The Issue Whether there exists just cause to suspend Respondent without pay for fifteen work days.
Findings Of Fact Mr. Madruga has been employed as an English, Stagecraft, and Theater Arts teacher at Ronald Reagan/Doral Senior High School since 2006. During the 2011-2012 school year, Mr. Madruga taught Stagecraft and Theater Arts. In his Stagecraft class, the students learned how to create the overall visual aspect of the high school productions. The students create costumes, construct set pieces, apply make-up, design the lighting scheme, and control the sound of the production. Mr. Madruga seems to thoroughly enjoy teaching these subjects; his passion for teaching was evident during his testimony. In July 2011, a complaint was filed against Mr. Madruga regarding communication he had with a student via Facebook. He received a letter of reprimand, which included the following directives: refrain from participating in any kind of communication with students through Facebook, cellular phone, or email unless it was regarding school business; refrain from using inappropriate language in conversation of any type (written or verbal) with students when addressing them; adhere to all School Board rules and regulations at all times; and conduct himself, both in his employment and in the community, in a manner that would reflect credit upon himself and the Miami-Dade public schools. On September 29, 2011, on a teacher planning day, Mr. Madruga and the Band Director were, with the help of student volunteers, building a set for a marching band production. Mr. Madruga was present that day to help the band students build the stage. He recognized most of the band students, but did not know them well. The school had received grant money from the City of Miami-Dade, and the money was being partially used for the construction of the set. The school was responsible for creating a report which documented the use of the grant money. E.P., a student, was assigned the task of photographing the construction of the set for use in the report. E.P.'s mother, C.P., was also helping that day. C.P., the Band Director, and Mr. Madruga went to Home Depot to buy all the materials needed for construction of the stage. During that trip, Mr. Madruga made some comments that C.P. interpreted to be sexual in nature. While the students were building the frame of the stage, they used metal braces at the junctures. Those supports are screwed into the wood frame using approximately 8-10 screws. Two students worked together during this process; one held the metal support piece in place, and the other used a power tool to drill the screws in place. While two students worked on installing one of these metal braces, E.P. photographed them. One photograph captures the two students on the floor with the framing; one is kneeling while using the power drill, the other is sitting on the ground while holding the metal brace in place. Mr. Madruga is standing beside the student who is using the power drill, holding screws in his left hand. His hand is lowered to his knee level, which is also at the level of the kneeling student's head. Mr. Madruga explained that, at the time the photo was taken, he was standing next to the student using the power drill because it is quite easy to get injured using it. As he was holding the screws, the photograph captured him handing a screw to the student using the power drill. C.P. filed a complaint with the school, alleging that Mr. Madruga had extended his middle finger in the photograph intentionally, and then laughed about having done so. She also alleged that while the student using the power drill was kneeling and bending at the waist over the framing, Mr. Madruga commented that he was familiar with that position. C.P. considered the comment to be sexual in nature, and thought that extending his middle finger in the photograph was inappropriate. Students present during this construction event were interviewed during the investigation of C.P.'s complaint, and none, with the exception of C.P.'s son, corroborated C.P.'s allegations. The student kneeling in the photograph refused to provide a statement. The student sitting down holding the metal brace had no knowledge of these allegations, and never heard Mr. Madruga make the alleged comment. The greater weight of the evidence supports Mr. Madruga's testimony; the photograph captures Mr. Madruga handing the student screws as he described, and if Mr. Madruga had made sexually charged comments while in close proximity to students, the undersigned believes the students--in particular the student to whom the comment was allegedly directed--would have heard it. The greater weight of the evidence established that Mr. Madruga is not guilty of misconduct in office, gross insubordination, or of violating any School Board policies.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the School Board dismiss the Administrative Complaint against Mr. Madruga. DONE AND ENTERED this 21st day of December, 2012, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JESSICA E. VARN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of December, 2012.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether there is just cause for Broward County School Board to suspend Lula Faison for 10 days without pay based upon the allegations made in its Administrative Complaint filed on October 11, 2017.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a duly-constituted school board charged with the duty to operate, control, and supervise all free public schools within Broward County. Art. IX, Fla. Const.; § 1001.32, Fla. Stat. Specifically, the School Board has the authority to discipline employees. § 1012.22(1)(f), Fla. Stat. Faison was hired by the School Board on February 10, 2004. She started her employment with the School Board at Sunset Center School, an off-campus program at Smith Community Health, where she taught for approximately four years. She was employed pursuant to a professional services contract with Broward County. Faison is a certified Exceptional Student Education ("ESE") and English for Speakers of Other Languages ("ESOL") teacher. She has worked with Emotional/Behavioral Disability ("EBD")1/ students her whole career with Broward County. She started working for Pompano Beach Elementary School ("Pompano") during the 2010-2011 school year as an ESE teacher for EBD students. During her first two years at Pompano, she had fourth- and fifth-grade EBD students. During the 2015-2016 school year, Faison's classroom was mixed with 10 EBD students in grades kindergarten, first, second, and third, with ages ranging from six to 10 or 11. The younger kids mimicked the older students' behavior, and it was challenging for Faison to control the classroom. Faison's classroom had the highest rate of incidents compared to the other EBD classrooms in the cluster at Pompano. Faison had both a paraprofessional, Hunt, and a substitute teacher, Popov, to assist in her classroom to help bring order. Hunt was assigned to assist Faison in her classroom with point sheets, monitoring the children, helping isolate behaviors, as well as manage and teach students. A.J. was approximately nine years old when he joined the EBD program during the 2015-2016 school year. A.J. was an enjoyable kid, but had numerous behavioral episodes. He was very explosive and lacked a concern for safety. He had various home issues going on. Additionally, A.J. was also a runner2/ and he had nine elopements3/ from January to April 2016. Pompano's protocol for if a student elopes was that administration was notified; the elopement was communicated over the school walkie-talkie system to notify staff to be aware to look out for the student; once the student was located, the locator was to keep eyes on the student; and typically a separate individual went after the student while the other watched. Safety is always the priority in any elopement. Faison was trained in the elopement protocol and was familiar with its process. While at Pompano, Faison never had any difficulty implementing or dealing with elopement protocols. On April 18, 2017, Faison reported to work late. Upon her arrival, Hunt had written the morning activities on the board and was instructing her classroom. Soon thereafter, Popov arrived and Faison took her class out to the playground. Popov assisted Faison taking the students outside, but she only remained about five minutes and then left Faison alone with the students. When no one came out to assist Faison with the students on the playground, she decided to take the students back inside. At the time, A.J. was playing with sticks. Faison instructed A.J. to put the sticks down because he could not bring them inside. She encouraged him to put them under the bench to retrieve and play with later. A.J. refused to put the sticks down and wanted to bring them inside. Faison told A.J. to walk with her and he did. Faison walked the students inside from off the playground headed to her classroom and ran into Popov. Faison had Popov walk the kids the remainder of the way into Faison's classroom so that Faison could deal with A.J. and the sticks. Faison had been trained in Professional Crisis Management ("PCM"). She evaluated the situation with A.J. and she determined that the best behavioral technique and de- escalation strategy to get A.J. to comply and put the sticks down, was to ask Felix to assist with A.J. Felix had a good relationship with A.J. Previously, A.J. had responded well to Felix and Felix had been able to calm A.J. down. Faison did not want A.J. to hurt anyone with the sticks. Faison went to the TAB room4/ where Felix was assigned. A.J. still had the sticks and was behind Faison in the hallway when she approached Felix's classroom.5/ Faison opened the door to the TAB room and observed that Felix had several students in his room that he was supervising when Faison arrived and that Felix was the only adult present. Faison stood in the doorway and explained to Felix that A.J. was not listening to her. She wanted to see if Felix could assist her and get him to come inside the classroom without the sticks. Faison requested that Felix help her out and speak to A.J. Faison held the conversation with Felix at the TAB room door with her body halfway in the door and Felix standing in the doorway on the TAB room side. When Faison turned around to address A.J. in the hallway, he was not there. Felix never saw A.J. in the hallway. When Faison discovered A.J. was no longer in the hallway, she thought A.J. was outside of Felix's classroom and she made a reasonable request that Felix call him in through the side door of the TAB classroom. Felix did not indicate to Faison that he either agreed to or refused to assist with or go after A.J. Faison left the TAB room believing that Felix was going to get A.J., which was a mistake because Felix did not follow up with A.J., unbeknownst to Faison. Faison's actions of not following up and believing Felix had followed up with A.J. were an isolated incident of misjudgment. After their discussion, Faison returned to her classroom. Later that morning, Pompano's secretary put out an elopement call on the Pompano walkie-talkie system. Faison did not receive the call because she did not have a walkie-talkie on April 18, 2016. Felix heard the elopement call and walked outside of the door towards the parking lot and emerged near the entrance of the school. There, Felix saw A.J. with a stick by the school marquee near the outer boundary of the school on the far end of the school property. Hunt also heard the elopement call on the walkie- talkie and went outside to follow the Pompano elopement protocol. Felix and Hunt worked together. Felix went to the left and Hunt went to the right to encircle A.J. When A.J. noticed them, he took off running toward 13th Avenue. Hunt and Felix caught A.J. approximately a block away from the school at the intersection of Northeast 8th Street and Northeast 13th Avenue near the baseball field. Following elopement protocol, Felix and Hunt let the administration know by walkie-talkie that they had caught up to A.J. The resource officer arrived and put A.J. in the patrol car because A.J. was combative. Principal Larson also appeared at the scene to check and see if everything was fine. Afterwards, Larson discussed A.J.'s elopement with Felix and decided he needed to follow up with Faison to determine what happened with A.J. When A.J. was returned to campus, he went to the TAB room to cool down and to determine why he eloped. Faison was not aware that A.J. had eloped. She was taking her students to lunch alone,6/ midway through the hallway about to lead the kids into the cafeteria, when Larson caught up with her and made the reasonable request that she come to him to have a discussion. He wanted to discuss the A.J. incident. Faison told Larson no when he told her to step aside and talk with him. Larson addressed Faison twice more and requested that she come to him. Faison refused to approach or talk to Larson. The third time Larson requested that Faison come to him, he informed her that she was being insubordinate. Faison felt she should not have left the kids and responded by telling Larson "I've been insubordinate all year." She finished walking the kids to the cafeteria following Larson's instructions. Broward County School Board's Police Special Investigative Unit and Broward Sheriff's Child Protective Investigations Services investigated A.J.'s April 18, 2016, off- campus elopement. Onagoruwa investigated the incident within 24 hours, including interviewing A.J. and closed her case as non-substantiated because no physical harm occurred to A.J. While at Pompano, Faison's previous discipline included: a summary memo dated May 2, 2014, regarding IEP deadlines; a second summary memo for failure to complete IEPs on time dated May 2, 2015; a disciplinary memo dated October 27, 2015, for failure to adhere to IEP deadlines and verbal reprimand of November 3, 2015; a February 1, 2016, written reprimand following a pre-disciplinary hearing meeting for failure to submit lesson plans and a comprehensive behavior plan; and a second written reprimand dated March 16, 2016, for failing to complete third grade portfolios and insubordinate behavior of hanging up the phone on Larson and refusing to meet with him in his office. The March 16, 2016, written reprimand specifically warned Faison about insubordination and stated: [Y]ou received notification regarding your insubordinate behavior on February 22, 2016, when you hung up the pone on me after I asked you to come to my office for a meeting and on March 2, 2016 for refusing to meet with me for non-disciplinary reasons. * * * [Y]our gross insubordination [is] a serious breach of conduct that cannot be tolerated. Therefore, I am issuing you a written reprimand that is consistent with School Board Policy 4.9. Please be advised that any further failure on your part to perform to the standards established for the effective and productive performance of your job duties as a teacher will result in further disciplinary action, up to and including termination of your employment. Petitioner ultimately filed charges against Faison by Administrative Complaint dated October 11, 2017, that included charges of misconduct in office, incompetency, gross insubordination, willful neglect of duty, and violation of School Board Policy 4008. On November 7, 2017, the School Board took action to suspend Respondent for 10 days without pay. Respondent contested the reasons for suspension.
Recommendation Upon consideration of the Findings of Fact and the Conclusions of Law reached, it is RECOMMENDED that the Broward County School Board enter a final order rescinding the 10-day suspension with back pay. DONE AND ENTERED this 6th day of July, 2018, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JUNE C. MCKINNEY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of July, 2018.
The Issue Whether the Respondent, Gloria P. Adams, violated School Board rules regarding a drug-free workplace, and excessive absenteeism; whether she abandoned her position of employment; whether Respondent committed gross insubordination or willful neglect of duty; and if so, whether such violation(s) support termination of Respondent's employment with the School District.
Findings Of Fact At all times material to the allegations of this case, the Petitioner is the authority charged with the responsibility of operating, controlling, and supervising all public schools within the Miami-Dade County, Florida School District. As such, its duties also include the personnel decisions related to teachers employed by the School District. At all times material to the allegations of this matter, the Petitioner employed the Respondent pursuant to a professional services contract. The Respondent was assigned to serve as a teacher at Jan Mann Opportunity School. On December 21, 2001, the Respondent presented for work staggering (in fact she fell down) with a disheveled appearance. At that time Respondent spoke with slurred speech and used verbally aggressive words. Based upon her appearance and actions, together with what was perceived as a strong odor of alcohol, the Respondent's supervisor determined that she should complete a "reasonable suspicion form." The form is designated when an employee is suspected of drug and/or alcohol use on school property. Betty Major completed the form (Petitioner's Exhibit 1) and noted Respondent's unsteady gait as well as the other indicators of being under the influence. Moreover, the Respondent admitted she had been drinking alcohol the night before. During the interview conducted by Ms. Major, the Respondent exhibited marked irritability and expressed anger. As a result, the Respondent was relieved of duty. The Respondent subsequently refused to submit to a drug and alcohol screening. On January 10, 2002, the School Board's Office of Professional Standards held a conference-for-the-record (CFR) and informed the Respondent that the refusal to submit to drug and alcohol screening would be considered a positive test response. The details of the CFR are memorialized in Petitioner's Exhibit 2. At the CFR the Respondent was also advised that she had excessive absences. Although the Respondent maintained she was physically ill and unable to attend school, documentation from a treating physician to support the number of absences has not been provided. At the conclusion of the CFR, the Respondent was provided with a copy of the School Board rule regarding its policy for a drug-free workplace, a copy of the responsibilities and duties rule, and the code of ethics of the Education Profession in Florida. The CFR was concluded with an indication from Respondent that she would promptly address the issues raised therein. As part of the CFR the Respondent was advised of her opportunity to obtain assistance through the Employees' Assistance Program (EAP). Among its functions the EAP counsels School Board employees with substance or drug abuse concerns. Alcohol is considered a "drug" under the drug-free workplace policy. The Respondent initially agreed to complete the EAP requirements in order to return to the classroom. She did not fully cooperate with or complete the program. On April 15, 2002, a second CFR was conducted with the Respondent. This meeting again sought to address the Respondent's ability to return to duty and her noncompliance with the drug-free workplace policy. At the second CFR the Respondent again expressed a willingness to complete the EAP and to obtain appropriate help for her on-going problems. The Respondent was directed to comply with the recommendations made by the School District's EAP. The Respondent continued to be apologetic for her past behaviors. On August 13, 2002, a third CFR was held between the Respondent and the Office of Professional Standards. The agenda for that meeting was similar to the past CFRs. The Respondent had not complied with the EAP, had not explained the unauthorized excessive absences, and the issue of the presumptive positive response for the drug and alcohol screening still loomed large. Again, as in the past, the Respondent apologized for not completing the EAP. Additionally, the number of leave without pay (unauthorized) absences had by that time grown to The Respondent had also exhausted her sick/personal leave time. The absences were directly attributable to the Respondent's failure to complete the EAP. Basically, the Respondent was unable to be cleared to return to the classroom until she completed the EAP. She failed to complete the EAP so the number of unauthorized absences continued to grow. Eventually the Respondent was dropped from the EAP due to lack of participation. Her case was then closed. The Petitioner gave the Respondent numerous opportunities to demonstrate she was fit to return to the classroom. The Respondent did not offer any credible explanation for her actions. Regrettably, the Respondent demonstrated by her failure to comply with the EAP that she was unprepared to return to the classroom. The Respondent did not request medical leave (with appropriate documentation from a physician) if her condition were due to a physical illness. Moreover, the Respondent did not apply for any leave that might have protected her job. This lack of judgment in itself suggests the Respondent was impaired and therefore unable to perform her duties as a classroom teacher. At the minimum, had Respondent attended the EAP she could have received counseling and assistance that might have protected her future employment with the School District.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the School Board of Miami-Dade County, Florida, enter a Final Order confirming the initial decision to suspend without pay and to terminate the employment of the Respondent based upon just cause as set forth above. It is further recommended that, should the Respondent complete an accepted program for substance abuse and demonstrate fitness for Duty, that the School Board consider re-employment of the Respondent. DONE AND ENTERED this 30th day of May, 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ___________________________________ J. D. PARRISH Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of May, 2003. COPIES FURNISHED: Merrett R. Stierheim Interim Superintendent Miami-Dade County School Board 1450 Northeast Second Avenue, No. 912 Miami, Florida 33132-1394 Daniel J. Woodring, General Counsel Department of Education 325 West Gaines Street, Room 1244 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400 Gloria P. Adams 19511 Northwest 8th Avenue Miami, Florida 33169 Melinda L. McNichols, Esquire Miami-Dade County School Board 1450 Northeast Second Avenue, Suite 400 Miami, Florida 33132
The Issue Whether Respondent violated section 1012.795, Florida Statutes (2015),1/ and implementing administrative rules, as charged in the Administrative Complaint, and if so, what is the appropriate sanction.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is responsible for the investigation and prosecution of complaints against holders of Florida Educator Certificates who are accused of violating section 1012.795 and related rules. At all times material to the allegations in this case, Respondent held Florida Educator’s Certificate 701877. The certificate covered the areas of elementary education, English for Speakers of Other Languages (ESOL), and world language- Spanish. The certificate was valid through June 30, 2015. Respondent has been a teacher for over 20 years. At all times material to this proceeding, Respondent was employed by the Osceola County School District (OCSD) as a teacher at Michigan Avenue Elementary School (Elementary School). The allegations against Respondent arise from Respondent transporting an Elementary School student home after school one day. Tammy Cope-Otterson is the chief human resource officer for the OCSD. OCSD has a policy that requires school personnel to have approval from the principal before transporting a student. OCSD has a rule that requires written consent from a parent before a student can be transported in a private vehicle. Respondent admitted that he was aware that it was against school district rule to transport students in a personal vehicle without permission from the school district or the student’s parents. During the 2008-2009 school year, K.N. was a student in Respondent’s second-grade class at the Elementary School. While K.N. was in Respondent’s class, M.N. (K.N.’s mother) expressed that she was not fond of Respondent’s teaching methods. During the 2010-2011 school year, K.N. was ten years old and in fourth grade at the Elementary School. Following the completion of the 2010-2011 regular school year, K.N. enrolled in the Elementary School summer enrichment program, called the Spirit Program. Respondent served as a physical education instructor for the Spirit Program. When M.N.’s work hours changed, she and K.N. walked to and from the Elementary School to establish K.N.’s daily route. K.N. was allowed to walk or ride her bike to the Elementary School. M.N and K.N. lived on 10th Street, approximately 15 blocks from the Elementary School. On July 6, 2011, K.N. started to ride her bike to the Elementary School. During the ride, she noticed that a tire was becoming flat. K.N. stopped at a local convenience store and attempted to put air in the tire, to no avail. She walked the rest of the way to the Elementary School, parked her bike in the bike rack, and left a voice message for M.N. that she had arrived at the Elementary School. After the Spirit Program ended for the day on July 6, K.N. left her bike at school and started walking home via the established route. K.N. walked to the corner of Michigan and 10th Street and crossed over Michigan to be on the south side of 10th Street. Because it was a hot day, K.N. rested in some shade, a little south of the corner. Respondent stopped his car close to K.N. Respondent used his authoritative teacher voice and told K.N. to get in the car. K.N. got into Respondent’s car. Respondent admitted that K.N. got into his private car. He then drove a block south on Michigan Avenue, turned west on 11th Street, drove two blocks, turned right on Indiana Avenue, drove two blocks, turned east on 9th Street, drove one block, turned south on Illinois Avenue and stopped at the corner of Illinois Avenue and 10th Street. K.N. got out of Respondent’s car and walked to her home on 10th Street. Respondent testified that he wanted to let K.N. out on her home’s (north) side of the street so she could use the sidewalk to safely get home. There was no sidewalk on the north side of 10th street. K.N. credibly testified that as Respondent was driving her around, he placed his hand on her left thigh and rubbed it. K.N. was “upset,” “very uncomfortable,” and “wanted to crawl out of [her] own skin.” K.N. also credibly testified that Respondent asked if she wanted to go for ice cream, which she declined. Later that same day, Respondent was questioned about whether he had any interaction with K.N. after school on July 6. Initially Respondent denied any interaction with K.N., but later admitted that he had picked K.N. up and taken her home. Respondent did not take K.N. home, but merely dropped her off down the street from her home. Respondent’s selective memory about the events of July 6 lessens his credibility and his testimony is deemed unreliable. Respondent was arrested and criminally charged. While he awaited his court date, OCSD initially suspended and later terminated Respondent’s employment. There was extensive media coverage. Respondent was acquitted or found not guilty in the criminal matters. PRIOR CONDUCT On November 10, 2000, a Final Order was entered by the Education Practices Commission of the State of Florida (EPC) involving Respondent. Respondent was alleged to have allowed an ineligible player to participate in a soccer game. Respondent did not contest the allegations and entered a Settlement Agreement that was accepted by the EPC. Respondent agreed to be reprimanded, placed on probation for one year, refrain from violating any laws, fully comply with all district school board regulations, rules and State Board of Education rule 6B-1.006, pay $150 to defray the costs of his monitoring while on probation, and satisfactorily perform his assigned duties. The allegations in the 2000 matter are not similar to the allegations in the instant case, were resolved in 2000, and Respondent successfully completed his probation.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Education Practices Commission enter a Final Order finding that Respondent violated sections 1012.795(1)(g) and (j), and rule 6A-10.081(3)(a), and that he did not violate section 1012.795(1)(d), and rule 6A-10.081(3)(e). It is further RECOMMENDED that the Education Practices Commission suspend Respondent’s educator certificate for five years, followed by five years of probation. The Education Practices Commission shall establish the terms and conditions of Respondent’s suspension and probation, which may include the cost of monitoring the suspension and probation. DONE AND ENTERED this 17th day of December, 2015, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LYNNE A. QUIMBY-PENNOCK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of December,2015.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether a district school board is entitled to terminate a teacher's employment for just cause based upon the allegation that he picked up an administrator and dropped her to the floor.
Findings Of Fact Introduction The Miami-Dade County School Board ("School Board"), Petitioner in this case, is the constitutional entity authorized to operate, control, and supervise the Miami-Dade County Public School System. Respondent Michael De Palo ("De Palo") is a teacher. He was employed in the Miami-Dade County Public School System from September 1999 until September 10, 2003, on which date the School Board suspended him without pay pending termination. At all times relevant to this case, De Palo was assigned to Miami Norland Senior High School ("Norland"), where he taught social studies. The School Board's preliminary decision to dismiss De Palo was based on an incident that occurred at Norland on January 23, 2003. De Palo is alleged to have committed at least a technical battery that day upon the person of Gladys Hudson, an Assistant Principal, in the presence of Benjamin Cowins, a school counselor. These three are the only individuals who have personal knowledge of the January 23, 2003, incident. De Palo, Ms. Hudson, and Mr. Cowins testified in person at the final hearing. Also, proof of some prior statements about the incident was introduced into evidence. The most reliable such proof, in terms of establishing what was actually said, consists of the signed, written statements of Ms. Hudson and Mr. Cowins, dated February 3, 2003, and January 27, 2003, respectively, as these documents contain the witness' own words. Ms. Hudson and Mr. Cowins also gave verbal accounts to Detective Hadley, the school police officer who investigated the incident. Detective Hadley recorded their statements in his March 5, 2003, Preliminary Personnel Investigation Report, which is in evidence. De Palo, too, made a brief oral statement about the matter to Detective Hadley, which statement is recounted in the investigative report. De Palo also gave an oral statement at a conference-for-the-record held on May 14, 2003, and this statement is set forth in a Summary of Conference-for-the-Record dated May 19, 2003, which is in evidence. The aforementioned writings memorializing the several witness' prior oral statements, having been prepared by (and thus filtered through) someone other than the witness himself or herself, do not necessarily capture the witness' actual words and therefore have been accorded relatively little weight, as compared with the testimony given under oath at hearing. Ms. Hudson and Mr. Cowins are largely in agreement as to what happened on January 23, 2003. Their version of the incident, however, conflicts irreconcilably with De Palo's on crucial points. After carefully reviewing the entire record and reflecting upon the respective impressions that each of the participant-eyewitnesses made on the undersigned at hearing, the fact-finder has determined that De Palo's testimony, for the most part, is more credible than that of Hudson/Cowins. To the extent any finding of material fact herein is inconsistent with the testimony of one witness or another, the finding reflects a rejection of all such inconsistent testimony in favor of evidence that the undersigned deemed to be more believable and hence entitled to greater weight. Material Historical Facts On the morning of January 23, 2003, Ms. Hudson and Mr. Cowins were standing and talking in the hallway outside the door to Mr. Cowins' office. De Palo approached the pair as he walked through the hallway on his way to the copy machine. The hallway where this encounter took place is narrow and does not afford sufficient space for three adults to pass by each other with ease. Consequently, Ms. Hudson, whose feet hurt almost every day due to preexisting conditions, requested that De Palo please take care not to step on her feet when he passed.2 This plea for caution was not given because De Palo had stepped on Ms. Hudson's feet in the past, or because De Palo was approaching in a manner that threatened to injure her feet, but rather because the passage was so narrow. (Ms. Hudson would have said the same thing to any colleague who happened down the hallway at that particular time.) In response to Ms. Hudson's entreaty, De Palo remarked that he would "sweep her off her feet" and help Ms. Hudson back to her office. De Palo, who was in good spirits at the time, made these comments in a lighthearted, even jovial manner. His demeanor was good-natured——not hostile, threatening, or menacing. De Palo proceeded to pick Ms. Hudson up. At this point, it is relevant to note that De Palo is a retired firefighter and paramedic who had returned to teaching after a 28-year career with the fire department. From his work experience, De Palo was familiar with body mechanics, and he knew how to lift and transport someone without injuring himself or the person being carried. To lift Ms. Hudson, De Palo placed one hand and arm on her back at around shoulder level, and another hand and arm under her legs, at the knees. Once he had her off the ground, De Palo held Ms. Hudson close to his body, more-or-less at his waist level, in a semi-reclining position, her head somewhat higher than her legs. (To envisage the way he held her, imagine the iconic picture of the groom carrying his bride across the threshold.3) Ms. Hudson is relatively small woman——she weighed approximately 110 pounds at the time of the incident——but nevertheless De Palo likely could not have lifted her as he did, the undersigned reasonably infers, without her cooperation or acquiescence. This is because, in order to pick her up, De Palo needed to set his own feet and arms, during which maneuvering—— which would have revealed his intentions——Ms. Hudson easily could have moved out of position (e.g. by stepping forward), had she objected to being lifted.4 There is no persuasive evidence, and thus it is not found, that De Palo grabbed Ms. Hudson and forcibly wrestled her into his arms to be lifted.5 Ms. Hudson did not protest or object when De Palo picked her up. Indeed, the persuasive evidence establishes that she said nothing at all. The undersigned finds that had she been physically or verbally resistant (which she was not), De Palo would have refrained from lifting Ms. Hudson off her feet. It is found as well that De Palo had no intent to harm Ms. Hudson in any way, including through the infliction of emotional distress. Rather, De Palo, the former fireman, believed that he was doing a good deed, in a playful manner. With Ms. Hudson in his arms, De Palo walked a short distance (15 feet or so) to her office, which is around a corner, and hence cannot be seen, from Mr. Cowins' office. Mr. Cowins did not follow along. The door to Ms. Hudson's office was open, and De Palo carried her into the room, where he set her down on her feet. De Palo did not drop Ms. Hudson onto the floor, nor did she fall down, and any evidence suggesting otherwise is explicitly rejected. De Palo bade Ms. Hudson a good day and left. The entire episode had lasted no more than 30 seconds. The next day, Ms. Hudson summoned De Palo to her office and told him that his lifting and carrying her had been inappropriate. De Palo agreed and apologized. At some point after January 23, 2003, Ms. Hudson filed a workers' compensation claim relating to the incident, during which, she maintained, her back had been hurt. Ms. Hudson remained off duty for about one month. While these particular facts are not disputed, the evidence in the record does not persuade the undersigned that Ms. Hudson was injured as a result of De Palo's actions on January 23, 2003.6 Ultimate Factual Determinations De Palo's conduct on January 23, 2003, did not entail threats, threatening behavior, or acts of violence. Therefore, De Palo did not violate School Board Rule 6Gx13-4-1.08, which proscribes violence in the workplace. De Palo's conduct on January 23, 2003, constituted horseplay. His spur-of-the-moment behavior, like most on-the- job tomfoolery, while foolish and inappropriate in hindsight, and certainly neither authorized nor praiseworthy, was nevertheless relatively harmless in the grand scheme. De Palo's actions for a half-minute that day were plainly out of place and unprofessional, but his conduct was not "unseemly"——an adjective that, as ordinarily used, denotes something offensive to good taste. Moreover, De Palo did not use abusive or profane language in the presence of Ms. Hudson and Mr. Cowins. Therefore, it is determined that De Palo did not violate School Board Rule 6Gx13-4A-1.21, which prohibits unseemly conduct and abusive or profane language. The School Board has not identified, and the undersigned has not located, a specific principle in Florida Administrative Code Rule 6B-1.006 (prescribing the Principles of Professional Conduct for the Education Profession in Florida) that clearly proscribes the conduct in which De Palo engaged on January 23, 2003. Accordingly, it is determined that De Palo is not guilty of misconduct in office, an offense defined in Florida Administrative Code Rule 6B-4.009(3). Finally, it is determined that De Palo's conduct was not so serious as to impair his effectiveness in the school system.
Conclusions The Division of Administrative Hearings has personal and subject matter jurisdiction in this proceeding pursuant to Sections 120.569 and 120.57(1), Florida Statutes. In an administrative proceeding to dismiss a teacher, the school board, as the charging party, bears the burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, each element of the charged offense(s). See McNeill v. Pinellas County School Bd., 678 So. 2d 476, 477 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996); Sublett v. Sumter County School Bd., 664 So. 2d 1178, 1179 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995). De Palo's guilt or innocence is a question of ultimate fact to be decided in the context of each alleged violation. McKinney v. Castor, 667 So. 2d 387, 389 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995); Langston v. Jamerson, 653 So. 2d 489, 491 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995). II. In its Notice of Specific Charges served October 13, 2003, the School Board advanced three theories for De Palo's removal: Violence in the Workplace (Count I); Conduct Unbecoming a School Board Employee (Count II); and Misconduct in Office (Count III). Counts I and II are grounded in School Board Rules, namely School Board Rule 6Gx13-4-1.08 and School Board Rule 6Gx13-4A-1.21. These Rules, like all rules applicable to only one school district, are not published in the Florida Administrative Code. See § 120.55(1)(a)2., Fla. Stat. The School Board neither introduced copies of its Rules into evidence nor asked that official recognition be taken of them. Thus, although the undersigned thinks he knows the contents of these Rules, based on experience and access to DOAH's Recommended Orders, he does not have before him, in this record, the complete text of either Rule as offered during the hearing, where the accused party would have had opportunities to inspect and object to the admission or official recognition thereof. Though unlikely to be applauded on appeal, it is possibly within the undersigned's discretion to initiate the process, on his own motion, for taking official recognition of, or reopening the record to receive in evidence, the pertinent School Board Rules. See Collier Medical Center, Inc. v. State Dept. of Health and Rehabilitative Services, 462 So. 2d 83, 86 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985)(Allowing "a party to produce additional evidence after the conclusion of an administrative hearing below would set in motion a never-ending process of confrontation and cross-examination, rebuttal and surrebuttal evidence, a result not contemplated by the Administrative Procedures [sic] Act."). Such a process would entail (a) requesting copies of the Rules and (b) affording each party an opportunity to present information relevant to the propriety of supplementing the record in this manner. Cf. § 90.204, Fla. Stat. (setting forth the procedure for sua sponte taking judicial notice of a fact). The undersigned is disinclined to do this, however, believing it reasonable to insist that the School Board produce at hearing, without prompting, a complete copy of any unpublished rule upon which it relies——or suffer the consequence of failure. The ordinary consequence of failing properly to introduce a pertinent rule would be, of course, a determination that the School Board had failed to prove a violation of the rule——and that is what would happen here. The undersigned cannot ultimately determine that De Palo violated either School Board Rule 6Gx13-4-1.08 or School Board Rule 6Gx13-4A-1.21, regardless of what the other evidence might establish, unless he can examine the Rules in question. Thus, the undersigned's refusal to initiate a process for receiving these Rules into the record necessarily would be outcome determinative as to Counts I and II. It so happens in this case, however, that when the undersigned applies what he thinks the Rules in question provide to the historical facts as found above, ultimate determinations of innocence result. Thus, in this case, receiving the Rules would not change the outcome, assuming the Rules say what the undersigned believes they say. The question of whether to receive the Rules sua sponte will therefore be sidestepped. For the purposes of this Recommend Order, it will simply be assumed, for the sake of reaching the merits, that the Rules are properly before the undersigned.7 III. In this section, the three charged offenses will be examined one-by-one, putting aside momentarily the element of "resulting ineffectiveness," which, being common to all counts, will be addressed separately in the next section. For organizational convenience, the counts will be taken up in reverse order, starting with Count III. Misconduct in Office The School Board is authorized to terminate the employment of a teacher such as De Palo "only for just cause." See § 1012.33 (1)(a), Fla. Stat.; see also § 1012.33(6)(a), Fla. Stat. ("Any member of the instructional staff . . . may be suspended or dismissed at any time during the term of the contract for just cause[.]") The term "just cause” includes, but is not limited to, the following instances, as defined by rule of the State Board of Education: misconduct in office, incompetency, gross insubordination, willful neglect of duty, or conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude. § 1012.33(1)(a), Fla. Stat. The term “misconduct in office” is defined in Florida Administrative Code Rule 6B-4.009, which prescribes the "criteria for suspension and dismissal of instructional personnel" and provides, in pertinent part, as follows: (3) Misconduct in office is defined as a violation of the Code of Ethics of the Education Profession as adopted in Rule 6B- 1.001, F.A.C., and the Principles of Professional Conduct for the Education Profession in Florida as adopted in Rule 6B- 1.006, F.A.C., which is so serious as to impair the individual's effectiveness in the school system. The Code of Ethics of the Education Profession (adopted in Florida Administrative Code Rule 6B-1.001) and the Principles of Professional Conduct for the Education Profession in Florida (adopted in Florida Administrative Code Rule 6B- 1.006), which are incorporated in the definition of "misconduct in office," provide as follows: 6B-1.001 Code of Ethics of the Education Profession in Florida. The educator values the worth and dignity of every person, the pursuit of truth, devotion to excellence, acquisition of knowledge, and the nurture of democratic citizenship. Essential to the achievement of these standards are the freedom to learn and to teach and the guarantee of equal opportunity for all. The educator’s primary professional concern will always be for the student and for the development of the student’s potential. The educator will therefore strive for professional growth and will seek to exercise the best professional judgment and integrity. Aware of the importance of maintaining the respect and confidence of one's colleagues, of students, of parents, and of other members of the community, the educator strives to achieve and sustain the highest degree of ethical conduct. * * * 6B-1.006 Principles of Professional Conduct for the Education Profession in Florida. The following disciplinary rule shall constitute the Principles of Professional Conduct for the Education Profession in Florida. Violation of any of these principles shall subject the individual to revocation or suspension of the individual educator’s certificate, or the other penalties as provided by law. Obligation to the student requires that the individual: Shall make reasonable effort to protect the student from conditions harmful to learning and/or to the student’s mental and/or physical health and/or safety. Shall not unreasonably restrain a student from independent action in pursuit of learning. Shall not unreasonably deny a student access to diverse points of view. Shall not intentionally suppress or distort subject matter relevant to a student’s academic program. Shall not intentionally expose a student to unnecessary embarrassment or disparagement. Shall not intentionally violate or deny a student’s legal rights. Shall not harass or discriminate against any student on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, age, national or ethnic origin, political beliefs, marital status, handicapping condition, sexual orientation, or social and family background and shall make reasonable effort to assure that each student is protected from harassment or discrimination. Shall not exploit a relationship with a student for personal gain or advantage. Shall keep in confidence personally identifiable information obtained in the course of professional service, unless disclosure serves professional purposes or is required by law. Obligation to the public requires that the individual: Shall take reasonable precautions to distinguish between personal views and those of any educational institution or organization with which the individual is affiliated. Shall not intentionally distort or misrepresent facts concerning an educational matter in direct or indirect public expression. Shall not use institutional privileges for personal gain or advantage. Shall accept no gratuity, gift, or favor that might influence professional judgment. Shall offer no gratuity, gift, or favor to obtain special advantages. Obligation to the profession of education requires that the individual: Shall maintain honesty in all professional dealings. Shall not on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, age, national or ethnic origin, political beliefs, marital status, handicapping condition if otherwise qualified, or social and family background deny to a colleague professional benefits or advantages or participation in any professional organization. Shall not interfere with a colleague’s exercise of political or civil rights and responsibilities. Shall not engage in harassment or discriminatory conduct which unreasonably interferes with an individual’s performance of professional or work responsibilities or with the orderly processes of education or which creates a hostile, intimidating, abusive, offensive, or oppressive environment; and, further, shall make reasonable effort to assure that each individual is protected from such harassment or discrimination. Shall not make malicious or intentionally false statements about a colleague. Shall not use coercive means or promise special treatment to influence professional judgments of colleagues. Shall not misrepresent one’s own professional qualifications. Shall not submit fraudulent information on any document in connection with professional activities. Shall not make any fraudulent statement or fail to disclose a material fact in one’s own or another’s application for a professional position. Shall not withhold information regarding a position from an applicant or misrepresent an assignment or conditions of employment. Shall provide upon the request of the certificated individual a written statement of specific reason for recommendations that lead to the denial of increments, significant changes in employment, or termination of employment. Shall not assist entry into or continuance in the profession of any person known to be unqualified in accordance with these Principles of Professional Conduct for the Education Profession in Florida and other applicable Florida Statutes and State Board of Education Rules. Shall self-report within forty-eight (48) hours to appropriate authorities (as determined by district) any arrests/charges involving the abuse of a child or the sale and/or possession of a controlled substance. Such notice shall not be considered an admission of guilt nor shall such notice be admissible for any purpose in any proceeding, civil or criminal, administrative or judicial, investigatory or adjudicatory. In addition, shall self- report any conviction, finding of guilt, withholding of adjudication, commitment to a pretrial diversion program, or entering of a plea of guilty or Nolo Contendre for any criminal offense other than a minor traffic violation within forty-eight (48) hours after the final judgment. When handling sealed and expunged records disclosed under this rule, school districts shall comply with the confidentiality provisions of Sections 943.0585(4)(c) and 943.059(4)(c), Florida Statutes. Shall report to appropriate authorities any known allegation of a violation of the Florida School Code or State Board of Education Rules as defined in Section 231.28(1), Florida Statutes. Shall seek no reprisal against any individual who has reported any allegation of a violation of the Florida School Code or State Board of Education Rules as defined in Section 231.28(1), Florida Statutes. Shall comply with the conditions of an order of the Education Practices Commission imposing probation, imposing a fine, or restricting the authorized scope of practice. Shall, as the supervising administrator, cooperate with the Education Practices Commission in monitoring the probation of a subordinate. As shown by a careful reading of Rule 6B-4.009,8 the offense of misconduct in office consists of three elements: (1) A serious violation of a specific rule9 that (2) causes (3) an impairment of the employee's effectiveness in the school system. The second and third elements can be can be conflated, for ease of reference, into one component: "resulting ineffectiveness." A school board seeking to terminate an employee on the basis of misconduct in office must prove "each and every element of the charge." MacMillan v. Nassau County School Bd., 629 So. 2d 226 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993). Here, the School District did not allege or prove, nor has it argued, that De Palo violated a particular Principle of Professional Conduct. Further, none of the Principles appear, to the undersigned, to be obviously applicable to the situation at hand. Accordingly, it is concluded that the offence of misconduct in office has not been established. Conduct Unbecoming a School Board Employee The School Board grounded its charge of "conduct unbecoming a school board employee" on De Palo's alleged violation of School Board Rule 6Gx13-4A-1.21, which provides (the undersigned assumes) as follows: All persons employed by the School Board of Miami-Dade County, Florida are representatives of the Miami-Dade County Public Schools. As such, they are expected to conduct themselves, both in their employment and in the community, in a manner that will reflect credit upon themselves and the school system. Unseemly conduct or the use of abusive and/or profane language in the workplace is expressly prohibited. This particular offense is not one of the just causes enumerated in Section 1012.33(1)(a), Florida Statutes, although that statutory list, by its plain terms, is not intended to be exclusive. Yet, the doctrine of ejusdem generis10 requires that "conduct unbecoming" be treated as a species of misconduct in office, so that, to justify termination, a violation of School Board Rule 6Gx13-4A-1.21 must be "so serious as to impair the individual's effectiveness in the school system." See Miami- Dade County School Bd. v. Wallace, DOAH Case No. 00-4392, 2001 WL 335989, *12 (Fla.Div.Admin.Hrgs. Apr. 4, 2001), adopted in toto, May 16, 2001. This case does not involve allegations of abusive or profane language in the workplace. Thus, the question whether De Palo violated School Board Rule 6Gx13-4A-1.21 turns on whether his conduct was "unseemly." This is admittedly a fairly close question, made more difficult by the fact that the term "unseemly conduct," which is not defined in the Rule, has a kind of "I know it when I see it" quality. In view of the Rule's elasticity, it would be possible without straining to label De Palo's inappropriate behavior "unseemly." The word "unseemly," however, usually suggests inappropriateness manifesting indecency, bad taste, or poor form (e.g. a crude joke in mixed company), and while De Palo's conduct displayed a little of each, it was a lot more sophomoric than indecorous——a silly, rather than unseemly, prank. Thus, it is concluded, De Palo acted inappropriately but not in violation of School Board Rule 6Gx13-4A-1.21. Violence in the Workplace In Count I of its Notice of Specific Charges, the School Board accused De Palo of violating School Board Rule 6Gx13-4-1.08, which (apparently) provides in pertinent part: Nothing is more important to Dade County Public Schools (DCPS) than protecting the safety and security of its students and employees and promoting a violence-free work environment. Threats, threatening behavior, or acts of violence against students, employees, visitors, or other individuals by anyone on DCPS property will not be tolerated. Violations of this policy may lead to disciplinary action which includes dismissal, arrest, and/or prosecution. (Emphasis added.) The School Board neither alleged nor proved that De Palo engaged in "threats" or "threatening behavior." The questions at hand, therefore, are: (a) whether De Palo committed an act of violence against Ms. Hudson; and, if so, (b) whether the act was "so serious as to impair [De Palo's] effectiveness in the school system." Cf. Miami-Dade County School Bd. v. Wallace, DOAH Case No. 00-4392, 2001 WL 335989, *12 (Fla.Div.Admin.Hrgs. Apr. 4, 2001), adopted in toto, May 16, 2001. In support of its case, the School Board asserts (correctly, as far as it goes) that School Board Rule 6Gx13-4- 1.08 encompasses acts that constitute battery under the criminal law and tort law. From this premise, the School Board turns to statutes and cases dealing with battery, a wrong of which the essence is the intentional touching of another person against such person's will. As the School Board then points out, it is often not necessary, in making out a battery case, to prove that the offensive contact was actually harmful or even intended to cause harm. Thus, the School Board concludes, De Palo violated School Board Rule 6Gx13-4-1.08 because he intentionally touched Ms. Hudson against her will. The flaw in the School Board's logic is its casual equation of "acts of violence" (which the Rule proscribes) with "battery" (which the Rule does not mention). The fact is, although the two categories of misbehavior overlap to some extent, they are not synonymous. And significantly, of the two, "battery" is the broader, more inclusive class. The term "violence" is commonly understood to mean an "[u]njust or unwarranted exercise of force, usually with the accompaniment of vehemence, outrage, or fury." Black's Law Dictionary 1408 (5th ed. 1979). A battery——that is, an offensive or nonconsensual touching——can be committed with or without violence.11 Thus, while all or most acts of violence by one person against another constitute battery,12 all forms of battery clearly do not entail acts of violence.13 In this case, the evidence does not persuade the undersigned that De Palo committed an act of violence.14 De Palo, therefore, is not guilty of violating School Board Rule 6Gx13-4-1.08. IV. To terminate De Palo's employment, the School Board needed to show that his conduct not only violated a specific rule, but also that the violation was so serious as to impair his effectiveness in the school system. Although the School Board's failure to prove that De Palo violated a specific rule is reason enough to recommend against termination, the issue of resulting ineffectiveness will be discussed anyway, providing an alternative basis for decision. There was little, if any, direct evidence that De Palo's effectiveness in the school system was impaired as a result of the incident of January 23, 2003. On this issue, therefore, the Board must rely on inferences in aid of its proof. For the School Board to profit from an inference of resulting ineffectiveness, it must establish two things: (1) that the violation was not of a private immoral nature, and (2) that, on the basis of past experience as drawn from the fund of common knowledge, the violation would not, in the ordinary course of events, have failed to impair the individual's effectiveness in the school system. See Miami-Dade County School Bd. v. Wallace, DOAH Case No. 00-4392, 2001 WL 335989, *19 (Fla.Div.Admin.Hrgs. Apr. 4, 2001), adopted in toto, May 16, 2001. The allegations against De Palo do not involve misconduct of a private immoral nature, so the first condition is satisfied. The undersigned is not persuaded, however, that De Palo's carrying of Ms. Hudson back to her office could not have happened without impairing De Palo's effectiveness in the school system. Rather, taking into consideration all of the evidence in this case, it is determined that De Palo continued to be effective, notwithstanding the incident of January 23, 2003. Thus, while an inference of resulting ineffectiveness might be legally permissible under the circumstances of this case, such an inference is not factually justified and hence has not been drawn. Ultimately, therefore, the School Board failed to prove that De Palo's effectiveness in the school system was impaired by his conduct. For that independent reason, he must be found not guilty of the charges brought against him.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Board enter a final order: (a) exonerating De Palo of all charges brought against him in this proceeding; (b) providing that De Palo be immediately reinstated to the position from which he was suspended without pay; and (c) awarding De Palo back salary, plus benefits, that accrued during the suspension period, together with interest thereon at the statutory rate. DONE AND ENTERED this 20th day of May, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JOHN G. VAN LANINGHAM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of May, 2004.
