The Issue The issue to be determined by this Order is whether the Petition for Formal Proceedings filed with the Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) on February 4, 2009, was timely 1/ and, if so, whether Petitioners have standing to challenge the DEP?s issuance of the Minor Modification to FDEP Operation Permit 171331-002-UO for IW-1 under 171331-003-UC (the Permit Modification).
Findings Of Fact The Parties The Conservation Alliance is a Florida not-for-profit corporation in good-standing, with its corporate offices currently located at 5608 Eagle Drive, Fort Pierce, Florida. The Conservation Alliance has approximately 200 members. Elaine Romano is a resident of St. Lucie County, Florida. The DEP is an agency of the State of Florida having jurisdiction for permitting UIC facilities and the waste-streams being discharged to such facilities, pursuant to chapter 403, Florida Statutes, and the rules promulgated thereunder. Pursuant to that authority, the DEP issued the Permit Modification that is the subject of this proceeding. FPUA provides utility service to the City of Fort Pierce, Florida. FPUA owns and operates a Class I industrial injection well (IW-1), discharges to which are the subject of the Permit Modification. Allied owns and operates a chlorine bleach manufacturing facility which produces a brine waste-stream that is proposed for disposal to IW-1. Issuance of the Permit Modification On December 19, 2008, the DEP issued a Notice of Permit, Permit Number 171331-002-UO (FPUA operation permit), which authorized the operation of IW-1 at the Gahn wastewater treatment plant. The Gahn wastewater treatment plant and IW-1 are owned and operated by the FPUA. The FPUA operation permit authorized the disposal of concentrate and water treatment by- product from FPUA?s reverse-osmosis water facility at a permitted rate of 2.8 million gallons per day. FPUA also owns and operates water production wells that serve the City of Fort Pierce potable water supply system. IW-1 was constructed within 500 feet of three of the FPUA production wells, which required FPUA to obtain a variance from setback requirements. On July 17, 2008, prior to the issuance of the FPUA operation permit, Allied submitted an application for a major modification of the FPUA operation permit. The application proposed the disposal to IW-1 of up to 21,600 gallons per day of a brine waste-stream that is a by-product of the production of chlorine bleach. The application cover letter provides that “[w]hile we have been notified that this project is only a Minor Permit Modification, we feel by submitting for a Major Permit Modification that the Department will have the ability to review the application and downgrade the application to a Minor Permit Modification, if needed.” On December 30, 2008, the DEP issued the Permit Modification as a minor modification of the FPUA operation permit. The Permit Modification allowed a maximum of 21,600 gallons of brine to be received at the FPUA facility and disposed of in IW-1. Notice of the Permit Modification On or about September 12, 2008, a paralegal for Ruden McClosky, Lucinda Sparkman, requested information from the DEP regarding the procedure for receiving notification of permit applications and DEP action thereon. Her request was subsequently refined to request notice regarding two permits, those being “injection Well Construction, application #171331- 003,” and the other being “Water-Industrial Wastewater, application #FLA017460-004.” DEP File No. 171331-003 is that pertaining to the Permit Modification. At the time of the request, Ruden McClosky represented Odyssey Manufacturing Company (Odyssey), an economic competitor of Allied.3/ On September 24, 2008, Ms. Sparkman asked to be “put on the distribution list for the URIC permit for Fort Pierce.” From September 24, 2008 through December 15, 2008, Ms. Sparkman made periodic requests for information, and received periodic updates from the DEP. On December 19, 2008, the DEP sent Ms. Sparkman an e- mail indicating that the FPUA operation permit had been issued, and later that same day sent Ms. Sparkman an electronic copy of the permit. On December 19, 2008, Ruden McClosky made a public records request to FPUA for, among other items, records pertaining to the disposal of brine to the Gahn Water Plant underground injection well, and any agreements between FPUA and Allied regarding the disposal of brine. The request was made on behalf of Florida Tire Recycling, Inc. (Florida Tire). On December 22, the DEP sent Ms. Sparkman a copy of the notice of intent for the FPUA operation permit. There is no record evidence of further communication or inquiry between Ruden McClosky and the DEP from December 22, 2008 to January 14, 2009. On January 9, 2009, notice of the Permit Modification was published in the Fort Pierce Tribune. The notice was prepared and publication arranged by counsel for Allied. The published notice provides the information required by rule 62-110.106(7)(d), and stated that any challenge to the Permit Modification was required to be received by DEP within 14 days of publication or, for persons that requested actual notice, within 14 days of receipt of such actual notice. On January 14, 2009, Ms. Sparkman called her contact person at the DEP to inquire about the Permit Modification. That call was not returned. On January 21, 2009, Ms. Sparkman again called the DEP to inquire about the Permit Modification. In response to Ms. Sparkman?s inquiry, the DEP sent Ms. Sparkman an electronic copy of the Permit Modification. Ms. Sparkman made further inquiry on January 21, 2009, as to whether the notice of the Permit Modification had been published in a newspaper. On January 22, 2009, the DEP replied that “[e]verything was noticed as required.” On January 22, 2009, the Fort Pierce Tribune prepared an affidavit of publication of the notice. The affidavit of publication was received by counsel for Allied on January 28, 2009, who sent the affidavit to the DEP by certified mail on January 29, 2009. Alleged Defects in the Notice of Permit Modification Petitioners have alleged a number of procedural defects that they contend render the published notice ineffective to establish a deadline of 14 days from the date of the notice to file a challenge to the Permit Modification. Late Proof of Publication Petitioners allege that Allied filed the proof of publication with the DEP more than seven days from the date of publication, and that delay made such publication ineffective to establish a deadline for filing the petition. Although the proof of publication was provided to the DEP on or shortly after January 29, 2009, the evidence demonstrates that Allied provided the proof of publication to the DEP immediately upon receipt from the Fort Pierce Tribune newspaper. The delay in filing was not within the control of Allied, or anyone else associated with the Permit Modification. As established by rule 62-110.106(9), proof of publication is required by the DEP to provide assurance to the DEP that required notice has, in fact, been published, with the sanction being the delay or denial of the permit. The rule does not suggest that a delay in providing proof of publication to the DEP serves to alter or extend the time for filing a petition. There is little case law construing the effect of a delay in providing proof of publication on the petition rights of a person challenging the proposed agency action. However, the undersigned agrees with, and adopts, the following analysis of the issue provided by Administrative Law Judge P. Michael Ruff: . . . the purpose of requiring an applicant to publish notice of agency action is to give substantially affected persons an opportunity to participate in an administrative proceeding. See Section 403.815, Florida Statutes, and Rule 17- 103.150(4), Florida Administrative Code. Consequently, the crucial element in the Department's publication requirement is that the notice be published to trigger the commencement of the time for affected persons to request a hearing. The requirement that proof of publication be provided to the Department does nothing to affect the rights of third parties, but merely is a technical requirement which allows the Department to determine whether a third party has timely exercised its rights to contest a published notice of intended agency action. If an applicant publishes notice of intended agency action, but fails to timely provide the Department with proof of that publication, the deficiency is one which is easily cured. No harm will occur because the permit will not be issued until proof of publication is received by the Department, in any event, because of Rule 17-103.510(4), Florida Administrative Code. Bio-Tech Tracking Systems, Inc. v. Dep?t of Envtl. Reg., Case No. 90-7760, ¶32 (Fla. DOAH Apr. 3, 1991; Fla. DER May 17, 1991). The filing of the notice beyond the seven-day period in rule 62-110.106(5) was, at most, harmless error, did not adversely affect any rights or remedies available to Petitioners, and does not affect the fairness of this proceeding. Notice Prepared by Counsel Petitioners allege that the notice was prepared by Allied?s counsel, rather than the DEP, and that the notice was therefore ineffective to establish a deadline for filing the petition. Publication of the notice of the Permit Modification was not required, since it was a minor modification. Thus, publication was at Allied?s option. Rule 62-110.106(10)(a) provides, in pertinent part, that: Any applicant or person benefiting from the Department?s action may elect to publish notice of the Department?s intended or proposed action . . . in the manner provided by subsection (7) or (8) above. Upon presentation of proof of publication to the Department before final agency action, any person who has elected to publish such notice shall be entitled to the same benefits under this rule as a person who is required to publish notice. The most logical construction of rule 62-110.106 is that the DEP is responsible for preparing required notices pursuant to rule 62-110.106(7)(c), but that non-required notices may be prepared and published at the applicant?s or beneficiary?s option without direct DEP involvement. In this case, the notice was prepared by an authorized agent of the corporate “person” that benefitted from the Permit Modification. The more salient point regarding the preparation of the notice is whether it contained all of the information required by rule. The evidence demonstrates that it did, and that the notice was sufficient to provide a meaningful and complete point of entry to the public of the Permit Modification and the rights attendant thereto. The fact that the notice was prepared by Allied?s counsel was, at most, harmless error, did not adversely affect any rights or remedies available to Petitioners, and does not affect the fairness of this proceeding. Lack of Actual Notice Petitioners allege error in the notice process because actual notice of the Permit Modification was not provided to Petitioners. The basis for the alleged deficiency was that Mr. Stinnette had, in 2003, asked to be placed on the DEP?s UIC mailing list, but did not receive the notice of the Permit Modification. Rule 62-110.106(2) provides that published notice establishes the point of entry for the public to challenge proposed agency action “except for persons entitled to written notice personally or by mail under Section 120.60(3), Florida Statutes, or any other statute.” Section 120.60(3) provides that a notice of proposed agency action shall be mailed “to each person who has made a written request for notice of agency action.” The preponderance of the evidence demonstrates that Mr. Stinnette was acting solely as an agent of Indian Riverkeeper when he requested to be placed on the UIC mailing list. He was not requesting notices in his personal capacity, or as an agent of the Conservation Alliance or Ms. Romano. Thus, Indian Riverkeeper was entitled to notice of the Permit Modification. Indian Riverkeeper is not a party to this proceeding. The undersigned is not willing to attribute a request for actual notice to any person other than the person requesting such notice. The DEP?s failure to provide written notice of the Permit Modification to Indian Riverkeeper did not adversely affect any rights or remedies available to the Conservation Alliance or Ms. Romano, and does not affect the fairness of this proceeding. Lack of Information Pursuant to Rule 62-528.315(7) Finally, Petitioners argue that the published notice was ineffective because it did not include the name, address, and telephone number of a DEP contact person, citing rule 62- 528.315(7)(d). The provision cited by Petitioners involves DEP notices that are required when the DEP has prepared a draft permit, draft consent order, or has scheduled a public meeting as identified in rule 62-528.315(1). The notice requirement in rule 62-528.315(7) does not apply to a notice of proposed agency action, which is governed by rule 62-528.315(10), and which provides that: “[a]fter the conclusion of the public comment period described in Rule 62-528.321, F.A.C., and after the conclusion of a public meeting (if any) described in Rule 62- 528.325, F.A.C., the applicant shall publish public notice of the proposed agency action including the availability of an administrative hearing under Sections 120.569 and 120.57, F.S. This public notice shall follow the procedure described in subsection 62-110.106(7), F.A.C. (emphasis added). The published notice of the Permit Modification was consistent with the notice described in rule 62-110.106(7), and therefore complied with rule 62-528.315(10). For the reasons set forth herein, there were no defects in the published notice of proposed agency action that serve to minimize the effect of that published notice on the time for filing a petition challenging the Permit Modification, that adversely affect any rights or remedies available to the Conservation Alliance or Ms. Romano, or that affect the fairness of this proceeding. Representation of Petitioners by Ruden McClosky Petitioners were not represented by Ruden McClosky at the time Ruden McClosky requested actual notice of any DEP agency action regarding FPUA. Petitioners were not represented by Ruden McClosky at the time Ruden McClosky requested actual notice of any DEP agency action regarding Allied. The parties stipulated that an attorney-client relationship was formed between the Petitioners and Ruden McClosky on or after January 1, 2009. No further specificity was stipulated. On February 3, 2009, Ruden McClosky sent an engagement letter to the Conservation Alliance regarding governmental and administrative challenges to the Permit Modification. The engagement was accepted by Mr. Stinnette on behalf of the Conservation Alliance on February 4, 2009. The Petition for Formal Proceedings, which named the Conservation Alliance as a party, was filed with the DEP on February 4, 2009. On February 10, 2009, Ruden McClosky sent an engagement letter to Ms. Romano regarding governmental and administrative challenges to the Permit Modification. There is no evidence that the engagement was accepted by Ms. Romano. Ms. Romano testified that she has never spoken or corresponded with anyone from Ruden McClosky, and had no knowledge that she was being represented by Ruden McClosky. Ms. Romano had no input in drafting any of the petitions filed on her behalf, and had no recollection of having ever read the petitions. The Amended Petition for Formal Proceedings, which named Ms. Romano as a party, was filed with the DEP on February 12, 2009. Both of the Ruden McClosky engagement letters reference an “Other Client” that had an interest in challenging the Permit Modification, which “Other Client” would be responsible for paying all fees and costs, and would be involved in the approval of all work performed by Ruden McClosky. The parties stipulated that the “Other Client” was Odyssey. The date of an engagement letter is not dispositive as to the date on which an attorney-client relationship is established. It is, however, evidence that can be assessed with other evidence to draw a conclusion as to the date that the relationship commenced. The preponderance of the evidence demonstrates that requests for notice made prior to January 21, 2009, regarding the FPUA operation permit and the Permit Modification that is the subject of this proceeding were made on behalf of Odyssey or Florida Tire, existing clients of Ruden McClosky. The preponderance of the evidence leads the undersigned to find that Ruden McCloskey commenced its representation of the Conservation Alliance with regard to the instant case no earlier than January 21, 2009, the date on which Ruden McClosky received notice that the Permit Modification had been issued. The preponderance of the evidence leads the undersigned to find that Ruden McCloskey commenced its representation of Ms. Romano with regard to the instant case after January 21, 2009, if at all. Filing of the Petitions The 14th day after publication of the notice of the Permit Modification fell on January 23, 2009. On February 4, 2009, the initial Petition for Formal Proceedings was filed challenging the DEP issuance of the Permit Modification. The Petition named the Conservation Alliance as a party. On February 12, 2009, an Amended Petition for Formal Proceedings was filed that, among other things, added Ms. Romano as a party. Allegations of Standing - Conservation Alliance The Conservation Alliance is a non-profit, Florida corporation incorporated in 1985. It has at least 100 members that reside in St. Lucie County. It was formed for the general purpose of protecting the “water, soil, air, native flora and fauna,” and thus the environment of St. Lucie County. In the Petition for Formal Proceedings, as it has been amended, the Conservation Alliance made specific allegations as to how the issuance of the Permit Modification may affect its substantial interests. Those allegations are related, first, to the effect of the Permit Modification on the FPUA public water supply that serves members of the Conservation Alliance and, second, to the effect of the Permit Modification on the ability of the members to recreate and enjoy the waters of St. Lucie County. FPUA Water Service In its Second Amended Petition for Formal Proceedings, the Conservation Alliance alleged that “[m]embers of the Alliance own real property or otherwise reside within the service area of FPUA, and are, in fact, serviced by FPUA.” As a result, the members “will be adversely affected by the injection of the Allied waste stream into IW-1, which is located within 500 feet of three potable water supply sources, from which . . . Romano and the Alliance?s members are provided with potable water,” resulting in “a potential for those contaminants and hazardous materials to get into Petitioners? source of potable water.” Mr. Brady, the Conservation Alliance?s president, does not receive water service from the FPUA. Mr. Brady did not know how many members of the Conservation Alliance received water service from the FPUA. Persons living in unincorporated areas of Fort Pierce do not receive potable water from the FPUA. A mailing address of “Fort Pierce” does not mean that the person lives in the incorporated City of Fort Pierce. Mr. Brady “assumed” many of the members lived in the City of Fort Pierce, but offered no admissible, non-hearsay evidence of any kind to support that assumption. Mr. Stinnette testified that he was “confident that we have members that receive water from [FPUA]” but was not able to quantify the number of said members. As with Mr. Brady, Mr. Stinnette offered no admissible, non-hearsay evidence of any kind to support his belief. Recreational and Environmental Interests In its Second Amended Petition for Formal Proceedings, the Conservation Alliance alleged that “. . . Romano and the Alliance?s members utilize and protect the waters of St. Lucie County. Petitioners? recreational and environmental interests will be adversely affected if the Allied waste stream leaves the injection well area and flows into the rivers, streams, and or ocean.” Mr. Brady understood that one member of the Conservation Alliance, George Jones, fished in the C-24 canal, although Mr. Brady had not personally fished there for 25 years. Mr. Brady otherwise provided no evidence of the extent to which members used or enjoyed the waters in or around St. Lucie County. Mr. Stinnette has recreated in various water bodies that are tributaries of the Indian River Lagoon system. He indicated that he had engaged in recreational activities in and on the waters of St. Lucie County with “dozens” of people over the past 16 years, some of whom were members of the Conservation Alliance. There was no evidence offered as to how many of those persons were members of the Conservation Alliance, as opposed to members of other organizations or of no organization at all, or whether they were current members during the period relevant to this proceeding. Mr. Stinnette testified that the previously mentioned Mr. Jones said that he kayaked in the waters of St. Lucie County but, as to the recreational activities of other members, testified that “I don't know, I don't keep up with their day-to-day activities to that extent.” Although Mr. Jones testified at the hearing, he provided no information as to the nature or extent of his recreational uses of the waters of St. Lucie County. The only evidence of Mr. Jones? use of the waters of St. Lucie County is hearsay. Thus, the only finding that can be made as to the recreational use of the waters of St. Lucie County by current members of the Conservation Alliance is limited to the recreational use by a single member, Mr. Stinnette. Petitioner, Elaine Romano Ms. Romano is a member of the Conservation Alliance. The allegations regarding Ms. Romano?s substantial interests in this proceeding were the same as those of the Conservation Alliance as set forth above. FPUA Water Service Ms. Romano has her primary residence at 3436 Roselawn Boulevard, Fort Pierce, Florida. Her residence is not served by FPUA. Ms. Romano is the executor of the estate of her mother, Marion Scherer. The estate owns a residence at 1903 Royal Palm Drive, Fort Pierce, Florida that is currently vacant. That residence is served by FPUA. The estate is not a party to this proceeding. Recreational and Environmental Interests Ms. Romano attends certain meetings and functions of the Conservation Alliance, but offered no testimony of her use or enjoyment of any natural resources that could be affected by the Permit Modification. In that regard, her interest in this case was precipitated by a desire to support her mother?s interest in ecology.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law set forth herein, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent, Department of Environmental Protection, enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Formal Proceeding as amended. DONE AND ENTERED this 24th day of May, 2013, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S E. GARY EARLY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of May, 2013.
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following relevant facts are found: On or about August 1, 1978, respondent Pilot Properties, Inc. filed an application with the Department of Environmental Regulation for the issuance of a construction permit to expand and enlarge a wastewater treatment facility from 18,000 gallons per day to 150,000 gallons per day. The DER issued its notice of intent to issue the permit on November 13, 1978, and the Perdido Key Development Association, Inc. timely requested a hearing on said notice. Over the objection of respondent Pilot Properties, Southwest Escambia Improvement Association, Inc. was joined as a party petitioner. The Perdido Key Development Association, Inc. subsequently withdrew as a petitioner. The remaining petitioner, Southwest Escambia Improvement Association, Inc. is comprised of members who reside on, own property on or have a business interest in Perdido Key. Among its purpose are the improvement of the Perdido Key community and the protection of the environment. The members of the Association utilize Old River for recreational and commercial purposes. The proposed expanded facility is designed to serve cluster homes and condominium complexes on Perdido Key, for a total of approximately 428 units. It will utilize a contact stabilization process whereby raw sewage enters the plant from the individual units, receives treatment and then the effluent is discharged evenly through a spreader or equalizer into two percolation ponds continuing approximately 54,000 square feet. The facility is designed to remove 95 percent of B. O. D. and suspended solids. The plant is not designed to remove nutrients. The percolation ponds serve as a disposal device, and not a treatment device. The ponds are to be constructed at an elevation of six feet. Considering fluctuation, the percolation pond bottoms will be separated from the groundwater by three feet. It is an accepted DER guideline to require a three foot separation between the groundwater and a percolation pond. The conditions of the proposed permit require that a three foot buffer zone be maintained between the bottom of the ponds and the maximum groundwater elevation. The nearest edge of the percolation pond will be located approximately 105 to 110 feet from the water line of Old River. The effluent will be discharged from the plant to the percolation pond and then to the groundwater, which ultimately flows in the direction of Old River. Groundwater monitoring wells are provided to measure the level of nitrogen. The soil on Perdido Key is course-type sand, with little clay or silt. It has a very rapid vertical percolation rate. According to the respondent's witness who qualified as an expert in ecology and botany, the process of adsorption, precipitation and denitrification which occurs as groundwater moves horizontally will prevent the degradation of Old River. This witness observed no suspicious levels of phosphate in samples from Old River. This witness observed no suspicious levels of phosphate in samples from Old River. He found the phosphate nitrate and fecal chloroform level of Old River comparable to that found in other clean water bodies. The petitioner's witness who qualified as an expert in aquatic ecology took samples of groundwater and sand from various areas on Perdido Key to analyze their nitrate and phosphate content. It was his conclusion that phosphate was not attenuated by the sands and that nutrients, particularly phosphate, are being discharged into Old River from sewage treatment facilities existing on Perdido Key. He observed a shifting of the composition of flora in Old River near the site of another existing sewage treatment facility which was not designed to remove nitrates or phosphates. However, the other existing facility was not shown to be comparable in the size of its percolation ponds, the pond elevation from the groundwater or in the manner of discharge form the plant to the percolation pond. This witness did agree that the spreading or equalizing method of discharging effluent from the plant to the 54,000 square feet of percolation ponds could delay the entrance of nutrients to Old River by as much as five months. The petitioner produced a witness who was skilled in the operation and maintenance of wastewater treatment plants similar in design to that proposed by respondent Pilot Properties. This witness testified that this type of facility required greater operating time due to difficulties encountered by hydraulic imbalances on clarifiers and the upward flow of discharge. The witness had no knowledge as to the future operating plans of the respondent. The two respondents presented witnesses who were qualified as experts in the areas of design and construction of sewage treatment systems. Both witnesses had reviewed the subject permit application and were of the opinion that if the proposed plant is constructed as designed, it will meet the minimum treatment standards required by DER's statutes and rules. The application submitted by Pilot Properties was for the issuance of a construction permit. Among the conditions of the proposed issuance of such a construction permit is a requirement that the permitted obtain an operation permit sixty days prior to the expiration date of the construction permit. Prior to the issuance of an operating permit, the applicant must provide the Department of Environmental Regulation with four months of results of analysis and flow measurements. An operation permit is issued only to those facilities which are able to operate within the standards of DER's rules. If the plant does not properly operate, DER requires the necessary corrections and modifications to bring the plant into compliance. DER may also prohibit further hookups if the plant operates improperly.
Recommendation Based upon the findings of fact and conclusions of law recited above, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Environmental Regulation issue to the Respondent Pilot Properties, Inc. the requested construction permit subject to the conditions contained in the Department's initial notice of intent to issue the permit. DONE AND ORDERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 4th day March of 1980. DIANE D. TREMOR Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings 101 Collins Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Honorable Jacob Varn Secretary, Department of Environmental Regulation 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32301 T. Michael Patterson, Esquire 26 East Garden Street Pensacola, Florida 32501 Robert T. Fulton General Counsel Pilot Properties, Inc. 664 Cherry Street Winter Park, Florida 32789 William Hyde, Esquire Assistant General Counsel Twin Towers Office Building 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue The issue to be determined is whether Bradford County meets the criteria listed in Florida Administrative Code Rule 62-330.051(4)(e) for a road repair exemption.
Findings Of Fact Based upon the demeanor and credibility of the witnesses, the stipulations of the parties, and the evidentiary record of this proceeding, the following Findings of Fact are made: The Parties Dr. Still resides at 14167 Southwest 101st Avenue, Starke, Florida. That property abuts work that was performed pursuant to the Exemption. The District is a water management district created by section 373.069(1), Florida Statutes. It has the responsibility to conserve, protect, manage, and control the water resources within its geographic boundaries. See § 373.069(2)(a), Fla. Stat. The District, in concert with the Department of Environmental Protection, is authorized to administer and enforce chapter 373, and rules promulgated thereunder in chapter 62-330, regarding activities in surface waters of the state. The District is the permitting authority in this proceeding and issued the Exemption to the County. The County is a political subdivision of the State of Florida. The County is responsible for keeping county roads and structures within its boundary in good repair and for establishing the width and grade of such roads and structures. §§ 334.03(8) and 336.02(1)(a), Fla. Stat. 101st Avenue, a dirt road, was constructed decades ago and runs in a general north/south direction for several miles. It was in existence, publicly used, and under County maintenance long before January 1, 2002. Dr. Still acknowledged that when he purchased his property in 1996, the road was publicly used and was being maintained by the County. The centerline of 101st Avenue has existed in its current position as long as Mr. Welch, the Bradford County surveyor, has been familiar with the property, since at least 1996. The County owns and is allowed to use a 60-foot right-of-way (“ROW”) extending 30 feet to either side of the centerline. The driving surface of 101st Avenue has consistently been from 20 to 22 feet in width, with drainage structures extending further into the ROW. The evidence was convincing that 101st Avenue was regularly maintained or repaired by the County for more than seven years prior to the Exemption. The evidence was equally convincing that, during that period, the width of the road that actually has been maintained or repaired is substantially -- if not identically -- the same as the width of 101st Avenue after the road repairs under the Exemption were completed. 101st Avenue was, prior to the exempt road repair work, “very wet” during rainy periods, and cars and trucks would routinely get stuck in the mud. Mr. Welch testified credibly that 101st Avenue was “a mess” even before the events that led to the work covered by the Exemption. It is reasonable to conclude that the driving surface of 101st Avenue may have shifted by a matter of feet in either direction over the years prior to the exempt road repairs, which would have generally been the result of persons driving off of the driving surface to escape impassable areas, and of the imprecision inherent in grading a dirt road with a large motor grader. The evidence established that the County has maintained 101st Avenue at a location as close to the established centerline as possible, and has not intentionally moved or realigned 101st Avenue from its historic location. Mr. Welch was very familiar with 101st Avenue, having used it numerous times, including during the period leading up to the events that precipitated the road repair work at issue. He testified to two surveys he performed of the area, first in 1996, and again in the vicinity of the Still property in May 2017. He testified that 101st Avenue was under County ownership and maintenance prior to his first survey in 1996. Photographic evidence offered by Dr. Still showed 101st Avenue to be significantly degraded near his property for several years leading up to 2017. Turbidity of the waters passing alongside and under 101st Avenue was “a long ongoing issue with this road,” dating back to at least 2015. 101st Avenue “was in pretty poor shape” in January 2017. Cars would routinely go around wet areas on the driving surface and possibly onto Dr. Still’s property. That gave the appearance of a change in the eastern ROW. Over a period of years prior to the Exemption work, the ROW may have crept eastward as the road was graded, ditches were maintained, and residential traffic diverted around impassable areas. The shift could have been as much as 10 to 15 feet, but the evidence establishing such was neither precise nor compelling. However, even if the ROW shifted over time, the movement was not the result of intentional operation and maintenance by County staff, but was a gradual, unintentional movement over time. Such a gradual shift is common with dirt and limerock roads. Furthermore, the alignment of the travel surface was stable, and was always within the 60-foot ROW, although the stormwater structures may have gone beyond the ROW. In August 2017, a series of storm events caused 101st Avenue to be flooded. Dr. Still testified that the existing road and ditches and most of the areas adjacent to his property were “destroyed” by continued public use after the August 2017 rain event. He believed there was no way to ascertain the alignment of 101st Avenue. Around September 10, 2017, Hurricane Irma impacted the County, causing substantial flooding and damaging numerous dirt and limerock roads in the County, including 101st Avenue. 101st Avenue was partially damaged from flooded conditions, and rendered completely impassable at places along its path, which led motorists to drive off of the established roadway onto adjacent properties to get through. The diversion of traffic off of the road surface was due to the personal decisions of the public using the road, and was not the result of any direction, operation, or maintenance by County staff. 14 After Hurricane Irma, Governor Scott issued emergency orders that allowed local governments to undertake necessary repairs to roadways. The County issued similar emergency orders.1 In November 2017, Mr. Welch performed a survey to establish the alignment of the road. 101st Avenue was partially repaired consistent with the survey and pursuant to the emergency orders, with the work beginning in December 2017. As the work to repair 101st Avenue was proceeding, Dr. Still asserted that the ROW encroached onto his property. He and Mr. Welch walked the property line, noted that the ROW appeared to extend across a fence installed on the west side of 101st Avenue, and staked the disputed area. Though the County believed it was working within its ROW, it decided, more as a matter of convenience to avoid the time and expense of litigation, to purchase the disputed area. Thereafter, on January 5, 2018, the County purchased 1.78 acres of property from Dr. Still, which was incorporated into the County ROW.2 The purchase of the property, and establishment of the undisputed ROW, was completed well before the December 23, 2019, filing of the Petition. The travel surface of the road remained within the prescriptive and historical ROW. The “footprint” of 101st Avenue was the same before and after the road repair work. Dr. Still admitted that the road had not “physically moved.” However, he believes that the County’s use of the 1 Since the Exemption work was largely (and lawfully) performed under the emergency orders, the County’s Exemption application was filed after the repair work had begun on 101st Avenue, and is considered an after-the-fact application. The application for the Exemption was originally filed pursuant to rules 62-330.051(4)(b) and (e). The County thereafter withdrew its request for an exemption pursuant to rule 62-330.051(4)(b), and limited its Exemption to rule 62-330.051(4)(e), which establishes the standards at issue in this proceeding. The District’s December 10, 2019, proposed agency action granted the Exemption for resurfacing the entirety of the length of 101st Avenue. 2 The evidence was not sufficient to establish that the ROW actually encroached onto Dr. Still’s property. It is equally plausible that the fence encroached into the 101st Avenue ROW. Nonetheless, the issue was -- or should have been -- resolved when the County agreed to pay Dr. Still to extinguish any plausible claim to the property in dispute. 1.78 acres of purchased property for the ROW constitutes a realignment of 101st Avenue. From an engineering perspective, as long as a road surface is within an established ROW, and there has been no intentional change in its direction or trajectory, the road is not “realigned.” The evidence established that 101st Avenue remained within its established ROW, and there was no intentional change in its direction or trajectory from the repair work. The work performed under the exemption involved grading 101st Avenue along its entire length, and applying asphalt millings and a sealant to stabilize the travel surface. The asphalt millings placed on the 101st Avenue travel surface were applied on top of the “as-is” existing limerock. The millings provided structure and stability to the travel lanes, and eliminated erosion and the large muddy bogs that were a feature of the road during the rainy season and after storms. There was no persuasive evidence that the millings materially raised the height of the road travel surface. Mr. Rischar testified that 101st Avenue, after the road repair work, is now in good condition and intact. The asphalt millings are not “loose” but are bound together. The work stabilized the roadbed, provided structural integrity, and improved water quality as compared to a simple graded road. His testimony is accepted. Dr. Still produced several photographs depicting a small pile of dirt near a roadside ditch near the drainage culvert under 101st Avenue. The pile pre-dated the Exemption work. Ms. Diaz testified that the mounds had been “taken care of,” and they do not appear in any post-Exemption photographs. There was no evidence of any excavated material having been deposited at or near the Still property from the exempt road repair work. As part of the Exemption work, drainage structures were incorporated to receive and convey stormwater from the road surface. Rule 62- 330.051(4)(e)5. requires that work performed under a road repair exemption incorporate “[r]oadside swales or other effective means of stormwater treatment.” The evidence was not sufficient to demonstrate that the stormwater structures incorporated along 101st Avenue met the stringent criteria for “swales” as set forth in the Applicant’s Handbook, Volume II, §§ 5.5.1 and 5.5.2. However, the testimony was convincing that the drainage work incorporated into the road repairs was an “other effective means of stormwater treatment.” Dr. Still’s testimony as a “citizen scientist” was not sufficient to overcome the expert testimony offered by the County and the District. During the initial phases of the work, when the County was acting under the post-Irma emergency orders, the County had not installed silt fences. Dr. Still complained to the County, and silt fences and turbidity curtains were installed. Dr. Still admitted that they “functioned fairly well.” The silt fences and turbidity curtains were installed prior to the December 23, 2019, filing of the Petition. The turbidity curtains and silt screens met best management practices (“BMPs”). BMPs are generally construction-related practices, and are not designed for the “operation” of a facility after conditions have stabilized. Compliance with BMPs is intended to demonstrate compliance with water quality standards. Ms. Carr directed the County to remove the turbidity control curtains prior to her last inspection since the area had stabilized. While photographic evidence depicted differences in the appearance of water in the roadside ditches from that flowing under the road from forested areas to the west, the photographs were not sufficient to establish violations of state water quality standards for turbidity. A turbidity violation is, by definition, a reading of 29 Nephelometric Turbidity Units (NTUs) over background as measured by a meter. Fla. Admin. Code R. 62-302.530(69). Ms. Carr testified credibly that one cannot gauge water quality from a picture, and that the photographs she took on her December 20, 2018, site visit did not depict the conditions “in real life.” District employees who visited the area, including Ms. Carr, saw nothing that raised water quality concerns. The appearance of the water in photographs is not sufficient to demonstrate that the County failed to control turbidity, sedimentation, and erosion during and after construction to prevent violations of state water quality standards due to construction-related activities. Dr. Still was critical of the District inspectors for failing to take turbidity samples using calibrated meters. However, he did not take such samples himself, and was not able to offer proof of any violation of water quality standards due to the exempt road repairs. Rule 62-330.050(9)(b)5., read in conjunction with rule 62- 330.051(4)(e)8., provides that the “construction, alteration, and operation” of exempt road repair work shall not “[c]ause or contribute to a violation of state water quality standards,” and that “[t]urbidity, sedimentation, and erosion shall be controlled during and after construction to prevent violations of state water quality standards.” The rules establish that the standards and conditions apply to the exempt work being performed, and not to conditions in the area that may have existed prior to the exempt work. The issue of turbidity, though discussed at length during the hearing, was resolved conclusively when Dr. Still admitted that turbidity was not made worse by the road repairs. Furthermore, a preponderance of the evidence established that the structure and stability provided to the travel lanes improved the turbidity and sedimentation that pre-dated the road repair, and reduced erosion of the road, not only by the repair of the road itself, but by eliminating the need to drive off of the road surface to avoid and bypass impassable areas. The Exemption work included the replacement of a culvert under 101st Avenue. At some time between January 8, 2018, and January 19, 2018, an existing 30-inch culvert was removed and replaced with two 24-inch culverts. Dr. Still complained that the 24-inch culverts were resulting in flooding of his property. Therefore, on or about December 17, 2019, prior to the December 23, 2019, filing of the Petition, the 24-inch culverts were removed, and a 30-inch culvert was installed to match the size and capacity of the previously existing culvert, and return the area to its pre-existing condition. There was no evidence that the current 30-inch culvert has resulted in any flooding. Since the 30-inch culvert reestablished the pre-Exemption condition, a strong inference is drawn that the exempt work will not “cause adverse water quantity or flooding impacts to receiving water and adjacent lands.” Rather, the evidence establishes that water quantity impacts, if any, were in existence prior to the exempt road repairs.3 The work was not related to the alteration or maintenance of a “culverted roadway crossing,” despite the culvert work. Thus, the previous inclusion of rule 62-330.051(4)(b) as a basis for the County’s Exemption request was withdrawn. The District accepted that withdrawal, and its notice of Exemption did not include any reference to the culvert. As indicated in the Preliminary Statement and the amended disposition of the Motion in Limine, the road repair Exemption does not explicitly address culvert replacement. Therefore, any allegation that the replacement of the culvert was a violation of District permitting standards must be taken up with the District as an exercise of its enforcement discretion, and is not an issue in this proceeding. Dr. Still produced photographs that were described as depicting “sediment” that was deposited along a “canal” on his property between 101st Avenue and a cleared utility easement. To the extent the photographs depicted sediment as described, which was not visually apparent, they were not sufficient to prove when any such sediment was deposited, or whether the sediment was related to the road repairs performed under the Exemption. 3 Again, simplistically, work performed under the road repair exemption is not designed to make pre-existing water quality and water quantity issues better, it just cannot make those conditions worse. Mr. Rischar testified convincingly that there was no scientific data to support a determination that there are water quality issues, including turbidity, at the roadway. Dr. Still produced photographs of the post-Exemption condition of 101st Avenue with several comparatively tiny depressions that, if never maintained, would presumably develop into potholes. Despite the nascent depressions, the road appeared to be vastly improved from its condition prior to the repairs, as evidenced by Dr. Still’s pre-Irma photographs. Mr. Rischar testified credibly that any roadway, from the least developed dirt road to the most highly developed interstate highway can, and does, develop holes in the travel surface over time. For that reason, governmental bodies, including the County, maintain roads, including 101st Avenue. The photographs provide no support for a finding that the exempt road repairs have resulted in any violation of a standard in either rule 62-330.051(4)(e)8. or rule 62- 330.050(9)(b)5. The evidence established that 101st Avenue was regularly maintained and repaired by the County for more than seven years prior to the Exemption, and that the road repairs did not realign, expand the number of traffic lanes, or alter the width of the existing road. The evidence established that the work performed under the Exemption did not realign 101st Avenue. The repairs to 101st Avenue included work reasonably necessary to repair and stabilize the road using generally accepted roadway design standards. The evidence demonstrates that no excavated material related to the work under the Exemption was placed at or near Dr. Still’s property or, for that matter, anywhere along 101st Avenue. The evidence established that the repairs to 101st Avenue did not adversely impound or obstruct existing water flow, cause adverse impacts to existing surface water storage and conveyance capabilities, or otherwise cause adverse water quantity or flooding impacts to receiving waters and adjacent lands. The evidence was not sufficient to establish that the road repair work caused or contributed to a violation of state water quality standards. Ultimate Findings of Fact The greater weight of the competent substantial evidence establishes that 101st Avenue was in existence long before January 1, 2002, has been publicly used since that time, and has been regularly maintained and repaired by the County for more than seven years prior to the Exemption. Evidence to the contrary was not persuasive. The greater weight of the competent substantial evidence establishes that during its relevant period of existence, the width of 101st Avenue that actually has been maintained or repaired is substantially -- if not identically - - the same as the width of 101st Avenue after the road repairs under the Exemption were completed. The work performed under the Exemption did not realign or expand the number of traffic lanes of 101st Avenue. The repairs to 101st Avenue included work reasonably necessary to repair and stabilize the road using generally accepted roadway design standards. Evidence to the contrary was not persuasive. The greater weight of the competent substantial evidence establishes that no excavated material related to the work under the Exemption was placed at or near Dr. Still’s property or, for that matter, anywhere along 101st Avenue. Evidence to the contrary was not persuasive. The greater weight of the competent substantial evidence establishes that the repairs to 101st Avenue did not adversely impound or obstruct existing water flow, cause adverse impacts to existing surface water storage and conveyance capabilities, or otherwise cause adverse water quantity or flooding impacts to receiving waters and adjacent lands. Evidence to the contrary was not persuasive. The greater weight of the competent substantial evidence establishes that the road repair work incorporated effective means of stormwater treatment, and did not cause or contribute to a violation of state water quality standards. Evidence to the contrary was not persuasive. The greater weight of the competent substantial evidence establishes that turbidity, sedimentation, and erosion were controlled during and after construction, and continue to be controlled, to prevent violations of state water quality standards. Erosion and sediment control BMPs were installed and maintained in accordance with applicable guidelines and specifications. Evidence to the contrary was not persuasive.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Suwannee River Water Management District enter a final order: Approving the December 10, 2019, Environmental Resource Permit (ERP): Exemption, ERP-007-233697-2, determining that activities related to the repair of Southwest 101st Avenue in Bradford County, Florida, met the criteria to be an exempt activity pursuant to rule 62-330.051(4)(e); and Taking such action pursuant to section 120.595(1) as it deems appropriate. The undersigned retains jurisdiction to determine the award of costs and attorneys’ fees pursuant to section 120.595(1)(d), if the final order makes such an award and the case is remanded by the Suwannee River Water Management District to DOAH for that purpose. DONE AND ENTERED this 19th day of November, 2020, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S E. GARY EARLY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of November, 2020. COPIES FURNISHED: George T. Reeves, Esquire Davis, Schnitker, Reeves and Browning, P.A. Post Office Drawer 652 Madison, Florida 32341 (eServed) Paul Edward Still 14167 Southwest 101st Avenue Starke, Florida 32091 (eServed) Frederick T. Reeves, Esquire Frederick T. Reeves, P.A. 5709 Tidalwave Drive New Port Richey, Florida 34562 (eServed) William Edward Sexton, County Attorney Bradford County, Florida 945 North Temple Avenue Post Office Drawer B Starke, Florida 32091 (eServed) Hugh L. Thomas, Executive Director Suwannee River Water Management District 9225 County Road 49 Live Oak, Florida 32060 (eServed)
The Issue Whether Respondent discriminated against Petitioner on the basis of his age and handicap in violation of the Florida Human Rights Act of 1977 and the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992, Chapter 760, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Harold Asher (Asher), was born on January 13, 1929, and as of April 1, 1992, he was 63 years old. Respondent, Barnett Banks, Inc. (BBI), is a holding company that owns and controls numerous banks in Florida and Georgia. The banks in Florida owned by BBI are located in three geographical regions: the north region, the central region, and the south region. In the south region there are nine banks: Barnett Bank of Key West, Barnett Bank of South Florida (Miami), Barnett Bank of Broward (Fort Lauderdale), Barnett Bank of Palm Beach County, Barnett Bank of Martin County, Barnett Bank of Treasure Coast, Barnett Bank of Lake Okeechobee, Barnett Bank of Naples, and Barnett Bank of Lee County (Fort Myers). Each bank has branches. Barnett Banks, Inc. is an employer subject to Section 760.10, Florida Statutes. Harold Asher was hired by Barnett Bank of Palm Beach County in 1983, at the age of 54 as a loan review officer and was later promoted to Vice President/Loan Review. His job responsibility was to review loans which had been granted by Barnett Bank of Palm Beach County. A loan review is an evaluation of the portfolio after a loan is made to insure that the loan was properly approved, that the analysis done to support the sources of repayment was adequate, that the loan is collectible, that the risk factors associated with the loan is in line with policy and regulatory standards, and that the loan is properly underwritten. The loan review is memorialized on a line or summary sheet. While employed by Barnett Bank of Palm Beach County, Asher had several supervisors, including Ken Parrish, Art Kite, James Kammert, Noel Coan, and Martin Streischek. Barnett Bank of Palm Beach County used a rating system of one to five in evaluating its employees, which equated as follows: 1.0 to 1.49 means fails to meet minimum position accountabilities; 1.5 to 2.49 means with few exceptions, meets position accountabilities; 2.5 to 3.49 means meets position accountabilities; 3.5 to 4.49 means exceeds position accountabilities; and 4.5 to 5.0 means significantly exceeds position accountabilities. In March, 1988, James Kammert rated Asher's performance as 3.0. On January 1, 1989, Art Kite rated Asher's performance for 1988 as 3.70. In June, 1989, Art Kite rated Asher as meeting or exceeding in the key result areas (KRAs) of Asher's position. On January 1, 1990, Art Kite performed an evaluation of Asher's performance for 1989 and rated him 3.45. On January 18, 1991, Neal Coan rated Asher's performance for 1990 as 3.0. While working for Barnett Bank of Palm Beach County, Asher was never disciplined. Prior to 1991, BBI and its banks had a dual system for loan reviews. Some of the banks such as Barnett Bank of Palm Beach County, had set up loan review sections which operated at the bank level only. The staff of these sections would report directly to the bank. BBI had a loan review section for each of its regions. The BBI regional loan review sections would review loans in each of the banks located in that particular region. In January, 1991 a decision was made by BBI to consolidate the loan reviews at the holding company level. On-site teams were established in Miami, Fort Lauderdale, and Palm Beach. A travel team reviewed loans at all the banks including the banks which had on-site teams. As a result of the consolidation, the local banks eliminated their loan review departments and the staff comprising those particular departments were terminated from their positions. At the time of the decision to consolidate, Barnett Bank of Palm Beach County's loan review section consisted of one secretary and three loan officers, one of whom was Asher. The three loan officers interviewed for positions with BBI. Asher and Steven Clapp were hired by BBI. Asher was 61 years of age when he was hired by BBI on January 1, 1991, as the on-site manager for Credit Quality Review at the Barnett Bank of Palm Beach County. His office was located on Datura Street in West Palm Beach. Part of Asher's duties included supervising Mr. Clapp. The BBI on-site manager for Credit Quality Review at Barnett Bank of South Florida (Miami) was Barry Goldberg, who was born on September 24, 1962. The BBI on-site manager for Credit Quality Review at the Barnett Bank of Broward County was Mark Tavoletti, who was born on December 19, 1961. Although the same methods were used to review loans for BBI as were used to review loans for Barnett Bank of Palm Beach County, there were some changes. Computers were used more at BBI. Instead of traveling to the 45 branches of Barnett Bank of Palm Beach to review loans, Asher received the files through the interoffice mail. BBI loan reviews focused more on a loan instead of the work of the loan officer. Monthly reports were required by BBI. BBI report formats differed from those of Barnett Bank of Palm Beach County. Asher no longer selected the loans to be reviewed. BBI selected the loans using specific criteria established by BBI. Asher reported to Scott Bechtle. While working with Mr. Bechtle, Asher did not receive any criticism or disciplinary action. In July, 1991, Edward Angulo (Angulo) took over Mr. Bechtle's position as the Regional Credit Review Director for the south region. Asher, Mr. Goldberg, and Mr. Tavoletti began reporting to Angulo. Angulo's primary duty was to review the line sheets that were generated by the on-site groups and the travel team. From July, 1991 to the end of December, 1991, Angulo met with Asher approximately three to five times and talked with Asher numerous times on the telephone. Angulo reviewed all the line sheets that were generated by Asher and Clapp during that six-month period. In reviewing the work done by the Palm Beach on-site group, Angulo noted that generally the line sheets did not have sufficient quantifiable information, did not contain information supported by an independent evaluation, and contained deficiencies regarding underwriting. He would make comments concerning these problems and call Asher to discuss them. Some times Asher would not provide additional information requested by Angulo or would provide it in an unsatisfactory manner. During the last six months in 1991, Angulo spent more time in connection with the Palm Beach loan reviews than he did with the other loan review teams because of the problems the Palm Beach team was having. Angulo sat in with Asher during an exit meeting with bank management wherein Asher appeared indecisive and unprepared, forcing Angulo to take over and conduct the meeting in its entirety. Angulo completed a performance evaluation on Asher for the period 1/91 to 12/91. Asher was evaluated on nine KRAs: 1) supervise staff, 2) analyze specific loans, 3) determine quality of credit analyses, 4) evaluate underwriting standards, 5) insure accuracy of CSS, 6) evaluate overall credit administration, 7) evaluate loan approval process, 8) prepare reports and exit meetings, and 9) train junior officers. Each KRA was weighted and rated on a scale of one to five, with one being the lowest rating and five being the highest. For KRAs 1, 5, and 9, Asher was rated as 3, which meant that his performance met expectations. For KRAs 2, 3, 7, and 8, Asher received a rating of 2, which stood for approaches expectations. In the KRA concerning evaluating underwriting standards, Asher received a rating of 1, which meant that Asher's performance failed to meet expectations. Angulo noted on the evaluation that Asher needed to improve his performance in the following areas: technical/analytical, independent/inquisitive attitudes, and judgement/decisiveness. Asher's total weighted rating was 2.25, which equates to an overall rating of 2. At the time of the evaluation, Asher and Angulo understood that Asher's position was a Review Officer III. Asher had been performing the work of a Review Officer III. Accordingly, Angulo evaluated his work using the standards for Review Officer III, and evaluated the work actually performed by Asher. However, at the hearing it was revealed that Asher had been a Review Officer II at the time of his employment with BBI and held that position until his termination. On or about April 1, 1992, Angulo met with Asher and discussed Asher's performance since January, 1992. Angulo cited a problem that had occurred concerning a review of Southside Investors which had been done by Asher's subordinate, Steven Clapp. Angulo had discussed with Asher several inconsistencies or omissions in the report relating to potential underwriting problems and asked Asher to have the deficiencies cleared up. As of April 1, 1992, the deficiencies had not been resolved. Angulo also discussed with Asher problems dealing with the adequacy of supervision of report preparation and the conduct of exit meetings with bank management. Deficiencies in these areas had been pointed out in Asher's 1991 annual performance evaluation. Since that evaluation, a monthly report by Steven Clapp had to be amended because of his erroneous conclusion that the bank's overall underwriting and lending practices were inadequate. The incorrect finding was not corrected until a draft of the report was reviewed by the regional office. As the on-site manager, Asher should have reviewed Mr. Clapp's report and caught the error before it was sent to the regional office. Angulo also pointed out to Asher that his performance at exit meetings with bank management still lacked decisiveness, resulting in the need for frequent changes in reports. As a result of the continued deficiencies in Asher's performance since his 1991 performance evaluation, Angulo felt that Asher needed technical training, improvement in supervisory skills, and familiarization with BBI policies and procedures. To assist Asher in reaching an acceptable level of performance, Asher was moved from his on-site manager position to Barnett Banks, Inc.'s Credit Review Office travel team on or about April 1, 1992. There was no decrease in salary, benefits, or pay grade. Additionally, Asher was placed on a 90-day probationary period. In mid-April, 1992, Asher wrote Ken Veniard, a Senior Vice President, stating that he disagreed with Angulo's evaluation and felt that the negative comments were "based on factors totally unrelated to performance, such as age, personality, or simply the lack of complete information." Asher requested to be considered for a transfer. Veniard received the memorandum on April 29, 1992. On or about April 1, 1992, Jack Shoben, a credit review officer with BBI since 1989, was moved into the position of on-site manager for Credit Quality Review at the Barnett Bank of Palm Beach County at the Datura Street location. Jack Shoben was born on October 1, 1947, and as of April 1, 1992, he was 44 years old. Angulo chose Shoben as the on-site manager because of Mr. Shoben's qualifications and experience. After Mr. Shoben became on-site manager, the work product from the on-site team at Barnett Bank of Palm Beach County began to improve; thus Angulo did not have to spend as much time on the Palm Beach site as he had when Asher was on-site manager. William Westland, who was born on October 26, 1927, was Asher's supervisor on the travel team. During Asher's first two weeks on the travel team, he worked in Broward County. His performance was satisfactory. The third week on the travel team was spent in Miami, where Asher was required to review real estate loans. Mr. Westland noted that Asher needed some training in the real estate loan area. On May 10, 1992, shortly after Asher returned from Miami, he suffered a brain seizure and was hospitalized for two days. Six weeks after his seizure, Asher returned to work. As a result of Asher's seizure, his doctors prohibited Asher from driving for at least six months and possibly longer and required his work-related travel to be kept to an absolute minimum, which included avoiding long travel trips of any type. An essential requirement for the position that Asher held on the travel team was that he be able to travel to the different banks in the south region to conduct loan reviews. Asher was aware that extensive travel was a requirement of his job and so advised his doctor by letter dated July 3, 1992. When Asher returned to work, he was temporarily placed on the on-site review team at Palm Beach under the supervision of Jack Shoben. Steven Clapp who had been at Palm Beach on the on-site review team was transferred to the travel team. Asher's probationary period was extended to August 7, 1992. The temporary placement was to accommodate Asher's non-travel status until December 31, 1992, and after such time Asher's continued employment was contingent upon his satisfactory completion of the probationary period and his ability to meet the requirements of all credit review officers of his level, which included travel. During June 1992 until Mr. Asher's termination, Jeff Asher, his son, often drove Asher to Barnett Bank's offices on Datura Street in West Palm Beach. He also drove him home from that location during the same time. Jeff Asher also drove Asher to and from branch locations within Palm Beach County during the same period. A memorandum dated July 28, 1992, was sent from Ken Veniard, Angulo's supervisor, to BBI Credit Quality Staff, stating that although BBI was committed to maintain the on-site loan review teams, that all on-site staff would be required to travel and assist the travel team as necessary. On August 7, 1992, Asher's probationary period lapsed. There was no evaluation of Asher's performance at that time. In August, 1992, Steven Clapp was transferred to the BBI office in Jacksonville to fill a position for which he had posted. The position on the travel team that Mr. Clapp had filled in Asher's absence was held open for Asher in the event that his travel restrictions would be lifted in January, 1993, thereby enabling him to return to his position on the travel. In November, 1992, Asher, Sarah Ketchum, Jack Shoben, and Angulo participated in a teleconference, at which time Angulo advised Asher that if Asher's doctor did not approve a full time travel schedule in January, 1993, Asher's employment with BBI would be terminated effective as of December 31, 1992. On December 28, 1992, Asher visited his doctor, who continued the travel restrictions. On December 30, 1992, Asher, Jack Shoben, Joan Slaughenhaupt, and Angulo participated in a teleconference. Asher stated that his travel restrictions had not changed. Angulo advised Asher that his employment would be terminated effective December 31 due to his inability to travel. Mr. Asher's employment ended on December 31, 1992. On January 1, 1992, the on-site teams in Miami and Fort Lauderdale were each reduced from three to two on-site personnel. The Palm Beach on-site team was reduced to one one-site person, Jack Shoben, who was the only loan review officer there from January 1, 1993 to December 31, 1993. In January, 1994, all on-site positions were eliminated. Mr. Asher's salary at the time of his termination was $47,339.96 annually. In the spring of 1993, Asher and his wife went to Huntsville, Alabama, traveling by automobile two days each way. In June, 1993, all Asher's travel restrictions were lifted. Prior to his driving restrictions being lifted, Asher began driving short distances in his neighborhood. In January, 1994, BBI made an offer of reinstatement to Asher, whereby he would have been reinstated as a Credit Review Officer II on the regional travel team with the same salary, same seniority, and same salary grade level as when he was terminated on December 31, 1992. In addition, a procedure was implemented whereby Asher could report directly to Janice Gurny, Director of Human Resources for BBI in the Jacksonville office, any complaints regarding harassment on the part of his supervisors. Asher received the offer but did not contact anyone at BBI regarding the offer of reinstatement. Asher did not take the offer because it was a Credit Review Officer II position (he was under the impression he was a Credit Review Officer III at the time of his termination); he felt the environment was hostile; and he had his house on the market to sell.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a Final Order denying the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 8th day of June, 1994, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. SUSAN B. KIRKLAND Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of June, 1994. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 93-5815 To comply with the requirements of Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes (1993), the following rulings are made on the parties' proposed findings of fact: Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact Paragraph 1: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 2: Accepted. Paragraphs 3: The first sentence is accepted in substance. The second sentence is rejected as constituting argument. The third sentence is accepted to the extent that Petitioner received two letters which advised him of his increase in salary and thanked him for his hard work and professionalism and advised him that the bank was glad that he was on the team. Paragraph 4: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 5: The first three sentences are accepted in substance. The last sentence is accepted to the extent that the methods to review loans were basically the same but rejected to the extent that the only changes were in the format of the loan review reporting process. Paragraphs 6-7: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 8: The third, fourth, and fifth sentences are rejected as constituting argument. The remainder of the paragraph is accepted in substance. Paragraph 9: Rejected as subordinate to the facts actually found. Paragraphs 10-11: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 12: The last sentence is rejected to the extent that it implies that Asher was rated on work for which he was not performing. He was doing the job of a level III but his personnel file reflected that he officially was placed in a level II position. The remainder of the paragraph is accepted in substance. Paragraph 13: Rejected as constituting argument. Paragraphs 14-16: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 17: The first sentence is rejected as recitation of testimony. The remainder of the paragraph is rejected as constituting argument. Paragraph 18: The first, second, sixth, and tenth sentences are rejected as not supported by the greater weight of the evidence. The third, fourth, fifth, eighth and ninth sentences are accepted in substance except as to the reference to the placement on the travel team as a demotion. The seventh sentence is rejected as unnecessary. Paragraph 19: The first sentence is rejected as not supported by the greater weight of the evidence. The second sentence is accepted. The last sentence is rejected as recitation of testimony. Paragraphs 20-23: Rejected as recitation of testimony and constituting argument. Paragraph 24: Rejected as constituting argument. Paragraph 25: The first, second, third, and fourth sentences are accepted in substance. The fifth, sixth, and seventh sentences are rejected as not supported by the greater weight of the evidence. The eight sentence is rejected as constituting argument. The ninth sentence is rejected as not supported by the greater weight of the evidence in that the charge against Asher was his failure to catch Mr. Clapp's errors before the report left the Palm Beach office. The last sentence is rejected as irrelevant. Paragraph 26: The first sentence is rejected as subordinate to the facts actually found. The second sentence is rejected as not supported by any evidence. The remainder of the paragraph is accepted in substance. Paragraph 27: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 28: The first, third, and fourth sentences are accepted in substance. The second and fifth sentences are rejected as subordinate to the facts actually found. Paragraph 29: The first sentence is accepted. The remainder of the paragraph is rejected as subordinate to the facts actually found. Paragraph 30: The first sentence is accepted in substance. The remainder of the paragraph is rejected as subordinate to the facts actually found. Paragraph 31: Rejected as mere recitation of testimony. Paragraph 32: Rejected as mere recitation of testimony. Paragraph 33: Rejected as subordinate to the facts actually found. Paragraph 34: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 35: Rejected as subordinate to the facts actually found. Paragraph 36: The first and second sentences are accepted in substance. The remainder of the paragraph is rejected as subordinate to the facts actually found. Paragraph 37: Rejected as constituting argument. Paragraph 38: Rejected as subordinate to the facts actually found. Paragraph 39: Rejected as constituting argument. Paragraph 40: Rejected as subordinate to the facts actually found. Paragraph 41: Accepted. Paragraphs 42: Rejected as subordinate to the facts actually found. Paragraph 43: The first sentence is rejected as not supported by the greater weight of the evidence as it applies to the time period from June, 1992 to June, 1993. The second sentence is accepted. The remainder of the paragraph is accepted in substance. Paragraph 44: Rejected as subordinate to the facts actually found. Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact Paragraph 1: Accepted. Paragraphs 2-13: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 13: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 14: The first sentence is rejected as constituting argument. The remainder of the paragraph is accepted in substance. Paragraph 15: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 16: The first two sentences are accepted in substance. The remainder of the paragraph is rejected as constituting argument. Paragraphs 17-18: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 19: The first sentence is accepted. The remainder of the paragraph is accepted in substance. Paragraph 20: The first sentence is accepted. The remainder of the paragraph is rejected as unnecessary. Paragraphs 21: The sixth sentence is rejected as constituting argument. The remainder of the paragraph is accepted in substance. Paragraphs 22-24: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 25: The first sentence is accepted in substance. The third sentence is rejected as not supported by the greater weight of the evidence. The remainder of the paragraph is rejected as subordinate to the facts actually found. Paragraphs 26-27: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 28: The first sentence is accepted in substance. The remainder of the sentence is rejected as subordinate to the facts actually found. Paragraph 29: Accepted in substance. Paragraphs 30-34: Rejected as subordinate to the facts actually found. Paragraph 35-39: Accepted in substance. COPIES FURNISHED: James E. Moye, Esquire Patrick J. Kennedy, Esquire 201 East Pine Street, Suite 710 Orlando, Florida 32801 Richard Tannenbaum, Esquire Shea & Tannenbaum 204 Brazilian Avenue, Suite 210 Palm Beach, Florida 33480 Sharon Moultry, Clerk Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road, Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149 Dana Baird General Counsel Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road, Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149
Findings Of Fact On May 20, 1993, PRUPAC filed an application, under the Department's emergency rule 4ER93-18(4), to be excluded from rule's moratorium on cancellations and non-renewals of personal lines residential property insurance on the basis of risk of hurricane claims. On June 4, 1993, the Department promulgated emergency rule 4ER93-20 (ER 20). This action was taken with the knowledge that the Legislature had enacted a 180-day statutory moratorium, and it established detailed procedures for applying for what it calls an "exemption" from the rule and statutory moratoria. In addition, ER 20(2) also sets out the following substantive rule criteria for granting exemptions: (b) A risk of insolvency is not sufficient grounds to obtain an exemption from the moratorium. There must be an "unreasonable" risk of insolvency, which is interpreted by the Department to mean that insolvency is not just a possible outcome, but is in fact the probable outcome, of a denial of exemption. Loss scenarios that depend for their fulfillment upon the occurrence of statistically unlikely events, will not constitute an unreasonable risk of insolvency. Insurers seeking exemptions must present expert opinion as to all assumptions made in the insurers' predictions. On August 10, 1993, the Department sent PRUPAC a letter denying PRUPAC's application. The denial letter invited PRUPAC to resubmit a proposal in which the planned cancellations and nonrenewals are designed to reduce your exposure to that amount which, after calculating the effects of reinsurance, would reduce Prupac's probable maximum loss to an amount not in excess of its total surplus. The denial letter also notified PRUPAC of its right to request either informal or formal administrative proceedings under Chapter 120 of the Florida Statutes. It gave PRUPAC 21 days to make such a request. On September 2, 1993, ER 20 expired. On the same day, the Department promulgated 4ER93-28 (ER 28). ER 28 is an essentially verbatim repromulgation of ER 20. If valid, ER 28 would be effective for another 90 days, until December 2, 1993. See Section 120.54(9)(c), Fla. Stat. (Supp. 1992). On or about September 3, 1993, PRUPAC filed a Petition for Formal Administrative Hearing on the August 10, 1993, denial letter. The Department referred PRUPAC's petition to the Division of Administrative Hearings, and final hearing on the petition was held on October 25 through 27, 1993. On October 25, 1993, the court entered an opinion in Prudential Property & Casualty Ins. Co. of Indiana v. Dept. of Insurance, 18 Fla. L. W. D2312 (Fla. 1st DCA Oct. 25, 1993). On petition for review of the August 10, 1993, denial letter, the court "reverse[d] the department's decision and remand[ed] . . . with directions that the department reconsider PRUPAC's application and consider granting it an exemption from the moratorium 'in part' on terms that are consistent with this opinion." 18 Fla. L.W. at D2315. At the same time, the court stated: Whether PRUPAC is entitled to the exemption sought in its application 'in whole' can be determined after receipt of the hearing officer's recommended order, which we anticipate will be entered as soon as possible. 18 Fla. L.W. at D2315. The Department responded to the court's opinion by entering a "Final Order Granting Partial Exemption," Dept. of Ins. Case No. 93-L-713NJA, on October 26, 1993, which authorized PRUPAC to cancel at least $500 million of policies in Dade and Broward counties on the condition that PRUPAC ask for cancellation volunteers and offer to pay the first year's premium on a replacement policy. On November 1, 1993, PRUPAC filed a copy of this agency action in this case and advised "that PRUPAC regards the partial exemption issue as now controlled by the First District's opinion, and will seek any relief needed as to the DOI order in DOI case no. 93-L-713NJA by way of appeal to the First District Court of Appeal." In the pending Section 120.57(1) proceeding, both parties have contended that the Section 120.57(1) proceeding is not moot, and the parties have submitted proposed recommended orders. In accordance with the court's instruction, a recommended order will be entered in that proceeding "as soon as possible." 18 Fla. L.W. at D2315.
Findings Of Fact Application for consumptive use permit No. 75-00225 is a request for an existing use to be withdrawn from the Floridan Aquifer from two different wells. These two wells are located in the Hillsborough Basin and in Polk County. The property contiguous to the wells encompasses approximately 80.9 acres. The water is to be used for citrus processing and disposed of off site. The permit seeks, for average daily withdrawal, 2.98 million gallons per day for one well and 1.566 million gallons per day for the other well for a total average daily withdrawal of 3.864 million gallons per day. For maximum daily withdrawal the permit seeks 4.096 million gallons per day for one well and 2.792 million gallons per day for the other well for a total maximum daily withdrawal of 6.888 million gallons per day. The amount of water sought to be consumptively used by this application greatly exceeds the water crop of the subject lands owned by applicant. Mr. John C. Jennings and Mr. William Sunderland, owners of property adjacent to the Kraft property, appeared in their own behalf and stated that they felt that their wells were being hurt because of the large quantities of water pumped by Kraft. They did not attempt to offer expert testimony nor did they claim to be hydrologists. They did note that each had substantial problems with their wells running out of water.
Recommendation It does not appear that the district has had a reasonable opportunity to examine the objections and comments of Messers. Jennings and Sunderland with regard to the effect of the applied for consumptive use on their property. These objections were apparently raised for the first time at the hearing. As noted in paragraph 6, if the wells of Messers. Jennings and Sunderland are substantially affected in an adverse manner by applicant's use of such large quantities of water, such a use would not seem to be a reasonable, beneficial use as is required for permit unless further conditions were placed upon the permit. Therefore, it is recommended that the Southwest Florida Water Management District staff further investigate the effect of the applied for consumptive use on the wells located on the property of John C. Jennings and William Sunderland prior to the Board taking formal action on this application. ENTERED this 26th day of May, 1976, in Tallahassee, Florida. CHRIS H. BENTLEY, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Jay T. Ahern, Esquire Staff Attorney Southwest Florida Water Management District P. 0. Box 457 Brooksville, Florida 33512 Douglas T. Moring, Esquire Kraftco Corporation Kraftco Court Glenview, Illinois 60025
The Issue Whether disciplinary action should be taken against Respondent’s license to practice contracting, license number CGC 060878, based on violations of Subsection 489.129(1), Florida Statutes (2005)1, as charged in the three-count Administrative Complaint filed against Respondent in this proceeding. Whether Respondent violated Subsection 489.129(1)(g)2., Florida Statutes (Count I) by committing mismanagement or misconduct in the practice of contracting that causes financial harm to a customer; Subsection 489.129(1)(j), Florida Statutes (Count II) by abandoning a construction project in which the contractor is engaged or under contract as a contractor, and Subsection 489.129(1)(m), Florida Statutes (Count III) by committing incompetency or misconduct in the practice of contracting. And, if so, what discipline should be imposed, pursuant to Section 489.129, Florida Statutes, and Florida Administrative Code Rule 61G4-17.002.
Findings Of Fact Based on the evidence and testimony of the witnesses presented and the entire record in this proceeding, the following facts are determined: At all times material, Respondent was a certified general contractor, having been issued license number CGC 060878 by the Florida Construction Industry Licensing Board (CILB). At all times material, Respondent was the qualifier of Epic Building and Development Corporation, a Florida Corporation, with its principal place of business in the Fort Myers area. On February 22, 2005, Respondent entered into a contract with Edward Dueboay to rebuild a house owned by Dueboay and his wife, located at 22299 Laramorre Avenue, Port Charlotte, Florida, which had been distroyed some months earlier by Hurricane Charlie. The price of the contract was $150,000.00. On or about March 24, 2005, Dueboay gave Respondent a check in the amount of $3,500 payable to Contractors Marketing America, Inc. (CMA, Inc.), for the engineering plans. On May 6, 2005, Dueboay paid Respondent $5,000, as an advance on the contract. Respondent did not obtain the building permit from the Charlotte County Building Department until December 12, 2005, and work on the project did not start until January 2006. Because of the enormous damage caused by the hurricane, contractors in the area were flooded with jobs, and significant shortages in building materials also occurred. On January 13, 2006, Respondent billed Dueboay $11,000.00 for land clearing and filling, $750.00 for permit fees, and $3,200.00 for a temporary electric pole. The bill gave credit for the $5,000.00 Dueboay paid on May 6, 2005, and showed a balance due of $10,000.00. On January 20, 2006, Dueboay paid the above-mentioned invoice, by check to Respondent, in the amount of $10,000.00. Respondent paid $4,600.00 to the sub-contractor who performed the lot clearing and filling, but billed Dueboay $11,000.00. However, the contract provided for a $2,500.00 allowance for clearing and filling, and a $750.00 allowance for permit fees. Section 11.c of the contract also provided that Respondent shall provide and pay for all materials and utilities and all other facilities and services necessary for the proper completion of the work on the project in accordance with the contract documents. To pay for the remainder of the contract, Dueboay negotiated and obtained a loan in the total amount of $153,000.00 from Suncoast Schools Federal Credit Union (Credit Union). On March 21, 2006, Dueboay and the Credit Union signed the construction loan agreement. On March 21, 2006, Respondent was paid $18,235.00 by the Credit Union for the pre-cast walls used in the erection of the structure. On May 11, 2006, Respondent finished Phase I of the project. On May 15, 2006, Respondent received $11,350.00 as the first draw by the Credit Union. On June 20, 2006, Respondent finished Phase II of the project. On June 20, 2006, Respondent was paid $26,335.00 as the second draw by the Credit Union. From June 2006 to November 2006, Respondent performed no work on the house under the Dueboay contract. Because the roof was not completed, mold appeared on and in the house. On August 21, 2006, Dueboay paid $109.95 to America’s Best Cleaning and Restoration, Inc., for mold removal. On or before September 13, 2006, Dueboay hired an attorney to clarify billing charges related to lot filling, permit fees and the temporary electric pole, and to prompt Respondent to resume work abandoned since June 2006. Under the Credit Union Loan Agreement, after several extensions, the completion of the Dueboay home should have taken place on or before October 17, 2006. On October 18, 2006, the Loan Agreement extension expired, and Dueboay was required to pay mortgage and interest on the loan, even though construction of the house was not completed. On November 10, 2006, Dueboay’s attorney sent Respondent a third letter advising him that the project was stagnating; that after eighteen months since the signing of the contract, the roof of the house was not yet completed; and that, under the contract, Respondent was obligated to substantially complete all work in a reasonable time after construction had started. On or about December 1, 2006, the building permit expired and had to be renewed. At some point after November 10, 2006, Respondent resumed work and finished Phase III on March 8, 2007, with the exception that some doors were not installed, including the garage door. Respondent submitted a sworn Contractor’s Affidavit stating that all subcontractors had been paid, and that there are no liens against Dueboay’s property. However, Dueboay had to pay Charlotte County Utilities $224.93 on October 29, 2007, and $240.00 to Pest Bear, Inc., on May 7, 2008, to avoid two liens being recorded against his property. From March 8, 2007, until July 2007, Respondent performed no work under the contract. David Allgood, another general contractor, was hired by Respondent to complete some of Respondent’s projects in the Port Charlotte area, including the Dueboay house. However, Dueboay was not informed of this arrangement. There was no contract directly between Dueboay and Allgood. On September 4, 2007, relying on advice from his attorney, Dueboay changed the locks to the house, with the intent to keep Respondent and his employees off his property. Shortly thereafter, employees of general contractor David Allgood broke the front lock and entered the property in September 2007, without Dueboay’s permission. Dueboay, again, following advice from this attorney, called law enforcement to eject Allgood’s employees from his property. Allgood attempted to invoice Dueboay for installing some doors on the house that Respondent had previously paid for, and which Respondent should have installed. However, following advice from his attorney, Dueboay resisted Allgood’s request to pay him for the doors. Respondent was paid a total of $122,246.03 for the Dueboay project, before the contract was cancelled. Respondent did not complete work from Phases IV and V, with the following exceptions: he did some work on the driveway, painted the interior, did some cabinet work, exterior trim and soffit, siding, stucco, and some interior trim. Therefore, Respondent completed, at best, three out of seven operations from Phase IV (interior and exterior paint, interior trim and doors, and exterior trim and soffits) and worked on, but did not complete, stucco and some cabinets. From Phase V, Respondent only worked on the driveway and sidewalks, which had to subsequently be repaired. Dueboay hired Storybook Homes, Inc. (Storybook), to complete work abandoned by Respondent from Phases IV and V. Storybook was hired to complete work as follows: install cabinets and vanities, install ceramic tiles, repair stucco, install custom tub, all electrical and plumbing per code, complete exterior paint, install hardware, sinks and faucets in the baths and showers, complete floors, install all appliances, complete air conditioning and heat, and obtain the certificate of occupancy. The amount of $122,246.03 paid to Respondent at the time when Respondent abandoned the Dueboay project represents 81 percent of the total contract price of $150,000.00. Respondent completed, at best, 75 percent of the job by completing only three out of seven operations of Phase IV and working on some additional operations that needed to be redone, like the driveway, sidewalks and stucco. Due to Respondent’s failure to perform work on time, Dueboay incurred $5,116.42 in additional expenses, as follows: $109.95 on August 21, 2006 (mold removal), $360.00 on November 23, 2006 (legal fees), $175.00 on June 4, 2007 (legal fees), $375.00 on September 4, 2007 (legal fees), $224.93 on October 29, 2007 (to satisfy lien), $668.34 on November 3, 2007 (legal fees), $200.00 on April 4, 2008 (legal fees), $1,151.05 on May 7, 2008 (to correct work performed deficiently by Respondent), $390.00 on May 7, 2008 (to repair driveway), $240.00 on May 7, 2008 (to avoid lien), and $412.00 on May 12, 2008 (to install safe room door that Respondent failed to install). The total investigative costs of this case to Petitioner, excluding costs associated with any attorney’s time, for Petitioner’s case no. 2005-028129 was $276.18.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Board render a Final Order as follows: Finding Respondent guilty of having violated Subsection 489.129(1)(g)2., Florida Statutes, as alleged in Count I of the Administrative Complaint, and imposing as a penalty an administrative fine in the amount of $1,500. Finding Respondent guilty of having violated Subsection 489.129(1)(j), Florida Statutes, as alleged in Count II of the Administrative Complaint, and imposing as a penalty an administrative fine in the amount of $2,500. Finding Respondent guilty of having violated Subsection 489.129(1)(m), Florida Statutes, as alleged in Count III of the Administrative Complaint, and imposing as a penalty an administrative fine in the amount of $1,500. Respondent’s license to practice contracting (CGC 060878) be suspended for a period of three months, followed by a period of probation for two years, upon such conditions as the Board may impose, including the payment of costs and restitution. Requiring Respondent to pay financial restitution to the consumer, Edward Dueboay, in the amount of $5,116.42 for consumer harm suffered due to payment of additional expenses. Requiring Respondent to pay Petitioner’s costs of investigation and prosecution, excluding costs associated with an attorney’s time, in the amount of $276.18. DONE AND ENTERED this 21st day of July, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DANIEL M. KILBRIDE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of July, 2009.
The Issue Whether petitioners have timely availed themselves of a clear point of entry into administrative proceedings on Mr. and Mrs. Rankin's application for a permit to build a dock and, if so, whether the permit application should be granted?
Findings Of Fact On April 12, 1982, Frederick W. Rankin applied for a dredge and fill permit to construct a dock six feet wide and 300 feet long in the waters of Bayou Chico in Escambia County, Florida. Paralleling the dock on either side of the outboard end, two rows of mooring pilings 19.5 feet distance from the dock were proposed in the application. On April 20, 1983, Mark N. Snowdon, an employee of the Department of Environmental Regulation (DER) inspected the site, and, in an official DER permit application appraisal dated April 23, 1982, reported: Two large support vessels (crew boats) are moored at a small pier immediately east of the site. A commercial marina facility i[s] located directly across the bayou (north) from the project site. Bayou Chico is approximately 0.25 mile wide at this point. DER Exhibit No. 4. Between the crew boats' dock (Gulfwater Marine) and the site proposed for the Rankins' dock is the mouth of a small embayment (the bayouette). The Holzbauers own a house and lot, separated from the Rankins' lot by a parcel less than 75 feet wide, that fronts on the bayouette. PERMIT ISSUES DER issued a permit on June 9, 1982, and work began on the Rankins' dock on June 12, 1982. On the same day, Mr. Holzbauer inquired of the men putting in pilings whether DER had issued a permit for the work, then telephoned DER and asked DER's Mr. Fancher the same question. Mr. Fancher told Mr. Holzbauer that a permit had been issued, which was the first Mr. Holzbauer was told of issuance of the permit. As far as the evidence revealed, no notice of intent to issue preceded issuance of the permit. On June 26, 1982, the Holzbauers received a letter from W. Richard Fancher on behalf of DER, dated June 24, 1982, in which he stated: It is my understanding that, until recently, you had no knowledge of this private dock project. If this is correct, you may consider this formal notice of the activity. Should you object to this permit, including any and all of the conditions contained therein, you may file an appropriate petition for administrative hearing. This petition must be filed within 14 days of the receipt of this letter. Further, the petition must conform to the requirements of Part III, Chapter 17-1 and Section 28-5.201, Florida Administrative Code (copies enclosed). The petition must be filed with the Office of General Counsel, Department of Environmental Regulation, Twin Towers Office Building, 2600 Blair Stone Road, Tallahassee, Florida 32301. If no petition is filed within the prescribed time, you will be deemed to have waived your right to request an administrative hearing on this matter. DER Exhibit No. 1. A copy of Mr. Fancher's letter to the Holzbauers was also sent to Mr. Rankin. On July 8, 1982, a letter from the Holzbauers to Ms. Tschinkel reached DER's Office of the Secretary, protesting issuance of the permit and alleging that the dock did not conform to permit conditions. 1/ This letter was referred to the Division of Administrative Hearings, whose Director entered an order, sua sponte, on July 28, 1982, that "[t]his matter is dismissed without prejudice." No. 82-1947. An amended petition dated August 4, 1982, reached DER's Office of the Secretary on August 9, 1982, and the Division of Administrative Hearings on August 20, 1982. No. 82-2314. NO PERMIT RELIANCE The dock has been continued to completion, at a cost of $11,000.00. As built, the dock veers out from shore at a more easterly angle than the permit purported to allow. Whereas the permit contemplated construction at an angle several degrees west of north, the dock has in fact been built at an angle about 15 degrees east of north. One result is that the end is some 90 feet east of the point contemplated by the permit. Although a DER employee testified that this deviation was "within reason," it is clearly a significant departure from what the permit putatively allowed. The Rankins only own 86 feet of bayou frontage. The mouth of the bayouette is no more than 110 feet across. The mooring pilings, moreover, have been set in two rows parallel to the dock not 19.5 feet on either side, but 40 feet from the west side of the dock and 30 feet from the east side. If any of the landowners on the bayouette (with one exception) tried to build a pier perpendicular to their shore line extending even half the length of the Rankins' dock, it would intersect the Rankins' dock. NAVIGATION While the dock does not seal off the bayouette, it makes access considerably more difficult, especially for Mr. Holzbauer who sails in and out in his 14 foot boat. The dock juts out from the point at the western edge of the entrance into the bayouette at such an angle that it comes within 70 feet of the eastern edge of the entrance into the bayouette. Petitioner's Exhibit No. The crew boats moored to the east of the Rankins' dock have overall lengths ranging from 65 to 85 feet and there were three of them moored at Gulfwater Marine last summer. When the crew boats are docked, the distance between the westernmost one and the most inboard mooring piling next to the Rankins' dock is 81.5 to 103 feet. Where traffic from Bayou Chico to Pensacola Bay passes under a bridge, the channel is only 80 feet wide and the crew boats sometimes hit the bridge. The greatest problem the Rankins' dock has caused the crew boats is making docking more difficult. It is not always easy to turn an 85 foot boat around in the wind. The root of the problem, according to Mr. Kingry, who owns the crew boats, is that a patch of slightly deeper water in this generally shoaled area has been cut or blocked by the Rankins' dock. Sooner or later, Mr. Kingry predicted, a crew boat will "wipe out" the Rankins' mooring pilings.
Recommendation Upon consideration of the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Department of Environmental Regulation deny the application for a dredge and fill permit for a dock located and aligned as this dock is. DONE and ENTERED this 27th day of April, 1983, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT T. BENTON, II Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of April, 1983.
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following relevant findings of fact are made. Chandler sought exemption from permitting requirement from the Department to perform certain dredging in two artificial dead-end canals located in Placida Point Subdivision (formerly Porto-Fino Subdivision), Charlotte County, Florida. The Department has denied the exemption on the basis that "the proposed work indicates that it is not for maintenance purposes, and therefore, it does not fit the maintenance exemption". The dredging proposed by Chandler would remove the existing earthen plugs between Coral Creek (an adjacent creek) and the two canals. Coral Creek is a natural body of water and is waters of the State. The two canals were excavated (constructed) during the latter part of 1969 and early 1970 (before April 1970). Although no original design specifications were offered into evidence, there is sufficient competent evidence to show that at the time the canals were constructed earthen plugs were left between the canals and Coral Creek which restricted the water exchange between the canals and Coral Creek. The exchange of water apparently occurred at mean high water, and navigation, if any, was restricted to small boats. Porto-Fino Realty Co., Inc., (Porto-Fino) developed the Porto-Fino Subdivision in 1971, and in early 1971 applied to the Board of Trustees of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund (Board) for a dredge permit to connect the certain existing canals, which included the canals in question, to Coral Creek. As part of the application review, a site inspection was made, and it was found that the earthen plugs left between Coral Creek and the canals when they were constructed allowed water to ebb and flow during periods of high tide. As a result of this site inspection, it was recommended that before any further consideration be given the permit application, that the applicant be advised that the canals had to be adequately diked. The record is not clear on whether this permit was granted, but apparently it was not because this subject was raised again in 1974 with Lou Fusz Motor Company, the present owner of Porto-Fino Subdivision, by the Board and the Department of Army, Corps of Engineers (Corps). Apparently, it was determined by the Board, and possibly by the Corps, that the plugs had washed out and needed to be repaired. In 1975, at the request of the Board, the earthen plugs were repaired and culverts placed in the plugs to allow flushing of the canals. The earthen plugs are presently in existence in the mouth of the canals, and are colonized by mangroves, Brazilian pepper and Australian pine. The mangroves are mature trees 10-15 feet in height, and approximately 10-15 years old. The plugs do not show any signs of any recent dredging in or around the mouths of the canals. The plugs form a barrier to navigation between the canals and Coral Creek. The canals have not been used for navigational access to Coral Creek since they were repaired in 1975. The canals have not been previously dredged to maintain navigational access for boat traffic to Coral Creek, and are not presently used for navigational access to Coral Creek. There is sufficient competent substantial evidence to establish facts to show that the earthen plugs, as they presently exist, are man-made barriers that separated the two canals from Coral Creek. There is insufficient evidence to show that the repair of the earthen plugs in 1975 by the developer was illegal. The repair of the earthen plugs in 1975 by the developer was necessary because the original plugs had not been properly constructed or had washed out over the period of years. Coral Creek and the canals in question are surface waters of the state as defined in Rule 17-312.030(2), Florida Administrative Code. Canals which are used for navigation have to be periodically dredged to maintain navigational access. There is sufficient competent substantial evidence to establish facts to show that the dredging proposed by Chandler would not be "maintenance dredging" as contemplated by Rule 17-312.050(1)(e), Florida Administrative Code.
Findings Of Fact This cause comes on for consideration based on the Petitioners' challenge to the Respondent's State of Florida, Department of Environmental Regulation's stated intent to issue a permit to the applicant, Atlantic Bancorporation under the authority of Chapters 253 and 403, F.S., and Public Law 92-500. The Respondent Atlantic Bancorporation filed an application for a permit with the Respondent State of Florida, Department of Environmental Regulation. There were four items found in the application, being: The construction of a 256 foot long by 5 foot wide dock, together with a 30 foot long by 14 foot wide boat ramp. Six storm sewers using 15" pipe with headwalls. An access road to the boat ramp of 425 feet in length, constructed of limerock. Crossing of a stream with sanitary sewer. The details of the written application may be found in the Respondent, Atlantic Bancorporation's Exhibit #1, admitted into evidence. The only aspects of the permit application which the Petitioners are challenging pertain to the proposed dock, boat ramp and access road to those facilities. On May 3, 1977, Mr. C. E. Barber, an inspector with the Department of Environmental Regulation met with Daniel Thatcher, the President of General Shelter Corporation, which corporation was the agent of Atlantic Bancorporation on that date. (Subsequent to the time of the application General Shelter Corporation has become the owner of the land and Atlantic Bancorporation is the first mortgagee on the land.) The meeting on May 3, 1977 took place at the site of the proposed boat dock, boat ramp and access road. The meeting was for purposes of pre-application inspection, as a preliminary step toward filing the application for permit. During the course of this meeting, Mr. Barber looked around the general area and talked to Thatcher about the underlying scope of the project and the items which would be considered in the permit process. This conversation and inspection took place over a period of 45 minutes. Subsequent to this meeting and conversation, the application for permit was filed on May 9, 1977 over the signature of Daniel Thatcher. Inspector Barber determined that the nature of the project was such that a short form investigation could be utilized in keeping with the requirements of Chapter 403, F.S. He returned to the area of the project on June 7, 1977 and spent two hours inspecting the area. He went to his office and wrote a report on the question of granting the permit. This report is entitled Permit Application Appraisal and may be found as Respondent's Department of Environmental Regulation's Exhibit #1, admitted into evidence. His recommendation was that the permit be granted upon condition that silt screens be used in the course of the construction phase of the project to combat turbidity in the literal zone, an area of the creek In which the dock and boat ramp are being placed. Mr. Barber's supervisor David Scott, who was an Environmental Specialist III, at the time of the application, approved the recommendation that the permit be granted. This approval of Mr. Barber's position was upon condition that the silt screens be employed in the construction phase. Additionally, the State of Florida, Department of Natural Resources and local water management district were made aware of the pending application of the Respondent Atlantic Bancorporation. Neither of these agencies offered any comment or disagreement to the intention to grant the permit. The Petitioners were notified of the position of the State of Florida, Department of Environmental Regulation's intention to issue the permit requested by Atlantic Bancorporation, in the form of letters addressed to the Petitioners. Copies of those letters may be found as Respondent, Department of Environmental Regulation's Composite Exhibit #2, admitted into evidence. The substance of these letters is the same in that the letters state that the Department of Environmental Regulation has been given reasonable assurances by the applicant that the short term and long term effects of the proposed activity will not result in violation of water quality criteria, standards, requirements and provisions of Chapter 17-3, Florida Administrative Code. Nor, will the proposed activity interfere with the conservation of fish, marine and wildlife or other natural resources to such an extent as to be contrary to the public interest. Finally, the letter also states that the proposed project will not create a navigational hazard, or serious impediment to navigation, or substantially alter or impede the natural flow of waters, so as to be contrary to the public interest. In trying to establish a position contrary to that of the Respondent, State of Florida, Department of Environmental Regulation, Petitioners offered the testimony of one of the Petitioners Thomas T. Elmore, Jr. and a Mr. Lamar Veal. The substance of their testimony indicated that there was a large number and variety of fish, marine and wildlife to include: osprey, hawks, blue and white herring, water turkey, ducks, coots, cranes, geese, egrets, woodpeckers, and various other small birds. The type of fish spoken of were bass and sunfish. They also indicated that alligators, manatee, and shrimp may be found in the vicinity of the project. Specific reference was made to one manatee that had been observed in the area which appeared to have been scarred by propellers of boats. Reference was also made to an alligator that had been killed, apparently by propellers of boats. Considering the damage done to the manatee, it is unclear where the damage occurred, because the area in question, which is known as Doctors Lake is a tributary to the St. Johns River, a body of water of considerable dimension. On the other hand Doctors Lake is one to one and a half miles wide and five miles long. These same witness, to wit: Elmore and Veal, testified about grass beds at various places in the area of Doctors Lake. Photographs offered as exhibits by the Petitioners demonstration that some of these grasses were found in the vicinity of the location for the boat ramp and dock, but there was no testimony that these grasses would be unduly disturbed. Testimony by Mr. Veal indicated that Doctors Lake does not "flush" very readily. Their testimony established that there are a number of homes located on Doctors Lake and that there is some motor boat activity and that oil and gas spills from boats occur in the lake. Finally, the testimony established that the power boats that pass by have some effect, which measurement was not known, on the erosion of the shore, particularly in the areas that lack grass vegetation. The area where the permit is requested is not one lacking in grass vegetation at the shoreline. After examining the sum and substance of the testimony offered in behalf of the Petitioners, they have failed to establish that the granting of the permit and subsequent construction under the permit, violates water quality criteria, standards, requirements and provisions of Chapter 17-3, Florida Administrative Code. Nor, have they established that the proposed activity will interfere with the conservation of fish, marine and wildlife or other natural resources, to such an extent as to be contrary to the public interest. Moreover, the Petitioners have failed to show that the proposed project will create a navigational hazard, or a serious impediment to navigation, or substantially alter, or impede the natural flow of navigable waters so as to be contrary to the public interest. Therefore, the Petitioners have failed to show any reason why the permit as applied for should not be granted by the Respondent, State of Florida, Department of Environmental Regulation.
Recommendation It is recommended that the permit application filed by Atlantic Bancorporation, which is the subject of this case, be granted by the State of Florida, Department of Environmental Regulation. DONE AND ENTERED this 25th day of October, 1977, in Tallahassee, Florida. CHARLES C. ADAMS, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 101, Collins Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Edward C. Coker, III, Esquire 1212 Atlantic Bank Building Jacksonville, Florida 32202 Allen Scott, II, Esquire 220 East Forsyth Street Jacksonville, Florida 32202 Sheri W. Smallwood, Esquire Assistant General Counsel Department of Environmental Regulation 2562 Executive Center Circle, East Montgomery Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301
