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VERONICA P. HOLT vs DEPARTMENT OF MANAGEMENT SERVICES, DIVISION OF RETIREMENT, 04-001046 (2004)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Jacksonville, Florida Mar. 24, 2004 Number: 04-001046 Latest Update: Aug. 09, 2004

The Issue The issue is whether Petitioner is entitled to additional retirement benefits for her years of service between September 1966 and December 1974.

Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a retired member of the FRS. She began working for the Duval County Juvenile Detention Center (DCJDC) in August 1966. However, Petitioner's name was not placed on the payroll until September 1966 because of the time she was absent. As an employee of the DCJDC, Petitioner was a county employee but also a participant in the FRS. She made contributions in the amount of $1,850.78 to the FRS from September 1966 through December 1974. The FRS became non- contributory for all state and county employees in January 1975. Petitioner terminated her employment with Duval County on June 20, 1977. At that time, Petitioner requested a refund of her accumulated contributions to the FRS. Petitioner acknowledged in her request for refund that she waived her interest in FRS for the refunded service. On or about February 22, 1978, Respondent issued Voucher #273254 and Warrant #0364356 made payable to Petitioner in the amount of $1,850.78. Petitioner's testimony that she never received the refund is not credible. On or about October 16, 1981, Petitioner returned to work at DCJDC. After receiving several promotions, Petitioner transferred to a position at the Department of Health. Petitioner terminated her employment at the Department of Health on November 13, 1998. In August 2000, Petitioner filed an Application for Service Retirement. The application includes the following sworn statement: I understand I must terminate all employment with FRS employers to receive a retirement benefit under Chapter 121, Florida Statutes. I also understand that I cannot add additional service, change options, or change my type of retirement (Regular, Disability, and Early) once my retirement becomes final. My retirement becomes final when any benefit payment is cashed or deposited. Respondent sent Petitioner an Acknowledgment of Service Retirement Application dated August 10, 2000. The acknowledgment indicated that Petitioner's retirement date was June 2000 and that she could purchase credit for refunded service from September 1966 through December 1974 by paying Respondent $7,918.46. The acknowledgment made it clear that Respondent required written notification if Petitioner did not intend to purchase this service. In March 2001, Petitioner executed an Option Selection for FRS Members. She selected Option 1, which provides her a monthly benefit for her lifetime. In a letter dated March 27, 2001, Petitioner advised Respondent that she did not intend to buy back any time. Additionally, she stated as follows: I would like for my retirement application to be accepted/processed as is. The rate quoted was at $517.00. However, if this amount is incorrect, I would like to know as soon as possible. Based upon Petitioner's statement in the letter, Respondent began paying and Petitioner began receiving her retirement benefits effective June 1, 2000.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That Respondent enter a final order finding that Petitioner is not entitled to any additional retirement benefits. DONE AND ENTERED this 24th day of June, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S SUZANNE F. HOOD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of June, 2004. COPIES FURNISHED: Larry D. Scott, Esquire Department of Management Services 4050 Esplanade Way, Suite 260 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950 Veronica P. Holt 230 East First Street, Apartment 1313 Jacksonville, Florida 32206 Alberto Dominguez, General Counsel Department of Management Services 4050 Esplanade Way Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950 Sarabeth Snuggs, Interim Director Division of Retirement Department of Management Services 2639 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1560

Florida Laws (5) 112.05120.569120.57121.071121.085
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SILVIA M. URRECHAGA vs DEPARTMENT OF MANAGEMENT SERVICES, DIVISION OF RETIREMENT, 06-003265 (2006)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Miami, Florida Aug. 29, 2006 Number: 06-003265 Latest Update: Jan. 29, 2007

The Issue The issue in this case is whether Petitioner held a "regularly established position" during the period from January 1979 through June 1979, when she worked as a teacher's assistant for a district school board; if so, then she would be entitled to receive retirement service credit for the period, which Respondent so far has declined to grant.

Findings Of Fact Historical Facts Petitioner Silvia Urrechaga ("Urrechaga") worked for nearly 30 years, in various positions, as an employee of the Miami-Dade County School Board ("MDCSB"). As an employee of a district school board, she became a member of the Florida Retirement System ("FRS"), which is administered by Respondent Department of Management Services, Division of Retirement ("Division"). It is undisputed that, before July 1, 1979 (and thus at all times material to this case), local employers (such as district school boards) that participated in the FRS had the authority to determine, in the exercise of discretion, which of their employees would be covered under the FRS. At that time, the Division did not have the authority to review and overrule local employers' decisions in this regard. From January 1979 through June 1979, Urrechaga was employed as a teacher's assistant. A "Request for Personnel Action" memorandum dated January 8, 1979, memorializes MDCSB's hiring of Urrechaga to fill this part-time hourly position. The memorandum specified that Urrechaga would be "paid from discretionary funds until [the] end of [the] 78/79 school year." On or around January 19, 1979, a "Personnel Transaction Form" was completed, wherein it was recorded that, effective January 8, 1979, Urrechaga would participate in Retirement Plan "F." It is undisputed that Plan "F" meant the FRS. It is further recorded on the personnel form that MDCSB would contribute 9.1 percent of Urrechaga's salary into the FRS trust to fund her retirement benefit. An Annual Earnings Report for the 1978-79 school year shows that for the payroll period ending February 6, 1979——her first as a teacher's assistant——Urrechaga was paid a gross salary of $208.89, and that MDCSB deposited 9.1 percent thereof, or $19.01, into the FRS trust for the benefit of Urrechaga, a Plan "F" participant. Beginning with the very next pay period, however, and continuing through the end of June 1979, Urrechaga's retirement plan designation on the Annual Earnings Report is "J" rather than "F." It is undisputed that "J" meant no retirement benefit. Consistent with that designation, MDCSB (apparently) did not contribute to the FRS on Urrechaga's behalf for the pay periods ending February 9, 1979 through June 22, 1979, at least according to the Annual Earnings Report. MDCSB does not presently have any records documenting the grounds, if there were any, for removing Urrechaga from the FRS. There are likewise no existing records reflecting that Urrechaga was notified contemporaneously that, wittingly or unwittingly, she had been taken out of the retirement plan. It is reasonable to infer, and the undersigned does so, that MDCSB neither informed Urrechaga that she was being excluded from participation in the FRS nor notified her about any administrative remedies that she might have had in consequence of such action. Years later, after an issue had arisen regarding whether Urrechaga is entitled to retirement service credit for the months from January 1979 through June 1979, MDCSB investigated the situation and concluded that Urrechaga had been removed from the retirement plan by mistake. This determination was reported to the Division by MDCSB's Retirement Coordinator, Maria Y. Perez, in a letter dated July 23, 2003, which provided in pertinent part as follows: In reviewing the payroll/personnel records of Ms. Urrechaga, it's [sic] been determined that from January, 1979 through June, 1980, she was excluded from the retirement plan in error. Ms. Urrechaga was hired January 8, 1979, as a part-time hourly teacher assistant, job code 4259, a position eligible for retirement coverage[,] and [she] worked though June, 1979 [in that position.] The Division refused to accept MDCSB's determination, however, on the ground that it was not supported by sufficient proof that Urrechaga had been paid out of a "regular salary account." Consequently, by letter to the Division dated February 28, 2006, Ms. Perez reiterated MDCSB's conclusion, stating in relevant part as follows: Although I cannot provide you with a specific account serial number listing indicating [sic] that specifically Ms. Urrechaga was in a regularly established position; all our hourly teachers assistants were hired in a regularly established position, particularly as late as 1979, and not in a [sic] Other Personnel Services accounts. As support for this statement, Ms. Perez furnished the Division with the records of several other teacher's assistants who, the records unambiguously show, had been treated by MDCSB as FRS participants at the time that Urrechaga, who held the same employment position, had been excluded from the retirement plan. As of the final hearing, Ms. Perez continued to be MDCSB's Retirement Coordinator, a position she had held since 1982. In that capacity, Ms. Perez was MDCSB's senior management person in charge of retirement matters. Ms. Perez's communications to the Division regarding Urrechaga, which were written in her official capacity as MDCSB's agent, did not give voice to mere personal opinions, but rather——as statements clearly falling within the scope of her agency and authority——constituted MDCSB's official statements on the subject of Urrechaga's retirement benefit.1 In other words, Ms. Perez's letters to the Division concerning Urrechaga's retirement benefit expressed an agency determination of Urrechaga's substantial interests, namely the conclusion that Urrechaga had worked for MDCSB in a regularly established position and, accordingly, was supposed to have been a participant in the FRS during the period from January 1979 through June 1979, notwithstanding that conflicting statements in contemporaneously prepared documents give rise to some confusion concerning her participation therein.2 Determinations of Ultimate Fact From January 1979 through June 1979, Urrechaga worked in a "regularly established position" as a teacher's assistant with MDCSB. As an employee in such a position, Urrechaga was entitled to participate in the FRS, and she earned retirement service credit for her work during the period at issue.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Division enter a final order awarding Urrechaga the retirement service credit that she earned for working in a regularly established position as a teacher's assistant with MDCSB during the period from January 1979 through June 1979. DONE AND ENTERED this 11th day of December, 2006, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. JOHN G. VAN LANINGHAM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of December, 2006.

Florida Laws (2) 120.569120.57
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ANGELA ROBERTS, O/B/O ROBERT RANDALL ROBERTS vs DEPARTMENT OF MANAGEMENT SERVICES, DIVISION OF RETIREMENT, 04-000309 (2004)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Shalimar, Florida Jan. 27, 2004 Number: 04-000309 Latest Update: Jun. 17, 2004

The Issue Whether Petitioner is entitled to receive retroactive retirement benefits from the Florida Retirement System account of her late husband for the period September 1999 through February 28, 2003.

Findings Of Fact Petitioner Angela Roberts is the widow of Florida Retirement System (FRS) member Robert Randall Roberts. Mr. Roberts was employed by the Walton County Board of Commissioners and had approximately 25 years of creditable FRS service at the time of his death. Mr. Roberts died on August 20, 1999. At the time of his death, Mr. Robert’s most recent beneficiary designation on file with the Division of Retirement (Division) was made on August 15, 1980. That designation named Terri L. Roberts, who was married to Mr. Roberts at the date the designation was made. Sometime prior to June 25, 1997, Mr. Roberts and Terri L. Roberts were divorced. On June 25, 1997, Mr. Roberts and Petitioner were married. There is no dispute that at the time of his death, Mr. Roberts was married to Petitioner. According to the Division’s telephone records, Terri Ward, f/k/a Terri Roberts, contacted the Division and informed the Division that she and Mr. Roberts had divorced and that he remarried prior to his death. After being contacted by Terri Ward, Division employees contacted the Walton County Board of Commissioners and were given the last known address of Mr. Roberts: 718 Adams Street, Laurel Hill, Florida 32567. However, Petitioner and her five children were forced out of the Laurel Hill residence by her deceased husband’s father, Frank Eugene Roberts, shortly after the death of her husband. Frank Eugene Roberts also provided incorrect information to Evans Funeral Home in Florala, Alabama, regarding his son’s marital status at the time of his death. Because of this incorrect information, the death certificate indicated that Mr. Roberts was divorced at the time of his death. On December 7, 1999, Respondent sent a letter to Petitioner at the Laurel Hill address which read in pertinent part as follows: We are sorry to learn of the death of Robert Roberts on August 20, 1999. According to our records, Terri L. Roberts is the designated beneficiary. However, under present law, you would become the beneficiary if your marriage to the member occurred after the date the beneficiary was designated. In order for us to determine the beneficiary and the benefits payable from this account, we need a copy of your Marriage Certificate. We cannot take any further action until this is received. If you have any questions, you may call the Survivor Benefits Section at (850) 488-5207. At the time the letter was sent to her, Petitioner was no longer residing at that address and did not receive the December 7, 1999, letter. In May 2001, Petitioner received a hand-written letter from her former step-daughter, Nichole Roberts, dated May 10, 2001, informing her that Nichole received a call from the Division regarding Mr. Roberts’ retirement money. Her step- daughter informed Petitioner that Petitioner needed to call the Division if she still wanted to receive her deceased husband’s retirement money or to notify the Division if she did not. Petitioner contacted the Division by telephone on May 17, 2001. Petitioner informed the Division that her late husband’s death certificate was incorrect regarding his marital status at the time of this death. She was informed that she would have to get the death certificate changed. The Division gave Petitioner the phone number of the local circuit court. The Division’s record of the phone conversation indicates that Petitioner would call the Circuit Court to inquire as to how to get the death certificate changed. On August 24, 2001, the Division sent Petitioner a letter to an address in Saint Mary, Georgia, informing her of what documentation was required to begin receiving benefits effective September 1, 1999, the date of Mr. Roberts' death. The letter read in pertinent part as follows: This is in reference to the retirement account of Robert R. Roberts. According to our records, Terri L. Roberts is the designated beneficiary. However, under present law, you would become the beneficiary if your marriage to the member occurred after the date the beneficiary was designated. In order to determine the beneficiary, we need a copy of your marriage certificate. If it is determined that you are the beneficiary, you would be entitled to the Option 3 monthly retirement benefit. This benefit is payable for your lifetime and is approximately $585.43 effective September 1, 1999. To receive the Option 3 benefit, the following documents are needed: Copy of member’s death certificate. Proof of member’s date of birth. Proof of your date of birth. Completed application, Form FST-11B. Copy of your marriage certificate. The Division sent another letter to Mrs. Roberts on December 19, 2001, to the Saint Mary, Georgia address. That letter was entitled, "Request for Survivor Benefits Information" and again requested the same five documents that were referenced in the August 24, 2001, letter. A copy of the August 24, 2001, letter is also referenced as enclosed with the December 19, 2001, letter. No response was received by the Division to the letters of August 24 or December 19, 2001. Neither letter informed Petitioner of any deadline by which the information needed to be received by the Division. The Division sent another letter to Mrs. Roberts on March 15, 2002. That letter again requested the same five documents that were requested in the two previous letters and indicated that copies of the two previous letters were enclosed. Unlike the two previous letters, the March 15, 2002, letter also included a 30-day deadline if she wanted to receive retroactive benefits: If you will furnish this information within 30 days from your receipt of this letter, you may choose to have benefits paid retroactive to September 1, 1999. Otherwise, it will be your responsibility to contact us when you wish benefits to begin. Benefit payments will not be retroactive, but will be effective the month following receipt of the requested information. Ms. Stanley Colvin is the Benefits Administrator of the Survivor Benefits Section of the Division. She has worked at the Division for approximately 31 years. According to Ms. Colvin, when a letter is sent from the Division to members or beneficiaries indicating any missing form is needed, that blank form is automatically generated and sent to the recipient as an enclosure. Accordingly, a blank application form should have been included with the August 24, 2001, December 19, 2001, and March 15, 2002, letters sent to Mrs. Roberts. Mrs. Roberts acknowledges receiving the March 15, 2002, letter, but insists that no application form was enclosed. Further, Mrs. Roberts asserts that she and her friend, Nichole Tuttle, called the Division soon after Petitioner received the March 15, 2002, letter, using a speaker phone. Both Mrs. Roberts and Ms. Tuttle assert that Mrs. Roberts verbally received a two-year extension from an unidentified person at the Division in which to file the requested documentation. Ms. Tuttle’s telephone record does reflect a call that was made to the Division on April 30, 2002, which is not reflected in the Division’s records. Petitioner did not have the means to accomplish the task of correcting the death certificate on her own. She attempted to hire an attorney to get the death certificate corrected. However, Mrs. Roberts had serious financial difficulties as a result of having five children and, when able to find work, has not been able to maintain a good income. She also found it difficult to find an attorney who had not represented the deceased’s family. Because of these obstacles, she was unable to retain an attorney until January 23, 2003. Ms. Colvin acknowledges that extensions are sometimes given to people for filing documents but the longest extension granted is for 60 days. However, there is no record of a phone call or any other documentation in the Division’s records that a two-year extension was given. Only Ms. Colvin has the authority to grant such extensions. Ms. Colvin has a distinctive voice. Neither Mrs. Roberts nor Ms. Tuttle recalls hearing Ms. Colvin’s voice prior to the hearing. The next contact the Division had with Mrs. Roberts was a telephone call from Mrs. Roberts’ stepmother on February 24, 2003. The caller requested that the Division call Mrs. Roberts at a particular phone number,as Mrs. Roberts could not make long-distance calls from her phone. At this time, the caller supplied a new address for Mrs. Roberts in Bay Minette, Alabama, and informed the Division that Mrs. Roberts has an attorney attempting to get the death certificate corrected. A Petition to Correct Death Certificate was filed with the Walton County Circuit Court on or about March 10, 2003. An Order was signed by Judge Lewis Lindsey on March 24, 2003, directing the Bureau of Vital Statistics to correct the death certificate. On March 20, 2003, the Division sent a letter to Mrs. Roberts requesting a copy of her marriage certificate and the death certificate. No reference is made in this letter to any other document. Mrs. Roberts again called the Division on March 24, 2003, informing the Division that her attorney was still waiting to receive the corrected death certificate and that she was in possession of a marriage certificate indicating her marriage to Mr. Roberts. Mrs. Roberts also inquired about the retroactive payment of the retirement benefits. On April 14, 2003, Mrs. Roberts sent a letter to the Division requesting benefits retroactive to September 1, 1999. On April 14, 2003, the Division received the required proof of birth for Petitioner and for Mr. Roberts. On May 14, 2003, the Division sent another letter to Mrs. Roberts. This letter included the following: As the surviving spouse and joint annuitant, you are entitled to the Option 3 monthly retirement benefit. This benefit is payable for your lifetime and is approximately $561.35 effective March 1, 2003. To receive the Option 3 benefit, we need the following: Completed application, Form FST-11b. (Emphasis supplied) A completed application Form FST-11b was received by the Division on May 21, 2003. Mrs. Roberts was added to the retirement payroll effective March 1, 2003. Ms. Colvin became involved in this case in May 2003 for the purpose of reviewing the file to see if retroactive benefits were appropriate. According to Ms. Colvin, Mrs. Roberts was added to the payroll effective March 1, 2003, instead of June 1, 2003 (the month following receipt of the completed application), because of the phone call Mrs. Roberts made to the Division on February 24, 2003. Ms. Colvin explained that she "bent the rule" in Mrs. Roberts’ favor by looking at the February 26, 2003, phone call as "starting a new folder." Ms. Colvin determined that retroactive benefits were not in order because the March 15, 2002, letter gave a 30-day deadline and the Division did not receive any of the required documents until approximately a year later. She did not find anything in the file to justify any change to the effective date. Some benefit recipients purposefully defer payments for a number of reasons, e.g., eligibility for public assistance programs. Mrs. Roberts never indicated to the Division that she wanted the benefits deferred. Mrs. Roberts was not aware that the Division would have accepted the requested documents in piecemeal fashion, but focused on getting the death certificate corrected.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law set forth herein, it is RECOMMENDED: That Respondent enter a final order denying Mrs. Roberts’ request for an effective benefit date of September 1, 1999. DONE AND ENTERED this 27th day of April, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S BARBARA J. STAROS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of April, 2004. COPIES FURNISHED: James C. Campbell, Esquire James C. Campbell, P.A. 4 Eleventh Avenue, Suite 2 Shalimar, Florida 32579 Thomas E. Wright, Esquire Department of Management Services 4050 Esplanade Way, Suite 260 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950 Erin Sjostrom, Director Division of Retirement Department of Management Services Cedars Executive Center, Building C 2639 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1560 Monesia Taylor Brown, Acting General Counsel Department of Management Services Division of Retirement 4050 Esplanade Way, Suite 260 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950

Florida Laws (5) 120.569120.57121.021121.09126.012
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RICHARD L. DULEY vs DEPARTMENT OF MANAGEMENT SERVICES, DIVISION OF RETIREMENT, 10-008475 (2010)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida Aug. 30, 2010 Number: 10-008475 Latest Update: Feb. 24, 2011

The Issue The issue in this proceeding is whether Petitioner is entitled to retirement service credit for the time period in which he was not employed with the State of Florida.

Findings Of Fact The Department of Management Services (DMS) is responsible for the administration of the Florida Retirement System (FRS) under Chapter 121, Florida Statutes. The Department of Transportation (DOT) is an agency of the State of Florida whose employees qualify for membership in FRS. Petitioner Richard L. Duley is an honorably discharged veteran. He began employment with DOT in 1991. At the same time, he became a member of FRS. Prior to 2001, then-Governor Jeb Bush directed state agencies to reduce their workforce by 25 percent over a five- year period beginning in 2001. The directive was known as the "Service First Initiative." In response to the Governor’s directive, DOT developed an Agency Organizational Efficiency Plan. On January 18, 2005, Petitioner was notified that his position was designated to be deleted under the Agency’s Organizational Efficiency Plan; his position was abolished on June 30, 2005. As a result, Petitioner was dismissed from state employment and was no longer receiving retirement service credit for FRS. However, Petitioner did not receive a clear point of entry to challenge either his termination or whether he was entitled to a veteran's preference by DOT. After his dismissal, Petitioner was hired by a private firm who had contracted with the State to perform the functions that Mr. Duley had previously provided as an employee of the state. The contract terminated in June or July of 2007, and was not renewed. As such, Mr. Duley became unemployed. On July 30, 2007, Petitioner filed a complaint with the Department of Veterans’ Affairs (DVA) alleging that DOT had denied him veteran’s preference in retention during the 2005 layoff. The DVA found that Petitioner's complaint had merit. On November 19, 2007, Petitioner filed a complaint with the Public Employees Relations Commission (PERC), which held an evidentiary hearing on the complaint. PERC is the administrative body that has jurisdiction to determine issues and remedies under the veteran's preference statute. In its Final Order issued April 8, 2007, PERC found that Petitioner was an honorably discharged veteran and was entitled to preferential treatment in employment. PERC also found that DOT violated the veteran’s preference law by not affording Petitioner special consideration in finding alternative employment after the layoff. As a remedy for its violation of the veteran's preference law, PERC ordered DOT to make Petitioner an offer of employment to an existing position comparable to that which he held prior to his layoff. PERC also awarded Petitioner attorneys’ fees and costs. However, and most importantly, PERC did not reinstate Petitioner to his former position because it had been abolished. Similarly, PERC did not rescind Petitioner's termination. Finally, PERC did not award back pay or benefits to Petitioner. As a consequence of the Final Order, neither Petitioner nor DOT paid contributions towards the Retirement Systems Trust Fund for the period that Petitioner was not employed with the State. Additionally, Petitioner was offered and hired into a new position by DOT and again began to accrue retirement service credit in FRS when he was hired by DOT in May of 2008. The PERC Final Order was not appealed and became res judicata on the issues litigated therein. Therefore, since Petitioner's termination was not rescinded and Petitioner was not reinstated by PERC and did not pay contributions into FRS, he is not entitled to receive credit for the time he was not employed by the State and this action should be dismissed.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing, Finding of Fact and Conclusions of Law set forth herein, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Department of Management Services, Division of Retirement, enter a Final Order dismissing this action. DONE AND ENTERED this 23rd day of December, 2010, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DIANE CLEAVINGER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of December, 2010. COPIES FURNISHED: Richard L. Duley 5432 Pinderton Way Tallahassee, Florida 32317 Larry D. Scott, Esquire Department of Management Services Division of Retirement 4050 Esplanade Way, Suite 160 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Kristin M. Klein, Esquire Department of Management Services 4050 Esplanade Way, Suite 160 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Sarabeth Snuggs, Director Division of Retirement Department of Management Services Post Office Box 9000 Tallahassee, Florida 32315-9000 John Brenneis, General Counsel Department of Management Services 4050 Esplanade Way Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950

Florida Laws (5) 120.569120.57120.68121.011121.021
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JOHN C. DEITER vs DIVISION OF RETIREMENT, 96-001613 (1996)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tampa, Florida Apr. 04, 1996 Number: 96-001613 Latest Update: Jun. 30, 2004

The Issue The central issues in this case are (1) whether Petitioner is eligible for membership in and retirement benefits from the Teachers' Retirement System; and (2) whether Petitioner is entitled to receive as a refund contributions paid by his employing agency and, if so, how much and at what interest rate.

Findings Of Fact Petitioner, currently sixty-six years old, was employed as a professor of economics and finance at the University of South Florida (USF), Tampa, Florida, from September 1965 through August 31, 1981, when he terminated employment. As a member of the teaching faculty, Petitioner automatically became a compulsory member of the Teachers' Retirement System (TRS) and remained a member throughout his tenure at USE. When Petitioner originally enrolled in the TRS in September 1965, he signed an enrollment form entitled "Teachers' Retirement System of Florida, Enrollment Blank New Teachers." The form provided general information concerning the TRS, and included information about contributions, service credit, and service retirement benefits under the TRS. The enrollment form provided in part the following: I understand that the full amount of deductions from my compensation for annuity purposes with compound interest will be returned to me if I leave the service without a retirement benefit or will be paid to my beneficiary if I die in active service. At all times relevant hereto, the TRS required that members make contributions of six-quarter percent of their total salaries to their retirement accounts. Of this amount, six percent went into the TRS member's retirement account and the quarter percent was allocated to the Survivors' Benefits Fund. In addition to the contributions made by TRS members, employers were required to contribute matching funds to the TRS Retirement Fund. While employed at USF, the prescribed six quarter percent of Petitioner's salary was deducted, with six percent appropriately posted to his TRS retirement account. During the time Petitioner was employed at USF, the employer contribution paid by USF to match Petitioner's contribution was $23,846.06. Had Petitioner remained a member of TRS, he would have been eligible to begin receiving benefits in February 1993. While employed at USF, Petitioner was given the option to transfer from the TRS to the newly created Florida Retirement System on five different occasions: December 1970; June 1971; July 1972; January 1975; and January 1979. Through information disseminated by Respondent, TRS members were notified that by transferring to the "new" Florida Retirement System, they would become mandatory members of the federal Social Security System. Petitioner chose to remain in TRS rather than transfer to the Florida Retirement System, thereby foregoing membership in the federal Social Security System. In August 1981, prior to his normal age of retirement, Petitioner terminated his employment with USF and requested that Respondent refund Petitioner's retirement contributions. In making the request, Petitioner completed and signed a form entitled, "Request for Refund," FRS M81. Completion of this form is a requisite for receiving retirement refunds and applies to members of any of the Florida retirement systems. The Request for Refund states: I hereby make application for refund of my accumulated contributions in the Florida Retirement Systems. I do waive for myself, my heirs and assignees all rights, title and interest in the Florida Retirement Systems. On the reverse side of the Request for Refund card, is the following: Under the provision of the Florida Statutes, a member MUST terminate employment before he can obtain a refund. * * * The refund process may be started upon receipt of this application. It may be necessary to issue a second refund after all payrolls on which a member's name appears are received and audited by the Retirement System Office. A member who has ten or more years of creditable service has a vested interest in retirement and may leave his contributions on deposit indefinitely and qualify for deferred retirement. Pursuant to Petitioner's request, the Division refunded $22,153.10 to Petitioner in October 1981. The refund, which was provided in three warrants, included all employee contributions and earned interest posted to Petitioner's retirement account as of the date of the refund. Petitioner's refund was provided in three separate warrants because the system in place, in 1981, was incapable of generating a single check for an amount in excess of $9,999.99. In late 1995 or early 1996, Petitioner called the Division of Retirement to inquire about his benefits under the TRS. Petitioner made after this call after he reviewed his Social Security wage earning history and learned that no contributions had been posted to his Social Security account during the sixteen years he had been employed at USF. Upon reviewing the Petitioner's request, Respondent discovered that $1,692.96 remained in Petitioner's TRS account. Of the amount remaining in Petitioner's account, $292.63 represented Petitioner's employee contributions, and $1,400.33 was earned interest. Respondent's failure to refund Petitioner's $292.63 and the interest earned thereon as soon as these moneys were posted to Petitioner's account was the result of an unintentional accounting error. Under the procedures used by the Division at that time, Petitioner's most recent employee contributions were not posted to his account until November or December 1981. The interest earned on Petitioner's employee contributions were not posted to Petitioner's account until the end of the 1981/1982 fiscal year. This matter is addressed in the Request for Refund which notified members that "it may be necessary to issue a second refund" after all payrolls on which the member's name appears have been posted. After discovering this inadvertent accounting error, Respondent initially agreed to refund Petitioner the outstanding $1,692.96. Subsequently, the Division of Retirement agreed to pay Petitioner $1,692.96 plus six a-half percent interest from October 1981, for a total amount of $4,088.31. The six and a- half percent interest rate is the current rate established by Respondent. Pursuant to Petitioner's request, Respondent has not yet refunded Petitioner's outstanding employee contributions and interest, pending the culmination of this proceeding. At the time Petitioner completed and signed the Request for Refund, it was his intention to obtain all of his contributions and interest. It was not until Petitioner's inquiry in 1995 or 1996 that he became aware that a small amount of his employee contributions and interest thereon had not been refunded. Petitioner believes that because Respondent did not refund all moneys due him, some $1,692.96, he retained membership in the TRS and is now able to retire from that system with a partial benefit. Alternatively, Petitioner asserts that he is entitled to receive as a refund, all contributions paid into his retirement fund, including the contributions paid by USF. According to Petitioner, his understanding and belief in this regard is based on an explanation provided to him by Dr. John Milliken, the Dean of the College of Business at USF. Petitioner's understanding in this regard was not correct. At some point prior to Petitioner's terminating his employment at USF, he reviewed a Summary Plan Description (SPD) which was issued by the Division of Retirement in 1980. One section of the SPD, Refund of Contributions, provides in relevant part: If a member terminates employment he may elect to receive a refund of all the contributions he has made to the retirement system, except those made to the Survivors' Benefit Trust Fund. Furthermore, the first paragraph of the Summary Plan Description states: This brochure contains basic information on the Teachers' Retirement System, established by Ch. 238, Florida Statutes. It is not intended to be a comprehensive review of the Teachers' Retirement System and should not be used in place of the law on questions of interpretation and appli-cation. Any question which are not answered by this brochure may be addressed to the Div. of Retirement, . . . . Based on Petitioner's reading of the provision of the SPD quoted in paragraph 20 above, it was his "judgment" and "impression" that any refund prior to retirement, would include both employee and employer contributions and the interest on these contributions. At no time did Petitioner verify his interpretation with the Division of Retirement or the USE Personnel Office.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Division of Retirement enter a final order finding that Petitioner, John C. Deiter, is (1) ineligible for retirement benefits under the Teachers' Retirement System and (2) is not entitled to receive employer contributions and interest thereon. DONE AND ENTERED this 3rd day of September, 1997, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. CAROLYN S. HOLIFIELDK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of September, 1997. COPIES FURNISHED: Murray B. Silverstein, Esquire POWELL, CARNEY, HAYES and SILVERSTEIN, P.A. Barnett Tower One Progress Plaza, Suite 1210 St. Petersburg, Florida 33701 Stanley M. Danek, Senior Attorney Division of Retirement Cedars Executive Center, Building C 2639 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399 A. J. McMullian, III, Director Division of Retirement Cedars Executive Center, Building C 2639 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399

Florida Laws (8) 112.66120.57153.10238.01238.03238.05238.07400.33
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AUBRIE PEREZ, AS PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ESTATE OF EDWARD PEREZ vs DEPARTMENT OF MANAGEMENT SERVICES, DIVISION OF RETIREMENT, 16-001101 (2016)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida May 26, 2017 Number: 16-001101 Latest Update: Feb. 02, 2018

The Issue Whether Respondent, Department of Management Services, Division of Retirement (“Respondent”), is entitled to a deduction of the retirement benefits to be paid to Aubrie-Elle Perez, and if Respondent is entitled to a deduction, whether the deduction should be in the amount of the gross disbursements of $19,833.21 or the net payments to Edward Perez (“Lt. Perez”) in the amount of $17,017.80.

Findings Of Fact The FRS is a public retirement system as defined by Florida law. There are approximately 400,000 active members within the FRS. Respondent is charged with managing, governing, and administering the FRS. In 1997, Lt. Perez began employment with the Miami-Dade County Fire Department. For over 16 years, Lt. Perez served as a fire fighter with the Miami-Dade County Fire Department, his last position being a Lieutenant. Lt. Perez was a vested member of the FRS. Upon his initial employment and enrollment with the FRS in 1997, Lt. Perez entered the Investment Plan and made a retirement benefits election designating that if he died before his retirement and chose not to designate a beneficiary, retirement benefits would be paid in accordance with section 121.091(8), Florida Statutes. Lt. Perez chose not to designate a beneficiary. Thus, according to this statute, retirement benefits would first be paid to Lt. Perez’s spouse, and if no spouse, then to his only child, the Petitioner. Tragically, on April 7, 2013, Lt. Perez collapsed at the fire station. Subsequently, Lt. Perez was diagnosed with a grade-four malignant brain tumor known as a glioblastoma multi-forming--a very aggressive and generally terminal form of brain cancer. There is no cure and the median survival rate for adults with this form of brain cancer is 9 to 14 months. Due to his terminal brain cancer and the treatments he had undergone and was undergoing, Lt. Perez was unable to continue his duties with the Miami-Dade County Fire Department. On February 19, 2014, a two-page FRS Investment Plan Application for Disability Retirement Form PR-13 (“application for disability retirement”), and an FRS Investment Option Selection Form PR-11o (“option selection form”), were submitted to Respondent for Lt. Perez. They were sent to Respondent by mail by Lt. Perez’s sister, Alecs Perez-Crespo. The effect of the application for disability retirement and the selection of Option 1 on the option selection form would be to transfer the monies from the Investment Plan into the Pension Plan, and convert Lt. Perez’s accumulated Investment Plan retirement benefits to monthly disability retirement benefits during his lifetime. Then, upon his death, the monthly benefit payments would stop, and the beneficiary would receive only a relatively small amount, if any--a refund of contributions Lt. Perez had paid into the Investment Plan retirement account, which are in excess of the amount he received in benefits, not including the transferred Investment Plan account balance.2/ The two-page application for disability retirement was not completed by the member, Lt. Perez, and was not signed by Lt. Perez in the presence of a notary public. The option selection form was not completed by the member, Lt. Perez, and was not signed by Lt. Perez in the presence of a notary public. Affirmative medical and factual evidence establishes, and rebuts any legal presumption to the contrary, that Lt. Perez was not mentally, physically, cognitively, or legally competent to execute the option selection form or the application for disability retirement in February 2014, or to understand their legal nature and effect. Nevertheless, Respondent processed the application for disability retirement and option selection form. As a result, Lt. Perez was deemed to have retired effective April 1, 2014, and he forfeited approximately $238,000, which was transferred from the Investment Plan to the Pension Plan. Subsequently, two disability retirement benefit warrants were issued by the State of Florida, Department of Financial Services, to Lt. Perez, via the Pension Plan, in care of Alecs Perez-Crespo, POA. The dates of these warrants are April 30, 2014, and May 30, 2014. Both warrants were endorsed by Ms. Perez-Crespo, “POA For Edward Perez.” Respondent made these disability retirement gross benefit disbursements resulting in net payments to Lt. Perez on the following dates and in the following amounts: April 30, 2014: gross disbursement of $4,950.63, less deducted taxes of $413.20, for a net payment to Lt. Perez of $4,537.43; May 30, 2014: gross disbursement of $4,950.63, less taxes of $413.20 and less a medical insurance deduction of $386.00, for a net payment to Lt. Perez of $4,151.43.3/ A direct deposit authorization for electronic transfer of future retirement benefit warrants into a checking account solely in the name of Lt. Perez was signed by Alecs Perez Crespo, “POA for Edward Perez,” on May 9, 2014. Two additional disability retirement gross benefit disbursements resulting in net payments to Lt. Perez were sent to the checking account of Lt. Perez on the following dates and in the following amounts: June 30, 2014: gross disbursement of $4,950.63, less taxes of $413.20 and less a medical deduction of $386.00, for a net payment to Lt. Perez of $4,151.43; July 31, 2014: gross disbursement of $4,981.32, less taxes of $417.81 and less a medical insurance deduction of $386.00, for a net payment to Lt. Perez of $4,177.51, bringing the total sum of the gross disbursements for the four payments made to Lt. Perez $19,833.21, and the total sum of the net disbursements for the four payments made to Lt. Perez $17,017.80. The net sum of $17,017.80 issued by the Pension Plan as disability retirement benefits to Lt. Perez was deposited into Lt. Perez’s checking account. Accordingly, $19,833.21 (gross)/ $17,017.80 (net), was received by Lt. Perez. Lt. Perez died on July 16, 2014, from the cancer. At the time of Lt. Perez’s death, Petitioner was, and remains, his sole surviving child (natural or adopted). Lt. Perez was not married at the time of his death and, thus, left no surviving spouse. Because of the receipt of the four payments during his lifetime, which are applied first to the personal contributions made by Lt. Perez into the Investment Plan during his lifetime, the amount of Lt. Perez’s small contributions into the plan were exhausted by the time of his death. Therefore, if the option selection form is valid, Petitioner, as the sole beneficiary and child of Lt. Perez, would receive nothing. Respondent concedes that notwithstanding the facial appearance of the option selection form and application for disability retirement, the documents are void and invalid because they failed to comply with the statutory, rule, and manual requirements applicable to properly effectuate the Option 1 selection, in that they were not completed by the member, Lt. Perez, and not signed by Lt. Perez in the presence of a notary public. Respondent concedes that due to Lt. Perez lacking the mental, cognitive, physical, and legal capacity to understand the nature and legal effect of executing the option selection form and application for disability retirement, the purported execution by Lt. Perez of the option selection form and of the application for disability retirement are void and invalid. Respondent concedes that the option selection form is invalid and void ab initio, and Lt. Perez’s earlier selection in 1997, pursuant to section 121.091(8), should be reinstated under the FRS Investment Plan. Respondent concedes that with Lt. Perez having died in 2014 with no surviving spouse, and with Petitioner being his sole surviving child at the time of his death, that the full retirement benefits of $234,035.81, to which Lt. Perez was entitled under his Investment Plan designation of beneficiary should be paid directly to Petitioner. Respondent asserts, however, that the payment of the retirement benefits to which Petitioner is entitled should be reduced by the amount of the four payments made by Respondent to Lt. Perez, which gross disbursements total $19,833.21, or net disbursements total $17,017.80, making the retirement benefits to which Petitioner is entitled to be $214,202.60 or $217,018.01, not $234,035.81. Respondent’s position is correct because the gross benefits in the amount of $19,833.21 were received by Lt. Perez when the four payments, after applicable required deductions, were deposited into his personal checking account. At hearing, no persuasive and credible evidence was presented indicating whatever happened, if anything, to the net payments of $17,017.80 deposited into Lt. Perez’s checking account. No persuasive or credible evidence was presented indicating whether any of the monies were withdrawn from the checking account before or after Lt. Perez’s death. No persuasive or credible evidence was presented indicating that Ms. Perez-Crespo used, diverted, or withdrew any of the funds from the checking account. No bank statements were offered into evidence. Petitioner, who is the personal representative of the estate, did not testify. No accounting of the assets of Lt. Perez’s estate was presented. Even if any of the $17,017.80 was used or diverted by Ms. Perez-Crespo after being deposited into Lt. Perez’s checking account, Petitioner, as personal representative of the estate of Lt. Perez, might have a remedy in another forum to recover such funds from Ms. Perez-Crespo. In any event, such a potential claim, not borne by the evidence presented in the instant proceeding, is beyond the scope of this administrative proceeding. Based on the evidence adduced at hearing and the stipulations of the parties, it is clear that $19,833.21 was received by Lt. Perez when $17,017.80 (after the required deductions) was deposited into his personal checking account. To require Respondent to pay the entire amount of $234,035.81 would result in overpayment of $19,833.21. Respondent is, therefore, entitled to a deduction in the amount of the gross disbursement of $19,833.21.4/

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Respondent, Department of Management Services, Division of Retirement, enter a Final Order requiring that that the total sum of $214,202.60 be returned by Respondent to the FRS Investment Plan for the benefit of Lt. Perez, deceased, and that pursuant to section 121.091(8)(a), Florida Statutes, that Petitioner, Aubrie-Elle Perez, as the sole surviving child of and the sole beneficiary of Lt. Perez, immediately receive the amount of $214,202.60. The undersigned reserves jurisdiction to address issues regarding Petitioner’s entitlement to, and the amount of, attorneys’ fees, costs, and interest. DONE AND ENTERED this 23rd day of January, 2017, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DARREN A. SCHWARTZ Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of January, 2017.

Florida Laws (7) 117.107120.569120.57120.595120.68121.09157.105
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JAKE FISHER vs DEPARTMENT OF MANAGEMENT SERVICES, DIVISION OF RETIREMENT, 12-001266 (2012)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Miami, Florida Apr. 12, 2012 Number: 12-001266 Latest Update: Sep. 17, 2012

The Issue Whether Petitioner received a refund of retirement contributions made to the Florida Retirement System ("FRS") for his service from June 1969 to September 1975, thereby waiving his right to receive additional retirement benefits represented by the refunded contributions.

Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a member of the FRS. He was hired by Miami-Dade County ("County") in 1969, and terminated his employment with the County in 1989. At all times relevant to this proceeding, Respondent, Division of Retirement Services,1/ was the state agency charged with administering the FRS. § 121.031(1), Fla. Stat. (1989).2/ Prior to 1975, the FRS was a contributory system.3/ Under this system, members paid a portion of their salaries into the FRS Trust Fund ("Trust Fund") as a contribution toward future retirement benefits. Members who contributed to the Trust Fund could request a refund of those contributions at the time they left their FRS-eligible employment. Receipt of a refund constituted a waiver of the right to service credit for the employment period for which the contribution was paid. At the time Petitioner terminated his employment with the County, he had accrued 18.77 years of service credit. He had contributed $2,708.94 to the Trust Fund for creditable employment service from June 1969 through September 1975. In April 1990, Petitioner requested an audit of his FRS account. Specifically, he requested an estimate of his retirement benefits based on his total service credit consisting of both contributory and non-contributory service, and an estimate of his retirement benefits based only on his non- contributory service from October 1975 to August 1989. On May 17, 1990, Respondent responded to Petitioner's request. The response letter provided the requested estimates and further informed Petitioner that he had $2,708.94 in contributions in his retirement account for the period between June 1969 and September 1975, that he had 18.77 total years of service, and that he had 12.52 years of non-contributory service credit. The letter explained that if Petitioner wished to receive a lump sum refund of his contributions, he must submit a completed Request For Refund Form, FRS M-81. The letter was mailed to Petitioner at his then-current address4/ of 2221 Northwest 51st Street, Miami, Florida 33142. In addition to the May 17, 1990, letter explaining Petitioner's options, Respondent's staff engaged in several documented telephone discussions with Petitioner to explain the process for obtaining a refund of his contributions and the consequences of doing so. In September 1990, Petitioner submitted a completed Request For Refund Form, FRS M-81, requesting a lump sum refund of the $2,708.94 in retirement contributions he made for the period of June 1969 through September 1975. The form provided in pertinent part: "I give up all rights to receive any benefits from FRS based on service represented by this refund." Petitioner listed his address as 2221 Northwest 51st Street, Miami, Florida 33142, and signed the form. Upon receiving the completed Request For Refund form, Respondent provided pertinent information from the form to the Department of Banking and Finance5/ and requested issuance of a warrant in the amount of $2,708.94, the full amount of Petitioner's retirement contributions for his service between June 1969 and September 1975. The Department of Banking and Finance issued the warrant, dated September 19, 1990, and returned it to Respondent with a computer-generated label listing Petitioner's name and social security number, refund amount, voucher number, and date of the warrant. On September 26, 1990, the warrant was mailed to 2221 Northwest 51st Street, Miami, Florida 33142.6/ Respondent maintains a list of outstanding warrants. This list does not show the warrant sent to Petitioner as being outstanding; thus, Respondent's records establish that the warrant was cashed. In June 1993, Petitioner applied to receive his service retirement benefits. In the course of processing the retirement benefits application, Respondent provided Petitioner an estimate of the service benefits he would receive based on 12.52 years of creditable service. At that time, Petitioner did not question the estimate or that his benefit was based on 12.52 years of creditable service. On February 16, 2012——almost 22 years after the contributions refund warrant was sent to Petitioner and almost 19 years after Petitioner began receiving his retirement benefits based on 12.52 years of service——Petitioner contacted Respondent to inquire why he was not receiving retirement benefits based on 18 years of creditable service. Respondent's staff advised Petitioner that he was not entitled to benefits for 18 years because he had requested and received a refund of the contributions he had paid into the FRS Trust Fund between June 1969 and September 1975.7/ Petitioner insists that he did not submit the Request For Refund Form in 1990 and claims that the signature on the form was forged.8/ He further claims that he never received the warrant because Respondent mailed the warrant to an address using an incorrect zip code. He posits that an employee of Respondent forged his signature and cashed the warrant. However, the credible evidence in the record does not support these claims. The credible, persuasive evidence in the record establishes that Petitioner requested and received a refund of his retirement contributions in the amount of $2,708.94 for his employment service between June 1969 and September 1975, thereby waiving his right to receive retirement benefits for this period.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Department of Management Services, Division of Retirement, issue a Final Order determining that Petitioner is not entitled to receive retirement benefits for his service between June 1969 and September 1975. DONE AND ENTERED this 30th day of August, 2012, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S CATHY M. SELLERS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of August, 2012.

Florida Laws (5) 120.569120.57121.031121.0712.04
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FREDERICK M. RHINES vs DEPARTMENT OF MANAGEMENT SERVICES, DIVISION OF RETIREMENT, 07-005050 (2007)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida Nov. 02, 2007 Number: 07-005050 Latest Update: Sep. 23, 2008

The Issue The issues are whether Petitioner became an employee of an FRS employer within a calendar month after completing his participation in the Deferred Retirement Option Program (DROP) in violation of Subsection 121.091(13)(c)5.d., Florida Statutes (2006)1; whether Respondent's interpretation of relevant statutes is an unadopted rule; and whether Respondent's interpretation of relevant statutes is an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority.

Findings Of Fact The parties stipulated to several facts in this proceeding. Respondent is the state agency responsible for administering the FRS. Petitioner was employed as an equipment operator (street sweeper) by the City of Venice, Florida (the City), for more than 35 years until he completed his participation in DROP on January 11, 2007. At that time Petitioner was earning approximately $38,000.00 annually. The City revoked its participation in the FRS effective January 1, 1996, and established a new City retirement plan. The new City retirement plan applies to all employees hired after January 1, 1996. However, the City continued its participation in the FRS for all employees who were members of the FRS prior to January 1, 1996. Petitioner elected to participate in DROP on March 31, 2002. At the conclusion of DROP, Petitioner received a lump-sum payment of approximately $84,279.00 and received monthly benefits until Respondent ceased paying benefits in accordance with the proposed agency action. Petitioner's efforts at reemployment were unsuccessful. On January 31, 2007, the City employed Petitioner to perform the same work he previously performed at a base salary as a "new hire."2 The City assured Petitioner that reemployment would not adversely affect Petitioner's FRS retirement benefits because the City does not consider itself an FRS employer. A member of the City's human resources department contacted a representative for Respondent to verify the City's statutory interpretation. The conversation eventually led to this proceeding. Petitioner was not employed by an employer under the FRS during the next calendar month after completing his participation in DROP on January 11, 2007. Judicial decisions discussed in the Conclusions of Law hold that the issue of whether Petitioner is an employee of an FRS employer is a factual finding. When Petitioner began employment with the City on January 31, 2007, Petitioner was not a member of the FRS within the meaning of Subsection 121.021(12). He was not an employee covered under the FRS because he was hired after January 1, 1996, when the City revoked its participation in FRS. On January 31, 2007, Petitioner was not an employee within the meaning of Subsection 121.021(11). Petitioner was not employed in a covered group within the meaning of Subsection 121.021(34). Petitioner did not become a member under Chapter 121, and the City was not a "city for which coverage under this chapter" was applied for and approved for Petitioner. On January 11, 2007, Petitioner ceased all employment relationships with "employers under this system" within the meaning of Subsection 121.021(39). When Petitioner resumed employment on January 31, 2007, Petitioner did not fail to terminate employment with an employer under the FRS system. Petitioner's new employer was not an employer under the FRS system and had not been such an employer after January 1, 1996. After January 1, 1996, the City was not a covered employer for any employees employed after that date, including Petitioner. On January 31, 2007, Petitioner was not an employee of an employer within the meaning of Subsection 121.021(10). The City did not participate in the FRS system for the benefit of Petitioner. The employment of Petitioner by the City on January 31, 2007, had no financial impact on the FRS, and Petitioner did not begin to accrue new benefits with the FRS. Respondent did not demonstrate in the record why the agency's proposed statutory interpretation requires special agency insight or expertise and did not articulate in the record any underlying technical reasons for deference to agency expertise. Nor did the agency explain in the record or its PRO why the issue of whether Petitioner is an employee of an FRS employer is not an issue of fact that is within the exclusive province of the fact-finder. Respondent proposes a literal interpretation of selected statutory terms without explaining legislative intent for the prohibition against reemployment within the next calendar month.3 Respondent's proposed statutory interpretation also fails to distinguish the economic impact in situations involving what may be fairly characterized as a dual-purpose employer; that is one like the City which is part covered employer and part non-covered employer.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent enter a final order reinstating Petitioner's monthly retirement benefits, paying all past due amounts to Petitioner, with interest, and dismissing its request for reimbursement of past FRS benefits from Petitioner. DONE AND ENTERED this 3rd day of June, 2008, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DANIEL MANRY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of June, 2008.

Florida Laws (3) 120.56120.57121.021
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DEBORAH BOHLER vs DEPARTMENT OF MANAGEMENT SERVICES, DIVISION OF RETIREMENT, 09-002842 (2009)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Jacksonville, Florida May 22, 2009 Number: 09-002842 Latest Update: Mar. 22, 2011

The Issue The issues to be resolved in this proceeding concern whether the Petitioner, as a surviving spouse, is entitled to a continuing benefit from the Florida Retirement System (FRS) based on the retirement account of her deceased husband, George S. Bohler. More specifically, it must be determined whether the forgery of the spousal acknowledgement form renders the member's election of the "Option 1" retirement benefit payment, which precludes a survivor's benefit for his spouse, invalid and void.

Findings Of Fact George Bohler, the FRS member at issue, was employed, at times pertinent, as a Professor of Economics at Florida Community College in Jacksonville. The College is an FRS employer and Mr. Bohler was a member of the FRS retirement system. The Division of Retirement is an administrative agency charged with regulation and operation of the Florida retirement system, including calculation of and determination of entitlement to retirement benefits, under various options and member circumstances. On March 22, 1999, Mr. Bohler filed a completed Florida Retirement System Application for service retirement and the Deferred Retirement Option Program (DROP). This was accomplished through his filing of "Form DP-11." The Form provides a retiree with information pertaining to four options by which his retirement benefits may be paid. One full page of that form provides an explanation of each option. Mr. Bohler selected Option 1, a retirement benefit pay-out plan which provides the highest monthly benefit. The Option 1 selection provides that this highest monthly benefit is payable for the lifetime of the retiree only. Upon his death, the benefit would stop and his beneficiary, here his spouse, the Petitioner, would receive only a refund of any contributions the member might have paid into the FRS which exceeds the amount he had received in benefits. Option 1 provides no continuing or survivor benefit to a beneficiary or surviving spouse. The DP-11 Form filed with the retirement application contained an apparent spousal acknowledgement purportedly signed by Deborah T. Bohler, the spouse of member George Bohler. It appears to acknowledge that the member had elected either Option 1 or Option 2, which provide no survivor/spouse benefit. The DP-11 Form indicated to the Division that the member was married. The parties have stipulated, however, that the Petitioner's signature on the FRS application for service retirement and the DROP program was actually forged. George Bohler, the member, was an FRS member from August 19, 1968, to March 31, 2005. He received FRS retirement benefits based upon the above-referenced application from the Division from April 1, 2000, to October 31, 2007. The Form DP-11 contained a statement to the effect that the retiree member understood that he could not add additional service, change options, or change his type of retirement once his retirement became final. Mr. Bohler began participation in the DROP program on April 1, 2000. Thereafter, his last date of employment was March 31, 2005, and he passed away on October 18, 2007. He received FRS benefits from April 1, 2000, until October 31, 2007. For 28 years, until his death on that date, Mr. Bohler was legally married to the Petitioner, Deborah Bohler, during which time they were never separated or divorced. On March 10, 1999, Mr. Bohler executed the FRS Application for Service Retirement and the DROP program. He had his signature notarized as required for that form. Joint Exhibit 1, in evidence. Mr. Bohler designated the Petitioner as his primary beneficiary on the DROP Application. He elected to begin participation in the DROP program as of April 1, 2000, and to retire from state employment effective March 31, 2005, which he did. There are four options which an FRS member may select for his or her retirement benefits to be paid to the member or to the survivors/beneficiaries. Mr. Bohler selected "Option 1" on his DROP Application form. This results in a significantly higher retirement monthly benefit than does Options 3 or 4, which have survivorship rights. The acknowledgement section on the DROP Application form requires that a member's spouse be notified and must acknowledge a member's selection of Option 1 or Option 2 by signing that DROP Application form, so that the FRS is thus informed that the spouse made a knowing, intelligent waiver of survivorship rights to benefits. The spousal acknowledgement provision or section does not require that the member's spouse's signature be notarized. The form also does not require a member to swear under oath that the spouse was notified. The parties have stipulated that the Petitioner's apparent signature shown on Mr. Bohler's retirement application form was forged. The Petitioner had no knowledge that her name had been placed on the form by some other person, nor did she have any knowledge that Mr. Bohler had selected Option 1 prior to his death. The Petitioner first learned that her husband had selected Option 1 when she contacted the Respondent, after his death, to request that his retirement benefits now be paid to her. She believed that she was entitled to survivorship benefits. Her husband never informed her that he had selected a retirement option which would not pay her survivorship benefits, nor had they discussed the matter before or since his retirement. In their marital and family relationship, the Bohlers had divided certain duties in such a way that Mr. Bohler, the FRS member at issue, handled all financial matters himself. The Petitioner, Mrs. Bohler, dealt with any tax issues or filings the couple was required to make during the years of their marriage. The Petitioner is a certified public accountant. The Petitioner was simply aware that her husband received retirement benefits, and knew the amount of them, but did not know that they represented benefits for Option 1 rather than Option 3 or 4. The Petitioner's signature on the spousal acknowledgment section of the DROP Application form is stipulated to have been forged. The fact of the forgery, and the Petitioner's un-refuted testimony, establishes that she was never notified, nor did she ever acknowledge that her husband had selected Option 1. She was not aware that an attempt to waive or extinguish her survivor's benefits had been made. She believed, during his lifetime, that she was to be accorded survivor benefits. Testimony presented by the Respondent shows that the Respondent Division will not accept a retirement application form, or process it, if a member fails to complete the spousal acknowledgement section or, alternatively, to submit a signed statement explaining why that section is left blank, or the signature of the spouse has not been obtained. The fact that the Division will not accept a retirement or DROP Application form or process the related benefits if the acknowledgement section is unsigned or blank establishes the mandatory nature of the requirement that a spouse acknowledge a member's election to receive benefits under an option which would preclude a spouse's survivorship benefits. The acknowledgement is thus not an optional requirement. In fact, the legislature clearly placed that requirement in the statute, Section 121.091(6)(a), Florida Statutes, as a mandatory requirement so a spouse would know of any such attempt to waive the spouse's survivorship rights and benefits. It is an acknowledgement that the spouse has a vested or property right in such benefits, which must be knowingly and intelligently waived. The Statute says, in fact, that the spouse of any member "shall be notified of and shall acknowledge any such election." Therefore, obtaining a spouse's signature is not the only desired result set forth by the legislature (and under the rule adopted pursuant thereto) because it requires actual notification of the spouse, not merely the obtaining of a spouse's signature, whether genuine or forged. Actual notification is what must be accomplished. The required notification and indeed the obtaining of the Petitioner's signature was not accomplished in the facts of this case. In light of these facts, the act of declaring and accomplishing retired status, and selection of the related benefit option, was never completed. The Option selection was obviously a nullity and void ab initio because the mandatory condition precedent never was accomplished by the member.

Recommendation Having considered the foregoing findings of fact, conclusions of law, the evidence of record, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses and the pleadings and arguments of the parties, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the State of Florida, Department of Management Services, Division of Retirement, awarding the Petitioner retirement benefits based upon her status as a surviving spouse and joint annuitant, in the manner described above, adjusted to reflect re-calculation and recoupment of overpayment based upon the amount of benefits already paid from the subject retirement account pursuant to Option 1. DONE AND ENTERED this 10th day of November, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S P. MICHAEL RUFF Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of November, 2009. COPIES FURNISHED: Elizabeth Regina Stevens, Esquire Department of Management Services Office of the General Counsel 4050 Esplanade Way, Suite 160 Tallahassee, Florida 32327 T. A. Delegal, Esquire Delegal Law Offices, P.A. 424 East Monroe Street Jacksonville, Florida 32202 Sarabeth Snuggs, Director Division of Retirement Department of Management Services Post Office Box 9000 Tallahassee, Florida 32315-9000 John Brenneis, General Counsel Department of Management Services 4050 Esplanade Way Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950

Florida Laws (4) 120.56120.569120.57121.091 Florida Administrative Code (5) 60S-4.00260S-4.00860S-4.01060S-6.00160S-9.001
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VERNON TAYLOR BELL vs. DIVISION OF RETIREMENT, 81-002499 (1981)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 81-002499 Latest Update: Nov. 15, 1982

The Issue May Petitioner make an application with Respondent for disability retirement benefits when he was already applied for and has received regular retirement payments?

Findings Of Fact Mr. Vernon Taylor Bell voluntarily terminated his employment with the Department of Legal Affairs on February 26, 1980. By that date he had accumulated 23.66 years of service for credit in the Florida Retirement System. After his termination Mr. Bell had a conference with a retirement benefits specialist, Ms. Taylor, who is an employee of Respondent. At Mr. Bell's request she gave him an estimate of his retirement benefits for a regular retirement. She did not discuss the benefits which a disabled retiree might receive. The testimony of Ms. Taylor and Mr. Bell is in conflict on whether or not she discussed disability retirement benefits with him. Ms. Taylor's testimony is accepted as being more credible because Mr. Bell was shown throughout his testimony to have a poor memory. Mr. Bell began to receive regular retirement benefits in the monthly amounts of $178.32 on May 30, 1980. Since that date he has continued to receive and accept regular retirement payments. Petitioner has cashed or deposited his first benefit check. If Mr. Bell were to be granted disability retirement benefits rather than regular retirement benefits, his monthly payment would be substantially increased. Petitioner did not present credible evidence that he was misinformed or mislead by Respondent about the relative advantages to him in electing to apply for regular retirement as opposed to applying for disability benefits. On August 26, 1980, Mr. Bell wrote a letter to Mr. Andrew M. McMullian III, who is the State Retirement Director. Mr. Bell stated that he had been given incorrect information about the disability benefits he might be eligible for. He requested that he be allowed to make an application as a disabled retiree. On October 1, 1980, Mr. McMullian responded to Mr. Bell in a letter which states in part: We have reviewed your retirement account and have determined the information provided to you by this office was correct regarding your retirement eligibility. We regret if there was any misunderstanding on your part re- garding disability retirement; however, we cannot honor your request to be retired with disability at this late date, because you applied for regular retirement which was approved for you effective April 1, 1980. Your initial monthly benefit was $178.32 and your July 1980 benefit payment contained a cost-of-living increase, thus your current monthly benefit is $179.73. The Florida Retirement System law requires certification by two licensed physicians in Florida that one is totally and permanently disabled and unable to render any useful and efficient work before this agency can approve an employee for retirement with disability. Apparently, you made no attempt to retire with disability, other than discussing the matter in general with us, and according to our records, you made no application for disability retirement. Further, a retiree is not allowed by law to change his type of re- tirement once he begins drawing monthly re- tirement benefits.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the State Retirement Director enter a Final Order authorizing Mr. Bell is submit an application for disability retirement benefits. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 24th day of August, 1982, in Tallahassee, Florida MICHAEL PEARCE DODSON Hearing Officer Department of Administration Division of Administrative Hearings Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24 day of August, 1982. COPIES FURNISHED: Silas R. Eubanks, Esquire 103 North Gadsden Street Post Office Box 4266 Tallahassee, Florida 32303 William Frieder, Esquire Division of Retirement Cedars Executive Center 2639 North Monroe Street Suite 207C - Box 81 Tallahassee, Florida 32303 Daniel C. Brown, Esquire General Counsel Department of Administration 530 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Nevin G. Smith Secretary Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301

Florida Laws (2) 120.57121.091
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