The Issue Whether Petitioners received salary overpayments from the Agency for Persons with Disabilities.
Findings Of Fact At all times material hereto, Petitioners Ileana Toledo, Norma Pedraza, and Lil Guerrero have been career service employees of Respondent. The Department of Management Services (“DMS”) has a classification and pay system that is used by Respondent, and DMS is responsible for designating employment positions within Respondent. A position is either included for overtime pay or excluded from overtime pay. At issue is whether Petitioners erroneously received monetary compensation for overtime hours worked after their position was reclassified from an included career service position to an excluded career service position. Prior to March 28, 2013, Petitioners held the position of Human Services Counselor III, which was designated by DMS as an included career service position. On March 26, 2013, Respondent proposed to reclassify Petitioners’ position from Human Services Counselor III to Human Service Program Analyst, which is designated by DMS as an excluded career service position. The proposed reclassification resulted from a reorganization of Respondent’s regional offices, and an effort by Respondent to standardize its functions, services, and types of positions in its regional offices. In a letter dated March 26, 2013, Petitioners were advised by Respondent’s Human Resources Director, Dale Sullivan, that if they accepted an offer to reclassify their position from Human Services Counselor III to Human Service Program Analyst, their “current status and salary will remain unchanged.” Notably, the March 26, 2013, letter makes no specific mention of overtime. On March 28, 2013, Petitioners accepted Respondent’s offer of employment to reclassify their position from Human Services Counselor III to Human Service Program Analyst. Typically, employees of Respondent who are appointed to new positions are placed in probationary status, as opposed to permanent status, and are required to review and execute new position descriptions. However, the reclassification of Petitioners’ position by Respondent was not typical. As part of the reclassification of Petitioners’ position to Human Service Program Analyst, Respondent provided Petitioners with a new position description. However, Petitioners’ job duties, salaries, and permanent status remained the same as they had been in their prior position of Human Services Counselor III. Petitioners read and acknowledged their receipt of the new position description on March 28, 2013. On the first page of the position description, there is a heading titled “Position Attributes”. Under this heading, the term “Overtime” is shown, followed by two boxes, “Yes” and “No.” The “No” box is marked, indicating that Petitioners are not eligible to work overtime hours. The position description further indicates that Petitioners would be career service employees. However, the position description does not specifically include the terms included or excluded. Prior to the reclassification, Petitioners were paid bi-weekly based on an 80-hour pay period. If they worked more than 80 hours in a pay period, they received additional monetary compensation for their overtime hours. Payment for Petitioners’ regular and overtime work hours was based on employee timesheets submitted to the People First leave and payroll system. After the reclassification of their position, Petitioners continued to work overtime in excess of their bi-weekly contractual hours, despite the prohibition in the position description. Petitioners were required to obtain approval by their supervisors before being allowed to work overtime. Petitioners’ overtime was approved by their supervisors after the reclassification despite the prohibition on working overtime hours as indicated in the position description. During the pay periods of March 29-April 11, 2013; April 26-May 9, 2013; and May 10-June 23, 2013, Petitioner Ileana Toledo worked a total of 28 hours of overtime, and received monetary compensation in the amount of $464.63 from Respondent for these overtime hours. For the pay periods of March 29-April 11, 2013; April 12-April 25, 2013; April 26-May 9, 2013; and May 10-May 23, 2013, Petitioner Norma Pedraza worked a total of 32.25 hours of overtime, and received monetary compensation in the amount of $624.14 from Respondent for these overtime hours. For the pay periods of March 29-April 11, 2013; April 12-April 25, 2013; April 26-May 9, 2013; and May 10-May 23, 2013, Petitioner Lil Guerrero worked a total of 25.50 hours of overtime, and received monetary compensation in the amount of $426.65 from Respondent for these overtime hours. Respondent’s payment of monetary compensation to Petitioners for the overtime hours worked after the reclassification of their position to Human Service Program Analyst occurred due to an administrative coding error, thereby resulting in the overpayment of monetary compensation to Petitioners by Respondent in the amounts the Respondent seeks to recover from Petitioners. The administrative coding error occurred because of Respondent’s failure to note the change from included to excluded on the People First system following the reclassification of Petitioners’ position. The error occurred due to an honest mistake, and resulted in the overpayments at issue. Petitioners should not have received monetary compensation for their overtime hours in the Human Service Program Analyst position because a Human Service Program Analyst position is an excluded career service position. An excluded career service employee must earn and receive regular compensation leave credits for overtime work, but cannot receive monetary compensation for overtime work. On the other hand, included career service employees, such as those persons in Petitioners’ previous position of Human Services Counselor III, must receive monetary compensation for overtime hours worked, rather than regular compensatory leave credits. Neither Petitioners nor their supervisors were aware at the time that the overpayments were made that Petitioners could not receive monetary compensation for their overtime hours, but must instead receive regular compensatory leave credits. At hearing, Petitioners did not dispute the amounts and hours of overtime worked as set forth in paragraphs 12-14 above. In accordance with the Department of Management Services’ Bureau of Payroll Manual, the amount of salary overpaid, and the amount sought to be repaid, was calculated as set forth in paragraphs 12-14 above. When an agency has determined that a salary overpayment has occurred, it is required to follow procedures set forth in the above-referenced manual, to seek repayment. Respondent followed those procedures in making the calculations relevant in this case.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered by the Agency for Persons with Disabilities determining that: 1) Petitioner Ileana Toledo was erroneously paid salary in the amount of $464.63; 2) Petitioner Norma Pedraza was erroneously paid salary in the amount of $624.13; 3) Petitioner Lil Guerrero was erroneously paid salary in the amount of $426.65; and 4) Petitioners are entitled to be compensated by Respondent through compensatory leave credits for the overtime hours worked as reflected in paragraphs 12-14 above. DONE AND ENTERED this 25th day of November, 2013, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DARREN A. SCHWARTZ Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of November, 2013.
Findings Of Fact For calendar year 1989 and until November 11, 1990, petitioner worked for respondent. As of January 5, 1989, having exhausted accumulated leave balances, petitioner was not entitled either to sick leave or to annual leave. After January 5, 1989, and until her employment with respondent ended on November 11, 1990, petitioner earned 192 hours of sick leave and 192 hours of annual leave. During the pay period ended January 19, 1989, she took 1.75 hours of leave. During the pay period ended February 2, 1989, she took 3.5 hours of leave. During the pay period ended February 16, 1989, she took 1.5 hours of leave. During the pay period ended March 2, 1989, she took 18.25 hours of leave. During the pay period ended March 16, 1989, she took 16 hours of leave. During the pay period ended March 30, 1989, she took 1.5 hours of leave. During the pay period ended April 13, 1989, she took 36 hours of leave. During the pay period ended April 27, 1989, she took 22 hours of leave. During the pay period ended May 11, 1989, she took 20.75 hours of leave. During the pay period ended May 25, 1989, she took 6 hours of leave. During the pay period ended June 8, 1989, she took 8.75 hours of leave. During the pay period ended June 22, 1989, she took 17.25 hours of leave. During the pay period ended July 6, 1989, she took 16 hours of leave. During the pay period ended July 20, 1989, she took 1 hour of leave. During the pay period ended August 3, 1989, she took 9 hours of leave. During the pay period ended August 17, 1989, she took 10 hours of leave. During the pay period ended August 31, 1989, she took 4 hours of leave. During the pay period ended September 14, 1989, she took 12 hours of leave. During the pay period ended September 28, 1989, she took 8.5 hours of leave. During the pay period ended October 12, 1989, she took 10.5 hours of leave. During the pay period ended October 26, 1989, she took 8.5 hours of leave. During the pay period ended November 9, 1989, she took 26.25 hours of leave. During the pay period ended November 23, 1989, she took one hour of leave. During the pay period ended December 7, 1989, there was no leave taken. During the pay period ended December 21, 1989, she took .5 hours of leave. During the pay period ended January 4, 1990, she took 18 hours of leave. During the pay period ended January 18, 1990, she took 10.5 hours of leave. During the pay period ended February 1, 1990, she took 1.5 hours of leave. During the pay period ended February 15, 1990, she took 1.5 hours of leave. During the pay period ended March 1, 1990, she took 3 hours of leave. During the pay period ended March 15, 1990, she took 27 hours of leave. During the pay period ended March 29, 1990, she took 11.5 hours of leave. During the pay period ended April 12, 1990, she took 36 hours of leave. During the pay period ended April 26, 1990, she took 24 hours of leave. During the pay period ended May 10, 1990, she took 34.25 hours of leave. During the pay period ended May 24, 1990, she took .5 hours of leave. During the pay period ended June 7, 1990, she took 2 hours of leave. During the pay period ended June 21, 1990, she took 27.5 hours of leave. During the pay period ended July 5, 1990, there was no leave taken. During the pay period ended July 19, 1990, she took 8 hours of leave. During the pay period ended August 2, 1990, she took 26 hours of leave. During the pay period ended August 16, 1990, she took 31 hours of leave. During the pay period ended August 30, 1990, she took 8 hours of leave. During the pay period ended September 13, 1990, she took 16 hours of leave. During the pay period ended September 27, 1990, she took 24.5 hours of leave. During the pay period ended October 11, 1990, she took 13.25 hours of leave. Because petitioner's time sheets were not always processed in a timely manner, leave balances stated on contemporaneous print outs were not always accurate. (In 1989, respondent had no official mechanism for notifying employees that time sheets were missing.) After petitioner's situation came to the attention of payroll specialists at HRS, a manual audit was performed. For the period ending March 30, 1989, petitioner had an annual leave balance of 6.5 hours. During the next pay period, she used the entire balance, but at the end of the pay period, at the close of business on April 13, 1989, four more hours of annual leave were credited, all of which she used before the succeeding period ended. During the period ended May 25, 1989, she was also out on leave two hours for which she was not entitled to pay. In all, the audit established that respondent had taken some 563 hours of leave after January 5, 1989. This exceeded paid leave she was entitled to by 179 hours. Nothing in the evidence suggests she was docked for more than 135.25 hours' pay.
Recommendation It is, accordingly, RECOMMENDED: That respondent deny petitioner's request for refund. DONE and ENTERED this 19th day of April, 1991, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT T. BENTON, II Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of April, 1991. COPIES FURNISHED: Sam Power, Agency Clerk Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, FL 32399-0700 Linda Harris, General Counsel Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, FL 32399-0700 Robert L. Powell, Esquire Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Building One, Room 407 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0700 Ruby Bush 3111-21 Mahan Drive, #113 Tallahassee, FL 32308
The Issue At issue in this proceeding is whether Petitioner, an employee of the Department of Children and Family Services (the Department), was overpaid in the amount of $1,671.29 and should be required to repay that amount to the Department.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a career-service employee of Respondent and was initially employed on September 18, 1992. In a letter dated March 13, 2001, Petitioner was informed that a salary overpayment occurred on the supplemental payroll of February 22, 2000. Two warrants were inadvertently issued on that day for $847.57 and $823.72 totaling $1,671.29. The overpayment resulted because the Department made a series of administrative errors. The reason for the overpayment was communicated to Petitioner. Petitioner's pay was remitted to her bank account electronically. She received a written explanation of her pay each time she was paid. However, Petitioner was not monitoring her bank account closely and did not realize she had been overpaid. Currently, Petitioner's rate of pay is $963.36 bi-weekly. Ms. Henderson prepared a certified letter dated February 28, 2001, notifying Petitioner of the overpayments. The letter stated that Petitioner had received $1,671.29 in gross overpayments for the supplemental payroll dated February 22, 2000. The letter was not picked up by Petitioner and was, therefore, returned to the Department. Subsequently, Ms. Henderson prepared a letter dated March 13, 2001, notifying Petitioner of the overpayment. The letter indicated the overpayment would be deducted from her next two pay checks. Petitioner received the second letter. By letter dated March 15, 2001, Petitioner objected to the payroll deductions since the amount of the deductions would leave her with a little more than $100. The amount left to Petitioner would be below minimum wage. A meeting was arranged between Petitioner, Allean Lovett, Human Resources Manager, and Linda Ricke, Personnel Services Specialist, with the Department to discuss, inter alia, a schedule for repayment. The meeting took place on April 9, 2001, however, was not concluded and was to be continued, by mutual agreement, to April 13, 2001. Petitioner informed Mrs. Lovett on April 12, 2001, that she did not want to continue with their scheduled meeting and would prefer to have the matter determined through the administrative hearing process. At the hearing, Petitioner did not dispute the amount of the gross overpayment. Petitioner testified that she would be able to repay the money at a rate of $25 to $50 per pay period. She could not afford any greater amount due to her living and medical expenses. The repayment schedule of $50 per pay period is reasonable.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent repay $50 per pay period to the Department of Children and Family Services beginning with the pay period immediately following entry of a final order in this case and continuing each pay period thereafter until the overpayment is repaid. DONE AND ENTERED this 25th day of October, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DIANE CLEAVINGER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of October, 2001. COPIES FURNISHED: Leslie Scott Jean-Bart, Esquire Farah and Farah, P.A. 1845 University Boulevard, North Jacksonville, Florida 32211 Craig A. Gibbs, Esquire Law Office of Craig Gibbs 1200 Riverplace Boulevard Suite 810 Jacksonville, Florida 32207 Robin Whipple-Hunter, Esquire Department of Children and Family Services Post Office Box 2417 Jacksonville, Florida 32211 Virginia A. Daire, Agency Clerk Department of Children and Family Services 1317 Winewood Boulevard Building 2, Room 204B Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Josie Tomayo, General Counsel Department of Children and Family Services 1317 Winewood Boulevard Building 2, Room 204 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700
Findings Of Fact The employee herein, the Petitioner, is employed by DEP as a park ranger. DEP is an agency of the State of Florida. The Petitioner failed to report for work after June 10, 1995. He apparently had some health problem or complaint and was on sick leave for a time. October of 1995 was the first month that he was on leave without pay. He was on leave without pay when he was terminated, which occurred on November 27, 1995. The Petitioner was not receiving workers compensation benefits between his last day of work on June 10, 1995 and the termination date of November 27, 1995. His monthly rate of pay was $1,627.23. He was paid $1,627.62 in gross wages for 176 hours on November 30, 1995. He received $1,319.18 in net wages for November of 1995. The Petitioner was entitled to $71.74 in wages for 10.75 hours for November of 1995. DEP calculated the amount of overpayment by offsetting the wages issued to him in November of 1995 by the amount he was actually entitled to receive for that month for the 10.75 hours. Thereafter, on December 12, 1995, DEP notified the Petitioner, by certified mail, return receipt requested, that he had been overpaid $1,247.44 in net wages for November of 1995. That return receipt reflected that the Petitioner received that letter on December 15, 1995. The Petitioner failed to refund the money to DEP during the 1995 tax year and as yet, has still not refunded the money. Because the money was not refunded during the 1995 tax year, the Petitioner also owes DEP an additional $163.87, which was withheld for taxes on the payment or overpayment in question. Thus, DEP overpaid the Petitioner a total of $1,411.31 in wages for November of 1995.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record, and the candor and demeanor of the witnesses, it is RECOMMENDED that the Respondent, Department of Environmental Protection, enter a Final Order finding that the employee, the Petitioner, Eugene Breeze, owes $1,411.31 for a salary overpayment received by him in November of 1995. DONE AND ENTERED this 1st day of November, 1996, in Tallahassee, Florida. P. MICHAEL RUFF Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of November, 1996. COPIES FURNISHED: Mr. Eugene Breeze 1110 Florida Avenue Lynn Haven, Florida 32444 Melease Jackson, Esquire Department of Environmental Protection 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3000 Virginia B. Wetherell, Secretary Department of Environmental Protection 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3000 Perry Odom, General Counsel Department of Environmental Protection 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3000
The Issue The issue presented for decision herein is whether or not Petitioner was unlawfully discriminated against, by being separated from her employment with Respondent, because she sustained a back injury which Respondent perceived as a potential problem and whether she was the subject of disparate treatment as relates to the treatment Respondent afforded its other employees.
Findings Of Fact Based upon my observation of the witnesses and their demeanor while testifying, documentary evidence received and the entire record compiled herein, I hereby make the following relevant factual findings. Petitioner, Joyce A. Dykes, was employed by Respondent, Quincy Telephone Company, for a period of approximately thirteen (13) years where she served as a service representative/cashier and an operator. Petitioner was laid off on May 27, 1983 based upon a company-wide employment reduction mandated by economic factors. Prior to her employment with Respondent, Petitioner was formerly employed as a bookkeeper with Higdon Furniture Company for approximately 17 years. Petitioner's first date of employment with Respondent was September 28, 1970. Approximately 7 years later, i.e., on November 21, 1977, Petitioner, during the course of her duties as an operator, left her work area and, upon return, sat down in a chair which she described as "wobbly." Petitioner fell backwards from the chair and "landed on her buttocks." Ann Kirkland, a fellow employee, was summoned to the scene of the incident and took Petitioner to the hospital for an examination. Petitioner stayed in the hospital approximately 3 days and returned to work. Since she returned to work, Petitioner has not requested any special treatment such as a convenient parking space, less strenuous duties or other more favorable treatment based on her "back problem." Petitioner expressed that she was leery of complaining to Respondent, and/or its agents, based on her back problem and therefore refused to make noises about that problem. During the summer of 1981, Petitioner experienced a traumatic incident involving the drowning of her son at the pool of a local motel. Petitioner's fellow employees, including Bladis Crow, an employee of Respondent during December, 1980 to October, 1981, and who was in overall charge of Petitioner, attempted to console her during her period of mourning by suggesting that she return to work where she would be in the company of fellow employees who could console her during this low period in her life. During the period of 1980-81 when Petitioner was under the supervision of supervisor Crow, she was "cross-trained" such that she could fill in for other employees during periods of other employee absences including vacations and other leaves. Petitioner, like other employees who were "cross-trained" did not like the idea of learning new tasks and being assigned to perform other duties temporarily. Supervisor Crow perceived Petitioner to be a valuable employee and considered that she got along well with other employees. One other employee, Eunice Hancock, a cashier and service representative, recalled Petitioner bringing in a heating pad and, on occasion, voicing complaints about a backache. During her period of employment with Respondent, Petitioner was perceived as a divisive employee in the minds of Respondent's managerial employees. (Testimony of supervisor Geary 1/; Lila D. Corbin, president and general manager; and Ann Kirkland, a former supervisor and business representative). Petitioner was viewed as an employee with a morale problem and often appeared unhappy and was a source of constant bickering between other employees. Petitioner was reprimanded by Bill Geary, who served as Respondent's supervisor for approximately one year from mid-1982 to the time of her layoff on May 26, 1983. Supervisor Geary interviewed Petitioner respecting a written reprimand he issued her on January 21, 1983. All of the items listed on that reprimand were discussed with Petitioner. Among the items discussed were Petitioner's fellow employees' complaints about her activities including moodiness, low morale and other problems dealing with the quantity and quality of Petitioner's work. Throughout the discussions with supervisor Geary, Petitioner repeatedly attempted to digress from the purpose of her interview and attempted to compare her work with that of other employees. From the time that Petitioner was employed by Respondent, Respondent has undergone three changes of ownership and is presently owned by Teledata Systems (TDS). With the change in ownership by TDS, a number of changes were instituted, some of which stem from the deregulation of the telephone industry. Upon becoming the owner, TDS immediately commissioned an overall forecast study of the operations in Quincy. Following that study, TDS determined that cutbacks in operating costs were necessary to insure profitability. The decision was therefore made to reduce employees and, in some instances, to reclassify positions or redefine the duties of its employees. In keeping with that goal, TDS, through its management, issued a directive to implement a work force reduction during May of 1983. Ms. Corbin, then the president and general manager, first learned of TDS' plans to institute the work force reduction during March of 1983. The plan was divulged to other supervisory and management employees during the week of approximately May 22, 1983. Pursuant to the company-wide reduction plan, TDS determined that of its complement of 83 employees when it took over during January of 1983, the work force needed to be reduced by approximately 11 employees. When the policy directive was issued to managers and supervisors, they were told to rid themselves of employees who did not meet certain criteria deemed critical by management such as the skills of each employee; the difficulty in replacing certain skilled employees and in training replacements; customer relationship; productivity level; ability to learn new skills; ability for overtime work, if and when needed; attendance; salary level; ability to work as a member of a new organizational structure and to be a team player; and the overall attitude toward company, customer and fellow employees. (Respondent's Exhibit 1) Those employees considered as fitting within the category of employees needing to be laid off were employees who came in late and left early; were repeatedly absent; performed sloppy work; wasted time and material; engaged in personal telephoning; stretched breaks and lunch hours; spent too much time in the washrooms and talked to other employees about personal activities; rudeness that causes customer irritation and costly work errors. (Respondent's Exhibit 1) During the time when the work force reduction was implemented, Petitioner was on vacation. Prior to that time, she had been afforded training as a keypunch operator. Of the 3 employees who were given keypunch training with Petitioner, Petitioner was tested as having the least leadership skills of the three. When the work force reduction was implemented, 11 employees were laid off. Presently that number has increased from 11 to 19. The only area where there has been one (1) employee hired is an employee trained to operate the Respondent's "complex" PBX and PABX systems. It is true that there were employees with less seniority than Petitioner who were retained, however seniority (length of service) was considered to be only a factor if it is also indicative of the experience gained and versatility (of the employee). Respondent considered that there were other factors more paramount which would influence the retention decision. (Respondent's Exhibit 1, paragraph 2) Respecting Respondent's claim that the Respondent perceived her back injury as a handicap or a potential problem, the evidence fails to sustain her claim in that regard. What the facts show is that while Petitioner did sustain an on-the-job injury during 1977, evidence fails to support Petitioner's claim that the injury was perceived the Respondent as a problem it needed to rid itself of or that it was a physical handicap which could or would be the source of a problem for Respondent. Noteworthy is the fact that Petitioner never requested any preferential treatment in her job assignments based on this claimed handicap other than one isolated incident wherein she spoke to her then- supervisor Geary at the time that she was asked if she desired training as a keypunch operator. For all of these reasons and the wide range of layoffs implemented by this Respondent during May of 1983, Petitioner's claim does not appear meritorious but was rather necessitated by changes in the telephone industry which continues today to have an economic impact on the Respondent. Respondent developed nondiscriminatory criteria which were given to all management types to use in determining what employees should be retained. The criteria was not designed to weed out or eliminate troublesome employees but, rather, to determine those employees to be retained and the criteria which guided that retention decision. That decision appeared to have been based solely on economic and business decisions of the Respondent company as a whole. 2/ Petitioner failed to establish that she was the subject of unlawful disparate treatment.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is hereby recommended that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a Final Order dismissing Petitioner's Petition for Relief from an Unlawful Employment Practice. RECOMMENDED this 25th day of March, 1985, in Tallahassee, Florida. JAMES E. BRADWELL Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 FILED with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of March, 1985.
Findings Of Fact Coflin was a permanent Career Service Employee, in Employment Office Supervisor (EOS) III Position. Coflin was "bumped" from his position by another permanent Career Service employee (Mr. Reddy), whose EOS III position was abolished by virtue of the failure of Hillsborough County to renew a contract for service with the Department of Commerce in November, 1975. Coflin was "bumped" on April 1, 1976 because pursuant to Department guidelines approved by the State Personnel Director as required by the State Personnel Rules, Coflin had fewer retention points than Reddy. Coflin, pursuant to the guidelines and rules and regulations, was in turn entitled to "bump" either the incumbent of an EOS III position who was not permanent in the position of EOS III or the employee within the State with the least retention points. This right and the positions available to him were communicated to Coflin; however, because he would have had to move to another area of the State to assume either of these positions, Coflin elected under protest to take the third alternative, demotion to another class in which he held permanent status in his immediate geographical area. Coflin appealed the resulting demotion, asserting that he had been wrongfully demoted. The demotion was solely the result of Coflin having been "bumped" in accordance with the guidelines of the Department of Commerce and not because of Coflin's job performance and conduct which were above average. The Department's guidelines were not adopted as rules in the manner prescribed in Chapter 120, Florida Statutes.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the Hearing Officer recommends that Coflin be reinstated to his position as EOS III, the personnel action taken having not been for good cause. DONE and ORDERED this 10th day September, 1976 in Tallahassee, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of September, 1976. COPIES FURNISHED: Mrs. Dorothy Roberts Appeals Coordinator Division of Personnel and Retirement Department of Administration 530 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 Kenneth H. Hart, Jr., Esquire 401 Collins Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 Brian Duffy, Esquire Post Office Box 1170 Tallahassee, Florida 32302
The Issue The issue is whether Respondents failed to file four quarterly and one annual financial statements and failed to maintain minimum amounts of net worth and working capital. If so, an additional issue is what penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact At all material times, Respondent Susan Jan Haggerty (Haggerty) was the controlling person of Respondent Suncoast Resource Management, Inc. (Suncoast). The Board of Employee Leasing Companies (Board) licensed Suncoast as an employee leasing company, holding license number EL 0000055, and Haggerty as the company’s controlling person, holding license number CO 0000125. Haggerty is also the licensed controlling person for Suncoast Management Group, Inc., an employee leasing company licensed since January 1994. Respondents applied for their licenses in July 1992. Suncoast was first licensed on March 22, 1994, and Haggerty was first licensed on January 13, 1994. Haggerty’s license remains currently in effect. However, following its surrender, as described below, Suncoast’s license became null and void on September 12, 1995. During 1994--its first year of licensed operation-- Suncoast encountered financial problems. At some point prior to December 31, 1994, a workers’ compensation carrier won a judgment of about $200,000 against Suncoast for unpaid workers’ compensation premiums. During 1994, Haggerty decided to close Suncoast. She instructed the company’s independent accountant to contact Board staff and find out how to close down the company, from a regulatory standpoint. An unidentified male staffperson employed by the Board informed the accountant by telephone that all the Respondents had to do was to write the Board a letter informing it of what was happening and to submit the quarterly compiled financial statement. The accountant conveyed these instructions to Haggerty in October or November 1994. Suncoast ceased doing business effective December 31, 1994. During this month, Suncoast terminated its last employee. During 1994, Suncoast had a gross Florida payroll of less than $2.5 million. During 1995, an investigator for Petitioner contacted Haggerty and discussed some of the unfiled financial statements that are the subject of these cases. In an effort to resolve this matter, Suncoast formally surrendered its license on August 2, 1995. The Administrative Complaints allege that Respondents failed to file five financial statements with the Board. These are four quarterly financial statements due for the quarters ending December 31, 1994, and following, and the 1994 annual financial statement. There are also allegations of failure to maintain minimum requirements of net worth and working capital. It appears that Suncoast did not file any quarterly financial statements prior to the one due for December 1994. However, Petitioner did not elect to allege violations of the law for these failures to file. For the relevant period, Suncoast only filed two statements with the Board of Employee Leasing Companies. The first statement was a quarterly financial statement for the last quarter of 1994, which was filed in March 1996--well after the ordinary deadline for such quarterly statements. The second statement was an annual financial statement for 1994. The accountant prepared this statement, dated June 4, 1995, and Haggerty filed it with the Board of Employee Leasing Companies on July 10, 1996--also well after the ordinary deadline for such annual statements. The 1994 financial statement is compiled, not audited or reviewed. The 1994 financial statement reveals that Suncoast had a tangible accounting net worth deficiency of about $180,000 and a positive working capital of $28,737, which reflects current assets and current liabilities and treats the $200,000 judgment as a long-term liability. Suncoast never obtain Board-approved security to offset the $180,000 deficiency in its net worth.
Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that the Board of Employee Leasing Companies enter a final order dismissing the administrative complaint against Suncoast Resource Management, Inc. and suspending Susan Jan Haggerty’s license for a period equal to the earlier of five years or until she proves to the reasonable satisfaction of the Board that the $200,000 judgment in favor of the workers’ compensation carrier has been satisfied or vacated with all judicial review concluded; but in no event shall the term of the suspension be less than one year. ENTERED in Tallahassee, Florida, on June 5, 1997. COPIES FURNISHED: Mary Ellen Clark Senior Attorney Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Suite 60 ROBERT E. MEALE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings on June 5, 1997. Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Attorney Frank M. Gafford Post Office Box 1789 Lake City, Florida 32506-1789 Isla Jones Executive Director Board of Employee Leasing Companies 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Lynda L. Goodgame General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Petitioner was overpaid in the amount of $809.46; and, if so, whether she should be required to repay that amount to Respondent.
Findings Of Fact At all times material to this matter, Petitioner was a career service employee of Respondent until her separation in October 2018. Petitioner went into labor unexpectedly in December 2017, and as a result, she began maternity leave. Petitioner was not present at work and did not submit a timesheet for the timeframe of December 29, 2017, through July 2, 2018. Petitioner testified that she was unable to submit her timesheets electronically and for this reason, someone else submitted them on her behalf. The evidence presented at hearing did not show who submitted her timesheets. By May 23, 2018, Petitioner had exhausted all of her annual, sick, and donated leave. Once an employee of Respondent no longer has sick leave remaining, annual leave is used to cover any shortages of sick leave. An employee may use donated leave to cover any shortages. Once an employee has exhausted annual, sick, and donated leave, the employee cannot be paid for additional time taken as leave. The additional time during leave is considered “leave without pay” (“LWOP”). Petitioner was placed on LWOP from March 23, 2018, through July 2, 2018, because she had exhausted all of her leave. Although Petitioner was on LWOP during the pay period of May 4, 2018, through May 17, 2018, a pay warrant for 80 hours of work was inadvertently issued on May 25, 2018, for that pay period. Consequently, Petitioner was overpaid $809.46. Petitioner was not responsible for the overpayment. She did not submit her timesheets and, thus, did not falsify them. Petitioner testified that her supervisor verbally advised her that she had received donated leave, but she could not recall the amount. Petitioner also did not offer any written representation from her supervisor or otherwise regarding her leave. The overpayment resulted because Petitioner's timesheet for LWOP for the pay period of May 4, 2018, through May 17, 2018, was not timely approved. Upon discovery of this error, Respondent’s human resources office conducted a manual audit of Petitioner’s leave. Ms. Anderson completed the leave audit and discovered that Petitioner had been overpaid for the May 4, 2018, through May 17, 2018, pay period. On May 30, 2018, the Department sent Petitioner a certified letter requesting the overpaid amount of $809.46. Petitioner became aware of the error when she received the Department’s letter. Petitioner’s pay was transmitted to her bank account electronically via direct deposit. However, she was not monitoring her bank account closely and did not immediately realize that she had been erroneously overpaid. At the time of the final hearing, Petitioner had not paid the overpayment. Petitioner stated she could only pay $40 per month to repay the overpayment.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Health enter a final Order requiring Shanace Isaac to repay Respondent $809.46. DONE AND ENTERED this 7th day of March, 2019, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S YOLONDA Y. GREEN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of March, 2019. COPIES FURNISHED: Shanace Isaac Post Office Box 101 Hastings, Florida 32145 (eServed) Riley Michelle Landy, Esquire Department of Health Bin A-02 5052 Bald Cypress Way Tallahassee, Florida 32399 (eServed) Shannon Revels, Agency Clerk Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin A02 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1703 (eServed) Louise Wilhite-St Laurent, Interim General Counsel Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin C65 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 (eServed) State Surgeon General Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin A00 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1701 (eServed)
