Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to the allegations concerned herein, Respondent, William M. Floyd has been certified as a corrections officer in Florida under certificate number C- 7585, dated May 23, 1980. He had been certified prior to that time under another Commission procedure. The Commission is the state agency responsible for certifying law enforcement and corrections officers in Florida. Throughout the majority of the year 1986, Respondent was employed as a corrections officer at the Department of Corrections' Tampa Corrections Work Release Center. When he was arrested for grand theft during 1986, he advised his boss that he intended to plead not guilty. Because of his prior eight years of good work and based on his representations, he was not discharged and was allowed to keep his employment. Approximately six months later, Respondent was hospitalized for what his doctors thought was cancer of the spine. While he was in the hospital, his attorneys convinced him that due to his poor health, it would be to his advantage to plead nolo contendere and avoid the stress of a trial and thereafter negotiated an arrangement with the state attorney that in exchange for the plea of nolo contendere, adjudication of guilt would be withheld and Respondent would be placed on two years probation. Respondent entered that plea in open court on November 10, 1986 in the Circuit Court of Hillsborough County and was placed on two years probation. He was promised that at the successful completion of his term of probation, his record would be sealed from the public but not from law enforcement officials. Respondent is looking forward to that happening. After his court appearance, Respondent resigned from his position as a corrections officer with the Department of Corrections, he claims, due to his poor health. On December 4, 1986, the Department of Corrections advised the Petitioner, Commission, however, that Respondent had resigned his position due to the fact that he was placed on two years probation for grand theft. The documentation in question was not presented at the hearing, however, but the basis for Respondent's resignation is irrelevant. The seminal issue here is Respondent's plea of nolo contendere to a felony and of that there is no question. Respondent is not now employed as a corrections officer or in any law enforcement capacity. As a result, he does not need his certification. However, because of the nature of the charges against him, and what he believes is a lack of culpability on his part, (not further explained); and because he may some day again want to work as a corrections officer, he wants to keep his certification.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, therefore: RECOMMENDED that the certification of Respondent, WILLIAM M. FLOYD, as a corrections officer be revoked. RECOMMENDED this 23rd day of January, 1989 at Tallahassee, Florida. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of January, 1989. COPIES FURNISHED: Joseph S. White, Esquire Assistant General Counsel Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 William M. Floyd Post Office Box 1084 Gibsonton, Florida 33534 Jeffrey Long, Director Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Daryl McLaughlin, Executive Director Florida Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302
Findings Of Fact Douglas L. Adams is an inmate at Union Correctional Institution. On August 26, 1985, he was awakened early in the morning and brought before a disciplinary hearing for an alleged violation of institutional rules and regulations. Prior to the hearing, he was advised by a correctional officer to pack up all his personal property and to bring it with him to the hearing. Mr. Adams took with him as much as he could which included his clothing and other personal effects, but he was unable to carry all he owned with him at one time. He did not ask for either help in carrying his property or a cart to carry it in prior to leaving his cell area to go to the hearing. When he arrived at the movement center where the hearing was to be held, he advised the authorities there that he did not have all his property with him. At that point, he asked for help or the use of a cart to go get the rest of his property but he was refused because no cart was there. As a result, he went to the hearing leaving some of his property in his cell area and while in the hearing, contends he was required to leave his property in the control center. This property was secured in a storage room behind the control center which, while not locked, was not available for access to other inmates unless they were accompanied by a corrections officer. When the hearing was over and Mr. Adams, who had been directed to administrative confinement requested to go back to his former cell area to get the rest of his property, his request was refused. His property was inventoried by UCI personnel at that time, but because in his opinion the inventory was not complete, Mr. Adams refused to sign the form. When he was released from administrative confinement he claims he did not get all his property back. He relates that he was told he had forfeited whatever property he had not brought to the hearing. As a result, he filed a complaint on September 16, 1985, which was subsequently denied. Petitioner has been incarcerated in 7 or 8 institutions within the Department of Corrections including Florida State Prison, River Junction Correctional Institution, Baker Correctional Institution, Polk Correctional Institution, Old Unit, the Reception and Medical Center, and DeSoto Correctional Institution. At each one of these institutions a rule similar to this one was in existence. At Baker Correctional Institution, the inmate was required to bring his mattress as well. Robert Craig has been in prison for a total of 27 years and has been incarcerated in almost every major penal institution in the State of Florida that was built prior to the last five years. At Avon Park Correctional Institution he underwent a disciplinary hearing and was told at the time to bring all his personal property with him to the hearing. While in the hearing, he was required to leave all his property outside in the hall. At Cross City Correctional Institution the guards took him to the hearing without his property, bringing his property along afterwards. In essence, at all the institutions where he was incarcerated, there was some variation of the same procedure regarding his personal property. He either had to bring it to the hearing or it was packed up prior to the hearing. At no institution was his property inventoried prior to the hearing. As a result, he has lost personal property including a calculator for which he was subsequently reimbursed by the institution. According to Mr. Craig, if the inmate does not bring his personal property with him he either is given a deficiency report or is precluded from going back to get it when the hearing is over. Sgt. Denmark has worked for approximately 8 1/2 years with the Department of Corrections, all at UCI, where he formerly worked at the movement center. One of the functions he performed there was to handle prisoners coming for a disciplinary hearing. The rule as explained to him regarding the inmates' personal property is that the inmate is required to bring all of it with him to the hearing. Once the property is brought with the inmate to the hearing, the inmate is free to either take it into the hearing with him or to leave it in the storage room in back of the movement center during the hearing. If the inmate is sentenced to disciplinary confinement as a result of the hearing, in that case, and at that point, the inmate's property is inventoried. If the inmate is not sentenced to disciplinary confinement, the property is returned to the prisoner who is returned to his area. In the instant case, Mr. Denmark heard the Petitioner tell Sgt. Howe, when he arrived at the movement center, that he had left some of his property in his cell. However, when Adams went into his hearing, he neither took his property with him nor requested that it be secured. According to Mr. Cunningham, the Chief Classification Supervisor, the Union Correctional Institution Policy, (85-52.9 B1) requires inmates to bring all their property to disciplinary hearings. It is an old policy, and the reason for it is to protect the property from theft. In a disciplinary hearing, there is a chance that an inmate might not get back to his old cell to retrieve his property after the hearing. For security reasons, institution officials prefer not to take a prisoner back to his old cell after a hearing because, at that point, he is often angry as a result of the hearing and disruptive. All Department of Corrections' institutions in the region incorporating UCI, except Florida State Prison, have a similar policy. Inquiry of corrections personnel at the agency headquarters in Tallahassee reveals that most major DOC facilities have a similar policy. There are a total of 33 other facilities which hold less than 100 inmates each. These smaller institutions do not, generally, have a similar policy and Florida State Prison has a different situation because of the different security problems. It is the needs of the institution, however, which determine the use of the policy. Mr. Cunnningham is aware of Mr. Adams' hearing and the complaint filed as a result thereof. Upon inquiry it was determined that Mr. Adams had failed to establish a loss and the complaint was denied. Mr. Cunningham does not know whether there was an investigation into the loss of the property left in the cell. It is Mr. Cunningham's understanding that if the witness cannot carry all his property at one time, normally, if the inmate asks for permission to do so, he will be allowed to go back and get the balance before the hearing. This is not in the procedure approved by DOC, however, nor in the IOP at UCI. Corrections Officer Howe is also aware of the fact that Mr. Adams had a hearing on August 26, 1985. He, in fact, was called to the movement center to escort several prisoners, including Adams, to the confinement barracks after the hearings. A part of this duty involves inventorying the prisoners property. Howe told Adams to get his property and bring it in for inventory. At this point, after the hearing Adams said he did not have all his property with him and asked to be taken back to his old cell to get the rest. Howe declined to do this and explained the security reasons for his decision to Adams. He did advise Adams, however, that he would call down to Adams' old cell area and have his property packed which, in fact, he did. It is standard practice at UCI, according to Howe, that if an inmate has a large amount of property, he can request the use of a cart or wheelbarrow which is assigned to each housing area for carrying this excess property. This cart will be returned by a runner who can also help carry the excess. To his knowledge, inmates are not denied the use of these carts. Howe declined to return Adams to his old cell area after the hearing because, at the time, Adams was belligerent and unstable and presented a security risk in his opinion and also, because Adams had previously been advised to bring all his property with him and had failed to do this even though there was a way for him to accomplish it.
The Issue Whether a proposed amendment to Rule 33-7.008(7), Florida Administrative Code, constitutes an invalid exercise of delegated authority?
Findings Of Fact Standing. The Petitioners are inmates in the custody of the Respondent, the Department of Corrections. The Petitioners are subject to the rules of the Respondent, including the Challenged Rule. The Respondent stipulated that the Petitioners have standing to challenge the Challenged Rule. The Respondent. Section 944.09, Florida Statutes, requires that the Respondent, an agency of the State of Florida, adopt rules governing the administration of the correctional system in Florida. Among other things, Section 944.09, Florida Statutes, requires that rules be adopted by the Respondent governing all aspects of the operation of the prison system in Florida. The Challenged Rule implements Section 944.706(3), Florida Statutes, which provides: (3) The department shall advance the release date of a nonparole contract releasee by up to 30 days and shall forward to the Department of Labor and Employment Security a release assistance stipend of up to $200 for the purpose of motivating the releasee to participate in prerelease orientation, secure permanent employment, and secure permanent residence. The Department of Labor and Employment Security shall distribute the release assistance stipend to the releasee in accordance with the provisions of law and of the release contract. Violation of the terms of the contract may constitute grounds for the forfeiture of the release assistance stipend and the termination of the contract. Rule 33-7.008(7), Florida Administrative Code. Rule 33-7.008(7), Florida Administrative Code, currently provides: (7) Each facility is authorized to release a contract releasee up to 30 days prior to his sentence expiration date after the Bureau of Admission and Release has verified the expiration date as computed in accordance with instructions of the sentencing court and applicable statutes. The discharge certificate and any related documents must reflect the actual date of release. Parole releasees and inmates excluded in subsection (2) will not be eligible for a further reduction in their release date. The only modification to Rule 33-7.008(7), Florida Administrative Code, made by the Challenged Rule is to replace the terms "up to 30 days" with the terms "one day." The Transition Assistance Program. The program established by the Legislature in Section 944.706(3), Florida Statutes, is known as the Transition Assistance Program (hereinafter referred to as "TAP"). In creating the TAP, the Legislature has evidenced an intent to assist certain inmates in adjusting to their release back into the community. Indirectly, the TAP also creates an early release mechanism which has helped control inmate population. In the past the Respondent has relied on the TAP and Section 944.706(3), Florida Statutes, as a means of meeting required inmate population levels. The early release of inmates through TAP is conditioned upon their participation in the pre-release activities of the TAP, the payment of a $200.00 stipend to inmates to encourage their participation in the TAP and participate in post-release activities of the TAP. There is no requirement that inmates be released early contained in Section 944.706(3), Florida Statutes, unless an the inmate meets these conditions. Pre-release activities of the TAP includes analysis of inmates, a pre- release orientation program and paper work for referrals in the community for post-release activities. The pre-release orientation program lasts 40 hours. The $200.00 stipend is paid in part when an inmate is released, in part when the inmate reports to a community contact person and in part when the inmate returns to the community contact person. Post-release activities of the TAP included housing and employment referrals which were provided by the Florida Department of Labor and Employment Security and community-based organizations through a contract with the Respondent. Purpose For the Challenged Rule. In 1991, the Legislature did not appropriate any funds to the Respondent to carry on the TAP. No funds were authorized for the $200.00 stipend, to fund the contracts for post-release programs or to fund staff needed for the pre-release program. The Respondent, since the 1991-1992 fiscal year has only been able to provide a two-hour pre-release orientation video to inmates prior to their release. The Respondent has not been able to provide inmates with a $200.00 stipend or any post- release TAP activities. As a consequence of the Legislature's failure to fund the TAP, the Respondent has been unable to provide the means for inmates to meet the conditions for any significant early release required by Section 944.706(3), Florida Statutes. The Control Release Authority was created by Section 947.146, Florida Statutes, in 1989. The Primary purpose of the Control Release Authority is to implement a system of uniform criteria for determining the number and categories of inmates who must be released in order to maintain required prison populations. The need to rely on the TAP to maintain required prison populations was eliminated by the creation of the Control Release Authority. Based upon the inability to provide the TAP caused by loss of funding and in light of the creation the Control Release Authority, the Respondent decided to limit early release of inmates pursuant to Section 944.706(3), Florida Statutes, to one day. This decision was initially implemented by non- rule policy. This policy was declared invalid for failure to adopt the policy as a rule in accordance with Section 120.54, Florida Statutes, in a Final Order entered September 6, 1991, in Richard Charles Gaston v. Department of Corrections, DOAH Case Number 91- 3203R. The Respondent subsequently promulgated the Challenged Rule. Although it cost more to house an inmate than to release an inmate, the Respondent has no authority under Section 944.706(3), Florida Statutes, to simply release inmates early because it is cheaper. Early release pursuant to Section 944.706(3), Florida Statutes, is conditioned on participation in the TAP. If the Respondent is unable to provide the programs necessary for inmates to meet the conditions of Section 944.706(3), Florida Statutes, for early release, then the Respondent may not release inmates simply because it is cheaper than housing them. In light of the program that the Respondent is able to provide inmates (a two-hour orientation video), a one day early release is reasonable. Although the Respondent testified that any number of days could have been authorized by the Challenged Rule (up to a maximum of thirty), this testimony ignores the requirement of Section 944.706(3), Florida Statutes, that early release is conditioned on inmates receiving the programs contemplated. The testimony was merely an indication that the Respondent could select any number of days for early release from a practical- logistical basis. It does not appear, however, that such authority is granted the Respondent by Section 944.706(3), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact After surgery on his shoulder, petitioner found it painful to lift sacks of fertilizer and the like at the nursery where he was employed, so he left his job and sought help at respondent's Orlando office. Albert Michael Tester, a counselor in respondent's employ, caused petitioner's shoulder to be evaluated by a physician and arranged for vocational testing. Presented with various vocational options, petitioner chose a two year paralegal training program at Valencia Community College. Beginning April 26, 1977, respondent paid for petitioner's books and tuition and paid petitioner $10.00 weekly toward transportation expenses incurred in getting to and from school. Petitioner's counselor also found a job for petitioner, as a child care worker at the Orange Regional Juvenile Detention Center. Petitioner testified that the $10.00 weekly transportation "maintenance" he had been receiving ceased when he began work. Petitioner held down the job and did well in school until he left both in January of 1978. Petitioner had consulted two physicians before he left off working and quit school in January of 1978. Petitioner testified that one, Dr. Samano, told him he should cut something out; but that the other, Dr., Tew, told him he need not cut out anything. At the time of the hearing, petitioner had not been employed since January 23, 1978. After dropping out of the paralegal program, petitioner suggested to his counselor that respondent set him up in a woodworking shop as a means of vocational rehabilitation. Mr. Tester advised petitioner that, in all likelihood, this request would not be granted. In mid-February, petitioner and a legal services representative met with Charles May, Mr. Tester and other employees of respondent. When informed that the rules did not seem to authorize setting petitioner up in business, petitioner's representative asked that a final determination be postponed pending a medical evaluation of petitioner. Respondent agreed to order a series of diagnostic tests to evaluate petitioner's psychiatric condition and to access the effects of petitioner's essential hypertension. Respondent had been advised as early as August of 1977, that petitioner's shoulder "should not be disabling to any degree or restrict him from activity of choice." Respondent's exhibit No. 7. Petitioner's counselor arranged for petitioner to receive four weeks' "diagnostic maintenance" and suggested he use his spare time to gather information about establishing a woodworking business. By letter dated May 8, 1978, respondent formally notified petitioner that it was "unable to meet [his] request to assist [him] in self- employment." Respondent's exhibit No. 5. On or about June 16, 1978, respondent sponsored petitioner in the photography program in which he was involved at the time of the hearing. This sponsorship has included maintenance payments. At no time before filing the petition in the present case did petitioner request any maintenance benefits. Respondent's "Rehabilitation Services Manual" provides: "Maintenance may only be provided when supportive of other vocational rehabilitation services." Respondent's exhibit No. 9. Respondent's "Vocational Rehabilitation Counselor Manual" provides: "Maintenance will be provided a client only if it is necessary for him to derive full benefits from other services being provided." Respondent's exhibit No. 8. Neither manual has been promulgated as a rule.
Recommendation Upon consideration of the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That respondent deny petitioner's request for back maintenance payments. DONE and ENTERED this 27th day of March, 1979, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT T. BENTON, II Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: William R. Barker, Esquire 128 West Central Boulevard Orlando, Florida 32802 Douglas E. Whitney, Esquire Room 912, 400 West Robinson Orlando, Florida 32801
Findings Of Fact Jules Montouri is a retarded adult. Rahya Montouri is his mother. Prior to March, 1980, Jules Montouri resided at a facility maintained by the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services in Gainesville, Florida. Jules Montouri's mental capacity is retarded to an extent that he will never be able to completely care for himself and meet his own needs. He can, however, with proper training become capable of living a somewhat normal life with minimal supervision. Since March, 1980, Jules Montouri has resided at "Hillcrest House." Hillcrest House is an adult group residential facility maintained by the Provider, Sheltered Community Residence, Inc. The Provider is under contract with the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services to provide a residential educational setting for retarded adult males. The concept of the program offered by the Provider is to move clients out of heavily restricted institutional environments into less restrictive ones. The program is designed to train clients to meet as many of their own needs as they can, and to gradually move them into less and less restrictive living situations. The Provider has sought to teach Jules Montouri to live in harmony in a minimally supervised environment, and to do his own cleaning and cooking. The Provider's goal with respect to Jules Montouri would be to move him into an apartment-type living facility with several other retarded adult males with a minimal degree of supervision. The Provider's program is an appropriate one for Jules Montouri. Except for problems that have developed between the Provider and Rahya Montouri, the program offered by the Provider would have a reasonable prospect of successfully training Jules Montouri to live in a substantially independent manner. Rahya Montouri disagrees with the goal of the Provider's program to steer Jules Montouri toward a level of substantial independence. She has objected to programs designed to train Jules Montouri for marginal employment, and to programs designed to teach him how to cook for himself. While Rahya Montouri maintains that she wants her son to remain as a resident in the Hillcrest House facility, she has found very little but fault with the program. Since Jules Montouri has been a client of the Provider, Rahya Montouri has complained on a constant basis about virtually every aspect of the Provider's program. She visits her son often at the facility, and has complained verbally to staff members on virtually every visit. She has made many complaints through telephone conversations with members of the staff. She has written numerous letters to complain about the facility, the program, other clients, and the staff. For example, she has expressed suspicion that her son has engaged in homosexual conduct and has implied that members of the staff may have been involved. These suspicions and accusations appear to have been based upon no evidence whatever. Mrs. Montouri's antagonistic attitude toward the Provider's program has become disruptive to the program. The Provider's staff at the Hillcrest facility has spent from five to ten hours per week since Jules Montouri has been a client dealing with complaints from Mrs. Montouri. On at least two occasions, Mrs. Montouri has violated the rights of other clients at the facility by going through their belongings looking for items that she asserted had been taken from her son. Mrs. Montouri's antagonism toward the program has affected the ability of Jules Montouri to participate in it. Jules is caught in the unfortunate cross fire between the program and his mother. As can be expected, it has confused him considerably. Recently, he has told several of the Provider's staff members and social workers from the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services that he wishes to leave the program. Mrs. Montouri has complained to the Human Rights Advocacy Committee for Retardation. This committee is a group of volunteers who serve to investigate potential emotional, psychological, or sexual abuse of clients. Mrs. Montouri's complaints have resulted in investigations by the Human Rights Advocacy Committee of the Provider's program. The investigations have not revealed any instances of actual abuse. The investigations have, however, had a demoralizing effect upon the staff of the Provider's program, and could seriously damage the program's reputation. Mrs. Montouri's antagonistic attitude toward the Provider's program has become abusive. The time that the Provider's staff has had to devote to her complaints is unjustified. Her antagonistic attitude has rendered it difficult for her son to progress in the program. Her complaints have demoralized the program's staff and could eventually injure the program's reputation. While the program offered by the Provider is an appropriate one for Jules Montouri and could serve to prepare him to live the most normal life possible for him, it is not practical that he continue in the program.
The Issue Whether Respondent's proposed decision to award a contract to The Next Step Adolescent and Youth Community Center, Inc., pursuant to RFP No. K8025 is contrary to Respondent's governing statutes, rules, or policies or the proposal specifications.
Findings Of Fact On April 27, 1999, Respondent, Department of Juvenile Justice (Department), issued and advertised RFP No. K8025, which was a request for proposals (RFP) for a 16-bed, non-secure detention program. Petitioner, Non-Secure Detention Home, Inc. (Non-Secure Detention Home) and The Next Step Adolescent and Youth Community Center, Inc. (Next Step) submitted proposals. Another provider submitted a proposal but it was rejected as nonresponsive and was not evaluated. On June 1, 1999, the Department posted the tabulations for the RFP, recommending the contract be awarded to Next Step. Next Step received the highest number of points, 248.66, and Non-Secure Home Detention ranked second with 209.33 points. Non-Secure Detention Home filed a protest on June 3, 1999, and an Amended Notice of Protest on July 1, 1999. There were three evaluation committee members: Anna Bustamante, Kenneth Williams, and Allen Hepburn. Mr. Williams is a community youth leader supervisor with the Department. Mr. Hepburn is a juvenile probation officer supervisor, who supervises the court unit for the Department. The RFP provides that the program is to be operated at a provider-leased or owned facility. Next Step indicated in its proposal that Next Step would be leasing two homes. One of the homes was to be leased from Reginald Rucker, who was the president and a member of the Board of Directors for Next Step. A copy of the lease was included with the proposal and stated that Reginald Rucker and his wife, Charlene Rucker, were to be the landlords. There was no indication in Next Step's proposal that the facility was owned by anyone other than Reginald and Charlene Rucker. The property is described as "Lot 9, in Block 125 of Leslie Estates Section Fourteen, According to the Plat thereof, as Recorded in Plat Book 116, at Page 95 of the Public Records of Dade County." In May 1996 the property was sold by the Veteran's Administration to Reginal Rucker, Charlene Rucker, and Connie White. Connie White is an employee of the Department, and a former employee at Non-Secure Detention Home. Ms. White's job duties do not include determining the facilities in which juveniles will be placed. For a two-week period, Kenneth Williams supervised Ms. White. At the time that the proposals were being evaluated, Mr. Williams was not supervising Ms. White nor was he aware that Ms. White had any interest in the property proposed to be leased by Next Step. Allen Hepburn knows Connie White. He also knows Connie White's sister, Gladine White, both socially and professionally. Mr. Hepburn is acquainted with Gladine White's husband. Mr. Hepburn attends the same church as Connie White and Gladine White. He does not know either Reginald Rucker or his wife, Charlene Rucker. Mr. Hepburn was not aware that Connie White had any interest in the property which Next Step proposed to use if it received the contract. The RFP set out the proposal award criteria. The proposals were to be evaluated on the statement of work, organizational capability, management approach, and past performance. The evaluation areas were weighted with 65 percent for statement of work, 10 percent for organizational capability, 15 percent for management approach, and 10 percent for past performance. The percentage used in the evaluation of past performance was subdivided as follows: Historical Implementation 1% Educational achievements 5% Recidivism rates 2% QA evaluation 2% Community involvement 1% CMBE subcontracting 1% The RFP stated: Offers without prior Department contract experience shall receive a rating based on the average score of the other competing offers in evaluating their proposals in accordance with stated criteria. This provision of the RFP was not protested within the time frames provided in Section 120.57(3), Florida Statutes, and the RFP. Fifty points was the maximum number of points which could be awarded for past performance. The past performance evaluation consisted of five areas which could receive from zero to ten points. The evaluators were given a scale by which to award points. If the proposal did not address an area, zero points would be awarded. If the proposal response were deemed unsatisfactory, two points would be awarded. Four points would be awarded for a poor proposal response. An adequate proposal response would be worth six points. If the proposal was evaluated to be very good, it would receive eight points. An excellent proposal response would be awarded the maximum of ten points. For the past performance section, Non-Secure Detention Home garnered 12 points from Mr. Williams, 21 points from Ms. Bustamante, and 26 points from Mr. Hepburn for a total of 59 points. Next Step did not have previous experience with the Department. Evaluator Hepburn gave Next Step a total of two points for the past performance section. Ms. Bustamante awarded Next Step ten points for the past performance portion. Mr. Williams gave Next Step a total of six points for past performance. The RFP required that Next Step be given the average of the other competing proposals because Next Step did not have previous experience. Non-Secure Detention Home had the only other competing proposal for the solicitation. Eric Stark, a contract manager for the Department, attempted to apply the provision in the RFP by averaging the scores that each of the evaluators had given Non-Secure Detention Home for past performance and using that average in computing the total scores from each of the evaluators. The average score given to Non-Secure Detention Home was 19; thus a rating of 19 was applied in the evaluation of the past performance of Next Step in lieu of the original scores given by the evaluators. The RFP requires the following: The PROVIDER shall comply with the Department of Juvenile Justice, Office of the Inspector General's Statewide Procedure on Background Screening for Employees, PROVIDERS, and Volunteers. The PROVIDER agrees, to comply with the requirements for background screening as mandated in Section 985.01, Florida Statutes. Failure to comply with the Department's background screening procedure could result in cancellation of the contract. Reginald Rucker was a former employee of Non-Secure Detention Home. Mr. Xavier Moore, the Executive Director for Non-Secure Detention Home, made a request to the Department of Juvenile Justice to do a preliminary FCIC/NCIC and DHSMV screening check on Mr. Rucker. According to Mr. Moore the screening did not indicate a problem with Mr. Rucker being employed by Non-Secure Detention Home. Mr. Rucker was employed with Non-Secure Detention Home from 1997 until June 10, 1999. On October 4, 1995, an Order to Seal Records Pursuant to Section 943.058, Florida Statutes, and Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.692 was issued in the Circuit Court of the Ninth Judicial Circuit in and for Osceola County, Florida, sealing all records pertaining to Reginald Rucker's arrest on January 13, 1990, by the Florida Highway Patrol for cocaine and marijuana possession. The order stated that Mr. Rucker was not adjudicated guilty of charges stemming from the arrest. The RFP did not require the proposers to submit a financial statement or audit; however, the evaluators were asked to rate the proposals based on whether an acceptable financial statement or audit was included. Neither Next Step nor Non-Secure Detention Home submitted a financial statement or audit. Next Step received the following points for its non- existent financial statement: eight points from Mr. Hepburn; zero points from Mr. Williams; and zero points from Ms. Bustamante. For its nonexistent financial statement Non-Secure Detention Home received the following scores: six points from Mr. Hepburn; a N/A which equated to zero points from Mr. Williams; and six points from Ms. Bustamante.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered awarding the contract for a 16-bed, non-secure detention program to The Next Step Adolescent and Youth Community Center, Inc. and dismissing the protest of Non-Secure Detention Home, Inc. DONE AND ENTERED this 14th day of September, 1999, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. SUSAN B. KIRKLAND Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of September, 1999. COPIES FURNISHED: Walter S. Pesetsky, Esquire Pesetsky & Zack, P.A. 1367 Northeast 162nd Street North Miami Beach, Florida 33162 Scott C. Wright, Esquire Department of Juvenile Justice 2737 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3100 William G. "Bill" Bankhead, Secretary Department of Juvenile Justice 2737 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3100 Robert N. Sechen, General Counsel Department of Juvenile Justice 2737 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3100
Findings Of Fact Cirilo Alvarez, at all times pertinent to the allegations in the complaint, operated an adult congregate living facility in Lake City, Columbia County, Florida, Briar's Haven Adult Care Center, under license number 03-12- 0128-BPS, issued by the Florida Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services. In late July or early August, 1982, Respondent, who is a psychiatric nurse specialist and who works full time at North Florida State Mental Hospital (Hospital) at Macclenny, Florida, took Woodrow Harrison, an elderly patient at that institution, into his home, Briar's Haven Adult Care Center, on pass status from the Hospital for periodic short visits. Ultimately, on July 30, 1982, Harrison was released from Macclenny and began living full time at Respondent's facility. On August 3, 1982, Sharon Stucky, a registered nurse case manager for the North Florida Mental Health Center (Center) in Lake City, Florida, did an intake interview with Harrison, who had just been released from the Hospital and who was living at Respondent's facility. Mr. Harrison was brought into the Center by Respondent's wife. Records from the Hospital pertaining to Harrison, which came to the Center, reflected that he suffered from a seizure disorder and a diabetic condition. His medication consisted of 300 mg. of Dilantin daily and 30 mg. of phenobarbital daily, and he was to receive a daily insulin injection. At the time of his release from the Hospital, he was furnished with a thirty-day supply of these medications. On the afternoon of August 13, 1982, Mr. Alvarez went into the Center with Mr. Harrison and asked to see Ms. Stucky. Respondent indicated that Mr. Harrison was having many physical problems. Earlier in the day, he had taken Harrison back to Macclenny to have him readmitted for seizures, incontinence, etc., even though he was taking his medications, but officials at the Hospital refused to admit him. Mr. Alvarez wanted him admitted to some facility in Lake City. Stucky, indicating she would have to talk with Harrison before taking any action, did so and felt she could see no change in his condition since her first interview of him on August 3, and she decided she could not justify having him recommitted to the mental hospital. Since Stucky wanted to find out if the seizures were the result of a physical problem, and she could not do a physical herself, she requested that Respondent take Harrison to a doctor for an examination. The Respondent again demanded that Harrison be admitted and, when Ms. Stucky refused, stated he would take Harrison to the hospital and leave him. Ms. Stucky talked with her supervisor to see if there was any way that Harrison could be readmitted to Macclenny, and it was determined there was not. When the information was related to Mr. Alvarez, he departed with Mr. Harrison. Respondent then took Harrison to the emergency room at Lake City's Lake Shore Hospital. After a chart was prepared on Harrison, Alvarez departed, leaving Harrison there without his medications. When Alvarez first took Harrison in, he was told there would be an hour wait before Harrison could be seen. Alvarez asked if Harrison could sit there and wait, and the person on duty said, "Yes." Once that was arranged, Respondent left without Harrison. According to a report of the doctor on duty, Harrison was confused and incapable of giving a complaint or history. As a result, evaluation of him was difficult, and his well-being was compromised. Respondent subsequently made no effort to get Harrison's drugs to him by delivering them to Ms. Stuckv, nor did he inquire where Harrison was. Respondent's actions in dropping Mr. Harrison off at the Lake Shore Hospital unsupervised, and only calling to check on his status somewhat later, constitute an intentional abandonment which could have seriously affected Harrison's health, safety, and welfare. Somewhat later the same day, Respondent called Lake Shore Hospital to find out what Harrison's status was, but Harrison had already been placed in another adult care facility by Ms. Stucky when the hospital called her and told her of Harrison's situation. Respondent did not make any other calls. Ms. Stucky visited Harrison daily at this new facility and administered his insulin shot. He appeared to be doing well there and wanted to remain, but on August 17, 1982, he was readmitted to Macclenny, where he currently resides. Harrison is incapable of taking care of himself. He has a poor memory and is somewhat retarded and childlike, according to Stucky. He has no concept of time and could not administer his medicines to himself. He could not understand the need to take his medicine or remember to take it if he could. Since Mr. Harrison was dropped off at Lake Shore without either his medicines or a change of clothing, Stucky made several telephone calls to the Respondent to retrieve them. Mr. Alvarez was always out when she called, and Stucky talked with several different females who answered the phone and with whom she left messages requesting him to call her back. Alvarez did not return any of the calls, but he states he never received them. This is rossible since, he says, neither his mother nor his wife, two of the people at home who may have received the original calls from Stucky, speaks much English. Respondent provided Mr. Harrison with all the clothes he had except those he was wearing when he came from Macclenny. Upon the advice of individuals at Macclenny who he could not remember to identify, Respondent applied for Social Security benefits to support Harrison while he was at Respondent's facility. Because Harrison had no family, Respondent sought the counsel of the legal aid office in Lake City to see if he could be appointed Harrison's legal guardian and was told he could not. In late January or early February, 1983, Respondent received one Social Security check in the amount of $1,900 made out to Harrison and Mrs. Alvarez. This check was not cashed because Harrison was no longer with the Respondent, but was returned to the Social Security Office. Harrison's medicines that were in Respondent's possession when Harrison was taken to the hospital were discarded. Respondent worked with Harrison at Macclenny for about a year before taking him to his own facility. During that time to his knowledge, Harrison never had any seizures. Respondent gave him his medications at Macclenny and knew he needed drugs. When he took Harrison to his facility, he took Harrison's drugs as well.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Secretary of the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services enter a final order revoking the Adult Congregate Living Facility License of Cirilo Alvarez, doing business as Briar's Haven Adult Care Center. RECOMMENDED this 1st day of April, 1983 in Tallahassee, Florida. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of April, 1983. COPIES FURNISHED: James A. Sawyer, Jr., Esquire District III Legal Counsel Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 2002 NW 13th Street, 4th Floor Gainesville, Florida 32601 Mr. Cirilo Alvarez Post Office Box 2392 Lake City, Florida 32055 Mr. David H. Pingree Secretary Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32301
