Findings Of Fact In its 1969 legislative session, the Florida Legislature enacted Section 409.266, Florida Statutes, entitled "Medical Assistance for the Needy," providing the original state legislative basis and authority for Florida's entry into the Medicaid program. Section 409.266(2), Florida Statutes, as enacted, authorized the Florida Department of Social Services or any other department that the Governor might designate to: Enter into such agreement with other state agencies or any agency of the federal government and accept such duties with respect to social welfare or public aid as may be necessary to implement the provisions of subsection (1) and to qualify for federal aid including compliance with provisions of Public Law 86-778 and the "Social Security Amendments of 1965" [estab- lishing Title XIX of the Social Security Act] Section 409.266(3), Florida Statutes, as enacted, stated that: The Department is authorized and directed to prepare and operate a program and budget in order to implement and comply with the provisions of public law 86-778 and the "Social Security Amendments of 1965." No provisions of Florida law other than Section 409.266, Florida Statutes, as enacted, authorized any agency to perform any function specifically to implement the Medicaid program. The State of Florida formally commenced participation in the Medicaid program effective January 1, 1970. At all times pertinent to this controversy, respondent, Florida Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services or its predecessor agencies (referred to as "HRS"), has been and continues to be the "State Agency" identified in 42 U.S.C. Section 1396a(a)(5), and charged under Section 409.266, Florida Statutes, as amended, with the formulation of a State Plan for Medical Assistance ("State Plan"), 42 U.S.C. Section 1396a, and with the ongoing responsibility for the administration of the Medicaid program in the State of Florida. Since Florida's entry into the Medicaid program in 1970, HRS has been authorized essentially to "[e]nter into such agreements with appropriate agents, other State agencies, or any agency of the Federal Government and accept such duties in respect to social welfare or public aid as may be necessary or needed to implement the provisions of Title XIX of the Social Security Act pertaining to medical assistance." Section 409.266(2)(a), Fla. Stat., as amended. HRS has never been authorized to enter into any agreements, accept any duties, or perform any functions with respect to the Medicaid program that are in contravention of or not authorized by Title XIX of the Social Security Act and implementing federal regulations and requirements. As a prerequisite for Florida's entry into the Medicaid program, HRS prepared and filed with the United States Department of Health, Education, and Welfare ("HEW") a State Plan, pursuant to Title XIX of the Social Security Act, and pursuant to its delegated legislative authority set forth in Section 409.266(2)(a), Florida Statutes. (In May, 1980, HEW was redesignated the United States Department of Health and Human Services, but for purposes of this action both shall be referred to as HEW.) C.W. Hollingsworth was the HRS official who had the responsibility for supervising the preparation, the filing, and for obtaining the approval of HEW of Florida's initial State Plan. Florida's initial State Plan was approved by HEW effective January 1, 1970. At the time that Florida received approval of its initial State Plan, Title XIX of the Social Security Act required state plans to provide for the payment of the reasonable cost of inpatient hospital services. At the time that Florida received approval of its initial State Plan, HEW regulations governing reimbursement for inpatient hospital services under Medicaid required the State Plan to provide for reimbursement of Medicaid inpatient hospital services furnished by those hospitals also participating in the Medicare program, applying the same standards, cost reimbursement principles, and methods of cost apportionment used in computing reimbursement to such hospitals under Medicare. 45 C.F.R. Section 250.30(a), and (b), 34 Fed. Reg. 1244 (January 25, 1969). At the time that Florida entered the Medicaid program, Medicare cost reimbursement principles in effect governing reimbursement for the cost of inpatient hospital services required payment of a participating hospital's actual and reasonable costs of providing such services to Medicare beneficiaries, and, moreover, that such payment be made on the basis of the hospital's current costs rather than upon the costs of a prior period or upon a fixed negotiated rate. 42 U.S.C. Section 1395x(v)(1)(A); 20 C.F.R. Sections 405.451(c)(2), 405.402(a) [later renumbered 42 C.F.R. Section 405.451(c)(2) and Section 405.402(a)]. Such Medicare principles and standards also provided for interim payments to be made to the hospital during its fiscal year. At the conclusions of the subject fiscal year, the hospital was required to file a cost report wherein the hospital included all of its costs of providing covered inpatient services to Medicare beneficiaries. A settlement or "retroactive adjustment" process then was required to reconcile the amount of interim payments received by the hospital during the fiscal period with its allowable costs incurred during that period. If the hospital had been overpaid during the year, it was required to refund the amount of that overpayment to the Medicare program. Conversely, if the hospital had been underpaid during the year, the Medicare program was required to make an additional payment to the hospital, retroactively, in the amount of the underpayment. 20 C.F.R. Sections 405.402(b)(2), 405.451(b)(2). Essentially the same Medicare principles and standards governing reimbursement of inpatient hospital services described in the two preceding paragraphs have been in effect at all times pertinent to this controversy. 42 C.F.R. Section 405.401, et seq. Florida's approved State Plan as of January 1, 1970, governing reimbursement of inpatient hospital services under the Medicaid program, committed HRS to reimburse hospitals that also participated in the Medicare program for their reasonable costs of providing inpatient hospital services to Medicaid patients, applying Medicare cost reimbursement principles and standards. The only versions of Florida's State Plan provisions that have been approved by HEW and that have governed HRS's reimbursement of inpatient hospital services prior to July 1, 1981, each commit HRS to reimburse hospitals that also participated in the Medicare program for their reasonable costs of providing inpatient hospital services to Medicaid patients, applying Medicare cost reimbursement principles and standards. Attached as an appendix to the recommended order is the form agreement drafted with the supervision of C.W. Hollingsworth, which has been in use from January 1, 1970, until July 1, 1981. From the inception of the Florida Medicaid program, and as a prerequisite for participation therein, a hospital has been required to execute a copy of the form agreement. A hospital may not participate in the Medicaid program without having executed such an agreement, nor may it propose any amendments thereto. The intent and effect of the form agreement is to require HRS to reimburse hospitals that also participated in the Medicare program for their reasonable costs of providing inpatient hospital services to Medicaid patients, applying Medicare cost reimbursement principles and standards. The form agreement requires HRS to compute a percentage allowance in lieu of the retroactive adjustments ("percentage allowances") in determining the rates that hospitals will be paid for providing inpatient hospital services to Medicaid patients. The form agreement requires HRS to compute a new percentage allowance each year based on hospital cost trends. The meanings of the terms "allowance in lieu of retroactive adjustments" in all pertinent state plans and "percentage allowance for the year in lieu of retroactive payment adjustment" contained in the form agreement are identical. In drafting the form agreement HRS intended that the "percentage allowance for the year in lieu of retroactive payment adjustment" be set at a level sufficient to ensure that hospitals participating in the Medicaid program would be reimbursed their "reasonable costs" of providing inpatient hospital services to Medicaid patients, applying Medicare cost reimbursement principles and standards. At all times pertinent to this controversy, participating hospitals, like petitioner, have been reimbursed by HRS for inpatient hospital services provided to Medicaid patients in the following manner: Within ninety (90) days following the close of its fiscal year, the partici- pating hospital files a Form 2551 or 2552 Annual Statement of Reimbursable Costs, as applicable, with both Blue Cross of Florida, Inc., the major fiscal intermediary respon- sible for the administration of Part A of the federal Medicare program in the State of Florida, and with HRS. This document, also referred to as a "cost report" details various hospital and financial statistical data relating to the patient care activities engaged in by the hospital during the sub- ject fiscal period. Upon receipt of the participating hospital's cost report for a fiscal period, HRS makes an initial determination based upon Medicare cost reimbursement principles and standards of the hospital's total allow- able inpatient costs, charges, and total patient days during the subject fiscal period, and then determines an inpatient per diem reimbursement rate for the period. To the inpatient per diem reimburse- ment rate is then added a percentage allow- ance in lieu of making any further retroactive corrective adjustments in reimbursement which might have been due the hospital applicable to the reporting period. The adjusted inpa- tient per diem reimbursement rate is applied prospectively, and remains in effect until further adjustments in the rate are required. If HRS determines that total inpa- tient Medicaid reimbursement to a partici- pating hospital during a fiscal period exceeds the hospital's allowable and rea- sonable costs of rendering such covered inpatient services applying Medicare cost reimbursement principles and standards, then the hospital is required to remit to HRS the amount of such overpayment. If, however, HRS determines that the total inpatient Medicaid reimbursement received by a participating hospital is less than the hospital's actual and reason- able costs of rendering such covered inpa- tient services to Medicaid patients during the period applying Medicare cost reimburse- ment principles and standards, no further retroactive corrective adjustments are made; provided, however, that should an overpayment occur in a fiscal period, it may be offset and applied retroactively against an under- payment to the participating hospital which occurred during the next preceding fiscal period only. HRS has used the following "percentage allowances" in determining Medicaid reimbursement rates for inpatient hospital services: a. January 1, 1970 - June 30, 1972 . . . 12 percent July 1, 1972 - approximately March 30, 1976 . . . . . . . . . . 9 percent Approximately March 31, 1976 - June 30, 1981 . . . . . . . . . . . 6 percent Since at least January 1, 1976, HRS has not recomputed the "percentage allowance" on an annual basis. Since at least January 1, 1976, HRS has not based the "percentage allowance" that it has applied in determining Medicaid inpatient hospital reimbursement rates upon hospital cost trends. HRS has used no technical methodology based upon hospital cost trends to develop any of the "percentage allowances." At least since January 1, 1974, HRS's "percentage allowances" have been less than the corresponding average annual increases in the costs incurred by Florida hospitals of providing inpatient hospital services. Prior to March 30, 1976, all of HRS's published regulations addressing reimbursement of participating hospitals for their costs of providing inpatient hospital services to Medicaid patients required HRS to reimburse such hospitals in accordance with Medicare cost reimbursement principles and standards. In certain internal documents, Petitioner's Exhibits P-44 and P-12, HRS states that the average costs of providing inpatient hospital services in the State of Florida rose at least 18 percent during calendar year 1975. In November, 1975, the Secretary of HRS was informed by HRS officials that HRS faced a projected budgetary deficit for its fiscal year ended June 30, 1976. A decision memorandum presented options to the HRS Secretary for reducing the projected deficit. Among such options presented to and approved by the HRS Secretary was to reduce the "percentage allowance" from 9 percent to 6 percent. The reduction of the "percentage allowance" by HRS from 9 percent to 6 percent was effected in response to HRS's projected deficit, and was not based upon an analysis of hospital cost trends. HRS incorporated the 6 percent "percentage allowance" into its administrative rules which were published on March 30, 1976. In response to objections raised by the Florida Hospital Association to the reduction in the percentage allowance by HRS from 9 percent to 6 percent, HRS officials reexamined that reduction. During HRS's reexamination of its previous "percentage allowance" reduction, HRS was aware of and acknowledged the fact that Florida hospital costs were increasing at an average annual rate in excess of both the earlier 9 percent and the resulting 6 percent "percentage allowance." In a memorandum dated September 13, 1976, from HRS official Charles Hall to the Secretary of HRS, Petitioner's Exhibit P-45, Charles Hall informed the Secretary that the methods and standards then used by HRS to reimburse participating hospitals for their costs of providing inpatient hospital services to Medicaid patients was out of compliance with federal requirements. Charles Hall further informed the Secretary that the reason HRS had not theretofore been cited by HEW for noncompliance was the manner in which the Florida State Plan had been drafted, i.e., that the State Plan required HRS to reimburse hospitals under Medicaid for the reasonable costs that they would have been reimbursed applying Medicare cost reimbursement principles and standards. In a letter dated September 20, 1976, Petitioner's Exhibit P-31, HEW informed HRS that HEW had received a complaint from the Florida Hospital Association that the methods HRS was actually using to reimburse hospitals for the costs of providing inpatient hospital services to Medicaid patients were in violation of Federal Regulation 45 C.F.R. Section 250.30(a). A proposed amendment to Florida's State Plan submitted by HRS to HEW in November, 1976, Petitioner's Exhibit P-49, if approved, would have allowed HRS to reimburse hospitals for the cost of providing inpatient hospital services to Medicaid patients under methods differing from Medicare cost reimbursement principles and standards (an "alternative plan"). "Alternative plans" have been permitted under applicable federal regulations since October 21, 1974. A state participating in the Medicaid program may elect to establish an "alternative plan, but may not implement such "alternative plan" without the prior written approval of HEW. Florida has not had in effect an "alternative plan" of reimbursing participating hospitals for their costs of providing inpatient hospital services to Medicaid patients that was formally approved by HEW at any time prior to July 1, 1981. By letter dated January 7, 1977, Petitioner's Exhibit P-32, HEW notified HRS that it had formally cited HRS for noncompliance with federal regulations governing reimbursement of inpatient hospital services under Medicaid. HRS acknowledged their noncompliance and between November, 1976, and October 30, 1977, HRS attempted to revise its proposed "alternative plan" on at least two occasions in an attempt to obtain HEW approval. In October, 1977, HRS withdrew its proposed "alternative plan" then pending with HEW. HRS then contracted with an outside consultant, Alexander Grant & Company, to assist in the formulation of a new "alternative plan" proposal. In January, 1978, Alexander Grant & Company delivered its draft of an "alternative plan" to HRS. In October, 1978, HRS submitted a draft "alternative plan" to HEW for review and comment, and HEW expected HRS to submit a formal "alternative plan" proposal to HEW for its approval by November 1, 1978. HRS did not submit the formal "alternative plan" proposal to HEW until August 12, 1980. In a letter dated February 21, 1979, from Richard Morris, HEW Regional Medicaid Director, Region IV, to United States Senator Richard Stone of Florida, Mr. Morris advised Senator Stone: For more than two years the Florida Medicaid Program has not met Federal Requirements for inpatient hospital services reimbursement. Their payment methodology under-reimburses certain hospitals year after year. The pros- pective interim per diem rate paid by Florida to hospitals includes a percentage allowance to cover increased costs during the forthcom- ing year that is consistently less than increased costs in some hospitals. If the payments are less than costs, the difference is not reimbursed. This results in underpay- ments. We have worked closely with Florida to develop an acceptable alternative system that would meet Federal requirements. To date, Florida has not implemented such a system despite having received informal HEW agreement on a draft plan developed more than a year ago. It is our understanding that this alternative plan is not a high priority item at this time. We will continue to work with HRS staff to secure Florida compliance re- garding this requirement. Petitioner's Exhibit P-46. Since August 12, 1980, HRS has submitted to HEW for its approval at least four more versions of an "alternative plan." Petitioner's Exhibits P-120, P-121, P-123, and P-152. Each of these versions was approved by the Secretary of HRS, and HRS believes each to comply with applicable Florida law. Mr. Erwin Bodo, Ph.D., was and is the HRS official responsible for the development and drafting of Exhibits P-120, P-121, P-123, and P-152. In June, 1981, HEW approved an "alternative plan" for the State of Florida (Exhibit P-152), and such "alternative plan" was implemented effective July 1, 1981. Until July 1, 1981, HRS continued to use the 6 percent "percentage allowance" to compute inpatient hospital reimbursement under Medicaid. Even after its repeal, Rule 10C-7.39(6), Florida Administrative Code, is applied by respondent in calculating reimbursement for Medicaid services provided between March 30, 1976, and July 1, 1981. From November 20, 1976, until July 1, 1981--the period in which HRS was attempting to secure HEW approval for an alternative plan--HRS was aware that the costs of inpatient hospital se vices were increasing at an average annual rate in excess of the 6 percent "percentage allowance." From September 1, 1976, through July 1, 1981, HRS has been out of compliance with its a proved State Plan provisions, and HEW regulations governing reimbursement for inpatient hospital services under Medicaid because HRS's methods for reimbursing hospitals for the cost of providing those services to Medicaid patients have resulted in a substantial number of hospitals-- including petitioner--being reimbursed at a lower rate than the hospitals would have been reimbursed applying Medicare cost reimbursement principles and standards. Since the quarter ending December 31, 1976, until July 1, 1981, HEW has formally cited HRS as being in contravention of its approved State Plan provisions, and HEW (now HHS) regulations, governing reimbursement for inpatient hospital services under Medicaid because HRS's methods for reimbursing hospitals for the cost of providing those services to Medicaid patients have resulted in a substantial number of hospitals--including petitioner--being reimbursed at a lower rate than the hospitals would have been reimbursed applying Medicare cost reimbursement principles and standards. PAN AMERICAN HOSPITAL CORPORATION Petitioner, Pan American Hospital Corporation, is a not-for-profit corporation, duly organized and existing under the laws of the State of Florida. Petitioner is a tax-exempt organization as determined by the Internal Revenue Service pursuant to Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, as amended. At all times pertinent to this controversy, petitioner has operated and continues to operate a duly licensed 146-bed, short-term acute care general hospital, located at 5959 Northwest Seventh Street, Miami, Florida 33126. At all times pertinent to this controversy, petitioner has been and continues to be a duly certified provider of inpatient hospital services, eligible to participate in the Florida Medicaid program since January 27, 1974. The appendix to this recommended order is a true and correct copy of the "Participation Agreement" entered into between petitioner and HRS, whereunder, inter alia, petitioner became eligible to receive payment from HRS for covered inpatient hospital services provided to Medicaid patients. At all times pertinent to this controversy, petitioner has been a certified "provider of services" participating in the Medicare program. During the fiscal periods in dispute in this action, petitioner did provide covered inpatient hospital services to Medicaid patients, and became eligible for payment by HRS of its reasonable costs of providing such services, determined in accordance with Medicare cost reimbursement principles and standards. With respect to each of the fiscal periods in dispute in this action, petitioner timely filed all cost reports and other financial data with HRS or its contracting agents, including Blue Cross of Florida, Inc., to enable HRS to determine petitioner's reasonable costs of providing covered inpatient hospital services to Medicaid patients. During each of the fiscal periods in dispute in this action, to reimburse petitioner for its reasonable costs of providing covered inpatient hospital services to Medicaid patients, determined in accordance with applicable Medicare cost reimbursement principles and standards. Such costs incurred by petitioner were reasonable, necessary, related to patient care, and less than customary charges within the meaning of those Medicare principles and standards. With respect to each of the fiscal periods in dispute, HRS and/or its contracting agent, Blue Cross of Florida, Inc., reviewed and audited the cost reports filed by petitioner, and as a result of such review and audits set or adjusted, as applicable, the Medicaid inpatient per diem reimbursement rate at which petitioner would be paid during the next succeeding fiscal period or until that rate was again adjusted. On May 3, 1976, a Notice of Program Reimbursement was issued to petitioner applicable to its fiscal year ended March 31, 1975, and setting forth the audited amount of petitioner's reasonable costs of providing covered inpatient hospital services to Medicaid patients during such period and the amount of interim Medicaid payments made to petitioner by HRS during the period in respect to those services. During its fiscal year ended March 31, 1975, petitioner received $86,469 less than its reasonable costs of providing covered inpatient hospital services to Medicaid patients, and no retroactive corrective adjustment has been made in connection with such underpayment. On February 14, 1979, a Notice of Program Reimbursement was issued to petitioner applicable to its fiscal year ended March 31, 1976, and setting forth the audited amount of petitioner's reasonable costs of providing covered inpatient hospital services to Medicaid patients during such period and the amount of interim Medicaid payments made to petitioner by HRS during the period with respect to those services. During its fiscal year ended March 31, 1976, petitioner received $199,328 less than its reasonable costs of providing covered inpatient hospital services to Medicaid patients, and no retroactive corrective adjustment has been made in connection with such underpayment. On September 29, 1978, a Notice of Program Reimbursement was issued to petitioner applicable to its fiscal year ended March 31, 1977, and setting forth the audited amount of petitioner's reasonable costs of providing covered inpatient hospital services to Medicaid patients during such period and the amount of interim Medicaid payments made to petitioner by HRS during the period with respect to those services. During its fiscal year ended March 31, 1977, petitioner received $6,083 less than its reasonable costs of providing covered inpatient hospital services to Medicaid patients, and no retroactive corrective adjustment has been made in connection with such underpayment. On March 13, 1980, a Notice of Program Reimbursement was issued to petitioner applicable to its fiscal year ended March 31, 1978, and setting forth the audited amount of petitioner's reasonable costs of providing covered inpatient hospital services to Medicaid patients during such period and the amount of interim Medicaid payments made to petitioner by HRS during the period with respect to those services. During its fiscal year ended March 31, 1978, petitioner received $178,506 less than its reasonable costs of providing covered inpatient hospital services to Medicaid patients, and no retroactive corrective adjustment has been made in connection with such underpayment. On June 30, 1981, a Notice of Program Reimbursement was issued to petitioner applicable to its fiscal year ended March 31, 1979, and setting forth the audited amount of petitioner's reasonable costs of providing covered inpatient hospital services to Medicaid patients during such period and the amount of interim Medicaid payments made to petitioner by HRS during the period with respect to those services. During its fiscal year ended March 31, 1979, petitioner received $302,347 less than its reasonable costs of providing covered inpatient hospital services to Medicaid patients, and no retroactive corrective adjustment has been made in connection with such underpayment. On or about June 30, 1981, the audit of petitioner's Medicaid cost report for the period ending March 31, 1980, was concluded. A formal Notice of Program Reimbursement had not been issued at the time of the hearing. MOTION TO DISMISS DENIED Respondent contends that these proceedings should be summarily concluded "for failure to join an indispensable party," viz., the Federal Government, because it "is Respondent's intention, should any liability result from this action, to make a claim for federal financial participation as to approximately fifty-nine percent of such liability . . . [See generally] 42 U.S.C. Section 1320b-2(a)(2)." Motion to Dismiss, p. 2. This contention must fail for several reasons. Neither the Division of Administrative Hearings nor the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services has the power or means to bring an unwilling party into a proceeding instituted pursuant to Section 120.57, Florida Statutes (1979). At most, "the presiding officer may, upon motion of a party, or upon his own initiative enter an order requiring that the absent person be notified of the proceeding and be given an opportunity to be joined as a party of record." Rule 28-5.107, Florida Administrative Code. There exists no administrative writ for joining a non-petitioning party in a substantial interest proceeding in the way judicial process can join a party within a court's jurisdiction in a pending judicial proceeding. The two cases respondent cites in support of its motion, Bannon v. Trammell, 118 So. 167 (Fla. 1928), and Heisler v. Florida Mortgage Title and Bonding Co., 142 So.2d 242 (Fla. 1932), are inapposite, because both cases involve judicial, not administrative proceedings. HRS does not really seek joinder of the United States Department of Health and Human Services; instead, HRS argues that the petition should be dismissed and the controversy relegated to federal court because it "believes that the Secretary [of the United States Department of Health and Human Services] will not succumb voluntarily to the jurisdiction of the Division of Administrative Hearings." 2/ Motion to Dismiss, p. 3. Participation by the Department of Health and Human Services in the present proceedings would have been welcomed, as the Hearing Officer indicated at the prehearing conference, but neither the Department itself nor either of the parties requested such participation. In any event, petitioner is seeking additional reimbursement from respondent HRS, not from any federal agency. Medicaid providers like petitioner do not receive any funds directly from the Department of Health and Human Services. Since "[t]he contracts involved are clearly between the hospitals and [H]RS [, n]o third party requirement appears," Montana Deaconess Hospital v. Department of Social and Rehabilitation Services, 538 P.2d 1021, 1024 (Mont. 1975), and the Department of Health and Human Services is not an indispensable party to administrative proceedings arising out of contracts between HRS and Medicaid providers. HRS protests that it might find itself making additional reimbursement to petitioner, yet be deprived of the federal component of such expenditures. See 42 U.S.C. Section 1396b. This prospect is an unlikely one in view of the fact that the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare has repeatedly cited HRS for noncompliance because of under-reimbursements to Medicaid providers. If the Federal Government fails to contribute to any additional reimbursement, it would not be for want of a forum in which HRS could present its claim. There are administrative mechanisms within the Department of Health and Human Services, including its Grant Appeals Board. See 42 U.S.C. Section 1116(d). After exhaustion of administrative remedies, HRS would have access to the courts, if necessary. See Georgia v. Califano, 446 F. Supp. 404 (N.D. Ga. 1977). There is no danger that HRS will be deprived of an opportunity to litigate any question about federal contribution because the United States Department of Health and Human Services is not a party to the present proceedings. MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT Petitioner's motion for partial summary judgment was amended ore tenus at the final hearing to delete "and FYE March 31, 1981," on page 1 of the motion, after leave to amend was granted, without objection by respondent. As a technical matter, the motion is a misnomer, since substantial interest proceedings before the Division of Administrative Hearings eventuate in recommended orders, not judgments. But, petitioner's contention that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact is well founded. The parties have so stipulated. (T. 70; Mr. Weiss's letter of November 12, 1981.) At the time the petition was filed, the parties contemplated numerous factual disputes which, however, had all been resolved by the time of final hearing through the commendable efforts of counsel. In the absence of a disputed issue of material fact, the Administrative Procedure Act provides for informal proceedings pursuant to Section 120.57(2), Florida Statutes (1979), "[u]nless otherwise agreed." Section 120.57, Florida Statutes (1979). On December 7, 1981, the parties filed their Stipulation and Agreement to proceed pursuant to Section 120.57(1), Florida Statutes (1979), notwithstanding the absence of any factual dispute. DISPUTE COGNIZABLE In the present case, as in Graham Contracting, Inc. v. Department of General Services, 363 So.2d 810 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978), there "can be no doubt that the Department's contract . . . calls for agency action which potentially affects . . . substantial interests," 363 So.2d at 812, of the petitioning contractor. Cf. Solar Energy Control, Inc. v. State Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, 377 So.2d 746 (Fla 1st DCA 1979) (reh. den. 1980) (disappointed bidder substantially affected). See Section 120.52(10)(a), Florida Statutes (1979). In Graham Contracting, Inc. v. Department of General Services, 363 So.2d 810 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978), the petitioner sought "additional money and construction time under its contract," 363 So.2d at 813, with a state agency. The court found "no difficulty . . . with sovereign immunity," 363 So.2d at 813, and held that a contractor with a state agency could invoke the Administrative Procedure Act in order to enforce its contract, even though the contract purported to establish another method for settling the contract dispute. A clause in the contract at issue in the Graham Contracting case contemplated agency action outside the parameters of Chapter 120, Florida Statutes, in resolving certain disputes under the contract. In contrast, each of the successive contracts on which petitioner predicates its claim in the present case contains the following provision: "The hospital agrees to comply with the rules, policies, and procedures required by [HRS's] Division of Family Services for this program." Among the rules thus incorporated by reference into the contracts between petitioner and respondent is Rule 10C-7.35, Florida Administrative Code, which provides: An official representative of a facility participating in Medicaid, . . . or . . . representative, may appeal Medicaid Program policy, procedure, or administrative rulings whenever the provider feels there has been an unfair, illegal or inappropriate action by the Department affecting them or their facility. (1) Provider Appeals The Administrative Procedures [sic] Act, Chapter 120 F.S., provides for provider appeals and hearings, which are conducted by the Division of Administrative Hearings in the Department of Administration. The spe- cific rule relative to the appeal and hearing process is Chapter 28-3 [sic] of the Florida Administrative Rules. . . Since, by reference to Rule 10C-7.35, Florida Administrative Code, the contract in the present case incorporates Chapter 120, Florida Statutes, the applicability of the Administrative Procedure Act is even clearer here than in the Graham Contracting case. THE MERITS The parties have stipulated that petitioner has been reimbursed by respondent less than its reasonable costs of providing covered inpatient hospital services over the time period in question. Under-reimbursement of this kind is not authorized by Section 409.266, Florida Statutes, which incorporates the federal statutory requirement that hospitals which, like petitioner, provide Medicaid services be reimbursed by respondent for reasonable costs incurred, in accordance with an approved State Plan, and not some lesser amount. 42 U.S.C. Section 1396a(a)(13)(B), Pub. L. 89-97, Section 121(a) redesignated 42 U.S.C. Section 1396a(a)(13)(D), Pub. L. 90-248, Section 224(a). All Florida "State Plan provisions . . . approved by HEW and . . . govern[ing] HRS's reimbursement of inpatient hospital services prior to July 1, 1981, commit HRS to reimburse hospitals [like petitioner] that also participated in the Medicare program for their reasonable costs of providing inpatient hospital services to Medicaid patients, applying Medicare cost reimbursement principles and standards." Prehearing Stipulation, Paragraph 19. The record is clear. Respondent consistently reimbursed petitioner less than its reasonable costs of providing inpatient hospital services in order to cut its own expenses and in doing so jeopardized the entire Medicaid program. This cannot be condoned, even though respondent acted under color of law, viz., Rule 10C-7.39(6), Florida Administrative Code [now repealed and declared invalid; see Pan American Hospital Corporation v. Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, No. 81-1480R (DOAH; December 4, 1981)], and even though a lack of money or, at least, an apparent shortage was the reason for respondent's parsimony. The question remains, however, whether this dereliction on respondent's part should inure to the benefit of petitioner; and the answer turns on the construction of the agreement between the parties attached as an appendix to this order. Petitioner argues cogently that public policy has clearly been enunciated by statute to be full reimbursement for costs reasonably incurred by Medicaid providers in furnishing covered services. There can be no clearer expression of public policy than a statute duly enacted; and the reasons behind the full reimbursement policy are themselves compelling: to deal fairly with the providers, not only for fairness sake, but also to assure their participation in the program, and to remove any temptation to give indigent patients substandard care, inter alia. But, there is surely an overriding public policy requiring that a contractor with state government who voluntarily agrees to forego a claim against the public fisc be held to that agreement in administrative proceedings like these. The form agreement between petitioner and respondent, which they renewed annually, states: "It is understood that reimbursement will be made on the basis of an interim payment plan in the form of a per diem cost rate, plus a percentage allowance for the year in lieu of retroactive payment adjustment. However, . . . in the event the hospital did not receive its audited reasonable costs in the year prior to the current year then the hospital may deduct from the refund the prior year deficiency." (Emphasis supplied.) The agreement thus contemplated under-reimbursement and specified the method for recoupment, if there was to be any. Any "retroactive payment adjustment," as the result of administrative proceedings or otherwise, is specifically ruled out. Elsewhere in the parties' agreement is found this language: [T]he fiscal responsibility of [respondent's] Division of Family Services is subjected [sic] to the appropriation and availability of funds to the Medicaid program . . . by the state legislature every year." The terms of the agreement make clear that under-reimbursement is not in itself a breach. Respondent's failure to compute annually a "new percentage . . . based on hospital cost trends" was attributable to a shortage of funds; and the agreement provided that respondent's "fiscal responsibility" was subject to just such a shortage. In sum, provisions of the agreement petitioner voluntarily entered into with respondent operate in much the same way as a liquidated damages clause and preclude the relief petitioner seeks. Petitioner's invocation of the parol evidence rule is unavailing. Even if the stipulated facts outside the four corners of the form agreement are looked to, the course of dealing between these parties buttresses the construction outlined above. The fact that respondent may have settled a case it litigated against another hospital in some other way, as asserted by petitioner, is technically irrelevant.
Recommendation Upon consideration of the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That respondent deny the prayer of the petitioner for additional reimbursement. DONE AND ENTERED this 10th day of December, 1981, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT T. BENTON II Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of December, 1981.
The Issue The issues in this case are whether Respondent applied the proper reimbursement principles to Petitioners' initial Medicaid rate setting, and whether elements of detrimental reliance exist so as to require Respondent to establish a particular initial rate for Petitioners' facilities.
Findings Of Fact There are nine Petitioners in this case. Each of them is a long-term health care facility (nursing home) operated under independent and separate legal entities, but, generally, under the umbrella of a single owner, Tzvi "Steve" Bogomilsky. The issues in this case are essentially the same for all nine Petitioners, but the specific monetary impact on each Petitioner may differ. For purposes of addressing the issues at final hearing, only one of the Petitioners, Madison Pointe Rehabilitation and Health Center (Madison Pointe), was discussed, but the pertinent facts are relevant to each of the other Petitioners as well. Each of the Petitioners has standing in this case. The Amended Petition for Formal Administrative Hearing filed by each Petitioner was timely and satisfied minimum requirements. In September 2008, Bogomilsky caused to be filed with AHCA a Change of Licensed Operator ("CHOP") application for Madison Pointe.1 The purpose of that application was to allow a new entity owned by Bogomilsky to become the authorized licensee of that facility. Part and parcel of the CHOP application was a Form 1332, PFA. The PFA sets forth projected revenues, expenses, costs and charges anticipated for the facility in its first year of operation by the new operator. The PFA also contained projected (or budgeted) balance sheets and a projected Medicaid cost report for the facility. AHCA is the state agency responsible for licensing nursing homes in this state. AHCA also is responsible for managing the federal Medicaid program within this state. Further, AHCA monitors nursing homes within the state for compliance with state and federal regulations, both operating and financial in nature. The AHCA Division of Health Quality Assurance, Bureau of Long-Term Care Services, Long-Term Care Unit ("Long-Term Care Unit") is responsible for reviewing and approving CHOP applications and issuance of an operating license to the new licensee. The AHCA Division of Health Quality Assurance, Bureau of Health Facility Regulation, Financial Analysis Unit ("Financial Analysis Unit") is responsible for reviewing the PFA contained in the CHOP application and determining an applicant's financial ability to operate a facility in accordance with the applicable statutes and rules. Neither the Long-Term Care Unit nor the Financial Analysis Unit is a part of the Florida Medicaid Program. Madison Pointe also chose to submit a Medicaid provider application to the Medicaid program fiscal agent to enroll as a Medicaid provider and to be eligible for Medicaid reimbursement. (Participation by nursing homes in the Medicaid program is voluntary.) The Medicaid provider application was reviewed by the Medicaid Program Analysis Office (MPA) which, pursuant to its normal practices, reviewed the application and set an interim per diem rate for reimbursement. Interim rate-setting is dependent upon legislative direction provided in the General Appropriations Act and also in the Title XIX Long-Term Care Reimbursement Plan (the Plan). The Plan is created by the federal Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS). CMS (formerly known as the Health Care Financing Administration) is a federal agency within the Department of Health and Human Services. CMS is responsible for administering the Medicare and Medicaid programs, utilizing state agencies for assistance when appropriate. In its PFA filed with the Financial Analysis Unit, Madison Pointe proposed an interim Medicaid rate of $203.50 per patient day (ppd) as part of its budgeted revenues. The projected interim rate was based on Madison Pointe's expected occupancy rate, projected expenses, and allowable costs. The projected rate was higher than the previous owner's actual rate in large part based on Madison Pointe's anticipation of pending legislative action concerning Medicaid reimbursement issues. That is, Madison Pointe projected higher spending and allowable costs based on expected increases proposed in the upcoming legislative session. Legislative Changes to the Medicaid Reimbursement System During the 2007 Florida Legislative Session, the Legislature addressed the status of Medicaid reimbursement for long-term care facilities. During that session, the Legislature enacted the 2007 Appropriations Act, Chapter 2007-72, Laws of Florida. The industry proposed, and the Legislature seemed to accept, that it was necessary to rebase nursing homes in the Medicaid program. Rebasing is a method employed by the Agency periodically to calibrate the target rate system and adjust Medicaid rates (pursuant to the amount of funds allowed by the Legislature) to reflect more realistic allowable expenditures by providers. Rebasing had previously occurred in 1992 and 2002. The rebasing would result in a "step-up" in the Medicaid rate for providers. In response to a stated need for rebasing, the 2007 Legislature earmarked funds to address Medicaid reimbursement. The Legislature passed Senate Bill 2800, which included provisions for modifying the Plan as follows: To establish a target rate class ceiling floor equal to 90 percent of the cost- based class ceiling. To establish an individual provider- specific target floor equal to 75 percent of the cost-based class ceiling. To modify the inflation multiplier to equal 2.0 times inflation for the individual provider-specific target. (The inflation multiplier for the target rate class ceiling shall remain at 1.4 times inflation.) To modify the calculation of the change of ownership target to equal the previous provider's operating and indirect patient care cost per diem (excluding incentives), plus 50 percent of the difference between the previous providers' per diem (excluding incentives) and the effect class ceiling and use an inflation multiplier of 2.0 times inflation. The Plan was modified in accordance with this legislation with an effective date of July 1, 2007. Four relevant sentences from the modified Plan are relevant to this proceeding, to wit: For a new provider with no cost history resulting from a change of ownership or operator, where the previous provider participated in the Medicaid program, the interim operating and patient care per diems shall be the lesser of: the class reimbursement ceiling based on Section V of this Plan, the budgeted per diems approved by AHCA based on Section III of this Plan, or the previous providers' operating and patient care cost per diem (excluding incentives), plus 50% of the difference between the previous providers' per diem (excluding incentives) and the class ceiling. The above new provider ceilings, based on the district average per diem or the previous providers' per diem, shall apply to all new providers with a Medicaid certification effective on or after July 1, 1991. The new provider reimbursement limitation above, based on the district average per diem or the previous providers' per diem, which affects providers already in the Medicaid program, shall not apply to these same providers beginning with the rate semester in which the target reimbursement provision in Section V.B.16. of this plan does not apply. This new provider reimbursement limitation shall apply to new providers entering the Medicaid program, even if the new provider enters the program during a rate semester in which Section V.B.16 of this plan does not apply. [The above cited sentences will be referred to herein as Plan Sentence 1, Plan Sentence 2, etc.] Madison Pointe's Projected Medicaid Rate Relying on the proposed legislation, including the proposed rebasing and step-up in rate, Madison Pointe projected an interim Medicaid rate of $203.50 ppd for its initial year of operation. Madison Pointe's new projected rate assumed a rebasing by the Legislature to eliminate existing targets, thereby, allowing more reimbursable costs. Although no legislation had been passed at that time, Madison Pointe's consultants made calculations and projections as to how the rebasing would likely affect Petitioners. Those projections were the basis for the $203.50 ppd interim rate. The projected rate with limitations applied (i.e., if Madison Pointe did not anticipate rebasing or believe the Plan revisions applied) would have been $194.26. The PFA portion of Madison Pointe's CHOP application was submitted to AHCA containing the $203.50 ppd interim rate. The Financial Analysis Unit, as stated, is responsible for, inter alia, reviewing PFAs submitted as part of a CHOP application. In the present case, Ryan Fitch was the person within the Financial Analysis Unit assigned responsibility for reviewing Madison Pointe's PFA. Fitch testified that the purpose of his review was to determine whether the applicant had projected sufficient monetary resources to successfully operate the facility. This would include a contingency fund (equal to one month's anticipated expenses) available to the applicant and reasonable projections of cost and expenses versus anticipated revenues.2 Upon his initial review of the Madison Pointe PFA, Fitch determined that the projected Medicaid interim rate was considerably higher than the previous operator's actual rate. This raised a red flag and prompted Fitch to question the propriety of the proposed rate. In his omissions letter to the applicant, Fitch wrote (as the fourth bullet point of the letter), "The projected Medicaid rate appears to be high relative to the current per diem rate and the rate realized in 2006 cost reports (which includes ancillaries and is net of contractual adjustments). Please explain or revise the projections." In response to the omissions letter, Laura Wilson, a health care accountant working for Madison Pointe, sent Fitch an email on June 27, 2008. The subject line of the email says, "FW: Omissions Letter for 11 CHOW applications."3 Then the email addressed several items from the omissions letter, including a response to the fourth bullet point which says: Item #4 - Effective July 1, 2007, it is anticipated that AHCA will be rebasing Medicaid rates (the money made available through elimination of some of Medicaid's participation in covering Medicare Part A bad debts). Based on discussions with AHCA and the two Associations (FHCA & FAHSA), there is absolute confidence that this rebasing will occur. The rebasing is expected to increase the Medicaid rates at all of the facilities based on the current operator's spending levels. As there is no definitive methodology yet developed, the rebased rates in the projections have been calculated based on the historical methodologies that were used in the 2 most recent rebasings (1992 and 2002). The rates also include the reestablishment of the 50% step-up that is also anticipated to begin again. The rebasing will serve to increase reimbursement and cover costs which were previously limited by ceilings. As noted in Note 6 of the financials, if something occurs which prevents the rebasing, Management will be reducing expenditures to align them with the available reimbursement. It is clear Madison Pointe's projected Medicaid rate was based upon proposed legislative actions which would result in changes to the Plan. It is also clear that should those changes not occur, Madison Pointe was going to be able to address the shortfall by way of reduced expenditures. Each of those facts was relevant to the financial viability of Madison Pointe's proposed operations. Madison Pointe's financial condition was approved by Fitch based upon his review of the PFA and the responses to his questions. Madison Pointe became the new licensed operator of the facility. That is, the Long-Term Care Unit deemed the application to have met all requirements, including financial ability to operate, and issued a license to the applicant. Subsequently, MPA provided to Madison Pointe its interim Medicaid rate. MPA advised Madison Pointe that its rate would be $194.55 ppd, some $8.95 ppd less than Madison Pointe had projected in its PFA (but slightly more than Madison Pointe would have projected with the 50 percent limitation from Plan Sentence 1 in effect, i.e., $194.26). The PFA projected 25,135 annual Medicaid patient days, which multiplied by $8.95, would equate to a reduction in revenues of approximately $225,000 for the first year of operation.4 MPA assigned Madison Pointe's interim Medicaid rate by applying the provisions of the Plan as it existed as of the date Madison Pointe's new operating license was issued, i.e., September 1, 2007. Specifically, MPA limited Madison Pointe's per diem to 50 percent of the difference between the previous provider's per diem and the applicable ceilings, as dictated by the changes to the Plan. (See Plan Sentence 1 set forth above.) Madison Pointe's projected Medicaid rate in the PFA had not taken any such limitations into account because of Madison Pointe's interpretation of the Plan provisions. Specifically, that Plan Sentence 3 applies to Madison Pointe and, therefore, exempts Madison Pointe from the new provider limitation set forth in Plan Sentences 1 and 2. However, Madison Pointe was not "already in the Medicaid program" as of July 1, 2007, as called for in Plan Sentence 3. Rather, Madison Pointe's commencement date in the Medicaid program was September 1, 2007. Plan Sentence 1 is applicable to a "new provider with no cost history resulting from a change of ownership or operator, where the previous operator participated in the Medicaid program." Madison Pointe falls within that definition. Thus, Madison Pointe's interim operating and patient care per diems would be the lesser of: (1) The class reimbursement ceiling based on Section V of the Plan; (2) The budgeted per diems approved by AHCA based on Section III of the Plan; or (3) The previous provider's operating and patient care cost per diem (excluding incentives), plus 50 percent of the difference between the previous provider's per diem and the class ceiling. Based upon the language of Plan Sentence 1, MPA approved an interim operating and patient care per diem of $194.55 for Madison Pointe. Plan Sentence 2 is applicable to Madison Pointe, because it applies to all new providers with a Medicaid certification effective after July 1, 1991. Madison Pointe's certification was effective September 1, 2007. Plan Sentence 3 is the primary point of contention between the parties. AHCA correctly contends that Plan Sentence 3 is not applicable to Petitioner, because it addresses rebasing that occurred on July 1, 2007, i.e., prior to Madison Pointe coming into the Medicaid system. The language of Plan Sentence 3 is clear and unambiguous that it applies to "providers already in the Medicaid program." Plan Sentence 4 is applicable to Madison Pointe, which entered the system during a rate semester, in which no other provider had a new provider limitation because of the rebasing. Again, the language is unambiguous that "[t]his new provider reimbursement limitation shall apply to new providers entering the Medicaid program. . . ." Madison Pointe is a new provider entering the program. Detrimental Reliance and Estoppel Madison Pointe submitted its CHOP application to the Long-Term Care Unit of AHCA for approval. That office has the clear responsibility for reviewing and approving (or denying) CHOP applications for nursing homes. The Long-Term Care Unit requires, as part of the CHOP application, submission of the PFA which sets forth certain financial information used to determine whether the applicant has the financial resources to operate the nursing home for which it is applying. The Long-Term Care Unit has another office within AHCA, the Financial Analysis Unit, to review the PFA. The Financial Analysis Unit is found within the Bureau of Health Facility Regulation. That Bureau is responsible for certificates of need and other issues, but has no authority concerning the issuance, or not, of a nursing home license. Nor does the Financial Analysis Unit have any authority to set an interim Medicaid rate. Rather, the Financial Analysis Unit employs certain individuals who have the skills and training necessary to review financial documents and determine an applicant's financial ability to operate. A nursing home licensee must obtain Medicaid certification if it wishes to participate in the program. Madison Pointe applied for Medicaid certification, filing its application with a Medicaid intermediary which works for CMS. The issuance of a Medicaid certification is separate and distinct from the issuance of a license to operate. When Madison Pointe submitted its PFA for review, it was aware that an office other than the Long-Term Care Unit would be reviewing the PFA. Madison Pointe believed the two offices within AHCA would communicate with one another, however. But even if the offices communicated with one another, there is no evidence that the Financial Analysis Unit has authority to approve or disapprove a CHOP application. That unit's sole purpose is to review the PFA and make a finding regarding financial ability to operate. Likewise, MPA--which determines the interim Medicaid rate for a newly licensed operator--operates independently of the Long-Term Care Unit or the Financial Analysis Unit. While contained within the umbrella of AHCA, each office has separate and distinct duties and responsibilities. There is no competent evidence that an applicant for a nursing home license can rely upon its budgeted interim rate--as proposed by the applicant and approved as reasonable by MPA--as the ultimate interim rate set by the Medicaid Program Analysis Office. At no point in time did Fitch tell Madison Pointe that a rate of $203.50 ppd would be assigned. Rather, he said that the rate seemed high; Madison Pointe responded that it could "eliminate expenditures to align them with the available reimbursement." The interim rate proposed by the applicant is an estimate made upon its own determination of possible facts and anticipated operating experience. The interim rate assigned by MPA is calculated based on the applicant's projections as affected by provisions in the Plan. Furthermore, it is clear that Madison Pointe was on notice that its proposed interim rate seemed excessive. In response to that notice, Madison Pointe did not reduce the projected rate, but agreed that spending would be curtailed if a lower interim rate was assigned. There was, in short, no reliance by Madison Pointe on Fitch's approval of the PFA as a de facto approval of the proposed interim rate. MPA never made a representation to Madison Pointe as to the interim rate it would receive until after the license was approved. There was, therefore, no subsequent representation made to Madison Pointe that was contrary to a previous statement. The Financial Analysis Unit's approval of the PFA was done with a clear and unequivocal concern about the propriety of the rate as stated. The approval was finalized only after a representation by Madison Pointe that it would reduce expenditures if a lower rate was imposed. Thus, Madison Pointe did not change its position based on any representation made by AHCA.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by Respondent, Agency for Health Care Administration, approving the Medicaid interim per diem rates established by AHCA and dismissing each of the Amended Petitions for Formal Administrative Hearing. DONE AND ENTERED this 23rd day of February, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. R. BRUCE MCKIBBEN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of February, 2009.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether the Petitioner should be required to pay $300 as workers' compensation reimbursement for medical services provided to a patient.
Findings Of Fact Raulerson is an acute care hospital in Okeechobee, Florida, owned by Okeechobee Hospital, Inc. Raulerson's licensed premises includes the acute care hospital building and an additional building that contains a physical therapy department and an outpatient clinic identified as "Company Care." Company Care provides occupational health and workers' compensation services to employees working for participating employers. The clinic operates as a department of the hospital and is staffed by salaried employees of the hospital. The ambulatory care services provided at the clinic are hospital services pursuant to Florida Administrative Code Rules 59A- 3.065(4) and 59A-3.2085(7). The Patient suffered a compensable injury on August 4, 2011, and was treated on that date at the Raulerson emergency room. On August 8 and 15, 2011, the Patient went to the Raulerson outpatient clinic for evaluation and to have a non-surgical wound dressing changed or removed. Using a standard hospital billing form known as a UB-04, Raulerson submitted a single $400 bill to the Petitioner. The bill contained a separate $200 charge for each of the two outpatient service dates. The Florida workers' compensation program refers to the UB-04 form as a DFS-F5-DWC-90 form. Although the Petitioner attempted to assert at the hearing that the outpatient services had not been fully authorized, the stipulation filed by the parties prior to the hearing clearly stated that the services were authorized by the Petitioner and that there are no issues of medical necessity presented in this case. The Petitioner declined to pay the bill for the outpatient visits and issued an Explanation of Benefits Review (EOBR) form that provided the following coded explanation for its decision: 64-PAYMENT DISALLOWED: BILLING ERROR: SERVICE "NOT COVERED" UNDER APPLICABLE WORKERS' COMPENSATION REIMBURSEMENT MANUAL. * * * 5218-FACILITY CHARGE FOR TREATMENT ROOM OR CLINIC VISIT HAS BEEN IMPROPERLY BILLED PURSUANT TO NATIONAL UNIFORM BILLING MANUAL GUIDELINES. PROFESSIONAL SERVICES RENDERED FOR FACILITY BASED PHYSICIAN ARE TO BE BILLED ON APPROPRIATE FORM. NO ADDITIONAL REIMBURSEMENT GRANTED FOR FACILITY FEE. The standard billing form used by health care professionals to file for reimbursement of medical claims is a CMS-1500 form (identified as the DFS-F5-DWC-9 form by the Florida workers' compensation program). Essentially, the Petitioner has asserted that Raulerson should have submitted bills for the outpatient services on a professional services billing form rather than on a hospital billing form. The apparent effect of submitting the charges on the hospital billing form rather than the professional services billing form was to increase the reimbursement rate paid for the services. There was no credible evidence that Raulerson's use of the hospital billing form violated any applicable requirements of the Florida workers' compensation program. The Petitioner has previously paid similar claims that were submitted on the UB-04 hospital billing form. Florida Administrative Code Rule 69L-7.501 incorporates by reference, the Florida Workers' Compensation Manual for Hospitals (2006 Edition), which, states, in relevant part, as follows: Section X: Outpatient Reimbursement Reimbursement Amount Except as otherwise provided in this Section, hospital charges for services and supplies provided on an outpatient basis shall be reimbursed at seventy-five percent (75%) of usual and customary charges for medically necessary services and supplies, and shall be subject to verification and adjustment in accordance with Sections XI and XII of this manual. * * * Section XI: Disallowed, Denied and Disputed Charges * * * Physician Services The insurer shall not reimburse a hospital for physician services when billed by the hospital on the hospital billing form. Proper billing and reimbursement of physician services rendered in any location, including inside a hospital, shall be in accordance with the requirements of rules 69L-7.602 and 69L-7.020. Rule 69L-7.602 is the Florida Workers' Compensation Medical Services Billing, Filing and Reporting Rule. Rule 69L-7.602(4)(c) requires that hospitals submit bills using Form DFS-F5-DWC-90 (the hospital billing form). Rule 69L-7.602(4)(b)4.b. states as follows: Outpatient billing--Hospitals shall in addition to filing a Form DFS-F5-DWC-90: Enter the CPT®, HCPCS or workers' compensation unique code and the applicable CPT® or HCPCS modifier code in Form Locator 44 on the Form DFS-F5-DWC-90, when required pursuant to the UB-04 Manual; and Make written entry "scheduled" or "non-scheduled" in Form Locator 80 of Form revision 2006--'Remarks' on the DFS-F5-DWC- 90, when billing outpatient surgery or outpatient surgical services; and Attach an itemized statement with charges based on the facility's Charge Master; and Submit all applicable documentation required pursuant to Rule 69L-7.501, F.A.C.; Bill professional services provided by a physician or recognized practitioner on the Form DFS-F5-DWC-9, regardless of employment arrangement. (emphasis supplied). Rule 69L-7.602(1)(nn) sets forth the following relevant definition: "Recognized Practitioner" means a non- physician health care provider licensed by the Department of Health who works under the protocol of a physician or who, upon referral from a physician, can render direct billable services that are within the scope of their license, independent of the supervision of a physician. The services in this case were provided by an advanced registered nurse practitioner (ARNP), a recognized practitioner as defined by the rule. The coding on the bill submitted to the Petitioner by Raulerson indicated that the services were provided in a clinical setting (Revenue Code 510) by a recognized practitioner (CPT Code 99211). Review of the bill by the Department indicated that the charge for services attributed to "Revenue Code 510" was a "facility fee" rather than a professional services fee. Raulerson did not submit a bill for the professional services provided to the patient on August 8 and 15, 2011, by the ARNP. No specific charges for physician services were included on the bill at issue in this proceeding. Whether rendered on an inpatient or outpatient basis, the provision of hospital-based services routinely entails the services of medical professionals. The evidence failed to establish that Raulerson was legally required to submit a bill for professional services or that the bill at issue in this case should have been submitted on a professional services billing form.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Financial Services, Division of Workers' Compensation, enter a final order affirming the Reimbursement Dispute Determination dated January 20, 2012, wherein the Department directed FFVA Mutual Insurance Company to pay a $300 reimbursement claim filed by Raulerson Hospital. DONE AND ENTERED this 25th day of July, 2012, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S WILLIAM F. QUATTLEBAUM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of July, 2012. COPIES FURNISHED: Julie Jones, CP, FRP, Agency Clerk Department of Financial Services Division of Legal Services 200 East Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0390 Julie Lewis Hauf, Esquire Law Office of Julie Lewis Hauf, P.L. 15880 Summerlin Road, Suite 300 PMB 315 Fort Myers, Florida 33908 Mari H. McCully, Esquire Department of Financial Services Division of Workers' Compensation 200 East Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-4229 Richard M. Ellis, Esquire Rutledge, Ecenia and Purnell, P.A. 119 South Monroe Street, Suite 202 Post Office Box 551 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
Findings Of Fact Background Petitioner, United Health, Inc. (United), is the owner and operator of approximately one hundred and twenty-three nursing homes in thirteen states. In the State of Florida, it owns and operates sixteen nursing homes and one intermediate care facility for the mentally retarded that are licensed by respondent, Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (HRS). At issue in this proceeding are the cost reports and supplemental schedules filed by thirteen nursing home facilities.1 In accordance with Medicaid guidelines, petitioner was required to annually submit cost reports to HRS reflecting its allowable costs in providing Medicaid services to its patients. HRS is designated as the state agency responsible for the administration of Medicaid funds under Title XIX of the Social Security Act. In order to be reimbursed for said costs, the facility was required to show that the costs were in conformity with Federal and State Medicaid reimbursement principles. Those principles are embodied in the Long Term Care Reimbursement Plan (Plan) adopted by the State.2 This document contains the reimbursement methodology to be used for nursing homes who provide Medicaid services. In addition, providers must comply with Health Insurance Manual 15 (HIM-15), a compendium of federal cost reimbursement guidelines utilized by HRS, and generally accepted accounting principles. By letter dated September 9, 1985 petitioner requested that HRS adjust its July 1, 1985 reimbursement rates for the thirteen facilities to reflect certain annualized costs incurred during the preceding fiscal year ending December 31, 1984. According to the letter, the adjustment was appropriate under Section V.B.I.b. of the September 1, 1984 Plan. On October 21, 1985, an HRS Medicaid cost reimbursement analyst issued a letter denying the request on the following grounds: Our review of the information submitted with the fiscal year end 12/31/84 cost reports revealed that the annualized operating and patient care costs were not documented to be new and expanded services or related to licensure and certification requirements. The annualized property cost appeared to be 1 2 various purchases, repairs and maintenance and was not documented to be capital improvements. The denial prompted the instant proceeding. B. Reimbursement Principles In General Under the Medicaid reimbursement plan adopted for use in Florida, nursing homes are reimbursed by HRS on a prospective basis for their allowable costs incurred in providing Medicaid services. This method is commonly referred to as the prospective plan, and has been in use since 1977. Under this concept, a nursing home files with HRS, within ninety days after the close of its fiscal year, a cost report reflecting its actual costs for the immediate preceding fiscal year. Within the next ninety days, the nursing home is given a per diem reimbursement rate (or ceiling) to be used during the following twelve months.3 For example, if a provider's fiscal year ended December 31, 1984, its cost report would be due by March 31, 1985. HRS would then provide estimated reimbursement rates to be used during the period from July 1, 1985 through June 30, 1986. As can be seen, there is a time lag between the end of a cost reporting year and the provider's receiving the new rate. The new reimbursement rate is based upon the provider's actual costs in the preceding fiscal year (reporting period) adjusted upward by an inflation factor that is intended to compensate the provider for cost increases caused by inflation. The prospective plan enables a provider to know in advance what rates it will be paid for Medicaid services during that year rather than being repaid on a retroactive basis. If a provider operates efficiently at a level below the ceiling, it is "rewarded" being allowed to keep a portion of the difference. Conversely, if it exceeds the caps, it is penalized to the extent that it receives only the rates previously authorized by HRS, and must absorb the shortfall. At the same time, it should be noted that the reimbursement rate is not intended to cover all costs incurred by a provider, but only those that are reasonable and necessary in an efficiently operated facility. These unreimbursed costs are covered through other provider resources, or by a future cut in services. When the events herein occurred, there were two types of adjustments allowed under the prospective plan. The first adjustment is the inflation factor, and as noted above, it 3 authorizes the provider to adjust certain reported costs by the projected rate of inflation to offset anticipated cost increases due to inflation. However, because the prospective plan (and the inflation factor) ignores other cost increases that occur during the given year, HRS devised a second type of adjustment for providers to use. This adjustment is known as the gross-up provision, and allows the annualization of certain costs incurred by a provider during a portion of the reporting period. The concept itself .s embodied in subparagraph B.1.b. of Part V of the September 1, 1984 Plan. Its use may be illustrated with the following example. A provider constructs an addition to its facility with an in-service date at the end of the sixth month of the reporting period. By reflecting only the depreciation associated with the addition during the last six months of the reporting period, the facility understates its actual costs, and is reimbursed for only one-half of the facility's depreciation during the following year. Under the gross-up provision the provider grosses up, or annualizes, the reported cost to give it a full year's effect, thereby ensuring that the next year's rates will be more realistic. Although the provision has application to this proceeding, over objection by the nursing home industry it was eliminated from the Plan on October 1, 1985 and is no longer available to providers. At hearing HRS contended the provision should have been eliminated in 1984, but through oversight remained in effect until 1985. However this contention is rejected as not being credible, and is contrary to the greater weight of evidence. Finally, neither party could recall if a request under this provision had ever been filed. They do acknowledge that HRS has never approved such a request during the more than two years when the provision was operative. In addition to the gross-up and inflation provisions, there exists an alternative means for additional rate reimbursement through what is known as the interim rate provision. Under this provision, a provider can request an interim rate increase from HRS during the period when its prospective rates are in effect to cover major unexpected costs. Assuming a request is valid and substantiated, a provider is eligible for immediate cash relief dating back to the date of the actual expense. However, because of HRS' concern that this provision was being "abused", only those costs which exceed $5,000 and cause a change of 1% or more in the total prospective per diem rate are now eligible for reimbursement. These monetary thresholds on interim rate requests became effective September 1, 1984. When these higher thresholds were imposed, HRS made representations to the nursing home industry that a provider could still utilize the gross-up provision to cover other unexpected costs. Finally, it is noted that unlike the prospective rate, an interim rate is cost settled. This means the provider's cost reports are later audited, and excess reimbursements must be repaid to HRS. This differs from the prospective plan where any "overpayments" are not subject to recoupment by HRS. Even so, a provider is limited by the reasonableness and prudent buyer concepts which serve as a check on potential abuse by a provider. The Gross-Up Feature In its relevant form, the gross-up provision was first adopted for use by HRS in its April 1, 1983 Plan.4 It required HRS to: Review and adjust each provider's cost report referred to in A. (1.) as follows: * * * b. to compensate for new and expanded or discontinued services, licensure and certification requirements, and capital improvements which occurred during the reporting year but were not included or totally accounted for in the cost report. This language was incorporated with only minor changes into the September 1, 1984 Plan and is applicable to the cost reports in issue. In its 1984 form, the provision required HRS to review and adjust each provider's cost report as follows: b. To compensate for new and expanded or discontinued services, licensure and certification requirements, and capital improvements not included or totally accounted for in the reporting year. For additional costs to be provided, the provider must furnish adequate supporting documentation. 4 Accordingly, if a cost fits within one of the three categories, HRS is required to adjust a provider's report to compensate it for the expenditure. The April 1, 1983 Plan was negotiated by the nursing home industry and HRS representatives at a meeting in Gainesville, Florida. For this reason, it is commonly referred to as the Gainesville Plan. Through testimony of negotiators who participated at the meeting, it was established that the Plan had three objectives: to give proper payment to nursing homes; to meet state and federal regulations; and to help upgrade care in the nursing homes. At the same time, the negotiators recognized that a prospective plan based on inFla.ion alone overlooked other cost increases that occurred during a given year. Therefore, the gross-up provision was added to the Plan to ensure that providers could estimate (and recoup) their future costs in as accurate a manner as possible, and to bring the plan into compliance with federal guidelines. It was also designed to ensure that a provider did not have to wait an extraordinarily long time for expenses to be recognized. In addition, HRS was hopeful that the gross-up provision would minimize the providers' reliance upon the interim rate feature (which was intended to cover only major items) thereby reducing the agency's overall workload. Indeed, the interim and gross-up features were intended to complement each other, in that one provided immediate relief on major unexpected items while the other provided a means to adjust partial year costs incurred during the reporting period. The implementation of thresholds on the interim rate provision in September, 1984 increased the importance of the gross-up provision to handle smaller items. Therefore, HRS' contention that the interim and gross-up provisions are in conflict is hereby rejected. In order for a cost to be eligible for annualization, it must fall within one of three categories: new or expanded service, a capital improvement, or a cost to meet HRS' licensure and certification requirements. The parties have stipulated that HRS' denial of United's request was based solely upon HRS' perception that the costs did not fall within any of the three categories. The three types of costs within the feature are not defined in the Plan. Testimony from the Plan's negotiators established that the language in the gross-up feature was meant to be construed broadly and to encompass many costs. For this reason, no limitations were written into the Plan. Even so, the provision was not intended to give carte blanche authority to the providers to annualize every partial cost. There is conflicting testimony regarding the meaning of the term "capital improvement" and what expenditures are included within this category. However, Sections 108.1 and 108.2 of HIM-15, of which the undersigned has taken official notice, define a capital item as follows: If a depreciable asset has, at the time of its acquisition, an estimated useful life of at least 2 years and a historical cost of at least $500, its cost must be capitalized, and written off ratably over the estimated useful life of the asset. . . * * * Betterments and improvements extend the life or increase the productivity of an asset as opposed to repairs and maintenance which either restore the asset to, or maintain it at, its normal or expected service life. Repairs and maintenance costs are always allowed in the current accounting period. With respect to the costs of betterments and improvements, the guidelines established in Section 108.1 must be followed, i.e., if the cost of a betterment or improvement to an asset is $500 or more and the estimated useful life of the asset is extended beyond its original estimated life by at least 2 years, or if the productivity of the asset is increased significantly over its original productivity, then the cost must be capitalized. The above guidelines are more credible and persuasive than the limited definition of capital item enunciated at final hearing by HRS personnel. Therefore, it is found that the HIM-15 definition is applicable to the gross-up feature and will be used to determine the validity of petitioner's claim to gross up certain expenditures. There is also conflicting testimony as to what the term "new and expanded or discontinued services" includes. Petitioner construes this item to include any costs that increase the volume of services to a resident. Therefore, petitioner posits that an increase in staffing which likewise increases services to residents is subject to annualization. Conversely, HRS construes the term to cover any costs for new or expanded services that enable a facility to provide patients with services not previously provided or to expand an existing service to more patients in the facility. The latter definition is more credible and persuasive and will be used by the undersigned in evaluating petitioner's request. Finally, petitioner interprets the term "licensure and certification requirements" to cover any costs incurred to meet staffing requirements that are required by HRS rules. According to petitioner, the category would include expenditures that are made for so-called preventive maintenance purposes and to avoid HRS sanctions. On the other hand, HRS construes the language to cover costs incurred by a provider to either meet a new licensure and certification requirement, or to correct a cited deficiency. It also points out that salary increases were intended to be covered by the inflation factor rather than through this feature of the plan. This construction of the term is more reasonable, and is hereby accepted as being the more credible and persuasive. Petitioner's Request Petitioner's fiscal year ends on December 31. According to HRS requirements its cost reports must be filed by the following March 31. In accordance with that requirement petitioner timely filed its December 31, 1984 cost reports for the thirteen facilities on or before March 31, 1985. The reports have been received into evidence as petitioner's composite exhibit 3. Attached to the reports were schedules supporting a request for gross-up of certain capital items, additions and deletions of various personnel, and union salary increases that exceeded the inflation rate. The parties have not identified the actual dollar value of the items since only the concepts are in issue. In preparing the supporting schedules, United's assistant director of research reviewed all so-called capital items purchased by the thirteen facilities during the fiscal year, and determined which were purchased after the beginning of the year.5 He then calculated the depreciation on those 5 expenditures made after the beginning of the year and has included those amounts on the supporting schedules to be annualized. Consistent with the definition contained in Sections 108.1 and 108.2 of HIM-15, those items that are in excess of $500 (after annualization), that extend the useful life of the asset for two years or more, or that increase or extend the productivity of the asset are subject to annualization. It should be noted that repairs and maintenance items, as defined in Sections 108.1 and 108.2, are excluded from this category. Petitioner next seeks to adjust its rates by grossing up the net increase in costs associated with additions and deletions of various staff during the reporting period. Any net staffing additions that provide patients with services not previously provided or that expand an existing service to more patients in a given facility are properly subject to the gross- up provision. All others should be denied. Petitioner also contends that these costs should be considered as a licensure and certification requirement since they satisfy staffing requirements under HRS rules. To the extent the filling of old positions occurred, such expenditures are appropriately covered by the gross-up provision. The remainder do not fall within the purview of the provision. Finally, petitioner seeks to adjust its rates to cover all salary increases over and above the inflation factor that were awarded to union employees pursuant to its union contract. Under petitioner's theory, if such costs were not paid, United stood to lose staff through a strike which in turn could result in licensure and certification problems. But these concerns are speculative in nature, and such an interpretation would result in automatic approval of any salary increase called for by a union contract, no matter how unreasonable it might be. Since the expenditures do not meet the previously cited criteria, they must be denied.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED: That petitioner's request to have its July 1, 1985 reimbursement rates adjusted for thirteen facilities to reflect annualized costs as submitted on supplemental schedules with its 1984 cost reports be approved in part, as set forth in the conclusions of law portion of this order. The remaining part of its request should be DENIED. DONE AND ORDERED this 31st day of October, 1986, in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of October, 1986.
The Issue The issues to be determined are: whether Petitioners have standing; whether the petition of Automated HealthCare Solutions, Inc. (AHCS), was timely filed1/; and whether Respondent’s proposed rules 69L-31.005(2)(d), 69L-31.016(1), and 69L-31.016(2) are invalid exercises of delegated legislative authority on the grounds raised by Petitioners.
Findings Of Fact The Challenged Proposed Rules At issue in the proposed rule challenge proceeding are three provisions that are part of an overall rulemaking exercise by Respondent Department of Financial Services, Division of Workers’ Compensation (Respondent, Department, or Division), to amend Florida Administrative Code Chapter 69L-31. That rule chapter bears the misnomer “Utilization and Reimbursement Dispute Rule”--a misnomer because, rather than a single rule, the chapter currently contains 12 rules, with a history note of one additional rule that was repealed. The existing 12 rules in chapter 69L-31, in effect without amendment since November 2006, carry out the Department’s statutory authority to receive, review, and resolve reimbursement disputes between workers’ compensation insurance carriers (carriers) and providers of health care services, medication, and supplies to injured workers. See § 440.13(7), Fla. Stat. A “reimbursement dispute” is “any disagreement” between a provider and carrier “concerning payment for medical treatment.” § 440.13(1)(q), Fla. Stat. The proposed amendments to chapter 69L-31 include revisions to existing rules, the repeal of one existing rule, and the addition of two new rules. The challenges at issue here are directed to both paragraphs of a newly proposed rule which would become rule 69L-31.016, if adopted. One challenge is also directed to an amendment of an existing rule. Proposed rule 69L-31.016, entitled “Reimbursement Disputes Involving a Contract or Workers’ Compensation Managed Care Arrangement or Involving Compensability or Medical Necessity,” would provide as follows, if adopted: When either the health care provider or carrier asserts that a contract between them establishes the amount of reimbursement to the health care provider, or where the carrier provided health care services to the injured worker through a workers’ compensation managed care arrangement pursuant to Section 440.134, F.S., the Department will not issue a finding that there has been any improper disallowance or adjustment. Instead, the determination will only indicate the reimbursement amount for the treatment established by the appropriate reimbursement schedules, practice parameters, and protocols of treatment in Chapter 440, F.S., to assist the health care provider and carrier in their independent application of the provisions of the contract or workers’ compensation managed care arrangement to resolve the dispute. When the carrier asserts the treatment is not compensable or medically necessary and as a result does not reimburse, the determination will only address line items not related to compensability or medical necessity. If the petitioner has submitted documentation demonstrating the carrier authorized the treatment, the Department will issue a finding of improper disallowance or adjustment. Although these rules were not proposed for adoption until December 2016, Respondent has been implementing an unadopted policy that is consistent with paragraph (1) since August 2015. Respondent also has been implementing an unadopted policy that is similar to paragraph (2) since November 2015. The other object of challenge is the proposed deletion of rule 69L-31.005(2)(d), which currently provides: If the answer to question 5 on the Petition for Resolution of Reimbursement Dispute Form [asking if reimbursement is pursuant to a contract or rate agreement] is yes, [submit] a copy of all applicable provision(s) of the reimbursement contract. Although the evidence was less than clear, it does not appear that Respondent is already implementing this proposed change. The Parties Petitioners and Intervenors all are regular participants (or, in the case of FSASC, an association whose members are regular participants) in provider-carrier reimbursement disputes pursuant to section 440.13(7), Florida Statutes, before the Division. Petitioners represent the provider side of these reimbursement disputes, while Intervenors represent the carrier side of the reimbursement disputes. Petitioner Oak Hill is a private, for-profit hospital that cares for thousands of Florida patients each year, including injured workers. Petitioner Parallon provides revenue cycle services for HCA-affiliated Florida hospitals, including Oak Hill. Among other things, Parallon acts on behalf of the HCA-affiliated hospitals in workers’ compensation claim disputes. Parallon acts on the hospitals’ behalf to resolve reimbursement disputes with carriers, including: acting for the hospitals to resolve reimbursement disputes under chapter 69L-31; coordinating any resultant administrative litigation before DOAH; and taking steps necessary to collect amounts owed following receipt of the Division’s determination. Parallon is expressly authorized to participate in reimbursement disputes as a “petitioner,” as defined in proposed rule 69L-31.003, on behalf of Oak Hill and other HCA-affiliated hospitals. Oak Hill and Parallon are regulated by, and must comply, with the requirements of chapter 69L-31 (which will include the proposed rules, if adopted) in reimbursement disputes with carriers. Petitioner FSASC is the primary organization of ambulatory surgical centers (ASCs) in Florida. Among the purposes of the FSASC is to advance the ASC industry, and its member centers’ interests, through governmental advocacy. To that extent, the FSASC maintains close contact with state agencies to monitor and provide input into legislation and regulations that govern or affect ASC operations. In furtherance of this role, the FSASC has been an active participant in all phases of Respondent’s rulemaking efforts with regard to the proposed rules. Another purpose of the FSASC is to promote, assist, and enhance its members’ ability to provide ambulatory surgical services to injured workers efficiently and cost effectively throughout Florida and, in so doing, promote and protect the interests of the public, patients, and FSASC members. FSASC’s participation in this proceeding is consistent with its purposes, and the relief sought--invalidation of the challenged proposed rules (with possible attorney’s fees incurred in connection with this proceeding)--is appropriate for an organization to pursue in a representative capacity. A substantial number of FSASC’s members provide health care services to patients who are injured workers in Florida and who receive workers’ compensation benefits in accordance with chapter 440. These health care services are reimbursable by the patients’ employers’ carriers. FSASC’s members are participants in reimbursement disputes with carriers and are regulated by, and must comply with, the requirements of chapter 69L-31 (which will include the proposed rules, if adopted). Petitioner AHCS is a technology and prescription medication claims processing company. Many physicians who dispense medication from their offices to injured workers assign their rights, title, and interest to the prescription medication claims to AHCS. Prescription Partners, LLC, is wholly-owned and operated by AHCS and is the billing entity of AHCS. In some instances, AHCS contracts with physicians, while Prescription Partners, LLC, pursues the billing and reimbursement disputes on behalf of the physicians under the contract of assignment. AHCS is authorized to participate in reimbursement disputes as a “petitioner,” as defined in proposed rule 69L-31.003. As a participant in reimbursement disputes, AHCS is regulated by, and must comply with, the requirements of chapter 69L-31 (which will include the proposed rules, if adopted). Respondent is the state agency tasked with administering chapter 440 in a way that promotes “an efficient and self-executing” workers’ compensation system “which is not an economic or administrative burden” and ensures “a prompt and cost-effective delivery of payments.” § 440.015, Fla. Stat. The Division’s medical services section administers the provider-carrier reimbursement dispute process and issues the required determinations pursuant to section 440.13(7). The determinations are made in accordance with chapter 440 and the applicable reimbursement manuals, which are codified as rules. Intervenor Zenith is a foreign, for-profit corporation licensed by the Department to provide workers’ compensation insurance to employers throughout Florida. As a carrier, and in the normal course of its workers’ compensation claim-handling responsibilities, Zenith regularly authorizes, adjusts, and pays for medical benefits for injured workers for causally-related and medically necessary treatment, including treatment rendered by physicians, hospitals, ASCs, pharmacies and prescription drug vendors, physical therapists, and other licensed health care providers, such as Petitioners. As a carrier, Zenith is regulated by chapter 440 and the related rules of the Division, including chapter 69L-31 (which will include the proposed rules, if adopted). All parties stipulated that the challenged proposed rules directly and immediately affect the rights and obligations of Zenith, and directly impact the financial obligations of Zenith in medical bill payment, as well as in any statutory reimbursement dispute between a health care provider and Zenith under section 440.13(7). The proposed rules dictate which processes will govern reimbursement disputes involving Zenith, and whether Zenith may rely fully on the provisions of reimbursement contracts. Intervenors, the Summit Companies, are Florida- licensed monoline workers’ compensation insurance companies that are managed by a managing general agent, Summit Consulting LLC, and regulated by the Department. Pursuant to their workers’ compensation insurance policies, the Summit Companies pay workers’ compensation claims for injured workers, including payment of medical benefits for care provided to injured workers by health care providers who have filed petitions for reimbursement dispute resolution under chapter 69L-31. Also, the Summit Companies have a workers’ compensation managed care arrangement authorized by the Agency for Health Care Administration (AHCA) pursuant to section 440.134. Their delegated managed care entity, Heritage Summit HealthCare, LLC, has its own proprietary PPO network. The Summit Companies, either corporately or through their delegated managed care entity, regularly authorize, adjust, and pay medical benefits for injured workers for causally- related and medically necessary treatment, including payment for treatment rendered by physicians, hospitals, ASCs, pharmacies and prescription drug vendors, physical therapists, and other licensed health care providers, such as Petitioners. All parties stipulated that the challenged proposed rules directly and immediately affect the rights and obligations of the Summit Companies, and directly impact their financial obligations in medical bill payment, as well as in reimbursement disputes under section 440.13(7) and chapter 69L-31. The proposed rules dictate which processes will govern reimbursement disputes involving the Summit Companies, including whether the Summit Companies may rely on their managed care arrangements and contracts regulated under the authority of AHCA. To the same extent that all Intervenors are directly and immediately impacted by the challenged proposed rules, Petitioners Oak Hill, Parallon, and AHCS, as well as the members of Petitioner FSASC, are also directly and immediately impacted by the proposed challenged rules, which govern reimbursement disputes under section 440.13(7). Just as the challenged proposed rules directly and immediately impact Intervenors’ financial obligations in medical bill payment to providers, such as Petitioners, the challenged proposed rules also directly and immediately impact Petitioners’ financial rights in having medical bills paid by carriers, such as Intervenors. The challenged proposed rules dictate what processes will be available in reimbursement disputes, not only for Intervenors, but for Petitioners. The challenged proposed rules dictate when the cost-efficient reimbursement dispute process will be, and will not be, fully available to Petitioners and FSASC’s members, and when the prompt delivery of payment envisioned as the end result of the reimbursement dispute process will, or will not be, available to them. The parties also stipulated that the Division’s challenged proposed rules immediately and substantially affect Intervenors because prior authorization, the managed care defense, provider contract disputes, and medical necessity all have been raised as issues in prior chapter 69L-31 provider disputes with these carriers. It stands to reason that the providers who are on the other side of these disputes with carriers are just as immediately and substantially impacted by the proposed rules in this regard. Reason aside, Respondent readily stipulated to the direct, immediate, and substantial impacts to Intervenors, but steadfastly disputed that Petitioners (or the members of Petitioner FSASC) must necessarily be impacted to the same degree. Yet they are, after all, the other side of the reimbursement dispute coin. It is difficult to understand how one side of a dispute could be directly, immediately, and substantially impacted by proposed rules regulating the dispute process, while the other side of the dispute would not be equally impacted. At hearing, the undersigned raised this seeming incongruity, and suggested that Respondent would need to explain its different positions with regard to the factual predicates for standing for Intervenors and for Petitioners, besides the obvious difference that Intervenors were supporting Respondent’s proposed rules while Petitioners were challenging them. Respondent offered no explanation for its incongruous positions, either at hearing or in its PFO. Respondent’s agreement that Intervenors are immediately, directly, and substantially affected by the challenged proposed rules serves as an admission that Petitioners (or Petitioner FSASC’s members) are also immediately, directly, and substantially affected by the challenged proposed rules. Specific examples were offered in evidence of the Division’s refusal to resolve reimbursement disputes because contracts and managed care arrangements were involved, or because payment was adjusted or disallowed due to compensability or medical necessity issues. FSASC provided a concrete example of the application of the unadopted policies to one of its members, resulting in immediate injury when the Division refused to resolve a reimbursement dispute because a contract was involved. Petitioner Oak Hill identified a single reimbursement dispute over a $49,000 underpayment that remained unresolved because of the Division’s refusal to resolve the dispute because either a contract or managed care arrangement was involved. Petitioner Parallon’s income is based, in part, on paid claims by carriers, so it loses income when these reimbursement disputes are not resolved and the carriers are not ordered to promptly pay an amount. Petitioner AHCS offered examples of reimbursement disputes that the Division refused to resolve because the carrier disallowed or adjusted payment due to compensability or medical necessity issues. AHCS also noted that the incidence of carrier disallowances and adjustments of payment for compensability and medical necessity reasons has increased since the Division stopped making determinations to resolve reimbursement disputes on those issues. At the very least, Petitioners have already been harmed in these ways: by the delay in resolving reimbursement disputes, which includes lost cash flow and the time value of the money that carriers are not ordered to pay; by the increased personnel costs necessary to try some other way to pursue these claims; and by the prospect of court filing fees and attorney’s fees to try to litigate their right to payment when deprived of the statutory mechanism for cost-efficient resolution of reimbursement disputes. Conceivably, providers will not have recourse in court to contest disallowance or adjustment of payment, given Respondent’s exclusive jurisdiction to decide any matters concerning reimbursement. § 440.13(11)(c), Fla. Stat. Meanwhile, carriers immediately benefit from delay, by not being ordered to promptly pay claims. In an annual report addressing reimbursement dispute determinations for the fiscal year from July 1, 2015, through June 30, 2016, the Division reported that in 85.5 percent of its reimbursement dispute determinations, it determined that the health care providers had been underpaid. Overview of Workers’ Compensation Reimbursement Dispute Process Under Florida’s statutory workers’ compensation system, injured workers report their injury to the employer and/or the carrier. With an exception for emergency care, a health care provider must receive authorization for treatment from the carrier prior to providing treatment. After providing treatment, health care providers, including hospitals and physicians, must submit their bills to employers’ carriers; they are prohibited from billing the injured employees who received the treatment. These bills typically have multiple line items, such as for pharmaceutical prescriptions, diagnostic tests, and other services rendered. Carriers are required to review all bills submitted by health care providers to identify overutilization and billing errors, and to determine whether the providers have complied with practice parameters and protocols of treatment established in accordance with chapter 440. § 440.13(6), Fla. Stat. Mr. Sabolic explained that the “protocols of treatment” are the standards of care in section 440.13(15). These include criteria for “[r]easonable necessary medical care of injured employees.” § 440.13(15)(c), Fla. Stat. The carrier review of provider bills must culminate in a determination of whether the bill reflects overutilization of medical services, whether there are billing errors, and whether the bill reflects any violations of the practice parameters and protocols of treatment (standards of care). If a carrier finds any of these to be the case, the carrier is required by statute to disallow or adjust payment accordingly. The carrier is expressly authorized to make this determination “without order of a judge of compensation claims or the department,” if the carrier makes its determination in compliance with section 440.13 and Department rules. § 440.13(6), Fla. Stat. The Department’s rules require carriers to communicate to providers the carriers’ decisions under section 440.13(6) to pay or to deny, disallow, or adjust payment, with reasons for their decisions, in an “explanation of bill review” (EOBR).5/ If a carrier contests or disputes certain line items on a medical bill, the EOBR must identify the line items disputed and the reasons for the dispute, using EOBR codes and code descriptor. The EOBR code list, with 98 codes and descriptors, is set forth in Florida Administrative Code Rule 69L-7.740(13)(b). All but two of the codes describe reasons for disallowing or adjusting payment. EOBR Code 10 means payment denial of the entire bill, when the injury or illness is not compensable. EOBR Code 11 is used for partial denial of payment, where, although there is a compensable injury or illness, a diagnosis or procedure code for a particular line item service is determined by the carrier to be unrelated to the compensable condition. The EOBR coding rule provides that up to three codes can be assigned to each line item to “describe the basis for the claim administrator’s reimbursement decision in descending order of importance[.]” In addition, there is a “free-form” box in which additional notes of explanation may be given. The carrier’s determination to disallow or adjust payment of a health care provider’s bill, made pursuant to section 440.13(6), and explained to the health care provider by means of an EOBR, is the action that sets up a potential reimbursement dispute pursuant to section 440.13(7). “Any health care provider who elects to contest the disallowance or adjustment of payment by a carrier under subsection (6) must, within 45 days after receipt of notice of disallowance or adjustment of payment, petition the department to resolve the dispute.” § 440.13(7)(a), Fla. Stat. (emphasis added). The petition must be accompanied by “all documents and records that support the allegations in the petition.” Id. The carrier whose EOBR is disputed “must” then submit to the Department within 30 days of receipt of the petition all documentation substantiating the carrier’s disallowance or adjustment. § 440.13(7)(b), Fla. Stat. Section 440.13(7)(c) and (d) provide for the culmination of the reimbursement dispute process, as follows: Within 120 days after receipt of all documentation, the department must provide to the petitioner, the carrier, and the affected parties a written determination of whether the carrier properly adjusted or disallowed payment. The department must be guided by standards and policies set forth in this chapter, including all applicable reimbursement schedules, practice parameters, and protocols of treatment, in rendering its determination. If the department finds an improper disallowance or improper adjustment of payment by an insurer, the insurer shall reimburse the health care provider, facility, insurer, or employer within 30 days, subject to the penalties provided in this subsection. (emphasis added). Section 440.13(7)(e) provides that the Department “shall adopt rules to carry out this subsection,” i.e., the reimbursement dispute process. As noted, the Department did so in 2006, in promulgating chapter 69L-31. The rules were transferred from AHCA, which was the state agency vested with the statutory authority to determine reimbursement disputes between providers and carriers until the Department took over those functions in 2005.6/ Evolution of the Policies in the Challenged Proposed Rules Reimbursement Pursuant to a Provider-Carrier Contract or Managed Care Arrangement For approximately a decade, the Division accepted petitions to resolve reimbursement disputes when the reimbursement amount was determined by a contract between the provider and carrier. The Division resolved these disputes by issuing written determinations of whether the carrier properly adjusted or disallowed payment, and if the Division determined the carrier improperly adjusted or disallowed payment, the Division would specify the contract reimbursement amount that the carrier was required to pay within 30 days. That is because section 440.13(12) expressly recognizes that reimbursement to providers shall be either an amount set as the maximum reimbursement allowance (MRA) in fee schedules (or other amount set by a statutory formula), or the agreed-upon contract price.7/ Health care network reimbursement contracts typically do not (but may) include prices stated in dollar amounts. Instead, they frequently establish the price for reimbursement as a percentage of the MRA, or a percentage of allowable charges for services rendered. The Division’s reimbursement manuals in effect today, adopted as rules, recognize in a variety of contexts that the amount a provider is to be reimbursed is the contract amount, when there is a contract between the provider and carrier. The Workers’ Compensation Health Care Provider Reimbursement Manual currently in effect provides this introductory statement: Reimbursement will be made to a Florida health care provider after applying the appropriate reimbursement policies contained in this Manual. A carrier will reimburse a health care provider either the MRA in the appropriate reimbursement schedule or a mutually agreed upon contract price. (emphasis added). Florida Workers’ Compensation Health Care Provider Reimbursement Manual (2016 edition) at 15, adopted and incorporated by reference in rule 69L-7.020, effective July 1, 2017. The manual has dozens of references to reimbursing at the contract price, such as this example for reimbursement for multiple surgeries: Reimbursement for the primary surgical procedure will be the MRA listed in Chapter 3, Part B of this Manual or the agreed upon contract price. Reimbursement for additional surgical procedure(s) will be fifty percent (50%) of the listed MRA in Chapter 3, Part B of this Manual or the agreed upon contract price. * * * Note: If there is an agreed upon contract between the health care provider and the carrier, the contract establishes the reimbursement at a specified contract price. (emphasis added). Id. at 63. Similarly, the ASC reimbursement manual in effect has multiple references to reimbursement at the contract price or contract amount, such as this example for surgical services: For each billed CPT® code listed in Chapter 6 of this Manual, the ASC shall be reimbursed either: The MRA if listed in Chapter 6 of this Manual; or The agreed upon contract price. For each billed CPT® code not listed in Chapter 6 of this Manual, the ASC shall be reimbursed: Sixty percent (60%) of the ASC’s billed charge; or The agreed upon contract price. * * * Note: If there is an agreed upon contract between the ASC and the carrier, the contract establishes the reimbursement at the specified contract price. (emphasis added). Florida Workers’ Compensation Ambulatory Surgical Center Reimbursement Manual (2015 edition) at 17, incorporated by reference in rule 69L-7.020, effective January 1, 2016. See also ASC Manual App. A at 1 (surgical implant MRA is “50% above acquisition cost; amount certified or contract amount.”). The reimbursement manual for hospitals has similar references, including this directive for inpatient services: Except as otherwise provided in this Manual, charges for hospital inpatient services shall be reimbursed according to the Per Diem Fee Schedule provided in this Chapter or according to a mutually agreed upon contract reimbursement agreement between the hospital and the insurer. (emphasis added). Florida Workers’ Compensation Reimbursement Manual for Hospitals (2014 edition) at 15, adopted and incorporated by reference in rule 69L-7.501, effective January 1, 2015. In 2013, the Division submitted a legislative proposal for the Department to consider including in its proposed bill. The Division requested an amendment to section 440.13 to “[r]emove contracted reimbursement from [reimbursement dispute] resolution authority of [the] department.” Jt. Ex. 51 at 1. That proposal did not lead to a statutory change. An example of how the Division resolved reimbursement disputes involving contracts before its recent policy is shown in Exhibit FS1, a “Resolution of Reimbursement Dispute Determination.” According to the document, at issue was a reimbursement dispute regarding a bill for one service, for which the carrier issued an EOBR disallowing payment. The Division’s finding regarding reimbursement was that the contract at issue “provides for reimbursement at the lesser of 90% of billed charges or 90% of the fee schedule.” The Division calculated the contract price and determined that the “total correct reimbursement amount” per the contract was $2,334.60. The determination, issued June 30, 2015, was: The Department of Financial Services, Division of Workers’ Compensation has determined that the petitioner substantiated entitlement to additional reimbursement of disputed services based upon the documentation in evidence and in accordance with the provisions of the Florida Workers’ Compensation Reimbursement Manual [for ASCs], 2011 Edition, Chapter 3, page 26. The respondent shall remit the petitioner the amount of $2,334.60 and provide the Division proof of reimbursement to the petitioner within thirty (30) days of receipt of this notice[.] Ex. FS1 at 2. The evolution was a little different for reimbursement disputes involving workers’ compensation managed care arrangements. Rule 69L-31.015, adopted by the Department in 2006, provided as follows: A health care provider may not elect to contest under Section 440.13(7), F.S., disallowance or adjustment of payment by a carrier for services rendered pursuant to a managed care arrangement. Mr. Sabolic explained that while this rule was in effect, the Division would dismiss petitions that disclosed managed care arrangements. But the rule was repealed in response to a challenge to the rule’s validity. As Mr. Sabolic recalled it, the challenger was Parallon or an individual HCA-affiliated hospital. According to Mr. Sabolic, the Division agreed that it did not have the authority to simply dismiss petitions. The rule history note states that the rule repeal was effective May 22, 2014.8/ For the 15-month period from late May 2014 through late August 2015, the Division accepted reimbursement dispute petitions and resolved the reimbursement disputes, even though a workers’ compensation managed care arrangement was involved, just as it had been doing for years for reimbursement disputes involving contracts. On or about August 24, 2015, the Division changed its policy on issuing determinations when a contract (including a managed care arrangement) was alleged in the petition. In all determinations of reimbursement disputes issued after August 24, 2015, if a contract or managed care arrangement was alleged, the Division stopped making findings regarding the contracted-for reimbursement amount. Instead, the Division started reciting the fee schedule/MRA amount or applicable statutory formula amount, making no determination regarding whether the carrier properly adjusted or disallowed payment, or, if an improper adjustment or disallowance, how much the reimbursement should have been under the contract and how much the carrier was required to reimburse the provider within 30 days. The Division changed the name of the form it used from “Resolution of Reimbursement Dispute Determination” to just “Reimbursement Dispute Determination,” signaling that the Division would no longer be resolving reimbursement disputes involving contracts. Instead, the following language appeared in each such determination: The amount listed above does not apply to any contractual arrangement. If a contractual arrangement exists between the parties, reimbursement should be made pursuant to such contractual arrangement. Exhibit FS3 is an example showing a Division “determination” applying its new policy to a reimbursement dispute petition filed by an ASC member of FSASC. Part IV of the form, “Reimbursement Dispute Policies and Guidelines,” reflects (as did prior determinations) that the reimbursement manual for ASCs, adopted by rule, “sets the policies and reimbursement amounts for medical bills.” As previously noted, the reimbursement manuals set reimbursement amounts at either the MRA/statutory formula or the agreed-upon contract price, consistent with the policy in section 440.13(12)(a). Nonetheless, the Division added a note to the end of part IV: NOTE: This reimbursement determination is limited in scope to standards and policies set forth in chapter 440, Florida Statutes, including all applicable reimbursement schedules, practice parameters, and protocols of treatment. It does not interpret, apply or otherwise take into account any contractual arrangement between the parties governing reimbursement for services provided by health care providers, including any workers’ compensation managed care arrangement under section 440.134, Florida Statutes. Ex. FS3 at 2. Accordingly, even though the determination form reflects that the ASC petitioner met its filing requirements for a reimbursement dispute over a bill for services in the amount of $5,188.00, none of which was paid according to the EOBR, and even though the carrier failed to file a response to the petition, the Division did not make a determination that the carrier improperly disallowed payment or that the petitioner had substantiated entitlement to additional reimbursement in the amount of the agreed-upon contract price, as it had in previous determinations. Instead, the Division set forth the “correct reimbursement” amount that would apply if the MRA applied, while noting that amount would not apply if there was a contractual arrangement providing a different amount. The carrier was not ordered to remit any amount within 30 days. Reimbursement Disputes Involving Issues of Compensability or Medical Necessity Prior to November 2015, the Division resolved reimbursement disputes by determining the issues as framed by the carrier’s actions under section 440.13(6), to disallow or adjust payment of a bill or specific line items in a bill for reasons (codes) in the EOBR, which were contested by the provider in a timely-filed petition under section 440.13(7)(a). The EOBR code list contains one code (code 10) for denial of payment of an entire claim based on non-compensability of an injury or illness. One other code (code 11) is for partial denial of payment, where there is a compensable injury, but a specific line item indicates treatment unrelated to the compensable injury. Five additional codes (codes 21 through 26) apply to disallowed payments for various medical necessity reasons. Fla. Admin. Code R. 69L-7.740(13)(b). Prior to November 2015, the Division resolved reimbursement disputes when the provider timely petitioned to contest the disallowance or adjustment of payment by a carrier, as set forth in the EOBR, including when the EOBR cited compensability and/or medical necessity code(s) as the reason(s) for disallowing or adjusting payment of a provider’s bill. On or about November 2, 2015, the Division changed its policy and no longer addressed in its reimbursement dispute determinations whether a carrier properly or improperly disallowed or adjusted payment for reasons of medical necessity or compensability. Exhibit AH6 is an example of a Division written determination that makes no determination of whether a carrier properly or improperly disallowed payment of a line item based on a medical necessity issue (EOBR Code 24). Instead, the “determination” included this note: Note: The Department will not address any disallowance or adjustment of payment where the basis for the disallowance or adjustment or payment by the carrier involves denial of compensability of the claim or assertion that the specific services provided are not medically necessary. Ex. AH6 at 2. This note has been included in all determinations issued after November 2015, where payment was disallowed or adjusted based on medical necessity or compensability. Rulemaking Process The Division began rule development to incorporate its policy changes in amendments to chapter 69L-31. A Notice of Development of Proposed Rules was published on December 16, 2015. The notice set forth the preliminary text of proposed amendments, including new proposed rule 69L-31.016, entitled “Reimbursement Disputes Involving a Contract or Workers’ Compensation Managed Care Arrangement.” The notice stated that the purpose and effect of proposed rule 69L-31.016 was “to limit the scope of dispute resolutions to compliance with standards under Chapter 440, F.S. and exclude issues of contract interpretation.” The exclusion of disallowed or adjusted payments based on issues of compensability and medical necessity, not mentioned in the statement of purpose and effect, was initially put in rule 69L-31.005, in a paragraph stating that the Department will only address specific EOBR line items where the carrier adjusted or disallowed payment and are disputed by the provider, but then stating that the Department will not address specific EOBR adjustment or disallowance items involving compensability or medical necessity, even if disputed. A rule development workshop was held on January 12, 2016. The Department published a second Notice of Development of Proposed Rules, revising the proposed changes to chapter 69L-31, including both the contract/managed care exclusion and the compensability/medical necessity exclusion. On June 10, 2016, the Division held a second rule development workshop addressing the proposed rule revisions. On December 7, 2016, the Division published a Notice of Proposed Rules, formally initiating rulemaking to revise chapter 69L-31. The notice set forth a revised proposed rule 69L-31.016. Its new title was “Reimbursement Disputes Involving a Contract or Workers’ Compensation Managed Care Arrangement or Involving Compensability or Medical Necessity,” joining in one rule all of the new exceptions, for which the Division would not be making determinations of whether carriers properly or improperly adjusted or disallowed payments. As proposed, the rule provided: When either the health care provider or carrier asserts that a contract between them establishes the amount of reimbursement to the health care provider, or where the carrier provided health care services to the injured worker through a workers’ compensation managed care arrangement pursuant to Section 440.134, F.S., the Department will not issue a finding that there has been any improper disallowance or adjustment. Instead, the determination will only indicate the reimbursement amount for the treatment established by the appropriate reimbursement schedules, practice parameters, and protocols of treatment under Chapter 440, F.S., to assist the health care provider and carrier in their independent application of the provisions of the contract or workers’ compensation managed care arrangement to resolve the dispute. When the carrier asserts the treatment is not compensable or medically necessary and as a result does not reimburse, the Department will not issue a finding that there has been any improper disallowance or adjustment. Instead, the determination will only indicate the reimbursement amount for the treatment established by the appropriate reimbursement schedules, practice parameters, and protocols of treatment under Chapter 440, F.S., should compensability or medical necessity be later established. The stated purpose of proposed rule 69L-31.016 was to specify “that the scope of Department determinations involving reimbursement disputes is limited to findings relating to reimbursement schedules, practice parameters, and protocols of treatment, and [to clarify] that the Department will issue no findings regarding an improper disallowance or adjustment in reimbursement involving managed care contracts or when the carrier asserts that medical treatment was either not compensable or not medically necessary[.]” Jt. Ex. 3. As published in December 2016, proposed rule 69L- 31.016 cited sections 440.13(7)(e) and 440.591 as the “rulemaking authority,” and sections 440.13(7) and (12)(a) and 440.134(15) as the “laws implemented.” The Division’s notice stated that, based on its determinations as to adverse impact and regulatory costs: “A SERC has not been prepared by the Agency.” Jt. Ex. 3. By letter dated December 28, 2016, Parallon proposed a LCRA to the proposed rule 69L-31.016(1) (and to other proposed rules not at issue in this proceeding). The LCRA explained that Parallon was already experiencing increased costs because of the Division’s unadopted policy, and Parallon proposed that the most appropriate lower cost alternative to accomplish the statutory objectives was not to adopt proposed rule 69L-31.016(1). On January 5, 2017, the Division held a public hearing on the proposed rules. Petitioners (through counsel) offered comments in opposition to the proposed rules. Parallon’s counsel also submitted the LCRA letter into the record. On May 2, 2017, the Division published a Notice of Correction. The notice stated that, contrary to the statement in the Notice of Proposed Rules, SERCs had been prepared for the proposed rules, and that the SERC for proposed rule 69L-31.016 now had been revised to address the LCRA. The impression given by the various documents identified as a SERC or revised SERC, half of which are entitled “Department of Financial Services Analysis to Determine if a [SERC] is Required,” all of which are similar or identical in content, and none of which bear a date, is that, prior to the LCRA, Respondent did not prepare a SERC for proposed rule 69L- 31.016; it prepared a document by which it determined that no SERC was required. After the LCRA was filed, Respondent added a reference to the LCRA, but otherwise did not change the content of its non-SERC. In the Notice of Correction, the Division stated: “The [SERC] for each of the above-referenced proposed rules is available by accessing the Department’s website at http://www.myfloridacfo.com/Division/WC/noticesRules.htm.” The document titled “Department of Financial Services Analysis to Determine if Statement of Estimated Regulatory Costs Is Required,” referred to by the Division as the SERC, was not available on the DFS website on May 2, 2017, as the Notice of Correction indicated. Instead, it was available at the referenced website location on or after May 3, 2017. Upon request by counsel for Parallon on May 3, 2017, the document referred to as a SERC was also provided to Parallon. Mr. Sabolic testified that the document referred to as the SERC was actually available at the Division on May 2, 2017, and would have been made available to someone if it was requested on that day. However, the noticed means by which the document would be “made available” was at a specific website location that was not functional until May 3, 2017. The so-called SERC document for proposed rule 69L- 31.016 suffers from several obvious deficiencies. As to the Division’s “economic analysis,” the document states: “N/A.” That is because the Division did no economic analysis.9/ In response to two separate prompts, for the Division to set forth a “good faith estimate of the number of individuals and entities likely to be required to comply with the rule,” and separately, to give a “general description of the types of individuals likely to be affected by the rule,” the Division gave the identical response: “This Rule changes how the Medical Services Section review Petitions for Resolution of Reimbursement Disputes. Only the Medical Services Section will be required to comply.” In addition, the document indicates (with no explanation or analysis) that there will be no transactional costs to persons required to comply with the new rule, and no adverse impact at all on small businesses. In contrast to the so-called SERC document indicating that only the medical services section will be required to comply with, or be impacted by, the proposed rule, in the Division’s 2013 legislative proposal seeking to remove its statutory authority to determine reimbursement disputes involving contracts, the Division was able to identify persons who would be affected by the proposal, acknowledging as follows: “Workers’ compensation carriers, including self- insurers (DFS Div. of Risk Mgmt), third party administrators, and health care providers, including facilities, are affected.” And, of course, the Division was well aware by May 2017 of the variety of providers and carriers expressing their interests and concerns during the rule development that had been ongoing for 17 months by then. To say that the Division gave the SERC task short shrift would be generous. The Division did not take this task seriously. The so-called SERC document also identified the Parallon LCRA. In response to the requirement to describe the LCRA and provide either a statement adopting it or a statement “of the reasons for rejecting the alternative in favor of the proposed rule,” the Division stated: Parallon’s lower cost regulatory alternative consisted of a cost-based argument against the adoption of the proposed rule on the basis that the existing rule provides a lower cost alternative. The Division rejected the regulatory alternative and intends to move forward with adoption on the proposed rule, but will revise the proposed rule to read as follows[.] Jt. Ex. 12, at bates-stamp p. 48. The reference to a revision to the proposed rule does not belong in the statement of reasons for rejecting the LCRA. Its placement there was misleading, as if the revision to the proposed rule helped to explain why the Division rejected the LCRA. But no revision was made to the rule to which the LCRA was directed--proposed rule 69L-31.016(1). The revision was to proposed rule 69L- 31.016(2), not addressed by the LCRA. At hearing, Mr. Sabolic attempted to provide the statement of reasons for rejecting the LCRA, missing in the so- called SERC document. He said that the cost-based argument was considered speculative and lacked data (but that explanation was not in the so-called SERC document). Although he thought that the SERC document stated that the LCRA was rejected because it was based on a “faulty” cost-based argument, the word “faulty” was not in the SERC. On its face, the SERC offers no reason why the “cost-based argument” was rejected— just that it was rejected. The amendment to proposed rule 69L-31.016(2) mentioned in the SERC document was also published on May 2, 2017, in a Notice of Change. The change was shown as follows: When the carrier asserts the treatment is not compensable or medically necessary and as a result does not reimburse, the Department will not issue a finding that there has been any improper disallowance or adjustment. Instead, the determination will only address line items not related to indicate the reimbursement amount for the treatment established by the appropriate reimbursement schedules, practice parameters, and protocols of treatment under Chapter 440, F.S., should compensability or medical necessity be later established. If the petitioner has submitted documentation demonstrating the carrier authorized the treatment, the Department will issue a finding of improper disallowance or adjustment. The Notice of Change did not change either of the other challenged provisions—proposed rule 69L-31.016(1) and the proposed deletion of rule 69L-31.005(2)(d). The Notice of Change deleted the prior citation to section 440.13(12)(a) as one of the laws implemented by proposed rule 69L-31.016, leaving only sections 440.13(7) and 440.134(15) as the laws implemented. Division’s Justifications for the Challenged Proposed Rules Mr. Sabolic was Respondent’s hearing representative and sole witness to explain and support the challenged rules. Mr. Sabolic testified that when a contract dictates the reimbursement amount, the Division does not believe it has statutory authority to interpret or enforce contract terms. Yet he acknowledged that the Division’s reimbursement determinations were required to be based on policies set forth in chapter 440, and that the Division was required to apply its reimbursement manuals that are promulgated as rules. Both chapter 440 and the reimbursement manuals expressly require reimbursement at the agreed-upon contract price, as detailed above. The Division recognized this for a decade, during which it applied chapter 440 and its reimbursement manuals to determine the agreed-upon contract price, resolve reimbursement disputes, and order carriers to pay the amount required by their contracts. The Division’s rationale stands in stark contrast to the Division’s 2013 request for a legislative amendment to remove its statutory authority to determine reimbursement disputes when reimbursement is dictated by contracts. The Division’s request constitutes an admission that it believes it has the statutory authority it now says it lacks. Apart from statutory authority, Mr. Sabolic indicated that in the decade during which the Division did resolve reimbursement disputes involving contracts, it was sometimes difficult to determine whether there was a contract in effect between the parties. There was a variety of contracts, and sometimes they were complex. With regard to managed care arrangements, Mr. Sabolic said that, similar to contracts, the Division does not think it has the power to interpret or enforce managed care arrangements, because that power lies within AHCA under section 440.134. He said that section 440.134(15) was cited as a law implemented by proposed rule 69L-31.016 because the statute addresses grievance or complaint procedures under a managed care arrangement. Intervenors Summit Companies attempted to prove that providers are required to resolve reimbursement disputes involving workers’ compensation managed care arrangements by using the grievance process described in section 440.134(15). The evidence failed to support that contention. The evidence showed that the grievance form used by the Summit Companies’ managed care arrangement, approved by AHCA, describes the grievance process as encompassing “dissatisfaction with medical care issues provided by or on behalf of a workers’ compensation managed care arrangement.” Tr. 323. As confirmed by the definitions of “complaint” and “grievance” in the workers’ compensation managed care law, the grievance process is used to resolve an injured worker’s dissatisfaction with an insurer’s managed care arrangement, including a refusal to provide medical care or the care provided. See § 440.134(1)(b) and (d), Fla. Stat. Although under AHCA’s rules and the Summit Companies’ form, providers may initiate the grievance process, they would be doing so essentially on behalf of the injured worker or in tandem with the injured worker to resolve the injured worker’s dissatisfaction with medical care issues. When the issue is the insurer’s refusal to provide medical care, the grievance process is an administrative remedy for the injured worker that has to be exhausted before an injured worker can file a petition for benefits pursuant to section 440.192. Not surprisingly, providers have not attempted to file grievances to raise reimbursement disputes with insurers, as nothing in section 440.134(15), the rules, or the Summit Companies’ approved form contemplate use of the process for that purpose, much less mandate it. Strangely, Mr. Sabolic attempted to justify the proposed rule’s carve-outs from the reimbursement dispute process by reference to section 440.13(11)(c), which gives the Department “exclusive jurisdiction to decide any matters concerning reimbursement[.]” As he put it: I think that the statute indicates we can decide any matter relating to reimbursement under 440.13(11)(c), and that’s how we’re deciding to deal with those situations when a managed care arrangement or a contract is involved. That’s our decision. Our decision is that that determination’s going to reflect the amount that is in the applicable reimbursement manual for that service date. Tr. 232. It must be noted that section 440.13(11)(c) was not cited as one of the laws implemented by the proposed rules, even if the premise could be accepted that a grant of exclusive jurisdiction to decide any matter concerning reimbursement includes authority to decide never to decide certain matters concerning reimbursement. Mr. Sabolic admitted that under proposed rule 69L-31.016(1), the Division does not and will not issue a written determination of whether the carrier properly adjusted or disallowed payment when a contract or managed care arrangement is involved. Mr. Sabolic testified that the proposed deletion of rule 69L-31.005(2)(d) (requiring a copy of the contract or managed care arrangement addressing reimbursement) is tied to proposed rule 69L-31.016(1) that gets the Division out of the business of looking at contracts. The Division will not require any proof that a contract or managed care arrangement governs reimbursement so as to trigger the no-decision decision. Instead, if either a provider indicates in its petition or a carrier indicates in its response that reimbursement is pursuant to a contract or managed care arrangement, that ends the inquiry, and the Division will not determine whether the carrier properly adjusted or disallowed payment. Mr. Sabolic said that he was not concerned with the potential for abuse, because in the decade when the Division was in the business of interpreting and applying reimbursement provisions in contracts, it was very rare that the parties disagreed on whether a contract was in effect between them that governed reimbursement. Mr. Sabolic offered no justification for carving out from reimbursement disputes carrier adjustments or disallowances of payment based on compensability or medical necessity issues. He just reported the Division’s decision that if a carrier disallows or adjusts payment for line items on bills and cites reasons (EOBR codes) involving compensability or medical necessity, “we will indicate that we’re not going to issue a determination on those line items and [we will] only issue a determination on those line items which don’t reflect the carrier’s disallowance related to compensability or medical necessity.” But if the petitioner gives “proof that the carrier authorized treatment,” the Division “will proceed with rendering a determination related to those line items.” Tr. 197. The Division’s determinations under proposed rules 69L-31.016(1) (when a contract or managed care arrangement is alleged) and 69L-31.016(2) (when payment is disallowed or adjusted for compensability or medical necessity reasons) are characterized by the Division as “neutral determinations” in which there is no winner and no loser. A more fitting characterization is “non-determination.”
The Issue The issues are whether proposed and existing Florida Administrative Code rules, both numbered 59G-6.030, are valid exercises of delegated legislative authority.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioners are 120 hospitals--some not-for-profit, some for-profit, and some governmental--that are licensed under chapter 395, Florida Statutes, provide both inpatient and outpatient services, and participate in the Medicaid program. AHCA is the state agency authorized to make payments for services rendered to Medicaid patients. Before 2013, all Medicaid outpatient services were provided and paid fee-for-service. Under the fee-for-service model, hospitals submit claims to AHCA, and AHCA reimburses the hospitals based on the established rate. For many years, AHCA has set prospective Medicaid fee- for-service reimbursement rates for outpatient hospital services, either semi-annually or annually, based on the most recent complete and accurate cost reports submitted by each hospital; has re-published the Florida Title XIX Hospital Outpatient Reimbursement Plan (Outpatient Plan) that explained how the rates were determined; and has adopted the current Outpatient Plan by reference in rule 59G-6.030. In 2005, the Florida Legislature’s General Appropriations Act (GAA) stated that the funds appropriated for Medicaid outpatient hospital services reflected a cost savings of $16,796,807 “as a result of modifying the reimbursement methodology for outpatient hospital rates.” It instructed AHCA to “implement a recurring methodology in the Title XIX Outpatient Hospital Reimbursement Plan that may include, but is not limited to, the inflation factor, variable cost target, county rate ceiling or county ceiling target rate to achieve the cost savings.” AHCA responded by amending the Outpatient Plan to provide: “Effective July 1, 2005, a recurring rate reduction shall be established until an aggregate total estimated savings of $16,796,807 is achieved each year. This reduction is the Medicaid Trend Adjustment.” The amended Outpatient Plan was then adopted by reference in rule 59G-6.030, effective July 1, 2005. AHCA collaborated with the hospitals to determine how to accomplish the legislatively mandated reduction in a manner that would be fair to all the hospitals. It was decided to take the hospitals’ unaudited cost reports from the most recent complete fiscal year and the number of Medicaid occasions of service from the monthly report of AHCA’s Medicaid fiscal agent that corresponded to the hospitals’ fiscal years, and use an Excel spreadsheet program with a function called Goal Seek to calculate proportionate rate adjustments for each hospital to achieve the legislatively mandated aggregate savings. The resulting rate adjustments were incorporated in the hospital reimbursement rates, effective July 1, 2005. In 2006, there was no further Medicaid Trend Adjustment (MTA) reduction. However, in accordance with the instructions in the 2005 GAA, the 2005 MTA reduction of $16,796,807 was treated as a recurring reduction and was applied again in the 2006 Outpatient Plan, which again stated: “Effective July 1, 2005, a recurring rate reduction shall be established until an aggregate total estimated savings of $16,796,807 is achieved each year. This reduction is the Medicaid Trend Adjustment.” The 2006 Outpatient Plan also stated: “This recurring reduction, called the Medicaid Trend Adjustment, shall be applied proportionally to all rates on an annual basis.” It also came to be known as the first cut or cut 1. It again was applied by taking the hospitals’ most current unaudited cost reports and the corresponding occasions of service from the appropriate monthly report of the fiscal agent, and using the Excel spreadsheets and the Goal Seek function to calculate rate adjustments for each hospital. The cut 1 rate adjustments were incorporated in the hospital reimbursement rates, effective July 1, 2006. In 2007, the GAA stated that the funds appropriated for Medicaid outpatient hospital services were reduced by $17,211,796 “as a result of modifying the reimbursement for outpatient hospital rates, effective July 1, 2008.” This has been referred to as the second cut or cut 2. It instructed AHCA to “implement a recurring methodology in the Title XIX Outpatient Hospital Reimbursement Plan to achieve this reduction.” The 2008 Outpatient Plan again applied the first cut as a recurring reduction and stated that it was to be “applied proportionally to all rates on an annual basis.” It then made the second cut, which was to be “applied to achieve a recurring annual reduction of $17,211,796.” These cuts were again applied by taking the hospitals’ most current unaudited cost reports and the corresponding occasions of service from the appropriate monthly report of the fiscal agent, and using the Excel spreadsheets and the Goal Seek function to calculate rate adjustments for each hospital. The resulting rate adjustments were incorporated in the hospital reimbursement rates, effective July 1, 2008. This process was repeated in subsequent years. The third cut (cut 3) was in 2008; it was a $36,403,451 reduction. The fourth cut (cut 4) was in 2009, during a special session; it was a $19,384,437 reduction; however, per the GAA that made the fourth cut, it was not applied to the rates of certain children’s specialty hospitals, which were excluded from the reduction. In addition, using language similar to what AHCA had been using in the Outpatient Plans, the 2009 GAA stated: “The agency shall reduce individual hospital rates proportionately until the required savings are achieved.” The Legislature enacted cut 5 and cut 6 in 2009 and 2010. However, the GAAs stated that AHCA should not take these cuts if the unit costs before the cuts were equal to or less than the unit costs used in establishing the budget. AHCA determined that cuts 5 and 6 should not be taken. However, cuts 1 through 4 continued to be applied as recurring reductions, and rates were adjusted for cuts 1 through 4 in 2009 and 2010 in the same manner as before. In 2011, the GAA enacted cut 7; it was for $99,045,233 and was added to the previous cuts for all but certain children’s specialty and rural hospitals, which were excluded from the additional reduction. In setting the individual hospitals’ reimbursement rates, AHCA first applied cut 7 in the same manner as cuts 1 through 4. The result was a 16.5 percent rate adjustment for cut 7, which was much higher than for previous cuts. Some of the hospitals pointed this out to AHCA and to the Legislature and its staff. There was lots of discussion, and it was determined that the rate adjustment from cut 7 would be more like what the Legislature was expecting (about 12 percent), if budgeted occasions of service were used, instead of the number from the fiscal agent’s monthly report that corresponded to the most recent cost reports. AHCA agreed to change to budgeted fee-for- service occasions of service for cut 7, with the concurrence of the hospitals and the Legislature and its staff. The year 2011 was also the year the Legislature instituted what became known as the “unit cost cap.” In that year, the Legislature amended section 409.908, Florida Statutes, to provide: “The agency shall establish rates at a level that ensures no increase in statewide expenditures resulting from a change in unit costs effective July 1, 2011. Reimbursement rates shall be as provided in the General Appropriations Act.” § 409.908(23)(a), Fla. Stat. (2011). This part of the statute has not changed. The GAA that year elaborated: In establishing rates through the normal process, prior to including this reduction [cut 7], if the unit cost is equal to or less than the unit cost used in establishing the budget, then no additional reduction in rates is necessary. In establishing rates through the normal process, if the unit cost is greater than the unit cost used in establishing the budget, then rates shall be reduced by an amount required to achieve this reduction, but shall not be reduced below the unit cost used in establishing the budget. “Unit cost” was not defined by statute or GAA. To calculate what it was in 2011, AHCA divided the total dollar amount of Medicaid payments made to hospitals by AHCA by the number of Medicaid occasions of service for all hospitals. The result was $141.51. Since 2011, AHCA has applied the unit cost cap with reference to the 2011 unit cost of $141.51. Since then, AHCA has compared the 2011 unit cost to the current cost, calculated by dividing the total dollar amount of Medicaid payments made to all hospitals by AHCA by the number of Medicaid occasions of service for all hospitals, except in children’s and rural hospitals, to determine whether the unit cost cap would require a further rate reduction, after applying the MTA cuts. Using this comparison, the unit cost cap never has been exceeded, and no further rate adjustments ever have been required. It is not clear why AHCA excluded Medicaid occasions of service for children’s and rural hospitals from the unit cost calculations made after 2011. It could have been because those hospitals were excluded from cut 7 and cut 8. Cut 8 was enacted in 2012; it was for $49,078,485 and was added to the previous cuts for all but certain children’s specialty and rural hospitals, which were excluded from the additional reduction. In 2012, the Legislature specified in the GAA that budgeted occasions of service should be used in calculating the MTA reduction for inpatient hospitals. AHCA always treated inpatient and outpatient MTAs the same, and it viewed the specific legislative direction for the inpatient MTA as guidance and indicative of legislative intent that it should continue to use budgeted occasions of service for the outpatient cut 7 and should also use them for the outpatient cut 8. Again, the hospitals did not object since the result was a higher reimbursement rate. In 2014, the Florida Medicaid program began to transition Medicaid recipients from a fee-for-service model to a managed care model. Under the managed care model, AHCA pays a managed care organization (MCO) a capitation rate per patient. The MCOs negotiate contracts with hospitals to provide outpatient care at an agreed reimbursement rate per occasion of service. Since August 2014, the majority of Medicaid recipients has been receiving services through MCOs, rather than through fee-for-service. Currently, about 75 to 80 percent of Medicaid outpatient hospital occasions of service are provided through managed care In recognition of the shift to MCOs, the Legislature began to divide the Medicaid outpatient hospital reimbursement appropriation in the GAA between what AHCA reimburses directly to hospitals under the fee-for-service model and what it pays MCOs to provide those services under the MCO delivery system. This allocation of the budgets between fee-for-service and managed care necessarily accomplished a corresponding division of the recurring MTA reductions between the two delivery systems. The Legislature did not enact any statutes or GAAs requiring AHCA to change how it applies MTA reductions to determine fee-for-service outpatient reimbursement rate adjustments, or make any other changes in response to the transition to MCOs. There were no additional MTA reductions in 2015. The 2015 Outpatient Plan, which is incorporated in existing rule 59G- 6.030, applied the previous cuts as recurring reductions. The evidence was confusing as to whether cuts 7 and 8 were applied using the occasions of service in the fiscal agent’s monthly report corresponding to the hospitals’ most current unaudited cost reports, or using budgeted occasions of service. If the former, the numbers did not yet reflect much of the shift to the managed care model because of a time lag in producing cost reports, and the evidence suggested that the numbers were approximately the same as the budgeted occasions of service used previously. Whichever numbers were used, the resulting rate adjustments were incorporated in the hospitals’ reimbursement rates, effective July 1, 2015. Leading up to the 2016 legislative session, there was a legislative proposal to determine prospective Medicaid outpatient reimbursement rates using a completely new method called Enhanced Ambulatory Patient Groups (EAPGs). EAPGs would eliminate the need to depend on hospital cost reports and complicated calculations to determine the effects of MTA reductions on prospective hospital outpatient reimbursement rates, effective July 1, following the end of the legislative session each year. Hospitals, including some if not all of the Petitioners, asked the Legislature not to proceed with the proposed EAPG legislation until they had an opportunity to study it and provide input, and EAPGs were not enacted in 2016. However, section 409.905(6)(b) was amended, effective July 1, 2017, to require the switch to EAPGs. See note to § 409.905, Fla. Stat.; and ch. 2016-65, § 9, Laws of Fla. (2016). When it became apparent that EAPGs would not be in use for prospective reimbursement rates for fiscal year 2016/2017, AHCA basically repeated the 2015/2016 process, but adjusted the occasions of service used for calculating the hospitals’ rate reductions for cuts 7 and 8 by adding 14,000 occasions of service. At the end of July, AHCA published new rates effective July 1, 2016. When the new rates were published, they were challenged by some of the Petitioners under section 120.57(1), Florida Statutes. Citing section 409.908(1)(f)1., AHCA took the position that there was no jurisdiction and dismissed the petitions. That decision is on appeal to the First District Court of Appeal. The Petitioners also challenged the methodology used to calculate the new prospective reimbursement rates as a rule that was not adopted as required, and challenged the validity of existing rule 59G-6.030, which incorporated the 2015 Outpatient Plan by reference. These challenges became DOAH cases 16-6398RX through 16-6414RX. In response to DOAH cases 16-6398RX through 16-6414RX, AHCA adopted the 2016 Outpatient Plan by reference in proposed rule 59G-6.030. The 2016 Outpatient Plan provides more detail than the 2015 version. AHCA’s position is that the additional detail was provided to clarify the 2015 version. However, it changed the occasions of service used for calculating the hospitals’ rate reductions for cuts 7 and 8, as indicated in Finding 22, as well as some other substantive changes. The 2015 Outpatient Plan addressed the unit cost cap by stating: “Effective July 1, 2011, AHCA shall establish rates at a level that ensures no increase in statewide expenditures resulting from a change in unit costs.” The 2016 Outpatient Plan elaborates and specifies the calculation AHCA has been using, as stated in Finding 14. The 2015 Outpatient Plan provided that an individual hospital’s prospective reimbursement rate may be adjusted under certain circumstances, such as when AHCA makes an error in the calculation of the hospital’s unaudited rate. It also stated: “Any rate adjustment or denial of a rate adjustment by AHCA may be appealed by the provider in accordance with Rule 28-106, F.A.C., and section 120.57(1), F.S.” The 2016 Outpatient Plan deleted the appeal rights language from the existing rule. The effect of the existing and proposed rules on the Petitioners through their effect on managed care contract rates is debatable. Those rates do not have to be the same as the fee- for-service outpatient reimbursement rates, although they are influenced by the fee-for-service rates, and it is not uncommon for them to be stated as a percentage of the fee-for-service rates. By law, managed care contract rates cannot exceed 120 percent of the fee-for-service rates unless the MCO gets permission from AHCA, as provided in section 409.975(6). Currently, rates paid by MCOs for Medicaid hospital outpatient services average about 105 percent of the fee-for-service reimbursement rates. AHCA has indicated that it would not expect or like to see the contract rates much higher than that. It is not clear whether that still is AHCA’s position. If higher rates were negotiated, the impact of fee-for-services rate adjustments on managed care rates could be reduced or even eliminated. The effect of the existing and proposed rules on the Petitioners through their effect on how fee-for-service reimbursement rates are calculated is not disputed. With the transition to managed care, the effect is greater and clearly substantial. The recurring MTA reductions enacted by the Legislature through 2014, which total $224,015,229 (after taking into account $10,656,238 that was reinstated, and $4,068,064 that was added in consideration of trauma centers), are being spread over fewer fee-for-service occasions of service, especially for cuts 7 and 8, which significantly lowers the fee-for-service outpatient reimbursement rates calculated under the proposed rule. The Petitioners’ objections to the validity of the proposed and existing rules can be summarized as follows: a lack of legislative authority for recurring (i.e., cumulative) MTA reductions; a failure to adopt a fixed methodology to calculate individual hospital outpatient reimbursement rate adjustments resulting from MTA reductions; specifically, a failure to derive the number of fee-for-service occasions of service used in calculating individual hospital outpatient reimbursement rate adjustments in the same manner every year; conversely, a failure to increase the occasions of service used to calculate individual hospital outpatient reimbursement rate adjustments resulting from cuts 1 through 4; a failure of the unit cost cap in the existing rule to specify how it is applied; a failure of the unit cost cap in the proposed rule to compare the 2011 unit cost to the current cost, calculated by dividing the total dollar amount of Medicaid payments made to all hospitals by AHCA by the number of Medicaid occasions of service for all hospitals, including in children’s and rural hospitals; and proposed rule’s deletion of the language in the existing rule stating that a rate adjustment or denial can be appealed in accordance with Florida Administrative Code Rule 28-106 and section 120.57.
The Issue In an attachment to the joint prehearing stipulation filed on February 18, 1996, the parties describe their resolution of all issues in these consolidated cases with the exception of this issue: Whether the Agency for Health Care Administration, through audit adjustments, properly removed working capital interest from the patient care cost centers and reallocated those costs to the operating cost centers of the individual providers.
Findings Of Fact Petitioners are individual nursing homes participating in the Florida Medicaid program. They are separate providers in the program but are all owned by Florida Convalescent Centers, Inc. (FCC). Respondent, State of Florida Agency for Health Care Administration (AHCA) is the agency responsible for administration and implementation of the Medicaid program in Florida. Title XIX of the Social Security Act (Title XIX) is the matching entitlement program, now known as Medicaid, which provides medical assistance for eligible low-income persons. Within broad federal guidelines, states are given the authority to establish eligibility standards, define the scope of services, establish reimbursement rates and generally administer their own program. One requirement of Title XIX is that a state plan for medical assistance must provide for payment of nursing facility services through rates that "are reasonable and adequate to meet the costs which must be incurred by efficiently and economically operated facilities..." (42 USC 1396(a)). Florida's reimbursement methodology has been approved by the Health Care Financing Administration of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. Florida's Medicaid reimbursement methodology requires that a provider file an annual cost report which summarizes all costs by cost centers for a given reporting period. The three Medicaid cost centers are: operating costs, patient care costs and property costs, which are defined, respectively, in the Florida Title XIX Long Term Care Reimbursement Plan: Medicaid Nursing Home Operating Costs: [Those costs not directly related to patient care or property costs], such as administrative, plant operation, laundry and housekeeping costs. Return on equity or use allowance costs are not included in operating costs. Medicaid Nursing Home Patient Care Costs: Those costs [directly] attributed to nursing services, dietary costs, and other costs [directly] related to patient care, such as activity costs, social services, and all medically-ordered therapies. Medicaid Nursing Home Property Costs: Those costs related to the ownership or leasing of a nursing home. Such costs may include property taxes, insurance, interest and depreciation, or rent. [Petitioners' exhibit no. 5, page 85, emphasis added] The historical costs reported by the provider are used to compute a separate per-patient day cost for each of the three cost centers. The per diem rates are then added to create a comprehensive per diem rate which is used to prospectively compensate the provider. For example, a provider's costs for 1992, reported in its 1992 cost report, are used to set the 1993 per diem rate. Among the regulatory objectives of the reimbursement plan is cost containment. To further this objective, the plan provides for cost ceilings and targets in each of the cost centers. The ceilings and targets are derived from data collected from all providers in Florida's Medicaid program. The ceiling rates are the maximum amount any provider can be reimbursed, based on its geographical location and size. Provider reimbursement is also limited by facility-specific target rates based on historical data and rates for the individual facility. Year to year increases in the per diems for the three cost centers are permitted to reflect the inflation rate above an established base rate. In compliance with the reporting requirements of the reimbursement plan, FCC's in-house controller, Charles Wysocki, prepared Petitioners' 1992 cost reports. They were then reviewed and signed by a Florida CPA, Joseph Mitchell. In the cost reports, on Schedule C, Mr. Wysocki with the concurrence of Mr. Mitchell, reclassified working capital interest from the property cost center to the patient care and operating cost centers based on the ratio of the total salaries in each to the total salaries for the provider facility. This salary-based allocation method was selected because salaries account for the single largest expenditure in a nursing home, generally 65 - 70 percent, and as high as 86 percent of the total costs for some FCC providers. As part of AHCA's routine review, the agency engaged a nationally- recognized accounting firm, DeLoitte and Touche, to audit the Medicaid cost reports submitted by FCC. The purpose of the review and audits is to assure that only allowable costs are included, that the costs have been properly classified and that the data used to calculate future reimbursement is correct in all material respects. The treatment of working capital interest was one of several issues identified in the audit of FCC's 1992 cost report, but it is the only issue remaining now for resolution. At the time of the audit DeLoitte and Touche was under the impression that the working capital loans were "related party" loans which are treated differently for reimbursement purposes than loans that are "arms-length" between non-related parties. The working capital interest cost was disallowed altogether. After review by the agency an audit report was issued with citations to the authorities supporting the adjustment in the audit. Later in the audit review process the agency conceded that the problem was not "related party" loans and that the working capital interest was a reimbursable cost. However, the agency disputed the allocation of the interest and adjusted Petitioners' cost reports to allocate the interest to the operating cost center. There are three authorities for treatment of Florida Medicaid nursing home costs. The parties concur that the first and primary authority is the Florida Title XIX Long Term Care Reimbursement Plan (Plan). If an issue is not addressed in the Plan, then the next resort is to the Provider Reimbursement manual (HIM-15). Finally, if the issue remains unresolved, providers and the Agency rely on Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP). The Plan does not specifically address allocation of working capital interest, although it does provide some guidance in the definitions described in paragraph 4, above, and in this language: B. Setting prospective reimbursement per diems and ceilings. The department shall: * * * 4. Determine allowable Medicaid property costs, patient care costs, and return on equity or use allowance. Patient care costs include those costs directly attributable to nursing services, dietary costs, activity costs, social services costs, and all medically- ordered therapies. All other costs, exclusive of property cost and return on equity or use allowance costs, are considered operating costs. . . . (Petitioners' exhibit no. 5, page 45) The guidance found in HIM-15 is much more specific. For example, Section 2806.2 provides: Costs Excluded from Capital-Related Costs. This section sets forth some of the costs that are excluded from capital-related costs. To the extent that these costs are allowable they may be included in determining each provider's operating costs. Exclusions from capital-related costs include: * * * c. interest expense incurred to borrow working capital [for working expenses]; * * * [emphasis added] HIM-15, Section 2338, cited in the agency's audit report, provides: C. Interest expense incurred on funds borrowed for operating expenses must be allocated with administrative and general expenses. . . . Definitions found in Section 2102 of HIM-15 establish that reasonable costs take into account both direct and indirect costs of providers of services and that costs related to patient care include administrative costs. Costs that are neither directly nor indirectly related to patient care are not allowable in computing reimbursable costs. (Petitioners' exhibit number 2, Sections 2102.1, 2102.2 and 2102.3). The loans which generated the interest costs at issue here were obtained by the provider facilities to meet operating shortfalls. When a new facility opens there are almost all the expenses of a fully-staffed nursing home, but until the patient beds are filled, there is insufficient revenue to cover the expenses. FCC's methodology of allocating working capital interest based on salaries resulted in allocating those interest costs to both the patient care cost center and operating cost center, with most going to the patient care cost center. For example, 86 percent of salaries on the cost report for Palm Garden of Ocala for the year ending 12/31/92 were in the patient care cost center, so 86 percent of the working capital interest was allocated to patient care rather than the operating cost center. There is a substantial incentive for providers to shift costs from one center to another to avoid the ceilings. If the provider's reimbursement for operating cost is capped, but its patient care cost is not yet at the ceiling, then shifting costs from operating to patient care increases the total reimbursement to the provider. From the record it is impossible to determine exactly how the loan funds were expended by each provider. The monies were deposited into the general operating accounts of the providers and were used to cover operating shortfalls. In 1989, 1990 and 1991, the three years preceding the year at issue, the agency permitted FCC to allocate working capital interest in the same manner that FCC allocated that cost in its 1992 cost reports. However, the three preceding years' treatment was the outcome of a settlement agreement between the parties wherein each gave up some issues. Except in the context of settlement, the agency has steadfastly maintained its position that working capital interest must be allocated in the operating cost center. Prior cases with other providers have involved adjustments to move the working capital interest costs from the property cost center rather than from the patient care cost center.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing it is hereby: RECOMMENDED: That the Agency for Health Care Administration enter its Final Order adopting the parties' settlement agreement and approving the agency's audit adjustments related to allocation of working capital interest. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 26th day of April, 1996, in Tallahassee, Florida. MARY CLARK, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of April, 1996. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASES NOS. 94-6893 - 94-6906 To comply with the requirements of Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes (1993), the following rulings are made on the parties' proposed findings of fact: Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact. Adopted in paragraph 8. Rejected as unnecessary. 3.-4. Adopted in part in paragraph 11, otherwise rejected as irrelevant or immaterial. 5.-7. Adopted in part in paragraph 9, otherwise rejected as irrelevant or immaterial. 8. Rejected as irrelevant or immaterial. 9.-10. Adopted in substance in paragraph 18. Rejected as unnecessary. Rejected as unnecessary and argument. Rejected as contrary to the weight of evidence. Rejected as contrary to the weight of evidence. Moreover, it is immaterial since HIM-15 and the Plan are applied, not general principles in this case. Adopted in paragraph 13. Adopted in paragraph 4. Adopted in paragraph 5. Adopted in paragraph 6. Adopted in paragraph 7. 20.-23. Adopted in part in paragraph 14, otherwise rejected as immaterial. Rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in part in paragraph 17, otherwise rejected as unnecessary. 26.-31. Rejected as immaterial. 32. Adopted in part in paragraph 16, otherwise rejected as unnecessary. 33.-34. Rejected as unnecessary or immaterial. The interest addressed in paragraphs A and B is distinguished from working capital interest. Rejected as an interpretation not supported by the greater weight of evidence. Rejected as immaterial. Addressed in conclusion of law, paragraph 29. 38.-39. Rejected as argument and contrary to the greater weight of evidence. Rejected as argument or unnecessary. Rejected as argument. 42.-45. Rejected as immaterial. It is unnecessary to apply GAAP here. Rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in paragraph 22. 48.-51. Rejected as argument that is unsupported by the weight of evidence. 52. Adopted in summary in paragraph 20. 53.-54. Rejected as immaterial. Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact. Adopted in paragraphs 1 and 2. Adopted in paragraph 4. Adopted in paragraph 9. Adopted in paragraph 10. 5.-6. Adopted in substance in paragraph 11. Adopted in paragraph 13. Adopted in substance in paragraphs 14 and 15. Adopted in paragraph 16. Addressed in conclusion of law, paragraph 29. Adopted in paragraph 15. Adopted in part in paragraph 6, otherwise rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in part in paragraph 4. Rejected as unnecessary. 15.-18. Adopted in paragraph 4. Adopted in substance in paragraph 6. Rejected as unnecessary. COPIES FURNISHED: Gerald B. Sternstein, Esquire RUDEN, BARNETT, MCCLOSKY, SMITH SHUSTER & RUSSELL, P.A. 215 South Monroe Street, Suite 815 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Harold M. Knowles, Esquire KNOWLES & RANDOLPH 528 East Park Avenue Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Jerome Hoffman, General Counsel Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32308-5403 Sam Power, Agency Clerk Agency for Health Care Administration Ft. Knox Building 3, Suite 3431 2727 Mahan Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32308-5403
The Issue The issue for consideration in this case is whether the Agency for Health Care Administration is required by law and rule of the Agency to include the gain or loss on the sale of depreciable assets as the result of a sale or disposal, in the calculation of Medicaid allowable costs.
Findings Of Fact Prior to the hearing, the parties submitted a Joint Stipulation which is incorporated in part herein as follows: Petitioner purchased Orlando General Hospital ("OGH"), Medicaid provider number 120065, on December 31, 1990. Upon its sale, OGH merged into and became part of Adventist Health System/Sunbelt, Inc., wherein after it was known as Adventist Health System/Sunbelt, Inc., d/b/a Florida Hospital East ("Florida Hospital East"). Adventist Health System/Sunbelt, Inc., d/b/a Florida Hospital East is a wholly owned subsidiary of Adventist Health System Sunbelt Healthcare Corporation. Florida Hospital East assumed all of the assets and liabilities of OGH. OGH filed a terminating cost report for the fiscal period ending December 31, 1990. On December 31, 1990, the date of sale of OGH to Petitioner, OGH incurred a loss on the sale of the hospital, a depreciable asset. The loss on the sale of OGH was included on both OGH's Medicaid and Medicare terminating cost reports. A loss on the sale of a depreciable asset is the amount that the net book value of the asset sold exceeds the purchase price. A gain or loss on the sale of a depreciable asset is a capital cost. Due to the mechanism of the cost report, a loss on the sale of a depreciable asset is divided into "periods" based upon the time period to which the loss relates. The portion of the loss related to the fiscal year in which the asset is sold is referred to as a "current period" loss. The portion of the loss that relates to all fiscal years prior to the year in which the asset is sold is referred to as a "prior period" loss. Gains and losses related to the current period are included on Worksheet A of the Medicare and Medicaid cost report. Current period capital costs flow to Worksheet B-II Part and B Part III [sic] of the Medicaid cost report. Gains and losses related to the prior period are included on Worksheet E of the Medicare and Medicaid cost reports. OGH's current period is the fiscal year ending 12/31/90. OGH's prior periods in which it participated in the Medicaid Program are 10/24/84 through 12/31/89. OGH's audited Medicaid cost report included in allowable Medicaid costs a loss on the sale of OGH related to the current period. OGH's audited Medicaid cost report did not include in allowable Medicaid costs a loss on the sale of OGH related to the prior periods. The loss on the sale of OGH related to the current period was included in Worksheet A of OGH's audited Medicaid cost report. These costs, including the loss on the sale of OGH, flowed to Worksheet B Part II. OGH's audited Medicare cost report included as allowable Medicare costs the loss on the sale of OGH related to both the current and prior periods in the amount of $9,874,047. The loss from the sale of OGH related to the current period was included on Worksheet A of OGH's audited Medicare cost report. The costs from Worksheet A of OGH's audited Medicare cost report flowed to Worksheet B Part II of OGH's audited Medicare cost report. The loss related to the prior period was included on Worksheet E Part B of OGH's audited Medicaid cost report. The Agency utilizes costs included on Worksheet A of the Medicaid cost report to calculate Medicaid allowable costs. The Agency utilizes the capital costs included on Worksheet B Part II and/or B Part III to calculate allowable Medicaid fixed costs. The Agency does not utilize costs included on Worksheet E Part III to calculate Medicaid allowable costs. The Agency reimburses providers based upon Medicaid allowable costs. aa. The Agency did not include the portion of the loss on the sale of OGH related to the prior periods in the calculation of the OGH's Medicaid allowable costs. bb. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Florida, Inc. (Intermediary), contracted with the Agency to perform all audits of Medicaid cost reports. Agency reimbursement to Medicaid providers is governed by Florida's Title XIX Inpatient Hospital Reimbursement Plan (Plan), which has been incorporated in Rule 59G-6.020, Florida Administrative Code. The Plan provides that Medicaid reimbursement for inpatient services shall be based upon a prospectively determined per diem. The payment is based upon the facility's allowable Medicaid costs which include both variable costs and fixed costs. Fixed costs include capital costs and allowable depreciation costs. The per diem payment is calculated by the Agency based upon each facility's allowable Medicaid costs which must be taken by the agency from the facility's cost report. Capital costs, such as depreciation, are found on Worksheet B, Part II and Part III. The Plan requires all facilities participating in the Medicaid program to submit an annual cost report to the Agency. The report is to be in detail, listing their "costs for their entire reporting year making appropriate adjustment as required by the plan for the determination of allowable costs." The cost report must be prepared in accordance with the Medicare method of reimbursement and cost finding, except as modified by the Plan. The cost reports relied upon by the Agency to set rates are audited by Blue Cross/Blue Shield of Florida, Inc. which has been directed by the Agency to follow Medicare principles of reimbursement in its audit of cost reports. Prior to January 11, 1995, the Plan did not expressly state whether capital gains or losses relating to a change of facility ownership were allowable costs. The 1995 amendment to the Plan contained language expressly providing "[f]or the purposes of this plan, gains or losses resulting from a change of ownership will not be included in the determination of allowable cost for Medicaid reimbursement." No change was made by the amendment to the Medicare principles of reimbursement regarding the treatment of gains and losses on the sale of depreciable assets. The Medicare principles of reimbursement provides that gains and losses from the disposition of depreciable assets are includable in computing allowable costs. The Provider Reimbursement Manual (HIM-15)(PRM), identifies the methods of disposal for assets that are recognized. They include a bona fide sale of depreciable assets, but do not mention a change of ownership. PRM Section 132 treats a loss on a sale of a depreciable asset as an adjustment to depreciation for both the current and periods. Depreciable assets with an expected life of more than two years may not be expensed in the year in which they are put into service. They must be capitalized and a proportionate share of the cost expensed as depreciation over the life of the property. To do so, the provider must estimate the useful life of the property based upon the guidelines of the American Hospital Association, and divide the cost by the number of years of estimated life. It is this yearly depreciation figure which is claimed on the cost report and which is reimbursed. When a depreciable asset is sold for less than book value (net undepreciated value), the provider suffers a loss. Petitioner claims that Medicare holds that in such a case it must be concluded that the estimated depreciation was erroneous and the provider did not receive adequate reimbursement during the years the asset was in service. Medicare accounting procedures do not distinguish between the treatment of a loss on the sale of depreciable assets as related to current and prior periods. PIM Section 132 requires that Medicare recognize the entire loss as an allowable cost for both the current and prior periods, and Medicare treated Petitioner's loss from the sale of its facility as an allowable cost for Medicare reimbursement under both current and prior periods. With the adoption of the January 1995 amendment, however, the wording of the state plan was changed to specifically prohibit gains or losses from a change of ownership from being included in allowable costs for Medicaid reimbursement. This was the first time the state plan addressed gains and losses on the disposal of depreciable assets resulting from a change of ownership. The Agency contends, however, that it has never reimbursed for losses on disposal of property due to a change of ownership, and that the inclusion of the new language was to clarify a pre-existing policy which was being followed at the time of the 1995 amendment, and which goes back to the late 1970s. It would appear, however, that the policy was never written down; was never conveyed to Blue Cross/Blue shield; was never formally conveyed to Medicaid providers; and was never conveyed to the community at large. When pressed, the Agency could not identify any specific case where the policy was followed by the Agency. While admitting that it is Agency practice not to treat losses from the sale of depreciable assets in prior periods as an allowable cost, Petitioner contends that it has been the Agency's practice to treat the loss on the sale of depreciable assets relating to the current period as an allowable cost, and cited several instances where this appears to have been done. The Agency contends that any current period losses paid were paid without knowledge of the Agency, in error, and in violation of the plan. On October 25, 1996, the Agency entered a Final Order in a case involving Florida Hospital/Waterman, Inc., as Petitioner, and the Agency as Respondent. This case was filed by the Petitioner to challenge the Agency's treatment of the loss on the sale of Waterman Medical Center, Inc., another of Adventist Health Systems/Sunbelt Healthcare Corporation, and the Final Order in issue incorporated a stipulation into which the parties had entered and which addressed the issue in question here. The stipulation included certain position statements including: A loss on the sale of depreciable assets is an allowable cost under the Medicare Principles of Reimbursement. The State Plan does not specify that the loss on the sale of a depreciable asset is to be treated in a manner different than under the Medicare Principles of Reimbursement. Thus the loss on the sale of a depreciable asset is an allowable cost under the State Plan. The Agency agrees, in accordance with the Medicare Principles of Reimbursement, that under the terms of the State Plan, prior period losses for Waterman will be allocated to prior periods and included in the calculation of the per diem and per visit rates. According to William G. Nutt, Petitioner's director of reimbursement, the only difference between the facts of the Waterman case and the instant case is that they relate to the sale of different facilities. The treatment of loss on the sale of depreciable assets as outlined in the Waterman stipulation is in conflict with the amended Plan and with the unwritten and unuttered Agency policy as urged by the Agency in this case. The Agency agreed in one case to a treatment of loss which it now rejects in the instant case. Petitioner urges that subsequent to the settlement of the Waterman case, but before the instant case was set for hearing, the parties engaged in settlement negotiations during which, according to counsel for the Agency, they made "significant" progress toward applying the settlement in the Waterman case to the current case. In a motion filed to delay the setting of this case for hearing, counsel for the Agency indicated the parties were "finalizing" settlement to resolve the case without resorting to a final hearing, and in a follow-up agreed motion for continuance, advised that the "parties [had] finalized a settlement document [which they were] in the process of executing. The settlement agreement reached by the parties was signed by a representative of the Petitioner and then forwarded to the Agency for signature. The document was not signed by the Agency, and when Petitioner sought enforcement of the "settlement" by an Administrative Law Judge of the Division of Administrative Hearings, the request was denied as being outside the jurisdiction of the judge, and the matter was set for hearing.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Agency for Health Care Administration enter a Final Order including the loss on the sale of Orlando General Hospital as an allowable cost for determining Petitioner's entitlement to Medicaid reimbursement for both current and prior years. DONE AND ENTERED this 30th day of June, 1999, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6947 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of June, 1999. COPIES FURNISHED: Joanne B. Erde, Esquire Broad and Cassel Miami Center Suite 3000 201 South Biscayne Boulevard Miami, Florida 33131 Jonathan E. Sjostrom, Esquire Steel Hector & Davis LLP 215 South Monroe Street Suite 601 Tallahassee, Florida 32301-1804 Mark S. Thomas, Esquire Madeline McGuckin, Esquire Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive Fort Knox Building 3, Suite 3431 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Sam Power, Agency Clerk Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive Fort Knox Building 3, Suite 3431 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Julie Gallagher General Counsel Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive Building 3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308
