Findings Of Fact In early July, 1972, Donald R. and Pamela S. Leininger (buyer) entered into a contract to purchase a residence through Sun Up Realty with its salesman, Bernard Zapel. The real property involved and Sun Up Realty were owned by Defendant, Norman N. Zipkin either as sole proprietor or as sole shareholder of the corporation in whose name the property was held. Disclosure of the role of Defendant as owner-seller was not an issue in these proceedings. Buyer executed two contracts for the purchase of the property both dated July 9, 1972. The first contract acknowledged receipt of $100 as a deposit with a down payment to be made of $1750 with the buyer obtaining a mortgage of $33,250. Noted on this contract are two additional payments of $650 and $1,000. All of these deposits were payable to and deposited in Sun Up Realty's Escrow Account. The second deposit receipt contract was also dated July 9, 1972 and receipt of $1750 was thereon acknowledged by seller. The sale price of $35,000 applied to both contracts. The second contract provided as terms and conditions of sale that the buyer would make an additional deposit of $1700 before closing and that buyer was to apply for, qualify, and obtain a mortgage insured by FHA. Papers to so qualify were sent to the bank but buyer never qualified for the loan. The Administrative Complaint indicates that the first document executed by the buyer provided for an FHA insured mortgage; the evidence presented was as noted above. Apparently to allow buyer additional time to qualify for the loan Defendant leased the premises to buyer pursuant to lease agreement (Exhibit 5). Although Defendant testified buyer paid him nothing while he occupied the house pursuant to this lease agreement, in his deposition (Exhibit 1) buyer presented a receipt for one month's rent paid to the seller for the premises. Buyer never qualified for the mortgage because the lending agency was never satisfied from whence the additional $1700 down payment was to come. Although no evidence was presented on this point it appears that this additional deposit was required for buyer to reach a 10 percent down payment on the price of the residence. The July 9, 1972 deposit receipt contract that was in effect with respect to this transaction provides in pertinent part: "2. An additional sum of seventeen hundred dollars ($1700) shall be deposited with Escrow Agent before closing. In the event such sum is not so deposited, Seller at his option may cancel and terminate this agreement." "3. Buyer to apply for, qualify for, and obtain a Mortgage insured by the FHA Section in an amount not less than $31,550. In the event the Buyer fails to qualify for said mortgage, all said deposit shall be returned immediately, less the cost of the credit report. "14. It is mutually agreed that the trans action shall be closed and the Buyer shall pay the balance of the first payment and execute any and all papers necessary to be executed by him for the completion of this purchase within days from the aforementioned abstract of title, or such time as shall reasonably be required by seller to make such title good, otherwise the herein named Escrow Agent is hereby directed by both Seller and Buyer to divide the monies being held by said Escrow Agent, under the terms under this Contract between the Seller and Broker herein named as hereinafter provided." "It is further agreed that in case of default by the Buyers, the Seller may at his option take legal action at law and/or in equity to enforce this Contract, in which event, the Buyer shall pay reasonable attorney fees and court costs; or else the Seller may at his option retain one half of the deposit herein paid as considera tion for the release of the Buyer by the Seller from any and all further obligations under this Contract to the Seller, which release shall be implied from such act of retention by the Seller." Buyer quit the premises in October, 1972 and thereafter demanded return of his deposit from seller. By letter from buyer's attorney (Exhibit 6) dated March 19, 1973 demand was made for return of the deposit. By letter dated March 23, 1973 (Exhibit 7) Seller denied the refund of the deposit on grounds that the buyer had breached the contract as the Buyer had qualified for and been approved for a mortgage by the Collateral Mortgage Co. The money was withdrawn from the escrow account and paid to the seller. Defendant is an attorney, mortgage broker, general contractor, developer and real estate broker. For the past decade he has devoted most of his energies toward real estate development. This is the first time charges have been preferred against him by the Florida Real Estate Commission.
The Issue The issue is whether Respondents' real estate licenses should be disciplined on the ground that Respondents allegedly violated a rule and various provisions within Chapter 475, Florida Statutes, as charged in the Administrative Complaint.
Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, the following findings of fact are determined: When the events herein occurred, Respondents, Edward D. Armbruster and Colleen Michele Armbruster, were licensed real estate brokers having been issued license numbers 0002159 and 0362890, respectively, by Petitioner, Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Division of Real Estate (Division). Respondents served as qualifying brokers and officers of Respondent, Armbruster Realty, Inc., a corporation registered as a real estate broker and located at 1031 West Nelson Avenue, DeFuniak Springs, Florida. The corporation holds license number 0211855, also issued by the Division. On July 10, 1996, Gerald and Joyce Singleton, who had just relocated to California, entered into a contract with James B. and Joyce Patten to sell their single-family residence located on Madison Street in the City of Freeport, Florida, for a price of $78,000.00. The contract called for the Pattens to pay $1,000.00 as an earnest money deposit, to be held in escrow by Respondents. The contract further provided that "[c]losing shall be within 30 days (more or less) after acceptance of this contract," and that "[i]n the event that buyer defaults and deposit is forfeited, it is agreed said deposit shall be divided equally between seller and broker." The transaction was handled by Geraldine Dillon (Dillon), a salesperson in Respondents' office, who is now retired. Because the Pattens had recently moved to Walton County from Washington State, and they were temporarily living with a relative in a mobile home, the time for closing was of the essence. Accordingly, the Pattens inserted into the contract a provision requiring that a closing be held within "30 days (more or less)." This meant that a closing should be held on or about August 10, 1996, give or take a few days. The parties acknowledge that property boundary problems were somewhat common in certain areas of Freeport, including the area where the subject property was located. To satisfy the bank and title company, a surveyor was engaged to prepare a survey of the property. However, the parties agree that the surveyor noted problems with the boundaries of the lot. When a second surveyor would not undertake the survey because of similar boundary problems, Joyce Patten, who was the principal negotiator for the couple, notified Dillon that they did not wish to close because of potential title problems and wanted a refund of their deposit. Notwithstanding this concern, Dillon advised Joyce Patten that a third surveyor would be hired, at the seller's expense, and he could "certify" the property. Although Joyce Patten expressed concern that the bank might not accept a third survey after two earlier ones had failed, and she did not want to pay for another survey, she did not instruct Dillon to stop the process. Accordingly, Dillon engaged the services of Tommy Jenkins, a local surveyor, to perform another survey. After a certified survey was obtained by Jenkins on August 12, 1996, which Respondents represent without contradiction satisfied the lender and title company, a closing was scheduled within the next few days. This closing date generally conformed to the requirement that a closing be held by August 10, 1996, "more or less." The seller, who by now had relocated to California, flew to Florida for the closing, and the title company prepared a closing statement and package. Just before the closing, however, Respondents learned through a representative of the title company that the Pattens were "cancelling the closing," apparently in violation of the contract. Shortly after the aborted closing, Joyce Patten requested that Dillon return their deposit. By this time, the Pattens had already entered into a second contract to buy another home in the same area and closed on that property before the end of August. Respondents were never informed of this fact by the Pattens. On August 21, 1996, Colleen Armbruster prepared a rather lengthy letter to the Pattens (with a copy to the sellers) in which she acknowledged that they had orally requested from Dillon that their escrow deposit be returned. The letter has been received in evidence as Petitioner's Exhibit 4. Armbruster stated that she was "perplexed" that they were demanding a refund of their earnest money deposit, given the fact that the seller had "met the terms and conditions of the sale." Armbruster outlined the three reasons in the contract which would allow the Pattens to withdraw without forfeiting their deposit, but noted that none were applicable here. Accordingly, she advised them that the seller would be consulted as to his wishes regarding the deposit, and that the Pattens should contact her if they had any questions. Through oversight, however, she did not include a notice to the Pattens that they must respond to her letter within a stated period of time reaffirming their demand for the trust funds, or the deposit thereafter would be disbursed pursuant to the contract. By failing to include this specific language, and sending the letter by regular rather than certified mail, return receipt requested, Respondents committed a technical, albeit minor, violation of an agency rule. Even so, the Pattens acknowledged receiving the letter, and there is no reason to believe that they did not understand its import, especially the requirement that they contact the broker if they disagreed with the proposed disbursement of the money. It can be reasonably inferred that the Pattens did not respond because they "figured [they weren't] going to be able to get [their] money back" due to their failure to perform. On September 13, 1996, the seller's attorney advised the Pattens by letter that the seller considered the deposit forfeited pursuant to paragraph 15(a) of the contract, which pertains to the "Default" provisions. The Pattens never responded to either letter, and they also failed to respond to telephone calls made by Respondents or their agents regarding this matter. In view of the Pattens' lack of response or reaffirmance of their demand, and the fact that they had already closed on another property, Respondents logically and fairly assumed that the Pattens were in agreement with the disbursement procedures outlined in Coleen Armbruster's letter of August 21. Accordingly, on September 17, 1996, Edward Armbruster, who had not been involved in this transaction to date, in good faith signed two disbursement checks giving $697.50 to the seller and retaining the balance for his firm. This division was consistent with the terms of the contract. In making this disbursement, there was no intent on the part of Respondents to trick, deceive, breach their trust, or in any way unlawfully deprive the Pattens of their deposit. Respondents did not notify the Florida Real Estate Commission (Commission) that they had received conflicting demands for a deposit, nor institute any other procedures regarding the deposit, since they no longer had any good faith doubt as to whom was entitled to their trust funds. This was because the Pattens had failed to respond to letters and telephone calls regarding the sellers' claim to the deposit. There is no evidence that Respondents have ever been the subject of prior disciplinary action during their lengthy tenure as licensees. At the same time, it is noted that Respondents acted in good faith throughout the process and genuinely believed that there was no dispute. It should also be recognized that, for at least part of the time, the Pattens were working two contracts simultaneously without advising the realtors.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Real Estate Commission enter a Final Order finding Respondents guilty of a technical violation of Rule 61J2-10.032(1), Florida Administrative Code, and Section 475.25(1)(e), Florida Statutes, and that they be given a reprimand. All other charges should be dismissed. DONE AND ENTERED this 28th day of July, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of July, 1998. COPIES FURNISHED: Henry M. Solares, Director Division of Real Estate Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802-1900 Christine M. Ryall, Esquire 400 West Robinson Street Suite N-308 Orlando, Florida 32801-1772 Edward D. Armbruster Colleen M. Armbruster Post Office Box 635 DeFuniak Springs, Florida 32433 Lynda L. Goodgame, Esquire Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792
The Issue Respondents' alleged violation of subsection 475.25(1)(a), 475.25(1)(c), and 475.25(3), Florida Statutes, as set forth in the Administrative Complaint. Inasmuch as Respondents were not represented by legal counsel at the hearing, the Hearing Officer explained their rights in administrative proceedings to James F. Catron who elected to represent himself and Cooke Catron Realty, Inc.
Findings Of Fact Cooke Catron Realty, Inc. is now and was at all times alleged in the Administrative Complaint a corporation registered as a real estate broker doing business at 5805 Margate Boulevard, Margate, Florida. Respondent James F. Catron is now and was at all times alleged in the Administrative Complaint a registered real estate broker and the active broker and officer of Cooke Catron Realty, Inc. (Stipulation) In January, 1976, Richard H. Goodwin, Jr. and Christine S. Goodwin, his wife, owned a four-unit apartment building at 7650 Southwest 10th Court, North Lauderdale, Florida, described as Lot 7, Block 13, Lauderdale North Park, Section 3. The Goodwins were having marital difficulties and decided to separate at this time and divest themselves of mutually-owned property. In a conversation with a salesman for respondents, Mr. Goodwin learned that James F. Catron was in the business of purchasing investment properties and reselling the same whereupon he would divide any profit with the former owner. Goodwin thereafter entered into negotiations with Catron for the sale of the apartment building. It was orally agreed that Catron would pay $62,700.00 for the property with a $1,000.00 down payment, and assume a first mortgage with Southern Federal Savings and Loan Association of Broward County in the amount of approximately $57,400.00 and a second mortgage with Seacrest Homes, Inc., John E. Abdo, Trustee, in the approximate amount of $5,300.00. It was further agreed that Catron would pay the Goodwins 30 percent of 80 percent of any net profit realized when he resold the property. As a consequence of this agreement, the Goodwins, on January 19, 1976, executed a deposit receipt contract embodying the above terms except that it recited the receipt of $10.00 as a deposit rather than $1,000.00, and made no mention of assumption of the mortgages. However, the sum of $1,000.00 was paid to the Goodwins by Catron. Although Mr. Goodwin testified that Catron signed this contract, Catron denied it and no such contract signed by Catron was placed in evidence at the hearing. (Testimony of R. Goodwin, C. Goodwin, Catron, Petitioner's exhibit 1) Mr. Goodwin, on January 19, 1976, executed a document authorizing Cooke Catron Realty, Inc. to collect rents from the tenants of the apartment building. Catron, anticipating consummation of the purchase, proceeded to collect rentals in the amount of approximately $800.00 per month for the next four and one-half months, for total collections of approximately $3,600.00. He also made some repairs to the property and paid utilities bills. The Goodwins believed that he would take steps to assume the two mortgages on the property and take over the payments thereon. Although Mr. Goodwin testified that he and his wife had executed a warranty deed and delivered it to Catron, Catron denied receipt of such a deed and it was not produced at the hearing. Accordingly, it cannot be found that such a deed was in fact executed and delivered. The rents were collected by a limited partnership called Forest Run, Limited, of which Catron was a partner. Although the February payments were made on the mortgages, they were discontinued when Catron discovered that he could not assume the second mortgage from Seacrest Homes, Inc. without payment of $1,000.00 to the trustee, Abdo. As a consequence, the Goodwins filed suit against the respondents in the Broward County Circuit Court on June 23, 1976, requesting that any agreements concerning the property be rescinded, and that an accounting be ordered and a receiver appointed to administer and manage the property in question. A receiver was appointed by the court. Thereafter, in August 1976, Southern Federal Savings and Loan Association filed suit to foreclose its mortgage on the property and obtained summary judgment in the Broward County Circuit Court on January 25, 1977. The property was thereafter sold at public sale and bought in by Southern Federal. On January 25, 1977, the suit of the Goodwins against respondents was dismissed by stipulation after the parties had reached an amicable settlement in the matter. (Testimony of R. Goodwin, C. Goodwin, Petitioner's Exhibits 2-4)
Recommendation That the charges against the respondents, James F. Catron and Cooke Catron Realty, Inc., be dismissed. DONE and ENTERED this 26th day of October, 1977, in Tallahassee, Florida. THOMAS C. OLDHAM Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings 530 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 COPIES FURNISHED: Frederick H. Wilsen, Esquire Florida Real Estate Commission 2699 Lee Road Winter Park, Florida 32789 James F. Catron and Cooke Catron Realty, Inc. 5805 Margate Boulevard Margate, Florida 33063
Findings Of Fact Respondent Martha M. Bustillo is a real estate broker licensed in the State of Florida, having been issued license number 0401092. At all times material hereto, she has been the qualifying broker for Respondent Virmar Investments, Inc. Respondent Virmar Investments, Inc., is a real estate brokerage corporation licensed in the State of Florida, having been issued license number 0237551. At no time material hereto has Respondent Olga Venedicto been licensed in the State of Florida as either a real estate broker or as a real estate salesperson. In July of 1992 Thomas F. Sevilla contacted Virmar Investments, looking for a house to buy. Olga Venedicto took his phone call and told him that she would help him. Sevilla went to Venedicto's "office" at Virmar Investment and began working with her. Venedicto gave Sevilla her business card which represented that she is the vice president of Virmar Investments, Inc., and carries the notation "registered real estate brokers." In addition to giving him her card which carried her name, Virmar's name, and the word "brokers" in the plural form rather than the singular form, Venedicto specifically told Sevilla that she was a broker. Venedicto and Bustillo took Sevilla to see a house which he decided to buy. He gave Venedicto his check for $2,000 as a deposit and instructed her and Bustillo to make an offer on that house. Venedicto told him she would put the money in Virmar's escrow account. Instead, the money was deposited in Virmar's operating account. Sevilla did not buy that house, and Venedicto and Bustillo took him to see a second house. Sevilla decided not to make an offer on that house and asked Venedicto to refund his money. It took a month before Sevilla received a check from Venedicto. Although the check was marked "deposit return," the check was not written from Virmar's account but rather was a check from a Mega Group Corp. for only $1,675. When Sevilla attempted to cash that check, it was dishonored three times, with the notation "N. S. F." Finally, the check was honored by the bank. Sevilla had expected to receive his entire $2,000 deposit. Neither Venedicto nor Bustillo had ever told him in advance that they would keep part of his money. Although Respondents' attorney during the final hearing implied that his clients may have kept part of Sevilla's money to pay for a survey and credit report, Sevilla had not agreed in advance to pay for a credit report, and no evidence was offered as to what house Sevilla might have purchased a survey on or for what reason. Further, neither Venedicto nor Bustillo gave him a copy of any survey or credit report nor was he ever shown one or advised that either would be obtained. When Sevilla inquired as to why he was reimbursed the lesser amount, only then did Venedicto tell him that Respondents were keeping part of his money for a credit report. Respondents Bustillo and Virmar authorized and assisted Venedicto in her performance of acts and services requiring licensure as a salesperson relative to the transaction with Sevilla. Rita and Carlos Benitez listed their house for sale with Pedro Realty. Gladys Diaz was the listing agent at Pedro Realty. Respondents Bustillo and Venedicto brought Carlos Martinez and his wife to look at the Benitez house. Gladys Diaz was present at the time. Respondents Bustillo and Venedicto subsequently came to Diaz' office and presented to Diaz and Carlos Benitez an offer on behalf of Mr. and Mrs. Martinez. Respondent Venedicto represented herself to be a realtor and Respondent Bustillo to be Venedicto's partner and broker. Respondent Venedicto discussed the contract and price with Diaz and Benitez while Respondent Bustillo observed Venedicto's presentation. The offer had previously been signed on behalf of Respondent Virmar by Respondent Venedicto who represented to Diaz that the signature on the offer was that of Respondent Venedicto. Mr. Benitez signed the document, and Diaz then took the offer to Mrs. Benitez to obtain her signature. Mrs. Benitez also signed the offer, thereby completing the contract. Thereafter, delays ensued because Mr. and Mrs. Martinez were not in a financial position to be able to purchase the home. Respondent Venedicto contacted Mrs. Benitez and attempted to re-negotiate the contract. During those negotiations which were not successful, Respondent Venedicto represented herself to Mrs. Benitez as being a licensed real estate agent. In response to Mrs. Benitez' inquiries, Respondent Venedicto gave Benitez her business card carrying the names of Venedicto and Virmar and the notation "registered real estate brokers." As to the portion of the transaction involving Mrs. Benitez, all of her contact with the three Respondents in this cause was with Respondent Venedicto. Venedicto gave Benitez advice regarding proceeding with the sale and handled the negotiations. Prior to September 24, 1992, Hector F. Sehweret, an investigator for the Department of Business and Professional Regulation, requested that Respondents Bustillo and Virmar produce certain records for inspection by him. He spoke with Respondent Bustillo on a number of occasions to no avail. He offered to give her time to gather the records if necessary, but she never did. On September 24, 1992, he served Respondent Bustillo with a subpoena for those records. She still failed to produce them. Thereafter, she would not return his phone calls, and when he came to the office of Virmar Investments, Respondent Bustillo would hide from him. Neither Respondent Bustillo nor Respondent Virmar have ever produced the records subpoenaed. Further, no explanation has been given for the failure of Respondents Bustillo and Virmar to produce their records. Although the attorney for Respondents implied during the final hearing that the records may have been destroyed by Hurricane Andrew, there is no evidence to support that implication; rather, the evidence is uncontroverted that the building housing the real estate office of Respondents Virmar and Bustillo was not damaged by Hurricane Andrew. Ileana Hernandez is a realtor and a mortgage broker licensed in the State of Florida. She met Respondents Bustillo and Venedicto during a real estate transaction. In November of 1991 Respondents Bustillo and Venedicto contacted Hernandez regarding obtaining money in exchange for a second mortgage on certain real property. At the time, Respondents did not tell Hernandez the identity of the owner of the property, but Hernandez was given the address of the property and was advised that the market value of the property was approximately $79,000. Hernandez was subsequently advised that Respondent Venedicto (a/k/a Olga Bichara) was the owner of the property. It was agreed that Respondent Venedicto would execute and record the promissory note and mortgage in the amount of $15,500. Hernandez, who knew that Respondent Bustillo was the president of Terra Title, gave her a personal check payable to Terra Title in the amount of $15,000 on November 26, 1991. Respondent Venedicto, who had promised Hernandez that the promissory note and second mortgage would be recorded, never recorded those documents. Further, Respondents never delivered the original copy of the promissory note and mortgage to Hernandez despite her repeated demands. Hernandez later discovered that Respondent Venedicto was not the sole owner of the property which she had attempted to mortgage but jointly owned the property with her son. Accordingly, Respondent Venedicto's signature would not be sufficient to perfect a mortgage on the property. Hernandez also discovered that the mortgage, represented by Bustillo and Venedicto to be a second mortgage, was not. There were already two mortgages on the property. Had Hernandez known the true ownership and the true encumbrances on the property, she would not have loaned Venedicto the $15,000 because that raised the total amount of mortgages on the property to be in excess of the value of the property. Three checks which were subsequently written by Respondent Bustillo from the operating accounts of Respondent Virmar and of Mega Group Corp. were dishonored by the bank with the notation "N. S. F." As a result of those checks, Hernandez obtained default final judgments against Respondent Virmar and against Mega Group Corp., which final judgments are still unsatisfied. Prior to that time, however, Respondents Venedicto and Bustillo approached Hernandez regarding their need to borrow $35,000 to be re-paid in 30 days in conjunction with some real estate development in which Respondents Venedicto and Bustillo were involved. Respondent Venedicto and Respondent Bustillo each individually represented that Hernandez would have her money back in 30 days. Respondent Bustillo told Hernandez that Respondent Venedicto was in business with Bustillo and was selling real estate in Mexico. Bustillo asked Hernandez to make the check payable to Bustillo's company Terra Title. Hernandez went to the offices of Respondent Virmar and handed her personal check made payable to Terra Title to Respondent Venedicto. When the 30 days had passed with no payments to Hernandez, she went to Virmar Investments and made Respondent Venedicto sign a promissory note for $35,000. By the time of the final hearing in this cause, Hernandez had recovered only $15,000 of the $35,000 loan made to Respondent Venedicto and had recovered only the principal amount of the money supposed to have been secured by a second mortgage on real property. Hernandez is still owed $20,000 in principal alone.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered revoking the license of Respondent Martha M. Bustillo, revoking the license of Respondent Virmar Investments, Inc., and requiring Respondent Olga Venedicto to pay an administrative penalty in the amount of $5,000 within 30 days from the entry of the Final Order. DONE and ENTERED this 31st day of January, 1994, at Tallahassee, Florida. LINDA M. RIGOT Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of January, 1994. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER DOAH CASE NO. 93-3328, 93-3329, and 93-3330 Petitioner's proposed findings of fact numbered 2-18, 20-29, and 31-33 have been adopted either verbatim or in substance in this Recommended Order. Petitioner's proposed finding of fact numbered 1 has been rejected as not constituting findings of fact but rather as constituting argument of counsel, conclusions of law, or recitation of the testimony. Petitioner's proposed finding of fact numbered 19 has been rejected as not being supported by the weight of the evidence in this cause. Petitioner's proposed finding of fact numbered 30 has been rejected as being unnecessary to the issues involved herein. Respondents' proposed findings of fact numbered 1, 4, 5, 8, 9, 18, 25, 26, 28, 37, 42, 49-52, 55, 57, 62, 63, 69, 71, and 73 have been adopted either verbatim or in substance in this Recommended Order. Respondents' proposed findings of fact numbered 2, 6, 11-17, 19-22, 30- 36, 43, 46-48, 53, 54, 56, 58, 60, 67 and 68 have been rejected as not constituting findings of fact but rather as constituting argument of counsel, conclusions of law, or recitation of the testimony. Respondents' proposed findings of fact numbered 7, 10, 23, 29, 61, 64, 65, 70, 72, and 75 have been rejected as not being supported by the weight of the evidence in this cause. Respondents' proposed findings of fact numbered 3, 24, 27, 38-41, 44, and 45 have been rejected as being unnecessary to the issues involved herein. Respondents' proposed findings of fact numbered 59, 66, 74, and 76-78 are rejected as being irrelevant to the issues under consideration in this cause. COPIES FURNISHED: Steven W. Johnson, Esquire Department of Business and Professional Regulation Division of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street, Suite N-308A Orlando, Florida 32802-1900 Ofer M. Amir, Esquire Amir & Associates, P.A. 8751 West Broward Boulevard, Suite 500 Plantation, Florida 33324 Darlene F. Keller, Division Director Department of Business and Professional Regulation Division of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street Orlando, Florida 32802-1900 Jack McRay, Acting General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation Northwood Centre 1940 North Monroe Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792
The Issue Whether Respondent violated Section 475.025(1)(b), Florida Statutes, and, if so, what the appropriate penalty is.
Findings Of Fact At all times relevant hereto, O. Dane Streets was licensed by the Florida Real Estate Commission as a real estate broker having been issued License No. 0085710-1 for an address in Lakeland, Florida. In the Spring or early Summer of 1991, Nathan Price, a minister in Orlando, Florida, contacted Respondent to solicit Respondent's participation in representing Price's daughter, Melissa Howard, in purchasing real estate in Orlando. Price and Respondent have been business and social acquaintances for more than 10 years, and Price was helping his daughter and son-in-law in purchasing a home. The Howard's found a house they liked, Respondent obtained the listing information from the listing broker and prepared a contract for sale and purchase (Exhibit 1). As modified and accepted by all parties, this contract provided for a $1000 earnest money deposit to be held in escrow by Respondent's real estate company. In lieu of obtaining the deposit from Price or Howard, Respondent told Howard to give the earnest money deposit to the selling broker as all of the transactions were to be conducted in Orlando. The $1000 earnest money deposit was given to neither Respondent nor the listing broker, ReMax Southwest in Orlando. The failure of Respondent to follow up to insure that the earnest money deposit had been given to the listing broker in this transaction does not reach the status of fraud or dishonest dealing as Respondent had no such intent. Shortly before the August 21, 1991 closing date, Price advised Respondent that the mortgage lender was asking about the earnest money deposit. Respondent immediately obtained a cashier's check dated August 8, 1991 (Exhibit 2) in the amount of $1000 which Price presented at the closing on August 21, 1991. In his testimony, Respondent acknowledged that he erred in not obtaining the earnest money deposit or failing to check to be sure the deposit had been made with the listing broker. Since Respondent is located in Lakeland and the property being purchased is in Orlando when the closing was held, Respondent thought everything would be simplified if the deposit was held by the listing broker. When the listing broker learned that the deposit of $1000 had never been received by Respondent and placed in escrow, a complaint was made to the Florida Real Estate Commission, and these proceedings followed. Respondent has held licenses from the Florida Real Estate Commission for some 20 years, and this is the first time any charges have been brought against his license.
Recommendation It is Recommended that a Final Order be entered finding O. Dane Streets not guilty of violating Section 475.25(1)(b), Florida Statutes, as alleged. ENTERED this 21st day of January, 1992, in Tallahassee, Florida. K. N. AYERS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Desoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of January, 1992. Copies furnished to: Steven N. Johnson, Esquire Darlene F. Keller Division of Real Estate Division Director 400 W. Robinson Street Division of Real Estate Post Office Box 1900 400 W. Robinson Street Orlando, FL 32801-1900 Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, FL 32801-1900 O. Dane Streets Post Office Box 6852 Jack McRay, Esquire Lakeland, FL 33807 Department of Professional Regulation 1940 N. Monroe Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0792
The Issue Whether the license #16-7170-H of Robert A. Rinehart should be suspended or revoked, or whether a civil penalty should be assessed.
Findings Of Fact The Respondent, Robert A. Rinehart, trading as 629 Apartments, was at all times pertinent to this cause licensed as a public lodging establishment, holding license control #16-7170-H. A notice to show cause and notice of hearing' was served upon Respondent Rinehart, notifying him that certain evidence had been presented which, if true, was good and sufficient reason to cause his license to be suspended or revoked or to have a fine assessed against him. The Notice to Show Cause indicated also that an administrative hearing would be held to which the Respondent would receive notice, and was dated December 5, 1978. No answer was filed to the Notice to Show Cause. The Notice of Hearing was mailed April 26, 1979, and was returned. The Respondent did not appear at the administrative hearing or send a representative to testify in his behalf. It is found that the address to which the Notice of Hearing was sent was the same address as provided on the existing license held by Respondent, which is active until December 1, 1980. This address is the same address as indicated on the standard form apartment lease entered into evidence as Petitioner's Exhibit 2. The Respondent is under obligation to keep the Petitioner Division advised of his current address to be shown on his official records in the Division of Hotels and Restaurants, Department of Business Regulation, State of Florida. In December of 1976, Respondent Rinehart rented, or permitted his agent to rent, an apartment in 629 Apartments to Carol Miller. Ms. Miller was required to pay a security deposit in the sum of $100.00 shortly after renting the apartment, and later paid an additional security deposit of $35.00 upon acquiring a pet. Subsequently Ms. Miller moved from the apartment after personally notifying Respondent Rinehart of her intent to vacate the rented premises at a time in excess of thirty (30) days before the intended date of her departure. Ms. Miller then again informed Respondent of her intent to move and requested that he give her an address where he could be contacted and to also return her security deposits, however Respondent did not do so. Ms. Miller moved from the licensed premises in September of 1978, and has not received her security deposits, nor has there been a claim submitted by Respondent Rinehart for the deposit. Entered into evidence was a typed rental agreement and a receipt for various sums of monies growing out of the rental agreement with Respondent Rinehart. The testimony of Carol Miller, together with the evidence submitted, is sufficient to show that Respondent Rinehart in fact received security deposits from Ms. Miller as a tenant and failed to return said security deposits to her or to make a claim against them. A proposed recommended order was submitted by the Petitioner Division, and this instrument was considered in the writing of this Order. To the extent the proposed findings of fact have not been adopted in, or are inconsistent with, factual findings in this Order they have been specifically rejected as being irrelevant or not having been supported by the evidence.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the Hearing Officer recommends that a civil penalty be assessed in the amount of $250.00 to be imposed upon the Respondent, Robert A. Rinehart t/a 629 Apartments. DONE and ORDERED this 31st day of August, 1979, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DELPHENE C. STRICKLAND Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 101, Collins Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Mary Jo M. Gallay, Esquire Robert A. Rinehart t/a Department of Business 629 Apartments Regulation 629 NE 5th Avenue 725 South Bronough Street Fort Lauderdale, Florida Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue Whether a civil penalty should be assessed against the Respondent, or whether the license held by Respondent should be suspended or revoked.
Findings Of Fact The Respondent, Carolina Rosenberg, trading as Eastview Apartments, is licensed by the Petitioner, the Division of Hotels and Restaurants, Department of Business Regulation, and is in business at 1530 Washington Avenue in Miami Beach, Florida. A Notice to Show Cause was issued by Petitioner on September 1, 1978, notifying Respondent that certain evidence, which, if true, is good and sufficient cause pursuant to Section 509.261, Florida Statutes, to assess a civil penalty against the Respondent, or to suspend or revoke her License #23- 5830H for failure to return a security deposit of $175.00 to Paul C. Kent and failure to provide a written notice making a claim against said security deposit. Paul C. Kent was a tenant in Eastview Apartments, Unit #518, from September of 1977, through June, 1978. As a condition of renting such unit, Mr. Kent was required to and did pay a security deposit in the amount of $175.00. Mr. Kent was not required to and did not sign a written lease, and at no time during his tenancy was he furnished with a copy of Section 83.49, Florida Statutes. He was not furnished with any specific address for Respondent Rosenberg, the owner, or for a person authorized to receive written notices on her behalf. Mr. Kent said that he gave the manager of Eastview Apartments thirty (30) days' oral notice of his intent to terminate his tenancy. Respondent Rosenberg was notified personally of his intention to terminate his tenancy two (2) weeks before the end of the last month for which he paid rent. No written notice was furnished to Mr. Kent of the Respondent's intention to impose a claim upon his security deposit, and such monies were not returned to him. Respondent Rosenberg testified that the tenant, Mr. Kent, had moved out in the middle of the month, that she felt she had the right to retain the security deposit for the expense of getting the apartment ready to lease again, and that Mr. Kent never came back to ask for the security deposit. Submitted into evidence without objection was a receipt for rental payments dated August 30, 1977, on which it was stated "Received from Paul C. Kent $50.00 for security deposit on 518," and "Balance due $125.00." Said receipt was signed by Kay Kukla, who was the manager of Eastview Apartments at that time. A receipt for $25.00, signed by said manager, was marked "Balance of security paid in full." The Petitioner Division submitted a memorandum of law. This instrument was considered in the writing of this order. To the extent the proposed memorandum has not been adopted in, or is inconsistent with, factual findings in this order it has been specifically rejected as being irrelevant or not having been supported by the evidence.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the Hearing Officer recommends that the Respondent, Carolina Rosenberg, be assessed a fine of $200.00. DONE and ORDERED this 21st day of December, 1979, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DELPHENE C. STRICKLAND Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 101, Collins Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Mary Jo. M. Gallay, Esquire Department oil Business Regulation 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Ms. Carolina Rosenberg c/o Eastview Apartments 1530 East Washington Avenue Miami Beach, Florida
The Issue The primary issues in this case relate to whether Respondent, a licensed check cashing concern, failed to make and maintain various records documenting regulated financial transactions undertaken during a two-year audit period (2011- 2012), as Petitioner alleges. If Respondent is found guilty of any disciplinable offense(s), then it will be necessary to determine the appropriate penalties for such violation(s).
Findings Of Fact At all times relevant to this case, Respondent Greenland Food Market, Inc. (the "Market"), held a license to engage in the business of cashing payment instruments, such as checks, pursuant to chapter 560, part III, Florida Statutes. Bassam Dimiati is the Market's president and sole shareholder. Petitioner Office of Financial Regulation ("OFR" or the "Office") is the state agency charged with licensing and supervising money services businesses in Florida. Licensed check cashers, such as the Market, fall within the Office's regulatory and disciplinary jurisdiction. On at least one previous occasion, the Office imposed discipline against the Market for failing to maintain books and records.1/ On May 6, 2013, OFR conducted a routine on-site examination of the Market's records to evaluate the licensee's compliance with the statutes and rules governing the check cashing business. OFR had given the Market advance notice of the examination. The two-year period under review was from January 1, 2011, through December 31, 2012. The examiners found, and OFR proved at hearing, that the Market had not complied fully with the applicable record-creation and -retention requirements, as detailed below. Missing Identification Numbers Check cashers must maintain an electronic payment instrument log documenting each transaction involving a check in the amount of $1,000 or more. For each such transaction, the log must include, among other required information, the identification number——e.g., the Florida driver license number—— of the person seeking to cash the check, who is referred to formally as a "conductor."2/ The Market's log for 2012 lists 156 transactions. Of these, the conductor's identification number was not recorded 57 times, in violation of section 560.310(1)(c), Florida Statutes (2011),3/ and Florida Administrative Code Rule 69V- 560.704(5)(a). Thus, it is determined, as a matter of ultimate fact, that the Market is guilty as charged of failing to include identification numbers in its electronic payment instrument log. Missing Endorsements A licensed check cashing business is required to make and keep a legible, complete copy (including both sides) of every check accepted. Further, at the time the licensee accepts a payment instrument, the licensee must endorse the instrument using the legal name appearing on its license. Thus, if the licensee is fully compliant, the licensee's copy of each check cashed will show the requisite endorsement. The Market failed properly to maintain copies of every payment instrument received. Showing leniency, OFR allowed the Market to obtain copies of canceled checks from its bank, even though a licensee is not entitled to rely upon bank records as a substitute for the licensee's own records.4/ Out of 720 payment instruments retrieved from the bank, 280 lacked an endorsement, or at least a legible endorsement, in contravention of section 560.309(2) and rule 69V-560.704(2)(a). It is therefore determined, as a matter of ultimate fact, that the Market is guilty as charged of failing to endorse all payment instruments accepted during the period under review, or alternatively of failing to maintain a legible copy of each such check containing an identifiable facsimile of the endorsement. Missing Thumbprints For each payment instrument accepted having a face value of $1,000 or greater, the licensee must——at the time of acceptance——affix the conductor's original thumbprint to the original payment instrument, a copy of which must be maintained, as mentioned above. Of 720 payment instruments retrieved from the Market's bank, 38 exceeded $1,000. Only 23 of these checks bear a visible thumbprint, which means that the Market either accepted at least 15 checks without taking the required thumbprints, or alternatively failed to maintain legible copies of such prints, in violation of section 560.310(1)(b)2.5/ and rule 69V- 560.704(4)(a). Consequently, it is determined, as a matter of ultimate fact, that the Market is guilty as charged of failing to take, or alternatively of failing to maintain a legible copy of, a thumbprint of the customer in connection with every transaction involving a check having a face value of $1,000 or more. Missing Records of Fees Charged For each check accepted, the licensee must keep a record showing the fee charged to cash the payment instrument. The Market created, kept, and made available to the Office a record showing the fee charged for each check having a face amount of $1,000 or more, but it failed to maintain a record of the fees charged for cashing any other checks. Thus, when asked in writing on May 10, 2013, to produce "records that show the fee charged to customers for each payment instrument cashed prior to May 10, 2013," the Market responded that it could not provide additional documentation. On May 17, 2013, Mr. Dimiati signed a statement attesting that "[a]fter a diligent search" of all the Market's books and records, he was unable to locate the requested materials and had "no reasonable basis to believe" that information regarding the fees charged for cashing checks for amounts less than $1,000 would become available. Accordingly, it is determined, as a matter of ultimate fact, that the Market is guilty as charged of failing to maintain and produce records reflecting the fee charged to each customer for the service of cashing a check, in violation of rule 69V-560.704(2)(b). Missing Corporate Customer Files When accepting a check payable to a corporation, which is referred to as a "corporate payment instrument,"6/ the licensee must create and maintain a customer file on the payee if the amount of the check exceeds $1,000. This file must include: (i) documentation from the Secretary of State verifying registration as a corporation or fictitious entity and showing the officers and Federal Employer Identification Number; (ii) articles of incorporation or similar documentation; (iii) documentation of the occupational license; (iv) documentation from the Division of Workers' Compensation website showing proof of coverage; and (v) documentation of individuals authorized to negotiate payment instruments on the corporation or fictitious entity's behalf, including corporate resolutions or powers of attorney. See Fla. Admin. Code R. 69V-560.704(4)(d). During the period under review, the Market cashed corporate payment instruments in amounts exceeding $1,000 for Impact Collision and Main Line Trucking. On May 10, 2013, OFR submitted a written request for the Market's customer files on Impact Collision and Main Line Trucking. Mr. Dimiati replied that, after a diligent search, he was unable to locate in the Market's records all of the information relating to these customers that rule 69V-560.704(4)(d) requires be kept on corporate payees. The Market was unable to provide the following information about Impact Collision: (i) articles of incorporation or similar documentation; (ii) documentation of the occupational license; and (iii) documentation of individuals authorized to negotiate payment instruments on the corporation or fictitious entity's behalf, including corporate resolutions or powers of attorney. The Market was unable to provide the following information about Main Line Trucking: (i) documentation of the occupational license and (ii) documentation of individuals authorized to negotiate payment instruments on the corporation or fictitious entity's behalf, including corporate resolutions or powers of attorney. Consequently, it is determined, as a matter of ultimate fact, that the Market is guilty as charged of failing to maintain a complete customer file, i.e., one meeting all of the requirements prescribed in rule 69V-560.704(4)(d), for each corporate entity named as the payee in a corporate payment instrument, in violation of section 560.310(1)(a), Florida Statutes (2011).7/
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Office of Financial Regulation enter a final order finding Greenland Food Market, Inc., guilty of the offenses charged in the Amended Administrative Complaint. It is further RECOMMENDED that the Office impose a fine against the Market in the amount of $10,500 and suspend its license for a period of 30 days. DONE AND ENTERED this 17th day of September, 2014, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JOHN G. VAN LANINGHAM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of September, 2014.
The Issue Whether Respondent failed to preserve and maintain broker records in violation of Section 475.5015, Florida Statutes. Whether Respondent committed culpable negligence or breach of trust in any business transaction in violation of Subsection 475.25(1)(b), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a state licensing and regulatory agency charged with the duty to prosecute administrative complaints pursuant to the laws of the State of Florida, in particular, Section 20.30, Chapters 120, 455, and 475, and the rule promulgated thereto. Respondent is and was at all times material hereto a licensed real estate broker in the State of Florida, having been issued License No. 600642 in accordance with Chapter 475. The last license was issued to Respondent as a broker of Cascade Referral Service, Inc., 2439 Bee Ridge Road, Sarasota, Florida. At all times material, Respondent was the president and registered agent of Knightsbridge Park International (KPI), a corporation under the laws of Florida. At all times material, Respondent was the registered agent of an entity called Knightsbridge Vacation Homes (KVH). Between August 14, 1999, through May 21, 2001, Respondent was an active broker/officer of Knightsbridge Realty, Inc. (KRI). In the Fall of 1999, Sharon Malecki (Malecki), a resident of Wisconsin, met with Respondent's wife, Janet Wilkes, who was vice-president of KPI, to discuss engaging KPI's services in managing Malecki's property in Kissimmee, Florida. On or about February 14, 2000, as a result of this initial contact, Malecki entered into a contract with KPI to manage her property. Respondent signed the contract as president of KPI. The contract required Respondent and KPI to provide general management services to Malecki and to provide a monthly accounting showing all income and expenses for a period of one year commencing on March 1, 2000. The contract also required Malecki to keep a balance of $500 as a "management reserve balance." Respondent and KPI were required to deposit any amounts held in excess of the reserve amount in Malecki's bank account. Implicit in the monthly accounting requirement was that KPI and Respondent would collect the rental proceeds from Malecki's property and remit the proceeds to Malecki. At the same time the parties executed the contract, Malecki sent KPI a check for $500 to be kept in the escrow account for incidental maintenance and repairs of the property. Between August 10, 2000, and August 24, 2000, KPI placed a tenant by the name of "Plant" in Malecki's property and collected $1,214.29 in rent from the tenant. Between August 29, 2000, and September 12, 2000, KPI placed a tenant by the name of "Lusted" in Malecki's property and collected $1,309 in rental income funds from the tenant. The monthly accounting for August of 2000, purports to represent that KPI paid Malecki $616.42 toward the balance owed. Malecki never received this payment. Respondent failed to remit any of the above-referenced funds to Malecki. Respondent sent Malecki a letter dated November 7, 2000, in which he terminated the management contract and promised to send Malecki a final accounting "as soon as possible." On or about January 2, 2001, Respondent sent Malecki a letter, in which he acknowledged that there had been a "major accounting breakdown." In the letter, Respondent promised to make an interim payment within the next week. Subsequent to receipt of the two letters, Malecki made various attempts to obtain an accounting of the rental proceeds due. Respondent never remitted nor accounted for the funds. At all times material, Respondent failed to account for the $500 deposit he held for the benefit of Malecki. In June of 1999, a real estate broker by the name of John Young (Young) referred Isabel Benitez (Benitez) to Respondent after she bought a home through Young. On or about June 23, 1999, Benitez signed a contract with Respondent to manage her property located at 7981 Magnolia Bend Court, Kissimmee, Florida. The contract period was for one year and was renewed for an additional year in June of 2000. Although structured in the form of a lease, there was a clear understanding that KPI and Respondent were performing property management services and were obligated to pay a guaranteed amount to Benitez every month. The contract required Benitez to place a $500 deposit with Respondent and KPI as a "management deposit" to be used for incidental expenses associated with the management of the property. In approximately August of 2000, Benitez stopped receiving monthly payments from KPI. During the latter part of 2000, Benitez made various attempts to contact Respondent to determine the whereabouts of the monies due her. On or about December 14, 2000, Benitez sent Respondent a letter, in which she requested the monies due her under the contract. On or about December 15, 2000, Respondent faxed to Benitez a response to her letter, in which he accepts her termination of the contract and confesses that he had "not been involved in property management matters, let alone accounting aspects " On or about January 2, 2000, Respondent mailed to Benitez a letter informing her that there had been an "accounting breakdown," and promising to make an interim payment within a week. A review of an accounting provided to Benitez, dated February 9, 2001, indicates that Respondent owes Benitez funds in excess of $8,473. At all times material, Respondent has failed to remit the funds due or otherwise account for said funds. Around February of 2001, Thirza Neal (Neal), a resident of Washington, D.C., engaged the services of KRI to manage her property located at 114 Dornock Street, Davenport, Florida. Neal delivered a check for $1,000 to a Chris Turner (Turner), who was an agent of KRI, for the "start-up of utility costs." At some point, Neal decided not to engage the services of KRI, and on March 12, 2001, Neal sent an e-mail to Turner, in which she terminated the management contract and requested a return of her deposit. The above e-mail contains an indication that it was copied to the attention of Respondent. On or about March 26, 2001, Neal sent a certified letter to Respondent demanding a return of the deposit. On or about March 28, 2001, Neal received a letter from a gentleman by the name of B.C. Murphy, referencing her letter to Turner, denying that the check had been deposited into KRI's account and informing Neal that he had purchased KRI during the previous year. Eventually, Neal determined that the bank had inadvertently deposited the check into KVH's account. Neal made several attempts to contact Respondent personally and through his attorney and received no response. Neal was eventually able to obtain a reimbursement from the bank. Respondent neither provided assistance to Neal, nor did he remit the funds on his own accord. At some point later, Petitioner began an investigation and David Guerdan (Guerdan) was assigned to investigate the case. During the course of his investigation, Guerdan conducted interviews of the complaining witnesses and Respondent. On or about September 26, 2001, Guerdan conducted an interview of Respondent. During the course of the interview, Respondent was unable to address the specifics of the complaints. Respondent told Guerdan that he was not involved in the day-to-day operations of the business. He stated that his wife and son actually ran the business and that they had "poor accounting practices, overspent and ran out of the money." During the interview, Respondent could not be specific as to the amounts due each owner. Guerdan was unable to determine whether Respondent paid the funds due to each owner.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that The Florida Real Estate Commission issue a final order finding Respondent guilty of violating Subsections 475.25(1)(a) and (e) and Section 475.5015, as charged in the Administrative Complaint; and Impose a fine of $1,000 and suspend Respondent's license for a period of two years and require Respondent to make restitution to his former clients and complete a 45-hour salesperson's post-licensure course, as prescribed by the Florida Real Estate Commission. DONE AND ENTERED this 22nd day of August, 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DANIEL M. KILBRIDE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of August, 2003. COPIES FURNISHED: Christopher J. De Costa, Esquire Department of Business and Professional Regulation 400 West Robinson Street, Suite N801 Orlando, Florida 32801-1772 Brian John Wilkes 55 Pacific Close Southampton, England SO143TY Nancy P. Campiglia, Acting Director Division of Real Estate Department of Business and Professional Regulation 400 West Robinson Street Suite 802, North Orlando, Florida 32801 Hardy L. Roberts, III, General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2202
