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DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, BOARD OF OSTEOPATHIC MEDICINE vs DAVID SIMON, D.O., 13-004756PL (2013)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:West Palm Beach, Florida Dec. 11, 2013 Number: 13-004756PL Latest Update: Jan. 02, 2015

The Issue The issues in this case are whether Respondent, an osteopathic physician who had a year-long consensual affair with one of his patients, committed sexual misconduct in the practice of osteopathic medicine; and if so, whether Petitioner should impose discipline on Respondent's license within the applicable penalty guidelines or take some other action.

Findings Of Fact Respondent David Simon, D.O. ("Simon"), is a family practitioner who was, at all times relevant to this case, licensed as an osteopathic physician in the state of Florida. His office was located in Palm Beach County, where he practiced medicine from 1985 through the events at issue and beyond, until at least the date of the final hearing. Petitioner Department of Health (the "Department") has regulatory jurisdiction over licensed osteopathic physicians such as Simon. In particular, the Department is authorized to file and prosecute an administrative complaint against a physician, as it has done in this instance, when a panel of the Board of Osteopathic Medicine has found that probable cause exists to suspect that the physician has committed a disciplinable offense. In May 2005, a 30-something year-old woman named C.K. became a regular patient of Simon's. As C.K.'s primary care physician from 2005 until the end of 2011, Simon treated C.K. for a variety of physical and psychological disorders. The nature and quality of Simon's medical care of C.K. are not in dispute, the Department having neither alleged nor proved that Simon's treatment of C.K. ever fell below the applicable standard of care, or that Simon's medical records failed to justify any course of treatment he undertook for her benefit. In or around November 2010, while their otherwise unremarkable physician-patient relationship remained intact, Simon and C.K. entered into a mutually consensual sexual relationship. This affair had its genesis in a discussion between Simon and C.K. that occurred on October 12, 2010, during an office visit. While being seen that day, C.K. expressed concern about having been exposed recently to sexually transmitted diseases as a result of experiences which she not only related in some detail to Simon, but also corroborated with photographic evidence stored in her cell phone. In view of these disclosures, Simon lost his professional detachment and entered into a flirtatious conversation of a personal, even intimate, nature with C.K. that was outside the scope of his examination or treatment of C.K. as a patient. C.K. was a willing participant in the non-clinical sexual banter which ensued. Some days or weeks later (the precise date is unavailable), C.K. stopped by Simon's office on a Friday afternoon after business hours, when Simon was there alone. The two resumed their previous, personal conversation, and C.K. proposed that they have sexual relations with one another, a suggestion to which Simon responded positively. Within weeks afterwards, Simon called C.K., and they made arrangements to meet privately after hours at his office, which they later did, as mentioned above, sometime in November 2010. Beginning with that visit, and continuing for about one year, Simon and C.K. met once or twice a month in Simon's office, alone, to engage in sexual activity.2/ Simon used his cell phone to call or text C.K. to schedule these trysts. C.K. consented to the sexual activity with Simon. She was, however, incapable of giving free, full, and informed consent to such activity with her physician.3/ Because C.K. was, at all relevant times, a competent adult, the undersigned infers that her incapacity to freely give fully informed consent stemmed from Simon's powerful influence over her as a patient of his. C.K. and Simon did not have sexual relations during, or as part of, any visit that C.K. made to Simon's office for the purpose of seeking medical advice or care. In other words, doctor's appointments did not provide occasions, or serve as cover, for intimate rendezvous. There is no persuasive evidence that Simon ever tried to convince C.K. that their sexual encounters would be therapeutic or were somehow part of a course of purported medical treatment or examination. Rather, Simon testified credibly (and it is found) that he and C.K. kept their personal and professional relationships separate and distinct.4/ The Department has made much of the type of sexual acts that Simon and C.K. engaged in. Simon described their behavior, somewhat euphemistically, as "sexually adventurous." The Department, in contrast, has implied that Simon is a paraphiliac or pervert, a contention which the undersigned rejects as not just unsupported, but disproved by the evidence. Although at least some of the sexual conduct in question might fairly be dubbed unconventional, more important is that every interaction between these adults took place in private, within the context of mutual consent. There is, moreover, no clear and convincing proof in this record of sexual violence or aggression, nor any evidence of actual injury, damage, or harm. For reasons that will be discussed, the undersigned has concluded that the details of Simon and C.K.'s sexual encounters are irrelevant to the charges at hand; thus, no additional findings about the specific sexual activities are necessary. Simon's liaison with C.K. lasted until late December 2011, at which time C.K. abruptly terminated the relationship. The evidence fails to establish C.K.'s reasons for doing so. Thus, the circumstances surrounding the end of the affair, of which scant evidence was presented in any event, are irrelevant. In the wake of the break up, Simon's affair with C.K. became a matter of public knowledge, gaining him the sort of notoriety few physicians would covet. Facing personal disaster and professional ruin, Simon sought counseling from Helen Virginia Bush, a specialist in sex therapy who is licensed both as a clinical social worker and as a marriage and family therapist. Ms. Bush counseled Simon on subjects such as professional boundaries and erotic transference. At her urging, Simon attended and successfully completed the PBI Professional Boundaries Course, a nationally recognized program for doctors and others at risk of developing inappropriate personal relationships with patients or clients. Ms. Bush testified credibly that in her opinion, which the undersigned accepts, Simon is unlikely to enter into another sexual relationship with a patient or attempt to do so. Simon shares office space and staff with Mary Scanlon, D.O., a physician who, like Simon, specializes in family medicine. Although she has an independent practice, Dr. Scanlon works in close proximity to Simon, whom she met in 2000 during her residency when Simon was the attending physician. Dr. Scanlon believes Simon to be an excellent physician from whom she has learned much about practicing medicine, and her credible testimony that Simon's patients hold him in high regard and have largely stood by him throughout this scandal is accepted. Dr. Scanlon was an effective character witness for Simon who favorably impressed the undersigned with her earnest and forthright demeanor. That she has elected to continue practicing in the office she shares with Simon despite the public disclosure of Simon's disgraceful dalliance with C.K. (which she in no way condoned or tried to excuse), even though she is not contractually bound to stay there, manifests genuine support of and respect for Simon, and tells the undersigned—— more persuasively than any testimony——that his career is worth saving. This is the first time that any disciplinary action has been taken against Simon's medical license. Ultimate Factual Determinations The evidence establishes, clearly and convincingly, that Simon exercised influence within the patient-physician relationship, albeit probably unwittingly, for purposes of engaging C.K. in sexual activity. This ultimate finding is based in part on an inference which follows from the presumed fact of C.K.'s incapacity to consent to sexual activity with Simon, but also on other circumstances, the most salient of which are that the initial steps toward the affair were taken during a medical examination, and that all of the sexual activity at issue occurred in the doctor's office. It is therefore determined, as a matter of ultimate fact, that Simon is guilty of engaging in sexual misconduct with a patient, as more fully defined in section 459.0141, Florida Statutes, which is a disciplinable offense punishable under section 459.015(1)(l).

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Board of Osteopathic Medicine enter a final order finding Simon guilty of committing sexual misconduct with a patient, which is punishable under section 459.015(1)(l), Florida Statutes. Because this is Simon's first such offense, it is further RECOMMENDED that Simon be placed on probation for two years subject to such reasonable terms and conditions as the board deems appropriate, and that an administrative fine of $10,000 be imposed. DONE AND ENTERED this 30th day of July, 2014, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JOHN G. VAN LANINGHAM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of July, 2014.

Florida Laws (6) 120.569120.57120.68456.072459.0141459.015
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ANAND LATTANAND vs BOARD OF MEDICINE, 94-005828F (1994)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tampa, Florida Oct. 17, 1994 Number: 94-005828F Latest Update: Jun. 13, 1995

Findings Of Fact On or about May 6, 1993, the Department of Professional Regulation, Board of Medicine (predecessor agency to the Agency for Health Care Administration, Board of Medicine) received a complaint from patient A. L. alleging that the Petitioner had attempted inappropriate sexual contact with the patient during an examination. The complaint was assigned to a DPR investigator who notified the Petitioner that the complaint had been received. The DPR investigator interviewed the patient, obtained the patient's medical records from the Petitioner, and obtained a letter apparently written on the day of the incident from the patient confirming the nature of the complaint. The investigator also obtained information regarding the Petitioner's licensure and confirmation from the patient that he would appear to testify at a hearing if an Administrative Complaint was filed. During the interview and by letter, the patient alleged that during the dermatological examination, the Petitioner had asked the patient if he was single and did he "play" with himself. The patient further alleged that the Petitioner requested that the patient masturbate while the Petitioner watched. The DPR investigator compiled a report including the complete investigative file, relevant discovery, the agency's recommendation and memoranda, and the proposed administrative complaint. The report also advised that, allegedly according to agency legal counsel, other administrative complaints were pending against the Petitioner. The report was forwarded to the members of the Probable Cause Panel (PCP) prior to their meeting on September 14, 1993. The PCP received and reviewed the materials. Present at the September 14 meeting were panel members Edward A. Dauer, M.D., Robert Katims, M.D., and Maribel C. Diblan. Also present were legal counsel and administrative personnel. Upon review of the materials, the PCP unanimously determined that probable cause existed for the filing of the Administrative Complaint. Probable cause was found that the Petitioner violated Section 458.331(1)(j) and (x), Florida Statutes. On September 17, 1993, the agency filed the Administrative Complaint, AHCA Case No. 93-8352, subsequently DOAH Case No. 93-6252. On April 19, 1994, the case was heard in formal hearing before William F. Quattlebaum, Hearing Officer, Division of Administrative Hearings. A Recommended Order was issued, finding that the testimony of the patient lacked credibility and recommending that the Administrative Complaint be dismissed. On August 15, 1994, the agency issued a Final Order adopting the recommended order issued by the hearing officer and dismissing the Administrative Complaint. The Petitioner asserts that the agency investigation was flawed because no dermatological expert was sought to review the case. There is no credible evidence that an expert is required to review allegations of sexual misconduct such as those charged in the administrative complaint filed against Dr. Lattanand. The Petitioner further asserts that alleged inconsistencies in addresses provided by the patient to various entities warranted further review by the agency and apparently suggest a lack of credibility on the complainant's part. Review of the alleged address inconsistencies indicates only that the complainant maintained more than one address. The implication related to credibility is not supported by evidence. Based on the prehearing stipulation of the parties, the following Findings of Fact are made: The Petitioner qualifies as a small business party as defined by section 57.111, Florida Statutes. The Petitioner is the prevailing party. The amount of fees claimed by the Petitioner are reasonable. Special circumstances do not exist which would make an award of costs and fees unjust.

Florida Laws (4) 120.57120.68458.33157.111
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BOARD OF MEDICAL EXAMINERS vs. STANLEY MARK DRATLER, 84-004167 (1984)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 84-004167 Latest Update: Sep. 20, 1985

Findings Of Fact At all times relevant hereto Stanley Mark Dratler, M.D., was licensed by the Florida Board of Medical Examiners. He completed a four-year residency in obstetrics and gynecology before opening an office in Dade City, Florida, in 1981. He has taken the written portion of the examination for Board certification but, at the time of the hearing, was not aware of the result of that examination. Patient A visited Respondent July 22, 1982, for a Pap smear which was subsequently followed by a biopsy and hysterectomy on August 18, 1982. Following her release from the hospital, A reported to Respondent's office on August 30, 1982, for her first office checkup following surgery. At this visit Respondent performed a complete physical examination including a pelvic examination, asked A questions regarding her sex life at home, and told her he could show her things that would help her sex life. While examining her and discussing her sex life, Respondent applied a Q-tip to various areas outside the vagina and asked A to describe the sensations created thereby. Some two weeks later A developed back pains, called Respondent's office, and was told to come in the next day. Again, Respondent did a complete examination, including pelvic, used a Q-tip swab to stimulate areas outside the vagina, and told A she needed to know how to masturbate herself and not rely solely upon her husband. During this examination, conducted in an examining room containing only A and Respondent, Respondent masturbated A and had her masturbate herself. When A asked about her back, Respondent told her there was nothing wrong with her back. A denied she ever told Respondent she felt numb between her legs. In Respondent's testimony he confirmed the August 30 visit to his office by A but claimed she complained of feeling numb between the legs. When he put her in the stirrups for an examination, he found nothing wrong externally and performed a psycho-sexual examination which involved the stimulating of sensitive areas around the vagina with a cotton swab. He denies he ever masturbated A; that at her final visit on October 8, 1982, she again complained of numbness between her legs; his examination, which included the touching of sensitive areas, revealed nothing wrong; and when they returned to his office after the examination she made advances toward him. When he told A he treated her like all other patients, she got mad and stormed out of his office. In Exhibit 3, the patient records of A, the October 8 entry indicated only that A came in complaining of some swelling of the lower extremities, and no problem with that was foreseen. That entry states A would not need to return for another visit before six months unless some other problem developed. In view of the significant differences between the medical record and Respondent's testimony, the testimony of A is the more credible. Patient E visited Respondent's office September 29, 1982, complaining of bleeding. During this visit a Pap smear was taken, as was a sexual history of the patient. During the pelvic examination Respondent talked to E of areas to stimulate for sexual arousal. With his finger in her vagina, he started to masturbate her and told her she needed to have more orgasms. E acknowledges telling Respondent she had intercourse five or six time per week and was anxious to get pregnant. She does not recall telling Respondent she reached climax only once per week, that her last climax was one week before the visit, or that she experienced pain on deep thrusting. Following this examination, E was given an appointment to return in two weeks, which she cancelled and did not again return to Respondent's office. Respondent acknowledges that E visited his office as alleged and that he gave her a complete examination including a pelvic exam. He contends the questions regarding her sex history were necessary to ascertain any problems inhibiting E getting pregnant. He denies masturbating E or telling her that masturbation, stimulation, or sexually-oriented conversations were a necessary part of gynecological treatment. Patient B first visited Respondent November 4, 1982, complaining of a rash in the vaginal area. Respondent obtained a sexual history of B, who at the time of this visit was 16 years old. This revealed B's first sexual encounter occurred at age 12, that she had never experienced orgasm although she had been sexually active. During the pelvic examination Respondent applied a cotton swab to various areas around B's vagina and asked her if it felt good here or there. B was given a prescription for the rash and told to return a week later. When she returned on November 8, B again was undressed for an examination. Respondent performed what he described as a psycho- sexual examination on B during which he massaged her breasts, stimulated areas outside the vagina with a cotton swab, and inserted fingers in B's vagina. While this stimulation was going on, B had an orgasm. B had experienced some side effects with the first rash medication and on the second visit Respondent prescribed a different medicine. B returned for a third visit on November 22, 1982, which she testified was for blood tests only. However, there is some disparity in the testimony and it is more likely that the stimulation and orgasm occurred during the visit on November 22 rather than on November 8. On her final visit, December 6, 1982, B was again examined and testified Respondent fondled her breasts while masturbating her. At this time she had commenced her menstrual cycle but Respondent told her that was all right as he could still examine her. At this final visit Respondent prescribed birth control pills for B. Respondent acknowledges that B had visited his office four times as she testified and that he gave her the psycho- sexual examination because she had engaged in sex for four years without enjoying it. His questions regarding her sex life was to find out if the rash was related to a sexually transmitted disease. Respondent denies that he fondled B's breasts or masturbated her. Exhibit 4, the medical history of B, confirms the four visits but contains no reference to the psycho-sexual examination Respondent performed. A return visit scheduled for December 22, 1982, was never kept by B. The testimony of B is more credible than that of Respondent respecting his actions with B while she was being examined. Patricia Cherry worked in Respondent's office as a medical assistant and secretary from July 1982 until January 1983 when she quit to work at Humana Hospital in Dade City. Respondent asked Cherry if she would teach some of his patients how to masturbate themselves. She refused by stating she was not interested. Cherry was told by Respondent that he was conducting a survey on human sexuality and each patient would be a part of that survey. On one occasion Respondent asked Cherry to come in one weekend and he would give her Sodium Pentothal. She declined this also. On one occasion she witnessed Respondent administer intravenously a drug to a patient which Respondent said was Sodium Pentothal. Respondent told Cherry that a patient was coming in to be given Sodium Pentothal and had requested Cherry be present while the drug was administered. The patient came in as scheduled and was administered something intravenously while undressed from the waist down. After the IV started, the patient became unconscious on two occasions. During one period while the patient was awake Respondent asked the patient what she thought about oral sex. During one period the patient was unconscious Respondent asked Cherry if she would sexually stimulate the patient. Cherry said no. Once while a drug salesman was in the office Cherry asked Respondent if he would give her some of the new medicine the salesman was offering for pimples. Respondent told her she should have a pelvic examination to find out if she was through puberty because use of the drug by one not through puberty could cause undesirable side effects. Cherry was 22 to 23 years old at the time, had experienced her menstrual cycle for several years and she declined to be examined. By definition, girls are through puberty when they commence their menstrual cycles. Petitioner's two expert witnesses opined that hands-on masturbation of a patient constitutes treatment below generally prevailing standards; constitutes use of fraud, intimidation, or undue influence on a patient; constitutes exercising influence within a patient-physician relationship for purposes of engaging the patient in sexual activity; and constitutes deceptive, untrue or fraudulent representations in the practice of medicine, or employing a trick or scheme which fails to conform to the minimum acceptable standards of the profession. Also, the use of a swab around the genitalia of a female patient to sexually arouse the patient does not conform to the generally prevailing standards of treatment in the medical community. Nor does the use of Sodium Pentothal on a patient in an out-patient setting comply with the prevailing standards. Sodium Pentothal is a drug not normally administered in an out-patient setting where emergency backup procedures are unavailable. Very few gynecologists are sufficiently trained in the use of this drug to safely administer such a drug to a patient and particularly so in an out-patient setting. Research is normally done in an approved academic environment and not by individual practitioners. Respondent denied that he was engaged in the research he told Ms. Cherry he was conducting. After hearing the testimony of the witnesses, Dr. J. Kell Williams, a Board-certified gynecologist and faculty member at the University of South Florida, opined that Respondent's treatment of the three patients who testified was below acceptable medical standards, constituted use of physician- patient relationships for improper purposes, constituted fraud and deception in the practice of medicine and the employment of a trick or scheme, which fails to comply with the minimum acceptable standards of the medical profession. Patricia Cherry was never a patient of Respondent. As an employee she was requested to instruct female patients in masturbation, which she declined to do. Respondent also suggested to Cherry that she submit to Sodium Pentothal, which she also declined. Likewise, she declined to allow Respondent to do a complete examination which Respondent insisted was necessary before prescribing medication for her acne. Although Cherry was not a patient, the representations regarding a pelvic examination prior to prescribing medication for acne constitutes deceptive, untrue and fraudulent representations in the practice of medicine and fraudulent solicitation of a patient. Absent a medical reason to conduct a pelvic examination, Respondent's insisting on doing so prior to treatment of acne constitutes an attempt to engage the patient in sexual activity.

Florida Laws (2) 458.329458.331
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DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, BOARD OF PSYCHOLOGY vs DAVID FAUSTINO GRABAU, 97-003644 (1997)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida Aug. 07, 1997 Number: 97-003644 Latest Update: May 21, 2004

The Issue The issue for consideration in this hearing is whether Respondent’s license as a psychologist in Florida should be disciplined because of the matters alleged in the Administrative Complaint filed herein.

Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to the issues herein the Board of Psychology was the state agency in Florida responsible for the licensing and professional discipline of psychologists in Florida. Respondent is and has been licensed as a psychologist in Florida and is subject to the jurisdiction of the Board of Psychology. During the period April 11, 1995, through August 7, 1995, Respondent was employed as a psychologist at the University of South Florida Counseling Center for Human Development. In that capacity, Respondent saw the Complainant, K.R., on several occasions and established a psychologist-client relationship with her. At the initial visit of K.R. to his office, Respondent conducted an initial intake evaluation of her and, in his client notes, defined the goal of his continued treatment of her as being to assist Ms. K.R. in stabilizing her depression; and to clarify her needs and patterns with regard to her career and relationships. Upon completing the intake evaluation of K.R., Respondent referred her to himself as treating therapist, and between the initial meeting and the end of August 1995, met with her approximately thirteen times. Review of Respondent’s notes regarding his sessions with K.R. reveals that they discussed her relationship with her parents; her relationships with men; her ability to deal with her emotions, her anxiety, and depression. K.R. relates that during many of their sessions, Respondent told her she had nice legs and was very sexy. He also told her of his personal life, including his dissatisfaction with his marriage, and it appears that he met with her outside his professional office on a purely social basis. K.R. claims Respondent told her not to tell anyone about their friendship outside the clinic. The relationship between Respondent and K.R. culminated in their engaging in sexual intercourse which resulted in her becoming pregnant. The pregnancy was subsequently aborted. As a result of their relationship, K.R. filed a complaint against Respondent with the Board of Psychology relating the sexual nature of their relationship. Subsequent to the filing of K.R.’s complaint against Respondent, and the Agency For Health Care Administration’s (Agency) filing of an Administrative Complaint against him, the Agency deposed Dr. George J. Rockwell, Jr., a retired psychologist with a specialty in school psychology. Dr. Rockwell did not meet with Respondent or speak with him in any capacity. He examined the file collected in this case regarding the allegations against Respondent, and from his review of all the material, concluded that Respondent had established a psychologist/patient relationship with K.R. This relationship involves trust and the generation in the patient of a basic belief that the psychologist has the skills and knowledge that would assist the patient in dealing with whatever problems he or she has. The patient develops the ability to talk to a non- critical, non-judgmental person in an effort to help him or her deal with their problems or concerns. The psychologist has the responsibility to create an emotionally safe environment for the patient. In this process the patient is often made vulnerable. The patient must be open with the psychologist and feel comfortable in sharing emotions and incidents which he or she would most likely not be able to share with others. It is without question a special relationship, and in Dr. Rockwell’s opinion, it is unlikely that a patient will work with a psychologist and not form that special relationship. This special relationship places upon the psychologist special responsibilities toward the patient. These include abiding by the laws and rules relating to the practice of psychology; having respect for the patient; and keeping all matters confided by the patient confidential. In addition, the psychologist has the responsibility to comport himself or herself in a manner so as to maintain a professional relationship and distance with the patient. Specifically, sexual relationships between a psychologist and his or her patient are normally prohibited as being beyond boundaries that should not be crossed. It is the psychologist’s responsibility to set the limits on behavior so as to prevent an inappropriate relationship from developing. This applies even if the patient initiates sexual advances. These advances would not excuse the psychologist from professional responsibility toward the patient. In the event the psychologist detects what appear to be inappropriate sexual advances from the patient, the psychologist had a duty to discuss this with the patient; talk about the nature of the psychologist/patient relationship; and explain that such a relationship would not be appropriate. The constrictors on the professional are even more specific in the event the psychologist finds himself or herself sexually attracted to the patient. Under no circumstances should the professional act on those feelings, but should evaluate the situation to ensure that those feelings are in no way interfering with the therapeutic relationship. There is absolutely no situation which Dr. Rockwell can think of in which it would be appropriate for a therapist to engage in sexual relations with a patient, either during or after termination of a therapy session. Inappropriate sexual contact between a therapist and a patient can have severe and deleterious effects on a patient. These might include feelings of guilt and depression, based on the patient’s belief that the inappropriate behavior was his or her fault. The patient might also feel embarrassment and be reluctant to undergo further treatment. Further, the patient would most likely lose trust in the involved therapist and potential other therapists. Dr. Rockwell concluded that notwithstanding Respondent’s contention that he saw K.R. solely for the purpose of career counseling, and at no time entered a psychologist/patient relationship with her, Respondent’s clinical notes regarding K.R. clearly indicate a professional psychologist/patient relationship was formed. An independent review of the records supports that conclusion, and it is so found. Even were the counseling limited solely to career counseling, it would still constitute counseling, the conduct of which is covered by the standards of the profession. Here, however, Dr. Rockwell is convinced that Respondent’s conduct toward K.R., as alleged, constituted sexual misconduct in the practice of psychological counseling which fell below the minimum standards of performance and professional activities when measured against generally prevailing peer performance. It is so found.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Board of Psychology enter a final order in this matter finding Respondent guilty of all Counts in the Administrative Complaint, and revoking his license to practice psychology in the State of Florida. DONE AND ENTERED this 3rd day of March, 2000, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of March, 2000. COPIES FURNISHED: Maureen L. Holz, Esquire Williams & Holz, P.A. 211 East Virginia Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 O. C. Allen, Qualified Representative 314 West Jefferson Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Angela T. Hall, Agency Clerk Department of Health 2020 Capital Circle, Southeast Bin A02 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1703 Dr. Kaye Howerton, Executive Director Board of Psychology 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750 Amy M. Jones, Acting General Counsel Department of Health 2020 Capital Circle, Southeast Bin A02 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1703

Florida Laws (7) 120.569120.57490.009490.011190.80290.80390.804 Florida Administrative Code (1) 64B19-17.002
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DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, BOARD OF MEDICINE vs FRANK K. KRUMM, M.D., 00-002782PL (2000)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tampa, Florida Jul. 07, 2000 Number: 00-002782PL Latest Update: Jul. 06, 2024
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DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, BOARD OF RESPIRATORY CARE vs JENNIFER ABADIE, R.R.T., 18-005694PL (2018)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:St. Petersburg, Florida Oct. 26, 2018 Number: 18-005694PL Latest Update: Nov. 08, 2019

The Issue Did Respondent, Jennifer Abadie, R.R.T., violate sections 468.365(1)(q), 468.365(1)(x), 456.072(1)(v), or 456.063(1), Florida Statutes (2018),1/ by committing sexual misconduct?

Findings Of Fact Section 20.43 and chapters 456 and 468, Florida Statutes, charge the Board with regulating the practice of respiratory care in Florida. Ms. Abadie is a licensed registered respiratory therapist in Florida. Ms. Abadie worked for Comprehensive Healthcare of Clearwater (Comprehensive) from October 24, 2017, through February 4, 2018, at its Pinellas County, Florida, location. Comprehensive is a residential rehabilitation and nursing facility. Ms. Abadies’s 89-year-old father was a patient at Comprehensive from before she started working there until his death. He suffered from dementia. Ms. Abadie visited her father frequently, before and after her shifts and when she was not working. G.B. was a severely ill patient at Comprehensive trying to recover from multiple strokes. G.B. was only 56 years old. However, he had extensive medical conditions. They included hypertension, congestive heart failure, fibromyalgia, diabetes, blindness and end-stage renal (kidney) disease. G.B. received dialysis three times a week for his kidney disorder. He took dozens of medications daily. G.B. also had a tracheostomy. A tracheostomy is a tube that goes into the trachea to help people with impaired breathing breathe. The heavy treatment load weighed on G.B. psychologically and caused him anxiety and depression. Ms. Abadie provided respiratory therapy services to G.B. G.B. recognized Ms. Abadie from an earlier time when she worked at Florida Hospital where he had been a patient. He reminded her of that time and established a friendship with her. Over time, the friendship grew closer. As a result of their friendship and Ms. Abadie's compassion for G.B., Ms. Abadie and G.B. spoke regularly. When Ms. Abadie visited her father, she usually checked on G.B. He and Ms. Abadie talked about the range of subjects that acquaintances talk about including families, children, marital status, holiday plans, and day-to-day lives. They spoke regularly by telephone as well as in person. Although they spoke regularly, Ms. Abadie and G.B. did not always speak at length. Sometimes she just waved and poked her head in to say hello. At G.B.'s request, Ms. Abadie brought him items from outside the facility, such as toiletries and a blanket. G.B. grew very fond of Ms. Abadie and wanted her as his girlfriend and eventually his wife. Ms. Abadie did not encourage or reciprocate these feelings or intentions. Lisa Isabelle was G.B.'s only other visitor. G.B. was a friend of her husband. She had known G.B. for most of their lives. Ms. Isabelle rented G.B. a residence on her property. Ms. Isabelle described her relationship with G.B. as "love-hate." Ms. Isabelle held a durable power of attorney for G.B. His family lived out of town and decided it would be good for somebody local to hold the power of attorney. On Sunday, February 4, 2018, Ms. Abadie came to Comprehensive to visit her father. She wanted to watch the Eagles play in the Super Bowl with him. Their family is from Philadelphia. Ms. Abadie stopped at G.B.'s room first. Charity Forest, L.P.N., was on-duty that day. G.B. was one of her patients. Towards the end of the first of her two shifts, Ms. Forest noticed that the curtain by G.B.’s bed was pulled halfway around his bed, which was unusual. The door was open. Ms. Forest entered G.B.’s room and looked around the curtain. She saw G.B. and Ms. Abadie sitting on the bed, on top of the covers. The head of the bed was raised about 45 degrees to provide a backrest. G.B. was wearing long pajama pants but not wearing a shirt. Ms. Abadie was wearing jean shorts, a T-shirt, and Keds®. Ms. Abadie was resting her feet on her iPad® so she would not dirty the covers. G.B. and Ms. Abadie were not touching each other. They were talking, watching television, and looking at pictures on Ms. Abadie's telephone. The room was a two-bed room. There was a patient in the other bed. Ms. Forest thought that the two sitting on the bed was inappropriate and left in search of her supervisor. Ms. Forest could not locate her supervisor. But she met another L.P.N., Ruth Schneck. Ms. Forest told Ms. Schneck what she had observed. Ms. Schneck went to G.B.'s room. The door was open. Ms. Schneck briefly entered the room. G.B. and Ms. Abadie were still sitting on the bed. Ms. Schneck left immediately, closing the door behind her. She joined the search for the supervisor. Neither Ms. Schneck nor Ms. Forest could locate the supervisor. While looking for the supervisor, Ms. Forest and Ms. Schneck encountered Sean Flynn, L.P.N. They told him what they had seen. Mr. Flynn was a licensed practical nurse and a case manager at Comprehensive. He had come to the facility briefly that day in order to take care of some paperwork. After talking to Ms. Forest and Ms. Schneck, Mr. Flynn went to G.B.’s room and opened the door. Ms. Abadie and G.B. were sitting on the edge of the bed facing the door. Mr. Flynn asked them if anything was going on. They said no. Mr. Flynn left the room and called Nicole Lawlor, Comprehensive's Chief Executive Officer. Ms. Lawlor told Mr. Flynn to return to G.B.'s room, instruct Ms. Abadie to leave, and tell her that she would be suspended pending an investigation. He returned to G.B.'s room with Ms. Forest and Ms. Schneck. G.B. and Ms. Abadie were still sitting on the bed. Mr. Flynn asked Ms. Abadie to step outside. She did. G.B. soon followed in his wheelchair. Mr. Flynn told Ms. Abadie that she was suspended and had to leave. G.B. overheard this and became very upset and aggressive. He insisted that Ms. Abadie was his girlfriend and that he wanted her to stay. Ms. Abadie asked to visit her father before she left. Mr. Flynn agreed. Ms. Abadie visited her father for a couple of hours. Ms. Abadie also called Ms. Isabelle to tell her that Mr. Flynn asked her to leave and that G.B. was very upset. After Ms. Abadie's departure, G.B. became increasingly upset and loud. His behavior escalated to slamming doors and throwing objects. Comprehensive employees decided G.B. was a danger to himself and others and had him involuntarily committed under Florida's Baker Act at Mease Dunedin Hospital. On her way home, Ms. Abadie received a telephone call offering her full-time employment at Lakeland Regional Hospital. February 4, 2018, at 6:08 p.m., Ms. Abadie submitted her resignation from Comprehensive in an e-mail to Ms. Lawlor. Ms. Abadie's only patient/caregiver relationship with G.B. was through her employment with Comprehensive. As of 6:08 p.m. on February 4, 2018, G.B. was not a patient of Ms. Abadie. She no longer had a professional relationship with him. Ms. Lawlor suspended Ms. Abadie on February 4, 2018. She based her decision on the information that Ms. Forest, Ms. Schneck, and Mr. Flynn told her, not all of which is persuasively established or found as fact in this proceeding. Still, Ms. Lawlor's memorandum suspending Ms. Abadie reveals that the nature of G.B.'s relationship with Ms. Abadie and the events of February 4, 2018, were not sexual. Ms. Lawlor's Employee Memorandum suspending Ms. Abadie does not identify a state or institution rule violated in the part of the form calling for one. She wrote "Flagrant violation of code of conduct." The description in the "Nature of Infraction" section of the form reads, "Employee was found cuddling in bed with a resident during her time off." There is no mention of sex, breasts, genitalia, or sexual language. None of the varying and sometimes inconsistent accounts of the day mention touching or exposure of breasts, buttocks, or genitalia. None of the accounts describes or even alludes to sex acts or statements about sex. The only kiss reported is a kiss on the cheek that G.B. reportedly forced upon Ms. Abadie as she was leaving. The deposition testimony of the Board's "expert," offers many statements showing that what the Board complains of might be called "inappropriate" or a "boundary violation" but does not amount to sexual misconduct. He testified about the strain a patient expressing romantic feelings toward a therapist puts on the professional relationship. He says the professional should tell the patient that the statements are inappropriate. The witness says that if the patient starts expressing the romantic feelings by touching the therapist, the therapist must tell the patient that his behavior is inappropriate and begin recording the events for the therapist's protection so that "no inappropriate allegations are made later." (Jt. Ex. 3, p. 3). Asked his opinion about allegations that Ms. Abadie was laying on G.B.'s bed, the witness says the behavior "crossed a professional boundary" and that he was not aware of the "behavior being appropriate in any situation." (Jt. Ex. 3, p. 16). The witness acknowledged that a hug is not inherently sexual. (Jt. Ex. 3, pp. 24 & 30). In addition, the training and experience of the witness do not qualify him as someone whose opinion should be entitled to significant weight. Among other things, he has never written about, lectured about, or testified to an opinion about sexual misconduct. Had the deposition not been offered without objection, whether the testimony would have been admissible is a fair question. § 90.702, Fla. Stat. After February 4, 2018, Ms. Abadie attempted to continue her friendship with G.B. by telephone calls and visits. However, Comprehensive refused for several weeks, against G.B.'s wishes, to allow Ms. Abadie to visit G.B. and would only permit Ms. Abadie brief, supervised visits with her father. G.B. was very upset by Comprehensive's prohibition of visits from Ms. Abadie. He began refusing food and treatment, including medications and dialysis. G.B.'s condition deteriorated to the point that he was admitted to hospice care. At that point, on February 24, 2018, Comprehensive contacted Ms. Abadie and gave her permission to visit G.B and lifted restrictions on visiting her father. A February 27, 2018, e-mail from Shelly Wise, Director of Nursing, confirmed this and admitted that the Agency for Health Care Administration had advised that G.B.'s right as a resident to visitors trumped Comprehensive's concerns. Ms. Abadie resumed visiting her friend, G.B. On May 21, 2018, G.B. passed away. G.B. was a lonely, mortally ill man. He initiated a friendship with Ms. Abadie that she reciprocated. Ultimately, he developed unfounded feelings about her being his girlfriend and them having a future together. The clear and convincing evidence does not prove that the relationship was more than a friendship or that it was sexual in any way.

Conclusions For Petitioner: Mary A. Iglehart, Esquire Christina Arzillo Shideler, Esquire Florida Department of Health Prosecution Services Unit 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin C-65 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 For Respondent: Kennan George Dandar, Esquire Dandar & Dandar, P.A. Post Office Box 24597 Tampa, Florida 33623

Recommendation Based on the preceding Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that Petitioner, Department of Health, Board of Respiratory Care, dismiss the Administrative Complaint. DONE AND ENTERED this 17th day of July, 2019, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JOHN D. C. NEWTON, II Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of July, 2019.

Florida Laws (9) 120.569120.5720.43456.063456.072456.073468.353468.36590.702 DOAH Case (4) 12-1705PL18-0263PL18-0898PL18-5694PL
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DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, BOARD OF MEDICINE vs AUNALI SALIM KHAKU, M.D., 21-001438PL (2021)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Lake Mary, Florida Apr. 30, 2021 Number: 21-001438PL Latest Update: Jul. 06, 2024

The Issue Whether Respondent committed the violations alleged in the Amended Administrative Complaint; and, if so, the appropriate penalty therefor.

Findings Of Fact Parties and Investigation Leading to Issuance of the Amended Complaint The Department is the state agency responsible for regulating the practice of medicine pursuant to section 20.43, Florida Statutes, and chapters 456 and 458, Florida Statutes. Respondent, Aunali Salim Khaku, M.D., is a neurologist and sleep medicine specialist licensed (ME 114611) in Florida. Respondent completed a neurology residency in 2013 and a sleep medicine fellowship in 2014. He practiced at the VA from 2014 until 2020, initially at the Lake Baldwin facility and then at the Lake Nona facility. From 2020 until early 2021, Respondent practiced at Orlando Health. Other than the allegations herein, the Department has never sought to discipline Respondent. The Department seeks to revoke Respondent’s license based on allegations that he engaged in sexual misconduct during office visits with three female patients—S.R., M.H., and M.V.S. The parties stipulated that the factual allegations, if proven by clear and convincing evidence, constitute sexual misconduct under Florida law. On or around December 6, 2020, M.V.S. reported to both the LMPD and the Department that Respondent acted inappropriately during an office visit on November 30, 2020. The Department investigated further, interviewed M.V.S. and Respondent, and obtained medical records from Orlando Health. On February 17, 2021, the Department issued an Order of Emergency Restriction of License (“ERO”) that restricted Respondent from practicing on female patients based on findings of sexual misconduct with M.V.S. On February 22, 2021, Respondent requested an expedited hearing under sections 120.569 and 120.57. The Department properly did not transmit the case to DOAH at that time, as judicial review of the ERO is via petition in the appellate court. §§ 120.60(6)(c) and 120.68, Fla. Stat. Respondent filed such a petition, but the First District Court of Appeal ultimately denied it on the merits. On March 9, 2021, the Department presented its disciplinary case to a probable cause panel of the Board. After hearing argument from both parties, the panel unanimously found probable cause to issue a three-count Administrative Complaint (“Complaint”) seeking to discipline Respondent for engaging in sexual misconduct with M.V.S. On March 10, 2021, the Department issued the Complaint. On March 16, 2021, Respondent requested an expedited formal hearing under chapter 120. However, the Department did not immediately transmit the Complaint to DOAH because it had just received notification that the VA investigated complaints of sexual misconduct against Respondent by two veterans, S.R. and M.H., who each saw Respondent multiple times between 2014 and 2016. The Department obtained records from the VA. As to S.R., the VA closed the matter as unsubstantiated based on S.R.’s decision not to pursue criminal charges and the VA’s finding of insufficient evidence to support the allegations. As to M.H., the VA found no conclusive evidence of misconduct based on Respondent’s testimony, which was corroborated by the testimony of his nurse and a medical student. After receipt of the VA records, the Department interviewed S.R. and M.H. Based on this additional information, the Department presented its case to another probable cause panel to amend the Complaint to include allegations relating to S.R. and M.H. After hearing from both parties, the panel voted unanimously on April 23, 2021, to find probable cause of sexual misconduct with S.R. and M.H. On April 27, 2021, the Department issued the three-count Amended Complaint seeking to discipline Respondent’s license for sexual misconduct with S.R., M.H., and M.V.S. On April 29, 2021, Respondent filed a third request for a hearing, which sought transmission of the case to DOAH for an expedited evidentiary hearing to be held within 30 days. On April 30, 2021, 45 days after Respondent’s request for a hearing on the initial Complaint, the Department transmitted the Amended Complaint to DOAH to conduct an evidentiary hearing under chapter 120.2 2 In filings prior to transmittal of the Amended Complaint to DOAH, in pleadings prior to the final hearing, and orally at the final hearing, Respondent argued that the Department improperly delayed transmitting the case to DOAH and violated his due process rights throughout the investigatory process. Even had Respondent preserved those arguments by including them in his PRO, the undersigned would have found that the Department’s investigation, the probable cause panel proceedings, and the timing of the transmittal of the case to DOAH did not render the proceedings unfair or impair the correctness of the Department’s action based on the weight of the credible evidence. For one, the Department presented its case to the probable cause panel 20 days after issuing the ERO and issued the initial Complaint the next day. It presented the new allegations to a probable cause panel 65 days after the ERO (and 44 days after filing the initial Complaint) and issued the Amended Complaint the next day. The Department then transmitted the Amended Complaint to DOAH on April 30, 2021, one day after Respondent requested a hearing on it and 45 days after requesting a hearing on the initial Complaint. Based on this timeline, the Department met its obligation to promptly institute chapter 120 proceedings. See § 120.60(6)(c), Fla. Stat. (“Summary suspension, restriction, or limitation may be ordered, but a suspension or revocation proceeding pursuant to ss. 120.569 and 120.57 shall also be promptly instituted and acted upon.”); see also § 456.073(5), Fla. Stat. (“Notwithstanding s. 120.569(2), the department shall notify the division within 45 days after receipt of a petition or request for a formal hearing.”); Fla. Admin. Code. R. 28-106.501(3) (“In the case of the emergency suspension, limitation, or restriction of a license, unless otherwise provided by law, within 20 days after emergency action taken pursuant to subsection (1) of this rule, the agency shall initiate administrative proceedings in compliance with Sections 120.569, 120.57 and 120.60, F.S., and Rule 28- 106.2015, F.A.C.”). The weight of the credible evidence also failed to establish any resulting prejudice to Respondent. He presented no evidence as to how the Department’s decision to investigate the new allegations and issue the Amended Complaint before transmitting the case to DOAH prejudiced his ability to defend against the allegations. The Department notified Respondent of M.V.S.’s complaint and allowed him to provide statements during the investigation, make arguments before both probable cause panels, conduct discovery, and adequately prepare for and defend against the allegations at a final hearing. The fact that the VA did not comply with Respondent’s discovery requests or make witnesses available is neither attributable to the Department nor a reasonable basis to argue prejudice, particularly where Respondent failed to enforce subpoenas or challenge the VA’s discovery objections in state or federal court. The undersigned simply cannot find that the Department violated Respondent’s due process rights by waiting 45 days to transmit the case to DOAH while the Department investigated new allegations involving two other female patients. At best, Respondent’s alleged prejudice is that the Department was able to prosecute him for sexual misconduct with two additional patients, which it had authority to do independently by separate complaint or by moving to amend the Complaint once it transmitted the case to DOAH. The latter option could have resulted in even more delay, as DOAH may have had to relinquish jurisdiction to allow for the new allegations to be approved by a probable cause panel if the Department had not already completed that necessary step. S.R.’s Two Appointments with Respondent in 2014 and 2015 In 2014, S.R., a 58-year-old veteran who just moved to Orlando, requested a neurology referral because she suffers from multiple sclerosis (“MS”). The VA referred her to Respondent with whom she had two office visits. On December 29, 2014, S.R. had her first appointment with Respondent at the VA Lake Baldwin facility. Respondent’s assistant took S.R.’s vitals but did not remain in the room during the examination.3 S.R. never asked for a chaperone to be present and one was not offered to her. Respondent entered the room and made introductions with S.R. They discussed the new VA facility in Lake Nona, where Respondent lived, and restaurants in that area. According to S.R., Respondent said that he hoped to see her, though she did not understand what that meant. S.R. explained that she suffered her first MS attack over 30 years earlier but only recently was diagnosed with the disease after a neurologist ordered an MRI. She discussed her current symptoms, including back pain, muscle spasms, and fatigue. Respondent told her that back problems were common for women with large breasts, which she thought was odd. But, she expressed hope that Respondent could continue to help with her symptoms much like her prior neurologists in South Carolina and South Florida. Respondent examined S.R. and tested her reflexes, vision, coordination, and physical limitations. Respondent said he wanted to listen to S.R.’s heart. Without even trying to listen over her clothes, he asked S.R. to lift her t-shirt. He began rubbing his stethoscope across both her breasts and under her bra. He then cupped the bottom of her left breast with the palm of 3 The VA advocate’s report indicated that S.R. said that Respondent instructed his assistant to leave the room prior to his examination. However, S.R. testified credibly that she never made that allegation and her handwritten statement to the VA advocate also contained no such allegation. That the VA advocate’s hearsay report says otherwise neither calls S.R.’s credibility into doubt nor undermines the clear and consistent nature of her testimony. his hand while holding the stethoscope between his fingers and touching her nipple. This portion of the examination lasted about ten seconds. At the end of the initial visit, Respondent discussed treatment plans, medication, and physical therapy with S.R. They scheduled a follow-up appointment for several months later. Respondent documented S.R.’s records based on his examination. Although S.R. testified credibly that she had a heart murmur, Respondent noted a regular heart rate and rhythm with no murmurs. He also continued S.R.’s prescription for Diazepam, though several months later he placed an addendum for that initial visit record to indicate the prescription was improperly entered under his name and that he would defer to S.R.’s primary care physician for that medication. S.R. thought Respondent’s conduct was weird because no doctor had ever listened to her heart under her clothes or touched her breasts in that manner. She felt confused and uncomfortable, but she did not report the incident then because she trusted Respondent as her doctor and thought it could have been a mistake. She also thought Respondent might be the only neurologist at the VA. She discussed the incident with her husband and decided that she would be more aware at subsequent appointments. On March 30, 2015, S.R. had her second visit with Respondent at the Lake Nona facility. She arrived early, but the office staff delayed bringing her back and then had trouble taking her vitals. S.R. did not request a chaperone for this visit because everyone seemed very busy. Respondent entered the room and they were again alone. Respondent seemed irritated because he thought S.R. arrived late, which made her defensive. She complained of left hip pain and told Respondent that she had not gone for physical therapy. He examined her hip by lifting her leg, which hurt. She then sat up and he said he needed to listen to her heart. Again, without attempting to listen over her t-shirt and bra, he told her to lift her t-shirt. Because of what occurred during the last visit, S.R. kept her arms tightly by her sides to limit Respondent’s ability to touch her breasts. He kept using his elbow to try to relax her arms while moving the stethoscope higher over her breasts, eventually cupping her breast under her bra. He grabbed at her breasts but got frustrated by her refusal to relax her arms. At that point, Respondent threw the stethoscope into the sink and became angry, which startled S.R. and made her uncomfortable. She requested that he continue her Diazepam prescription to help her sleep at night, which she said her prior neurologist prescribed for muscle spasms. Respondent told her that the drug was for anxiety, not muscle spasms, though he documented in her record that she should continue to take the medication. Respondent also documented again that S.R. had a regular heart rate and rhythm. S.R. felt uncomfortable during the entire visit. She had never had a neurologist get angry or confrontational with her, but she decided not to report the incidents at that time because she was in pain and just wanted to go home. About a month later, she awoke in the middle of the night and realized the inappropriateness of Respondent’s conduct. In August 2015, S.R. returned to the Lake Nona facility to schedule an appointment with a different neurologist. When she saw Respondent’s name on the signage, she immediately went to the patient advocate to report his misconduct in the hope of preventing him from engaging in the same behavior with other patients. She met with the patient advocate and the VA police, and she completed a written statement. Although she was supposed to testify before the VA investigative board, she had trouble finding the room that day and left without speaking to anyone. Based on S.R.’s decision not to pursue criminal charges and the VA’s finding of insufficient evidence to support the allegations, the VA closed the matter as unsubstantiated. However, the matter was referred for clinical and/or administrative follow- up, which resulted in the VA updating its chaperone policy to require signs to be posted in the offices to put patients on notice of their right to ask for a chaperone. S.R. did not report the incidents to the Department at the time because she did not realize she could do so. But, when the Department contacted her in 2021 about this case, she agreed to participate and testify. The undersigned found S.R. to be a highly credible witness who unequivocally testified about Respondent’s inappropriate sexual behavior. S.R.’s testimony was compelling, specific, clear, and materially consistent with the statements she made when the incidents first occurred. Respondent testified about his treatment of S.R., but he conceded he had no independent recollection of the visits. Instead, he based his testimony on what he documented in her medical records and his standard practice. Respondent testified that he conducted a thorough examination in the same manner that he evaluates all of his new patients. He performed a cardiac examination over S.R.’s clothing by placing a stethoscope on her chest in several areas to listen to her heart. He confirmed that he never places the stethoscope on, or allows his hand to come into contact with, a patient’s breasts and that it was impossible that such contact happened with S.R. even inadvertently. He also said that he always has a chaperone present if he needs to listen to a female patient’s heart under her clothing and that is exactly what he would have done had he needed to do so with S.R. Respondent denied engaging in any inappropriate behavior with S.R. and suggested instead that she misperceived what happened. However, he offered no credible explanation for S.R. having such a misperception, except to accuse her of being upset for his refusal to prescribe her Diazepam. S.R.’s medical records fail to document any cognitive impairment and Respondent confirmed that she did not suffer from hallucinations or ailments that would cause her to imagine things that did not happen. Although S.R. admitted that it took her a few months to fully realize what Respondent had done and to report it to the VA, the undersigned has no hesitation in finding her testimony to be a fair and accurate account of Respondent’s actual conduct. The records themselves also call the veracity of Respondent’s testimony into question. Although S.R. credibly testified that she had a heart murmur, Respondent documented the lack of such a murmur even after conducting two cardiovascular examinations of her. Had Respondent conducted a proper cardiac examination, he should have identified and documented her murmur. Further, it cannot be ignored that the treatment plan for both visits continued her prescription for Diazepam, even though Respondent—after the first visit but before the second visit—placed an addendum in the record to indicate that S.R. needed to obtain the prescription from her primary care physician. Respondent’s notes for the March 2015 visit also document that Diazepam continued to be an active prescription for S.R., undermining the suggestion that she would fabricate an allegation of sexual misconduct against Respondent on that basis. Moreover, Respondent’s expert neurologist had never heard of a patient fabricating sexual misconduct allegations against a doctor for failing to prescribe medication. Based on the weight of the credible evidence, the undersigned finds that the Department proved by clear and convincing evidence that Respondent engaged in sexual misconduct with S.R. During the first visit, Respondent directed S.R. to lift her shirt and inappropriately rubbed his stethoscope across her breasts and under her bra, cupped her left breast with the palm of his hand while holding the stethoscope between his fingers, and touched her nipple. During the second appointment, Respondent directed S.R. to lift her shirt again. Although S.R. kept her arms tightly against her sides to try to limit Respondent’s ability to touch her inappropriately, he inappropriately rubbed the stethoscope across her breasts, cupped her breast under her bra, and grabbed at her breasts. Respondent did so on both occasions without first attempting to listen to S.R.’s heart over her clothing, which itself was contrary to the standard of care. M.H.’s Four Appointments with Respondent in 2015 and 2016 In late 2015, the VA referred M.H., a 39-year-old veteran, to Respondent for a neurological evaluation after she had an abnormal MRI showing white matter changes in her brain following an illegal drug overdose. M.H. had four office visits with Respondent at the Lake Nona facility on August 12, 2015, November 6, 2015, June 23, 2016, and August 1, 2016. During the first three visits, Respondent discussed M.H.’s medical history, prior drug use, and symptoms, including migraines, pain, possible nerve damage, and cognitive and motor issues; he also conducted physical and neurological examinations. During the fourth visit, Respondent performed a nerve block procedure to address M.H.’s migraines. M.H. testified about the visits and her uncomfortable interactions with Respondent. During several visits, he discussed the lack of sex with his wife and that she allowed him to step outside the marriage. He either asked M.H. out on a date or to meet at a hotel, which she interpreted as an offer of sex, and he also asked if he could call her. He asked her questions about her sex life several times, including how often she had sex with her boyfriend, what positions they liked, the size of her bra, and whether sex was painful. M.H. testified that Respondent also acted inappropriately. During one visit, he either lifted her shirt or asked her to lift her shirt to look at her breasts and listen to her heart. He once blocked the door to prevent her from leaving the room and attempted to put his arms around her to hug her. He once put his hands on the bottom of her buttocks, like a lover’s caress. During the fourth visit when the nurse left the room after the procedure, he had an erection and rubbed it through his pants against her leg while trying to give her a hug. She said that she told her mother in the waiting room after that visit that Respondent had rubbed his erection on her. She also said that he told her not to say anything about their interactions at each visit. In August 2016, M.H. reported Respondent’s conduct to the VA; she did not report the conduct to the Department because she did not know she could. The VA investigative board conducted sworn interviews of M.H., Respondent, his nurse, and a medical student, and it considered numerous letters of recommendation from Respondent’s patients and colleagues. It found no conclusive evidence of sexual misconduct based on Respondent’s testimony, as corroborated by testimony from a nurse and a medical student. M.H. testified passionately about Respondent’s conduct and how it made her feel. However, her recollection of the details—as to what occurred, when, and who was present—was fuzzy and inconsistent in material ways with the testimony she gave to the VA board in 2016, her deposition testimony in this case, and the testimony of her mother. M.H. stated that her recollection in 2016 was better than now, but the inconsistencies outlined below affect the weight to be given to M.H.’s testimony. M.H. testified initially that she and Respondent were alone in the examination room at some point during each visit. M.H. testified that she asked to have her daughter present during either the third or fourth visit, but Respondent refused. M.H. also testified on cross examination that she could not recall if her mother was in the room with her during the first two visits, only to later confirm that her mother must have been present during those two visits based on the testimony she gave before the VA board in 2016. M.H.’s mother testified that she accompanied M.H. to two of the visits, though she could not recall the dates. Contrary to M.H.’s testimony, her mother said she neither came back to the examination room nor met Respondent at any visit and based her testimony solely on what M.H. said. M.H.’s mother testified that M.H. said that Respondent asked her out after one visit and rubbed his erection against her back after another visit, which contravened M.H.’s testimony that Respondent rubbed his erection against her leg while hugging her from the front. Before the VA board in 2016, and contrary to her testimony at the final hearing, M.H. said that Respondent acted professionally during the first two visits and that her mother was present in the examination room both times. M.H. testified that Respondent became unprofessional while they were alone in the room during the final two visits, at which he asked inappropriate questions about her sex life. M.H. explained that she was offered a chaperone before the third visit, but she refused because nothing unprofessional had occurred before, and that Respondent refused to allow her daughter to be in the room during the procedure on the fourth visit. M.H. said Respondent grabbed her buttocks during the third visit and, during the fourth visit, he blocked the door after the procedure, grabbed her buttocks, lifted her shirt to comment on how much he liked her breasts, and rubbed his erection through his pants on her leg. When cross-examined about the inconsistencies, M.H. testified at the final hearing that she may have been protecting Respondent by saying in 2016 that he acted professionally during the first two visits, though she now recalls him acting unprofessionally during all four visits. During her pre-hearing deposition in this case, M.H. testified that Respondent asked questions about her sex life and bra size, discussed his open marriage, and asked her out during the first visit, but he did not touch her inappropriately. M.H. testified that Respondent refused to allow her daughter to stay in the room with her during the second visit and, after the examination, he blocked the door, grabbed her and tried to hug her, rubbed his erection on her stomach and leg, and again reiterated that he was allowed to have sex outside his marriage. She testified that Respondent discussed his open marriage and asked her to date him during the third visit; M.H. said that the office refused to allow her mother to accompany her in the room. M.H. testified that the only uncomfortable thing that Respondent did during the fourth visit was ask her out repeatedly. M.H. testified that Respondent never asked if she wanted a chaperone at any of the visits, though she later acknowledged that a chaperone was present at the fourth visit. Respondent testified about his treatment of M.H. based only on what he documented in her chart, as he had no independent recollection beyond his review of her medical records. Respondent denied any inappropriate behavior with M.H. He claimed that he never allowed himself to be alone in a room with her because she was engaging in manipulative, drug-seeking behavior. He basically accused M.H. of fabricating the allegations against him because he refused to prescribe her pain medication. However, Respondent’s accusations against M.H. are questionable for several reasons. Respondent never documented in her record his concern about M.H.’s alleged drug-seeking behavior, that a chaperone needed to be present at all visits, or that she had requested pain medication. Although he documented the presence of his nurse and a medical student at the fourth visit, he failed to do the same for the first three visits. One would expect a physician—surely one as concerned about a patient’s drug-seeking history and behavior as Respondent now claims to be—to document those concerns and the presence of chaperones in the medical record to prevent any future false accusation. This is particularly so given that Respondent, at the time, had recently been accused of misconduct by S.R., which he believed was both false and based on her drug-seeking behavior. The medical records also confirm that M.H. informed Respondent at the June 2016 visit that she had been prescribed Lyrica for pain while in jail and that it was working. Respondent noted, “Renewed lyrica,” in the plan/recs section of the record for that visit. Respondent also noted Pregabalin, the generic name for Lyrica,4 in both the active and pending medication lists for both the June and August 2016 visits. The weight of the credible evidence does not support Respondent’s claim that M.H. fabricated her allegations because he refused to prescribe her pain medication, particularly given her credible testimony that she did not 4 According to WebMD, the generic name for Lyrica is Pregabalin. Available at https://www.webmd.com/drugs/2/drug-93965/lyrica-oral/details. need pain medication because Respondent continued her Lyrica prescription. It also bears repeating that Respondent’s own expert had never heard of a patient falsely accusing a doctor of sexual misconduct for refusing to prescribe medication. After evaluating the evidence, the undersigned finds M.H. generally to be a more credible witness overall than Respondent. She testified passionately and credibly about Respondent’s requests to meet her outside the office because he had an open marriage and his wife allowed such conduct. She also credibly explained how Respondent commented on the size of her breasts, grabbed her buttocks, and rubbed his erection on her. Importantly, however, the undersigned cannot ignore that the clear and convincing evidence standard applies in this case. M.H.’s recollection was too fuzzy and inconsistent to definitively find without hesitation that Respondent engaged in the exact sexual misconduct alleged by M.H. and set forth in the Amended Complaint. If the Department’s burden in this case was a mere preponderance of the evidence, the undersigned would likely find that it proved Respondent engaged in sexual misconduct with M.H. But, the clear and convincing evidence standard applies herein. And, because M.H. could not provide the type of definitive and clear testimony required in this disciplinary action, the Department failed to prove that Respondent engaged in sexual misconduct with M.H. M.V.S.’s One Appointment with Respondent in 2020 On November 30, 2020, M.V.S., a 68-year-old woman, had an initial neurology consult with Respondent at Orlando Health. M.V.S. sought a neurologist based on an abnormal MRI showing a cyst near her pituitary gland and complaints of neck pain radiating to her shoulder and arm. After filling out paperwork in the reception area, a medical assistant or nurse brought M.V.S. to an examination room. The room had an examination table, which could be lowered, a counter, and a chair. M.V.S. sat in the chair while the assistant took her vitals. Although M.V.S. has a history of blood pressure spikes, for which she has called 911 and even gone to the hospital several times, her blood pressure was within normal limits that morning. The assistant waited for M.V.S. to complete the paperwork and then left the room. Respondent entered the room a few minutes later and closed the door behind him. He wore green scrubs and a white lab coat; she wore a skirt, blouse, bra, and underwear. He and M.V.S. were alone for the remainder of the appointment. They initially discussed M.V.S.’s medical history and complaints. M.V.S. talked about her aunt, who had symptoms of Alzheimer’s disease and did not recognize her on a recent visit. She was concerned about the disease because she recently had forgotten some small details, like the name of an actor in a movie. M.V.S. did not believe she had significant memory issues, but she wanted research on the disease because it ran in her family. Respondent asked M.V.S. if she lived with anyone, which she interpreted as a question relating to her safety. She informed him that she lived alone within close proximity to a fire station. She also mentioned that her daughter lived in Orlando and her fiancé lived in Longwood. Respondent asked if she had sexual relations with her fiancé; she explained that they did not because her fiancé had prostate cancer. M.V.S. thought the question was odd given the reason for the appointment and because no other physician had ever asked that type of question before. Respondent moved on to M.V.S.’s complaints of neck pain. She explained that she experienced pain on the left side of her neck that radiated to her left shoulder and left arm. At that point, Respondent directed M.V.S. to sit on the table so he could examine her. While standing to M.V.S.’s left, Respondent rubbed and squeezed her neck and shoulders with his thumbs and fingers for a couple of minutes. No other doctor had examined her in that fashion before. He said she felt tense, but never asked if she experienced pain during the examination. She confirmed that it definitely felt like a neck and shoulder massage, which she had received many times. She noted that her cardiologist had recently palpated her neck for pain by using two fingers to poke and feel around, which was different than Respondent’s examination. Indeed, when a doctor palpates for pain, they typically use two fingertips to lightly press and prod in the trouble areas and obtain feedback from the patient about the level of pain. Respondent then examined M.V.S.’s spine while she stood in front of him. He thereafter examined her reflexes, eyes, and extremity strength while she sat on the table. He also conducted a memory test, which she passed. M.V.S. did not recall Respondent listening to her heart during the visit. At that point, Respondent directed M.V.S. to lie face-down on the table, which already was lowered. He asked if he could raise her skirt and she said, yes, because she believed it related to a muscular or skeletal examination. He raised her skirt and, over her underwear, rubbed her lower back and eventually moved down to her buttocks using both of his hands. He rubbed and squeezed both of her buttocks. She confirmed it felt like a deliberate, prolonged massage, which had never happened to her at a doctor’s office. Her mind raced, she felt frozen, and she could not believe what was happening. After one to two minutes, Respondent told her to sit up because he heard a voice. She sat on the end of the table and he began massaging and squeezing her right breast while standing on her right. He told her that he had never done this before and that she was beautiful. She thanked him in a low voice, but she was afraid and felt trapped because they were alone, there were no witnesses, and she was unsure of what he would do. Respondent asked if M.V.S. was comfortable with him massaging her breast and he stopped when she said no. He moved to her left side and explained that his wife would not have sex with him, so she permitted him to have sex outside the marriage. He asked if M.V.S. would meet him for sex and she declined. Respondent asked if that was because her fiancé would object, and she confirmed they had a commitment. At that point, Respondent pulled his lab coat back and said, “Look at this. Look what you did to me.” Respondent revealed his erect penis, which M.V.S. confirmed was clearly visible through his scrubs. Respondent told her to keep this between us, said his assistant would be in shortly with paperwork, and left the room. M.V.S. waited for about seven minutes and, when no one came, she left the room, tried to hold her composure, and checked out. She said nothing before leaving because she felt unsafe and was unsure if anyone would believe her anyway. M.V.S. turned on her car’s air conditioning and drank water to calm down. Her heart was pounding, and she feared having a blood pressure spike. As soon as she arrived home, M.V.S. called her daughter to tell her what happened. M.V.S.’s daughter, who is a nurse, told her to call the police. M.V.S. called the LMPD that afternoon. The officer with whom she spoke suggested that she file a complaint with the Department, which she did on December 6, 2020. Both the Department and the LMPD investigated the allegations, which included interviews of M.V.S. and Respondent.5 M.V.S. also reported the incident to Orlando Health risk management. The undersigned found M.V.S. to be a highly credible witness who testified passionately and definitively about Respondent’s inappropriate sexual behavior during the office visit. She immediately reported it to the LMPD and, within a week, filed complaints with both the Department and Respondent’s employer. M.V.S.’s testimony was clear, specific, detailed, compelling, and materially consistent with the interviews and statements she gave immediately following the visit. Respondent testified about his treatment of M.V.S., but—as he did with the S.R. and M.H.—he conceded he had little to no independent 5 Based on the information obtained from M.V.S. and Respondent, the LMPD placed the case into inactive status pending further evidence. recollection of her or the visit. Instead, he reviewed her medical records, which refreshed his recollection of what occurred during the visit. Respondent denied engaging in any inappropriate behavior with M.V.S. that could have been interpreted as sexual or outside the scope of a proper examination. He testified that he conducted a neurological examination, palpated her neck for pain, checked her reflexes, and conducted a memory test. He said he never massaged her neck and shoulders, touched or massaged her breasts or buttocks, discussed his marriage, solicited her to have sex, said she was beautiful, or revealed an erection through his scrubs. He also said she could not have laid face-down on the table because he never lowered the back or extended the footrest; he confirmed that he would have brought in a chaperone if he needed her to lie on the table. Respondent testified that M.V.S.’s accusations against him were the product of memory loss and cognitive impairment. Although M.V.S. reported a family history of Alzheimer’s and a fear of mild memory loss, Respondent documented that she performed well on her memory and cognitive examinations. M.V.S. and her daughter testified credibly that she did not experience significant memory loss beyond forgetting the name of an actor in a movie. Respondent himself confirmed that M.V.S. did not suffer from hallucinations or ailments that would cause her to perceive things that were not there—a point with which his expert neurologist agreed given the way Respondent documented the medical record. And, more importantly, M.V.S.’s ability to recall the specific details of the visit and do so consistently with the statements she made previously undermine Respondent’s belief that cognitive impairment caused her to fabricate her allegations. The weight of the credible evidence simply does not support the suggestion that M.V.S. misperceived, confabulated, or fabricated her allegations based on memory loss or cognitive impairment. Additionally, Respondent attempted to discredit M.V.S. by suggesting that she may have come onto him. Indeed, he testified that she was verbose and told him during their initial discussion about her history that her fiancé was older, that she was a 60s baby, and that she had not been touched in a while. Aside from M.V.S.’s credible testimony that she said no such things, it cannot be ignored that Respondent conceded that his memory of the visit was based on his review of the medical record, which contained no reference to these comments even though Respondent says they were odd. Respondent also presented evidence that M.V.S. had previously called 911 on multiple occasions relating to blood pressure spikes to undermine the veracity of her testimony. However, the recordings of the 911 calls reveal an individual who, despite being concerned about her blood pressure, is alert, aware of her surroundings, clear-headed, and in no way suffering from an illness that would raise doubts about the veracity of her testimony or her credibility overall. Based on the weight of the credible evidence, the undersigned finds that the Department proved by clear and convincing evidence that Respondent engaged in sexual misconduct with M.V.S. He inappropriately massaged her neck and shoulders, buttocks, and breast. He disclosed that he had an open marriage and solicited M.V.S. to meet him for sex outside the office. He also told her that she was beautiful and revealed his erection through his scrubs.

Conclusions For Petitioner: Kristen Summers, Esquire Elizabeth Tiernan, Esquire Prosecution Services Unit Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin C-65 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3265 For Respondent: Kathryn Hood, Esquire Pennington, P.A. 215 South Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Jon M. Pellett, Esquire Pennington, P.A. 12724 Gran Bay Parkway West, Suite 401 Jacksonville, Florida 32258

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Health, Board of Medicine, issue a final order finding Respondent committed sexual misconduct prohibited by sections 458.331(1)(j), 458.329, and 456.063(1), suspending Respondent’s license for two years, and thereafter permanently restricting his license to either prohibit him from seeing female patients or, at a minimum, doing so without a chaperone present.7 DONE AND ENTERED this 28th day of October, 2021, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ANDREW D. MANKO Administrative Law Judge 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of October, 2021. 7 Section 456.072(4), Florida Statutes, provides that the Board, in addition to any other discipline imposed through final order, “shall assess costs related to the investigation and prosecution of the case.” Prior to the final hearing, the parties agreed to bifurcate the investigative costs issue (including Respondent’s argument that such costs should not be assessed because they are based on unpromulgated rules) pending resolution of the merits of the Amended Complaint. Upon further reflection, the undersigned concludes that resolving such an issue—even in a bifurcated proceeding—is premature because the Board has not yet issued a final order disciplining Respondent or followed the procedure in section 456.072(4), which requires it to consider an affidavit of itemized costs and any written objections thereto. It is in those written objections where Respondent may challenge the costs as being based on an unpromulgated rule. And, if Respondent’s written objections create a disputed issue of fact, the Department can transmit the investigative costs issue to DOAH to resolve that dispute, just as it did in Case No. 20-5385F. COPIES FURNISHED: Jon M. Pellett, Esquire Pennington, P.A. Suite 401 12724 Gran Bay Parkway West Jacksonville, Florida 32258 Kathryn Hood, Esquire Pennington, P.A. 215 South Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Donna C. McNulty, Esquire Office of the Attorney General The Capitol, Plaza Level 01 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Paul A. Vazquez, JD, Executive Director Board of Medicine Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin C-03 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3253 Kristen Summers, Esquire Prosecution Services Unit Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin C-65 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3265 Elizabeth Tiernan, Esquire Prosecution Services Unit Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin C-65 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3265 Edward A. Tellechea, Esquire Office of the Attorney General The Capitol, Plaza Level 01 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Louise St. Laurent, General Counsel Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin C-65 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3265

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DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, BOARD OF MEDICINE vs DEJENE ABEBE, M.D., 00-004224PL (2000)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida Oct. 12, 2000 Number: 00-004224PL Latest Update: Apr. 23, 2003

The Issue The issues to be resolved in this proceeding concern whether the Respondent has violated Section 458.331(1)(j) and (x), Florida Statutes, and, if so, what if any penalty should be imposed.

Findings Of Fact The Petitioner is an agency of the State of Florida charged with regulating the practice of medicine pursuant to Chapter 458, Florida Statutes, including conducting disciplinary proceedings for alleged violations of the provisions of the Chapter. The Respondent is a licensed physician in the State of Florida, holding license number ME0072783. The Respondent is a native of Ethiopia, where he was reared and educated. During the Ethiopian revolution he was drafted into the Ethiopian military and served as a lieutenant in combat for approximately two years. When a communist- dominated regime seized power in the country the Respondent was forced to flee, ultimately securing a scholarship to study medicine in Yugoslavia. He attended and completed medical school in that country, but had his passport revoked when he refused to join the communist party in Yugoslavia. Ultimately he fled that country and secured political asylum in the United States. He worked at a number of jobs, including as a security guard, for some years before he was able to take the Foreign Medical Graduate's Examination of Medical Science. He passed that examination in 1988 and attended the Harvard Medical School in the Department of Psychiatry in Boston. Thereafter, upon completing internship and residency training, he ultimately located in Tallahassee, Florida, in 1997 and became licensed in the State of Florida. The Respondent testified that he has, from time to time used, his personal history of adversity to help his patients by illustrating to them that, no matter what difficulties they experience, that they can, by persistence, overcome any adverse circumstance. He does this in an attempt to motivate his patients to get better. The Respondent has more than, 1000 patients in his practice and specializes in the treatment of children in the context of psychopharmacology. He does not practice psychotherapy. He has never before had a complaint filed against him by the Board of Medicine. In February of 1999, the Respondent and Dr. Thu Thai agreed to form a partnership whereby they would share overhead and make referrals to each other. Specifically, the Respondent and Dr. Thai agreed that the Respondent would refer all of his adult patients to Dr. Thai and that Dr. Thai would refer child patients to the Respondent. Before that arrangement could become effective, however, Dr. Thai had to establish himself with privileges at Tallahassee Memorial Hospital (TMH), in order to handle in-patient cases. As a consequence, the Respondent and Dr. Thai agreed to formalize their practice relationship in the summer of 1999. They formally opened their joint practice on June 25, 1999. B.R. moved to the Tallahassee area sometime in the latter part of the 1990's, either shortly before or after leaving her abusive husband. After moving to Tallahassee B.R. was under extreme stress due to lack of financial resources from her estranged husband. She was in constant pain as a result of severe scoliosis in her back, for which she had nine prior surgeries. The surgeries were unsuccessful in the sense that she was left with chronic, often severe pain, as a result. Because of the constant pain she was forced to take prescription pain medication on a daily basis. She began to suffer from significant depression due to the constant pain, her severe financial stress and, as she testified, became addicted to pain medication and at times could not function without it. She sought treatment from numerous physicians to be sure that she always had a supply of prescription pain medication. She became more and more concerned about money due to being estranged from her husband and his financial support. She often had insufficient funds to buy food and still pay her rent. In early 1999, she began to have suicidal ideations. She was thus suffering from severe emotional and physical stress. Finally, on March 31, 1999, she admitted herself to the TMH. She was extremely underweight at this time and in constant physical pain and was suffering from severe depression. She was also suffering from suicidal ideations upon her admission. Dr. Abebe was assigned as her treating psychiatrist at TMH. The psychiatric treatment for each psychiatric patient at TMH involved group therapy and individual treatment during the treating psychiatrist's rounds. During B.R. treatment sessions at TMH, according to her testimony, Dr. Abebe would talk about topics from his personal history at times. They discussed a recent incident or incidents in which her husband or former husband had forced her to have intercourse. An issue arose in her testimony concerning Dr. Abebe purportedly telling her that he had had a vasectomy. She maintains that he told her this on an occasion in June of 1999 at her apartment when they purportedly had sexual intercourse and she expressed fear of becoming pregnant. She maintained he reassured her by telling her that he had had a vasectomy. Dr. Abebe however, testified that he may indeed have told her that he had had a vasectomy, but it was in the context of treatment at TMH when they discussed the sexual abuse purportedly committed by her husband and her concern about becoming pregnant as a result; he counseled her concerning various means of pregnancy prevention. In any event, B.R. testified that she developed trust and confidence in Dr. Abebe because she felt he really cared about her. She felt he would be able to help her overcome her depression. B.R. was discharged from TMH on April 12, 1999, and was ordered to follow-up with Dr. Abebe with an appointment on May 4, 1999, for continued psychiatric treatment and medication. B.R.'s first appointment with Dr. Abebe, for treatment was on May 4, 1999. On April 28, 1999, she saw him, however, because she reported to him that she had lost her medication. He gave her enough medication on that occasion, by prescription, to provide her until her regularly scheduled appointment on May 4, 1999. B.R. did not appear for her May 4, 1999, appointment with Dr. Abebe. He or his secretary dispatched the police to her residence to check on her welfare. When the police came to her apartment she believed that this was another indication that Dr. Abebe was a "good doctor" and cared about her getting better. Dr. Abebe then saw B.R. again on May 10, 1999, for treatment and medication refills. B.R. admitted herself to the hospital again on May 15, 1999, staying in the hospital until May 18, 1999. During this hospital stay she was treated by Dr. Alcera for depression. Dr. Abebe refused to treat B.R. during this hospital stay. She was assigned to the treatment of Dr. Alcera during that admission to the hospital. Dr. Abebe did accept her for follow- up treatment, however. She was discharged on May 18, 1999, and told to follow-up in her treatment with Dr. Abebe, with an appointment on May 27, 1999. She did not appear for that appointment. A second occasion arose when B.R. called the Respondent's office requesting a prescription, alleging that something had happened to her supply of medication. On this occasion on or about June 7, 1999, she called the Respondent's office requesting prescriptions, stating that her husband had thrown away her medicine, or words to that effect. This resulted in B.R.'s seeing the Respondent at his office on June 10, 1999, when he gave her prescription for sixteen tablets of Lortab. He then saw her at his office on June 15, 1999, and gave her a prescription for a weeks supply with four refills. Refilling the prescription did not require her to again see the Respondent. B.R. apparently was also obtaining prescriptions from at least one other doctor for larger amounts of pain medication during the period of late May and early June 1999. On cross-examination, B.R. admitted that she had engaged in "doctor shopping" as she termed it, in order to get prescriptions from the Respondent and other Tallahassee area physicians. During the course of her testimony, B.R. also admitted to forging prescriptions, on at least two occasions. The Respondent saw B.R. on June 15, 1999, for the last time. On that date he formally discharged B.R. to the care of Dr. Thai, who was opening his practice with the Respondent on June 25, 1999. B.R. maintains that the Respondent transferred her care to Dr. Thai because he told her that he could no longer see her as a patient because of their alleged sexual relationship. The Respondent, on the other hand, contends that he discharged B.R. to the care of Dr. Thai because Dr. Thai's practice is focused on adult patients, while the Respondent's practice involves treating children. In any event, B.R. made an appointment on June 15, 1999, to see Dr. Thai on July 19, 1999. She kept that appointment and Dr. Thai met with the patient on July 19, 1999. On that occasion, B.R. said nothing to Dr. Thai concerning any inappropriate conduct on the part of the Respondent, making no mention of visits to her apartment or any description of sexual activity or encounters between B.R. and the Respondent. Dr. Thai's only other contact with B.R. was as a result of a conversation with a pharmacist. A pharmacist called him to verify the authenticity of a prescription that B.R. was attempting to have the pharmacist fill. The result of that conversation was that Dr. Thai denied that he had issued that prescription and directed the pharmacist to report the matter to the police, it being discovered that B.R. had forged or otherwise altered that prescription, which she admitted during her testimony. After the last appointment B.R. had with Respondent on June 15, 1999, B.R. was arrested and incarcerated, on approximately June 17, 1999 on a charge of grand theft. This was related to the fact that she had had a rental car in her possession for a substantial period of time in excess of the time provided for in the rental contract, which apparently related to the period of time she was incapacitated in the hospital. While she was incarcerated she called the Respondent to attempt to get him to bail her out of jail. He refused to do so. B.R. maintains that the Respondent began to visit her at her residence in early June and visited her residence on approximately six to eight occasions, all of which were purported to be in June. On the first occasion, according to her version of events, he came to her residence when she was not present and left her a note indicating that he was concerned about her and wanted to check on her welfare. A short time later, in early June, he allegedly again came to her residence and on or about this time she maintains that he discussed his sexual attraction to her and that she performed an act of oral sex with him. On another occasion in early June prior to her incarceration on or about June 17, 1999, she testified that he came to her residence and they engaged in sexual intercourse. She maintains that a third sexual encounter occurred in late June of 1999, after her incarceration, when he had refused to bail her out of jail, on which occasion they purportedly had sexual intercourse. B.R. claims that the Respondent always called her house before arriving and that she did not have a home phone, but only a cell phone. She maintains that on one occasion he left her money and a telephone credit card. She also contends that the Respondent left her prescriptions for Lortab on her coffee table, the last two times that she claims they had sexual encounters. The Respondent denies that he ever went to B.R.'s residence and denies that they ever engaged in any sexual activity. The Petitioner advances the Respondent's cell phone records (Joint Exhibit 6) as probative of B.R.'s version of these events. B.R. pinpointed the three alleged sexual encounters as occurring in June, both before and after her incarceration, which occurred on or about June 17, 1999. The Respondent's cell phone records, however, show no phone calls made to B.R.'s cell phone from the Respondent's cell phone during the month of June. Although B.R. testified that her cell phone was her only phone, B.R.'s cell phone records are notably absent from the record in this case. The only phone records introduced into evidence, the Respondent's, did not establish that the Respondent called B.R. during the month of June 1999. The Petitioner postulates five phone calls made between July 1, 1999, and August 15, 1999, from the Respondent's cell phone to B.R.'s cell phone, as probative of B.R.'s version of these events to the effect, that the Respondent would always call her before coming over to her house, including on those occasions when they purportedly had a sexual encounter and when he allegedly later attempted to unsuccessfully schedule visits to her house. It is important to note, however, that each of the five calls at issue are recorded as "one minute" phone calls, which indicates the minimum charge for simply dialing a number. Thus, it is also entirely possible that the Respondent either only called B.R. for a period of one minute or less, or even never reached B.R. with a phone call or only reached her voice mail, on any of the five occasions at issue. Both the Respondent and Dr. Thai testified that they frequently receive pages from their answering service indicating a patient call, which under the standard of care they must return, according to Dr. Thai. Dr. Thai testified that in fact he has been called by a patient of the Respondent and returned that call and told the caller that the caller would need to call the Respondent as the treating physician. Likewise, as to the five phone calls at issue in July and August 1999, the Respondent may have returned the phone call and found that the caller may have been a patient of Dr. Thai's, including, at that point in time, patient B.R., who was by that time under the care of Dr. Thai. Thus, the Respondent may have not had a conversation at all, in such a one-minute-or-less- duration phone call; may have merely referenced the caller to call Dr. Thai if the caller who had left a page was a patient of Dr. Thai (including possibly patient B.R.); or the Respondent may have indeed called B.R. In any event, five phone calls during July and August, of one- minute duration or less, during a period of a month and a half are not persuasively probative of B.R.'s claim concerning the Respondent's always calling before attempting to schedule a rendezvous scheduling with B.R. at anytime in June, July or August 1999. The Petitioner also contends it to be inculpatory that the Respondent shared personal information, particularly his method of birth control, with B.R. B.R. claimed that on one occasion when they are supposed to have engaged in sexual intercourse she expressed fears of becoming pregnant and that the Respondent told her not to worry, that he had had a vasectomy. This is unpersuasive. On direct examination B.R. related that it was the Respondent's treatment style to relate personal experiences or difficulties in his own life in an effort to motivate her to overcome obstacles and adversity. B.R. likened the Respondent's motivational style to "Tony Robbins." This is consistent with the Respondent's description of his method of interaction or counseling with his patients, where he described recounting personal experiences of adversity in his own life in an effort to motivate patients to overcome difficulties and get better. It is thus plausible that the Respondent may have mentioned his own method of birth control when the B.R., in the hospital, raised a concern about becoming pregnant by her abusive husband as a result of sexual abuse by her husband. The Petitioner maintains that the Respondent's testimony in this regard unbelievable. The Petitioner contends that it is incredible that the Respondent would merely discuss methods of birth control with a patient describing a rape or sexual abuse by her husband. The record, however, does not indicate that this is the only counseling advice or comment that the Respondent made to B.R. concerning alleged sexual abuse by her husband. The record does not establish that this was the only response he made to her description of sexual abuse by her husband. Standing alone the Petitioner's description of events concerning his counseling of B.R. during her hospital stay does not establish that he was insensitive to the psychiatric ramifications of alleged sexual abuse by B.R's husband. B.R. claims that she became distraught and extremely depressed as a result of the alleged sexual exploitation by the Respondent. She recounts, in essence, that she felt abused and essentially worthless and treated like a "prostitute" by the Respondent's alleged conduct, described above. She testified that she became so distraught as a result of the Respondent, her conduct that she attempted suicide and purportedly overdosed on 84 Lortab tablets with the result that she was hospitalized on August 19, 1999. She states that this was a voluntary admission to the Apalachee Center for Human Services or as she described it the "Eastside Facility." She testified that on this occasion she elected to admit herself at that facility, as opposed to TMH, because she did not want to have any contact with the Respondent as a potential treating physician, if she had been admitted to TMH. Upon the occasion of that admission however, B.R. did not make any allegations to any of the personnel of that facility that the Respondent had engaged in the inappropriate behavior described above. She contends that she failed to do so because she did not want to "get the Respondent in trouble" and, due to embarrassment or other reasons, was reluctant to discuss the matter, liking herself to a rape victim who is reluctant to describe such an incident. The record, however, belies the occurrence of such a suicide attempt as the reason for this hospitalization. B.R., while testifying that she took 84 Lortabs, a massive overdose, testified that her stomach was not pumped. Moreover, she indicated that this was a voluntary admission and, based upon her testimony, she apparently had the presence of mind to make an election as to which facility she wanted to be admitted to. Dr. Thai, however, testified unequivocally that an overdose of 84 Lortabs would kill any person if the person's stomach was not pumped on an immediate basis, even if 84 Lortabs had not been consumed at once, but over as much as a twelve hour period. Thus, it is found that this description of a suicide attempt occurring, and as being based upon extreme distress caused by the purported sexual abuse of B.R. by the Respondent is false and a false attempt to inculpate the Respondent in the conduct described by B.R. as having occurred in June of 1999. In essence, the Petitioner's theory of this case is that the Respondent provided prescriptions for drugs to B.R. in exchange for sex with her. Specifically, B.R. claimed that the Respondent left her a prescription for Lortab following an alleged sexual encounter, before her incarceration, in mid-June and a second prescription for Lortab following another alleged sexual encounter after her incarceration, or in late June. The only prescriptions for Lortab in evidence, however, coincide with regular office visits and/or phone calls for refills. The Petitioner alleges that the Respondent wrote another prescription for Lortab dated June 1, 1999. The Respondent denied that allegation. The disputed prescription was produced the morning of the hearing and conditionally admitted, based upon the stipulation that the disputed prescription would be subjected to handwriting analysis, by agreement of counsel. The disputed prescription was later withdrawn by the Petitioner when the Petitioner conceded that the Eckerd's pharmacy in question had made a mistake and that really no prescription dated June 1, 1999, had been written by the Respondent. The Petitioner sought to produce a second disputed prescription, dated July 15, 1999, which was not disclosed to the Respondent until it was presented by the Petitioner on cross-examination. This is not a rebuttal exhibit and had been in the possession of Petitioner's counsel for at least most of the day when it was advanced in an effort to impeach upon cross- examination. The prescription was excluded from evidence for reasons reflected in the transcript of this proceeding. The Petitioner's proposed fact findings contained in the Petitioner's Proposed Recommended Order based upon this prescription are not accepted. Parenthetically, it is noted that the Respondent conceded that the signature on this July 15, 1999, prescription is his but that he did not write the other information, (the patient's name and the date) on that prescription. If indeed B.R. obtained that prescription on July 15, 1999, or if it was written on that date, this would contradict B.R.'s testimony that, after their alleged third sexual encounter in late June that she was so disgusted with the Respondent that she refused to see him, admit him to her residence or even answer his phone calls. Alternatively, it is also possible that the date on the prescription was altered by B.R. or, under Petitioner's theory of the case it could conceivably have been a prescription signed by the Respondent and given to the B.R. during their purported rendezvous during the month of June 1999, which she completed or filled out with her name and the July 15th date at some point. Given the fact that the Respondent candidly admitted the signature on the prescription was his, and given the fact that the B.R. admitted to forging other prescriptions on more than one occasion and for the other reasons of record for which B.R.'s testimony is found uncreditable, this is the least likely explanation. In any event, because of the problematic circumstances surrounding the advanced Exhibit even had it been admitted into evidence the prescription dated July 15, 1999, can be accorded no evidentiary weight. In essence, it must be found that the Respondent's testimony and evidence are more credible and worthy of belief than that adduced by the Petitioner in the form of B.R.'s testimony and related Petitioner evidence. In addition to the reasons found above for accepting the Respondent's testimony and evidence over that offered by the Petitioner, there is, for instance, record evidence that B.R. may have made these allegations at least in part for pecuniary gain. The Respondent's Exhibit three, in evidence, demonstrates this as a possible motive, especially in light of B.R.'s testimony regarding to the subject matter of the letter which is Respondent's Exhibit three, to the effect that she sought the sum of $25,000.00 from the Respondent. This was proposed evidently in return for declining to pursue her complaint to, or "cooperation" with the Petitioner agency.1/ B.R. also testified that she was transferred to the care of Dr. Thai so that the Respondent could continue his purported illicit affair with her. Dr. Thai and the Respondent, however, testified that B.R. was going to be transferred to Dr. Thai's care in the summer of 1999 in any event, by an agreement which dates from their February 1999 decision to combine their practices and because Dr. Thai focused his practice on adult patients and Dr. Abebe focused on child patients. B.R. was in fact transferred to Dr. Thai contemporaneously with the time that he moved his practice to the offices of the Respondent. More importantly, Dr. Thai testified that the Respondent introduced him to B.R. during her March 1999 hospitalization at TMH and informed her that this would be the psychiatrist he would send her to as an outpatient. B.R.'s testimony is also contradicted by documentary evidence that when she was re-admitted to TMH, in May of 1999, that the Respondent would not accept her as a patient. B.R. also testified that the Respondent went to her house on six or eight occasions. She testified that she told her mother of his coming to her residence, but no testimony was taken from B.R.'s mother which might have corroborated her version of these events. B.R. also testified that she wrote a letter to TMH complaining about the Respondent coming to her home, before they allegedly engaged in sexual activity and that the hospital had responded to her with a letter of its own requiring her to fill out a form with certain information regarding the events she had purportedly related to hospital personnel. No such correspondence or documents were produced by the Petitioner to corroborate this testimony. B.R. testified that the Respondent told her, upon one of the alleged early visits to her apartment, that even when she had been in the hospital when he had first begun treating her, that he was sexually attracted to her. She attributed the statement to him, regarding that time period, as being to the effect that he was "f-ing her with his eyes." He denied making such a statement. Her testimony in this regard, and in relating her version of events, concerning his purported visits to her residence, is belied by the fact that when she missed her May 4, 1999, appointment, after she was released from TMH, that instead of using that as an excuse to go check on her at her home that he directed his secretary to summon the police to check on her welfare at her home. He sent a third party to B.R.'s home rather than going himself. B.R. testified that the Respondent gave her money, a phone credit calling card, and prescriptions under the Petitioner's theory that the Respondent was trading "drugs for sex." Yet, at the very point in time when the Respondent was allegedly involved in an illicit affair with B.R., she became incarcerated and the Respondent refused to bail her out of jail. B.R.'s testimony simply is not clothed with an aura of truth. It lacks circumstantial probability of reliability. B.R., in describing the Respondent's purported visits to her residence, and their purported, illicit sexual activities, described walking him to the door of her residence and observing him drive away in his car. She described a late- model car of dark green color. The Respondent on the other hand testified that his car at this time "cream colored" was a 1995 Mazda. Moreover, when the patient voluntarily admitted herself to the Apalachee Center for Human Services a second time, on September 20, 1999, when she made the allegations that the Respondent had engaged in inappropriate, sexually-related behavior with her, she purportedly told her version of these events to a staff member, Linda Johnson, as well as to mental health counselor Andrew Daire and Dr. Degala, M.D. Testimony and documentary evidence adduced through Andrew Daire and Dr. Degala are in evidence, by way of their recounting of the report of the alleged inappropriate conduct which B.R. made to them. This apparently initiated the investigation resulting in the instant proceeding. However, staff counselor Linda Johnson was not called as a witness by the Petitioner. In summary, the testimony of the Respondent and the evidence adduced by the Respondent is accepted as more credible and worthy of belief than the testimony of B.R. and the evidence adduced by the Petitioner. It is found that the above- referenced, alleged inappropriate conduct on the part of the Respondent, involving visits to the patient's residence and purported sexual activity with the patient B.R., did not occur.

Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses and the pleadings and arguments of the parties it is RECOMMENDED: That a final order be entered finding that the Respondent did not violate the statutory provisions charged by the agency and that the administrative complaint be dismissed in its entirety. DONE AND ENTERED this 7th day of February, 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. P. MICHAEL RUFF Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us. Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of February, 2003.

Florida Laws (2) 120.57458.331
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