Findings Of Fact Respondent, the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, is an agency of the State of Florida. On April 15, 1994, Respondent advertised an invitation to bid (ITB) on the interior painting for five county public health care facilities. (ITB #1240494) Petitioner received the bid package, including specifications, not later than May 9, 1994. Respondent received eight bids which were opened on May 13, 1994. Between May 13 and June 29, 1994, Respondent evaluated the eight bids to determine the lowest responsive bidder. Much of this time was spent in contacting references, which were numerous and many of which were not readily available. On June 29, 1994, Respondent mailed an intent to award the bid to Silcox and Strain (Silcox) as the lowest bidder. Its bids of $72,400 for option I, and $66,244, for option II, were approximately $20,000 higher than Petitioner's bids. Petitioner's bids were the lowest of the eight bidders. Petitioner issued an intent to protest on June 30, 1994, and a written formal protest on July 11, 1994. Respondent determined that Petitioner was not responsive to the specifications, specifically to the ITB, page 4, paragraph II A.2., which provides as follows: References Bidders will provide a minimum of three references where similar services have been provided. Bidder shall have at least three years experience in similar type projects in scope, cost and size. (Exhibit 1) As provided in the instructions to bidders, page 16, failure to provide references in accordance with this requirement would result in the bid being considered non-responsive. Petitioner's bid included three references: People's Gas Company, Mr. Barney Bonfiglio; Ramsberger Property Management, Mr. Jerry Ramsberger; and Vested Property Management, Mr. Jon Miller. Respondent checked all three references but did not make an effort to reach Barney Bonfiglio, as he had moved to a different office of People's Gas. All three references said that Petitioner had done fine or excellent work. Peoples Gas (Sue Richards) said that Petitioner had done primarily outside work: gas meters and tanks. Ramsberger Property Management (Mrs. Ramsberger) said that Petitioner had done exterior painting of condominiums. Vested Property Management (Jon Miller) said Petitioner had painted interiors and exteriors of condominiums. Jim Rourke has worked for the Hillsborough County Health Department (a department under Respondent) for twenty-seven years, and has been its facility manager for approximately thirteen years. He manages eleven health clinics in Hillsborough County, and his functions include the preparations of ITB's and contracts for millions of dollars of renovation projects. He prepared the specifications for the project at issue. He was looking for references that would indicate the bidders had painted a hospital, nursing home apartment complex, or similar interiors, and he was looking for past jobs that were close to or more than the dollar value of the project at issue. The specifications for ITB #1240494 make numerous references to interior painting. The title of the bid, on its face sheet, is "Interior Painting". In addition, the ITB makes clear that all of the clinics would remain open and operational during the painting, that the painting work would be done after hours and the clinic would require daily clean-up and removal of painting equipment. As required, Petitioner and the other bidders inspected each facility and knew, or should have known, that expensive medical equipment, furniture and computers would have to be carefully protected. Because of the nature of the facility, Rourke considered past evidence of interior painting essential. In his view, only one of Petitioner's references met that test: Vested Property Management. Silcox and Strain Renovations' bid included sixteen references, at least three of which provided what Jim Rourke was looking for. Only one other bidder, Fiemster-Peterson, Inc., met this requirement. This latter bidder provided approximately thirty references, but its bid was higher than that of Silcox and Strain. After the bid protest by Petitioner, Respondent checked Phoenix Painting Company's references again. This time Respondent spoke with Mr. Bonfiglio and Mr. Ramsberger. These gentlemen confirmed that Petitioner had done some interior painting work for them, but only in the amount of $3,000 and $1,000-$1,200 respectively. Petitioner actually has substantial experience with interior painting, including work for health care facilities, but this experience was not brought to light until after the bids were open and the protest proceeding had commenced. Petitioner, including its president Carl Pickard, made a considered business decision to limit the number of references exposed to public scrutiny. Pickard and his staff involved in preparing the bid felt that the references they gave were "similar". They did not anticipate that Respondent would interpret "similar", as called for in the specifications, as meaning interior painting, since "painting is painting" and their tradespeople are skilled in both interior and exterior painting.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby, RECOMMENDED: That the agency enter its final order denying Petitioner's protest and awarding Bid #1240494 to Intervenor, Silcox and Strain. DONE AND RECOMMENDED this 9th day of November, 1994, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. MARY CLARK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of November, 1994. COPIES FURNISHED: Robert L. Powell, Esquire Agency Clerk Dept of Health and Rehab. Services 1323 Winewood Blvd. Tallahassee, FL 32399-0700 Kim Tucker, Esquire General Counsel Dept of Health and Rehab. Services 1323 Winewood Blvd. Tallahassee, FL 32399-0700 Michael C. Berry, Sr., Esquire Berry Associates 28100 U.S. Hwy 19 N Ste 408 Clearwater, FL 34621 Raymond R. Deckert, Esquire T. Edwards Human Svcs. Ctr. 4000 W. Dr. M.L. King, Jr., Blvd. Tampa, FL 33614-9990 Paul A. Strain, President Silcox & Strain Renovations, Inc. 6440 Edgewater Drive Orlando, FL 32810 APPENDIX The following constitute specific rulings on the findings of fact proposed by the parties. Petitioner's Proposed Findings Adopted in preliminary statement. &3. Rejected as unnecessary. Both of these bids were rejected as well as Petitioner's bid. Adopted in substance in Paragraph 9. Rejected as immaterial. The agency checked their references to obtain the required information, just as it did with the other bidders. Adopted in Paragraph 5. 7.&8. Adopted in Paragraph 6. Adopted in substance in Paragraph 5. Rejected as immaterial. Adopted in substance in Paragraph 10. 12.-14. Rejected as immaterial, as this is not in issue. 15.-20. Adopted in summary in Paragraph 15, but immaterial to the outcome. 21. Rejected as unnecessary. 22.-24. Rejected as immaterial; See Paragraph 5, above. Rejected as immaterial; the references still did not disclose that projects for interior painting were completed for costs approximating the projects at issue. Adopted by implication in Paragraph 6. Rejected as contrary to the weight of evidence. Adopted in part, but otherwise rejected as to the characterization "misleading". Respondent's proposed Findings of Fact 1.-7. Adopted in corresponding Paragraphs 1-7. 8.-9. Adopted in Paragraph 11. 10. Adopted in Paragraph 9. 11.-12. Adopted in substance in Paragraph 12. 13.-17. Adopted in substance in Paragraphs 9 and 14. 18.-22. Adopted in summary in Paragraph 13. 23. Adopted in Paragraph 15.
The Issue The issues to be resolved in this proceeding concern whether the Petitioner, in the work of his business or trade, operates within the definition of "construction industry" as that term is defined in Chapter 440, Florida Statutes (2008), and the rules of the Respondent Agency. It therefore must be determined whether the Petitioner was required to secure workers' compensation coverage or suffer the disputed penalty for failure to do so.
Findings Of Fact The Division is an Agency of the State of Florida charged with enforcing the provisions of Chapter 440, Florida Statutes, with regard to the regulation of the workers' compensation insurance system in the State of Florida. It is charged with inspecting and ensuring that employers in the State of Florida comply with the relevant provisions of Chapter 440, Florida Statutes, and Florida Administrative Code Chapter 69L-6, regulating the circumstances under which employers are required to have workers' compensation insurance coverage.1/ The Petitioner is a corporation having its principal place of business in Jacksonville, Florida, under the name "James T. Quinn Handyman." The business of the Petitioner is primarily a "handyman" type business or service in which the Petitioner performs all sorts of home repairs, maintenance, services including pressure washing, cleaning, organizing, minor maintenance duties, and even running errands for homeowners or clients. Because of the nature of his business in which home repair, home maintenance, and associated painting are of a very minor nature, the Petitioner was under the belief that he was not actually involved in the construction business or "construction industry" and did not require workers' compensation coverage. For the same reasons he also believed he was not required to have an exemption on record with regard to workers' compensation coverage. After the imposition of the Stop-Work Order, however, the Petitioner filed for an exemption for workers' compensation coverage with the Division, and on that exemption listed his trades as being home repair, home maintenance, and then painting and pressuring washing. He was granted the exemption. The Petitioner also attempted to secure workers' compensation insurance subsequent to the entry of the Stop-Work Order. He spoke with a representative of the National Council on Compensation Insurance (NCCI) who advised him that, because of the nature of his business, he fell within the "Scopes Manual" classification code of 9014 which is "maintenance, non- construction." This representative advised him that this was a classification similar to janitorial work. He indicated his belief to the Petitioner that the nature of the Petitioner's business was more like an apartment building superintendent and that he essentially does any task his clients ask him to do. The Petitioner does not do any building of structures. He does not do land clearing, filling, or excavating preparatory to construction of any sort of structure or to alter the appearance of land. None of his work results in substantial improvements to properties. The Petitioner does not hold himself out as a licensed contractor nor is he so licensed. In fact, he avoids doing jobs which require the obtaining of permits related to any construction or other work. He has consistently avoided undertaking jobs involving remodeling of structures, whether residences or otherwise, and indeed has routinely refused to accept jobs constructing outdoor decks, which require permits. He does no roofing, concrete driveway or sidewalk work, tree trimming, and he does not paint houses nor entire rooms of houses. He has not done roofing work, although he has provided occasional clients with an estimate of what a roof repair should cost so that clients would know what to expect when they contacted a roofing contractor. He does no new construction and only does very minor repair work to existing structures, usually associated with residences. The Division classified the Petitioner as a "painter." This stems from the original inspection by Inspector Michael Robinson, who testified for the Division at the hearing. During that inspection and the conversation the Petitioner had with Mr. Robinson, he advised Mr. Robinson that his work did include painting, at least on that day. He never advised Mr. Robinson or the Division that the majority of his work involved painting, either on that job, or generally as to other jobs. Indeed, some of the work the Petitioner has done, as depicted on Petitioner's Exhibit Three in evidence, does involve painting. He confirmed in his testimony that on the day the Stop-Work Order was imposed by Mr. Robinson that he had engaged in some painting because he had repaired and re-hung shutters on a residence and needed to paint over the repaired area on a shutter. Mr. Robinson, the Inspector for the Division, testified on its behalf, stating that anyone must secure workers' compensation, if engaged in the "construction industry," meaning a trade coming within the ambit of the construction industry. In lieu of securing such coverage, a person who is an officer of a corporation may file a request for exemption from coverage, which the Petitioner, Mr. Quinn, did. Mr. Robinson noted that the "Scopes Manual" is a manual published by the NCCI, used to describe specific trades. The trades described in the manual are given a designation number and an explanation of what each trade consists of under each designation number or code. That manual is relied upon to describe various trades by the insurance industry and also by the Division. In fact, the Division has adopted the Scopes Manual classification codes by rule in Florida Administrative Code Rule 69L-6.021. Mr. Robinson noted that the Petitioner was engaged in painting, in his belief, and because painting is designated as a construction code under Code 5474, he concluded that the Petitioner operated within the definition of a construction trade or the construction industry. He would also designate someone observed repairing or replacing wood in a structure as being within the definition of a member of the construction industry under the classification of carpentry, if that were the case. Mr. Robinson believes that if the Petitioner's work consisted of mostly odd jobs, involving such things as hanging ceiling fans, cleaning up debris, cleaning out garages, and other odd jobs then such jobs would have various classification codes, most of which would not be within the construction industry. Mr. Robinson explained that if he or other inspectors encountered people working at two different occupations on a job, then they would consider the nature of the job or jobs being done, or work being done, and take the "highest class code for the work they are performing," inasmuch as that method is used for classification of trades or jobs by the insurance industry. He indicated in his testimony that if any part of the work is considered to be construction, then that person is considered to be a member working in the construction industry and must obtain workers' compensation coverage if there are one or more employees employed by the entity involved. The Petitioner, Mr. Quinn, compiled a list of jobs he has performed over several years. While the list may not be exhaustive, it has been shown to be a representative sample of the various tasks the Petitioner has performed over the years. The list was admitted into evidence as Petitioner's Exhibit Three. It reveals that the Petitioner has engaged in a number of job duties for his clients, most of which do not involve painting. The list includes such things as retrieving a boat trailer and a replacing a flat tire on the trailer for a client, transplanting two boxwood plants, installing a rope hand-rail on a dock, installing an ice maker, organizing a workshop, cleaning a poolroom, filling in dog holes, signing for Federal Express packages, installing a flat screen television, replacing ceiling tile, assembling a swing set, replacing a doorbell button, setting up a child's telescope, replacing a garage door spring, replacing a kitchen faucet, replacing a garbage disposal, repairing a bicycle, installing signs, pressure washing a pool deck, setting up a DVD player, re-arranging furniture, assembling a basket ball hoop, cleaning wood paneling, installing curtains, fixing a leaky faucet, replacing lighting fixtures and lights, repairing two French doors that included filling-in dog scratches and then painting over the marks. This last task is perhaps illustrative of the manner in which painting represents a minor portion of the duties performed by the Petitioner in the typical jobs he performs as a handyman or "odd job" worker. The painting was only incidental to repairing the scratches made by a family dog and simply involving painting over the marks so that the repaired area would properly blend with the other painted portions of the door. When the Petitioner inquired of a representative of NCCI about the need to obtain workers' compensation insurance coverage, the representative advised him that he more closely resembled a Scopes Manual class code 9014. That code 9014 was admitted into evidence as Petitioner's Exhibit Four. The NCCI representative advised the Petitioner that Code 9014 describes janitorial type services or duties and that the Petitioner's occupation or jobs seemed more appropriate to that endeavor and that thus he did not appear to need workers' compensation insurance coverage. Mr. Robinson the Inspector for the Division, was not familiar with that class code of the Scopes Manual. Code 9014 provides: Code 9014 is assigned to insureds primarily engaged in providing janitorial services for others. See Codes 9000 and 9001 in Florida. Janitorial Services are defined as keeping and doing cleaning and engaging in various types of maintenance and minor repair work for upkeep of a building. Stated differently, a risk qualifies as a janitorial service if the risk engages exclusively in cleaning a building or performs maintenance or minor repair operations in addition to cleaning a building. These maintenances or minor repair operations may include, but are not limited to, painting, cleaning windows, changing light bulbs, assisting occupants with the placement of furniture, replacing glass panes, clearing drains, and cleaning carpets. This class code thus includes in its definition the act of painting. Mr. Robinson confirmed in his testimony that this class code is not listed in the list of class codes identified by the Division as those making up the definition of "construction industry." See Fla. Admin. Code R. 69L-6.201. Thus, not all occupations involving painting have been identified by the Division as being construction trades or come within the definition of "construction industry." If the Petitioner is not a member or participant in the construction industry, then he does not have to have workers' compensation coverage, because he does not have a sufficient number of employees to apply the requirement for coverage as it is imposed by Sub-section 440.02(17)(b)2., Florida Statutes, for non- construction services, trades, or industries. Although the job or profession of "painter" would be within the definition of "construction industry" or would be a construction trade, the persuasive evidence shows the Petitioner is not a painter by trade or profession, nor does he hold himself out as a painter. Merely because some repair jobs include incidental painting, does not render him a painter, thereby causing him to become part of or be engaged in the "construction industry." In fact, there is an at least informally recognized industry or occupation of "handyman" in the Jacksonville vicinity, as recognized by the yellow page listing for "handyman services" in the Jacksonville area telephone directory, an example of which was admitted into evidence as Petitioner's Exhibit One. Even if the Petitioner does not qualify as a "janitorial service" for purposes of the above-referenced code 9014, if one interprets that code to require the necessity of both performing maintenance or minor repairs, in addition to cleaning a building, the fact remains that the persuasive evidence in this case does not demonstrate that the Petitioner was engaged and functioning as a "painter" or member of the painting occupation. He thus was not engaged in the "construction industry." Aside from the issue of engagement in painting as a purported participant in the construction industry, the evidence referenced-above and findings of fact, concerning the actual functions the Petitioner performs in his business, do not persuasively establish that he is engaged in the construction industry, as defined by the Scopes Manual categories and rules referenced above, and relied upon by the Division. The Respondent contends, in advancing its thesis that the Petitioner's essential business is that of a painter in the construction industry, that the Petitioner spent "thousands of dollars" on paint or painting-related materials. In fact, the evidence shows that the Petitioner purchased $4,228.88 dollars worth of paint or paint-related materials at Brittan's Paint Store, the only place the evidence shows he purchased any paint. It is interesting that the majority of the paint so purchased ($2,408.68 worth) was used for one apparent job at Lakeshore Baptist Church during the three-year investigatory period, specifically from June 30, 2007, through March 20, 2008. The bank-related records in evidence show these expenditures for paint attributable to the church and also show two one-hundred dollar checks issued on the Petitioner's account to that church. Further, the evidence in the form of the "spread sheet" or cash flow records for 2007, shows a $7,120.00 dollar "charitable contribution" for that year, without identifying the recipient. There is no direct evidence showing remuneration to the Petitioner for any work done for the church, painting or otherwise, for 2007 and 2008. That lack of evidence coupled with the evidence that two one-hundred dollar checks were paid to the church by the Petitioner, or the Petitioner's wife, and the fact that a $7,120.00 dollar charitable contribution was made during that year, raises the possibility that the job may not have been done for profit or remuneration to the Petitioner, and thus that it does not constitute engagement in the construction industry as a for-profit activity. (See § 440.02(8), Fla. Stat.) The point is that it has not been established by persuasive evidence that these paint purchases were made for the primary purpose of engaging in the construction industry as a painter or painting business. The details regarding the use made of this purchased paint and the nature and scope of any work done at the church were not developed on direct or cross-examination. One could just as easily infer that the painting work for the church was done by the Petitioner as a contribution to the church with which he may have been affiliated as a member, or even as an employee. In any event, it was not clearly and convincingly established that he was engaged in the construction industry with regard to the painting in terms of the use made of these paint purchases from Britton's Paint Store. There were other, more minor purchases of paint from Britton's Paint Store shown in the bank records, which did not indicate how they were used or for which client. Some could have been merely for personal use. Three purchases were for "Dave" and three noted on the memo line on the check were for "dry storage." There were 22 of these "non-church" paint purchases. Only four were for more than $100.00. This indicates a pattern of mostly small paint material purchases which fits the Petitioner's business as being that of repairman or handyman and not as a professional painter. These purchases were made over a period of almost 14 months. In light of the lack of inquiry of the Petitioner, on direct and cross-examination, about the details of the uses and purposes of these paint material purchases, it was not established by persuasive evidence that these paint purchases were "for-profit," as a painting trade or business, nor that they represent evidence that painting was other than an incidental activity or minor part of the Petitioner's "handyman" work. The totality of the evidence of his type of work does not show that painting was a major part of it or other than an intermittent activity. It was thus not established that the paint purchases represent engagement in the "construction industry" as a for-profit painting activity.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses, and the pleadings and arguments of the parties, it is, therefore, RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the Department of Financial Services finding that James T. Quinn, d/b/a James Quinn Handyman was not required to secure payment of workers' compensation for any employee or employees and was not in violation of Sections 440.10(1)(a) and 440.38(1), Florida Statutes, during the times and circumstances pertinent to this proceeding. No penalty against said Petitioner should be assessed. DONE AND ENTERED this 7th day of November, 2008, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S P. MICHAEL RUFF Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of November, 2008.
Findings Of Fact The following quoted provisions of the joint stipulations of fact entered into by the parties, as attached to this recommended order, constitutes the underlying evidential facts to be considered by the undersigned in deliberating the charges in this case. The exhibits mentioned in the quoted provision may be found as a part of the attached joint stipulations of fact and exhibits, which have been made a part of the record herein. The quotation is as follows: JOINT STIPULATIONS OF FACT The charge herein attached as cumulative exhibit #1 was filed by the Charging party on October 21, 1976 and a copy was simultaneously served on Respondent. Pursuant to Florida Administrative Rule 8H-4.03 a copy of the charge is hereby attached. The trial and presentment of the above-captioned cause was assigned to Rodney W. Smith, attorney for the Charging Party on or about February 25, 1977. Respondent is a public employer within the meaning of F.S. 447.203(2) and has its principal place of business in the City of Jacksonville, Duval County, Florida where it is engaged in the business of operating a consolidated municipal government. Respondent is created directly by the legislature of the State of Florida so as to constitute a consolidated government administered by individuals who are responsible to public officials and/or the general electorate. Charging Party is now and has been at all times material herein an employee organization within the meaning of 447.203(l0) of the Act. On March 4, 1976 Respondent filed a PETITION FOR CERTIORARI with the opinion that said petition would stay the "proposed CERTIFICATION ORDER by the Public Employees Relations Commission until final determination of the case was resolved. On or about May 18, 1976 the Public Employees Relations Commission issued a CERTIFICATION ORDER certifying the Charging Party as the exclusive bargaining representative for the Public Employees in the following unit: INCLUDED: Firefighters Lieutenants Captains Employed by the City of Jacksonville Fire Department EXCLUDED: All officers above the rank of captain employed by the City of Jacksonville Fire Department and all other employees of the City of Jacksonville On or about June, 1976 the Respondent filed an APPEAL of the above- stated certification order by PETITION FOR REVIEW in the First District Court of Appeal in and for the State of Florida. At no time was a stay of the certification order sought or obtained by the Respondent. Although the CERTIFICATION ORDER was challenged by PETITION FOR REVIEW, the Charging Party has been the certified representative for purposes of collective-bargaining of all public employees in the unit described in the above paragraph since May 18, 1976. It has been the continuous policy, and most recently by special ordinance, for the City of Jacksonville to extend dues- deductions to firefighters, lieutenants and captains authorizing such deductions since on or about 1969. This policy of extending dues-deductions to captains, lieutenants and firefighters has continued at all times until October 15, 1976. On October 15, 1976 the biweekly paychecks of the captains (sic) and lieutenants employed by the, Respondent did not reflect the usual dues- deduction. The Charging Party was notified of the City's intention to discontinue dues-deductions for the employees "in the ranks of lieutenants and captains during contract negotiations in late September, 1976. On or about October 18, 1976 agents for the City, including Dave Thompson, Administrative Aide for the Public Safety Department and John Waters, Director of Department of Public Safety informed Robert Carver, President of the Charging Party, that the Respondent would not extend dues-deductions to the captains or lieutenants since the Respondent did not feel these positions were properly included in the certified bargaining unit. The action of the Respondent in discontinuing the dues-deductions on October 15, 1976 was resultant from the attached cumulative exhibit B, Memorandum of September 24, 1976 from John M. Waters to Jack Parker, City Accountant for the City of Jacksonville, which directs that positions above the rank of firefighter are to no longer receive dues-deductions. The Director of Employee Relations and chief negotiator for the Respondent, William Davis, was officially notified of the proposed discontinuation on September 29, 1976 by action of the attached cumulative exhibit c." The act complained of by the Charging Party, is the act of the Respondent in discontinuing the dues-deductions for the ranks of lieutenant and captain effective October 15, 1976. (The facts that led up to that action are established in the stipulations of fact entered into by the parties.) In the mind of the Charging Party the discontinuation of the dues-deductions on October 15, 1976, constituted: (1) an interference with the rights of employees as described in 447.501(1)(a), F.S.; (2) a unilateral change during the bargaining process in violation of 447.50l(1)(c), F.S.; and (3) a specific refusal to comply with the provisions of 447.303, F.S. The Respondent disputes and joins issue with that claim. To resolve the conflict, the case is best discussed by dividing the consideration into two broad categories. The first category is concerned with the question of whether the Respondent's initial petition for writ of certiorari filed with the First District Court of Appeal, State of Florida, on March 4, 1976, and/or the Respondent's appeal of the Public Employees Relations Commission's certification order, which was filed with the First District Court of Appeal, State of Florida; imposed an automatic stay of the effect of the proposed certification order by the Public Employees Relations Commission, and/or a stay of the certification order of May 18, 1976, entered by the Public Employees Relations Commission. Any stay of the proposed certification order and subsequent certification order by the Public Employees Relations Commission must have been effectuated by the filing of the initial petition for writ of certiorari on March 4, 1976, and the appeal of June, 1976, because the facts establish that no specific request was ever made of the First District Court of Appeal or the Public Employees Relations Commission to grant a stay. To that end, the Respondent contends that it could justifiably rely on the Florida Appellate Rule to grant an automatic stay in both the initial petition for writ of certiorari of March 4, 1976, and the appeal of June, 1976 Pertinent provisions of Rule 5.12 state: "Rule 5.12 Supersedeas Bond not Required of the State and its Political Subdivisions and their Boards, Commissions, etc.; Security when Required When Security Not Required. When the state or any of its political subdivisions, or any officer, board, commission or other public body of the state or any of its political subdivisions, in a purely official capacity, takes an appeal or petitions for certiorari, the filing of the notice of appeal or the petition for certiorari as the case may be shall perfect the same and stay the execu tion or performance of the judgment, decree or order being reviewed and no supersedeas bond need be given unless expressly required by the court. Court May Require Bond. The court may, on motion for good cause shown, require a super sedeas bond or other security, in such amount, form and manner as it may prescribe as a condition for the further prosecution of the appeal or certiorari." On the face of the language of Florida Appellate Rule 5.12, it would appear that the Respondent is correct in its assumption of having an automatic stay; however, there is a subsequent appellate decision which defeats the Respondent's right to rely on the theory it offers as standing for the proposition that an automatic stay is granted. That case is Panama City v. Florida Public Employees Relations Commission, 333 So.2d 470, (1st DCA 1976, Fla.). The decision in this case was initially rendered on May 5, 1976, and a rehearing denied on June 29, 1976. The effective date of the decision is July 14, 1976. The Panama City case, supra, concerns the determination by the Public Employees Relations Commission of an appropriate bargaining unit and direction of an election. Those actions by PERC were not found to be final orders and in discussing the position of that Petitioner requesting a writ of certiorari, the Court stated that a stay of the effect of the enforcement of the agency action does not transpire merely by filing the petition for writ of certiorari. Under the ruling, in the decision, the stay may be granted by the agency or by the Court upon appropriate terms and in keeping with the authority of 120.68(3), F.S. That section of Chapter 120 indicated the following: "(3) The filing of the petition does not itself stay enforcement of the agency decision, but if the agency decision has the effect of suspending or revoking a license, supersedeas shall be granted as a matter of right upon such conditions as are reasonable, unless the court, upon petition of the agency, determines that a supersedeas would constitute a probable danger to the health, safety, or welfare of the state. The agency may grant, or the reviewing court may order, a stay upon appropriate terms, but, in any event, the order shall specify the conditions upon which the stay or supersedeas is granted." Moreover, in the opinion of the Court in the Panama City case, under Florida Appellate Rule 5.5, the Petitioner for writ of certiorari shall apply to the agency for supersedeas to forestall the terms of the agency action. Through its memorandum the Respondent in this cause has concluded that there is a distinction in the facts of the Panama City case and the facts sub judice, in that the Panama City case dealt with determination of an appropriate bargaining unit and direction of an election which were interlocutory matters, whereas the question here deals with a certification order which is final agency action on the part of the Public Employes Relations Commission. As an adjunct to this argument, Respondent indicated that it is the June, 1976, appeal taken by the Respondent, challenging the Public Employees Relations Commission order of certification, that becomes the focal point of the inquiry upon the subject of an automatic stay. This latter phase of the argument is accepted and it is the June, 1976, appeal that should be addressed. With that fact in mind, the language of the Court's opinion in the Panama City case on a petition for rehearing clarifies any distinction which might be drawn between the right to stay in an interlocutory situation, and the right to a stay of final action by an agency. The Court, in its discussion on rehearing, stated that the PERC order certifying an employee organization's exclusive collective bargaining representative of employees is a final order, which is subject to judicial review, together with all prior interlocutory orders. The Court goes on to say that if PERC refuses to stay any bargaining pending the Court review, the Court would have authority to grant that relief, in A order to make the Court's jurisdiction effective. For this proposition it cites to Article V, Section (4)(b) 3, Florida Constitution. A close analysis of the Court's statement on the rehearing in the Panama City case, supra, points out that the party who takes an appeal of the final order of certification by the Public Employees Relations Commission should look to the Public Employees Relations Commission to grant a stay prior to turning to the Court for such relief. This is in keeping with the requirements of 120.68(3), F.S. It can be seen by an examination of the facts stipulated to in this cause that the Respondent has failed at any point to request of the Public Employees Relations Commission that the effect of the order of certification be stayed pending the outcome of the consideration of the appeal on its merits. Consequently, in keeping with the decision of the Panama-City case, supra, the effect of the certification order is not stayed and any action which the Respondent took in derrogation of the decision of the First District Court of Appeal in Panama City, supra, subsequent to July 14, 1976, the date the decision became binding, may constitute an unfair labor practice. See also, Duval Cty School Bd v. Fla. Pub. Emp. etc., 346 So.2d 1086 (1st DCA 1977, Fla.) Having determined that the effect of the certification order of the Public Employees Relations Commission has not been stayed, consideration of the effect of the Respondent's action which discontinued the dues-deduction after October 15, 1976 for those ranks of lieutenant and captain can be made. It is clear from the facts In the record that it had been the practice of the employer to authorize the dues-deduction for lieutenants and captains since 1969 and there is no showing that the employees in those ranks who requested the dues- deduction ever asked that the deductions be discontinued. The conclusion on the part of the Respondent that the dues-deduction should be discontinued was a unilateral action, premised upon Respondent's individual evaluation of the propriety of including lieutenants and captains in a unit with firefighters. In view of the history of the dues-deduction process for lieutenants and captains in the City of Jacksonville, and the outstanding unit certification by PERC which includes such employees, it is concluded that deductions should have been continued beyond October 15, 1976. This is authorized under the opinion of United Faculty of Palm Beach Jr. College, Case No. 8H-CA- 754-1158. The failure to continue this deduction program beyond October 15, 1976 constituted an action by the Respondent in regard to conditions of employment and was per se a violation of the duty to collectively bargain. See 447.309(1), F.S., and NLRB v. Katz, 396 U.S.736 (1962). This responsibility on the part of Respondent to continue the dues-deduction has now been specifically established in 447.303, F.S., as amended at 77-343, Laws of Florida which reads: "Any employee organization which has been certified as a bargaining agent shall have the right to, upon request, have its dues and uniform assessments deducted and collected by the employer from the salary of those employees who authorized the deductions, set dues and uniform assessments In a related argument, the Respondent attempts to suggest that the Public Employees Relations Commission has unilaterally expanded and redefined the bargaining unit that had been previously agreed to between the City of Jacksonville and Local 1884 IAFF. Specifically, the Respondent claims that the City of Jacksonville and Local 1884 IAFF had agreed that only fire privates be included in the unit in 1973-1974 and 1974-1975, and that thereafter the Commission expanded and redefined the bargaining unit to include firemen and fire officers. Although this may be a fact, this fact is not in evidence through the stipulation of facts and in view of the limitations imposed by the agreement of the parties through their stipulation, the above-referenced information may not be utilized in reaching conclusions in this case. However, assuming arguendo the propriety of those facts, they would not seem to promote a different result in this cause. This conclusion is drawn from an examination of Clearwater Firefighters Association; Local 1158, IAFF and City of Clearwater, Case No. 8H- RC-766-1O68, 77E-377, reported at 3 FPER 177 (1977) and City of Titusville v. PERC, 3,30 So.2d 733 (1st DCA 1976, Fla.) Even though the Commission and the Court seemed to be stating that the Public Employees Relations Commission may not extend the unit which has voluntarily been recognized by the parties, or offered for recognition by the Petitioner for unit determination, these cases demonstrate that each case that occurs should be examined on an individual basis. Applying that process, it would be necessary to request the Public Employees Relations Commission to reconsider their position in the instant case on the question of the appropriateness of the inclusion of lieutenants and captains in the certified bargaining unit, and that decision could be subject to appeal to the appropriate appellate court. Because a determination has not been rendered on the merits of excluding lieutenants and captains from the certified bargaining unit, either by the Public Employees Relations Commission or an appellate court, the certification order remains in effect and all rights and entitlements for ,the unit employees remain in force and effect until amended by a Perc order. Consequently, the act of discontinuing the dues-deduction for lieutenants and captains in the bargaining unit after October 15, 1976, constituted a specific refusal to comply with the provision of 447.303, F.S.; an interference with the rights of employees in violation of 447.501(1)(a), and an unilateral change during the bargaining process, in violation of 447.501(1)(c) , F.S.
Recommendation It is recommended that the Respondent, City of Jacksonville, be required to reinstate the dues-deduction authorizations of those lieutenants and captains in the certified bargaining unit. DONE and ENTERED this 4th day of November, 1977, in Tallahassee, Florida. CHARLES C. ADAMS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings 530 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Rodney W. Smith, Esquire Post Office Box 508 Gainesville, Florida 32602 Robert G. Brown, Esquire Assistant Counsel Office of General Counsel City Of Jacksonville 1300 City Hall Jacksonville, Florida 32202 Leonard A. Carson, Chairman Public Employees Relations Commission Suite 300 2003 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FLORIDA Exhibit A STATE OF FLORIDA
The Issue This is a license discipline case in which the Respondent has been charged by Administrative Complaint with numerous violations of Part VII of Chapter 468, Florida Statutes (1989), which are the statutory provisions regulating the talent agency business.
Findings Of Fact At all times material hereto, Respondent has been licensed as a talent agency in the State of Florida, having been issued license number TA 0000015. Respondent's last known address is 2803 East Commercial Boulevard, Suite #204, Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33308. At all times material hereto, Respondent has been married to Bill Daniels, a photographer, whose office is in the same building as the Respondent's agency. The Respondent and Bill Daniels share living quarters, expenses, profits from each other's incomes, and a joint personal checking account. At all times material hereto, Art Feldman (who is also sometimes known as "Art Field"), under the Respondent's direction, regularly spoke to, interviewed, and took money from artists who sought work through T.J. Norris Co., Inc. At all times material hereto, the Respondent and Art Feldman recommended only Bill Daniels as a photographer to the artists seeking to register with the Respondent. At all times material hereto, the Respondent, as well as Art Feldman and Ed Russell (who was another of Respondent's employees), were authorized by Bill Daniels to collect funds from and issue receipts to talent registered with the Respondent for photographic services and to obtain Bill Daniels picture releases from talent. The Bill Daniels receipts reflected that the Respondent "does not guarantee work or casting." At all times material hereto, Bill Daniels, at no charge to the Respondent, would make up photos from proofs of talent registered with the Respondent, a service Mr. Daniels did not provide to other talent agencies. Bill Daniels gave the Respondent the photography negatives of talent registered with Respondent. Facts regarding Counts One, Two, and Three -- Laurie Wells On or about February 2, 1988, Laurie Wells, after seeing Respondent's advertisement, took her daughter, Jena, to the Respondent's agency for the purpose of procuring modeling and/or acting work for her daughter, who was three years old at the time. The Respondent and Art Feldman told Ms. Wells that Jena would be perfect for an upcoming television series starring Zsa Zsa Gabor. The Respondent and Art Feldman both told Ms. Wells that she would not be able to use her own photographs of Jena, but would need to have a portfolio of photographs taken by Bill Daniels before Jena could be submitted for consideration for a role in the television series. Ms. Wells paid Mr. Feldman three hundred twenty- five dollars to register her daughter with the agency and to have photographs taken by Bill Daniels. Nevertheless, Jena was never called for casting for the television series and Jena never received any work through Respondent's agency. Ms. Wells never received a copy of the contract she signed with the Respondent's agency. At the time she was dealing with the Respondent's agency, Ms. Wells was a beginner in the talent industry. The photographs that Ms. Wells brought with her to her first meeting with the Respondent and Mr. Feldman were current photographs of Jena. The photographs that Ms. Wells brought with her to that first meeting were later used by other talent agencies from which Jena obtained work. Even though the Respondent and Mr. Feldman never guaranteed any work for Jena, they both made statements implying that there was lots of work available and that Jena would be perfect for some of that work. Facts regarding Counts Four, Five, and Six -- Donna Thomas On or about March 29, 1988, Donna Thomas, as a result of one of Respondent's advertisements, took her four-year-old granddaughter, Tami, to Respondent's agency to procure modeling work for Tami. Ms. Thomas spoke with both Art Feldman and with the Respondent. The Respondent told Ms. Thomas that her granddaughter was one of the most beautiful little girls they had had in the agency for a long time. The Respondent went on to state that she could definitely get Tami all kinds of work, but before they could do so Tami would have to have some pictures made. The Respondent also suggested that the pictures should be made as soon as possible. It was suggested to Ms. Thomas that she should have the photographs done by Bill Daniels. Ms. Thomas was not told of any other options for obtaining photographs. Ms. Thomas paid the Respondent two hundred fifty-five dollars to register Tami with the agency and to have photographs of Tami taken by Bill Daniels. The Respondent's agency never procured any work for Tami; the agency never even called about any work opportunities for Tami. At the time of her dealings with the Respondent's agency, Ms. Thomas was a beginner or novice to the talent industry. The evidence in this case is unclear as to whether the Respondent did or did not provide a copy of a contact to Ms. Thomas or to Tami's parents. Facts regarding Counts Sixteen, Seventeen, and Eighteen--Mr. and Mrs. Waldron On or about April 21, 1988, Mrs. Waldron, after seeing one of the Respondent's advertisements, took her son Richard to the Respondent to procure work for him in modeling or acting. Art Feldman told Mrs. Waldron that her son Richard was absolutely beautiful and was exactly what the agency was looking for. Feldman went on to say that he received calls every day from people who are looking for children just like Richard for movies, commercials, catalogs, and newspaper ads. Mr. Feldman went on to say that photographs had to be taken before the agency could do any work for Richard; that without a portfolio there was absolutely nothing the agency could do for Richard. Feldman urged Mrs. Waldron to use Bill Daniels for the photographs and described Bill Daniels as a "resident photographer" who did all of the agency's portfolios and who could get the photos done faster than other photographers. Mrs. Waldron signed a contract with the Respondent's agency and paid the Respondent three hundred fifty-five dollars to register Richard with the agency and have Richard's photographs taken by Bill Daniels. Mrs. Waldron never received a copy of the contract she signed with the Respondent. Richard did not procure work through the Respondent for over a year. When contacted about the lack of work, Art Feldman insisted that updated photographs be taken. When Mrs. Waldron refused new photographs until Richard obtained work, Richard was suddenly called for work as an extra on a movie called "Chains of Gold." Subsequently, Mrs. Waldron asked about other work for Richard, but Art Feldman said it was unavailable until more photographs were taken. At the time of her dealings with the Respondent, Mrs. Waldron was a beginner to the talent industry. Facts regarding Counts Twenty-two, Twenty-three, and Twenty-four--Marie Strong On or about July 11, 1988, Mrs. Marie Strong took her six-month-old son, Caleb, to Respondent's agency for the purpose of procuring work for Caleb in modeling and/or acting. Mrs. Strong met with Art Feldman who told her he could obtain work right away for Caleb, because there were several catalogs coming out within the next week or two that needed children Caleb's age. Feldman also told her that in order to do that she needed to get a professional portfolio taken right away by the agency's photographer, Bill Daniels. Feldman urged Mrs. Strong to pay a deposit on the photographs that very day and dissuaded her from taking time to discuss the matter with her husband. Mrs. Strong paid a deposit in the amount of one hundred thirty dollars the first day and returned the next day with the balance of one hundred ninety- five dollars. The photographs of her son Caleb were taken that day by Bill Daniels. Mrs. Strong was not told of any options to have the photographs taken by some other photographer. The Respondent's agency never procured any work for Mrs. Strong's son. The Respondent's agency never provided Mrs. Strong with a copy of a contract. At the time of their dealings with the Respondent, Mrs. Strong and her son were novices or beginners to the talent industry. Facts regarding Counts Twenty-five, Twenty-six, and Twenty-seven--Kory Bielski On or about September 8, 1988, after seeing Respondent's advertisement and calling for an appointment, Kory Bielski went to Respondent's agency for the purpose of procuring modeling and/or acting work. Mr. Bielski met with Art Feldman. Mr. Feldman told Mr. Bielski there was a lot of work he might be good for and that he wanted Mr. Bielski to sign up with the agency and get started. However, Mr. Feldman told Mr. Bielski that he had to have photographs taken before they would do anything. Mr. Feldman told Mr. Bielski that the agency had a photographer it worked with, and referred him to Bill Daniels. Mr. Feldman did not mention that Mr. Bielski could go to another photographer. Mr. Bielski paid Mr. Feldman a total of $425.00 to pay for the agency's registration fee and for photographs to be taken by Bill Daniels. The only work Mr. Bielski received through the Respondent's agency was two days of work as an extra in a movie. Mr. Bielski signed a contract with the Respondent's agency, but he was never given a copy of the contract. Facts regarding Counts Twenty-eight, Twenty-nine, and Thirty--Brian Cossack On or about October 14, 1988, in response to a newspaper advertisement, Brian Cossack went to Respondent's agency for the purpose of procuring voice-over work. Mr. Cossack met first with Art Feldman. Even though Mr. Cossack's primary interest was in obtaining voice-over work (in which the physical appearance of the artist is irrelevant), Mr. Feldman told him he would be perfect for a role in an upcoming horror film and that he would also be given TV commercial work. When Mr. Cossack said he had very little on-camera experience and did not feel prepared to take on a role of that type, Mr. Feldman continued to insist that he would be a shoe-in for the role. Mr. Feldman called the Respondent into the room and the Respondent also expressed assurances that Mr. Cossack would be perfect for movie and TV work. The Respondent went on to say that she would pay half of the cost of Mr. Cossack's photography session. After mentioning that he was relying on their assurances, Mr. Cossack paid $30.00 to register with the Respondent's agency and agreed to pay $300.00 for photographs to be taken by the photographer recommended by the Respondent. Mr. Cossack paid $100.00 towards the photographs on the first day. A few headshots were taken that day. A few days later, Mr. Cossack returned, paid the $200.00 balance, and some more photographs were taken. Mr. Cossack never received any of the photographs. Mr. Cossack gave both checks for the photographs to Mr. Feldman. The only work Mr. Cossack obtained through the Respondent's agency was work as an extra in a movie. He worked one day as an extra and declined an opportunity to work a second day as an extra. There is no clear and convincing evidence that the Respondent's agency failed to provide Mr. Cossack with a copy of a contract. Facts regarding Counts Thirty-three and Thirty-four--Chaim Kohl On or about December 28, 1988, Chaim Kohl took his four-year-old son, Roy, to Respondent's agency for the purpose of procuring modeling work for Roy. At that time Mr. Kohl was a beginner to the talent industry. Mr. Kohl met with Art Feldman and told Mr. Feldman that he wanted the agency to teach his son how to be a model and to obtain work for his son as a model. Mr. Feldman told Mr. Kohl that Mr. Kohl would have to have photographs of his son taken by Bill Daniels if he wanted the Respondent's agency to represent him. Mr. Feldman also said that as soon as the photographs were ready there would be lots of castings because the agency had lots of work with huge clients. Mr. Kohl agreed to have the photographs taken and ultimately paid $30.00 to register his son with the Respondent's agency and $300.00 for the photography session with Bill Daniels. Mr. Kohl's son never received any work through the Respondent's agency; he was never even called for any castings. Facts regarding Counts Thirty-five and Thirty-six--Harriet and Jim Nabors During February of 1989, Jim and Harriet Nabors went to Respondent's agency for the purpose of procuring modeling and/or acting work. At that time Mr. and Mrs. Nabors were both beginners to the talent industry. They went to Respondent's agency more or less on a lark, in response to one of the Respondent's newspaper advertisements. Mr. and Mrs. Nabors met with Art Feldman. Mr. Feldman told them that before any work could be sought for them, they would have to have photographs taken by Bill Daniels, who he described as being the agency photographer. No other photographic options were given. Mr. and Mrs. Nabors paid $30.00 each to register with Respondent's agency. Mrs. Nabors paid an additional $395.00 for photographs. Mr. Nabors paid $410.00 for photographs and $300.00 for four acting lessons. All of the checks were delivered to Mr. Feldman. Neither Mr. Nabors nor Mrs. Nabors received any work through the Respondent's agency. They received very few calls advising them of work opportunities. When Mrs. Nabors called about opportunities, she was told that business was slow. Facts regarding Counts Thirty-nine and Forty--Michelle Barton On or about September 7, 1989, Michelle Barton took her son, Nicholas, to Respondent's agency for the purpose of procuring modeling work for Nicholas. At that time Nicholas was almost a year old and Ms. Barton was a beginner to the talent industry. Ms. Barton met with Art Feldman and told him she wanted to obtain modeling work for her son. The son had red hair. Mr. Feldman said there was a big need for children with red hair and specifically mentioned that there would be casting opportunities during the next month. Mr. Feldman also told Ms. Barton that she would have to have a portfolio of photographs of Nicholas taken by Bill Daniels, who was described to her as the agency photographer or as a photographer affiliated with the Respondent's agency. She was not told of any other photographic options. Ms. Barton paid $30.00 to register her son with the Respondent's agency and paid $295.00 to have photographs taken by Bill Daniels. She later paid an additional $25.00 to obtain two extra photographic prints. Ms. Barton delivered all of the checks to Mr. Feldman. Ms. Barton never received any work for her son through the Respondent's agency. Ms. Barton later registered her son with another agency. The only photographs she sent to that agency were snap shots. The second agency called her on several casting opportunities. Facts regarding Count Forty-one--Marilyn Moore On or about March 21, 1990, after seeing the Respondent's advertisement in the telephone book, Marilyn Moore took her thirteen-month-old daughter, Jaime, to Respondent's agency for the purpose of procuring modeling work for Jaime. At that time Ms. Moore was a beginner to the talent industry. Ms. Moore met with Art Feldman and told him she wanted to obtain modeling work for her daughter. She had with her a small color photograph of the child that had been taken approximately a month earlier by Olan Mills. Mr. Feldman told Ms. Moore that he definitely thought her daughter had potential as a model, but that first she would have to be registered with the agency and they would need more photographs of the child. Mr. Feldman also told her that he had a photographer who could take the photographs. Ms. Moore asked if they could use the photographer she already had, and Mr. Feldman replied that the agency really needed eight-by-ten black and white photographs and that the agency photographer was in the next room and could do the photographs right then and there for a fee. Ms. Moore asked Mr. Feldman if she could use another photographer and Mr. Feldman replied that it was best to use the agency's photographer because they had worked together before and the agency photographer knew exactly what they needed. Ms. Moore registered her daughter with the Respondent's agency and wrote a $30.00 check to pay the registration fee. She left the payee's name blank on the check and delivered the check to Mr. Feldman. Someone later stamped the check with the name Bill Daniels as payee. Ms. Moore did not agree to have the agency's photographer take any photographs of her child and she declined the request that she make another appointment with the Respondent's agency. Later that same day, Ms. Moore stopped payment on the $30.00 check she had delivered to Mr. Feldman. A couple of days later, before he knew that payment had been stopped on the check, Mr. Feldman called Ms. Moore on the telephone and told her she could use her own photographs. Facts regarding Counts Forty-two, Forty-three, and Forty-four--Sonia Watson On or about December 7, 1988, after seeing the Respondent's advertisement in a newspaper, Sonia Watson took her eight-month-old daughter, Jessica, to Respondent's agency for the purpose of procuring modeling work. At that time Mrs. Watson and her infant daughter were beginners to the talent industry. Because she was a beginner, Mrs. Watson went to the Respondent's agency primarily for the purpose of obtaining information. Mrs. Watson met with Art Feldman. Mr. Feldman was very encouraging about the modeling prospects for Mrs. Watson's child and he told Mrs. Watson the agency would have no problem finding jobs for her daughter and that Mrs. Watson should not worry about the money for the agency's service or for the photographs because she would be able to make it back easily. Mr. Feldman told Mrs. Watson she would have to pay a $30.00 registration fee, a $15.00 fee for a "portfolio" photograph, and a $300.00 fee for photographs and for hiring the agency to find jobs for her daughter. During the first visit Mrs. Watson paid the $30.00 registration fee and the $15.00 "portfolio" fee. She later made an appointment to have the photographs taken and paid half of the money for the photographs. Thereafter, half of the photographs were taken by Bill Daniels, who was described by Mr. Feldman as "our photographer." About two months later, Mrs. Watson returned and paid the remaining half of the money for the photographs and Bill Daniels took the other half of the photographs. Mrs. Watson paid all of the money to Mr. Feldman. Mrs. Watson was supposed to receive five 8 x 10 photographs of her child. The photographs were never provided to her. Mrs. Watson signed a contract after she paid all of the money. She did not receive a copy of the contract she signed. Before agreeing to have Bill Daniels take her child's photographs, Mrs. Watson had found a photographer who would do a photographic "portfolio" of her daughter for $90.00 or $95.00. When she told Mr. Feldman about that possibility, Mr. Feldman advised against it and told her she should use the agency's photographer because the photographer knew the companies the agency dealt with, knew the positions and things the companies were looking for, and, also, that the $300.00 fee included hiring him as her agent. Mrs. Watson's child never received any work through the Respondent's agency. Facts regarding Counts Fifty and Fifty-one--Mr. and Mrs. Trent On or about August 12, 1989, after seeing the Respondent's advertisement in a newspaper, Mr. V. G. Trent took his two daughters, Gayle and Shirene, to Respondent's agency for the purpose of procuring modeling work for Gayle and Shirene. At that time, Mr. Trent and his two daughters were all beginners to the talent industry. The Trents met with Art Feldman. Mr. Feldman said that, because of their tall and exotic looks, the two girls would be working in no time. Mr. Feldman told them that they would need photographs and that the agency would take the photographs for them. Mr. Trent was not advised of any other options regarding the photographs. Mr. Feldman told Mr. Trent it would be in the best interest of the girls for the agency to take the photographs because the agency would be representing the girls and the agency would know what pictures to select. Mr. Trent agreed to Mr. Feldman's suggestions regarding the photographs and agreed to pay $760.00 to have both girls registered with the Respondent's agency and to have both girls photographed by Bill Daniels. The registration was $30.00 for each girl and the photography was $350.00 for each girl. During the first visit Mr. Trent paid a down payment towards the $760.00 and the balance was paid by his wife during a subsequent visit. Neither of Mr. Trent's daughters ever received any work through the Respondent's agency. Facts regarding Counts Fifty-four and Fifty-five--Helena Jackson On or about February 25, 1988, Helena Jackson, also known as Helena Steiner-Hornsteyn, and her teenage daughter, Annika, went to Respondent's agency for the purpose of procuring modeling and/or acting work for Annika. Following conversations with Art Feldman and the Respondent, Mrs. Jackson and her daughter ultimately paid to register with the Respondent's agency and to have photographs taken by Bill Daniels. There is no clear and convincing evidence as to what representations were made to Mrs. Jackson and her daughter by Mr. Feldman or the Respondent. Facts regarding photography needs of beginners In the opinion of experts in the talent agency business, beginning talent should spend as little as possible for photographs until they learn more about the business, decide whether they like the business, or begin to receive regular bookings. In the case of infants and children up to the age of about 10 or 12 years of age, it is sufficient for beginning talent to use snapshots that have been enlarged up to about 5 x 7 inches. An adequate supply of such enlargements can be obtained for approximately $40.00. Everyone in the talent industry is aware of the fact that babies and young children change in appearance quite rapidly and they are not expected to submit professional photographs for castings. In the opinion of experts in the talent agency business, it is sufficient for beginning talent to limit their photography expense to obtaining an 8 x 10 glossy headshot. As one expert explained, ". . . to go beyond an 8 x 10 glossy headshot, to me, is ridiculous. And, I think is a waste of money." A photo session limited to headshots is available from Bill Daniels for $125.00 and is available for less from other photographers in the area of the Respondent's agency. In the opinion of experts in the talent agency business, inexperienced talent are very susceptible to suggestions made by talent agents and have a tendency to follow agents' suggestions due to their inexperience. Because of this tendency, it constitutes undue influence for a talent agent to recommend a specific photographer to a beginning talent without also advising the talent that there are other less expensive alternatives available. Allegations on which no evidence was submitted In DOAH Case No. 90-5328 there is no competent substantial evidence of the Respondent's conduct alleged in either Count One or Count Two, both concerning Elizabeth Kingsley. In DOAH Case No. 90-4799 there is no competent substantial evidence of the facts alleged in any of the following counts: Count Seven, concerning Sarah (Tina) Polansky Count Eight, concerning Sarah (Tina) Polansky Count Nine, concerning Sarah (Tina) Polansky Count Ten, concerning Tracy Wilson Count Eleven, concerning Tracy Wilson Count Twelve, concerning Tracy Wilson Count Thirteen, concerning Michael Pry Count Fourteen, concerning Michael Pry Count Fifteen, concerning Michael Pry Count Nineteen, concerning Julie Lane Count Twenty, concerning Julie Lane Count Twenty-one, concerning Julie Lane Count Thirty-one, concerning Michelle Morrill Count Thirty-two, concerning Michelle Morrill Count Thirty-seven, concerning Kathryn Bischoff Count Thirty-eight, concerning Kathryn Bischoff Count Forty-five, concerning Marilyn Abbey Count Forty-six, concerning Marilyn Abbey Count Forty-seven, concerning Gary Janis Count Forty-eight, concerning Gary Janis Count Forty-nine, concerning Carol Mulchay Count Fifty-two, concerning August Yamond Count Fifty-three, concerning August Yamond Count Fifty-six, concerning Marie Tortu Count Fifty-seven, concerning Marie Tortu Count Fifty-eight, concerning Ilandie Joseph Count Fifty-nine, concerning Marcia Burke Count Sixty, concerning Marcia Burke The Respondent has prior violations of Chapter 468, Florida Statutes. In DPR Case Number 102652, the Respondent entered a Settlement Stipulation agreeing to pay a fine in the amount of two hundred dollars for a violation of Section 468.412(6), Florida Statutes (1988), regarding advertising by a talent agency. In DPR Case Numbers 0110491 and 0106073, DOAH Case Number 89-5521, the Respondent was found to have violated Section 468.410(3), Florida Statutes, on three (3) counts and Section 468.402(1)(t), Florida Statues, on two (2) counts. The Respondent was ordered to pay a fine in the amount of two thousand dollars.
Recommendation Based on all of the foregoing it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be issued in this case to the following effect: In Case No. 90-5328, dismissing all charges in the Administrative Complaint for failure of proof. In Case No. 90-4799, dismissing the charges set forth in the following counts of the Administrative Complaint for failure of proof: Six, Seven, Eight, Nine, Ten, Eleven, Twelve, Thirteen, Fourteen, Fifteen, Nineteen, Twenty, Twenty-one, Thirty, Thirty-one, Thirty-two, Thirty-seven, Thirty-eight, Forty-five, Forty-six, Forty-seven, Forty- eight, Forty-nine, Fifty-two, Fifty-three, Fifty-four, Fifty-five, Fifty-six, Fifty-seven, Fifty-eight, Fifty-nine, and Sixty. In Case No. 90-4799, finding the Respondent guilty of the violations of Section 468.402(1)(s), Florida Statutes (1989), as charged in the following counts of the Administrative Complaint: Counts One, Four, Sixteen, Twenty-two, Twenty-five, Twenty-eight, Thirty-three, Thirty- five, Thirty-nine, Forty-one, Forty-two, and Fifty. In Case No. 90-4799, finding the Respondent guilty of the violations of Section 468.402(1)(t), Florida Statutes (1989), as charged in the following counts of the Administrative Complaint: Counts Two, Five, Seventeen, Twenty-three, Twenty-six, Twenty-nine, Thirty-four, Thirty- six, Forty, Forty-three, and Fifty-one. In Case No. 90-4799, finding the Respondent guilty of the violations of Section 468.402(1)(b), Florida Statutes (1989), as charged in the following counts of the Administrative Complaint: Counts Three, Eighteen, Twenty- four, Twenty-seven, and Forty-four. In Case No. 90-4799, imposing the following penalties for the violations described above: An administrative fine in the amount of $400.00 for each of the 28 violations found above, for a total of administrative fines in the amount of $11,200.00. Revocation of the Respondent's license. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 1st day of March 1993. MICHAEL M. PARRISH Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of March 1993. APPENDIX The following are my specific rulings on the proposed findings of fact submitted by all parties. The following general observations are made in order to facilitate an understanding on the basis for the findings of fact that have been made as well as the basis for the findings of fact that have been rejected. There is no great dispute about most of the basic facts in these cases. There is quite a bit of dispute about numerous details, as well as disputes about what inferences should be drawn from the facts. In resolving these differences I have, for the most part, been more persuaded by the versions described by the Petitioner's witnesses than by the versions described by the Respondent and her witnesses. In resolving such differences I have especially considered such matters as any motive or bias of each witness, the apparent candor or lack of candor of each witness, the extent to which the testimony of each witness appeared to be logical or illogical, and the extent to which the evidence of each witness appeared to be consistent or inconsistent with other evidence in these cases. Findings proposed by Petitioner: Paragraph 1: Rejected as constituting conclusions of law, rather than proposed findings of fact. Paragraphs 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, and 10: Accepted. Paragraphs 11 and 12: Accepted in substance, but with some details corrected. Paragraphs 13, 14, 15, and 16: Accepted. Paragraph 17: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 18: First sentence accepted; second sentence rejected as not supported by clear and convincing evidence. Paragraph 19: Accepted. Paragraph 20: Accepted. Paragraphs 21 and 22: Accepted in substance. Paragraphs 23, 24 and 25: Accepted. Paragraph 26: First sentence rejected as unnecessary details. Second sentence accepted. Paragraph 27: Accepted. Paragraph 28: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 29: Accepted. Paragraph 30: Accepted. Paragraph 31: Rejected as containing numerous inaccurate details. Some somewhat similar findings have been made. Paragraph 32: Accepted in substance. Paragraphs 33 and 34: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 35 First sentence accepted. First half of second sentence rejected as not supported by clear and convincing evidence. Second half of second sentence accepted. Paragraphs 36, 37, and 38: Accepted in substance. Paragraphs 39 and 40: Accepted. Paragraph 41: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 42: Accepted. Paragraph 43: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 44: Accepted Paragraph 45: Accepted. Paragraph 46: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 47: Rejected as not fully supported by the evidence and as, in any event, subordinate and unnecessary details. Paragraph 48: Accepted in substance. Paragraphs 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, and 54: Accepted. Paragraph 55: Accepted in substance. Paragraphs 56 and 57: Accepted. Paragraphs 58 and 59: Accepted that Mrs. Jackson paid to register herself and her daughter and to have Bill Daniels photograph her and her daughter. The remainder of these paragraphs are rejected as irrelevant details or as not supported by clear and convincing evidence. Mrs. Jackson was a difficult witness, both on direct examination and on cross-examination. She was often argumentative, unresponsive, rambling, and disjointed during her testimony. Her testimony was far from clear and was not convincing. Paragraphs 60, 61, and 62: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 63: Rejected as not fully supported by the record and as, in any event, irrelevant to the issues in this case. Paragraph 64: Accepted in substance, with additional details. Findings proposed by Respondent: With regard to the proposed findings of fact submitted by the Respondent, it is first noted that the Respondent's proposals are virtually impossible to address with specificity because, for the most part, they are comprised of summaries of testimony (testimony both favorable and unfavorable to the Respondent), rather than being statements of the specific facts the Respondent wishes to have found. In this regard it is perhaps sufficient to note that most of the Respondent's summaries of the testimony are essentially accurate summaries of the testimony at hearing, even where the summaries contain assertions that conflict with each other. As noted above, I have resolved most of those conflicts in favor of the versions put forth by the Petitioner's witnesses. Inasmuch as the Respondent has chosen to summarize testimony rather than make proposals of specific facts to be found, it would serve no useful purpose to embark upon a line-by-line discussion of all of the summaries. COPIES FURNISHED: E. Renee Alsobrook, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation Northwood Centre Suite 60 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Charles Tunnicliff, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation Northwood Centre Suite 60 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Gregory F. Esposito, Esquire Suite 9 8000 Wiles Road Coral Springs, Florida 33065 Anna Polk, Executive Director Board of Talent Agencies Department of Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Jack McRay, General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792
The Issue The issue in this case is whether just cause exists to terminate Respondent's employment with Petitioner based on violations of Florida Administrative Code Rules 6A-5.056(2), , and (5), for incompetence, misconduct in office, and/or willful neglect of duties, respectively.
Findings Of Fact The Board is responsible for hiring, monitoring, and firing employees at its schools, including Manatee and Pinewoods. At all times relevant hereto, Respondent was an employee of the Board. Respondent was hired by the Board on August 22, 2005, as a second grade teacher at Harns Marsh Elementary. She taught second grade at that school for three years. At the end of her third year, Respondent was awarded a professional services contract. Prior to the beginning of her fourth year at Harns March, Respondent was told she was being moved to a fifth grade class for the upcoming school year. Inasmuch as she preferred teaching second grade, Respondent voluntarily transferred to Manatee for the 2008-2009 school year, as there was a second grade position open there. Manatee is a Title I school, serving a distinct population of students with various emotional or behavior issues. After teaching second grade at Manatee for one year, she was moved to a third grade class for the 2009-2010 school year, then back to second grade for the 2010-2011 school year. The principal at Manatee, Louzao, began to have concerns about Respondent commencing in the 2009-2010 school year. The annual evaluation Louzao initially prepared for Respondent after the 2009-2010 school year had contained less than satisfactory scores. In the face of a possible grievance of those scores by Respondent and the teacher’s union, Louzao upgraded the scores to satisfactory. Louzao was a fairly new principal, being at that time in only her third year as an administrator. She did not feel comfortable defending her negative evaluation against a formal grievance. Louzao also believed a satisfactory evaluation would encourage Respondent to improve. As a result of some of her concerns, Louzao ultimately moved Respondent to third grade for the 2010-2011 school year. Louzao felt like Respondent might interact better with students slightly older than the second grade students she had been teaching. However, some of the third grade students’ parents complained to Louzao about Respondent, resulting in some students being transferred out of Respondent’s class to another third grade class. It was not Louzao’s normal policy to transfer students; she would prefer that the teacher and students work through their issues. In this case, however, Louzao felt like removal of the students would be most beneficial as Respondent continued to work with the school guidance counselor dealing with her classroom demeanor. The teacher-student relationship was never fully corrected to Louzao’s satisfaction. For example, the first student was transferred out of Respondent’s class in August, then another in October, and yet another in November 2010. Louzao met or talked with Respondent daily and had her assistant principal counsel Respondent in an effort to improve Respondent’s teaching skills. At the end of the 2010-2011 school year, Louzao gave Respondent another evaluation with generally satisfactory scores, but listed several “areas of concern,” i.e., areas that needed additional work. Louzao would have given Respondent less than satisfactory marks, but she had failed to adequately document Respondent’s shortcomings during the school year, a requirement for unsatisfactory evaluations. Louzao then attempted to deal with Respondent’s inability to properly interact with her students by moving Respondent to a fifth grade class for the 2011-2012 school year.1/ Louzao believed that Respondent’s sarcasm and coarse demeanor would be more well-received by older students. Almost immediately, however, parents began to make complaints about Respondent. Louzao was contacted by parents who reported that Respondent had called students “retarded” or “stupid.” School staff questioned a number of students and received verification from those students that the remarks had been made. Based upon that verification – although it was not absolute proof that the comments were made – Louzao contacted the Board’s professional standards office to begin further investigation into the allegations. It was also reported that Respondent was refusing to allow children to use the bathroom when needed. Again, while Respondent admitted to having a fairly strict bathroom policy, there is no proof that children were actually denied bathroom privileges. The school, nonetheless, found sufficient student verification of the allegation to make it a point of discussion with Respondent. Then, in September 2011, an incident occurred which led to an investigation of Respondent by the Department of Children and Families. The incident involved discipline in a school stairwell. The security videos from a stairwell near Respondent’s classroom showed students walking and running up and down the interior, non-air conditioned stairwell numerous times for approximately 20 minutes without water or rest. There is no dispute about what the videotapes show; Respondent admits that she had the students doing “training” to prevent them from ascending and descending the stairs improperly. Several parents complained to the school about the staircase discipline incident. Respondent described the matter as follows: She had been having a lot of trouble with this particular class; they were very disrespectful. The students would misbehave when they were moving from the classroom to other areas of the school. Particularly, the students would run up and down the stairs. To change that behavior, Respondent decided to teach the students how to walk up and down the stairs. To that end, she had the students walk up and down the stairs over and over until they did it properly. The videotape accurately reflected that it took some students more attempts to stop running and that some students never did stop running. The activity was not, according to Respondent, punishment; rather, it was a teaching moment. She had seen a student injured at a prior school because of running down the stairs, and Respondent did not want that to happen again. Respondent said she just lost track of how much time the students were on the staircase. To administration, however, it looked like Respondent was disciplining the students in an extremely harsh fashion. The Board does not condone such actions by its employees. After the staircase discipline matter, Respondent was suspended with pay. A pre-determination hearing was held, but Respondent said the staircase incident was not mentioned. Rather, she was questioned about various allegations that had been made by students and their parents. The allegations included: Calling a student a “retard;” saying someone was stupid; not allowing students adequate bathroom breaks; making fun of a student’s name; and yelling at students. Upon completion of the pre-determination meeting, Respondent was suspended with pay and sent home. She was later assigned to an office job so that she could be of some benefit to the Board during her suspension. The investigation concluded with the issuance of a Letter of Reprimand to Respondent, who was also required to attend a class on classroom management and a Code of Ethics training session. She was not allowed to return to the classroom at that time. In January 2012, at the beginning of the second semester of the 2011-2012 school year, a second grade teaching position came open at Pinewoods. The Board’s Professional Standards office called Dr. Carlin and told her the Board wished to have Respondent fill the position. Dr. Carlin agreed to the assignment. Dr. Carlin did not speak to Louzao about Respondent and did not know of Respondent’s prior issues at Manatee. Respondent’s testimony that Dr. Carlin stated she was aware of “everything that happened at Manatee” is not credible. Respondent first went to Pinewoods on or about January 19, 2012. She was introduced to the school and to her classroom by Dr. Carlin. Dr. Carlin attempted to prepare Respondent and to provide all the support and assistance she could to insure Respondent’s success. One of the items of support provided by Dr. Carlin, was a website containing the school handbook which sets out all of Pinewood’s policies for teachers and other staff members. Respondent remembers meeting Dr. Carlin on a Thursday and being told she would start co-teaching the class with the out-going teacher the following Monday, January 23, 2012. It was Respondent’s understanding that she would then begin teaching on her own the following Friday, January 27, 2012. (Respondent said her understanding was based on an email she received from the Professional Standards office informing her about the new assignment. However, the email was not produced as an exhibit in this case.) In fact, Respondent was introduced to the class on Friday January 20, 2012, the out-going teacher’s last day. She took over the class the following Monday, January 23, 2012, on her own. Dr. Carlin remembers spending a fair amount of time with Respondent on Respondent’s first day before introducing her to the class. Respondent’s first day with the students in her new class was atypical; it was a field day of sorts at the school, so the students were out of the class more than they were in. At the beginning of the class period, however, Respondent noticed that the children were socializing and talking for the first few minutes after arrival. Respondent asked the out-going teacher if she always allowed the children to do that, and was told she did. That was a different approach than the one normally taken by Respondent. She had hard-fast rules about what students should do upon entering the classroom, e.g., turn in their homework, bring their homework notebook to the teacher’s desk, sharpen their pencils, use the bathroom, and then do advanced reading or use the computer until regular instruction began. Respondent’s approach was much more strict and instruction-oriented than the prior teacher’s. Within two or three days of Respondent assuming her new teaching position, some of the students’ parents began calling the school with complaints. The initial complaint was that Respondent was assigning weekend homework in violation of the school’s policies. When Respondent became aware of the policy, she ceased that practice. Dr. Carlin believes Respondent should have known the policy after reading her school handbook, but the book was over 50 pages long and contained a lot of information. Thus, Respondent’s temporary violation of that policy is excusable. More troubling, however, were the complaints concerning Respondent’s alleged verbal abuse of students and her rude demeanor. Parents who visited Respondent’s classroom found her to be aloof, stand-offish, and she seemed not to be engaged with the students. It was reported again that Respondent was refusing to allow students to use the bathroom as needed. There is no competent evidence to support the allegation, but it is troubling that the same complaint that had been made by parents at Manatee was being made by parents at Pinewoods. The Board’s director of professional standards received “weekly, if not daily,” calls from parents and administration complaining about Respondent almost from the day she started her employment at Pinewoods. Dr. Carlin visited Respondent’s classroom on several occasions to see for herself whether there were any “teaching” issues that needed attention. Dr. Carlin met with Respondent on February 1, 2012, just one week after Respondent started teaching at Pinewoods. The purpose of the meeting was to discuss the parents’ complaints and to provide suggestions for doing better in the classroom. Respondent was not told at that time that she was being formally reprimanded. A letter dated February 6, 2012, memorialized the February 1, 2012, meeting and constituted a written reprimand for Respondent’s behaviors in the classroom. Despite the prior meeting, Respondent was surprised by the written reprimand. The letter set out six categories of problems that had been identified by Dr. Carlin from letters and conversations with a number of parents: Lack of respect shown to students and parents, e.g., rolling her eyes and speaking in disrespectful tones; Classroom not warm and supportive. Refusing to help children and making them cry; Refusing to allow children restroom privileges when needed; Moving through the curriculum too fast; Giving excessive homework; and Causing children to cry and become distressed about coming to school. Respondent denied each of the allegations and expressed surprise about the parents’ complaints. She also said that part of the blame for any problems lay with the students; they were not respectful to her and had no rules of conduct.2/ Dr. Carlin knew, however, that the prior teacher had rules for her classroom and the children were well-behaved. Respondent signed the letter, acknowledging receipt. The letter then set forth some guidelines or action plans that were to be implemented immediately by Respondent. In response to the first item, prohibiting Respondent from yelling at students or speaking in a disrespectful tone, Respondent seemed to go to the other extreme. She became very quiet and almost apathetic in her relationship with the students. Respondent did meet expectations in the other items, at least to some degree, though Dr. Carlin was not totally satisfied with all Respondent’s actions. Finally, the letter provided four distinct suggestions for improving her conduct and teaching habits, including: Use of the Peace Education materials in her classroom, including I-Care Rules. Respondent was to meet with Mrs. Cutting and Ms. Roberts for assistance with implementing the materials. Use of the Board’s academic plans for subject areas. Respondent was to meet with Mrs. Cutting and Mrs. Hardee to receive coaching and modeling with regards to the materials. Initiation of a classroom plan outlining her expectations for students. Following all directives in “this letter.” In response to the four suggestions, Respondent: Met with Mrs. Cutting and Ms. Roberts about the Peace Education materials. However, Respondent did not demonstrate implementation of the materials in her classroom. Respondent met with Mrs. Cutting and Mrs. Hardee about use of the Board’s academic plans. However, she did not utilize the plans on a regular basis. Respondent did initiate a classroom plan outlining her expectations for students. Dr. Carlin described the plan as inferior and had to re-write it (with assistance from her staff). Respondent considered her plan to be adequate in all regards, even prior to editing by Dr. Carlin. The fourth guideline was somewhat nebulous, so it is difficult to ascertain whether Respondent complied with the directive. After the letter was issued, Dr. Carlin waited for a week to give Respondent an opportunity to incorporate the guidelines and suggestions. She then conducted three formal observations of Respondent’s classroom to determine whether the guidelines and suggestions were being followed. She prepared written synopses of her observations. The assistant principal, Ms. DeMarchena, also did an observation that was codified in written notes. The gist of the observations by administrative staff was that Respondent was unresponsive to students, uncaring in her demeanor, lethargic in her efforts to teach, and somewhat rude. Dr. Carlin described Respondent as “the worst teacher I have ever seen in my career.” Dr. Carlin noticed a totally lethargic demeanor by Respondent after the February 1, 2012, meeting and February 6, 2012, written reprimand. Respondent seemed to just stop caring about her job. Dr. Carlin said of her visits to Respondent’s classroom, “I really couldn’t quite believe my eyes.” There were 18 students in Respondent’s classroom at Pinewoods. Eight of their parents made formal complaints to Dr. Carlin about Respondent’s classroom demeanor or teaching skills. Three of those parents testified at final hearing and expressed overall dissatisfaction with Respondent’s teaching abilities. The parents observed that their children did well at school prior to Respondent’s arrival, then did well after Respondent’s departure. While Respondent was teaching, however, their children were unhappy, unmotivated, and emotionally distressed. Two of the parents had teaching experience and measured Respondent both professionally and from their perspective as parents. These parents also discussed Respondent’s behavior and teaching abilities with many of the other parents from the class. The parents’ complaints included the following: Respondent ignored two parents when they came into the classroom, a response the parents had not experienced from any other teacher. Respondent did not engage her students in the celebration of a holiday (Valentine’s Day), even upon intervention by a parent who brought treats for the students. Respondent’s classroom was messy and disorganized. Students who had previously enjoyed school were now reluctant to attend Respondent’s class. Students feared Respondent and were afraid to complain about her strictly enforced policies, e.g., bathroom and pencil sharpening limitations. One parent reported that her child prayed each night that Respondent would be nice to the class. Pinewood’s curriculum specialist, Ms. Hardee, was asked by Dr. Carlin to observe Respondent in the classroom and to provide assistance as needed. Ms. Hardee intervened to assist Respondent to gain access to the web-based accelerated reading materials when Respondent initially experienced problems. She also helped Respondent understand the homework policy and other school policies. When observing Respondent’s classroom, Ms. Hardee found that not all students were actively engaged. Ms. Hardee also substituted for Respondent on one occasion and could not find a lesson plan for that day. Respondent said the lesson plan was right in the middle of her desk and does not know why Ms. Hardee could not find it. Many of the parents, as well as administrators, reported that Respondent’s classroom was extremely messy and disorganized. It is, therefore, understandable that Ms. Hardee would not find the lesson plan. Hardee, who was called by Respondent as a witness, provided extremely credible testimony. During her review of Respondent’s class, Hardee found a “lack of procedures” in the classroom and the students were not engaged during instruction time. Hardee described Respondent’s style as “flat, without expression or enthusiasm.” One parent of a student at Manatee, the prior school at which Respondent had taught, testified on Respondent’s behalf. She praised Respondent’s teaching and said Respondent did a good job with her child. Of the several parents’ testimony, the Manatee parent’s was the least persuasive. On February 22, 2012, Dr. Carlin met with Respondent and addressed the many concerns raised by parents and the observations made by herself and her staff. Respondent and Dr. Carlin discussed all the problem areas and Dr. Carlin told Respondent unequivocally that failure to correct the problems would result in sanctions, up to and including termination of employment. It was Dr. Carlin’s intention to place Respondent on a very short leash, intending to act quickly if things did not drastically improve. However, that very evening Dr. Carlin received three additional letters from upset parents complaining about “very disturbing” incidents in Respondent’s classroom. Dr. Carlin contacted the Professional Standards office and the Board’s attorney the next day. In consultation with those people, Dr. Carlin decided that, notwithstanding, her representations to Respondent the day before, she must remove Respondent from the classroom before irreparable harm was done to the students. She then notified Respondent – on February 23, 2012 – that she was being suspended with pay pending further review. The entire situation concerning Respondent’s classroom demeanor and actions was then reviewed by the Professional Standards office. That office determined that just cause existed to terminate Respondent’s employment. Dr. Carlin concurred with the decision. By letter dated April 20, 2012, Respondent was notified that a recommendation for termination of employment would be made to the Board at its next meeting. The letter also notified Respondent that she was suspended without pay effective April 23, 2012. Respondent rejects all of the complaints against her as being without basis or truth. She says the “staircase discipline” issue was just a misunderstanding; she simply lost track of how much time she made the children walk up and down the stairs. She did not, however, grieve the reprimand issued for that incident. Respondent says the children simply misunderstood her bathroom policy; it was correct and appropriate. The parents’ comments about her were, she said, derived from their children’s mistaken perception of her demeanor and attitude. And, even though Respondent acquiesced and took a behavior management class and a class on teacher’s code of ethics, she did not believe she needed them or that they taught her anything. Respondent’s testimony lacked credibility and was not persuasive. The most credible and persuasive evidence presented in this case indicates that Respondent does not recognize how she comes across to students and their parents. Respondent’s demeanor and teaching style, while it may be comfortable to her, is not consistent with good teaching practices. She is dour, lethargic, unfriendly, scary to her students, and defensive. Because she does not understand her own shortcomings, Respondent has become incompetent and has willfully neglected her duties as a teacher.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by Petitioner, Lee County School Board, upholding the termination of Respondent, Elaine Partenheimer's, employment for the reasons set forth above. DONE AND ENTERED this 19th day of October, 2012, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. R. BRUCE MCKIBBEN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of October, 2012.
The Issue Whether just cause exists for Petitioner to suspend Respondent without pay and terminate his employment as a teacher.
Findings Of Fact The Parties Petitioner is a duly-constituted school board charged with operating, controlling, and supervising all free public schools within the School District of Miami-Dade County, Florida, pursuant to Florida Constitution Article IX, section 4(b), and section 1012.23, Florida Statutes. In the timeframe relevant to this proceeding, the 2011- 2012 school year, Respondent was employed as the lead technology teacher, pursuant to an annual services contract, at Miami Norland High School ("Norland"), a public school in Miami-Dade County, Florida. At all times relevant to this proceeding, Respondent's employment with Petitioner was governed by Florida law, Petitioner's policies, and the collective bargaining agreement between Miami-Dade County Public Schools and the United Teachers of Dade. Events Giving Rise to This Proceeding Certification Examinations Norland offers courses in Adobe Photoshop ("Photoshop") and Adobe Dreamweaver ("Dreamweaver"). Each course offers an industry certification examination. The exams are provided by Certiport, an independent provider of educational, assessment, examination, and certification programs. To prepare for a certification exam, the student takes practice exams. Performance on the practice exams indicates readiness to take the certification exam, so it is important that the student perform well on the practice exams prior to taking the certification exam. Upon reaching a certain achievement level on the practice exams, indicating readiness to take the certification exam, the student goes to another classroom to take the certification exam. The exams are taken on a computer. Nothing but the computer is allowed on the desk during the exam. Students are informed of the rule that they are not allowed to have or use papers, notebooks, or any other materials when taking the exam. If the student passes the exam, he or she receives a certificate. In the 2011-2012 school year, the certification exams for Photoshop and Dreamweaver were administered more than once per school day at Norland. As part of his responsibility as lead technology teacher at Norland, Respondent proctored the certification exams for the Photoshop and Dreamweaver courses during the 2011-2012 school year. To be authorized to proctor the certification exams, Respondent entered into a Proctor Agreement with Certiport ("Agreement"). The Agreement required, among other things, that Respondent ensure the security of the exam and supervise certification candidates taking the exam to ensure that no notes containing the content of the test questions or answers were used during the exam. The Agreement provided that in the event of any evidence of improper conduct by the candidate or violation of the exam process, the proctor must terminate the exam, confiscate the exam materials, and immediately notify Certiport. Adherence to the Agreement was required for Respondent to be authorized to serve as a proctor for the certification exams. Alleged Cheating on Certification Exams D.J. was enrolled as a student in Mr. Halligan's Photoshop course at Norland during the 2011-2012 school year. Despite never having obtained a passing score on a practice exam, D.J. was taken out of Halligan's class to take the Photoshop certification exam.2/ D.J. took the Photoshop certification exam twice, and sat for it during her regularly scheduled Photoshop class.3/ D.J. took the certification exam for the second time on April 3, 2012, and passed it on her second sitting. Respondent proctored the Photoshop certification exam on April 3, 2012, during the period when D.J. took the exam and passed. D.J. testified, credibly, that Respondent allowed her to use a package containing the answers during the exam, and that he told the other students taking the exam during that period that they also could use assistance materials to take the exam. After finding out that she had passed the exam, D.J. returned to her Photoshop class and told Halligan that she had passed. She also told him that Respondent had allowed her and others to use materials to assist them while taking the exam. D.J. testified, credibly, that she had never been a student in Respondent's class, that he had never disciplined her, and that she had never had problems with him. Accordingly, she had no motivation to fabricate her statement that Respondent had allowed her to cheat on the exam. N.A. also attended Norland during the 2011-2012 school year and also took Halligan's Photoshop course. N.A. had never achieved the minimum passing score on the practice exams, but nonetheless was ordered to take the Photoshop certification exam.4/ She sat for the Photoshop certification exam three times and passed it on her third sitting, on April 3, 2012. N.A. credibly testified that Respondent had allowed her to use the practice exam package to take the certification exam.5/ After passing the exam, N.A. returned to Halligan's class and told him that she had passed. Halligan asked her how she had passed and she told him that Respondent had allowed her to use her practice exam package. Halligan asked her to provide a written statement regarding what had happened. She prepared a written statement but subsequently retracted it. Halligan and another technology teacher, Mr. Gant, contacted the Office of the Inspector General for Miami-Dade County Public Schools ("OIG") and reported that students who were not capable of passing the certification exams were, in fact, passing. The OIG conducted an investigation into alleged violations regarding the Adobe and Dreamweaver certification exam protocol at Norland. As part of this investigation, Ellen Roelofs, along with another OIG investigator, interviewed N.A. and asked her if she had cheated on the certification exam. N.A. initially denied having cheated but then confessed to having done so.6/ The OIG investigation ultimately substantiated allegations that Respondent had allowed students to cheat on the Photoshop and Dreamweaver certification exams. Following completion of the OIG investigation, a conference for the record ("CFR") was conducted between Respondent; Joyce Castro, a District Director for the Miami-Dade County Public Schools Office of Professional Standards; and others regarding charges that Respondent allowed students to cheat on the Photoshop and Dreamweaver certification exams, in violation of Petitioner's policies 3210, Standards of Ethical Conduct; 3210.01, Code of Ethics; and 2605, Research and Evaluation. Based on the OIG report findings, the Office of Professional Standards determined that Respondent could not be trusted in the future to proctor the certification exams. Following the CFR, the matter was presented to a disciplinary review team, which recommended that Respondent be terminated from his employment. On October 16, 2013, Petitioner took action to suspend Respondent without pay and terminate his employment. Respondent's Defenses Respondent verified that as part of his duties as lead technology teacher at Norland, he proctored the Photoshop and Dreamweaver certification exams in the 2011-2012 school year. Respondent denied having given students the answers to the exams or otherwise allowing them to cheat on the exams. The undersigned found Respondent's testimony less than forthcoming and not credible. Respondent also presented the testimony of Rhailyn Campbell, a student at Norland during the 2011-2012 school year. Campbell testified that he took the Dreamweaver certification exam on April 3, 2012, midday; that Respondent did not tell him or any other students that they could cheat on the exam; and that he did not observe any other students cheating or being allowed to cheat. Campbell denied having been interviewed by the OIG during its investigation of Respondent. However, Roelofs testified, credibly, that she did, in fact, interview Campbell during the OIG investigation. This testimony was substantiated by the Report of Interview she prepared memorializing that interview. Based on this evidence, Campbell's testimony is deemed not credible.7/ Respondent also presented the testimony of Haresh Seogopaul, T.O., and Dean Anthony Richards, students at Norland in the 2011-2012 school year. Seogopaul and T.O. testified that they took the Dreamweaver8/ certification exam on January 25, 2012. Richards took the Photoshop certification exam on January 25, 2012. Each testified that he did not cheat on the exam, that Respondent did not allow him to cheat on the exam, and that Respondent did not allow others to cheat on the exam. This testimony does not contradict D.J.'s and N.A.'s credible testimony that they were allowed to cheat on the Photoshop certification exams conducted on April 3, 2012; it merely shows that Respondent did not allow students to cheat on an entirely different day, January 25, 2012. Through the testimony of Roelofs, Respondent offered the Report of Interview ("Report") for K.E., D.C., and D.W., each of whom took the Photoshop certification exam on April 3, 2012, and each of whom were interviewed by Roelofs during the OIG investigation. Each Report was prepared by Roelofs and contained a summary of the statement made by the student being interviewed, at the time he was interviewed. Each summary reflects that the student stated that Respondent did not allow students taking the certification exam to cheat on the exam.9/ Clearly, Roelofs has no personal knowledge of the facts and events that are described in the summaries of these students' statements, and the statements themselves constitute unsubstantiated hearsay that does not supplement or explain other competent evidence in the record. As such, these reports and their contents do not constitute competent substantial evidence on which findings of fact may be based. Findings of Ultimate Fact In this proceeding, Petitioner seeks to suspend Respondent without pay and terminate his employment as a teacher on the basis of just cause——specifically, misconduct in office under Florida Administrative Code Rule 6A-5.056 and violation of Petitioner's policies 3210, 3210.01, and 2605. As more fully addressed below, Petitioner bears the burden of proof, by a preponderance of the evidence, to show that just cause exists, on these bases, to suspend Respondent without pay and terminate his employment. Whether Respondent committed the charged offenses is a question of ultimate fact to be determined by the trier of fact in the context of each alleged violation. Misconduct in Office Misconduct under rule 6A-5.056(3) requires violation of the Code of Ethics of the Education Profession, as adopted in rule 6B-1.001, and the Principles of Professional Conduct for the Education Profession in Florida, as adopted in rule 6B-1.006. Here, the evidence establishes that Respondent allowed students to cheat on the Photoshop certification exams administered on April 3, 2012. In doing so, Respondent failed to exercise the best professional judgment and integrity and failed to achieve and sustain the highest degree of ethical conduct, in violation of rule 6B-1.001. Respondent violated rule 6B-1.006 by failing to maintain honesty in all professional dealings. He also violated this rule by submitting fraudulent information on documents in connection with his professional activities, both in allowing or enabling students to cheat, and for his role in generating fraudulent passing scores for students who cheated on the exams. Rule 6A-5.056(3)10/ requires, for a finding of misconduct, a showing that the violation is sufficiently serious to impair the individual's effectiveness in the school system. Here, the evidence establishes that as a result of his conduct, Respondent's effectiveness in the school system is impaired. Castro persuasively testified that Respondent could not be trusted in the future to proctor exams. Moreover, Respondent violated the Agreement with Certiport, so can no longer serve as proctor for the Photoshop and Dreamweaver certification exams. For these reasons, it is determined that Respondent's effectiveness in the school system is impaired. Accordingly, the preponderance of the evidence establishes that Respondent's conduct at issue in this proceeding constitutes misconduct in office pursuant to rule 6A-5.056(3). Violation of Petitioner's Policies Petitioner has charged Respondent with violating Policy 3210, Standards of Ethical Conduct, which requires that instructional staff maintain honesty in all professional dealings and not submit fraudulent information on any document in connection with professional activities. Here, the evidence establishes that Respondent did not maintain honesty in his professional dealings in connection with his proctoring duty to maintain the integrity of the Photoshop certification exams. Further, he submitted fraudulent information on documents in connection with his professional activities, in allowing or enabling students to cheat and for his role in generating fraudulent passing scores for students who cheated on the certification exams. Accordingly, it is determined that Respondent violated Policy 3210. Petitioner also has charged Respondent with violating Policy 3210.01, Code of Ethics. Here, the evidence establishes that Respondent did not abide by Petitioner's Code of Ethics. His actions in allowing cheating on the certification exams show that he did not make the well-being of the students and the honest performance of his professional duties his core guiding principles. Through his actions, he failed to protect and advance the Miami-Dade County Public School District and its students. Accordingly, it is determined that Respondent violated this policy. Additionally, Petitioner has charged Respondent with violating Policy 2605, Research and Evaluation. Policy 2605 incorporates the test administration and security standards set forth in the document titled "Miami-Dade County Public Schools: Standards, Guidelines, and Procedures for Test Administration and Test Security"(November 2007)(hereafter "Test Security Document"). These standards require, among other things, that all testing activities, including supervision and monitoring, be conducted in a manner that ensures the security of test content. The standards also require that all standardized tests be administered in accordance with established administration and test security procedures as outlined in program guides for each testing program; that students shall not be assisted in answering test questions by any means or by any person; and that test proctors must actively monitor students to discourage cheating and must record, and immediately notify the principal and test chairperson of, any test administration irregularity or security breach. Here, Respondent's professional duties included serving as proctor for the Photoshop and Dreamweaver certification exams for Norland. Respondent's conduct in allowing students to cheat on the Photoshop certification exams violated the foregoing test administration and security standards and, thus, violated Policy 2605.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner, Miami-Dade County School Board, enter a final order upholding its suspension of Respondent, Emmanuel Fleurantin, without pay and terminating his employment as a teacher. DONE AND ENTERED this 29th day of July, 2014, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S CATHY M. SELLERS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of July, 2014.
The Issue The issues in the case are whether the allegations of the Administrative Complaint are correct, and, if so, what penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact At all times material to this case, the Respondent was a licensed chiropractic physician, holding Florida license number CH 5839. In addition to his chiropractic training, the Respondent has completed a course of study in biomechanics and has received a "Masters of Professional Studies" degree from Lynn University in Human Biomechanical Trauma. He advertised services related to "Human Biomechanical Trauma" to other chiropractic physicians practicing in the same geographic area. On November 29, 2001, a twenty-nine-year-old female (referred to hereinafter as the patient) presented herself to the Respondent's office complaining of back pain of approximately two weeks duration. The patient was a former gymnast with many years of training. Her regular exercise routine included weight lifting, and the onset of her back pain occurred while she was lifting weights. Initially the pain was in the area of her mid-back and during the subsequent weeks had progressed to her lower back, and to her upper back and neck. The patient also had a history of migraine-type headaches unrelated to the weightlifting and for which she had sought previous treatment with limited success from another physician. On November 29, 2001, the Respondent completed a medical history and performed an evaluation of the patient's condition. The Respondent provided treatment and adjustment. During the time the patient received treatment, she removed all clothing but for her underpants, at the Respondent's direction. A robe was provided inside the treatment room for her to wear after undressing and before the treatment was provided. After providing the treatment on November 29, the Respondent referred the patient to another facility for a series of x-rays. On November 30, 2001, the patient returned for additional treatment at which time the Respondent performed an adjustment to the patient's neck and back. After the treatment was completed and the Respondent exited the room, the patient began to dress, at which point the Respondent entered the room holding a digital camera. The patient testified that the Respondent removed her robe, leaving her clad only in her underpants, that the Respondent told her that the photography was a routine office practice, and that he could not continue the treatment unless the photographs were taken. The patient testified that the Respondent was aggressive while the photographs were taken, speaking with a "raised voice" and moving quickly, instructing her on how to pose, and moving her arms and legs into position. The patient testified that during the incident she was scared and in a "dazed state," and that she didn't know how many photos were taken or how much time elapsed during the photo session. She made no attempt to leave the examination room until after the photos were taken. The Respondent denied that he told the patient that the photographic evaluation was a routine office procedure. The Respondent testified that he discussed the photographic evaluation with the patient and that she permitted the photos to be taken. He testified that he both verbally directed and demonstrated by example, the positions in which he sought to photograph the patient. He further testified that some of the positions came from the patient when describing her "activities of daily living." He testified that she participated in the photography willingly and without protest. Other than the Respondent and the patient, no one else was in the room during the time the photographs were taken. The Respondent's offices consisted of a small suite of rooms located in a strip shopping center. Based on the physical structure of the offices described at the hearing, it is unlikely that voices could be raised to the point of "yelling" without others in the office being aware of the situation. There is no evidence that the patient was physically prevented from leaving the office. Although the patient signed a generic release for treatment when she began seeing the Respondent, the patient testified that the release was essentially blank at the time she signed. In addition to the generic consent for treatment form, the Respondent's office had prepared a separate "Consent Agreement Concerning Biomechanic Photographic Evaluation" which provided as follows: Dear Patient: Holistic Healthcare Centers offers Biomechanic Photographic Evaluation for the purpose of specific biomechanic assessment of the patient. The procedure will include some or all of the following: Digital photos of the patient in various positions, movements and activities. These photographs will be taken with the patient partially or completely unclothed, as determined by the physician(s). Processing and analysis of these photographs on computers either on the premises or at another location, to be determined by the physician(s). Reportage to the patient as to the results of the analyses. Restrictions on the use of these photographs include: Photographic data will be kept in password protected locations and will be accessible only by Dr. Scott Baker and Dr. Scott Drizin. Appropriate hard copies of photographs will be kept in the patient's confidential case file, if needed. The photographic data will not be published either in print or electronically without the patient's express written consent. Utilizations of photographs, data and analyses results can be used educationally while protecting the privacy of the patient. I HAVE READ, UNDERSTAND AND CONSENT TO THE ABOVE. Under the conditions indicated, I hereby place myself under your care for those procedures as described above as indicated in your professional judgment. The "Consent Agreement Concerning Biomechanic Photographic Evaluation" provided a space for the signature of the person from whom consent is being sought and for the signature of a witness. The patient did not sign the photographic consent form. At no time did the patient sign any written release specifically allowing the Respondent to take photographs. According to his note handwritten on the "Consent Agreement Concerning Biomechanic Photographic Evaluation," the Respondent became aware at some point that the patient had not signed the photo consent form. A few days after the photos were taken, the patient returned to the Respondent's office and inquired about the photographs. By that time, the digital photo files had been transferred from the camera used to take the photos to a computer located in the Respondent's office. After the patient requested to view the photos, the Respondent went to a computer where the digital photo files were stored. The Respondent and the patient reviewed the photographs for about 45 minutes. During the photo review, the Respondent made comments that could be construed as relating to the patient's posture. According to the patient's testimony, such comments included "you're standing a little to the left on this one and you should be standing more upright on this one" and "see, you're standing crooked, you should be standing straight." During the photo review, the Respondent told the patient that he and his partner, Dr. Scott Baker, were interested in writing a book and pursuing additional medical training. The patient testified that the Respondent may have used the word "biomechanics" during the photo review, but was not certain. After the photos were reviewed, the patient asked for a copy of the digital image files. Initially the Respondent declined to produce the files, but by the end of the appointment, after receiving additional therapeutic treatment and adjustments, the Respondent provided to the patient a disc containing the photo files. According to the patient, the Respondent advised the patient not to show the photographs to anyone. After the patient received a copy of the photo files, she did not again see the Respondent in a therapeutic setting. She cancelled her remaining appointments with the Respondent, obtained her X-rays from the Respondent's practice, and sought treatment elsewhere. After the patient cancelled the appointments, she received at least one call from the Respondent's secretary inquiring as to the reason for the cancellation. During the call, the Respondent spoke to the patient and inquired as to whether there were problems, at which point the patient advised that she would not return to the Respondent for treatment. At the hearing, the Petitioner presented the expert testimony of Dr. Michael Major, a Florida-licensed chiropractic physician. Although Dr. Major appears to be knowledgeable about biomechanics, he has not undertaken any advanced education in biomechanics. Dr. Major testified one of the reasons to use photography in a chiropractic setting would be to observe structural changes that could occur related to treatment. Dr. Major testified that such photos are generally taken from front, side, or rear perspectives, and utilize spinal or anatomical "landmarks" for purposes of comparing pre-treatment and post-treatment conditions. Dr. Major further testified that he has used digital photography in his practice, generally placing subjects in front of a grid-pattern marked on a wall. Dr. Major's grid system also includes a bilateral scale to identify weight-bearing issues. By using the photo of the subject in front of the grid and on the scale, a chiropractic physician is able to show to a photographic subject various spinal or postural conditions. Dr. Major has used this system in marketing services to prospective clients. Dr. Major termed photos taken from positions other than in front of, to the side of, or from behind a patient as "oblique" angle photos. Dr. Majors testified that such photos had very little analytical value because of the difficulty in accurately reproducing at a subsequent date, the angles from which the original photographs were taken, thus making comparison between the sets of photographs difficult. Dr. Major testified that, when taking a later set of photos, where the angle of camera placement relative to the body is different from the original camera placement by only a few degrees, the later photograph would offer little comparative value because the landmarks would not be located appropriately. A review of the photographs in evidence indicates that the patient was photographed in a routine examination room, posed in various positions, and unclothed but for her underpants. At the hearing, Dr. Major reviewed the photos offered into evidence and opined that although some of the photos taken by the Respondent of the patient provided appropriate diagnostic information, others did not. Dr. Major testified where the photos did not contain appropriate diagnostic information, the Respondent violated the applicable standard of care by not utilizing the best techniques in order to isolate planes of motion sufficiently to provide useful information. Dr. Major also testified that the failure to obtain the patient's consent prior to taking photographs was a violation of the applicable standard of care. Dr. Major opined without elaboration that taking the photographs without the patient's consent also constituted sexual misconduct. According to Dr. Major, the failure to have another female present in the room during an exam was not a violation of the applicable standard of care. The Respondent offered evidence related to his use of photography and the development of a "protocol" that he and his partner were creating to document biomechanical evaluations of certain patients. In addition to the Respondent's testimony, the Respondent presented the testimony of Scott M. Baker, D.C., who was in practice with the Respondent at the time of the events at issue. At some point in the mid-1990's, Dr. Baker and the Respondent became interested in continuing their education in biomechanics, and both completed the additional biomechanics training referenced herein. Part of their interests included conducting research to develop a "protocol" for biomechanical evaluation. Part of the protocol included photographic evaluations of patients. The model apparently being followed referenced radiological studies where multiple X-rays from different angles were taken of a patient during diagnostic testing. However, although the Respondent asserted that the photographs were part of the treatment offered to the patient, Dr. Baker testified that the photos were not actually taken for diagnostic purposes. The alleged purpose of the photos was to educate a patient on existing conditions with the ability to demonstrate at a later date, visible progress though the use of comparative photography. Dr. Baker testified that after the Respondent took the photos of the patient, he and the Respondent reviewed the photos and indexed them by reference to anatomical characteristics. Dr. Baker acknowledged that some of the photos "weren't useful," but that it was preferable to err towards taking too many photos rather than too few, and that the intent was to discard those photos that were not useful. The consent form specific to the photographic study also indicates that the photos may be used for educational purposes with appropriate protection of a patient's privacy. Dr. Baker acknowledged that the protocol was in preliminary stages of development and that greater specificity would be required as development continued. Prior to the patient in this case, only one other chiropractic client had been photographed based on the protocol. When the photographs of the patient were taken, the position from which each photo was taken was not recorded. Dr. Baker testified that when subsequent photos were taken for comparative purposes, the photo subject would have to be repositioned based on the earlier photograph, using an anatomical point of reference. No visible grid pattern was present in the room where the patient's photos were taken and no grid is present in the photos taken of the patient by the Respondent. In order to view the photos, the Respondent planned to use a graphics software program called "Paint Shop Pro" which could allow a grid to be superimposed on a photograph. Whether the computer imposition of a grid pattern on a photo taken subsequently would provide specific anatomical references sufficient to compare the photos is unknown. The asserted reason why the patient wore only underpants in the photos was that wearing a bra would alter the center of gravity being measured. The Respondent further testified that wearing a bra could cause a "cutaneous sensory response" that could lead to a "reflex muscle spasm which would alter the center of gravity." The evidence fails to establish why the same reasoning was not applicable to the underpants that the Respondent directed the patient to leave on.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Health, Board of Chiropractic Medicine, enter a final order finding that Scott Drizin, D.C., is guilty of a failure to practice chiropractic medicine with the level of care, skill, and treatment which is recognized as being acceptable under similar conditions and circumstances, and imposing a fine of $2,500. DONE AND ENTERED this 30th day of November, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S WILLIAM F. QUATTLEBAUM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of November, 2005. COPIES FURNISHED: Louis Kwall, Esquire Kwall, Showers, Coleman & Barack, P.A. 133 North Fort Harrison Avenue Clearwater, Florida 33755 Ephraim D. Livingston, Esquire Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin C-65 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3265 R. S. Power, Agency Clerk Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin A02 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1701 Joe Baker, Jr., Executive Director Board of Chiropractic Medicine Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin C07 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1701
The Issue Whether the decision of Respondent, Seminole County School Board, not to include Petitioner, Cady Studios, LLC, in its award of a yearbook and photography services contract was contrary to its governing statutes, rules, or the solicitation specifications.
Findings Of Fact Respondent, School Board, operates the public school system established for the School District of Seminole County, Florida. See § 1001.30, Fla. Stat. The School Board oversees 37 elementary schools, 12 middle schools, nine high schools, and seven special centers. The Seminole County School District includes over 67,000 students. The School Board is an authorized governmental entity allowed to contract for commodities or services using the competitive solicitation process set forth in section 287.057, Florida Statutes. See §§ 1010.04 and 1001.41(4), Fla. Stat. On July 18, 2017, the School Board published [Request for Proposal] #17180001P-LL, Yearbook and Photography Services (the “RFP”). Through the RFP, the School Board solicited qualified vendors to provide Photography Services to Seminole County Public Schools. The initial contract for the Photography Services runs for three years, with a possible extension of another two years. Prior to this RFP, the School Board had never used a request for proposal to solicit the Photography Services. Thirteen photography and yearbook vendors, including Cady Studios, responded to the RFP. Ultimately, as further explained below, the School Board determined to offer the top seven vendors a contract to provide the Photography Services. Cady Studios was ranked eighth. Consequently, Cady Studios was not selected under the RFP. Cady Studios is a family-owned portrait company based in Florida and has provided school portrait services since 1998. Cady Studios has partnered with over 50 schools in central Florida, and is an approved vendor in 35 Florida school districts. The School Board published the RFP, as well as an Addendum, on VendorLink and Demand Star websites. The School Board used these two on-line platforms to disseminate information regarding the solicitation to interested vendors. The School Board provided links to VendorLink and Demand Star on the district’s website. After the School Board posted the RFP on July 18, 2017, the School Board did not receive any protests to the terms, conditions, or specifications contained in the RFP.5/ Pertinent to this matter, Cady Studios never protested the RFP’s terms, conditions, or specifications, or the School Board’s decision to competitively solicit bids for the Photography Services under section 287.057. As stated in the RFP, the School Board conducted a pre- proposal conference on July 27, 2017. During this meeting, the School Board offered interested vendors the opportunity to ask questions about the RFP, as well as educate themselves about the process. Cady Studios did not attend the pre-proposal conference. On August 2, 2017, the School Board posted an Addendum to the RFP which requested specific pricing information for the Photography Services to be offered to high schools, middle schools, and/or elementary schools in Seminole County. Proposals for the Photography Services were due on August 15, 2017. Thirteen school photography and yearbook vendors, including Cady Studios, presented proposals in response to the RFP. RFP, Section V, directed each vendor to deliver “One (1) original, One (1) copy, and ten (10) electronic [USB] thumb drive version[s]” of its proposal to the School Board. To score the proposals, as set forth in RFP, Section IV, 1.A, the School Board formed an Evaluation Committee. The voting members consisted of an executive director from an elementary school, a middle school, and a high school (or their designees), as well as a local business advisory member. A non-voting School Board member was also included on the Evaluation Committee. The individuals selected to serve as the voting members of the Evaluation Committee included Dr. Trent Daniel (Principal, Lake Brantley High School); Byron Durias (Principal, Sanford Middle School); Tina Langdon (Principal, Sabal Point Elementary School); and Donald Miller (Business Advisory Member). Karen Almond served as the non-voting School Board member. After the School Board assembled the Evaluation Committee, the four voting members received training on the RFP’s scoring procedure. The training was conducted by Luangel Lowder, the School Board’s Purchasing Agent, on August 17, 2017. Ms. Lowder drafted and prepared the RFP. She also facilitated the RFP process. Ms. Lowder distributed training notes to each evaluator, which included guidance on how to score the proposals. In her written comments, Ms. Lowder wrote, “The Vendor Submittals are on Individual Jump Drives. I do have a hard copy if needed.” Ms. Lowder also provided “Adjectival Descriptor Rating Guidelines,” which the voting members were to use to score the proposals. Regarding a score of “0,” the guidelines explained: Unsatisfactory (0): Not responsive to question. “Unsatisfactory” is defined as a response not meeting the requirements without major revisions and proposes an unacceptable risk. “Unsatisfactory” demonstrates a misunderstanding of the requirements; the approach fails to meet performance or capability standard and contains major omissions and inadequate detail to assure the evaluator that the respondent has an understanding of the requirement. RFP, Sections IV and V, also listed the specific evaluation criteria, as well as the adjectival scoring system, the Evaluation Committee was to use to determine each vendor’s score. RFP, Section V, directed that “[e]ach response shall be organized and presented in the following sequence and will include the following at a minimum”: Tab 1-Respondent’s Profile and Submittal Letter (Non- Scored) Tab 2-Experience of Personnel (Weighted Value 25) Tab 3-Technical Approach Methodology (Weighted Value 30) Tab 4-References (Weighted Value 10) Tab 5-Fee Schedule (Weighted Value 35) Tab 6-Confidential Materials, Financial Statement and Litigation (Non-Scored) Tab 7-Exceptions to Draft Contract (Non-Scored) Tab 8-Addenda (Non-Scored) Tab 9-Required Documents (Non-Scored) The proposals were to be scored on a scale of 0 to 4 with a score of 0 as the least favorable, and a score of 4 as the most favorable in all sections. RFP, Section IV, 1.C, noted that a vendor’s response would receive a score of 0 if it was “Unsatisfactory: Not responsive to the question.” The RFP did not provide objective measures for the evaluators to score the proposals. Instead, the School Board relied on the experience and judgment of each evaluator as to what score to award in each category. The RFP notified vendors that, after the proposals were evaluated, the Evaluation Committee might conduct interviews or presentations from a shortlist of vendors. Per the terms of the RFP, the School Board required each winning vendor to enter into a Master Services Agreement. The Master Services Agreement was to ensure that each vendor for the Photography Services complied with, and operated under, the same terms and conditions. These standard terms and conditions included, but were not limited to, requirements for background checks, licenses, certificates of insurance, as well as the use of a common commission’s structure. Thereafter, the School Board intended for each district school to select a company from the list of approved vendors from whom they desired to obtain the Photography Services. After the 13 vendors presented their proposals on August 15, 2017, the School Board distributed a thumb [USB] drive from each vendor to each Evaluation Committee member. At that point, each committee member separately scored each proposal using the four weighted criteria listed in RFP, Section V: Experience of Personnel (25 points), Technical Approach Methodology (30 points), References (10 points), and Fee Schedule (35 points). On September 21, 2017, the Evaluation Committee convened a “short-list meeting” to discuss the scores each committee member awarded to each vendor. When Cady Studios’ proposal came up for review, two committee members, Dr. Trent Daniel and Byron Durias, announced that the USB drives they had been given for Cady Studios were blank. Dr. Daniel had tried her USB drive on two computers with similar results: the USB drive did not contain any files. Ms. Lowder then asked both members if they wished to review another USB drive or a paper copy of Cady Studios’ presentation so that they could score its proposal. Dr. Daniel declined. On her score sheet for Cady Studios, Dr. Daniel wrote before the short-list meeting, “could not read USB - empty.” During the discussion between the other evaluators, Dr. Daniel added: “notes, experience limited, reference from school, senior package high, presentation of bid, partnership w/ Herff Jones.” At the end of the discourse, because she had no proposal to score, Dr. Daniel disclosed to the Evaluation Committee that she awarded Cady Studios a score of “0” in every category. Mr. Durias, however, was willing to evaluate Cady Studios during the short-list meeting. Therefore, Ms. Lowder provided him another USB drive that did contain Cady Studios’ proposal. After his review, Mr. Durias awarded Cady Studios: 3 – Experience of Personnel, 2 – Technical Approach Methodology, 1 – References, and 2 – Fee Schedule. Each USB drive that Tina Langdon and Donald Miller received for Cady Studios contained its proposal, which they scored. Ms. Langdon awarded Cady Studios: 3 – Experience of Personnel, 2 – Technical Approach Methodology, 3 – References, and 3 – Fee Schedule. Mr. Miller awarded Cady Studios: 3 – Experience of Personnel, 2 – Technical Approach Methodology, 3 – References, and 2 – Fee Schedule. At the final hearing, Dr. Daniel explained that she passed on the opportunity to rescore Cady Studios’ proposal because, in her mind, a blank response (or USB drive) equated to a nonresponsive proposal. In other words, she scored what she had been given. Cady Studios’ proposal was “unsatisfactory” because it contained no response to the questions. Dr. Daniel further commented that Cady Studios’ failure to ensure that its proposal was properly copied onto all of its USB drives was irresponsible and unprofessional. This carelessness gave Dr. Daniel apprehension about the quality of service Cady Studios would provide if it could not follow the RFP’s explicit directions. Following the discussion and scoring of the vendors’ proposals, the Evaluation Committee members ranked all 13 vendors by overall total weighted scores. The Evaluation Committee’s final list of vendors and their scores read as follows: Grad Images: 1335 Life Touch: 1290 Leonard’s: 1272.5 Dean Stewart: 1140 Strawbridge: 1095 Josten’s: 1030 Walsworth: 1010 Cady Studios: 720 Barksdale: 715 Nation Wide: 710 Monden Studios: 705 Herff Jones: 670 Ritoba: 585 As shown above, Cady Studios received the eighth highest score. The Evaluation Committee then discussed which vendors it should invite back for informal interviews. After a brief deliberation, the Evaluation Committee reached a consensus that it should extend an interview to the top seven vendors on the scoring list. Dr. Daniel and Ms. Lowder explained that this division was chosen because of the “natural break” in the scores between the seventh ranked vendor (Walsworth) and the eighth ranked vendor (Cady Studios). Ms. Lowder relayed that the relatively large scoring differential between Walsworth (1010) and Cady Studios (720) (nearly 300 points) appeared to separate the top vendors from the others. Therefore, to narrow down the list of vendors to those most qualified to provide the Photography Services, the Evaluation Committee chose this gap as the dividing line. Dr. Daniel relayed that she had previously used this “natural break” scoring technique in cheerleading and dance competitions. Ms. Lowder testified that the RFP did not establish an exact number of vendors the School Board should select to provide the Photography Services. Neither did the RFP state how the vendors were to be condensed, if at all. The Evaluation Committee, however, felt that the number of approved vendors should be limited. A truncated list of vendors would provide a more manageable group for the School Board to oversee to ensure that each vendor offered a similar pricing structure and consistent services. This action would also make it easier for individual schools to select the vendor with which they desired to work. As a result of the Evaluation Committee’s “natural break” methodology, Cady Studios was not grouped with the winning vendors for the Photography Services. As a non-selected vendor, Cady Studios was not authorized to offer Photography Services to the district schools for the length of the RFP contract period (3 to 5 years). Cheryl Olsen serves as the School Board’s Director of Purchasing and Distribution. In this role, she supervised the procurement activities. After the Evaluation Committee’s short- list meeting, Ms. Olsen prepared a “Short List Letter” for the top seven vendors. The letter notified the vendors of their ranking on the short list and invited them back for informal interviews with the Evaluation Committee. On September 22, 2017, Ms. Lowder forwarded Ms. Olsen’s letter to the seven short-listed vendors. The interviews were scheduled for September 28, 2017. On September 28, 2017, the Evaluation Committee met with each of the seven short-listed vendors. Following the interviews, the Evaluation Committee decided that the School Board should offer the Photography Services to all seven short- listed vendors. That afternoon, Ms. Olsen drafted a Notice of Intended Decision announcing the intent to award the RFP to the top seven vendors. Ms. Olsen posted the Notice of Intended Decision on-line through both VendorLink and Demand Star. The Notice of Intended Decision stated: The Purchasing and Distribution Services Department hereby notifies all firms of an intended decision regarding the award of the [RFP] as outlined below or attached. The firms on the attached list will be recommended to the School Board on October 17, 2017 with final contracts to be presented at a future meeting. Failure to file a protest within the time prescribed in section 120.57(3), Florida Statutes, or failure to post the bond or other security required by law within the time allowed for filing a bond shall constitute a waiver of the proceedings under Chapter 120, Florida Statutes.[6/] Attached to the Notice of Intended Decision was the list of the seven vendors who the Evaluation Committee intended to recommend to the School Board for award of the RFP. Cady Studios was not included on the list. On October 10, 2017, the School Board formally approved an award of the Photography Services to the seven vendors identified in the Notice of Intended Decision. On November 7, 2017, the School Board entered into a Master Services Agreement with each of the seven winning vendors for the Photography Services. The initial term of the Master Services Agreements runs from November 8, 2017, through November 7, 2020. Jimmy Smith works as the Market Vice President for Cady Studios. In his role, Mr. Smith oversees all of Cady Studios’ photography services in Florida. Mr. Smith prepared Cady Studios’ proposal for the RFP. Mr. Smith explained that he is familiar with the competitive solicitation process. He has previously submitted proposals on behalf of Cady Studios for school photography services in Pinellas, Hillsborough, and Brevard Counties. In a typical school portrait arrangement, the parents/students directly pay the studio for the photography services. The studio then pays a commission back to the school. Prior to the RFP, Cady Studios was an approved vendor for the School Board. Cady Studios had worked with approximately four schools in the Seminole County School District. Mr. Smith was also familiar with VendorLink and Demand Star, the on-line platforms the School Board used to publish information regarding the RFP. Mr. Smith learned about the RFP after the School Board had already posted notice of the solicitation on July 18, 2017. However, by August 9, 2017, Mr. Smith had registered Cady Studios with VendorLink, and began receiving the notifications regarding the RFP. On Sunday, September 24, 2017, Mr. Smith found out about the Evaluation Committee’s short-list from another vendor. Mr. Smith then accessed the VendorLink website and spotted the Evaluation Committee’s invitation to the seven top vendors to return for informal interviews. When he discovered that Cady Studios was not included on the list, he concluded that Cady Studios would not be awarded the Photography Services contract. Mr. Smith promptly wrote an e-mail to Ms. Lowder. He asked her for any information as to why Cady Studios did not make the Evaluation Committee’s shortlist. Ms. Lowder received Mr. Smith’s e-mail the following morning on Monday, September 25, 2017. She replied to Mr. Smith both through an e-mail, as well as a phone call. During the phone call, Ms. Lowder offered to meet with Mr. Smith for a “debriefing” to review the Evaluation Committee’s decision. Ms. Lowder did not offer any information as to why Cady Studios was not included with the short-listed vendors. Ms. Lowder and Mr. Smith scheduled the debriefing meeting for Thursday, October 5, 2017. In the meantime, Mr. Smith received the School Board’s Notice of Intended Decision on September 28, 2017. He did not contact Ms. Lowder to reschedule the debriefing meeting. On October 5, 2017, Mr. Smith met with Ms. Lowder and Ms. Olson for the debriefing meeting. They reviewed the results of the Evaluation Committee’s short-list meeting, as well as each evaluator’s scores. During this meeting, Mr. Smith first discovered that one evaluator (Dr. Daniel) scored Cady Studios’ proposal with a “0” in every category. Mr. Smith further learned that Cady Studios received this score because the USB drive Dr. Daniel had been given was blank. At the final hearing, Mr. Smith adamantly declared that all 10 USB drives that he produced for the School Board contained Cady Studios’ proposal. He had no idea why two of the drives were blank when opened by Dr. Daniel and Mr. Durias. Mr. Smith also pointed out (correctly) that the RFP contained no provisions regarding what an evaluator was supposed to do with a blank USB drive. The RFP certainly did not direct the evaluator to score the proposal with all zeros. In his communications with Ms. Lowder, Mr. Smith never indicated that Cady Studios intended to protest the School Board’s ranking of vendors, or challenge the School Board’s decision in any other manner. However, on October 12, 2017, legal counsel for Cady Studios, Jeff Childers (Cady Studios’ counsel in this administrative matter), wrote to Ms. Olsen questioning the results of the RFP. Mr. Childers referenced the fact that one evaluator failed “to assign any points in any category to Cady.” Mr. Childers concluded by requesting that the School Board consider resolving this issue informally by allowing Cady Studios “to join the other seven authorized proposers” to provide Photography Services to district schools. On October 16, 2017, Ms. Olsen responded to Mr. Childers in a letter saying: The Notice of Intent to Award this solicitation was posted on September 28, 2017 at 2:24 p.m. In accordance with School Board Policy 7.71, Resolution of Bid Protests, “Any person who claims to be adversely affected by a proposed award of a bid and who has standing to protest an award of a bid, may file a written notice of protest with the Office of the Superintendent or Clerk of the School Board not later than seventy-two (72) hours of the time of the posting of the bid tabulation.” Ms. Olsen then noted that, as of the date of her letter, Cady Studios had not filed a written notice of protest with the Office of the Superintendent or Clerk of the School Board. At the final hearing, Ms. Olsen (as well as Ms. Lowder) explained that, because the School Board posted its Notice of Intended Decision on Thursday, September 28, 2017, the 72-hour deadline to file a protest fell on Tuesday, October 3, 2017. (Saturday, September 30, 2017, and Sunday, October 1, 2017, are excluded in the computation of the 72-hour time period. See § 120.57(3)(b), Fla. Stat.) The fact that Mr. Smith’s debriefing meeting occurred two days after the 72-hour period had elapsed did not change the protest calculation. As described above, the School Board’s Notice of Intended Decision specifically stated, in pertinent part: Failure to file a protest within the time prescribed in section 120.57(3), Florida Statutes, or failure to post the bond or other security required by law within the time allowed for filing a bond shall constitute a waiver of the proceedings under Chapter 120, Florida Statutes. Similarly, RFP, General Purchasing Terms and Condition, Paragraph 10, entitled, RFP TABULATIONS, RECOMMENDATIONS, AND PROTEST, addressed the possibility of a bid protest and stated: Failure to file a protest within the time prescribed in Section 120.57(3) Florida Statutes will constitute a waiver of proceedings under Chapter 120, Florida Statutes and School Board Rules.[7/] Paragraph 10 also referenced School Board Policy 7.71, Resolution of RFP Protest, and included a link to the School Board’s policy webpage where the Policy 7.71 could be accessed. Policy 7.71, Section V, states: Notice of Protest - Any person who claims to be adversely affected by a proposed award of a bid and who has standing to protest an award of a bid, may file a written notice of protest with the Office of the Superintendent or Clerk of the School Board not later than seventy-two (72) hours of the time of the posting of the bid tabulation. In the event notice of intent to award a bid is issued by certified mail or express delivery service return receipt requested, the notice of protest must be filed on or before 4:30 p.m. on the third day following the date of receipt of the notice. In computing the deadline for filing, Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays observed by the School Board shall be excluded. Despite Ms. Olsen’s letter, as well as the language regarding protests in the RFP and the Notice of Intended Decision, Cady Studios formally filed a Notice of Protest with the School Board on November 9, 2017. At the final hearing, Mr. Smith acknowledged that 72 hours following the Notice of Intended Decision (not including Saturday and Sunday) fell on October 3, 2017. Therefore, to explain the delay in submitting Cady Studios’ Notice of Protest, Mr. Smith testified that he did not become aware of the material deficiencies in the Evaluation Committee’s review of Cady Studios’ proposal until he met with Ms. Lowder on October 5, 2017. Mr. Smith further admitted that he was not fully aware that Cady Studios only had 72 hours in which to protest the Notice of Intended Decision. Instead, he relied on Ms. Lowder to explain the RFP process, as well as the basis for the Evaluation Committee’s selection of the winning vendors. Consequently, Mr. Smith asserted that Cady Studios “was misled or lulled into inaction by” the School Board’s (Ms. Lowder’s) action of not scheduling a debriefing meeting until two days after the 72-hour protest window had closed. Mr. Smith maintained that if he had been informed of the deadline, Cady Studios would have filed immediately. Mr. Smith conceded that he was familiar with the protest language contained in the RFP’s General Purchasing Terms and Conditions, and was generally aware that the RFP referred to section 120.57(3). Mr. Smith further disclosed that he had read RFP, Paragraph 10, which identified Policy 7.71. However, he did not click the link to actually read the policy. Mr. Smith estimated that, by not making the School Board’s list of approved vendors for the Photography Services, it will lose approximately $2,000,000 worth of business and opportunity costs every year over the life of the contract. At the final hearing, Ms. Lowder responded to Mr. Smith’s testimony by pointing out that, even if Dr. Daniel had awarded Cady Studios with a “1” in each category, Cady Studios’ score would only have increased to 820. As the next lowest score to Cady Studios was 1010, Cady Studios’ adjusted score would still have fallen significantly below the top seven vendors. Continuing to conjecture, Ms. Lowder commented that if Dr. Daniel had given Cady Studios scores similar to the lowest score awarded by the other committee members, Cady Studios’ score would have equaled 935. This score is still below the “natural break” threshold of 1010. On cross examination, however, Ms. Lowder agreed that if Dr. Daniel awarded Cady Studios scores similar to the highest score awarded by the other committee members, Cady Studios would have received a score of 990--much closer to, but still below, the “natural break.” Ms. Lowder and Ms. Olsen also remarked that November 9, 2017, the date Cady Studios eventually filed its Notice of Protest, was 27 business days after the deadline to file a bid protest (and 25 business days after Mr. Smith learned the Evaluation Committee’s scores at the debriefing meeting). Cady Studios’ Notice of Protest was also submitted after the School Board had entered into a Master Service Agreement with each of the seven winning vendors. As discussed in detail below, the evidence presented at the final hearing establishes that Cady Studios failed to timely file its notice of protest within 72 hours after the School Board posted its Notice of Intended Decision. Further, Cady Studios did not prove that it may circumvent the filing deadline based on the defense of equitable tolling. Therefore, Cady Studios’ challenge of the School Board’s intended award of the Photography Services must be dismissed.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Seminole County School Board enter a final order dismissing Cady Studios’ protest as untimely filed. DONE AND ENTERED this 23rd day of January, 2019, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S J. BRUCE CULPEPPER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of January, 2019.
