Findings Of Fact The Findings of Fact set forth in the Final Order entered in DOAH Case Nos. 15-7010 through 15-7016 and 15-7022 are hereby adopted in this Final Order. The PFO is hereby adopted and incorporated in this Final Order as though set forth in full. During the course of the rulemaking proceedings regarding “designated player” card games, Petitioners submitted a good-faith proposal for a lower cost regulatory alternative (LCRA) indicating that the proposed rules would have a significant monetary impact on Petitioners, which required Respondent to prepare a statement of estimated regulatory costs (SERC) pursuant to sections 120.54(3)(b) and 120.541, Florida Statutes. Respondent did not prepare a SERC. That failure was determined to be a material failure to follow applicable rulemaking procedures and became a basis for the invalidation of the proposed rules.
Findings Of Fact Background The procurement of private legal services by the Department for child support enforcement is exempt from the competitive bidding requirements set forth in Chapter 287, Florida Statutes. In July 1992, the Department published notice that it was soliciting proposals from interested attorneys to provide intrastate and interstate child support legal services in HRS District VI, including Hillsborough, Hardee, Highlands, and Polk Counties. These services were to be provided from October 1, 1992, through June 30, 1993. Separate proposals were solicited for each of the following: the Hillsborough County Interstate Contract, the Hillsborough Intrastate Contract, the Polk County Contract, and the contract for Hardee and Highland Counties. The solicitation package does not incorporate any of the Florida Statutes or the agency's own rules regarding solicitation and award procedures in competitive bidding situations. Instead, the solicitation purports to be a self contained package of reasonably definite specifications with its own evaluation criteria and award procedures. The Petitioners in all four of the consolidated cases timely filed written protests which challenge the contents and requirements of the package. Evaluation Criteria In addition to the evaluation criteria contained in the solicitation package, the Department adopted and distributed to its employees additional criteria to be used in evaluating the proposals submitted. The additional criteria are set forth in the following documents which were entered into evidence as Belveal Exhibit No. 7: Work Sheet for Evaluating Criteria and Determining Relative Value to be Applied to Technical Information, Evaluation Criteria, Scoring Matrix for Structured Interview of Offerers, Work sheet for Scoring Oral Interview, and Questions for Use at Interview. The additional criteria set forth in these documents were intended for use to award points in the evaluation of offers, and to make the award of the contracts. They were not revealed to potential offerers. Such a procedure affords opportunities for favoritism, whether or not any favoritism is actually practiced by the Department. Once the representation is made in a solicitation package that it contains the evaluation criteria, the offerers should not be subjected to an additional evaluation process. Anne Donovan, Assistant Secretary of the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, admitted during hearing that the additional criteria which was not included in the solicitation package are intentionally biased to give existing legal services contractors an advantage in obtaining renewal of their contracts. This is contrary to the representation made in the solicitation package which states, "Through this solicitation for offers to provide legal services, the department seeks to obtain the highest possible standard of legal representation... while ensuring free and open competition among prospective offerers." Specifications The proposed contract to be executed at the conclusion of the bid solicitation and contract award process was to provide for compensation to the contractor based on (a) the number of cases referred to the contractor during the contract term, and (b) the number of final orders obtained by the contractor in these cases referred for action. The solicitation package contains a document identified as Attachment VI, which sets fort numbers purporting to be the Department's estimates of the number and type of cases which would be referred to the successful bidder during the course of each of the contracts, the number of payable orders to be expected, and the maximum fees which would be paid for each type of order obtained pursuant to the contract. Separate estimates have been given for the following contracts: Hillsborough County Intrastate, Hillsborough County Interstate, Polk County, and Hardee and Highlands Counties. The actual numbers set forth in each of the four separate contract proposals were estimates made by the field office staff of the Department and compiled by the headquarters office. Rosemary O'Neil, the contract manager in District VI, estimated the number of functions for each of the four contracts in District VI. In identifying the direct cost amount for each individual contract, she used automated and manual statistics or the tracking of functional activities for the past year. During the preparation of her projections, Ms. O'Neil tracked only nine activities, as originally required by the Department. Later, she was required to break these down into twenty-two functions, which may have adversely affected the estimates. Ms. O'Neil and other Department personnel testified that the estimates for District VI might be too low based upon past estimates and current needs. Ms. O'Neil completed the estimates in good faith and in accordance with the Department's stated requirements. Attachment VI also contains a fee schedule based upon a functional cost survey devised and carried out by the Department between April 15, 1991 and March 31, 1992. The survey randomly selected 3,800 cases throughout the state for tracking to determine the average cost the Department paid over the stated time period for each legal activity represented in the survey. During the survey, only 2,100 of these cases were actually tracked. In October 1992, the functional cost survey was changed to include 22 instead of 10 categories of legal service activity. The implementation of the survey was faulty in that different districts tracked attorney time and paralegal time in different ways. In addition, the administrative procedures utilized by judges and hearing officers in different districts directly affected statistics in ways which were not contemplated in the survey. Without uniform procedures, the legal services performed and attorney fees charged in different counties cannot be effectively reviewed on a comparable basis to create a true average cost per function. Many of the fees allocated to different functions in the specifications were illogical. For example: Fees paid for stipulated matters were, in many cases, higher than the fees paid for contested matters of the same type. Fees paid for simple matters, such as contempt hearings, were substantially the same as fees paid for more complex litigation involving the establishment of paternity and support. Certain orders obtained by the attorney, such as bankruptcy matters, required the expenditure of time by the contractor, but did not pay any fee. The functional cost survey used to establish the terms in the solicitations for estimated number of cases, types of cases and the maximum fees to be paid is defective as it relates to District VI. Proposals cannot be comparatively reviewed because the data upon which the proposals are created is inaccurate. After the contract award, it is reasonably anticipated that the Department would be required to make modifications to the contract which would afford opportunities for favoritism.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: The previously undisclosed evaluation criteria should be included in the solicitation package if the Department intends to use them in the evaluation process. The current specifications on the projected number of cases to be referred in each contract in District VI should be revised to more reasonably and accurately reflect potential referrals within the District. The designated attorney fee for each function should be revised so that the charges are reasonably related to the work expected by the specifications in the proposal. The contents of the functional cost survey should be reevaluated based upon the evidence presented during the protest proceedings. The current specifications should be rejected as they are so flawed as to be arbitrary, in violation of state standards regarding the competitive bidding process. DONE and ENTERED this 22nd day of December, 1992. VERONICAL E. DONNELLY Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of December, 1992. APPENDIX Petitioner Carlton's proposed findings of fact are addressed as follows: Accepted. Accepted. See HO No. 1. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. See HO No. 5 Accepted. See HO No. 7 Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Rejected. Irrelevant. Rejected. Irrelevant. Accepted. See HO No. 16. Accepted. See HO No. 19. Accepted. See HO No. 17. Accepted. See HO No. 18. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. See HO No. 20 - No. 21. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Rejected. Contrary to fact. See HO No. 21. Accepted. See HO No. 21. Accepted. Accepted. See HO No. 12. Accepted. See HO No. 12. Accepted. See HO No. 15. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Rejected. Contrary to fact. See HO No. 22. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. - 81. Rejected. Without jurisdiction to determine. 82. - 87. Rejected. Beyond the jurisdiction of the Hearing Officer under the Grove-Watkins review standards. 88. - 100. Rejected. Beyond the jurisdiction of the Hearing Officer. Petitioner Redman's proposed findings of fact are addressed as follows: Accepted. Accepted. See HO No. 1. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Rejected. Contrary to fact. See HO No. 3. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. See HO No. 7. Accepted. Accepted. See HO No. 8 - No. 9. Accepted. See HO No. 16. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Rejected. Irrelevant. Rejected. Irrelevant. Accepted. Accepted. See HO No. 20 and No. 22. Accepted. Accepted. See HO No. 17. Accepted. See HO No. 18. Accepted. See HO No. 16. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. See HO No. 19. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Rejected. Irrelevant. Accepted. Accepted. See HO No. 20. The word "misleading" should be replaced by the "faulty". Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. See HO No. 20 and No. 22. Accepted. Rejected. Speculative. Accepted. See HO No. 21. Accepted. See HO No. 21. Accepted. See HO No. 21. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. See HO No. 22. Accepted. See HO No. 21. Accepted. See HO No. 21. Accepted. Accepted. See HO No. 21. Accepted. See HO No. 21. Accepted. See HO No. 21. Rejected, except for the determination that the specifications are arbitrary. All other allegations were not proved at hearing. Accepted. See HO No. 11. Accepted. See HO No. 12. Rejected. Contrary to fact. See HO No. 13. Accepted. See HO No. 13. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. See HO No. 13. Accepted. See HO No. 13. Accepted. Accepted. - 105. Rejected. Beyond the hearing officer's jurisdiction. Accepted. Rejected. Contrary to findings, except the determination that the specifications were arbitrary and unreliable. Rejected. Beyond subject matter jurisdiction. Rejected. Competency not determined. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. See HO No. 20. Rejected. Contrary to fact. Accepted. Rejected. Contrary to fact. - 128. Rejected. Beyond subject matter jurisdiction. Petitioner Belveal's proposed findings of fact are addressed as follows: Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. See HO No. 1. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. See HO No. 2. Accepted. Accepted. See Preliminary Statement & HO No. 4. Accepted. See HO No. 11. Accepted. See HO No. 3. Accepted. Accepted. See HO No. 5. Accepted. See HO No. 5 - No. 6. Accepted. See HO No. 7. Accepted. See HO No. 10. Accepted. See HO No. 12. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. See HO No. 16. Accepted. Rejected. Irrelevant. Accepted. See HO No. 21. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. See HO No. 21. Accepted. Accepted. See Preliminary Statement. COPIES FURNISHED: CHARLES L CARLTON ESQ 2120 LAKELAND HILLS BLVD LAKELAND FL 33805 CECELIA M REDMAN ESQ 2124 W KENNEDY BLVD - STE B TAMPA FL 33606 DONALD W BELVEAL ESQ 100 W KENNEDY BLVD - STE 600 TAMPA FL 33602 JACK EMORY FARLEY ESQ HRS DISTRICT VI LEGAL OFFICE 4000 W DR MARTIN LUTHER KING JR BLVD TAMPA FL 33614 JOHN DAVIS ESQ 1170 NE CAPITAL CIRCLE TALLAHASSEE FL 32308 JOHN SLYE ESQ GENERAL COUNSEL DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND REHABILITATIVE SERVICES 1323 WINEWOOD BLVD TALLAHASSEE FL 32399 0700
The Issue Whether the Petitioner is entitled to an award for attorney's fees for litigating the attorney's fees issue where the appellate court has determined the Petitioner is entitled to attorney's fees and costs under the provisions of Section 120.57(1)(b)10., Florida Statutes. Whether the Petitioner is entitled to a multiplier enhancement to the lodestar in an award of attorney's fees and costs under Section 120.57(1)(b)10., Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact In March, 1989, the Respondent, Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services sought bids for 17,500 square feet of office space in central Orlando, for a period of seven years beginning in December, 1989, with two three-year option extensions. Petitioner and two others submitted bids. After committee review, the bid was awarded to another bidder on or about June 26, 1989. Petitioner timely filed his informal and formal bid protests, and the matter was heard at length before the Division of Administrative Hearings in August, 1989. The Hearing Officer found that Petitioner had sustained the burden of proof and demonstrated that the Department had acted arbitrarily and capriciously in the bid process, and recommended that the lease be re-bid. The Secretary for the Department adopted the Recommended Order but also added an additional condition that the lease be re-bid only if necessary. Petitioner appealed to the Fifth District Court of Appeal which sustained the position of the Petitioner and, although disputed by the Department, granted attorney's fees and costs for all stages of the proceedings. This matter was remanded to the Department for re-bidding and to the Division for the determination of the amount of fees and costs to be awarded. Courtenay v. Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, 581 So.2d 621 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991). The Law Office of Terrence William Ackert represented Petitioner through all stages of the administrative bid protest and appeal pertaining to the Invitation to Bid for 17,500 square feet of professional office space in the central Orlando, Florida area. Petitioner, a long time client of counsel of record, agreed to pay counsel at the rate of one hundred twenty-five Dollars, and later at one hundred thirty-five Dollars, per hour and for legal assistant charges ranging from twenty-five Dollars an hour to sixty Dollars an hour, and for costs. The Petition for Costs and Attorneys' Fees was timely filed on July 19, 1991. The parties were unable to reach a stipulation regarding the amount of reasonable attorney's fees to be awarded. A fair and reasonable fee for attorney and legal assistant time is as follows: For the period: 6/27/89-2/27/90 Trial attorney time...141.9hrs at $125.00hr =$17,737.50 Legal assistant time...66.0hrs at $45/50hr = $2,990.00 Total. $20,736.50 For the period: 2/27/90-6/30/91 Post-hearing appellate attorney time...92.4hrs at $125.00 =$11,550.00 Post-hearing appellate attorney time...50.6hrs at $135.00 = $6,871.50 Total. $18,421.50 Post-hearing appellate time for various legal assistants at $25/35/50/60hr. =$4,980 Total. $23,401.50 For the period: 7/1/91-to present Post-remand attorney time...48.2hrs at $135.00 = $6,489 Post-remand legal assistant time...50.1hrs at $25/35/60hr =$2,013.00 Total. $8,502 Costs expended for hearing, appeal and remand hearing Total. $8,548.10 Total due for reasonable attorneys' fee and costs. $61,188.10 During the administrative appeal, the Respondent vacated space previously leased from Petitioner and the consequent loss of income rendered Petitioner unable to make payments to counsel. Total payments to counsel of record have been limited to $5,785. Petitioner remains liable for all fees and costs, and has been billed regularly for the total due and owing. Challenge of a proposed award of bid by an agency is complicated, difficult and time consuming process because the litigation is focused primarily in the administrative arena, where few attorneys are willing to accept cases of this type. In order to attain a successful result, it required considerable skill by counsel to properly perform the service. Acceptance by counsel of this matter precluded the acceptance of other litigation because of the three stage administrative process in order to secure relief for his client.
The Issue Whether the Division of Administrative Hearings has subject matter jurisdiction to conduct a formal hearing under the provisions of Section 120.57(1)(b)10., Florida Statutes for costs and attorney's fees, if a decision of a case on appeal to the District Court of Appeal has not been rendered. Whether the Division of Administrative Hearings has subject matter jurisdiction for petition for attorney's fees and costs under the provisions of Section 57.111, Florida Statutes, if a decision of a case on appeal to the District Court of Appeal has not been rendered.
Findings Of Fact On December 29, 1994, the undersigned Hearing Officer issued a Recommended Order in the underlying case of Preferred Services, Inc. v. Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services and Wekiva Center Partnership, DOAH Case No. 94-4890BID, a bid dispute matter in which the Petitioner was not the prevailing party. The decision in the Recommended Order, which upheld the Department's action, was adopted by the Secretary in a Final Order, dated January 23, 1995. Petitioner timely filed a notice of appeal of the Final Order to the Florida Fifth District Court of Appeal, under the provisions of Section 120.68, Florida Statutes (1993). The court, in the matter of Preferred Services, Inc. v. Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, DCA Case No. 95-0461, has not rendered a decision as of the date of this Order. On May 17, 1995, Petitioner filed its Motion for Attorneys Fees and Costs with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings seeking reimbursement under the alternate provisions of Sections 57.111 and 120.57(1)(b)10., Florida Statutes.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is ORDERED that the Petitioner's Motion for Attorney's Fees and Costs in Case No. 95-2537F is DISMISSED without prejudice, for lack of jurisdiction, and this case is closed. DONE AND ENTERED this 15th day of June, 1995, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DANIEL M. KILBRIDE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of June, 1995. COPIES FURNISHED: Terrence William Ackert, Esquire Post Office Box 2548 Winter Park, Florida 32790 Eric D. Dunlap, Esquire Assistant District 6 Legal Counsel Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 400 West Robinson Street Suite S-827 Orlando, Florida 32801 Robert L. Powell Agency Clerk Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Kim Tucker, Esquire General Counsel Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700
The Issue The issue to be resolved in this proceeding is the amount of attorney’s fees to be paid by Respondent, Agency for Persons with Disabilities (“APD” or the “Agency”), to the Petitioners, G.B., Z.L., through his guardian K.L., J.H., and M.R.
Conclusions This matter is related to the promulgation of proposed rules 65G-4.0210 through 65G-4.027 (the “Proposed Rules”) by the Agency in May 2013 in its effort to follow the mandate issued by the Florida Legislature concerning the iBudget statute, section 393.0662, Florida Statute (2010). Petitioners challenged the Proposed Rules in DOAH Case No. 13-1849RP. The Proposed Rules were upheld by the Administrative Law Judge, but Petitioners appealed the Final Order to the First District Court of Appeal (the “Court”). The Court’s decision was rendered July 21, 2014. G.B. v. Ag. for Pers. with Disab., 143 So. 3d 454 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014). The Fee Order was entered by the Court on the same date. The Fee Order had been entered upon the filing of a motion for appellate attorney’s fees filed with the Court by Appellants/Petitioners. The motion set forth three bases for an award of fees, to wit: Section 120.595(2), Florida Statutes, which provides: Challenges to Proposed Agency Rules Pursuant to Section 120.56(2).– If the appellate court or the administrative law judge declares a proposed rule or portion of a proposed rule invalid pursuant to s. 120.56(2), a judgment or order shall be rendered against the agency for reasonable costs and reasonable attorney’s fees, unless the agency demonstrates that its actions were substantially justified or special circumstances exist which would make the award unjust. An agency’s actions are “substantially justified” if there was a reasonable basis in law and fact at the time the actions were taken by the agency. If the agency prevails in the proceedings, the appellate court or administrative law judge shall award reasonable costs and reasonable attorney’s fees against a party if the appellate court or administrative law judge determines that a party participated in the proceedings for an improper purpose as defined by paragraph (1)(e). No award of attorney’s fees as provided by this subsection shall exceed $50,000. Section 120.595(5), Florida Statutes, which provides: Appeals.– When there is an appeal, the court in its discretion may award reasonable attorney’s fees and reasonable costs to the prevailing party if the court finds that the appeal was frivolous, meritless, or an abuse of the appellate process, or that the agency action which precipitated the appeal was a gross abuse of the agency’s discretion. Upon review of the agency action that precipitates an appeal, if the court finds that the agency improperly rejected or modified findings of fact in a recommended order, the court shall award reasonable attorney’s fees and reasonable costs to a prevailing appellant for the administrative proceeding and the appellate proceeding. Section 120.569(2)(e), Florida Statutes, which provides: All pleadings, motions, or other papers filed in the proceeding must be signed by the party, the party’s attorney, or the party’s qualified representative. The signature constitutes a certificate that the person has read the pleading, motion, or other paper and that, based upon reasonable inquiry, it is not interposed for any improper purposes, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay, or for frivolous purpose or needless increase in the cost of litigation. If a pleading, motion or other paper is signed in violation of these requirements, the presiding officer shall impose upon the person who signed it, the represented party, or both, an appropriate sanction, which may include an order to pay the other party or parties the amount of reasonable expense incurred because of the filing of the pleading, motion, or other paper, including a reasonable attorney’s fee. The Court did not specifically address which of Petitioners’ stated bases for award of attorney’s fees was being relied upon when granting Petitioners’ motion. Petitioners assert that it must therefore be presumed that the Court granted the request for fees on the basis of all three of Petitioners’ bases. There is no other support for that presumption, as the Fee Order is silent on the issue. It could equally be presumed that only one of the bases was relied upon by the Court. Thus, a determination of the appropriate basis for fees is critical in the determination of the amount of fees to be awarded, as will be set forth more particularly below. The Fee Order establishes only that attorney’s fees are awarded, with leave for the parties to determine the appropriate amount or, failing to do so, obtain direction from an Administrative Law Judge on the matter. There is no issue as to whether Petitioners are entitled to fees or costs, only the amount to be awarded. DOAH has jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter of this proceeding under the August 6, 2014, Mandate of the First DCA, and under section 120.595(2). Although it is herein determined that section 120.595(2) is the appropriate provision to be considered for fees in this case, each of the other statutory sections argued in Petitioners’ motion for fees will be addressed nonetheless. Section 120.595(5) If section 120.595(5) is to be the basis for fees, it must be shown that Respondent is guilty of a “gross abuse” of its discretion. “Gross abuse” is not defined in statute. As stated by the Court in Allstate Floridian Insurance Co. v. Ronco Inventions, LLC, 890 So. 2d 300, 302 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004), “The troublesome nature of our review here is the admittedly high ‘gross abuse of discretion’ standard. . . . However, we have no definition of what a ‘gross’ abuse of discretion includes or how it differs from an abuse of discretion. We can only assume that it is more egregious than a typical abuse of discretion.” The Court cited Canakaris v. Canakaris, 382 So. 2d 1197 (Fla. 1980), in which the Supreme Court iterated that if reasonable men could differ on an issue, there was no abuse of discretion to act one way or the other. Other courts, looking at the issue of “abuse of discretion” in administrative matters, have struggled with a definitive description or definition. In Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc., et al. v. Volpe, Secretary of Transportation, 401 U.S. 402; 91 S. Ct. 814; 23 L. Ed. 2d 136 (1971), the Court was trying to determine whether the Transportation Secretary had acted within his discretion. The Court decided it “must consider whether the decision was based on clear error or judgment. [citations omitted] Although this inquiry into the facts is to be searching and careful, the ultimate standard of review is a narrow one. The Court is not empowered to substitute its judgment for that of the agency.” Id., at 416. And, as found by another Court, whether an act is arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion is “far from being entirely discrete as a matter of the ordinary meaning of language. . . . Rather than denoting a fixed template to be imposed mechanically on every case within their ambit, these words summon forth what may best be described as an attitude of mind in the reviewing court one that is ‘searching and careful’ . . . yet, in the last analysis, diffident and deferential.” Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., et al. v. Sec. and Exch. Comm'n, et al., 606 F.2d 1031, 1034, U.S. App. DC (1979). In Ft. Myers Real Estate Holdings, LLC, v. Department of Business and Professional Regulation, 53 So. 3d 1158 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011), the Court awarded fees under section 120.595(5). In that case, the agency denied party status to the applicant for services. The Court said, “The position taken by the Division in the dismissal order, and maintained in this appeal, is so contrary to the fundamental principles of administrative law that, by separate order, we have granted Appellant’s motion for attorney’s fees under section 120.595(5), Florida Statutes.” The Court did not, however, define gross abuse of discretion any more specifically than that. Likewise, in Salam v. Board of Professional Engineers, 946 So. 2d 48 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006), the Court found that an agency’s intentional delay on acting upon a petition for formal administrative hearing warranted fees under the statute. The Salam Court did not further define gross abuse of discretion; it merely found that such abuse existed under the circumstances of the case. Gross abuse of discretion must, by definition, be more difficult to ascertain than simple abuse of discretion. Gross abuse implies that the Agency first believed its intended action was improper, yet engaged in the action despite that knowledge. That is, that the Agency acted intentionally to do something it knew to be wrong. Proof of such intent would be extremely difficult.1/ One need only look at the plain language of the Court’s opinion in the rule challenge appeal at issue here to see that there was no gross abuse of discretion. The Court ultimately held that although the Agency’s rules “directly conflict with and contravene the Legislature’s clear language” concerning development of an algorithm to assist with the distribution of funds to needy Floridians, “[W]e recognize the difficulty in adhering to the Legislature’s command to create an algorithm solely capable of determining each client’s level of need. Further, we accept that [Respondent] is attempting to find a reasonable way to administer funds to the tens-of-thousands of people in need that it assists.” G.B. et al., supra, 143 So. 3d 454, 458. Nothing in that language suggests that the Agency knew its proposed rule was improper or that it was doing anything intentionally wrong. Rather, the language of the Court’s decision indicates that Respondent was certainly attempting to exercise its discretion properly in the adoption of the Proposed Rules. Despite the Agency’s attempts to justify the rules both at final hearing and on appeal, the Court found that the Proposed Rules did not comport with the specific authorizing statute. That failure did not, ipso facto, establish that there was a gross abuse of the Agency’s discretion. Besides, upon hearing all the testimony and reviewing the evidence, the undersigned initially upheld the Proposed Rule; that, in and of itself, is some indication that the Agency’s efforts were legitimate. Thus, in the present matter, there is no rational basis for finding that gross abuse of discretion was involved in the Court’s award of attorney’s fees. Section 120.569(2)(e) As for section 120.569(2)(e), there is no evidence to support Petitioners’ contention that the proposed rule addressed in the rule challenge proceeding (DOAH Case No. 13-1849RP) was interposed for any improper purpose. The appellate court said, “[W]e accept that APD is attempting to find a reasonable way to administer funds to the tens-of-thousands of people in need that it assists.” Id. Clearly, the Agency did not act for an improper purpose; its best efforts to follow the Legislative mandate for an iBudget simply fell short. The Proposed Rules contravened certain specific requirements of the governing statute. In order to find a way to meet its mandate, the Agency made a Herculean effort, yet failed. Although Petitioners argue that an “improper purpose” was implied by the Court in the Fee Order, there is no substantive support for that position. Not only was APD’s attempt to find a “reasonable way” to discharge its responsibility found wanting by the Court, experts in the field who testified at the underlying hearing disagreed as well. There was no dispute about the intended purpose of the Proposed Rules, only as to how that intent was to be effectuated. There was never any dispute as to the Proposed Rules’ intended purpose; they were meant to find a way to serve the tens-of-thousands of people in need. There is nothing in any of the Agency’s actions in this case that would be even arguably described as “interposed for any improper purposes, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay, or for frivolous purpose or needless increase in the cost of litigation.” This attorney’s fee section does not apply to the facts of this case. Section 120.595(2) Finally, in section 120.595(2), the Legislature has declared that if an appellate court or administrative law judge declares all or part of a proposed rule invalid, an order will be entered awarding reasonable attorney’s fees and costs (unless the agency demonstrated that its actions were substantially justified). The Court ultimately concluded that the proposed rules “directly conflict with and contravene the Legislature’s clear language.” That being the case, the Court seems to be finding that the Agency’s actions--promulgating the Proposed Rules--was not substantially justified, even if the Court did recognize the difficulty faced by APD in its efforts to comply with the statutes at issue. By process of elimination, section 120.595(2) is the basis for the Court’s award of attorney’s fees in the present case. That being so, the award is capped at $50,000. The Agency has conceded that Petitioners are entitled to at least $50,000 in fees, as well as costs in the amount of $41,609.65. There remains the issue of whether each of the four Petitioners is entitled to an award of the maximum fee. In their (singular) Petition for Administrative Determination of the Invalidity of Proposed Rules, the parties sought the following relief: That a Final Order be entered finding the Proposed Rules to be an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority; and That Petitioners be awarded their reasonable attorney’s fees; and Such other relief as the Administrative Law Judge deems appropriate. That is, the relief sought by each of the Petitioners was the same: invalidation of the proposed rules. It cannot be argued that each Petitioner in his or her own right was seeking individual redress or damages. Collectively, they wanted the proposed rules invalidated so that they could return to the status quo concerning their benefits from the State. In fact, only one of the four Petitioners presented testimony at the underlying administrative hearing as to the impact of the Proposed Rules. There was no issue as to each Petitioner’s standing in the underlying administrative hearing. As stated by the Agency in its Proposed Final Order in that case: “Petitioners are each recipients of Medicaid Services under the DD waiver program and have been or will be transitioned to the iBudget system. Stip., pp. 23-24. Thus, Petitioners have standing to challenge the substance of the Proposed Rules.” Petitioners contend that each of the 25,000-plus recipients of benefits from the Agency could have filed petitions challenging the Proposed Rule. That is true. But in the rule challenge proceeding there were four petitioners (ostensibly representing those other 25,000), each seeking the same relief, i.e., invalidation of the proposed rules. And only one of those, K.L., testified at final hearing in the underlying rule challenge proceeding. Thus, there is no justification for an award of fees to each of the Petitioners under section 120.595(2). In light of the findings and conclusions above, and based upon the Order as stated below, the issue of contingency multipliers is not relevant to the discussion of fees herein. As a general rule in Florida, fees and costs incurred in litigating entitlement to attorney’s fees are collectible although time spent litigating the amount of the award is not compensable. See, e.g., State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Parma, 629 So. 2d 830, 833 (1993). § 92.931, Fla. Stat.; Stokus v. Phillips, 651 So. 2d 1244 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995). Inasmuch as the Agency does not dispute entitlement to attorney’s fees, no fees for the fee case are warranted. The amount of fees sought in this administrative rule challenge by the Petitioners is, as set forth in their Proposed Final Order: $255,614.39 for the DOAH rule challenge proceeding; $154,662.35 for the appeal but also applied a contingent multiplier for a total of $309,324.70; $62,850.00 for the fee case but also applied a contingent multiplier for a total of $94,275.00; and $41,609.65 in taxable costs, for a total of approximately $660,000.00. While the amount of fees and costs allowed under the appropriate statute is well less than what Petitioners sought, it has been deemed legally sufficient by statute.
The Issue Is the practice of the Respondent, Agency for Health Care Administration (Agency), to decline Medicaid-funded compensation for emergency medical services provided to undocumented aliens once the patients have reached a point of stabilization an unpromulgated rule? The Petitioners' Proposed Final Order identifies the Agency's use of limited InterQual criteria to determine medical necessity as an issue in this proceeding. But the Petition for Determination of Invalidity of Non-Rule Policy does not raise this issue. Neither party's pre-hearing statement identifies it as an issue. Consequently, this Order does not consider or determine whether the Agency's limitation on the use of InterQual criteria is an "unpromulgated rule."
Findings Of Fact Proceedings Before the Division of Administrative Hearings and the First District Court of Appeal In the beginning this was an action by the Hospitals aimed at stopping Agency efforts to recoup reimbursement of Medicaid payments to the Hospitals for emergency services provided to undocumented aliens once the patients have reached a point of “stabilization.” The issue of whether the Agency could apply the “stabilization” standard to the Hospital claims for Medicaid payment for services provided indigent aliens recurred in Agency claims against hospitals throughout the state to recoup Medicaid payments. Hospitals challenged Agency claims in individual proceedings under section 120.569, which the Agency referred to the Division for disputed fact hearings. Duane Morris, LLP (Duane Morris), led by Joanne Erde, represented the hospitals in the individual proceedings. The Hospitals collectively engaged Duane Morris to represent them in this proceeding challenging the Agency’s stabilization standard as an unpromulgated rule. Joanne B. Erde, Donna Stinson, and Harry Silver were the Hospital’s lawyers in this proceeding. Ms. Erde is an experienced lawyer who has focused her practice in health care. Ms. Stinson is an experienced lawyer who concentrated her practice in health care and administrative law litigation before the Division. The Agency does not question their expertise. Mr. Silver is an experienced lawyer with no Florida administrative law experience. His role in the case was minimal. Depositions taken in one of the individual reimbursement cases were significant evidence in this proceeding. Those depositions make it clear that the Hospitals’ counsel was tuned into the unpromulgated rule issue and using discovery in that case to gather and identify the evidence that they would need in this case. Representation of the Hospitals in individual reimbursement actions provided Hospitals’ counsel the advantage of preparing with level of detail before filing the petition. The engagement letters recognize this stating: “We have an understanding of the facts underlying this matter and have substantial knowledge concerning the law governing the issues in this case.” This well-developed understanding of the facts should have minimized the need for discovery and preparation in this proceeding. Counsel were well positioned to prosecute this matter efficiently. Likewise, counsel’s “substantial knowledge concerning the law governing the issues in this case” should have minimized the need for time spent in research. This is not what happened. The pre-existing representation in the reimbursement cases provided another obvious and significant benefit to the Hospitals and their counsel. Since counsel represented the individual hospital in the separate reimbursement matters, the Hospitals could band together to jointly finance one case that would resolve the troublesome point of “stabilization” issue more consistently and more cheaply than if they litigated it in each and every case. As the basically identical engagement agreements between each hospital and counsel state: “Because many hospitals’ interests in [sic] are similar or identical as it relates to the Alien Issue and in order to keep legal costs to a minimum, each of the participants in the [hospital] Group will [sic] have agreed that it wishes this firm to represent them in a Group.” Because of counsel’s pre-existing relationships with the Hospitals, litigating this matter should have continued or enhanced the client relationships. The time required for this matter could not result in lost business opportunities. In fact, by consolidating the issues common to all the clients and their cases, counsel freed up time to work on other matters. Presentation of the issue for resolution in a single case also saved the Hospitals the greater cost of disputing the issue in each case where the Agency sought reimbursement. The Hospitals and counsel dealt with the only possible downside of the representation by including disclosures about joint representation and a waiver of conflict claims in the engagement letters. This was not a contingent fee case. The agreement provided for monthly billing and payment from counsel’s trust account. Each group member made an initial payment of $10,000 to the trust account. Any time the trust account balance dipped below $15,000, each group member agreed to contribute another $10,000 to the trust account. For counsel, this representation was about as risk free as a legal engagement can be. The Hospitals and their counsel knew from the outset that they would have to prove their reasonableness of their fees and costs if they prevailed and wanted to recover fees. The Petition for Determination of Invalidity of Non-Rule Policy seeks an award of fees and costs. They could have adjusted their billing practices to provide more detail in preparation for a fees dispute. An "unpromulgated rule challenge" presents a narrow and limited issue. That issue is whether an agency has by declaration or action established a statement of general applicability that is a "rule," as defined in section 120.52(16), without going through the required public rulemaking process required by section 120.54. The validity of the agency's statement is not an issue decided in an "unpromulgated rule challenge." Courts have articulated the legal standards for unpromulgated rule challenges frequently. See, e.g., Coventry First, LLC v. Off. of Ins. Reg., 38 So. 3d 200, 203 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010); Dep’t of Rev. v. Vanjaria Enters., 675 So. 2d 252 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996); and the cases those opinions cite. The facts proving the “stabilization” standard were easy to establish. Many Agency documents stated the shift to the “stabilization” standard. Documents of Agency contractors did also. Two examples of how clear it was that the Agency was applying a new standard were the Agency’s statements in its 2009-2010 and 2010-2011 reports to the Governor on efforts to control Medicaid fraud and abuse. The reports describe the “stabilization” standard as “more stringent” and certain to recover millions of dollars for the Agency. As the Agency’s reports to the Governor indicate, the stakes were high in this matter. For the Hospitals and other hospitals collectively affected by the Agency’s effort to recoup past payments by applying the “stabilization” standard, $400,000,000 was at stake. This matter did not present complex or difficult issues, legally or factually. The Order of Pre-Hearing Instructions requiring parties to disclose documents and witnesses and update the disclosures alleviated the discovery demands present in other litigation. The Agency’s failure to fully comply with the pre- hearing instructions and unfounded Motion in Limine added some additional time demands for the Hospital’s counsel. Nonetheless the issues were narrow, and the facts were essentially undisputed, if not undisputable. This matter did not require extraordinary amounts of time for discovery or preparation. Ordinarily challenges to rules or unpromulgated rules impose time pressures on the attorneys because of the requirement in section 120.56 that the hearing commence within 30 days of assignment to the Administrative Law Judge. The time constraint was not a factor in this case. The Hospitals requested waiver of the time requirement to permit more time for discovery. The Agency agreed, and the undersigned granted the request. Thus the Hospitals had the time their counsel said they needed to prepare for the hearing. The appeal imposed no time constraints. Both parties received extensions of time for their filings. Seventeen months passed between filing the notice of appeal and oral argument. Time for the Administrative Proceeding The total number of hours claimed for the services of the three lawyers, their claimed hourly rate, and the total fees claimed appear below. Joanne B. Erde 458.20 hours $550.00 rate $252,010.00 Donna Stinson 136.20 hours $455.00 rate $61,971.00 Harry Silver 93.40 hours $550.00 rate $51,370.00 Total 687.80 hours $365,351.00 The Hospitals’ counsel’s billing records are voluminous. For the proceeding before the Division, the Hospitals’ counsel’s invoices list 180 billing entries for the work of three lawyers. A substantial number of the entries are block billing. In block billing, all of a lawyer’s activities for a period of time, usually a day, are clumped together with one time total for the entire day’s service. It is an acceptable form of billing. But block billing presents difficulties determining the reasonableness of fees because a single block of time accounts for several different activities and the invoice does not establish which activity took how much time. Here are representative examples of the block billing entries from the Division level invoices: August 20, 2012 (Erde) – Conference call with ALJ; telephone conference with AHCA attorney; telephone conference with newspaper reporters – 2.0 hours September 16, 2012 (Erde) – Review depositions; prepare opening remarks; develop impeachment testimony – 5.50 September 27, 2012 (Erde) – Intra-office conference; finalize interrogatories; work on direct – 8.50 October 2, 2012 (Stinson) – Review and revise Motion in Limine; Telephone conferences with Joanne Erde and Harry Silver; review emails regarding discovery issues - `2.60 October 19, 2012 (Erde) – Intra-office conference to discuss proposed order; Research Re: other OIG audits; research on validity of agency rules – 2.10 hours November 9, 2012 (Erde) – Conference with ALJ; Intra-Office conference to discuss status; further drafting of proposed order – 7.70 hours. November 19, 2012 (Stinson) – Final Review and Revisions to Proposed Final order; Telephone conferences with Joanne Erde to Review final Changes and comments; Review AHCA’s proposed order and revised proposed order – 3.20 hours. Many of the entries, block or individual, do not provide sufficient detail to judge the reasonableness of the time reported. “Prepare for deposition and hearing,” “review depositions,” “review new documents,” “review draft documents,” “intra-office conference” and “attention to discovery” are recurrent examples. Senior lawyers with more expertise and higher billing rates are expected to be more efficient. This, the fact that the matter was not complicated, the relative simplicity of the issue, and the fact that the Hospitals’ counsel already had a great deal of familiarity with the facts and law involved, all require reducing the number of hours compensated in order for them to be reasonable. For this matter, in these circumstances, the claimed number of hours is quite high. The claimed 687.80 hours amounts to working eight hours a day for 86 days, two of which were the hearing. This is not reasonable. A reasonable number of hours for the proceedings before the Division is 180. That is the equivalent of 22.5 eight-hour days. That is sufficient to handle the matter before the Division from start to finish. The number includes consideration of the worked caused by the needless difficulties presented by the Agency in discovery and with its Motion in Limine. Time for the Appellate Proceeding The fees that the Hospitals seek for the appeal are broken down by hours and rates as follows: Joanne B. Erde 255.10 hours $560.00 $142,856.00 Joanne B. Erde 202.80 hours $580.00 $117,624.00 Donna Stinson 88.50 hours $460.00 $40,710.00 Donna Stinson 67.10 hours $500.00 $33,550.00 W.D. Zaffuto 48.30 hours $435.00 $21,010.50 Rob Peccola 10.90 hours $275.00 $2,997.50 Rob Peccola 17.50 hours $300.00 $5,250.00 L. Rodriguez- Taseff 6.20 hours $520.00 $3,224.00 L. Rodriguez- Taseff 19.50 hours $545.00 $10,627.50 Rachel Pontikes 38.20 hours $515.00 $19,673.00 Total 754.10 hours $397,522.50 For the appellate proceeding, the invoices present 341 entries, a substantial number of which are block billing for work by six lawyers. Here are representative examples from the appellate level invoices: May 16, 2013 (Erde) – Reviewed AHCA’s initial brief; intra- office conference to discuss; preliminary review of record – 2.90 May 24, 2013 (Erde) – Intra-office conference to discuss response to brief; preparation to respond to brief – 2.50 May 30, 2013 (Erde) – Attention to Appeal issues; finalize request for extension; brief research re jurisdictional issues – 1.60 June 18, 2013 (Peccola) – Strategy with J. Erde regarding research needs; review/analyze case law cited in answer brief; conduct legal research regarding documentary evidence and exhibits on appellate review; write email memo to J. Erde regarding same – 2.00 July 19, 2013 (Zaffuto) – Revise/draft Answer Brief; discuss extension of time with H. Gurland; research appellate rules regarding extension of time and staying proceedings pending ruling on motion; review appendix to answer brief; instructions to assistant regarding edits and filing of answer brief and appendix prepare answer brief for filing; call to clerk regarding extension of time review initial brief by AHCA and final order by ALJ – 5.50 August 14, 2013 (Erde) – Intra-office conference to discuss brief; further revised brief – 5.80 August 15, 2013 (Stinson) Reviewed appellees' answer brief; discussed language in answer brief with Joanne Erde – 2.50 October 9, 2013 (Stinson) – Review draft motion to relinquish regarding admission of exhibit; exchange e-mails with Joanne Erde; telephone conference with Joanne Erde – 1.60 October 10, 2013 (Erde) – Attention to new motion re relinquishing jurisdiction; review of revisions; further revisions – 6.00 October 30, 2013 (Erde) – Research re: AHCA’s current behavior; intra-office conference to discuss status of action at DOAH - .70 November 7, 2013 (Peccola) – Strategy with J. Erde regarding Appellees’ response in opposition to Appellant’s motion for supplemental briefing; conduct research regarding same; draft same; look up 1st DCA local rule on appellate motions and email same to J. Erde – 3.60 December 5, 2013 (Erde) – Research Re: supplemental briefing issues; research to find old emails from AHCA re: inability to produce witnesses -.90 January 21, 2014 (Rodriguez-Taseff) – Working on Supplemental Answer Brief – legal argument re authentication and cases distinguishing marchines [sic]; editing facts – 6.70 February 3, 2014 (Erde) – Review and revise response to motion for further briefing; intra-office conference to discuss same – 2.20 May 2, 2014 (Pontikes) – Continue to review relevant case law regarding the definition of an unpromulgated rule; continue to analyze the briefs and the arguments; continue to draft an outline of the argument discussed – 5.00 June 5, 2014 (Erde) – draft email to group regarding AHCA’s settlement offer; reviewed supplemental settlement offer from AHCA; draft email to group re same – 1.70 June 11, 2014 (Erde) – Attention to finalizing response to AHCA’s notice of dismissal and filing of fee petition; memo to members of group – 8.00 July 21, 2014 (Erde) – completed motion for rehearing re: fees as sanctions; drafted status report for DOAH regarding status of DCA opinion; drafted status report in companion case; emails with AHCA re: withdrawing pending audits – 6.90 July 21, 2014 (Peccola) – Strategy with D. Stinson and J. Erde regarding motion for rehearing; revise/edit same; review/revise edit notices in trial court 1.20. The descriptive entries in the invoices for the appellate representation also lack sufficient detail. Examples are: “begin preparation to respond to AHCA”s brief,” “attention to appeal issues,” “preparation to draft answer brief,” and “research and draft answer brief.” For the appellate proceedings, Duane Morris added four lawyers, none with experience in Florida administrative or appellate matters. W.D. Zaffuto, L. Rodriguez-Taseff, and Rachel Pontikes are senior level lawyers in Duane Morris offices outside of Florida. Rob Peccola is a junior level lawyer from a Duane Morris office outside of Florida. The apparent result is those lawyers spending more time on issues than the more experienced Ms. Erde and Ms. Stinson would. One example of this is a July 19, 2013, billing entry where a lawyer spent time researching “appellate rules regarding extension of time and staying proceedings pending ruling on motion.” The two lawyers primarily responsible for this matter, both laying claim to Florida appellate expertise, would only need to quickly check the Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure to confirm their recollection of the rules, something that would probably take less time than it took to make the time entry and review the draft bill. Hospitals’ also filed a puzzling motion that presents a discreet example of needless attorney time billed in this matter. The Hospitals expended 21.8 hours on a Motion for Rehearing of the court’s order awarding them fees and costs. The court’s opinion and the Final Order stated that fees and costs were awarded under section 120.595(4)(a), Florida Statutes. Yet the Hospitals’ motion fretted that fees might be assessed under section 120.595(4)(b), which caps fees at $50,000. The court denied the motion. Two things stand out when reviewing the invoices for the appellate proceeding. The first is that the appeal took more hours than the trial proceeding. A trial proceeding is generally more time-consuming because of discovery, a hearing much longer than an oral argument, witness preparation, document review, and preparing a proposed order. The second is the sheer number of hours. Hospitals’ counsel seeks payment for 754.10 hours in the appellate proceeding. This is 66.3 more than for the Division proceeding. It included a two day hearing, trial preparation, research, and preparing a 37 page proposed final order. In eight-hour days the claimed hours amount to a staggering 94.26 days. That amounts to one lawyer working on the appeal for eight hours a day for three months. Of this time, 613.5 hours were spent by Ms. Erde and Ms. Stinson, lawyers with expertise in the subject area, who had prepared the case for hearing, who participated in the hearing, who closely reviewed the entire record for preparation of their proposed final order, who researched the issues before the hearing and for the proposed final order, and who wrote the proposed final order. With all this knowledge and experience with the record and the law, handling the appeal should have taken less time than the proceeding before the Division.2/ One factor supports the appellate proceeding taking as many hours, or a few more hours, than the administrative proceeding. It is the Agency’s disputatious conduct over a scrivener’s error in the Final Order which erroneously stated that the Agency’s Exhibit 1 had been admitted. The Agency’s conduct increased the time needed to represent the Hospitals in the appeal. The Agency relied upon the exhibit in its initial brief, although it twice cited page 359 of the transcript where the objection to the exhibit was sustained. Also the Agency’s and the Hospitals’ proposed final orders correctly stated that Agency Exhibit 1 had not been admitted. The Hospitals’ Answer Brief noted that Agency Exhibit 1 had not been admitted. The transcript of the final hearing and both parties’ proposed final orders were clear that the exhibit had not been admitted. Yet the Agency argued in its Reply Brief that it had been. This required the Hospitals to move to remand the case for correction of the error. The Agency opposed the motion. The court granted the motion. The Final Order was corrected and jurisdiction relinquished back to the court. The Agency used this as an opportunity to trigger a new round of briefing about whether Exhibit 1 should have been admitted. This has been considered in determining the reasonable number of hours for handling the appeal. A reasonable number of hours for handling the appeal is 225. Converted to eight-hour days, this would be 28.13 days. For the appeal, Duane Morris attributes 28.4 hours of the work to a junior lawyer. This is 3.8 percent of the total time claimed. Applying that percentage to 225 hours, results in 8.6 hours attributed to the junior lawyer with the remaining 216.45 hours attributed to senior lawyers. Attorneys and Fees Each party presented expert testimony on the issues of reasonable hours and reasonable fees. The Agency presented the testimony of M. Christopher Bryant, Esquire. The Hospitals presented the testimony of David Ashburn, Esquire. As is so often the case with warring experts, the testimony of the witnesses conflicts dramatically. Mr. Bryant opined that a reasonable rate for senior lawyers, such as Ms. Erde and Ms. Stinson, ranged between $350 and $450 per hour. The reasonable rate for junior lawyers was $200 per hour. Mr. Ashburn opined that the reasonable hourly rate for senior lawyers ranged between $595 and $700 and the reasonable rate for junior lawyers was between $275 and $300. The contrast was the same for the opinions on the reasonable number of hours needed to handle the two stages of this litigation. Mr. Bryant testified that the administrative proceeding should have taken 150 to 170 hours and that the appeal should have taken 175 to 195 hours. Mr. Ashburn testified that the Hospitals’ claimed 687 hours for the proceeding before the Division and 754.10 hour for the appellate proceeding were reasonable. The Hospitals argue that somehow practicing in a large national law firm, like Duane Morris justifies a higher rate. The theory is unpersuasive. A national law firm is nothing special. There is no convincing, credible evidence to support a conclusion that lawyers from a national firm in comparison to smaller state or local firms provide better representation or more skilled and efficient lawyering that justifies a higher rate. Based upon the evidence presented in this record, a reasonable rate for the senior lawyers participating in this matter is $425 per hour. A reasonable rate for the junior lawyer participating in this matter is $200.00. Fee Amounts A reasonable fee amount for representation in the proceeding before the Division of Administrative Hearings is $76,500. A reasonable fee amount for the proceeding before the First District Court of Appeal is $93,701.25. Costs Hospitals seek $6,333.63 in costs. The evidence proves these costs are reasonable. The Agency does not dispute them.
The Issue Did the Florida Real Estate Commission (the Commission) engage in an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority when promulgating proposed rule 61J2-10.039 (the proposed rule)? See Section 120.52(8), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact A substantial number of the Association's members would be substantially affected by the proposed rule because property management is a fundamental business activity performed by the Association's members. As a percentage, 14.9 percent of the Association's members, in an in-house survey, responded that property management is one of their top three functions. The proposed rule substantially affects a substantial number of the Association's members because it would have a direct and immediate effect on the Association's members' right to earn a living in property management. The subject matter of the proposed rule is within the Association's general scope of interest and activity because of the Association's stated purpose "to serve the Realtor community by providing, promoting and delivering programs, products and services that will enhance members' skills and ability to operate their business profitably and ethically; to advance the real estate industry; and to preserve and extend the right to own, use, and transfer real property." The Association directed its rules challenge to the proposed rule which was noticed by publication in the Florida Administrative Weekly at Volume 24, Number 46, November 13, 1998. As announced in the published notice, the specific statements of authority for promulgating the proposed rule were Sections 475.05 and 475.25(1)(k), Florida Statutes. The notice referred to the law implemented by the proposed rule as Sections 455.224 and 475.25(1)(k), Florida Statutes. As noticed in the Florida Administrative Weekly, the purpose and effect of the proposed rule was as follows: The purpose and effect of the new rule is to require disclosure by a real estate broker to a landlord and tenant if the funds being delivered to the broker are to be held by a business entity or firm that is not a registered real estate broker. The disclosure would not apply to funds being held by an attorney or a title insurance company. In addition, the disclosure applies only to residential real property. The disclosure will then enable the landlord and tenant to make an informed choice about where the funds are being held in the event the funds are to be maintained by an unregulated entity. The notice in the Florida Administrative Weekly summarized the proposed rule as follows: Rule 61J2-10.039 will be a new rule. The rule will require disclosure in the event residential rental funds are to be maintained by an entity not registered as a real estate broker. The disclosure requirement would not apply if the funds are to be held by an attorney or title insurance company. The "summary of statement of estimated regulatory cost" as noticed in the Florida Administrative Weekly referred to costs as "none." That reference was followed by the following instruction: "Any person who wishes to provide information regarding the statement of estimated regulatory costs, or to provide a proposal for a lower cost singular regulatory alternative must do so in writing within 21 days of this notice." As noticed in the Florida Administrative Weekly, the full text of the proposed rule is: 61J2-10.039 Property Management Disclosure. A broker, when entrusted with funds in connection with the rental of residential real property, who is directed by the terms of a written agreement or document or by oral instructions of the parties to deposit the funds in an account maintained by a business entity or firm not registered or licensed with the Commission as a real estate broker shall inform the parties in writing of the following: that the business entity or firm is not registered or licensed with the Commission as a real estate broker and, therefore, is not subject to the escrow account requirements of Chapter 475, Part I, Florida Statutes, and is not within the jurisdiction of the Commission; and that the parties may choose to have the funds held only by a registered or licensed real estate broker. The disclosure requirements of paragraph (1) of this rule also apply to a licensed salesperson or broker-salesperson who is registered with the real estate broker and is involved in any aspect of the rental transaction. (3) The disclosure requirements of paragraph (1) of this rule shall not apply when the funds are to be deposited in an attorney's trust account or with a title insurance company. The text of the proposed rule as noticed in the Florida Administrative Weekly formed the basis for the challenge considered through the final hearing and the opportunity for post-hearing argument through proposed final orders by the parties. The proposed rule was offered for adoption in recognition that some real estate brokers engaged in the related activity of rental property management through the establishment of management companies that are separate from the brokerage activities. In particular, the Commission discovered that following brokerage activity in association with the rental of real property, through a licensed real estate company, by signing contracts between the affected parties, monies collected are placed with the management companies for future administration by those companies. The management companies are not licensed by the Commission and are outside the Commission's jurisdiction. As a consequence of the placement of the monies collected with the management company and not the brokerage firm, when the Commission's auditors went to brokers offices to audit trust accounts involved with rental property, the brokers would refuse to allow audits to be performed. The basis of refusal was premised upon the transfer of the money to the management company from the real estate brokerage company, outside the Commission's jurisdiction. In association with this practice, the Commission has received consumer complaints in which it was revealed that the consumers were unaware that they were dealing with two separate firms in the transactions related to the rental properties, the one firm being the brokerage firm and the other the management company. This transpired in a setting in which the consumers were not aware that the funds deposited were being held in the unregulated management company account. The realization of these developments led the Commission to propose the subject rule for adoption, with the expectation that consumers would be able to make an informed choice concerning the placement of the monies collected in relation to the rental properties. As proven by the Commission, audits by its investigators of the records of realtors would not increase the amount of time necessary to perform the audit function if the proposed rule was imposed on the regulated community. Instead, the time necessary to perform the audit function would be diminished. Following the presentation of the Commission's case, the Association failed to refute this proof concerning the costs to the Commission to enforce the terms of the proposed rule or to offer proof concerning costs to members of the Association to comply with the proposed rule.
