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DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE vs. SOUTHERN PAVING COMPANY AND TAFT ASPHALT COMPANY, 79-001668 (1979)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 79-001668 Latest Update: Sep. 27, 1980

The Issue The issues posed for decision herein are: Whether or not the Petitioner, Department of Revenue's use of fabricated costs in issuing sales tax assessments against Respondents, Southern Paving Company and Taft Asphalt Company, during the audit period April 1, 1976, through March 31, 1979, was proper. 1/ Whether Respondents are entitled to a credit for bad debts which resulted during the audit period.

Findings Of Fact Based upon my observation of the witnesses and their demeanor while testifying, the documentary evidence received and the entire record compiled herein, the following relevant facts are found. Southern Paving Company (Southern) was formed during 1969 as a manufacturer of asphalt. In addition to manufacturing asphalt, Southern is engaged in the retail sale of asphalt and is also a paving contractor. Taft Asphalt Company (Taft) was formed during approximately 1972 and during the audit period was engaged in the manufacturing of asphalt. Separate books were maintained by both companies based on their "simple operations" which continued through approximately November of 1977 when the two companies merged. The then directors of Taft considered the manufacturing phase of its operations unprofitable and a stock exchange resulted in the demise of Taft. During the audit period, the usual formalities of a sale and purchase were observed when asphalt was transferred from Taft to Southern with resultant invoices prepared to reflect the sale of asphalt from Taft to Southern and book entries made to indicate the price paid by Southern to Taft. Testimony of Taft's Comptroller, Jerry Leslie, opined that the invoiced amount for the asphalt purchased for Southern was only used to reflect inter- company transfers between the two entities and that taxes were paid on the fabricated cost for the price of asphalt based on known costs which were used to make up a ton of asphalt. The Department of Revenue (Department), on the other hand, through its Audit Supervisor, Max Anton, issued the proposed assessment for the two companies based on a fabricated cost based on figures reflected on the two entities' books and records with credits for those materials either already paid to the Department or not applicable to the fabrication of asphalt. (TR. 27, 28, 55 and 56.) Another phase of the audit which is at issue herein is an assessment for the purchase of fuel oil by Taft Asphalt for use and consumption on which no sales tax was remitted to the Department. Comptroller Leslie admitted that the fuel was used by Taft to heat the liquid asphalt during the fabrication process to cause it to flow into the mix and to dry the asphalt. The fuel was consumed and dissipated in the fabricating process. According to Leslie, one fuel dealer collected the tax for certain fuel purchases while other dealers did not collect the tax. As revised on July 23, 1979, the assessment issued against Taft reflects a total amount of $21,828.93. (Petitioner's Exhibit 2.) The proposed assessment against Southern Paving Company reflects a total amount of $7,145.98. (Petitioner's Exhibit 1.) The first item at issue in the assessment against Southern is again based on the purchase of fuel oil by Southern for self-use and consumption for which no tax was paid and which was consumed in the fabrication process of the asphalt, (TR. 48, 49, 58 and 59.) It is undisputed that the Respondent did not pay taxes for the fuels which are reflected on the assessment contained in Petitioner's Exhibit 1. The remaining item at issue herein in the assessment against Southern which is based on the fabricated cost of asphalt which Southern used in the furtherance of its own paving business. The issue as to this fact stems from the parties' differing methodology in the formation of fabrication costs. Comptroller Leslie, on behalf of Respondents, utilized as previously stated, a fabrication cost methodology which was based on those items he considered to be known by the company for use in fabricating a ton of asphalt, whereas the Department used through its auditor, Max Anton, those items invoiced as per the amounts reflected in Respondents' books and records. Auditor Anton reviewed Respondents' books and records for the period in question and formulated the tonage costs for asphalt on a month-by-month basis based on his notation that fuel costs and other materials utilized in the fabrication of asphalt were changing constantly. Auditor Anton allowed credits to Respondents when the costs of materials were rising and Respondents had tendered to the Department a higher tax based on what may be considered unrealistic costs and assessed a higher tax in those instances wherein the taxes remitted did not accurately reflect the cost of materials as reflected by Respondents' books and records. (TR. 61 through 64.) Comptroller Leslie offered that the utilization of invoice records to determine fabrication costs results in an artificially high fabrication cost for asphalt since the invoiced amounts were merely used to prompt the directors and officials of the companies, particularly Taft Asphalt Company, to become profitable inasmuch as they (Taft) were sustaining heavy losses since they became operational in 1972. Mr. Leslie used a fabrication cost method resulting in an average based on beginning and the year end costs for materials used to fabricate asphalt. Comptroller Leslie also testified that the methodology used by him is based on the results of audits of Respondent companies by Petitioner's agents during 1971 and 1972. Mr. Anton's methodology in arriving at fabrication costs appears to more accurately reflect the true cost for the fabrication of asphalt. Noteworthy was the fact that in arriving at his fabrication cost, Mr. Anton made his computations on a monthly basis based on the available documentation maintained by Respondents in their general ledger and other books and records which were available for inspection during the audit. Mr. Anton allowed credits in those instances where the tax remittances by Respondents were excessive in the sense that the fabrication cost methodology used (by Respondents) failed to accurately reflect the true costs for the materials. On the other hand, Mr. Anton issued an additional assessment in those instances wherein the books and records failed to substantiate the fabricated cost utilized by the Respondents based on available data in its records. Mr. Anton deleted the fuel oil used by Southern in his computation of the fabricated cost. Respondent did not offer any documentary evidence to create any doubt as to the reliability of the proposed assessment and the substantiating documents submitted by Mr. Anton. (Petitioner's Exhibits 1 and 2.) Based on the foregoing, I shall recommend that the Petitioner's proposed assessments contained in Petitioner's Exhibits 1 and 2 be upheld. The remaining issue centers around Respondent's contention that it is entitled to a credit for bad debts which were allegedly incurred by Respondent during the audit period but not claimed when they were realized. To support its contention that it was entitled to a credit for bad debts during the audit period, Comptroller Leslie testified that the two companies incurred bad debts of approximately $54,200.82 which were applicable during the audit period and which had been deducted by the Respondents on their Federal income tax returns. No records were introduced by Respondents to substantiate the bad debts claim. Prior to May 8, 1978, a taxpayer was required to submit any credit claim for bad debts on sales tax returns for the period in which the bad debts were found to be worthless and actually charged off for Federal income tax purposes. Subsequent to the 1978 amendment, a taxpayer is allowed to claim a credit for bad debts within the twelve months following the month in which the bad debt has been charged off for Federal income tax purposes. (Section 212.17(3), Florida Statutes.) The evidence introduced herein reveals that the Respondents have not filed a claim for credit for the bad debts within the allowable period pursuant to the requirements of Section 212.17(3), Florida Statutes. I shall, therefore, recommend that the claim (credit) for bad debts be denied.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED: The Department of Revenue's assessment herein for sales tax and interest be UPHELD. That the Department withdraw its penalty assessment herein based on evidence which indicates that the assessment stems from honest and differing opinions by the parties as to the fabricated costs; the fact that the Comptroller testified credibly that the fabrication methodology utilized by him in remitting the taxes here involved was based on methodology utilized by a former audit of the Respondent companies by Petitioner during the taxing periods 1971 and 1972; the absence of any evidence of fraud or other unfair dealing by the Respondents and the general discretionary authority vested in Petitioner pursuant to Section 212.12(2), Florida Statutes. RECOMMENDED this 26th day of June, 1980, in Tallahassee, Florida. JAMES E. BRADWELL Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings 101 Collins Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of June, 1980.

Florida Laws (6) 120.57212.02212.05212.06212.12212.17
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CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY LICENSING BOARD vs. DAVID WAYNE MILAM, 88-005192 (1988)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 88-005192 Latest Update: Apr. 07, 1989

Findings Of Fact Based upon my observation of the witnesses and their demeanor while testifying, documentary evidence received, and the entire record compiled herein, I make the following relevant factual findings: During times material hereto, Respondent was a certified residential contractor having been issued license number CR C018874 since 1981. Respondent, during late 1986, was approached by a Mr. Marlar, owner of Pinellas Builders, who requested that Respondent affiliate with Pinellas Builders using his licensure to qualify Pinellas. Respondent tentatively agreed to a business arrangement with Marlar, however, prior to the time that Respondent formally qualified Pinellas, the negotiations broke down and Respondent never formally qualified Pinellas. During January, 1987, Pinellas entered into a contract with a customer, John Kane of Clearwater, Florida, to build an addition to Mr. Kane's residence for a sum of $33,000. (Petitioner's Exhibit 1.) Pinellas was required to obtain a permit to construct the addition to Kane's residence. Pinellas obtained the permit and utilized Respondent's license to do so. Kane encountered difficulty with Pinellas as the subcontractors were not paid and liens and/or notices of intent to file liens were placed on his home. Mr. Kane ultimately had to rehire the subcontractors and pay them directly resulting in an additional expenditure by Kane of approximately $10,000 over and above the amount that Pinellas agreed to complete the addition to his home. During June of 1987, Kane filed a complaint with Petitioner and in connection therewith, Petitioner's investigator, H. Dennis Force, spoke to Respondent via telephone respecting the fact that permits were being pulled under his name. Respondent was unaware that Pinellas was utilizing his name as a qualifier to obtain permits nor was Respondent aware that Pinellas had obtained contracts to perform work utilizing his name as the licensing authority. As a result of Investigator Force's conversations with Respondent, Respondent revoked the letter of authorization given to Marlar during April, 1987. Respondent distributed copies of the revocation of authorization given to Marlar to the various local cities in the surrounding area. Respondent acknowledges his liability as a qualifier and accepts that responsibility. Respondent is not presently affiliated with any corporate entity in that he prefers to work as an individual such that he can insure the quality which he strives for comes to reality. Mr. Kane acknowledges that he never saw Respondent on the jobsite and had never met him during any of the negotiations with Marlar (Pinellas). Respondent received no monies from Kane or any other persons who had entered dealings with Pinellas.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner enter a final order imposing a civil penalty of $500 payable to Petitioner within thirty (30) days and issuing a written letter of reprimand to Respondent based on his authorization of an unlicensed person to use his name to obtain permits. 1/ DONE and ENTERED this 7th day of April, 1989, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. JAMES E. BRADWELL Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of April, 1989.

Florida Laws (3) 120.5717.001489.129
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BOARD OF DENTISTRY vs ROMEY D. BUZLEA, 94-005799 (1994)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Orlando, Florida Oct. 13, 1994 Number: 94-005799 Latest Update: Nov. 13, 1995

Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the governmental agency responsible for issuing licenses to practice dentistry and for regulating such licensees on behalf of the state. Respondent practices general dentistry under license number DN 0002494. Background Mr. Hubert Anderson is a 70-year-old male (the "patient"). The patient initially saw Respondent in September, 1989, for replacement of a three-unit gold bridge that had been seated many years earlier. The patient did not experience any pain from the old bridge. However, the old bridge had to be replaced because tooth #8 had abscessed and needed to be removed. On October 30, 1989, Respondent constructed and installed a porcelain- fused-to-metal bridge. The bridge is a six unit, anterior, fixed bridge for teeth numbers 6-11. The pontics of the bridge are located in the space formerly occupied by the patient's two anterior teeth, numbers 8 and 9. The two crowned teeth on either side of the pontics, numbers 6,7, and 10,11, form the abutments in the bridge that hold the pontics in place. 2/ Respondent built up tooth number 10 with dissolvable dental cement. A non-dissolvable material should have been used to build up tooth number 10. The patient experienced generalized pain and soreness in the mouth immediately upon installation of the bridge by Respondent. The patient returned to Respondent's office approximately one month later complaining that everything hurt. Respondent told the patient that nothing was wrong. However, Respondent offered to replace the bridge if the patient would have root canals done on all four abutments. 3/ Respondent did not confirm his diagnosis with x-rays. Open margins caused by an ill fitting bridge can cause symptoms similar to those associated with the need for root canals including: sensitivity to hot and cold; sensitivity upon chewing or eating sweet, sour, or salty food; and generalized aching. Open Margins The pain experienced by the patient was caused by the ill fitting bridge constructed and installed by Respondent. The substructure of the bridge was so ill fitting that the entire bridge needed to be replaced in 1991. 4/ None of the bridge margins fit well around the abutment teeth. 5/ Tooth number 6 has grossly open distal and mesial margins. Tooth numbers 7 and 10 have grossly open distal, mesial, and facial margins. Tooth number 11 is sensitive to percussion and has open margins circumferentially. 6/ The open margins in the bridge constructed and installed by Respondent jeopardize the patient's health. The open margins present areas where bacteria and food debris can collect and lead to decay or plaque. Open margins also expose nerve endings in dentin and cause discomfort. 7/ Other Causes Excluded The open margins in the bridge constructed and installed by Respondent are not caused by decay. A porcelain-fused-to- metal bridge with properly adapted margins at the time the bridge is seated in the patient's mouth will not exhibit open margins over a short period of time unless there is recurrent decay which erodes the teeth away from the bridge margin. The patient does not exhibit recurrent decay. The patient's decay resistance is evidenced by his age and lack of fillings or cavities in his teeth. The absence of recurrent decay was documented in two separate dental examinations. 8/ The open margins in the bridge constructed and installed by Respondent are not caused by gum recision. The patient has no periodontal problems, including periodontal problems in the area where the bridge is located. 9/ The open margins in the bridge constructed and installed by Respondent are not caused by normal wear and tear. The open margins on a porcelain-fused- to-metal bridge do not expand under normal wear and tear. Even if expansion were to occur as a result of normal wear and tear, the expansion would be slight and would occur over a period of 10 to 15 years. The margins in the bridge installed by Respondent are gross margins that were present when the bridge was installed. They were documented by examination within two years of the date of installation. The open margins in the bridge constructed and installed by Respondent are not caused by expansion of the metal in the porcelain-fused-to-metal bridge. If the bridge margins were closed at the time the bridge was initially seated, and then later opened due to expansion of the underlying metal, the porcelain veneer on all of the abutments would have fractured. The porcelain on the patient's abutments is intact. 10/ Negligence And Incompetence Respondent is incompetent and negligent within the meaning of Section 466.028(1)(y). Open margins in the patient's bridge are the result of Respondent's failure to meet the minimum standards of performance in installing the patient's bridge. 11/ Prior to permanently cementing a bridge to a patient's mouth, a dentist should "try-in" the bridge, checking all margins, contacts, and occlusion by clinical examination and x- ray. Respondent failed to meet the minimum standards of performance for dentists by failing to detect the open margins at the time of the try-in and by failing to remake the bridge by retaking the impression and sending it back to the laboratory for re-fabrication. The patient complained of pain on at least two separate occasions. Respondent's failure to use x-rays to determine the cause of the patient's complaints of pain failed to meet the minimum standards of performance for dentists. All crown and bridge margins should end on sound tooth structure. The bridge installed by Respondent is short and does not finish on sound tooth structure. The failure to finish on sound tooth structure fails to meet the minimum standards of performance for dentists. The margin on tooth number 10 ends on the build-up of cement and not on sound tooth structure. The failure to finish the bridge on non-dissolvable material fails to meet the minimum standards of performance for dentists. Respondent failed to detect open margins when initially fitting the bridge on the patient and upon two subsequent examinations. Respondent diagnosed the patient as needing root canals without verifying the diagnosis with x-rays. Respondent failed to determine the cause of the patient's pain on two separate examinations including the failure to use x-rays for diagnostic purposes.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner enter a Final Order finding Respondent guilty of violating Section 466.028(1)(y), reprimanding Respondent, imposing a fine of $3,000, and placing Respondent on probation for one year pursuant to the terms of probation prescribed in Petitioner's PRO. RECOMMENDED this 18th day of July, 1995, in Tallahassee, Florida. DANIEL S. MANRY Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of July 1995.

Florida Laws (2) 120.57466.028
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DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS AND PROFESSIONAL REGULATION, CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY LICENSING BOARD vs KENNETH RONALD BOAZ, 99-000603 (1999)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tampa, Florida Feb. 04, 1999 Number: 99-000603 Latest Update: Jun. 24, 2002

The Issue The issue for consideration in this hearing is whether Respondent’s license as a residential contractor in Florida should be disciplined because of the matters alleged in the Administrative Complaint filed herein.

Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to the issues herein, Petitioner, Construction Industry Licensing Board, was the state agency in Florida responsible for the licensing of contractors and the regulation of the construction industry in this state. Respondent, Kenneth Ronald Boaz, was a residential contractor holding license CR C035360. He was the qualifying agent for Revival Remodelers, and was doing business under that name. On or about August 23, 1996, Respondent, doing business as Revival Remodelers, entered into a contract with Vicky L. Smith to construct a 20 by 24-foot room addition to her residence located at 13281 Clay Avenue in Largo, Florida. The contract price for the addition was listed as $25,000, plus permit fees, and Respondent accepted a partial payment of $21,072.60 from Ms. Smith. Respondent was instrumental in helping Ms. Smith get the financing for the project. On September 5, 1996, Respondent obtained permit No. 146699 from the Pinellas County Building Department. Before starting construction on the room, Respondent arranged for several large trees to be removed from the area of Ms. Smith’s back yard near where the rear wall of the addition would be located. When the trees were removed, the holes left by their removal were to be filled with dirt. Though Respondent arranged for the trees to be moved, Ms. Smith paid an additional $680.00 to the sub-contractor who removed them. Respondent was aware that the trees had been removed and the holes filled with dirt. Respondent began work shortly after the removal of the trees and the filling of the holes. Ms. Smith claims she did not see anyone do any compacting of the soil where the trees had been removed, but the footers and slab were poured and finished. Whereas the Pinellas County Building Code does not require a soil compaction test, it provides that foundations shall be built on undisturbed soil of properly compacted fill. At Ms. Smith’s request, construction slowed down but continued while she tried to find additional financing to complete the work. Finally, Respondent and Ms. Smith agreed the work would cease until she could obtain the amount remaining due under the project. At this point, Ms. Smith owed Respondent approximately $4,000. Ms. Smith claims that even before this, however, she noticed cracking in the concrete slab. This worried her because she wanted to lay tile as flooring. But when she mentioned this to the Respondent, he told her not to worry as he would take care of it. He did not do so, however. Because of her concern, in the Spring of 1999, Ms. Smith called the Building Department in Clearwater and the building inspector from the county came out to inspect the work. The inspector issued a red tag for the work, signifying it was unacceptable. Ms. Smith also contacted other contractors to see if tile could be successfully laid on that slab. Each has said it could not. No other contractor with whom she has spoken is willing to take over the job without additional soil compaction. One contractor gave her an estimate of $47,500 to re-build the room. Another contractor quoted a price of $44,800, but both include items not on the contract she had with Respondent. Respondent last worked on this job in December 1996. Since that time, Ms. Smith has talked with him about the quality of his work and has had two mediation sessions with him without any success. The room has not been completed because there is substantial question whether the existing work done by Respondent can be successfully completed. The defects in the construction are manifested by the following: There is a separation of the additional wall from the existing house wall of from between 1/2 to 1 inch. The roof of the addition leaks and the insulation is moldy and falling. There are cracks all over the additional floor and outside patio slab. The corners of the addition are dropping. Cinder blocks in the addition walls are cracking The lintel is broken in three places. Ms. Smith has done no more construction on the addition because she filed her complaint with the Department and is waiting to see what is done. However, she has painted and sealed the exterior walls. The leak is not through the wall cracks but through the roof. After her complaint, Respondent had someone from PSI, an engineering consulting firm, come out and perform a soils compaction test. As a result of that test, several different formulae were offered to fix the problem, but Ms. Smith was not satisfied, considering it no more than a "cover-up." Finally, Respondent offered her a structural solution to the problem that would remove the red tag. Ms. Smith would put the balance owed, plus some additional money into an escrow account, whereupon Respondent would fix the problem. However, because Ms. Smith no longer has any confidence in the Respondent, she does not want him to do any of the work. She contends that Respondent never agreed to fix the problem if she would put what she stilled owed him in escrow - only if she would add to it. Kevin McGinley is a licensed general contractor who in 1997 was asked by Ms. Smith to give her an estimate on making repairs to and completing the addition started by Respondent. His examination of the site showed severe settling on the addition. The work appeared to have been built on an uncompacted pad which caused settling, and McGinley did not want to be responsible for the work. Therefore, he gave Ms. Smith an estimate to tear down what had been done by Respondent and to rebuild from scratch. His work would include an inspection by a soils engineer to see if the existing soil would support the project. While cracks in a slab can be repaired, in the instant case, without knowing what caused the problem, he would not want to try to fix it. Wendell G. Wardell, a building inspector for Pinellas County, first inspected this project on September 16, 1996, when he went out for the slab inspection. There were several problems with the site, none of which related to the instant problem, and all of which were cleared up by November 21, 1996. He was again sent to the site somewhat later based upon a complaint by the owner. On this visit he saw cracking and settlement of the slab and he issued the red tag. Neither Respondent nor the owner called for a re-inspection that would be required before work can resume because work was not resumed. Mr. Wardell noted that a compaction test was not required by the county before the permit was issued in this case, though sometime it is required. Mr. Yaxley, a consulting engineer, visited the site in April 1998. Ms. Smith was present at the time. He observed the cracking in the floors and walls and the mildew in the roof. The most obvious defects were the 1/4-inch cracks in the floors and walls of the addition. After studying the site and the results from the two other laboratories that tested the site, he concluded that the removal of the trees caused the holes several feet deep that were then filled with 20 square yards of dirt. This fill dirt should have been compacted in a reasonable manner, and it was not. Yaxley reasoned that Respondent knew of the holes and the placement of the fill dirt and he should have done tests to ensure the compacting was done properly. The use of a bob-cat, a front-end loader, as used here, did not provide the appropriate compaction. However, removal of the trees was a clue that a closer look at the soil was required. Yaxley examined the laboratory work done on the property and determined there are two voids left under the soil from the removal of the trees. One is about 18 inches down and the other at about three to four feet down. Compaction may or may not cure this. Settling may continue for a long time. While one void could have been an unknown factor, the existence of the three trees was a known factor, and proper caution and judgment would have called for further inquiry to determine the status of the sub-surface. Respondent claims he had no knowledge of any voids in the soil. He compacted with water and soil in layers but this compacting was done under the slab area, not where the holes were filled. He used a concrete contractor to do this work and has always found it to be consistent with acceptable standards before. There are several other defects in Respondent’s performance, according to Yaxley. The core of the slab shows no reinforcing of the concrete either by welded steel or fabric fiber mixed in with the concrete; the roof deck is mildewed; there are cracks in the slab and between the main building and the addition; there are step cracks in both the north and east wall of the addition; and the bracing and attachment of the east gable above the concrete block is not adequate. Mr. Yaxley went back to revisit the property on October 5, 1998, and found that as of that time, no corrective work had been done. The problem with the property can be fixed with injections of grout and the installation of pilings. If that were done properly, Ms. Smith would be able to safely install the tile flooring she wants. However, if nothing is done, the cracks will remain and probably get worse. Respondent contends that the removal of the trees did not create holes that required fill. He asserts that the fill dirt brought in was procured at the request of the Building Department that wanted it to construct another swale on the property. Mr. Boaz admits to not using reinforcing steel in the concrete slab he poured. Instead, he ordered the fiber- reinforced concrete at a thickness of more than six inches, which exceeds the code requirement of four inches. He did not know, until he heard Mr. Yaxley’s testimony, that the concrete poured by his sub-contractor was not fiber-fill.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Construction Industry Licensing Board issue a final order in this case finding Respondent guilty of negligence resulting in danger to property, and misconduct in contracting, and imposing an administrative fine of $5,500. It is also recommended that Respondent be ordered to pay restitution to Ms. Vicki Smith in the amount of $21,072.60 or, in the alternative, within 90 days from the date of the final order, undertake such remedial construction activity as is necessary to remove the red tag issued by the Pinellas County Building Department regarding this project. DONE AND ENTERED this 25th day of May, 2000, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6947 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of May, 2000. COPIES FURNISHED: Robert A. Crabill, Esquire Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32388-2202 Warren Knaust, Esquire Knaust & Valente, P.A. 2730 Central Avenue St. Petersburg, Florida 33712 Barbara D. Auger, General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Rodney Hurst, Executive Director Construction Industry Licensing Board Department of Business and Professional Regulation 7960 Arlington Expressway, Suite 300 Jacksonville, Florida 32211-7467

Florida Laws (2) 120.57489.129 Florida Administrative Code (2) 61G4-17.00161G4-17.002
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ARLINGTON EAST CIVIC ASSOCIATION, ET AL. vs. DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION AND DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, 78-001640 (1978)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 78-001640 Latest Update: May 10, 1979

Findings Of Fact JTA and DOT seek a complex air source permit from DER for construction of the Dame Point Bridge project in Jacksonville, Duval County, Florida. The application for the permit and supporting documents were filed and considered by DER in evaluating the permit. The proposed project is a 10.94 mile segment of a proposed easterly bypass around the City of Jacksonville. The project consists of a limited access, four and six-lane expressway which will become a portion of the Interstate 295 bypass system for Jacksonville. It will principally serve through traffic around urbanized Jacksonville and resident north-south traffic. The project extends from Monument Road, south of the St. John's River, to existing I-295 at U.S. 17, north of the River, and includes a six lane bridge over the St. John's River in the vicinity of Mill Cove and Dame Point. In addition to the bridge over the St. John's River, approximately 10,000 feet in length, the project includes seven grade separated intersections where major arterial roads serving urbanized Jacksonville intersect the project. The project will traverse high to medium density residential neighborhoods south of the St. John's River and medium to low density residential neighborhoods, developing industrial centers, and some rural property north of the River. Pursuant to Section 403.182, Florida Statutes, DER by formal agreement may delegate preview and evaluation of permit applications to qualified local programs. Such an agreement has been in force between DER and the Duval County Bio-Environmental Services Division since February 9, 1976. In compliance with that agreement, the Duval County Bio-Environmental Services Division reviewed and processed the Dame Point State Road 9-A extension application for a complex air source permit, determined that reasonable assurances of non-violation of ambient air quality standards was provided, and certified that conclusion to DER. DER then published a letter of intent to issue the permit on August 29, 1978. The Final Environmental Impact Statement (FEIS) for the project which was submitted with the application concluded that the project would be beneficial to the economic growth of the area by providing an improved transportation network. In addition, testimony established that the project would be needed in the near future by virtue of increasing traffic demand. Approximately forty to sixty percent of the north-south through traffic in the Jacksonville area is expected to use the facility. The proposed project would provide an efficient bypass for this traffic and could divert 7,000 to 10,000 vehicles per day from the downtown Jacksonville area upon completion. Evidence established that, as a direct result of construction of the project, downtown traffic congestion would be relieved; existing industry would receive more efficient transportation service; commuter traffic from southeastern Jacksonville to northern Jacksonville would be reduced by miles; transportation routes to education facilities would be improved; and tourist traffic would be routed around downtown Jacksonville. The benefits to costs ratio of the project is positive in that for every dollar spent to construct the facility, $2.80 might reasonably be expected to be returned to the community in the form of increased economic activity and more efficient transportation. Increased traffic demand in the Jacksonville-Duval County area is of such magnitude that, according to testimony at the final hearing, in the year 2000 the demand to cross the St. John's River is expected to exceed the capacities of all existing bridges, plus the proposed facility, if constructed, and another bridge crossing south of the city. JTA and DOT prepared projections for average anticipated future use of the project using the most recent, accurate and acceptable information available. Initial projections were based upon the Jacksonville Urban Area Transportation Study Network, 11WC. When the network was revised in 1977, JTA, in coordination with the Jacksonville Area Planning Board, revised the projections to be consistent with the updated Transportation Network plan for Jacksonville. This planning information, plus extensive historical data on population growth, urban development and changing land use patterns in the area of the project, were utilized to project future vehicle use for the project. The evidence clearly establishes that the proposed project generally will relieve downtown traffic congestion by diverting traffic around the city. Traffic projections indicate that the total vehicle miles traveled daily in Duval County might be reduced by as much as 600,000 miles if the project is constructed. Most of this reduction would result from eliminating circuitous routes through the downtown area. Traffic projections were in part based upon past experience with similar projects over a 10-year period, and included a factor for added traffic which might be generated by construction of the facility. The proposed project will be linked to I-95 north of Jacksonville, and will serve the southeast area of the city and provide a connection to the industrial center around Imeson Park to the north, in addition to offering a shorter and speedier route to local beaches. Average vehicle speeds through the open roadway portions of the project, and through intersections, were calculated according to commonly accepted traffic engineering methods. The evidence establishes that general roadway speeds should average 55 miles per hour through 1992, with a potential decline to 50 miles per hour by the year 2002. Average intersection speeds should vary from 45 to 20 miles per hour over the same time period. These calculations are based upon well-recognized and, long accepted traffic engineering data contained in the Highway Capacity Manual, 1965 edition. The method employed in these calculations is that commonly used by DOT throughout the State of Florida, and included consideration of potential future congestion as well as probable signalization of traffic at some intersections. The evidence establishes that JTA and DOT accurately analyzed roadway and intersection speeds for the proposed project according to accepted traffic engineering methods, and that reasonable predictions of air pollution loading along the project corridor based upon these speed calculations can reasonably be relied upon to establish non-violation of ambient air quality standards. Further, evidence in the record establishes that traffic speeds through the toll plaza to be constructed as a part of the proposed project were adequately analyzed. Average speeds and queuing through the toll booth facility were calculated using accepted average daily traffic projections for the project and assumed a 1,000 foot zone of deceleration/acceleration on either side of the toll booth. These calculations included deceleration, queuing, stopping at the toll booth, and acceleration away from the toll booth facility. The method employed in formulating these calculations followed recognized techniques outlined in the Transportation Traffic Engineers Handbook. DOT has asserted in the permit application here under consideration that the construction and operation of the proposed project will not violate DER ambient air quality standards. Using the traffic projections and average vehicle speeds discussed above, DOT utilized various computer modeling techniques which analyzed and modeled projected worst one-hour and eight-hour concentrations of carbon monoxide along the roadway and around critical intersections and the toll plaza. The Mobile I computer model was used to predict emissions of automobile related pollutants based upon the aforementioned traffic data. Included in the Mobile I computer program were various factors including highway speed, traffic volumes, vehicle mix, "cold" versus "hot" starts, ambient temperature, and pavement height. Emission factors generated from this computer model result in predicted pollutant loadings in grams per vehicle mile. In addition, another method, AP 42, Supplement 5, was also utilized to generate comparable emission factors. Data obtained from the Mobile I computer program and from AP 42, Supplement 5, is then programmed into another computer model, Caline II, which is a basic diffusion model designed to estimate concentrations of carbon monoxide at various points along and distances from the roadway. This computer model is a mathematical equation that simulates or predicts the concentration of pollutants at various points after they are released from their source and allowed an opportunity to mix with the atmosphere. The Caline II model can only project future expected carbon monoxide concentration levels. No computer model was used to project expected concentrations of hydrocarbons, nitrogen oxides, photochemical oxidants or other pollutants expected to be associated with the project because no such model is presently available to accurately project concentrations of those pollutants. This is due, at least in part, to the greater reactivity of those pollutants with other elements in the atmosphere. Factors included in the Caline II computer model in order to predict expected concentrations of carbon monoxide along a line source include traffic volume; a "K" factor, which is a percentage of daily traffic at a given point in "peak hour" conditions; highway width and height; wind speed; stability class; and wind direction. The result of this computer program is an expected "worst case" condition for one-hour and eight- hour concentrations of carbon monoxide along the roadway for the years 1982 and 1992. Computer program results, which included background ambient conditions for eight-hour concentrations, affirmatively established that expected concentrations of carbon monoxide will be considerably less than the DER one- hour standard of 40 milligrams per cubic meter, and the eight-hour standard of 10 milligrams per cubic meter. These DER standards were not exceeded at any of the intersections or along the roadway at any point. As indicated above, no computer modeling technique was utilized fox hydrocarbons, nitrogen oxides, photochemical oxidants, sulphur dioxide or total suspended particulate matter. Estimates concerning these pollutants were based upon AP 42, Supplement 5, which is a document promulgated by the United States Environmental Protection Agency, and the Mobile I computer program. These methods do not predict concentrations, but instead deal only with total emissions. The result of this analysis was that, given background levels of hydrocarbons in Duval County, the project, if constructed, either in whole or in the segment which is the subject of this permit application, hydrocarbon levels may be expected to be reduced, at least in part due to the increased average speed of vehicles using the proposed facility. In addition, since hydrocarbons appear to act as a precursor to the formation of photochemical oxidants, any reduction in the emissions of hydrocarbons can also be expected to reduce the levels of photochemical oxidants, which are a particular problem in Duval County, which has been designated a "non-attainment area" for photochemical oxidants. Further, data derived from AP 42, Supplement 5, and Mobile I, together with data from local monitoring programs, established that no violations of ambient standards are to be expected for nitrogen oxides and, since sulphur dioxide and total suspended particulate matter are not emitted in significant quantities from automobiles, no violation of air standards for these pollutants is to be expected as result of the project. In summary, testimony adduced at the final hearing demonstrated that studies submitted to DER in support of the permit application were prepared in accordance with valid, professionally and scientifically accepted methodologies. These studies adequately establish, not only that the project will not result in violations of state air quality standards, but that positive social, economic and environmental effects will accrue from construction of the proposed facility. Petitioners, JTA and DOT have submitted proposed findings of fact. Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact numbered 1 through 4 have been substantially adopted herein. JTA's and DOT's Proposed Findings of Fact have also been substantially adopted in this order. To the extent that proposed findings of fact have not been adopted in, or are inconsistent with, factual findings in this order, they have been specifically rejected as being either irrelevant to the issues in this cause, or as not having been supported by the evidence.

Florida Laws (5) 120.54120.57403.021403.087403.182
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SUPERIOR PAVING, INC. vs. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, 86-000314BID (1986)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 86-000314BID Latest Update: Apr. 09, 1986

Findings Of Fact On or about December 16, 1985, Petitioners submitted an application requesting qualifications in five major classes of work and two incidental classes of work. At the hearing, qualification in cement paving was not pursued. The Department denied the applications for qualification to bid on contracts for Minor Bridges, Portland Cement Concrete, Hot Plant-mixed Bituminous Base and Surface courses, and the two incidental classes of fencing and grassing, seeding and sodding. Petitioner here contests the Minor Bridge, Hot Plant-mixed Bituminous Base and Surface courses and the two miscellaneous categories. Superior Paving has been in the road building business for many years and the sole basis for denying qualification for Hot Plant-mixed Bituminous Base and Surface courses is that Superior does not own an asphalt plant. During the years Petitioner has worked in road construction for DOT its work has been satisfactory, contracts have been completed on time, and there has been no default. Petitioner has the financial ability to perform the work for which qualification is requested and has experienced personnel necessary for this work. With respect to construction work on minor bridges, Petitioner's general manager and superintendent both have extensive experience in this work area. During the past two years, Petitioner has done no work on DOT projects as the result of a two year suspension for a contract crime. Prior thereto on DOT construction involving minor bridge work in which Superior was the prime contractor, this work was subcontracted out to a contractor specializing in bridge construction. However, Superior has the resources to obtain all equipment needed for minor bridge work. Also Petitioner has been the successful bidder on jobs involving fencing as well as grassing, seeding and sodding. Petitioner has used this type work to meet its quota for subcontracting at least ten percent of the job to minority and female subcontractors. On one occasion when the sodding subcontractor failed to complete the project, Petitioner used its own personnel and equipment to do so. Petitioner's request for qualification for these incidental classes was denied because its application failed to show that the company accomplished fencing, grassing, seeding and sodding with its own forces and equipment. (Exhibit 14.) Most of the evidence submitted in these proceedings involved the denial of qualification for the type work that has been Petitioner's primary category for many years, viz. asphalt paving. The sole reason for denying Petitioner qualification in this class of work is that Petitioner does not have its own asphalt plant (Exhibit 14.) This requirement imposed by Respondent is a recent one which was placed into effect in 1985 following the amendment to Rule 14- 22.03 F.A.C. That amendment added "and the adequacy of equipment to perform the specific classes of work." At the time this change to the rule was made DOT was applying the policy of requiring a contractor to own an asphalt plant in order to qualify for this work class. When asked why this unwritten policy was not included in the rule when amended in 1985, the witnesses involved in incorporating the change involving equipment into the rule replied he could not answer that. The policy of DOT that in order to qualify for asphalt paving the bidder must own an asphalt plant has general applicability and has been applied during the past year to all contractors bidding on DOT road projects. DOT personnel who testified in these proceedings stated the purpose of adding the phrase regarding having the necessary equipment to the requirement for qualification, was to bring the rule more in line with the statutory provisions. The adverse publicity DOT received in recent years because of contractor delays in completing projects and deficiencies in some of the work performed resulted in the tightening of the requirements for qualification. Two contractors in particular were late in completing contracts on which they were successful bidders and part of the delay was due to their inability to get the necessary road paving material. However, both of these contractors owned asphalt plants. One had delays in getting a permit from the Department of Environmental Regulation to erect a plant near Destin, Florida, and the other had a falling out with his supplier and could not get the required material. In neither of these cases did the ownership of an asphalt plant alleviate the problem. No evidence was presented showing that a delay in the completion of a project was due solely to the failure of the contractor to have his own asphalt plant. Several asphalt producers submitted letters to the effect that they had supplied paving material to Petitioner for many years and would continue to supply him as much as he would buy. One plant owner testified that he had been in the production and laying of asphalt pavement for many years and much preferred to have the role only of supplier. He also testified that most producers felt the same way. There is no policy or rule requiring contractors who bid on jobs requiring the use of road aggregates to have their own rock quarry in order to qualify for this work class. Petitioner has the necessary equipment to transport mix from the plant to the job site and to install the mix at the job site. Hot Plant-mixed Bituminous Base and Surface courses can be successfully trucked approximately 60 miles from the plant. Accordingly, under DOT's policy, a successful bidder will frequently have to erect an asphalt plant near the job site. This will require him to obtain permits and negotiate the environmental problems associated therewith. The effect of not being qualified for Minor Bridge and Hot Plant-mixed Bituminous classes is that Petitioner is not qualified to bid as a prime contractor when one or more of these classes, in the aggregate, comprises fifty percent or more of the work.

Florida Laws (2) 22.03337.14
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YPAPANTI AND SEVASTI ALEXIOU/FRENCHY`S RESTAURANT vs CITY OF CLEARWATER AND ANTONIOS MARKOPOULOS, 01-000272 (2001)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Clearwater, Florida Jan. 19, 2001 Number: 01-000272 Latest Update: May 14, 2001

The Issue The issue is whether Petitioners' application for site plan approval for a proposed renovation and addition to their restaurant should be approved.

Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, the following findings of fact are determined: In this local land use dispute, Petitioners, Ypapanti and Sevasti Alexiou, who operate a restaurant under the name of Frenchy's Rockaway Grill, have appealed a decision by the Community Development Board (Board) to deny an application to renovate and expand their restaurant located at 7 Rockaway Street, Clearwater Beach, Florida. The Board, which is made up of seven local residents, acts as the local planning agency for Respondent, City of Clearwater (City). Although the City staff supports the project, the City is technically opposed to the application since the Board failed to approve the project by a 3-3 tie vote. In denying the application, the Board rejected the City staff's recommendation that the application be approved. Intervenor, Hunter Hotel Company, owns and operates a hotel known as Clearwater Beach Hotel which is contiguous to, and south of, Petitioners' property. It objects to the application on the grounds that "the criteria for the flexible development approval were not met nor proved, [and] that the relief requested [by Petitioners] is of such a magnitude that it is not warranted and cannot be allowed under the Code." As further clarified by Intervenor, the City's parking shortage in the Beach area is the "core issue on this appeal." Until the City solves the parking problem, Intervenor suggests that there should be a moratorium on development in the Beach area. Petitioners own and operate a popular and successful one-story restaurant and bar on a 0.38-acre lot at 7 Rockaway Street, Clearwater Beach, which fronts directly on the Gulf of Mexico. The property is zoned as a part of the City's Tourist District and is bounded by the Gulf of Mexico on the west, a municipal parking lot to the north, a motel on the east, and the Clearwater Beach Hotel on the south. Due to the small size of their lot, Petitioners seek to vertically expand their restaurant by adding a second story consisting of 3,487 square feet, including an approximately 2,300 square foot open deck and 1,200 square feet of enclosed area. Both sections will accommodate bar patrons and diners. Petitioners also intend to remove and replace a 945 square foot storage room attached to the south side of the building which is structurally unsound. To accomplish these changes, Petitioners will need "flexibility" in meeting setback and parking requirements. Because more than 95 percent of the City is now "built out," and very little land is vacant, the City has adopted comprehensive infill criteria for non-conforming structures, such as Petitioners' restaurant. The criteria which apply to Petitioners' project are found in Section 2- 803C. of the City of Clearwater Redevelopment Code (Code) and allow flexibility in promoting redevelopment and infill throughout the City, including the Clearwater Beach area. As pointed out by City staff, infill projects are often used on Clearwater Beach because there are so many non-conforming structures in that area. In determining whether a project should be given flexibility as an infill project, the City evaluates the proposed project against its infill criteria. Strict compliance with all criteria is not required, but rather the criteria are weighed or balanced collectively. If a project cannot meet a "significant number of [criteria], or a significant one in a meaningful way," then an applicant "would have problems [with gaining approval]." Once a project qualifies as an infill project, an applicant may then use flexible development standards for setbacks, height, size, and minimum off-street parking. In this case, Petitioners seek flexibility for setback and off-street parking requirements. As noted earlier, the main concern raised by Intervenor centers around item 9. of the criteria, which reads as follow: 9. Adequate off-street parking in the immediate vicinity according to the shared parking formula in Division 14 of Article 3 will be available to avoid on-street parking in the immediate vicinity of the parcel proposed for development. Intervenor contends that this criterion was not satisfied, and thus the project cannot qualify as an infill project. In addition, in its Proposed Final Order, the City contends that Petitioners have failed to satisfy items 1. and 5., which read as follows: The development or redevelopment of the parcel proposed for development is otherwise impractical without deviations from the use, intensity and development standards; 5. Suitable sites for development or redevelopment of the uses or mix of uses within the comprehensive infill redevelopment project are not otherwise available in the City of Clearwater. Table 2-803 of the Code establishes minimum off- street parking requirements of 7 to 15 parking spaces per 1,000 square feet for restaurants in the Tourist District. Therefore, a restaurant of Petitioners' size (that was not an infill project) would be required to have at least 47 off- street parking spaces. In actuality, Petitioners have only 13, due to a variance having been previously granted. Since Petitioners intend to add around 3,400 square feet through the second floor addition, the Code would normally require a minimum of 24 additional parking spaces, or a total of 71. However, these off-street standards do not apply to infill projects. Instead, another provision in Table 2-803 of the Code provides that minimum off-street parking for infill projects shall be "[d]etermined by the community development coordinator based on the specific use and/or ITE [Institute of Transportation Engineers] Manual standards." Therefore, using the guidelines in the foregoing provision, the community development coordinator determines the number of additional off-street parking spaces, if any, that an infill project will require. Because the City staff concluded that a parking study would assist it in analyzing the specific use of the property, it requested that Petitioners perform a parking study. The study was conducted by Robert Pergolizzi, a certified planner, who has performed a number of parking studies during his career. The Code does not describe any criteria for a parking study for an infill project. Therefore, the staff looked at other sections of the Code in arriving at a methodology to be used for the study. More specifically, it first considered Section 2-803J.6.a., which provides in part that off-street parking requirements can be relaxed if "the physical characteristics of the proposed building are such that the likely uses of the property will require fewer parking spaces per floor area than otherwise required." Because the restaurant sits directly on the beach, the staff believed that the primary destination of many of the customers was the beach, and not the restaurant, and that the visit to the restaurant was a side trip by the customers. Thus, the parking study methodology was designed, in part, to confirm or disaffirm that assumption. Section 2-803J.6.c. also provides flexibility in off-street parking requirements if "adequate parking is available on a shared basis as determined by all existing land uses within 1,000 feet of the parcel proposed for development, or parking is available through any existing or planned and committed parking facilities." The staff used this section of the Code to determine that 1,000 feet was an appropriate distance to analyze available parking for a restaurant. Therefore, Pergolizzi was directed by the staff to analyze available parking within 1,000 feet of the restaurant. Pergolizzi conducted his study on August 25 and 26, 2000, the Friday and Saturday which preceded the Labor Day holiday weekend. It is undisputed, and the parties have stipulated, that Pergolozzi conducted the study entirely consistent with the agreed methodology. The study confirmed that the primary destination of 49 percent of the restaurant's customers was the beach, and not the restaurant. In other words, the expansion would not affect the parking demand generated by almost one-half of the customers. The study also confirmed that there was available parking within 1,000 feet of the restaurant to accommodate not only the existing business, but the proposed expansion as well. As noted above, Table 2-803 of the Code required that the community development coordinator determine the minimum off-street parking after consideration of the specific proposed use and/or the ITE Manual standards. Here, the City staff looked at the specific use, the ITE Manual standards, and the parking study to determine the minimum off-street parking required for the restaurant. It concluded that there was available parking within 1,000 feet of the restaurant and that no additional parking spaces were required. The community development coordinator concurred with the results of the study and analysis and likewise determined that the minimum off-street parking for the project were the existing 13 spaces. This determination was wholly consistent with the requirements of the Code. In recommending to the Board that the project should be given flexibility as an infill project, the staff's report contained the following conclusion: The proposal is in compliance with the standards and criteria for flexible development approval, with maximum development potential, requirements of the Comprehensive Infill Redevelopment Projects, and with all applicable standards of the Community Development Code. A more detailed analysis of how each of the ten criteria were satisfied is found in Petitioners' Exhibits 9 and 14 received in evidence. At the hearing on March 27, 2001, the City's assistant planning director also established that the proposed expansion and renovation complied with all applicable standards of the Code. Intervenor's expert witness, Gail Easley, a certified planner, questioned whether the methodology used by Pergolizzi complied with the Code. More specifically, she contended that the City was required to determine minimum off- street parking for infill projects in the manner described in Section 2-803C.9. That section provides that "[a]dequate off- street parking in the immediate vicinity according to the shared parking formula in Division 14 of Article 3 will be available to avoid on-street parking in the immediate vicinity of the parcel proposed for development." If this contention were true, however, it would render meaningless the provision in Section 2-803C.8., which provides that "[f]lexibility in regard to lot width, required setbacks, height and off-street parking are justified by the benefits to community character in the immediate vicinity of the parcel proposed for development and the City of Clearwater as a whole." In other words, there would be no flexibility for off-street parking as permitted by that section. This would be contrary to the very purpose of infill projects. Witness Easley's interpretation is also inconsistent with Table 2-803, which states that "minimum off-street parking will be determined by the community development coordinator based on the specific use and/or ITE Manual standards." Under her interpretation of the Code, the community development coordinator would have no right to determine minimum off-street parking for infill projects based on the specific use and/or ITE Manual standards, despite clear language in the Code to the contrary. More importantly, the criteria in Section 2-803C., including item 9., are used to determine whether a project should be considered an infill redevelopment project under the Code. Item 9. is simply one of those criteria, and it does not establish minimum off-street parking requirements for an infill project. Witness Easley also opined that it was inappropriate for the parking study to consider on-street parking. However, the Code does not prohibit the community development coordinator from requesting a parking study which includes on- street parking. It only requires that he consider the specific use and/or ITE manual standards when determining off- street parking for an infill project. Other contentions that the methodology was flawed, including a concern about the date and time of the study and the use of 1,000 feet as a measuring stick for available parking, have been considered and found to be without merit. A contention was also made that certain other infill criteria were not met. However, there was no evidence to support these contentions, and the more persuasive evidence supports a finding that all criteria have been satisfied, and that Petitioners qualify as an infill project. The undersigned has also considered the testimony of the owners of two competing restaurants who object to the project. While they contended that the lack of parking motivated their opposition to the application, it is fair to infer from their testimony that they object mainly because they fear that Petitioners may capture some of their business through an expansion of their restaurant. Finally, in its Proposed Final Order, the City has contended that Petitioners have failed to satisfy a general standard contained in Section 3-913A.6., which requires that an applicant ensure that: [t]he design of the proposed development minimizes adverse effects, including visual, acoustic and olfactory and hours of operation impacts, on adjacent properties. Given the modifications agreed to by Petitioners in the following Finding of Fact, the requirements of this section have been met. In the nature of an affirmative defense, Petitioners have raised the issue of equitable estoppel and contend that Intervenor should be estopped from opposing the application. The facts underlying this argument are as follows. On November 21, 2000, the Board heard testimony and considered the application for the first time. At that meeting, Intervenor's counsel represented to the Board that "my client's concern is not the parking. My client's concern is because of proximity of noise and light intrusion." In light of these concerns, counsel for Petitioners and Intervenor reached an agreement wherein Petitioners agreed to limit the addition to the northern one-half of the existing building, construct an 8-foot concrete block wall on the south property line between the restaurant and the hotel, close the upstairs addition at 10:00 p.m. on week nights and 11:00 p.m. on Fridays and Saturdays, place no outside speakers and allow no live music on the upstairs addition, and direct upstairs lighting away from the hotel. With these accommodations, counsel for the hotel represented to the Board that "if [the Board] approve[s] this, you have addressed our primary areas of concern." After the close of public comments, the Board voted to approve the application by a 3-2 vote. Because four votes are required to approve an application, and one member was absent from the meeting, the matter was continued to the next meeting on December 12, 2000. By letter sent to Petitioners' counsel on December 5, 2000, Intervenor's counsel identified the "commitments at the preceding hearing, which [Petitioners were] willing to make to the Clearwater Beach Hotel." Upon receipt of that letter, Petitioners advised the City by letter that they were in agreement with Intervenor's counsel that "these are the conditions agreed to at the last CDB meeting, which shall be binding upon my client." Notwithstanding earlier representations, by letter dated December 7, 2000, counsel for Intervenor indicated that "the owners of Clearwater Beach Hotel have instructed us to object to the pending application. Upon further review, prompted by the renderings, the magnitude of this project is simply too great for the size of the property." The letter further stated that it was to be considered "as withdrawal of our prior letter and position of 'no objection,'" and that Intervenor would attend the December 12 hearing "to formally object." Petitioners have further contended that Board member William Johnson had ex parte communications with some of his neighbors concerning the merits of this application, and this constituted a departure from the essential requirements of the law. Section 4-206D.2. of the Code provides that "no member of the community development board or the city commission shall engage in any ex parte communications with any person in regard to the substance of a quasi-judicial matter which is to be considered by the board or commission, as the case may be." If such communications occur, Section 4-206D.3.a. requires that a member disclose these communications at the meeting. There is no record of any disclosure being made. At the first Board meeting on November 21, 2000, member Johnson had moved for approval of the application. Without any explanation, at the second meeting on December 12, 2000, he voted against the application. Member Johnson did not testify at hearing to confirm or deny Petitioners' allegation of wrongdoing. However, witness Pergolizzi testified that he spoke with member Johnson just after the December 12 meeting, at which time member Johnson allegedly admitted that he had such conversations with his neighbors and was sorry for his change of vote. But the out-of-court statements of member Johnson are hearsay in nature, do not supplement or explain any other competent evidence on this issue, and they cannot form the basis for a finding of fact.

Florida Laws (1) 120.57
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LEAMINGTON, INC. vs DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, 93-003291BID (1993)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida Jun. 11, 1993 Number: 93-003291BID Latest Update: Oct. 19, 1993

Findings Of Fact Leamington (Petitioner herein), is a road maintenance and construction contractor doing business since approximately 1985. John Hummell is Petitioner's President and is responsible for all bids submitted for contract awards. Petitioner contracts primarily with the Florida Department of Transportation (Respondent herein). Since 1985, Petitioner has entered into approximately forty-one (41) contracts with Respondent. Petitioner was one of seven bidders on State Job #17030-3536, Contract E-1706, let by Respondent in District I. Respondent notified Petitioner of its decision to award the bid to the second lowest bidder, Simco, by notice posted on April 19, 1993 stating that Leamington's bid was rejected because it was considered not to be responsible and was not in the best interest of the Department (to contract with Leamington). The work in question involves the repairs of the bridge located at SR- 789 at Little Ringling Causeway west of Sarasota in Sarasota County. The work entails removal and replacement of silicone sealant on the bridge deck and replacement and rejacketing of piling with grout epoxy. The bid tabulations revealed that Petitioner's bid was approximately $500.00 less than that of the second lowest bidder, Simco, Inc., of Sarasota. The Department has a procedure called the "district contracts procedure". Part of the procedure calls for the awards committee to review bids and determine who the bid should be awarded to. The awards committee, which was chaired by Glenn Ivey, the District Director of Operations, reviewed the bid submitted for project E-1706. The awards committee voted unanimously to reject Leamington's bid on Contract E-1706. The decision to reject Petitioner's bid, by the awards committee, was based on Petitioner's performance on its more recent Department contracts. Specifically, the awards committee considered projects E-1649, for sidewalk repair in several counties; contract E-1545, a concrete repair job in Lakeland; and contract E-1652, a roadway shoulder repair job. Leamington's contract on the concrete repair job (E-1545) was rated as being poor when Leamington was, in effect, asked to leave the job. Based on Leamington's poor workmanship and difficulties encountered on that contract, Respondent terminated work on the contract after approximately sixty percent (60 percent) of the work was completed. The remainder of that project was completed by another contractor. Specifically, Job No. E-1545 called for Petitioner to remove and replace portland concrete slabs on Memorial Boulevard in Lakeland. Petitioner failed to restore the concrete slabs to a smooth surface, making it necessary for Respondent to have the slabs ground such that motorists had a smooth driving surface. After several warnings, Respondent cancelled the project and, as noted, approximately forty percent (40 percent) of the work was completed by another contractor. Another project reviewed by the awards committee was Contract E-1652, a roadway shoulder repair contract. On that project, Petitioner was advised that the shoulder had to be graded at a certain angle and was shown, by several of Respondent's engineers, the proper manner in which to accomplish the task. Petitioner failed to grade the shoulder at the correct angle as requested. Petitioner also routinely failed to provide proper traffic control during the performance of Contract E-1652 and frequently disputed Respondent's employees advice as to work instructions and ways to eradicate the poor workmanship on that project. Additionally, Petitioner failed to use skilled workers and did not have ample equipment on the job to perform the work on Contract E-1652. Initially, Petitioner had limited equipment at the beginning of the work on Contract E-1652. After Petitioner received a letter from Respondent advising that there wasn't adequate equipment to complete the project, Petitioner obtained additional equipment. The Department terminated Petitioner's work under Contract E-1652 because Petitioner had approached the contract deadline for completion and due to of the numerous problems the Department experienced with Petitioner in getting the work completed acceptably. Bobby Cranford, the Assistant Maintenance Engineer for the Petitioner's Sarasota Maintenance Unit, recommended that Petitioner not be awarded any more roadway shoulder repair contracts based on the difficulties experienced by Petitioner's "poor" workmanship on contract E-1652. Another project reviewed by the awards committee was Petitioner's work performance on Contract E-1649, a sidewalk repair job which encompassed several counties. Petitioner did not have the required personnel and expertise to perform the sidewalk job correctly. Petitioner was kept informed of deficiencies and necessary corrections to correctly perform the sidewalk repair job, however, the proper repairs have not been made. The Respondent introduced a composite of twenty-three (23) photos showing the extent of the problems Petitioner needed to correct the sidewalk repairs with notes as to the corrective action that was needed. Specifically, Petitioner used little expansion joint materials and no edging tools were utilized on the project. Similar problems were found throughout the four county area in which Petitioner was engaged on the sidewalk project. By letter dated May 13, 1993, Respondent advised Petitioner of the numerous problems on contract E-1649. Specifically, Petitioner's President was told of visual inspections which showed substandard work on the original work as well as the work wherein Petitioner attempted to correct deficiencies which were discovered by Respondent. For example, Petitioner was advised that at 506 First and Main Streets in Wachula, there were sections of concrete sidewalk removed and scheduled for replacement with adjacent sections now damaged. Petitioner was further advised that workers had driven trucks on the sidewalk damaging several slabs not marked for replacement. Finally, Petitioner was asked to correct broken sprinklers at the work site and to resolve a claim filed by a Mrs. Campbell, which was registered with Respondent. The awards committee also relied upon an independent inspection report prepared by Bobby Cranford. That report is a forty (40) page report citing numerous deficiencies on the sidewalk repair project. Respondent requires that contractors employ english speaking superintendents at each work site to assist in communicating with its inspectors. Petitioner utilized superintendents who did not speak english and thereby created a language barrier making communication difficult with Respondent's personnel. Respondent had to monitor Petitioner's projects extensively and at a cost which increased the Department's overhead disproportionately when compared to other projects let to other district contractors. Based on a review of Respondent's work on Petitioner's recent contracts, no other contractors performing contracts in District I had a performance record as poor as Petitioner. When the awards committee made its decision to reject Petitioner's bid on the subject contract, it also relied on a memorandum from , Wally Clark, a District I attorney. In the memorandum it was concluded that Petitioner had subcontracted work to Hummell, Inc., a separate entity and that the required prior written approval of the subcontracting had not been obtained from Respondent. The investigation also revealed that the subcontractor, Hummell, Inc., had not been paid for its services (by Petitioner). An internal audit also prepared by Wall revealed that Hummell, Inc. was an unpaid subcontractor of Petitioner. The awards committee also considered allegations from Phillip Spears, a subcontractor of Petitioner, who had not been paid for work performed on Respondent's contracts. The committee also considers a newspaper article which stated that Petitioner was under investigation by local law enforcement officials for failure to pay subcontractors on the Interstate 75 project. Dennis Hall is the District Investigator for District I. Hall accompanied Wall, the author of the internal audit report, on investigations and interviews in compiling the audit report. One of the persons interviewed by Wall and Hall was Larry Zavitz. Zavitz was an inspector employed by Petitioner in excess of twenty- eight (28) years and had performed the inspection on Petitioner's sidewalk repair project under Contract E-1649. During the interview of Zavitz, he admitted to receiving a loan of $1,000.00 from John Hummell which Zavitz had not fully repaid at the time of the interview. Upon Zavitz admission of accepting the loan, he was asked and later resigned from the Department.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is, hereby, RECOMMENDED that: Petitioner's protest of the rejection of its bid on Contract E-1706 be rejected and the Department enter its award of the subject contract to the second lowest responsible bidder, Simco, Inc. of Sarasota. DONE AND RECOMMENDED this 8th day of September, 1993, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. JAMES E. BRADWELL Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of September, 1993. COPIES FURNISHED: Ben G. Watts, Secretary Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458 Thornton J. Williams, Esquire General Counsel Haydon Burns Building 562 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458 William H. Roberts, Esquire Department of Transportation 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458 Michael E. Riley, Esquire 106 East College Avenue Post Office Box 10507 Tallahassee, Florida 32302

Florida Laws (3) 120.53120.68337.11
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