The Issue The issue in this case is whether Petitioner has grounds for refusing to renew Respondent’s registration as an intrastate mover, where Respondent is currently a defendant in a civil enforcement action brought by Petitioner, which action Respondent’s president allegedly failed to disclose in the subject application for renewal registration.
Findings Of Fact The Department is the state agency responsible for, among other things, licensing and regulating household moving services in the State of Florida. Moving Systems is a Florida corporation registered with the Department as a licensed mover authorized to engage in the intrastate transportation and shipment of household goods. Moving Systems’ registration (IM1939) was scheduled to expire on February 11, 2020. Accordingly, it timely submitted an application for renewal registration (the “Renewal Application”), which was signed by James Fischer (“Fischer”), the corporation’s president, on February 9, 2020. Question number 9 of the Renewal Application asks: Has the mover or any director, officer, owner, or general partner of the business: been convicted of a crime involving fraud, dishonest dealing, or any act of moral turpitude? YES * * * NO not satisfied a civil fine or penalty arising out of any administrative or enforcement action brought by any governmental agency or private person based upon conduct involving fraud, dishonest dealing, or any violation of Chapter 507, Florida Statutes? YES NO a pending criminal, administrative, of [sic] enforcement proceeding in any jurisdiction, based upon conduct involving fraud, dishonest dealing, or any act of moral turpitude? YES NO had a judgment entered in any action brought by the department or the Department of Legal Affairs pursuant to Chapter 507 or ss. 501.201-501.213, Florida Statutes? YES NO Fischer checked the answer “NO” to each of these items. Moving Systems and Fischer are among the defendants in State of Florida, Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services v. Florida Licensed Moving Corporation, et al., Case No. 2018-CA-002516, which is pending in the Circuit Court for Seminole County, Florida (the “Action”). The Action is a civil proceeding brought by the Department under section 507.10, seeking to enforce compliance with chapter 507. The Department alleges in the Action that the defendants, including Moving Systems and Fischer, engaged in actions involving fraud or dishonest dealing. Moving Systems and Fischer have each vigorously denied the allegations made against them in the Action, which remained pending as of the final hearing in this case. The Department’s intended agency action in this case does not depend upon proof of the allegations upon which the Action is based. No findings of fact concerning the merits of such allegations will be made herein. By letter dated March 11, 2020, the Department notified Moving Systems that it intended to deny the Renewal Application for two reasons. First, the Department asserted, then as here, that both Moving Systems and one of its officers (Fischer) have pending against them an enforcement proceeding, i.e., the Action, “based upon conduct involving fraud, dishonest dealing, or any other act of moral turpitude,” which the Department contends provides grounds for nonrenewal pursuant to section 507.03(8)(d). Second, the Department alleged, and has here sought to prove, that Fischer knowingly made a false statement in the Renewal Application when he denied that the mover “has … a pending … enforcement proceeding in any jurisdiction, based upon conduct involving fraud, dishonest dealing, or any act of moral turpitude.” Fischer disputes that his answer to question number 9(c) was knowingly false. He maintains that this question is confusing because it (i) is syntactically awkward and (ii) employs legal terminology, which is unfamiliar to ordinary laypersons. There is some merit to these criticisms of the question. Question number 9(c) attempts—not entirely successfully—to paraphrase section 507.03(8)(d), which authorizes the Department to deny, refuse to renew, or revoke a registration if a mover or one of its principals “[h]as pending against him or her any criminal, administrative, or enforcement proceedings in any jurisdiction, based upon conduct involving fraud, dishonest dealing, or any other act of moral turpitude.” (Emphasis added.) The prepositional phrase (“pending against him or her”) makes clear that the verb (“has”), as used in the statute, is operating semantically as a standalone, transitive verb, which denotes that the mover stands in a certain relationship to the pending proceeding, i.e., he or she is a party to such proceeding. Question number 9(c) omits the prepositional phrase, without which the verb “has” is not clearly a transitive verb, but instead can be misread as an auxiliary verb. Confusion then arises because there is no verb phrase of which “has” is a part. Instead, the question asks, “[h]as the mover … a pending” proceeding? This may cause applicants to wonder, “Has the mover what with respect to a pending proceeding?” Testified in? Heard about? Been named as a party to? The undersigned believes that an applicant could reasonably read this somewhat affected language and decide that the question does not apply to him or her, based upon a simple misunderstanding of, or uncertainty about, what is being asked.1 In addition, the terms “enforcement proceeding,” and “fraud, dishonest dealing, or any act of moral turpitude,” are legalistic in nature, as Fischer argues. An applicant who is a party to a legal proceeding could reasonably conclude, even so, that the proceeding is not based upon historical conduct involving fraud, dishonest dealing, or an act of moral turpitude as he understands those terms. Increasing the likelihood of an applicant’s reaching such a conclusion is that the question does not distinguish between alleged conduct and actual conduct. As a result, an applicant who is certain of his innocence might answer “no” to question number 9(c) rather than appearing to admit that his conduct was fraudulent or dishonest. Indeed, a falsely accused applicant would probably view any pending enforcement proceeding as based upon, not his conduct, but upon unfounded allegations. Why should such an applicant not answer “no” to question number 9(c), when answering “yes” might give the impression that he did something which he knows that he did not do? Consequently, the undersigned credits Fischer’s testimony that he did not knowingly make a false statement on the Renewal Application. Reinforcing this finding is that Fischer had no reason to knowingly attempt to conceal the Action because the Department is the plaintiff therein. Obviously, the Department was aware of the Action, and thus falsely denying its existence would have been both foolish and futile. Fischer had no motive to lie, and while this is not dispositive, it is corroborative circumstantial evidence. It is found as a matter of ultimate fact that the evidence fails to show Fischer knowingly made a misrepresentation in the Renewal Application in violation of chapter 507. See § 507.07(2), Fla. Stat. 1 Question 9(c) is not wrong, grammatically, nor is it necessarily ambiguous in a legal sense. But, the question is stilted and likely confuses applicants who are not wordsmiths. The other ground, however, is the true crux of the Department’s case. The pendency of the Action is an undisputed fact, and Moving Systems and Fischer are defendants in that case. There can be no genuine dispute, moreover, that the Action is an “enforcement proceeding” based upon allegations of “dishonest dealing” as those terms are used in section 507.03(8)(d). Viewed in isolation, paragraph (d)’s plain and literal language makes for a seemingly open-and-shut case against Moving Systems, which has pending against it an enforcement proceeding based upon dishonest dealing. Yet, paragraph (d) does not stand alone but is just one part of subsection (8), all of whose provisions must be read as a whole and construed together. When paragraph (d) is considered in conjunction with the other paragraphs of subsection (8), it becomes far less clear that a license may be revoked or nonrenewed on the basis of mere allegations of wrongdoing by the licensee, where such allegations have yet to be proved. The undersigned concludes as a matter of law, for reasons explained below, that subsection (8) is clear and unambiguous with respect to the Department’s authority to deny an initial application based upon the pendency of a proceeding described in paragraph (d), but is ambiguous as to whether paragraph (d) provides grounds for taking away a valuable and legally protected property interest via revocation or nonrenewal of an existing license simply because unproved allegations of misconduct have been made against the licensee. Because subsection (8) is penal in nature, this ambiguity must be resolved in Moving Systems’ favor.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services enter a final order approving Moving Systems’ Renewal Application and renewing registration IM1939. 3 A license might also be revoked under paragraph (a) if the licensee ceased to meet the requirements for registration under chapter 507, but this provision is not implicated in this case. DONE AND ENTERED this 5th day of October, 2020, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JOHN G. VAN LANINGHAM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of October, 2020. COPIES FURNISHED: Genevieve Hall, Esquire Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services Mayo Building, Room 520 407 Calhoun Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0800 (eServed) Donald Goldrich, Esquire Donald S. Goldrich, P.A. Post Office Box 970735 Coconut Creek, Florida 33073-2734 (eServed) Tom A. Steckler, Director Division of Consumer Services Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services Mayo Building, Room 520 407 South Calhoun Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0800
The Issue The threshold issue in this case is whether Petitioner's claim is time-barred for failure to timely file an initial charge of discrimination with the Florida Commission on Human Relations. If Petitioner's claim were timely, then the question would be whether Respondent unlawfully discriminated against Petitioner on the basis of her age in violation of the Florida Civil Rights Act.
Findings Of Fact From April 4, 1998 until May 22, 2003, Petitioner Carol Manzaro ("Manzaro") worked for Respondent Department of Children and Family Services ("DCF") as an Inspector Specialist I (essentially, an investigator) in the Office of the Inspector General ("OIG"). Manzaro's duty station was at a satellite office located in Riviera Beach, Florida. Her supervisor was Richard Scholtz, who was based in the OIG's Fort Lauderdale field office. In October 2002, Sheryl Steckler became DCF's Inspector General. Shortly after assuming this position, Ms. Steckler hired Tom Busch as Chief of Investigations. Mr. Busch was responsible for, among other things, overseeing the OIG's field office in Fort Lauderdale and the satellite office in Riviera Beach. Ms. Steckler and Mr. Busch worked at offices in Tallahassee. In late December 2002, Mr. Busch called Manzaro and reprimanded her for sending an e-mail that Ms. Steckler felt was inappropriate. Manzaro believes that the reprimand was unwarranted and demonstrates that she was being singled out (or set up), but the evidence regarding this particular incident is much too sketchy for the undersigned to make such a finding. In January 2003, Manzaro and Louis Consagra, another inspector who worked in the Riviera Beach satellite office, were directed to attend a meeting in Fort Lauderdale, which they did. After they arrived, their immediate supervisor Mr. Scholz, recently back from a trip to Tallahassee, told the two that Mr. Busch had said to him, "Sometimes when you get older, you miss a step." Mr. Scholz further related that Mr. Busch had announced that "changes w[ould] be made." Mr. Scholz warned them that "they are looking to fire people," and that he (Scholz) would fire people to protect himself if need be. The three (Manzaro, Consagra, and Scholz) then met with Mr. Busch, who had traveled to Fort Lauderdale to see them. Mr. Busch informed them that he had just fired an inspector who worked in Fort Lauderdale, and that Ms. Steckler planned to close the Riviera Beach satellite office by June or July of 2003, at which time Manzaro and Mr. Consagra would be reassigned to the Fort Lauderdale field office. Manzaro, who was then 55 years old, decided at that moment it was time to start looking for a new job. Immediately upon returning to Riviera Beach, she began making phone calls to that end. Manzaro claims that for some weeks thereafter she received "haranguing" phone calls from Mr. Busch, who deprecated her abilities and was rude and patronizing. The undersigned credits Manzaro's testimony in this regard (which was not rebutted), but deems it insufficient to support an inference that Mr. Busch was critical of Manzaro because she was over the age of 40.1 Mr. Busch's telephone calls caused Manzaro to see (in her words) the "handwriting on the wall"; by this time, she "knew" her employment would be terminated. In March 2003, Manzaro's co-worker, Mr. Consagra, was fired. Around this time——it is not clear when——Manzaro was given a below-average performance evaluation.2 Not long after that, by letter dated April 18, 2003, Manzaro was notified of her appointment to the job of Economic Self Sufficiency Specialist I with DCF's District Nine, a position which Manzaro had sought.3 By accepting this appointment, she could continue working for DCF in Palm Beach County, albeit at a lower salary than she was earning as an inspector for the OIG. She decided to take the job. Manzaro resigned her position with the OIG via a Memorandum to Ms. Steckler dated April 18, 2003. In pertinent part, Manzaro wrote: I would first like to thank you for the opportunity to serve the Department and Office of Inspector General and for the opportunity to find other employment within the Department. At this time, familial and financial responsibilities preclude my traveling to the proposed new duty location in Ft. Lauderdale. As you will see from the attached letter, I have accepted a position with Economic Self Sufficiency effective May 23, 2003. With your permission, I would like to complete writing the three cases I presently have open and commence annual leave on May 5 through May 22, 2003. On or about May 27, 2003, Manzaro started working at her new job for DCF. On July 12, 2003, Manzaro received some paperwork that had been sent to her accidentally, which revealed that her replacement in the OIG was younger than she, and also was being paid more than she had earned as an investigator. Manzaro claims that it was then she discovered that she had been the victim of age discrimination, absent which she would not have been "involuntarily demoted" to the position of Economic Self Sufficiency Specialist I. Ultimate Factual Determinations Manzaro's theory is that she was forced to resign her position in the OIG by the threat of termination, which caused her to seek and ultimately accept other, less remunerative employment with DCF. Manzaro describes the net effect of her job-switch as an "involuntary demotion" and charges that DCF "demoted" her because she was over the age of 40. Manzaro testified unequivocally, and the undersigned has found, that during a meeting in Fort Lauderdale in January 2003 (the one where Mr. Busch had informed Manzaro and her colleagues that the Riviera Beach satellite office would be closed), Manzaro had made up her mind to look for another job. This means that the untoward pressure allegedly used by DCF to force Manzaro's resignation had achieved its purpose by January 31, 2003, at the latest.4 Therefore, if the alleged discrimination against Manzaro were a discrete act——which is, at least implicitly, how Manzaro views the matter——then the discrete act apparently occurred on or before January 31, 2003.5 Assuming, for argument's sake, that DCF did in fact force Manzaro to decide, in January 2003, to resign her position as an inspector, then the pressure that DCF exerted on Manzaro consisted of: (a) a verbal reprimand regarding an e-mail; (b) Mr. Busch's comment (reported via Mr. Scholz) that age sometimes causes one to "miss a step"; (c) Mr. Scholz's warning that people would be fired; (d) the firing of a Fort Lauderdale-based inspector; and (e) the announcement that the Riviera Beach satellite office would be closed. Assuming for argument's sake that the foregoing circumstances amounted to discriminatory coercion, the undersigned determines that Manzaro should have known, when she succumbed to the threat of termination and involuntarily decided to resign, that she might possibly be a victim of age discrimination.6 The undersigned comes to this conclusion primarily because Mr. Busch's comment about older people sometimes missing a step is the strongest (if not the only) hint of age discrimination in this record.7 The significance of the previous finding is that, if the discrimination consisted of the discrete act of demotion (as Manzaro urges), then the 365-day period within which a charge of discrimination must be filed with the FCHR began to run on Manzaro's claim no later than January 31, 2003, by which time she was on notice of the allegedly discriminatory act.8 Because Manzaro's charge of discrimination was not filed with the FCHR until June 10, 2004, it is clear that, as a claim involving a discrete act of discrimination, Manzaro's charge was untimely. Putting aside the question whether Manzaro's case is time-barred, it is further determined that, in any event, Manzaro did not suffer an "adverse employment action." The undersigned is not persuaded that Manzaro was forced to take another job, as she now contends. Rather, the greater weight of the evidence establishes that Manzaro elected voluntarily to seek other employment after learning that her duty station was being moved to Fort Lauderdale and developing concerns about her job security in light of new management's efforts to weed out employees it viewed as under-performers. Ultimately, it is determined that DCF did not discriminate unlawfully against Manzaro on the basis of her age.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the FCHR enter a final order dismissing Manzaro's Petition for Relief as time-barred, or alternatively finding DCF not liable for age discrimination. DONE AND ENTERED this 13th day of September, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JOHN G. VAN LANINGHAM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of September, 2005.
The Issue Whether Petitioner was the victim of an unlawful employment practice.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a black woman who was employed by Wal- Mart, Inc., at its Marianna, Florida store, as a cashier, from May 29, 1995, until her termination on April 19, 1999. The Marianna store is a "Super Wal-Mart." Respondent is a large retail establishment subject to the "Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992," as contemplated by Section 760.02(7), Florida Statutes. Prior to being employed by Respondent, Petitioner experienced mental depression and mood swings. She had anxiety attacks, including agoraphobia. Once she resided in her bedroom without exiting for nine months. Eventually, she became well enough to hold a job with Respondent. During the time she worked for Respondent she was also employed by a nearby service station. Ms. Jeannie Garrett, a black woman called as a witness by Petitioner, related an incident where she believed she was mistreated in a conflict involving whether a mop was or was not placed in a sink. She also was involved in a disturbance involving a customer in the restaurant portion of the store. She was admonished by the person in charge of the restaurant. Ms. Garrett was transferred to a cashier position and quit as a result. Ms. Garrett testified that, "It wasn't about race. It was because she didn't like me." Neither Ms. Garrett nor Petitioner presented any evidence that Respondent was prejudiced against anyone because of race. The evidence of record indicating that Petitioner was disabled consisted solely of her testimony that she had emotional problems, and a doctor's note dated August 26, 1998, entitled "For Margie Israel," which stated, "(undecipherable) needs one week off due to severe anxiety depression." Petitioner presented testimony regarding a number of incidences which she believed proved she was mistreated. In a question involving a determination of the correct amount of change, William Michael Gilmore (Mr. Gilmore), the store manager, talked harshly to her. Jan K. Peterson, in Petitioner's opinion, wanted to dominate Petitioner, resented Petitioner, talked harshly to Petitioner's husband, and "sassed" Petitioner's husband. Petitioner bought numerous items in the store and some of the cashiers did not want to check her out because she used coupons and determining the value of the coupons was too complicated for them. On one occasion Petitioner tried to use a coupon and a cashier named Rose instigated an argument about the matter. Petitioner believed Rose had a vendetta against her. The disagreement became loud and the Customer Service Manager (CSM) got involved. Francis Baker was the shift manager on duty and Petitioner tried to talk to him about the incident but he walked off. This hurt Petitioner's feelings. On one occasion a man attempted to utilize a discount card at another cashier's post and Petitioner intervened and informed the cashier that the man was separated from his wife, an employee of Respondent, and therefore was not eligible to use his discount card. The husband became angry and called her a "bitch." On another occasion the midnight cashier refused to check out Petitioner who had attempted to use a "comp ad." A "comp ad," is utilized in a situation where a customer produces an advertisement from a competitor which demonstrates that the competitor offers an identical product at a lower price. In such a situation, Respondent will sell the product at the competitor's price. Petitioner complained about this which attracted the attention of the night manager. This resulted in a disputatious event which disturbed the tranquility of the store. Petitioner wanted to be a backup CSM but was not installed as such. There is no actual position of "back-up CSM." It is simply a temporary working title. Petitioner never told Respondent's manager, Mr. Gilmore, or anyone else in authority, that she had a mental disability, although she once told Mr. Gilmore that she was suffering from depression. Petitioner never requested an accommodation. Mr. Gilmore was aware that Petitioner was afflicted with diabetes and made every accommodation for that condition, including giving her "breaks" and allowing her to have juice and water at her work station. This was accomplished even though Petitioner never provided Respondent with information from a physician indicating that she had diabetes. There was no record in her personnel file indicating that Petitioner was afflicted with diabetes or any other disorder. Petitioner agreed that during the time she worked for Respondent the drugs she was ingesting, designed to combat depression, controlled her problem. Petitioner affirmed that she was not limited in any major life activity as a result of her depression. Moreover, the record reveals that during the period prior to her termination she successfully worked at two different jobs. Jan K. Peterson is experienced in the retail trade. She was a supervisor of cashiers and CSM supervisor. She supervised Petitioner and observed that Petitioner was often late. Ms. Peterson tried to establish new hours for Petitioner for the convenience of Petitioner but Petitioner continued to be tardy nevertheless. She observed Petitioner clock in and thereafter visit with other associates rather than report to her work station. Ms. Peterson observed that Petitioner was disrespectful to the CSM's. On one occasion, Petitioner threatened to "get" her in the parking lot. Ms. Peterson concluded this communication was a threat of physical harm. Even though Ms. Peterson was often Petitioner's supervisor, Petitioner generally refused to speak to her. Petitioner indicated that she desired to be promoted to CSM. Ms. Peterson tried to train her so that her hopes could be realized. Ms. Peterson put Petitioner on the service desk to expand her vocational horizons. However, no openings for CSM occurred subsequent to Petitioner requesting the promotion and her eventual termination. Respondent demonstrated its caring attitude toward its personnel by providing a program called Resources for Living. This is a program for the benefit of employees although residual benefit is gleaned by Respondent. The program is designed to provide help to those who experience stress, or mental problems, alcoholism, or other maladies. The availability of this program was widely advertised in the store and Petitioner was aware of its availability. Petitioner never took advantage of this program. Brenda Garrett has worked at Wal-Mart for six and one half years and worked as a manager in another retail store before being employed by Wal-Mart. She is also a certified nursing assistant. Ms. Garrett observed Petitioner reporting to work late on numerous occasions. She was never informed by Petitioner that Petitioner believed she was mentally disabled. Ms. Garrett did, however, know that Petitioner was diabetic. During April 1997, Mr. Gilmore became manager of the Marianna Super Wal-Mart. Upon assuming his duties he reviewed employee work histories. Petitioner's record attracted his attention because it revealed entries involving insubordination, dress code violations, and tardiness. Mr. Gilmore attempted to counsel Petitioner in an effort to make her a better employee. Petitioner would not talk to him upon his initial attempt. Eventually she consented to talk to him and told him she wanted to be a CSM. Mr. Gilmore stated that if she improved her performance in her current position she could possibly be a CSM. Mr. Gilmore observed that Petitioner was capable of accomplishing her assigned duties. On one occasion Petitioner informed him that she was depressed. Mr. Gilmore asked her for documentation with regard to her depression but she never provided it. He did ensure that she was provided juice to ameliorate problems caused by her diabetes. Petitioner never asserted to Mr. Gilmore that she was disabled in any way and he observed no disability. Petitioner was the recipient of "coaching" forms. Some were entitled "Coaching for Improvement" forms. These forms are used to record a disciplinary breach and the corrective action taken. They cover the period May 7, 1997 through May 17, 1999. The coaching forms revealed that Petitioner was counseled for being short in her cash drawer, tardiness (twice), failing to make correct change, insubordination, shopping on duty, and causing a disturbance in the presence of customers on two occasions. Petitioner, during the time she worked at Respondent's store, was recorded as being late to work at least 38 times. Mr. Gilmore fired Petitioner because of her bad behavior, tardiness, absenteeism, and insubordination. He did not fire her because he did not believe she had a disability. He indicated a willingness to rehire her at some future date.
Recommendation Based upon the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That a final order be entered dismissing the Petition. DONE AND ENTERED this 21st day of June, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. HARRY L. HOOPER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of June, 2002. COPIES FURNISHED: Margie R. Israel 2940 Carver Lane Marianna, Florida 32446 John A. Unzicker, Jr., Esquire Vernis & Bowling of Northwest Florida, P.A. 635 West Garden Street Pensacola, Florida 32501 Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue Whether Petitioner demonstrated that she was terminated from employment by Respondent, Trend Offset Printing Company (Respondent or Trend), as the result of an unlawful employment practice based on her identification with a protected class, or as retaliation for Petitioner’s opposition to an unlawful employment practice.
Findings Of Fact Respondent is, purportedly, a printing company located in Jacksonville, Florida. Specific information as to the company is limited, since the company did not appear at the final hearing. Based on Petitioner’s testimony, it is inferred that Respondent meets the definition of an employer in section 760.02(7), Florida Statutes. On Saturday, September 28, 2019, the printing plant was open, though the office was closed for the weekend. Petitioner was at work that day. On September 28, 2019, Petitioner had some vegetables that she had placed in a personal refrigerator that she kept at work. She intended to take the vegetables to her aunt. Several of the bags in which the vegetables had been placed had broken open. Therefore, after she clocked out of work, Respondent took a box from a trash receptacle located on the plant floor in which to place the vegetables. Unbeknownst to Petitioner, there was a cell phone in the discarded box. She loaded the box, and took it to her aunt’s house. Upon arrival, Petitioner unloaded the box and, at that time, discovered the phone at the bottom. The screen of the phone was cracked and broken. There was no evidence as to how or when the phone was damaged, nor was there any evidence that Petitioner was responsible for the phone’s condition. Petitioner’s aunt recommended that Petitioner discard the damaged phone. Petitioner, wanting to ensure that the phone was returned to its rightful owner, 1 Section 760.10 has been unchanged since 1992, save for a 2015 amendment adding pregnancy to the list of classifications protected from discriminatory employment practices. Ch. 2015-68, § 6, Laws of Fla. regardless of its condition, decided to return the phone on Monday, September 30, 2019, when the office would be open. Upon her return to work on Monday, September 30, 2019, Petitioner immediately turned in the phone to her supervisor, and accurately explained the circumstances of how it came into her possession. On October 2, 2019, Petitioner was presented with a letter of termination from Respondent’s Human Resources Manager, which provided that: After reviewing the pertinent evidence on the evening of Sept 28th, 2019, we have determined to terminate your employment with Trend Offset Printing immediately. Any remaining hours worked and any unused vacation hours will be paid out in full on our next payroll cycle, Oct 11th, 2019. Those worked hours and unused vacation hours will be paid as directed via direct deposit or physical check. I've tried to reach out to you several times but unable to leave a message.[2] Please make arrangements with me to pickup any personal belongings that you may [sic]. If we don't hear from you in a reasonable time your personal belongings will be discarded. The evidence in this case establishes that Petitioner did nothing to warrant her termination. It is unreasonable to think that Petitioner would steal a phone, and then return it at the earliest opportunity. She had no desire or use for a cell phone. She did not try to use it. She had no idea to whom it belonged. That the phone ended up in her possession was entirely accidental. Though there was no evidence as to how or why the phone ended up in the box in the trash, the condition of the phone suggests that it may have been discarded by its owner. In any event, the evidence was persuasive that Petitioner did not intentionally take the phone. 2 The difficulty in reaching Petitioner may have been due to the fact that she did not own a cell phone, did not want a cell phone, and, according to both Petitioner and her sister, did not know how to use a cell phone. The letter of termination was vague, unusually and unnecessarily harsh, and not based on fact. Petitioner testified, for good reason, that “they didn’t treat me fair, at all.” However, Petitioner did not testify or present evidence at the hearing that Respondent’s action was based on discrimination due to race, sex, or age, or was the result of retaliation. As will be discussed herein, the failure to prove discrimination or retaliation based on a protected class or opposition to an unlawful act constitutes a failure to meet the jurisdictional element of an unlawful employment practice complaint.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is 3 Petitioner requested, as relief, that she be reinstated to her previous job with Respondent, because she loved working with her co-workers, who she described as family; and that her name be cleared of the unwarranted allegation of theft. Due to the outcome of this proceeding, the undersigned is unable to recommend Petitioner’s reinstatement. However, this Order is intended, and should be treated, as determining that Petitioner engaged in no theft, or any other conduct vis-á-vis the cell phone, that warranted her termination. RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a final order dismissing Petitioner, Annette Johnson’s Petition for Relief, FCHR No. 202126948. DONE AND ENTERED this 8th day of July, 2021, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S E. GARY EARLY Administrative Law Judge 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of July, 2021. COPIES FURNISHED: Tammy S. Barton, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations Room 110 4075 Esplanade Way Tallahassee, Florida 32399-7020 Annette Y. Johnson 635 Luna Court Jacksonville, Florida 32205 Trend Offset Printing Company 10301 Busch Drive North Jacksonville, Florida 32218 Cheyanne Costilla, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations Room 110 4075 Esplanade Way Tallahassee, Florida 32399-7020
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent committed an unlawful employment practice contrary to Section 760.10, Florida Statutes, by discriminating against Petitioner based on an alleged handicap.
Findings Of Fact Respondent is an employer as that term is defined in Section 760.10, Florida Statutes. Respondent employed Respondent in January 1990. Respondent reassigned Petitioner to the Division of Recreation and Parks in 1993. At the time of his dismissal in October 2003, Petitioner was working as a park ranger at the St. Marks GeoPark in Wakulla County, Florida. Petitioner is a history aficionado. He enjoys researching Florida and Civil War history. He has authored a 200-page book entitled The Civil War in and Around St. Marks, Florida. He has written an article entitled "Forts in St. Marks during the War Between the States." Petitioner enjoys participating in history interpretations for the public. Several times in the past decade, Respondent nominated him for an award for his activities in history interpretations. Petitioner has constructed colonial-era equipment and musical instruments. Although they are his personal property, Petitioner has used them in displays for the public at state parks. Petitioner researched the historical accuracy of his projects both at home and at work. Petitioner had surgery in 2000 for a cervical herniated disc. After the surgery, Respondent made accommodations for Petitioner in the form of lighter duty assignments during his recovery period in keeping with his doctor's request. In a letter dated August 28, 2000, Petitioner's doctor set forth the specific type of work that Petitioner could and could not perform. The doctor released Petitioner to perform desk work, telephone duties, and visitor services but no maintenance duties. At all times relevant here, Thomas Nobles was Petitioner's immediate supervisor. Mr. Nobles and Petitioner have known each other since high school. However, they did not have a good relationship at work. In 2001, Petitioner filed gender discrimination charges against Mr. Nobles. Respondent conducted an investigation and exonerated Mr. Nobles. Mr. Nobles wrote several counseling memoranda and one reprimand, which criticized Petitioner's work performance. Among other things, Mr. Nobles warned Petitioner not to visit a music store in Tallahassee during work hours. In a memorandum dated July 19, 2002, Mr. Nobles discussed his concern over Petitioner's work habits that allegedly caused damage to a state-owned vehicle and other property and Petitioner's inability to complete paperwork. Petitioner responded to each of Mr. Nobles' criticisms in a memorandum dated July 28, 2002. On September 20, 2002, Mr. Nobles wrote a memorandum to document an earlier conversation with Petitioner regarding Mr. Nobles' concern that Petitioner was not keeping the park neat. In the memorandum, Mr. Nobles instructed Petitioner not to bring "personal projects" to work, specifically referring to a mandolin that Petitioner had been sanding in the park office. In a memorandum dated October 22, 2002, Mr. Nobles criticized Petitioner for reading a book about musical instruments. Mr. Nobles warned Petitioner not to let personal projects take priority over the park's appearance and cleanliness. On February 25, 2003, Petitioner called his office to provide his employer with the date of his second neck surgery, which was scheduled for March 5, 2003. During the telephone call, Petitioner asserted that he required further surgery due to his work-related injury. However, Petitioner never filed a workers' compensation claim; he believed that he was not eligible for workers' compensation due to a preexisting condition. After Petitioner's March 2003 surgery, Respondent returned to work. In a letter dated April 10, 2003, Petitioner's doctor released him to work running a museum. On or about May 7, 2003, Petitioner's doctor released him to light- duty work assignments, including no more than one hour of lawn maintenance at a time. In a letter dated July 29, 2003, Mr. Nobles' doctor once again restricted Petitioner's work assignments. Petitioner was not supposed to use heavy machinery or operate mowers, edgers, or similar equipment for prolonged periods of time. The doctor recommended that Petitioner avoid repetitive gripping and lifting. There is no evidence that Respondent failed to provide Petitioner with these accommodations. In the meantime, on July 23, 2003, Mr. Nobles requested Respondent's Inspector General to investigate a posting on the eBay Internet site involving a replica of a 1800s guitar, advertised as being made of wood from the Gregory House, a part of Torreya State Park in Gadsden County, Florida. The Inspector General subsequently commenced an investigation. Petitioner posted the advertisement for the guitar under his eBay site name. Petitioner makes replica mandolins and guitars and occasionally sells them on eBay. Petitioner bragged to at least one co-worker in 2003 that he had made a lot of money selling musical instruments on eBay. One of Petitioner's friends made the "Gregory House" guitar out of discarded roof shingles. Petitioner merely posted the advertisement on his internet site because his friend did not know how to use a computer. During the Inspector General's investigation, Petitioner admitted that he had accessed eBay at work but denied he had used it for bidding. An inspection of the hard drive of the computer at Petitioner's office revealed that someone using Petitioner's eBay password had accessed eBay four times from April-July 2003. Around the general time and date of one of those occasions, someone placed an eBay bid on the "Gregory House" guitar. Additionally, the computer at Petitioner's office had been used to access numerous musical instrument and/or woodworking Internet sites other times from April-July 2003. Petitioner was at work on most, but not all, of the days. A park volunteer admitted that she sometimes used the office computer to access eBay. Respondent's policy prohibits an employee from accessing the Internet for personal use if that use adversely affects the employee's ability to perform his job. Personal use of the Internet should be "limited to the greatest extent possible." Petitioner was aware of Respondent's Internet policy. Nevertheless, he used the Internet for personal reasons at work to access eBay and sites related to his woodworking business after he had been counseled not to let personal projects interfere with his park duties. This caused him to not be available to do park business and, therefore, adversely affected his ability to do his job. Petitioner violated Respondent's Internet use policy. Respondent terminated Petitioner's employment on September 25, 2003, for alleged rule violations, conduct unbecoming a public employee, and perjury. Petitioner appealed to the Florida Public Employees Relations Commission (PERC), contending that Respondent lacked cause to discipline him. PERC appointed a Hearing Officer to conduct a hearing and issue a Recommended Order. The PERC Hearing Officer conducted a public hearing on October 28, 2003. The Hearing Officer issued the Recommended Order on November 10, 2003. In the instant case, the parties stipulated that they would not re-litigate issues previously litigated at the PERC hearing. The PERC Hearing Officer found as follows: (a) Respondent had cause to discipline Petitioner for violating the computer use policy; and (b) Respondent had discretion to discipline Petitioner by terminating his employment. On November 24, 2003, PERC entered a Final Order adopting the Hearing Officer's Recommended Order. The greater weight of the evidence indicates that Respondent did not allow employees, other than Petitioner, to read books unrelated to work during office hours. In fact, Respondent did not terminate Petitioner for any of the following reasons: (a) because he read history books at work; (b) because he might file a workers' compensation claim for a work-related injury; (c) because he filed a gender discrimination against Mr. Nobles; or (d) because Respondent intended to eliminate his position. Rather, Respondent dismissed Petitioner for using the office computer for personal reasons. Respondent has fired other employees for the same reason. At the time of his dismissal, Petitioner believed that he was physically incapable of performing the duties of his position. However, there is no evidence that Respondent failed to provide Petitioner with appropriate accommodations as requested by Petitioner's doctors.
Recommendation Based on the forgoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That FCHR enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 28th day of March, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S SUZANNE F. HOOD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of March, 2005. COPIES FURNISHED: Allen Gerrell, Jr. 10750 Kilcrease way Tallahassee, Florida 32305 Marshall G. Wiseheart, Esquire Department of Environmental Protection 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard Mail Station 35 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3000 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3000
The Issue Whether Respondent terminated Petitioner from her employment based on perceived handicap discrimination.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner was hired by Respondent on March 5, 1991, to work as a server at Respondent's restaurant, Bon Appetit. Shortly thereafter, on or about April 8, 1991, Petitioner was promoted to restaurant manager. During her tenure as restaurant manager, Petitioner was counselled about her appearance and personal hygiene. Additionally, Petitioner had problems with Respondent's performance including balancing the cash and credit card receipts collected during her shifts. Respondent required its managers to notify Respondent in advance of any absence due to a medical condition where possible. In all cases; however, managers were required to communicate with Respondent concerning their absence so that Respondent could schedule and plan for a manager's absence to avoid any disruption in its business and the scheduling of other employees. During her employment as restaurant manager, Petitioner was diagnosed as having "hammer toes". Petitioner was out of work for three weeks to have this condition surgically corrected. This absence was approved in advance by Respondent and Petitioner received full compensation for that medical leave. Following the scheduled three week absence for the surgery, there was an additional two to three week period during which Petitioner reported for work late or would leave early. Respondent considered those late arrivals and early departures to be unexcused absences. Following foot surgery, Petitioner returned to her position as manager with the same pay. Subsequently, during May 1992, Petitioner was out of work for surgery to have an ovarian cyst removed. This absence was approved by Respondent and Petitioner was out of work for five days. During this period of medical leave, Petitioner received her pay and returned to work following surgery. Following the cyst surgery, Petitioner complained of lower back pain which her gynecologist attributed to swelling from the cyst surgery. On May 30, 1992, Petitioner went to the emergency room at Morton Plant Hospital in Tampa suffering from lower back pain. Petitioner contacted restaurant manager, Leo Enciso, and told him of her visit to the hospital and "not to count on her reporting for work that day". Petitioner also informed Enciso that she would call as soon as she had been examined to give an update on her status. Subsequent to her initial phone call to Enciso on May 30, 1992, Petitioner did not speak with Enciso nor did he receive any messages from Petitioner concerning her status from May 30, 1992 to June 8, 1992. Following her treatment in the emergency room at Morton Plant, Petitioner sought treatment on that same date, May 30, 1992 from chiropractor Dr. Lynn Colucci. At that time, Petitioner knew she would be out of work until at least one more day. Petitioner did not communicate that information to Respondent or any of its management personnel. Petitioner's next consultation with her chiropractor to evaluate her condition was June 1, 1992. Following that session, Petitioner was advised that she would be out of work for at least two more days. Petitioner did not communicate this information to Respondent or any of its management staff. Petitioner again met with her chiropractor on June 3, 1992 and was told that she would be unable to return to work until June 8, 1992. Petitioner failed to communicate this information to any of Respondent's management or staff. Kailie Borzoni, Peter Kreuziger and Sharon Verhage, all managerial employees of Respondent, made several unsuccessful attempts to contact Petitioner by phone. Verhage left a message on Petitioner's answering machine but Petitioner did not return her phone call. Petitioner was released to return to work by her treating chiropractor on June 9, 1992. There were no restrictions placed on her when she was released for work and her physician related that Petitioner's back problem had "resolved itself". Petitioner was discharged by Respondent on June 9, 1992, when she reported for work. Peter Krueziger made an independent decision to discharge Petitioner based on what he considered to be poor performance, poor appearance, excessive absences and failing to truthfully advise of her work status and whereabouts from May 30, 1992 to June 8, 1992. When Petitioner was initially employed as a restaurant manager, Respondent's manager, Krueziger, noticed that Petitioner's dress apparel did not meet up to the standards of a "four star" restaurant that Respondent was operating. As a result, Respondent spoke with Petitioner about his expectations with regard to her dress and advised the controller to advance Petitioner some funds to purchase a wardrobe. Respondent sent one of its managerial employees to accompany Petitioner on a shopping trip to upgrade her wardrobe to reflect what Respondent considered to be appropriate dress for a restaurant manager. Respondent's managerial staff noted and complained to Petitioner on several occasions after she was given a new wardrobe, that her attire did not measure up to the standards that they expected of a manager. Negative comments were made about Respondent's stained clothing, her fingernails and her unkempt hair. Petitioner conceded that she had an exceptionally hard time balancing her cash and credit card accounts at the end of each shift. While some managers experience difficulty at the outset of their employment because an antiquated accounting system was being used, they soon became proficient in closing out the cash and credit card accounts following their shift. Respondent discharged Petitioner based on her failure to properly notify it of her absence from work during the period May 30, 1992 through June 8, 1992. Petitioner's medical condition, real or perceived, played no part in Respondent's decision to terminate her.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that: The Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing Petitioner's petition for relief as she failed to establish that she was terminated from employment because of a perceived handicap. DONE AND ENTERED this 6th day of December, 1994, in Tallahassee, Florida. JAMES E. BRADWELL Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of December, 1994. APPENDIX Rulings on Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact Paragraph 3 adopted as modified, paragraph 2 recommended order. Paragraph 4 rejected, contrary to the greater weight of evidence, paragraph 5 recommended order. Paragraph 5, adopted as modified, paragraph 4 recommended order. Paragraph 7, adopted as modified, paragraphs 9 and 10 recommended order. Paragraph 8 rejected, irrelevant. Paragraphs 9 and 10 rejected, contrary to the greater weight of evidence, paragraph 15 recommended order. Paragraphs 11-16 rejected, contrary to the greater weight of evidence. Paragraph 17 rejected, irrelevant and unnecessary. Paragraphs 18 and 19 rejected, conclusionary. COPIES FURNISHED: C. A. Sullivan, Esquire 311 S. Missouri Avenue Clearwater, FL 34616 Charles A. Powell, IV, Esquire Peter W. Zinober, Esquire Zinober and McCrea, P.A. 201 E. Kennedy Blvd., Ste. 1750 Tampa, FL 33602 Sharon Moultry, Clerk Commission on Human Relations Building F, Suite 240 325 John Knox Road Tallahassee, FL 32399-1570 Dana Baird, General Counsel Commission on Human Relations Building F, Suite 240 325 John Knox Road Tallahassee, FL 32399-1570
The Issue The issue is whether the Petition for Relief should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction because Respondent was not Petitioner’s employer.
Findings Of Fact The complaint alleged that Petitioner was the victim of employment discrimination based upon her race. The employers identified in the complaint were Respondent and Civigenics/Community Education Centers (Civigenics). The determination issued by FCHR with respect to Respondent stated in pertinent part:1/ The Commission lacks jurisdiction over the Complaint of Discrimination because the Respondent is not the Complainant’s employer. The investigation revealed that Civigenics/Community Education Center, not Respondent, is the proper Respondent in this case. The petition does not allege that Respondent was Petitioner’s employer. Rather, the petition “give[s] acknowledgement to the determination [of] no jurisdiction” and then focuses on the merits of Petitioner’s discrimination complaint. Respondent argues in its motion to dismiss that “Petitioner acknowledges and therefore, concedes the validity of FCHR’s no jurisdiction determination in her request for relief.” The Order to Show Cause entered on October 10, 2008, stated in pertinent part: The petition does not appear to raise any disputed issues of fact as to whether DOC was Petitioner’s employer. That is the only issue properly before the undersigned in this case based upon the “no jurisdiction” determination issued by the Florida Commission on Human Relations (FCHR). Petitioner is entitled to a de novo hearing on the issue of whether DOC was her employer. If it is determined that DOC was her employer, then the case will be returned to FCHR with a recommendation that it investigate the merits of Petitioner’s discrimination complaint against DOC. [Endnote omitted]. If it is determined that DOC was not Petitioner’s employer, then the case will be returned to FCHR with a recommendation that the petition be dismissed based upon a lack of jurisdiction. That said, Petitioner is only entitled to a formal administrative hearing at the Division of Administrative Hearings (DOAH) if there are disputed issues of fact as to whether DOC was Petitioner’s employer. If there are no disputed issues of fact, then DOAH must relinquish jurisdiction back to FCHR. See § 120.57(1)(i), Fla. Stat. As stated above, the petition does not appear to raise any disputed issues of fact on this issue; rather, it “give[s] acknowledgement to the determination of no jurisdiction” and then focuses on the merits of the discrimination complaint. The Order to Show Cause directed Petitioner to: show cause in writing as to why DOC’s Motion to Dismiss should not be granted and/or Petitioner shall file an amended petition that identifies the factual basis upon which Petitioner contends that DOC was her employer. The Order advised Petitioner that: Failure to respond to this Order and/or failure to identify any disputed issues of fact as to whether DOC was Petitioner’s employer will result in a Recommended Order of Dismissal or an Order closing DOAH’s file and relinquishing jurisdiction to FCHR. Petitioner’s response to the Order to Show Cause stated in pertinent part: This is response to the Order to Show Cause, Case #08-4878. I am submitting in response to this order the attachments of a notice of hearing to be held in this case at the Board of County Commissioners, Community Treasures [sic] Room, First Floor, County Administration Building, 12 Southeast First Street, on December 1, 2008, at 1:00 p.m., Gainesville, FL. I am also submitting a copy of the Order of Pre Hearing Instructions. All information as required will be provided at the times ordered. The response does not allege any facts that might establish that Respondent was Petitioner’s employer. The pleadings do not raise any disputed issues of material fact concerning whether Respondent was Petitioner’s employer.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, Respondent’s motion to dismiss is granted, the final hearing scheduled for December 1, 2008, is cancelled, and it is RECOMMENDED that FCHR issue a final order dismissing the petition with prejudice. DONE AND ENTERED this 30th day of October, 2008, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S T. KENT WETHERELL, II Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of October, 2008.
Findings Of Fact Vince Campbell was employed as a corrections officer for the Alachua County Department of Criminal Justice Services from 1985 until his termination on August 8, 1991. Numerous incidents led up to his termination. During 1985-1987, Campbell had repeated problems with tardiness and absenteeism, for which he received numerous disciplinary actions including warnings and suspension at no pay. On August 2, 1989, Campbell was arrested by the Alachua Police Department for multiple charges including resisting arrest with and without violence. Campbell was observed running two stop signs. When he was stopped, he became agitated and refused to give his name or driver's license. He resisted arrest and struggled with the officers. One officer was injured. At the police station, Campbell continued to struggle and kicked an officer in the stomach. Throughout this time, Campbell was exhibiting vast mood swings and was alternating among belligerence, laughing, crying, and making irrational threats, such as telling the officers that they would have to kill him before he would let himself be taken to the jail in which he worked. After Campbell was released, he was advised that he could return to work pending resolution of the criminal charges. Nevertheless, Campbell failed to appear for work on August 3 or 4, 1989, and did not call in to advise that he would not be at work. He received a warning for his failure to come to work or call in. On April 23, 1990, Campbell instigated an incident at work which involved his verbal abuse, pounding on a window, cursing and yelling at coworkers and finally publicly giving the finger and saying "fuck you" to a coworker. He received another warning for that incident. Campbell received another warning and letter of reprimand on May 14, 1990, for an incident where his negligence allowed an inmate to receive money belonging to another inmate. On May 5, 1990, Campbell was again arrested for resisting arrest, battery on a law enforcement officer and breach of the peace. This arrest occurred in Union County even though Campbell was on probation for the first criminal offenses and was not allowed to leave Alachua County without permission of his probation officer. The Union County arrest involved an altercation which occurred at a hospital after Campbell had taken his brother there for treatment of injuries received in a melee at a local bar and dance hall. Campbell was cursing and yelling at the nurses. The Union County Sheriff, Jerry Whitehead, went to the scene and Campbell screamed and swore at the sheriff. When he was told to leave the hospital, he refused and he was placed under arrest. He resisted arrest and fought with Sheriff Whitehead and a deputy, causing injuries to the sheriff. As a result of that incident, Campbell was suspended with pay until May 25, 1990, at which time he was suspended without pay pending resolution of the charges. Sentencing occurred on July 8, 1991, and Campbell met with his superiors on July 11, 1991. Major Garrahan, Chief of Security, proposed termination on July 17, 1991, and held a pre-termination hearing on July 29, 1991. As a result of Garrahan's recommendation and having reviewed all the relevant information, the Department Director, Walter P. Byrd, terminated Campbell on August 8, 1991. In addition to the incidents described above, Byrd also had information regarding other events involving Campbell. On one occasion, Campbell was at the firing range for routine in-service firearms instruction. While on the line with his firearms, he was displaying severe mood swings, including alternately laughing hysterically and crying and becoming angry when one of the instructor cautioned him about safety on the firing line. All firing had to be delayed while Campbell regained his composure. He had to lay his shotgun on the ground to wipe tears from his eyes. On another occasion at the firing range, Campbell requested to speak with "Melda," a fellow officer. He was anxious, nervous, and crying. He told Melda that he was seeing officers hiding in the woods around his house and that they were after him. Campbell was referred to Employee Assistance for a review of his mental state and stability. Byrd was also advised that Campbell's driver's license had been suspended on two occasions because of failure to pay traffic fines, but Campbell had not advised his employer that his license was suspended. Possession of a valid driver's license is one job requirement for a correctional officer. Byrd considered the arrests and convictions, Garrahan's recommendation, the in-house incidents, Campbell's emotional stability and the danger to Campbell's safety and that of inmates. He was very concerned that the County may be exposed to liability for Campbell's actions and apparent volatility and uncontrolled outbursts, if Campbell remained employed by the department. Byrd did not believe that Campbell was fit for continued employment because he was not emotionally stable. Byrd is black, as is Campbell. At no time was race a consideration in Campbell's termination. Campbell alleges that two white male employees were reinstated with back pay despite similar criminal charges. However, Campbell presented no evidence to support these allegations. One of the others resigned rather than be terminated and the other was not shown to have had similar charges or to have been reemployed by the department.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a Final Order dismissing the Petition for Relief filed by Vince Campbell. DONE and ENTERED this 4th day of November, 1992, in Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE K. KIESLING Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of November, 1992. COPIES FURNISHED: Robert M. Ott Litigation Attorney Office of Alachua County Attorney Post Office Box 2877 Gainesville, FL 32602-2877 Vince Campbell Post Office Box 964 Alachua, FL 32615 Margaret Jones, Clerk Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Suite 240, Building F Tallahassee, FL 32303-4149 Dana Baird, General Counsel Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Suite 240, Building F Tallahassee, FL 32303-4149
