifying local contributions. Taken together, the total qualifying contributions amounted to $11,654.20, which constituted 62 percent of the Foundation’s total donations during the period and which were somewhat in excess of $18,000. For the fiscal year ending April 30, 1997, the Foundation received donations totaling $50,597.38. Of that amount, $35,917 was dedicated to minors. This constituted 71 percent of the total. Respondent presented no evidence to contradict the evidence presented by the Petitioner.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Department of Revenue enter a Final Order granting the Cocoa Beach Woman’s Club Foundation, Inc., an exemption from Florida sales tax. DONE AND ENTERED this 25th day of July, 1997, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6947 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of July, 1977. COPIES FURNISHED: John R. Kancilia, Esquire O’Brien, Riemenschneider, Kancilia and Lemonidis, P.A. 1686 West Hibiscus Boulevard Melbourne, Florida 32901 Kevin J. ODonnell, Esquire Department of Revenue Post Office Box 6668 Tallahassee, Florida 32314-6668 Linda Lettera General Counsel Department of Revenue 204 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0100 Larry Fuchs Executive Director Department of Revenue 104 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0100

Florida Laws (3) 120.57210.50212.08
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RICHARD CORCORAN, AS COMMISSIONER OF EDUCATION vs LION OF JUDAH ACADEMY (8827)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Altamonte Springs, Florida Jun. 01, 2020 Number: 20-002513SP Latest Update: Jul. 04, 2024

The Issue The issues in these consolidated cases are as follows: (1) whether Respondents employed Lorene Walker, who had contact with scholarship students and who did not meet the requisite criteria to pass the Level 2 background screening as required by section 1002.421(1)(m) and (p), Florida Statutes (2019), and if so, what is the appropriate remedy; and (2) whether Respondents engaged in fraud in violation of section 1002.421(3)(d) and, if so, whether Petitioner should revoke Respondents' participation in several Florida Scholarship Programs.1

Findings Of Fact Parties, People, and Programs The Department is the government agency charged with administering numerous state scholarship programs pursuant to section 1002.421, Florida Statutes. The Department operates or has administrative responsibilities for the Gardiner Scholarship Program, the John M. McKay Scholarships for Students with Disabilities Program, the Florida Tax Credit (FTC) Scholarship Program, and the Family Empowerment Scholarship Program. See §§ 1002.385, 1002.39, 1002.394, and 1002.395, Fla. Stat. The Gardiner, McKay, FTC, and Family Empowerment scholarships defray tuition and other qualified educational expenses for eligible students who attend charter, private, or other eligible schools in the state of Florida. The Department also operates or administers the Hope Scholarship Program, which provides tuition assistance to victims of school bullying so that they can enroll in another school. See § 1002.40, Fla. Stat. The scholarship funds are awarded to eligible students to be used at eligible schools. The Commissioner is the agency head of the Department and has the authority to revoke or suspend a school's eligibility to receive scholarship monies on behalf of eligible students. The Independent Education and Parental Choice Office, also referred to as the School Choice Office (Office), is a section of the Department which oversees several school choice options outside Florida's public school system. The Office also oversees the administration of various scholarships programs under chapter 1002. The Office is in regular contact with schools that participate in these scholarship programs. Respondents have been operating as private schools for approximately six years. Since the 2013/2014 school year, they have been found eligible and participated in numerous scholarship programs pursuant to section 1002.421. Respondents operate two campuses: (1) School Code No. 4015 located at 1056 North Pine Hills Road, Orlando, Florida (Pine Hills Campus); and (2) School Code No. 8827 located at 5308 Silver Star Road, Orlando, Florida (Silver Star Campus). The Schools serve 40 to 50 scholarship students and receive approximately $200,000 per year in scholarship funds. Judith Shealey is the owner of the Schools. She carries the title of Executive Director, Principal, Headmistress, and/or Owner. Ms. Shealey has family members who are students and teachers at the Schools. Compliance Requirements As explained by RaShawn Williams, the Office, parents, and eligible schools work closely together to access the scholarship funds. The parents apply for the scholarships through the designated agency and enroll their students directly with an eligible school. The school is responsible for enrolling the student in the scholarship program awarded to that student. Essentially, the student must be deemed eligible to receive scholarship funds, and the school must be eligible to receive those scholarship funds. If a private school is deemed ineligible by the Office for participation in a scholarship program, the students at that school do not lose their eligibility for scholarship funds. Rather, they simply cannot use those funds to enroll in the ineligible school. As private school participants in the Florida Scholarship Programs, the Schools were required to register with the State through the submission of a Private School Annual Survey; and then apply for eligibility through the submission of a yearly Scholarship Compliance Form (Compliance Form). The Compliance Form specifies numerous governing statutory requirements including: (1) submitting background screenings for officers, directors, or other controlling persons; (2) certifying all staff with direct student contact have passed an FDLE Level 2 background screening; and (3) terminating or denying employment to all persons who cannot meet this requirement. The Compliance Form is completed by applicant schools online, and then a signed and notarized hard copy is mailed to the Office. The relevant portions of the Compliance Form are found in "Section 4," and involve background checks: * Has each Owner, Operator, and Chief Administrative Officer undergone a Level 2 background screening through the Florida Department of Law Enforcement and submitted the results to the Florida Department of Education in accordance with section 1002.421(1)(m), Florida Statutes? (Reports must be filed with the private school and made available for public inspection). * * * * Have all employees and contracted personnel with direct student contact submitted their fingerprints to the Florida Department of Law Enforcement for state and national background screening in accordance with section 1002.421(1)(m), Florida Statutes? * In accordance with section 1002.421(1)(m), Florida Statutes, does the school deny employment to or terminate an employee or contracted personnel with direct student contact if he or she fails to meet the background screening standards under section 435.04, Florida Statutes? * In accordance with section 1002.421(1)(m), Florida Statutes, does the school disqualify instructional personnel and school administrators from employment in any position that allows direct contact with students if the personnel or administrators are ineligible under section 435.40, Florida Statutes? A "No" answer on any of the above questions would, if unresolved, result in a private school's ineligibility for scholarship funds. The evidence establishes that the Schools answered "Yes" for sections 4A, 4C, 4D, and 4E on the notarized Compliance Forms that were submitted on December 18, 2018, and December 11, 2019. In addition to certifying the information above on the Compliance Forms every year, an eligible school must submit to the Office screening documentation for directors, principals, board members, administrators, and officers as part of the renewal of participation in the scholarship programs. Screening documentation related to other employees must be maintained by the schools and is usually only reviewed by the Office during an audit or a site visit of the school. There is no dispute that the Schools never listed Lorene Walker as an administrator for the Schools. There is no dispute the Schools never submitted any background screening information for Ms. Walker until specifically requested by the Office in November 2019. Employment of Lorene Walker Lorene Walker was hired by the Schools in 2013.3 She had children and/or grandchildren who attend the Schools. The Schools claim Ms. Walker was hired from an entity known as "Career Source." Although Ms. Walker believed that she had been cleared to work at the Schools, there is no employment file or documentation that she had undergone the Level 2 background screening required by law before being employed at the Schools. Originally, Ms. Walker worked as a "floater." As a floater, Ms. Walker cooked, cleaned, and did whatever the school needed at the time. It is unclear whether she had direct contact with students in this position. 3 Ms. Walker testified she began working there in 2015, but later stated she started in 2013. Ms. Shealey indicated by 2014, Ms. Walker had transitioned into the current position. Regardless, in 2014, Ms. Walker transitioned into a more active role at the Schools. Although the Schools claim in response to the Complaints that she was simply an administrative assistant to Ms. Shealey, the evidence establishes that Ms. Walker was the Administrator for the Schools during the time relevant to the Complaints. She reminded teachers to send out grades, attended meetings, oversaw the lunch program, and prepared school-related and financial documentation. Ms. Walker was also responsible for the Schools' students' enrollment into the scholarship programs. As Administrator, Ms. Walker also had authority, either explicit or implicit, from the Schools' owner, Ms. Shealey, to represent the Schools when dealing with the Office. She worked directly with Ms. Williams on compliance issues, including fire safety, health inspections, and completion of the Annual Survey and Compliance Form for the Schools. Ms. Walker also responded to requests for information from Ms. Williams and others in the Department. It was clear Ms. Walker was integral to the operation of the Schools. Ms. Shealey and Ms. Walker were the only two individuals with access to the Schools' email accounts that were used to correspond with the Department. The emails from one of the email addresses usually contained Ms. Shealey's signature block indicating either the title of "Principal" or "Headmistress." Ms. Walker's signature line identified her title as "Administrator." Before being hired by the Schools, Ms. Walker had been arrested for numerous offenses between 1978 and 2001 in Florida. Although most of these offenses were dismissed, dropped, and/or abandoned, she pled nolo contendere to and was found guilty of a 1994 charge for unlawful purchase of a controlled substance, a second-degree felony in violation of section 893.13, Florida Statutes (1993). The 1994 charge is a disqualifying offense which rendered Ms. Walker ineligible to be a school employee.4 There was no evidence that Ms. Walker had obtained an exemption for this qualification. As noted above, the Schools never disclosed Ms. Walker's importance in their operations in their Compliance Forms. Prior to November 2019, the Schools had never provided any screening documentation for Ms. Walker to the Office as part of the yearly compliance process. Investigation and Complaints On or around October 14, 2019, the Department received a complaint from another state agency concerning possible abuse by an employee of the School at the Pine Hills campus. Although the abuse investigation was handled outside of the Office, the Office opened an inquiry into the Schools' compliance with background check requirements and other issues. Whitney Blake conducted the investigation on behalf of the Office. The first step in this inquiry was a letter from Ms. Blake's supervisor, dated October 25, 2019, requesting (among other things) a list of all employees (including both teachers and other personnel) and results of current FDLE Level 2 background screenings for all employees. 4 Section 435.04, Florida Statutes, provides the following in relevant part: (2) The security background investigations under this section must ensure that no persons subject to the provisions of this section have been arrested for and are awaiting final disposition of, have been found guilty of, regardless of adjudication, or entered a plea of nolo contendere or guilty to, or have been adjudicated delinquent and the record has not been sealed or expunged for, any offense prohibited under any of the following provisions of state law or similar law of another jurisdiction: * * * (ss) Chapter 893, relating to drug abuse prevention and control, only if the offense was a felony or if any other person involved in the offense was a minor. On November 4, 2020, Ms. Walker sent the Department a list of all the Schools' staff, including herself as "Administrator," along with the results of her background screening, revealing her previous disqualifying offense. On November 15, 2019, Ms. Blake attempted to contact Ms. Shealey by phone because she was concerned that Ms. Walker, who was the disqualified employee, was the person sending the information from the School. When she called the Schools and requested to speak with the owner (Ms. Shealey), the person who answered purportedly claiming to be the Schools' owner did not have a distinguishable accent. Ms. Shealey was known to have a strong accent, whereas Ms. Walker did not. Regardless, on this call, Ms. Blake instructed the person on the other end of the phone line that the Schools would need to terminate Ms. Walker immediately because of her disqualifying offense. On that same day, Ms. Blake then sent a follow-up email to the Schools (at both email addresses utilized by the Schools) indicating there were outstanding items that had not been provided as requested in the October 25 letter. She also specifically requested proof Ms. Walker was no longer at the Schools. Specifically, the Department stated: Upon review of the Level 2 background screenings, it was determined Lorene Walker has disqualifying offenses pursuant to section 435.04, F.S. An employee or contracted personnel with direct student contact means any employee or contracted personnel who has unsupervised access to a scholarship student for whom the private school is responsible. To certify compliance with this requirement, please submit a signed statement indicating Lorene Walker's employment at your school has been terminated or that individual's role with your school no longer puts he/she in proximity to scholarship students. Your attention to this in the next five days will preempt any further action on our part. (emphasis added). That same date, November 15, 2019, the Schools emailed one of the items requested by Ms. Blake, an abuse poster, to the Office. Although Ms. Walker testified she did not send the email, it had her signature block and was from one of the Schools' two email accounts to which she had access. The undersigned finds Ms. Walker sent this email to Ms. Blake. On November 18, 2019, the Schools sent another item previously requested by Ms. Blake, the teaching qualifications for a teacher, to the Office. Again, although Ms. Walker claimed she did not send the email, it had her signature block and was from one of the Schools' two email accounts to which she had access. The undersigned finds Ms. Walker sent this email to Ms. Blake. Ms. Blake did not receive any proof that the Schools had removed Ms. Walker from her position within five days as requested in the November 15 email to the Schools. As a result, on November 22, 2019, Ms. Blake emailed the Schools reiterating the requirements of section 1002.421, and repeating her request for a signed statement that Ms. Walker had been terminated or had no contact with scholarship students. Ms. Blake also added: "Failure to turn in the requested documentation could impact your school's ongoing participation in the Scholarship Program." During this time, Ms. Blake spoke to Ms. Shealey numerous times on the phone regarding the outstanding requests related to another teacher and the signed documentation that Ms. Walker had been removed from her position. Ms. Shealey indicated it would be difficult to remove Ms. Walker due to Ms. Walker's oversight of the school and her familiarity with the scholarship student information. After Ms. Blake did not receive the requested proof of Ms. Walker's removal from the Schools and two other items related to a teacher, the Office issued a Notice of Noncompliance on December 5, 2019. On December 19, 2019, Ms. Shealey sent to Ms. Blake one of the outstanding items related to the teacher by email. There was no mention of Ms. Walker and no signed proof that Ms. Walker had been removed from her position. The next day, Ms. Blake wrote an email to Ms. Shealey indicating that she did not have authority to exempt Ms. Walker from the background screening requirements. She again asked for the outstanding information related to the other teacher and a signed statement indicating Ms. Walker had been removed and no longer had proximity to scholarship students. On December 23, 2019, Ms. Shealey emailed Ms. Blake that the teacher for which there was an outstanding request had resigned and no longer worked for one of the Schools. Ms. Blake responded with yet another request for the signed statement indicating Ms. Walker had been terminated or was no longer in proximity to scholarship students. In response, Ms. Shealey sent an email to Ms. Blake with an attached letter. The letter titled "Termination of your employment" and dated December 9, 2019, indicates that Ms. Shealey terminated Ms. Walker during a meeting held on December 9, 2019. The letter is unsigned. Ms. Shealey indicated in the text of the email that it was the hardest letter she had to write. Being concerned that they had not received a signed statement, Ms. Blake and Ms. Williams requested that a site visit be conducted at the Pine Hills Campus. A visit was scheduled for February 5, 2020, and the Schools were provided notice of the site visit by certified mail, email, and telephone. Additionally, the Schools were provided a checklist of the documents that should be provided to the inspector during the site visit. On February 5, 2020, Scott Earley from the Office conducted the site visit at the Pine Hills Campus. When he arrived, Ms. Shealey was not there and none of the documentation previously requested had been prepared for review. Mr. Earley testified that once Ms. Shealey arrived, she did not know where all the requested documents were, nor could she produce all of them. For example, when asked about a necessary health form, Ms. Shealey indicated that Ms. Walker would know where the document was, but she could not locate it. Mr. Earley did not recall Ms. Shealey stating during the inspection that Ms. Walker was working from home, but she gave Mr. Earley the impression that Ms. Walker's background screening issue had been resolved. Regardless, the Site Visit Staff/Consultant Worksheet filled out for the February 5 site visit does not disclose Ms. Walker as a member of staff or contracted personnel with the Pine Hills Campus. Although Ms. Walker was not at the Pine Hills Campus during the site visit, Mr. Earley believed based on his observations and conversations with Ms. Shealey that Ms. Walker was still employed by the Schools as a director or principal. Almost two weeks later on February 20, 2020, Petitioner filed the Complaints against the Schools. It was not until March 11, 2020, in response to the Complaints that the Schools submitted for the first time a signed copy of a termination letter dated December 9, 2020. Even after the Complaints had been served on the Schools, however, it was unclear what Ms. Walker's involvement was with the Schools. There may have been some confusion because Ms. Walker had been seen after her purported termination on campus. Ms. Walker claimed she was on campus only to pick up her children and grandchildren. Testimony from two of the Schools' teachers indicated that they noticed Ms. Walker was no longer at the Schools, but knew she was taking care of the Schools' paperwork from her home. Neither teacher could establish a date certain for when Ms. Walker stopped working on campus and/or when she began working at home. Prior to the filing of the Complaints in these proceedings, there was no evidence that the Schools ever reported to the Office that Ms. Walker had been working from home. Nothing in the Petition filed on March 4, 2020, indicates Ms. Walker was still employed at the Schools. It was not until March 11, 2020, in response to the Complaints that the Schools submitted for the first time a signed copy of a termination letter dated December 9, 2020. As part of the March 11 submission, Ms. Shealey sent a signed statement indicating she had not terminated Ms. Walker, but rather "had her work from home." This was the first time Ms. Shealey indicated to the Office that Ms. Walker was still working for the Schools. In the Motion filed April 10, 2020, the Schools indicated they were unaware of the specifics of the Level 2 background screening requirement, and that, once aware, "we took action immediately and terminated the employee in question." There was no indication in the body of the Motion the Schools continued to employ Ms. Walker to work at her home. Attached to the Motion, however, was the same letter submitted on March 11 indicating Ms. Walker was working from home. In the Amended Petition filed on May 15, 2020, the Schools state Ms. Walker was terminated: "I terminated Ms. Lorene Walker due to the Department's information in order to come into compliance with the Florida Department of Education." "I rectified this deficiency by terminating Ms. Walker." "Ms. Lorene Walker was terminated on December 9, 2019, as advised by Whitney Blake." Although the Amended Petition does not explicitly state Ms. Walker continued to work for the Schools at home, it does leave room for this interpretation: "As of December 9, 2019, Ms. Lorene Walker no longer works in the Lion of Judah facility." It is unclear on what date Ms. Walker stopped working from home for the Schools. What is clear is that at the time of the final hearing she was no longer working at the Schools in any location or in any capacity. ULTIMATE FACTUAL DETERMINATIONS The greater weight of the evidence establishes Ms. Walker, in her role as Administrator, should have been disclosed to the Office as an "operator" or "a person with equivalent decision making authority." The Schools were required to send her background screening documentation to the Office as required by the Compliance Form and section 1002.421(1)(p), and they did not. The Schools employed a person with a disqualifying offense in violation of sections 1002.421(1)(m) and 435.04(2)(ss). Specifically, the Schools employed Ms. Walker from 2014 (if not earlier) through December 2019 (if not later) in a position in which she was in the vicinity of scholarship students, knowing that she had been found guilty of a felony and without obtaining or providing documentation related to a Level 2 background clearance. The Schools continued to allow Ms. Walker to remain in a position that placed her in the vicinity of scholarship students after receiving notification of her ineligibility for almost a month (if not more). The greater weight of the evidence establishes the Schools engaged in fraudulent activity, to wit: (1) Ms. Shealey falsely represented to the Office that the Schools complied with Section 4 of the Compliance Form for 2018 and 2019; (2) the Schools falsely obscured Ms. Walker's role at the School and her criminal background; and (3) the Schools failed to honestly disclose Ms. Walker's employment status when they claimed to terminate her on December 9, 2020, but failed to inform the Office that they had retained (or rehired) her to work at home. The Schools made these statements of material fact either knowing they were false or in reckless disregard of the truth or falsity of the representations, which were false.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Commissioner enter a final order (1) upholding the suspension; and (2) revoking the eligibility of Lion of Judah Academy (4015) and Lion Of Judah Academy (8827) to participate in the following Florida Scholarship Programs: John M. McKay Scholarships for Students with Disabilities Program, Florida Tax Credit Scholarship Program, Gardiner Scholarship Program, Hope Scholarship Program, and/or Family Empowerment Scholarship Program. DONE AND ENTERED this 3rd day of November, 2020, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S HETAL DESAI Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of November, 2020. COPIES FURNISHED: Jason Douglas Borntreger, Esquire Department of Education Suite 1544 325 West Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32310 (eServed) Judith Shealey Lion of Judah Academy 1056 North Pine Hills Road Orlando, Florida 32808 Shawn R. H. Smith, Esquire Law Office of Shawn R. H. Smith, P.A. Post Office Box 547752 Orlando, Florida 32854 (eServed) Chris Emerson, Agency Clerk Department of Education Turlington Building, Suite 1520 325 West Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400 (eServed) Matthew Mears, General Counsel Department of Education Turlington Building, Suite 1244 325 West Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400 (eServed) Richard Corcoran Commissioner of Education Department of Education Turlington Building, Suite 1514 325 West Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400 (eServed)

Florida Laws (11) 1002.011002.3851002.391002.3951002.421002.421120.569120.57435.04893.13943.0542 DOAH Case (1) 17-3898SP
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JEFFREY R. STERMAN vs. FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY, BOARD OF REGENTS, 82-001713 (1982)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 82-001713 Latest Update: Apr. 08, 1983

The Issue The ultimate issue to be resolved in this proceeding is whether the Petitioner should be awarded a doctor of education degree by Florida State University. Petitioner contends that he properly completed the requirements for the degree, that a valid offer of the degree was made to him, that he accepted the offer, and that the degree was then wrongfully withheld. The university contends that Petitioner did not meet the requirements for the degree and that no valid, enforceable offer of it was made to Petitioner.

Findings Of Fact In 1976, Petitioner was admitted into the doctoral program in biology at Florida State University. He applied to transfer to the science education program and was admitted to the doctoral program in science education within the College of Education at Florida State University on June 24, 1977. He was pursuing a doctor of philosophy (Ph.D.) degree. Among the requirements that Petitioner needed to meet in order to receive the degree were successful completion of a diagnostic examination, completion of thirty-six resident hours of course work, course work in the field of statistics, a preliminary examination, approval of a prospectus for a doctoral dissertation, and presentation of an acceptable dissertation and a successful dissertation defense. Following his admission into the Ph.D. program in science education, a supervisory committee was established for the Petitioner, and a major professor was appointed. It was the major professor's and supervisory committee's function to monitor Petitioner's progress and ultimately to make a recommendation as to whether petitioner should be awarded a degree. By November 7, 1980, Petitioner had completed all of the requirements for a Ph.D. degree except for the presentation of his dissertation and the dissertation defense. These were scheduled to be conducted by the supervisory committee on November 7, 1980. Petitioner had been advised by at least two members of the committee that he might not be ready to present and defend his dissertation. Petitioner felt that he was. On November 7, 1980, Petitioner met with his supervisory committee and presented and defended his dissertation. After his presentation, Petitioner left the room, and the committee evaluated the dissertation and defense. The committee unanimously concluded that the dissertation and defense were inadequate. The dissertation was not marginally inadequate. It was grossly below standards. The committee unanimously and appropriately concluded that the dissertation and defense were not acceptable, and that Petitioner had not met the requirements for a Ph.D. degree. Petitioner's major professor felt that the Petitioner had devoted considerable time, energy, and hard work to the degree program. He was concerned that the effort not be totally wasted. He requested that the committee consider accepting the dissertation as adequate for the award of a doctor of education (Ed.D.) degree or a "master's specialist" degree, and that the committee recommend that Petitioner be awarded one of those degrees or that he be allowed to continue working toward a Ph.D. degree. None of the members of the supervisory committee had had experience with the Ed.D. degree. They all considered it an inferior degree and felt that awarding it to Petitioner would constitute something of a "consolation prize." In fact, an Ed.D. degree from Florida State University is not intended to be an inferior degree. Its focus is somewhat different, but the requirements for obtaining the degree are basically the same. The committee was mistaken in considering the offer of such a degree to Petitioner. Indeed, the requirements for an Ed.D. degree being similar, and in some cases identical to those for the Ph.D. degree, Petitioner had not qualified for the award of an Ed.D. degree. After the committee adjourned its proceedings on November 7, Petitioner's major professor discussed the committee's actions with Petitioner. He told Petitioner that pending proper approval, Petitioner would have the options of continuing to work toward a Ph.D. degree, or receiving an Ed.D. or master's specialist degree. It appears that the major professor was overly sensitive about the Petitioner's feelings, and he may not have bluntly advised Petitioner that he failed his dissertation, presentation, and defense. Petitioner considered his options and told his major professor that if it was possible, he would be amenable to accepting an Ed.D. degree. The major professor contacted administrative officials and was advised that the award of an Ed.D. degree would be possible. The major professor advised the Petitioner of that and told him that pending approval from the department chairman who had charge of the science education program, Petitioner could receive the Ed.D. degree. The major professor also advised Petitioner that some revisions would need to be made in the dissertation and that the title page would need to be retyped in order to reflect that it was being submitted in support of an Ed.D. degree. Petitioner complied with the direction to retype the first page, but made only minor revisions in the dissertation. Members of the supervisory committee signed off on the dissertation as being acceptable in support of an Ed.D. degree. The matter was submitted to the department chairman. The department chairman read the dissertation and concluded that it was grossly inadequate. He determined that he would not authorize the award of an Ed.D. degree because Petitioner would need to be properly accepted into an Ed.D. program before he could be awarded such a degree, and additionally because he considered the dissertation inadequate to support an Ed.D. degree. This action was communicated to the supervisory committee. The committee met again and determined that since the Ed.D. degree could not be awarded, that Petitioner should be given failing grades for the dissertation, presentation, and defense. Prior to the department chairman's review of the dissertation, Petitioner had paid his fees and was anticipating being awarded an Ed.D. degree. Since it was not approved by the department chairman, the degree was not awarded. Thereafter, the Petitioner opted not to apply to have his work considered in support of an Ed.D. degree or master's specialist degree. He continued working toward a Ph.D. degree for approximately six months. Ultimately, he decided to drop out of the program, and he initiated this proceeding.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, hereby, RECOMMENDED: That a final order be entered by Florida State University denying Petitioner's application for award of an Ed.D. degree and dismissing the Petition for Administrative Hearing. RECOMMENDED this 24th day of January, 1983, in Tallahassee, Florida. G. STEVEN PFEIFFER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of January, 1983. COPIES FURNISHED: John D. Carlson, Esquire Woods, Johnston & Carlson 1030 East Lafayette Street Suite 112 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Patricia A. Draper, Esquire Charles S. Ruberg, Esquire Florida State University Suite 311, Hecht House Tallahassee, Florida 32306 Dr. Bernard F. Sliger President Florida State University 211 Westcott Tallahassee, Florida 32306

Florida Laws (1) 120.57
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NOVA LISHON-SAVARINO vs DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, 08-001075 (2008)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Lauderdale Lakes, Florida Feb. 29, 2008 Number: 08-001075 Latest Update: Jul. 04, 2024
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JOHNNY MARTIN vs DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, 00-000712 (2000)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Jacksonville, Florida Feb. 11, 2000 Number: 00-000712 Latest Update: Feb. 06, 2001

The Issue Whether Petitioner has defaulted on student loans and, if so, the principal amounts due on the loans, as well as accrued interest, and collection costs. Whether Petitioner's employer should be required to withhold payments from Petitioner's pay pursuant to Section 112.175, Florida Statutes.

Findings Of Fact Petitioner is Johnny Martin. Petitioner's mailing address is 11431 Quailhollow Drive, Jacksonville, Florida. Respondent is the Florida Department of Education. The Department's business address is 325 West Gaines Street, Tallahassee, Florida. The Department is a guarantee agency which holds the loan account in question after paying the claim of the lender on July 28, 1994. All loans in this proceeding are Supplemental Loan(s) for Students (SLS), also known as Florida Auxiliary Loans. SLS loans are not subsidized by the federal government. Therefore, the federal government has no responsibility for payment of interest during periods of deferment or forbearance and there is no grace period for SLS loans. During any period of deferment or forbearance, such as when a borrower is unemployed, the borrower's repayment obligation may be suspended; however, interest accrues to the account for which the borrower is responsible. When the deferment or forbearance ends, the outstanding interest is capitalized on the loan. SLS loans accrue interest at the rate of 12 percent per year from the date of disbursement. Persons eligible to receive SLS loans include parents of dependent undergraduate students. As set forth below, Petitioner, as parent of an eligible dependent undergraduate student, received four SLS loans. Loan 1: Petitioner applied for and received Loan A000000442 in 1983. This loan, in the amount of $3,000.00, will be referred to as Loan 1. Although the Department is the guarantor of Loan 1, the lender never declared the loan in default or sold it to the Department. Therefore, Loan 1 is not at issue in this proceeding. Loan 2: Petitioner applied for and received Loan A000001064 in 1984. This loan, in the amount of $3,000.00, will be referred to as Loan 2. The lender declared Petitioner in default and sold Loan 2 to the Department as guarantor. Because Loan 2 was in repayment status for more than seven years, exclusive of suspensions of the repayment period, Loan 2 was discharged in bankruptcy. Therefore, Loan 2 is not at issue in this proceeding. Loan 3: Petitioner applied for and received Loan A000003767 in 1985. This loan, in the amount of $3,000.00, will be referred to as Loan 3. The lender declared Petitioner in default and transferred Loan 3 to the Department as guarantor. Because Loan 3 was in repayment status for more than seven years, exclusive of suspensions of the repayment period, Loan 3 was discharged in bankruptcy. Therefore, Loan 3 is not at issue in this proceeding. Loan 4: On or about August 5, 1986, Petitioner executed an Auxiliary (SLS) Loan application on behalf of his daughter, Kelly Aleta Martin, an eligible dependent undergraduate student. On or about September 8, 1986, Petitioner executed the promissory note for this loan. This SLS Loan was in the amount of $3,000.00. This loan was disbursed on or about October 9, 1986. The Department guaranteed this loan. Throughout exhibits presented by the Department, the loan number for this SLS Loan is A000007005; however, for convenience, herein this loan will be referred to as Loan 4. Loan 4 is the only loan at issue in this proceeding. Petitioner's first payment for Loan 4 was due October 25, 1986. The payment due date later changed to the 20th of each month. Petitioner's last payment to the lender was made on July 17, 1990. However, as Petitioner was behind in his payments, this payment was applied to the payment due May 20, 1990. The Petitioner is considered in repayment status for 44 months, from October 1986 through May 1990. A borrower is not considered in repayment status during any suspension of the repayment period, including any period of forbearance or deferment. Petitioner applied for and received an unemployment deferment on September 18, 1990. This deferment was for the period from July 21, 1990 through December 28, 1990. Because Petitioner was not current in his payments, he requested and received a forbearance from the lender for the payments due on June 20 and July 20, 1990, in order to qualify for the unemployment deferment. The forbearance together with the unemployment deferment brought Petitioner current in his payments; however, they suspended the repayment period for Loan 4 for seven months (two months for the forbearance and five months for the deferment). Petitioner failed to make any payments following the deferment period ending December 28, 1990. Petitioner applied for and received an unemployment deferment on April 23, 1991. This deferment was for the period from February 24 through July 23, 1991. Because Petitioner failed to make any payments following the deferment ending December 28, 1990, he again requested and received a forbearance for the payments due January 20 and February 20, 1991. The forbearance and unemployment deferment brought Petitioner current in his payments; however, they again suspended the repayment period for Loan 4 by another seven months (two months for the forbearance and five months for the deferment). Following Petitioner's unemployment deferment ending July 1991, he failed to resume payment to the lender beginning August 20, 1990. Thereafter, the lender declared Petitioner in default and made application to the Department for claim payment based on the guarantee. However, the Department refused to pay the lender's claim citing due diligence violations, and as a result, Petitioner is considered in repayment status from August 20, 1991 through April 20, 1992, or nine months, even though no payments were actually received by virtue of his Fresh Start Application. Petitioner submitted a Fresh Start Application to the lender dated May 13, 1992. This document reaffirmed the student loan obligation and, when received by the lender on May 19, 1992, reinstated the Department's guarantee of Loan 4. In an application dated May 24, 1992, Petitioner requested another unemployment deferment. The lender refused Petitioner's request for an unemployment deferment due to the fact that Petitioner was working at the time. However, the lender granted Petitioner a forbearance. This forbearance covered payments due from May 20 through December 20, 1992. Thereafter, Petitioner again requested and was granted forbearance of payments due through June 20, 1993. These forbearances, from May 20, 1992 through June 20, 1993, suspended the period Loan 4 is in repayment status by 14 months. Petitioner failed to resume payments beginning July 20, 1993, the final due date at default. In 1994, the lender declared Petitioner in default on Loan 4 and made application to the Department for claim payment based on the guarantee. The Department paid the default claim on Loan 4 on July 28, 1994. Although no payments were received from July 20, 1993 through July 20, 1994, or 13 months, Petitioner is considered in repayment status for that time because there was no forbearance or deferment in place. When the Department acquired Loan 4, Petitioner owed $2,195.68 in principal and $290.19 in accrued (claim) interest. These figures were capitalized by the Department and yield the figure of $2,484.18 in capitalized principal which is subject to interest at the rate of 12 percent per year. Beginning in 1995, Petitioner entered into a voluntary wage garnishment agreement with the Department. Under this agreement and through the period Petitioner was under the bankruptcy court's jurisdiction, a total of $383.95 was received by the Department and applied to Petitioner's account in accordance with Title 34, Code of Federal Regulations Section 682.404(f), relating to how borrower payments will be applied. The entire amount received was applied to outstanding interest. Prior to filing bankruptcy, Petitioner's Loan 4 was considered in repayment status from July 29, 1994 through January 5, 1995, during the time it was held by the Department. The Petitioner was credited for being in repayment status for five months, even though he made no payments. Additionally, Petitioner was credited for being in repayment status for 12 months in 1995, whether or not regular payments were received under Petitioner's voluntary wage garnishment agreement. Because Petitioner filed for bankruptcy prior to the January 20, 1996, the payment due date, the month of January 1996 cannot be counted as being in repayment status. Petitioner filed for Chapter 13 bankruptcy protection on January 11, 1996. The Department filed a proof of claim with the bankruptcy court for Loans 2, 3, and 4 in the principal amount of $5,571.91, the amount of capitalized principal due on the accounts. The Department filed with the court the claim of $5,647.02 due on the accounts through date of filing the case. See item 5 on page 2 of Department's Exhibit 5. This amount was the capitalized principal and interest due. On February 4, 1999, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Middle District of Florida, Jacksonville Division, issued an "Order Discharging Debtor After Completion of Chapter 13 Plan" in Petitioner's case, number 96-00175-3F3. That order provides in pertinent part, "The debtor is discharged for all debts provided for by the plan or disallowed under 11 U.S.C. [Section] 502, except any debt . . . for a student loan or educational benefit overpayment as specified in 11 U.S.C.[Section]523(a)(8)." In 1996, Title 11 United States Code Section 523(a) provided in pertinent part: A discharge under . . . this title does not discharge an individual debtor from any debt-- for an educational benefit overpayment or loan made, insured or guaranteed by a governmental unit, or made under any program funded in whole or part by a governmental unit or nonprofit institution, or for an obligation to repay funds received as an education benefit, scholarship or stipend, unless-- such loan, benefit, scholarship, or stipend overpayment first became due more than 7 years (exclusive of an applicable suspension of the repayment period) before the date of the filing of the petition . . . Pursuant to this order, Petitioner's debt to the Department for Loans 2 and 3 was discharged. The first payment for Loan 4 was due October 25, 1986. Petitioner filed for bankruptcy on January 11, 1996, nine days prior to the payment due date of January 20, 1996. There were 111 months from the month the first payment of Loan 4 was due through the month prior to the filing of bankruptcy (the month that bankruptcy was filed cannot be counted if the payment due date was after the date Petitioner filed for bankruptcy). Petitioner was in forbearance or deferment status for 28 months which suspends the period Loan 4 is considered in repayment status. Petitioner was in repayment status on Loan 4 for 83 months regardless of whether he actually made payments on the account. Therefore, Loan 4 was not discharged. Section 682.410(b)(2) of Title 34, Code of Federal Regulations, provides that the Department shall impose collection costs as follows: Collection charges. Whether or not provided for in the borrower's promissory note and subject to any limitation on the amount of those costs in that note, the guarantee agency shall charge a borrower an amount equal to reasonable costs incurred by the agency in collecting a loan on which the agency has paid a default or bankruptcy claim. These cost may include, but are not limited to, all attorneys fees, collection agency charges, and court costs. Except as provided in [Sections] 682.401(b)(27) and 682.405(b)(1)(iv), the amount charged borrower must equal the lesser of -- The amount the same borrower would be charged for the cost of collection under the formula in 34 CRF 30.60; or The amount the same borrower would be charged for the cost of collection in the loan was held by the U.S. Department of Education. The Department established that the amount of the annual collection cost mandated by Title 34 Code of Federal Regulations Section 682.410(b)(2) for the loan at issue in this proceeding should be calculated at least annually at the rate of 25 percent of the outstanding principal and accrued interest. Petitioner agreed to pay these costs in the application and promissory note he executed. Petitioner is employed by the Duval County School Board, a political subdivision of the State of Florida. As an employee of a political subdivision of the State of Florida, Petitioner is subject to the provisions of Section 112.175, Florida Statutes, and Chapter 28-40, Florida Administrative Code. These provisions pertain to employees of the State of Florida or its political subdivisions who have defaulted on an education loan made or guaranteed by the State of Florida. The Department notified Petitioner by letter dated August 13, 1999, that he had one or more student loans in default and offered him the opportunity to make voluntary payments on the loans. The letter also advised Petitioner that the Department would seek to make involuntary withholdings if he did not make voluntary payments. Petitioner elected to request the formal hearing which triggered this proceeding. As stated above, the capitalized principal due the Department for Loan 4 is $2,485.87. This amount reflects the principal due and the outstanding interest accrued on the account at the time the Department acquired the loan from the lender. All payments received by the Department were applied to outstanding interest which accrued on the account after the loan was bought by the Department, and no payment was applied to the capitalized principal. The capitalized principal accrues interest at the rate of 12 percent per year of $.82 per day. As of February 4, 1999, after taking into consideration the $383.95 received by the Department, the unpaid accrued interest for Loan 4 was $881.74. Pursuant to federal regulations collection costs assessed at the rate of 25 percent of principal and interest due as of February 4, 1999, were $867.08. Therefore, as of February 4, 1999, the total principal, interest, and collection costs due for Loan 4 totaled $4,234.69. Interest continues to accrue to the account as provided by law and collection costs may be reassessed as provided by law.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department enter a final order that adopts the findings of fact and conclusions of law contained herein, finds that Petitioner, as of February 4, 1999, owes the sum of $4,234.69, and orders the involuntary wage withholding of Petitioner's pay through his employer, Duval County School Board, pursuant to Section 112.175, Florida Statutes, and Chapter 28-40, Florida Administrative Code. DONE AND ENTERED this 22nd day of December, 2000, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of December, 2000. COPIES FURNISHED: Johnny Martin 11431 Quailhollow Drive Jacksonville, Florida 32218-3621 Ronald G. Stowers Assistant General Counsel Department of Education The Capitol, Suite 1701 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400 Honorable Tom Gallagher Commissioner of Education The Capitol, Plaza Level 08 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400 Michael H. Olenick, General Counsel Department of Education The Capitol, Suite 1701 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400

USC (1) 11 U. S. C. 523 Florida Laws (4) 112.175120.569120.6030.60 Florida Administrative Code (2) 28-40.00628-40.007
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ERIC J. SMITH, AS COMMISSIONER OF EDUCATION vs LEADERSHIP ACADEMY (5159)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Lauderdale Lakes, Florida Feb. 04, 2010 Number: 10-000531 Latest Update: Jul. 04, 2024
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MIAMI-DADE COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD vs DOUGLAS COOK, JR., 08-000318TTS (2008)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Miami, Florida Jan. 17, 2008 Number: 08-000318TTS Latest Update: Jul. 10, 2008

The Issue The issue is whether Respondent committed misconduct in office by applying for credential payment in reliance upon an online doctorate degree obtained without academic effort and thus violated Section 1012.33(6)(b), Florida Statutes, and Florida Administrative Code Rules 6B-4.009(3) and 6B-1.006(5).

Findings Of Fact Respondent is an assistant principal at Toussaint L'ouverture Elementary School in Miami. He graduated from the United States Naval Academy in Annapolis, Maryland, in 1978. While serving in the military in Pensacola, Respondent obtained a master's degree from Troy State University in 1985 by way of its extension program. Respondent is 54 years old. In 1994, when first employed as a teacher in the Miami- Dade County public school system, Respondent was admitted to the doctoral program in education leadership at the University of Miami. He attended classes a couple of times per week per course and submitted tuition reimbursement vouchers to Respondent. Respondent left that program the following year without completing the requirements for a doctoral degree. In 1996, Respondent reviewed brochures that he had received in the mail and decided to pursue his doctorate degree at Northwestern University, Ltd. He sent Northwestern International University, LLC, (NW) a check for about $8000 to a post office box in Brussels, but did not seek reimbursement from Respondent. For some reason, Respondent also decided to obtain a doctorate degree from Northeastern University (NE) and sent them a check for about $7000 to a post office box in New York, but again did not seek reimbursement. Respondent testified that he believed that he had already obtained the maximum reimbursement available to him. Respondent engaged in academic activities with both institutions from 1996-2000, but the activities did not rise in scope or intensity to those associated with a legitimate doctoral program. In 1998, Respondent applied for an assistant principal position, omitting any mention of his academic activities with NW and NE. He obtained the job. In 2000, Respondent completed his academic activities with NW and NE. NW sent him a transcript showing the completion of 19 courses and the Ph.D. dissertation, with grades assigned to each. Only one typo undermines the credibility of the transcript itself: the second "i" is dropped from "Administration" in a human resources course, but the transcript omits dates for the courses. Respondent received very good grades with only one C and A+s in Education Program Evaluation and his dissertation. Less care went into the preparation of the NE transcript, which also appears to culminate in the award of a Ph.D. "Curriculum" is spelled "Cirriculum, ""Philosophy" is spelled "Philosphy," and "Evaluation" is spelled "Evaluaton." The NE envelope covering the transcript misspelled "transcript." Respondent received all As and Bs. Shortly after obtaining his dual doctorates, Respondent submitted them to Petitioner. The credential payment program for administrators went into effect in April 2006, so Respondent's motivation at the time that he submitted the transcripts was to obtain the prestige, and perhaps advancement, that went with the advanced degrees. However, on June 8, 2006, Respondent submitted an application for the credential pay increment due to an administrator in possession of a relevant, legitimate doctorate degree. In the application, Respondent stated that he possessed a Ph.D. from NE, which he had obtained in 2000. He signed the application beside a statement, "I certify that all the foregoing information is true to the best of my knowledge." Respondent claims that he submitted papers, including dissertations, in connection with both programs, but offered no detailed description of his academic activities. Instead, he seems to be "sticking to his story" that he thought he was completing coursework from legitimate educational institutions, even though it is indisputable that he did not. At all material times, Respondent has known that NE and NW were diploma mills. He never explained why he spent the money and, presumably, time pursuing doctorate degrees at both institutions over the same timeframe. He is aware of the rigor of legitimate programs, having attended the Naval Academy, Troy State, and University of Miami. Respondent was undaunted by the sloppiness apparent in the transcripts. He claims now that, "[i]f there is any fault, in this matter, it is one of trusting the advertisements that I saw, brochures I received and the syllabi, course work and transcripts I received from the [sic] non-accredited institution." However, it is inescapably apparent that there was fault, and the fault is that Respondent, with the intent to deceive Petitioner, submitted these transcripts and a fraudulent application for credential pay, to which Respondent knew he was not entitled. There is no testimony explicitly to the effect that Respondent's fraudulent application for credential pay is so serious as to impair his effectiveness in the school system. However, this fact is inferred from the nature of a fraudulent application, to Respondent's professional employer, for credential pay based on fraudulently obtained academic credentials. After a conference for the record, Petitioner proceeded to discipline Respondent for his misconduct. By letter dated December 10, 2007, Petitioner informed Respondent that the Superintendent would be recommending to the School Board suspension without pay for "30 workdays," effective at the close of the workday on December 19, 2007. The School Board subsequently approved this recommendation and, by letter dated December 20, 2007, the Assistant Superintendent informed Respondent that he was suspended for "30 workdays" without pay and he was not to report to any work location from December 20, 2007, through February 13, 2008. The penalty is not excessive. At the final hearing, Respondent elected not to admit to his misdealings with his employer, but instead produced exculpatory witnesses, one of whom testified that she had done some typing for him and one of whom testified that he had seen the damage done to Respondent's home by a hurricane and a lot of water damage to Respondent's belongings. Respondent has evidently not yet accepted responsibility for his misconduct. Respondent rightly questions the accuracy of the Assistant Superintendent's calculation of the period of the suspension, which was to cover "30 workdays." Equating workdays with days for which Respondent was to be paid, Respondent claims that the suspension actually covers 40 workdays, not 30 workdays. The Manual of Procedures of Managerial Exempt Personnel, dated April 18, 2006, states at Section B-3 that a 12-month employee works a 260-day work year. This means that he works 52 weeks times five days per week, for a total of 260 days. Respondent's suspension started December 20, so, in accordance with the determination of the School Board, the suspension should have ended at the close of the workday on January 30.

Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner enter a final order finding Respondent guilty of misconduct in office for intentionally misrepresenting his academic qualifications in applying for credential pay for a doctorate degree and imposing a 30-workday suspension, as previously authorized by the School Board, but paying Respondent back pay for the period after January 30 through which the suspension was mistakenly implemented. DONE AND ENTERED this 9th day of May, 2008, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ROBERT E. MEALE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of May, 2008. COPIES FURNISHED: Dr. Rudolph F. Crew, Superintendent Miami-Dade County School Board 1450 Northeast Second Avenue, No. 912 Miami, Florida 33132-1308 Deborah K. Kearney, General Counsel Department of Education Turlington Building, Suite 1244 325 West Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400 Dr. Eric J. Smith Commissioner of Education Department of Education Turlington Building, Suite 1514 325 West Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400 James C. Casey, Esquire Law Offices of Slesnick & Casey, LLP 2701 Ponce de Leon Boulevard, Suite 200 Coral Gables, Florida 33134 Janeen L. Richard, Esquire Miami-Dade County School Board Attorney's Office 1450 Northeast 2nd Avenue, Suite 400 Miami, Florida 33132

Florida Laws (1) 1012.33 Florida Administrative Code (3) 6B-1.0016B-1.0066B-4.009
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