The Issue The issue presented is whether Petitioner James Joseph Richardson has met his burden of proving actual innocence, thereby entitling him to compensation under the Victims of Wrongful Incarceration Compensation Act.
Findings Of Fact On October 25, 1967, Petitioner's wife prepared a breakfast of grits for their seven children. In a separate pot she prepared the children's lunch of beans, gravy, rice, and hogs head meat. She also fried some fresh chicken which she used to make sandwiches for her and Petitioner's lunch. She and Petitioner then left to get a ride to the grove where they worked picking fruit. It was their routine for Petitioner's wife to cook the food. The eldest child, eleven-year-old Betty Jean Bryant, would later serve it to all the children after the Richardsons left for work. It is not clear whether the children actually ate their breakfast grits that day. The school-age children went to school while the younger children remained at home. It was the routine for Petitioner's neighbor Betsy Reese to look after them. Petitioner's family and Betsy Reese and her children lived in the same structure, assumedly similar to a duplex. There was a common porch across the front. There was also a shed in the back yard. The school-age children returned to the home at lunchtime. Reese divided the food in the second pot into seven equal portions, and the children ate lunch. Right after the children returned to school after lunch, they began exhibiting terrible symptoms, such as leaking from their orifices, twitching, and rigidity. Teachers began grabbing the Richardson children and rushing them to the hospital. One of the teachers, knowing there were younger children at home, drove to the Richardson home. Those children were on the shared porch, displaying the same symptoms. Reese was sitting on the porch, holding one of the children. The teacher took them to the hospital. Petitioner and his wife were summoned to the hospital. Six of the children died that same day, and the seventh child died early the next morning. At the hospital, medical personnel did not know what substance was causing the illness and deaths. Sheriff Frank Cline went to the Richardson home and conducted several searches of the home and the shed attempting to find what had poisoned the children. When Petitioner and his wife arrived at the hospital, Cline obtained from Petitioner the key to the refrigerator and searched again. The next morning Reese and Charlie Smith, who was described as the town drunk, found a bag of parathion, a highly- toxic insecticide, in the shed behind the house. Cline and his deputies had searched the shed approximately four times during the day the children became sick and Cline had searched the shed by himself late that night, and no bag of parathion had been seen by them. It was determined that parathion was present in the pot the grits were cooked in, the pot the lunch was cooked in, the frying pan the chicken may have been cooked in, flour, corn meal, sugar, and other substances found in the refrigerator. It was also determined that parathion is what killed the children. Petitioner had a key to the refrigerator as did his wife. Indications are that a third key was left on the refrigerator for the babysitter's use. Petitioner was tried for the first degree murder of the eldest child Betty Jean Bryant and was convicted. The jury did not recommend mercy, and he was sentenced to death. His conviction was reviewed by the Supreme Court of Florida. Richardson v. State, 247 So. 2d 296 (Fla. 1971). Petitioner's death sentence was commuted to life when Florida's death penalty was held to be unconstitutional the following year. In October 1988, 21 years after the seven children were murdered, the official file, which had been stolen ten years earlier from the office of the assistant state attorney who had prosecuted Petitioner, appeared in the office of the Governor of the State of Florida. Governor Bob Martinez ordered the Florida Department of Law Enforcement (FDLE) to investigate the disappearance and re-appearance of the file and accompanying information. That investigation resulted in new information and admissions surrounding the circumstances leading to the arrest and conviction of Petitioner. The Governor entered an Executive Order on July 31, 1989, appointing Janet Reno, State Attorney for the Eleventh Judicial Circuit of Florida, to provide prosecutorial assistance to FDLE. That Executive Order further directed FDLE to continue its investigation into all statements and evidence concerning Petitioner's arrest and conviction and to also investigate any violations of the criminal laws or misconduct by public officials relative to the events surrounding the deaths of the children and the arrest and conviction of Petitioner. On February 13, 1989, another Executive Order, amending the first, was signed by the Governor assigning State Attorney Reno to the Twelfth and Twentieth Judicial Circuits to discharge the duties of the State Attorneys in those Circuits relating to the investigation and prosecution of Petitioner's case. On March 31, 1989, a third Executive Order was signed. It amended the first two and recited that Reno and FDLE had reported their findings to the Governor and that Reno had also advised the Governor that Petitioner had filed a motion for post-conviction relief in the Circuit Court for the Twelfth Judicial Circuit. The Executive Order directed Reno to assume and discharge the duties of the State Attorney relating to any post-conviction proceedings involving Petitioner. A fourth Executive Order was then entered amending the first three by adding to Reno's duties consideration of any further prosecution of Petitioner. As a result of the extensive investigations conducted by Reno and FDLE, Reno joined in Petitioner's pending motion for post-conviction relief. Petitioner's request that his conviction and sentence be vacated was granted, and Petitioner was released from prison. Reno also made the decision that Petitioner would not be re-tried for the murder of Betty Jean Bryant and would not be prosecuted for the murders of the six other children. On May 5, 1989, Reno issued a 35-page Nolle Prosse Memorandum explaining in detail the evidence she had reviewed, the conflicting evidence she had considered, the apparent- perjured testimony that had been given at Petitioner's trial, and the conflicting witness statements which the State had before trial but had not disclosed to Petitioner's attorneys despite a court order to do so. The Memorandum discussed additional problems she had encountered because the physical evidence from the trial 21 years earlier had been misplaced or destroyed, a witness had later recanted his trial testimony, and key witnesses had died since the trial had taken place. Further, as a result of the publicity surrounding her investigation a number of persons had come forward claiming to have evidence, but they had never come forward during the initial investigation. Reno and the two Assistant State Attorneys who worked with her on her investigation determined that in evaluating whether Petitioner should be given post-conviction relief and whether Petitioner should be re-tried, they would only consider the files, records, and evidence that existed at the time that Petitioner was tried. They considered the evidence that had not been disclosed to anyone for 21 years to be unreliable. Some of it was also conflicting. She signed the Nolle Prosse Memorandum as did the two Assistant State Attorneys Don L. Horn and Richard L. Shiffrin. At the final hearing in this cause Don Horn testified extensively as to the contents of the Memorandum. Although he, Shiffrin, and Reno had discussed the misconduct they discovered on the part of the Sheriff and the prosecuting attorneys, they knew that the statute of limitations prevented taking action against those public officials, so the Memorandum did not discuss any action to be taken against them. It only considered the evidence against Petitioner. The Memorandum concluded that a "totally inadequate and incomplete investigation" into the deaths of the seven children had been conducted. Obvious leads had not been pursued, inconsistencies were not resolved, and standard investigative procedures had not been followed. The Memorandum further opined that at the time that Petitioner was charged with murder, the State did not have sufficient evidence to prove his guilt beyond and to the exclusion of a reasonable doubt. The Memorandum concluded that Petitioner "was probably wrongfully accused" based upon the evidence that existed at the time. Three years later a 260-page Memorandum Opinion prepared by United States Attorney Robert Merkle and indicating a need for further investigation into the 1968 prosecution of Petitioner was presented to the Treasurer of Florida. The Opinion, which was not admitted in evidence, was described as a "scathing indictment" of Reno's investigation. As a result, Governor Lawton Chiles issued a confidential Executive Order on October 16, 1992, appointing State Attorney Reno to further investigate all matters pertaining to or arising from the issues raised in the Opinion involving Petitioner's prosecution. On October 30, 1992, the Governor issued a second Executive Order deleting the provisions of his prior Order requiring that it be sealed and confidential. Assistant State Attorney Richard L. Shiffrin, who participated in Reno's first investigation, and Gertrude M. Novicki, Reno's Chief Assistant for Special Prosecutions, were assigned to conduct this investigation. Both of those Assistant State Attorneys signed the Response of the State Attorney of the Eleventh Judicial Circuit. The Response is not dated but a word-processing notation suggests it may have been issued on or about April 30, 1993. At the final hearing, Novicki testified regarding her Response. Rather than responding to or explaining each of the details set forth in Merkle's Memorandum Opinion, Novicki and Shiffrin re-examined the propriety of both the vacating of the original judgment of guilty and the decision to enter a nolle prosse. In doing so, they reviewed the original prosecution in light of the evidence at trial and of the law as it existed in 1968 and also reviewed the ability to re-prosecute Petitioner in light of the evidence currently available and admissible. The Response concluded that the Order granting Petitioner's motion to vacate his conviction and sentence was supported by the facts and the law and that the decision to enter a nolle prosse reached in 1989 was proper. The Response's summary states that the physical evidence against Petitioner did not establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, the testimonial evidence as to Petitioner's admissions of culpability were of dubious admissibility and value, the evidence of motive was equivocal at best, and the decision to enter a nolle prosse was unquestionably correct. The summary ends as follows: "Whether or not [Petitioner] is guilty of this horrible crime is uncertain. What is certain is that proof beyond a reasonable doubt of guilt is lacking." The prior proceedings involving Petitioner and the prior reviews of those proceedings have focused on the criminal law standard of guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. That standard, however, is not applicable to this proceeding. In this proceeding wherein Petitioner is seeking monetary compensation for his wrongful incarceration, Section 961.03, Florida Statutes, requires Petitioner to establish by clear and convincing evidence that he committed neither the act nor the offense that served as the basis for the conviction and incarceration and that he did not aid, abet, or act as an accomplice to a person who committed the act or offense. Further, he must prove his actual innocence by verifiable and substantial evidence in order to meet the definition of wrongfully incarcerated person. Petitioner testified that he did not poison his children, that he did not kill his children, and that he never told anyone that he did. He also testified that he did not aid or assist anyone in poisoning or killing his children. In order to provide verifiable and substantial evidence in support of his testimony that he is innocent, Petitioner has taken two approaches. The first is by relying on the investigation detailed in the 1989 Nolle Prosse Memorandum and the testimony of Don Horn, one of the authors. (In its defense, the State offered the 1993 Response and the testimony of Gertrude Novicki, one of its authors.) In so doing, Petitioner has offered clear and convincing evidence that the investigation leading up to Petitioner’s prosecution and conviction was incomplete. The investigation revealed conflicting evidence about whether Petitioner had obtained life insurance policies on his children the night before they were murdered, which he had not, and whether Petitioner believed that he had. The investigation did not determine how the parathion got into the pots and skillet and various food products in the refrigerator or when. The investigation appeared to focus only on Petitioner as a suspect and not also on others whose involvement was suspicious. Toward the end of the investigation and prior to Petitioner’s criminal trial, the prosecutors wrote memos expressing concern about the weakness of their case and their possible inability to present even a prima facie case. After those memos were written, the Sheriff produced three jailhouse informants to testify that Petitioner admitted to them his crimes. They also gave statements that Petitioner said he thought that Reese did it and gave details of different motives she might have had. Rather than resolving the conflicting statements, the prosecution withheld the conflicting statements from the defense. The Nolle Prosse Memorandum discusses these statements and informants and finds that one of the jailhouse informants recanted his testimony after Petitioner’s trial and one was drunk when he testified. The third one, whose statements were given under circumstances that made them highly doubtful, died before the trial, and his testimony given at the preliminary hearing was given to the jury in the form of five witnesses who testified as to their recollections of his testimony. The informants were not the only ones to provide perjured testimony at Petitioner’s trial; the Sheriff also appears to have done so. A review of the Nolle Prosse Memorandum and the detailed evidence it discusses makes it clear that Petitioner was wrongfully accused based upon the evidence and lack of evidence the prosecution had gathered. It is further clear that Petitioner’s conviction and sentence based upon that insufficient evidence should have been vacated, and they were. It is further clear that re-trying Petitioner would be fruitless because the evidence available 21 years after the murders was insufficient: the physical evidence was missing or destroyed, many of the key witnesses were dead, and the evidence that might have been admissible for a re-trial was conflicting. However, the inability of the State to prove Petitioner guilty beyond a reasonable doubt does not prove that Petitioner is actually innocent of committing the murders or aiding in the commission. Petitioner’s second approach to providing verifiable and substantial evidence of his actual innocence is attempting to show that Reese, not the Petitioner, murdered the children. The 1989 investigation showed that, at the time the Richardson children were poisoned, Reese was on parole for killing her second husband with a gun. Although there was also a rumor that she had poisoned her first husband, no evidence was found to support that rumor. Parenthetically, there was also a rumor that Petitioner killed his three other children in Jacksonville, but that was also untrue. Similarly, there was a rumor that Sheriff Cline fathered Reese’s granddaughter and that was why he steered the investigation away from her. The blood tests of all concerned done as part of the 1989 investigation proved that rumor also untrue. Petitioner relies also upon the facts that Reese was the last person in the Richardson home on the day in question, the person who served the children the poisoned lunch, and the person who found the parathion in the shed. Her unconcerned behavior while the Richardson toddlers were exhibiting horrible symptoms on her porch and her lack of concern about whether her children who were playing there might be at risk from whatever was making the Richardson children so sick are suggested to be evidence that she knew why the Richardson children were sick and why her children would not be. It was also suggested that she must have been the murderer since her third husband had gone to Jacksonville with Petitioner and his wife but they had returned without Reese’s husband who never did return to her. Petitioner relies heavily on evidence which he suggests constitutes admissions of her guilt by Reese. The 1988 investigation considered an affidavit by one certified nursing assistant and a taped interview of another, both of whom worked at a nursing home where Reese became a patient in 1986. The affidavit by Belinda Romeo asserts that Romeo asked Reese on more than 100 separate occasions if she killed the seven Richardson children, that Reese replied that she did, and that Reese was competent at the times Romeo asked that question. On the other hand, the transcript of a taped interview of Doris Harris, who was present several times when Romeo questioned Reese, is clearly contrary to that affidavit. Harris states that by the time Reese was admitted to the nursing home, she was incontinent, unable to walk, unable to feed herself, only “half way aware,” unable to say what day or year it was, "back to a child's state," and suffering from Alzheimer’s. When Romeo would ask if she killed the children, she would say that she killed them, say the name Charlie, and then lapse into incoherent mumbling. Harris believed that Reese was saying she killed them because she was the one who fed them the poisoned food, and not because she was the one who put the poison in the food. Reese’s “admissions” are, therefore, ambiguous and not trustworthy. Petitioner also introduced into evidence a 1988 affidavit of Richard H. Barnard, the Chief of Police who began an investigation into the children’s deaths. After he got Reese to admit she was in the Richardson home that day and served the children their lunch, he was removed from the investigation by the “Governor’s office” in a phone call which he believes Sheriff Cline instigated. His affidavit undermines the statements of the jailhouse informants, expresses his concern that Sheriff Cline may have tampered with the jury, and states his opinion that Sheriff Cline framed Petitioner. He concludes with his opinion that Petitioner was innocent and Reese was guilty. The hearsay evidence and suggestions that Reese was guilty of the murders do not constitute verifiable and substantial evidence of Petitioner’s innocence. Opinion testimony does not constitute verifiable and substantial evidence of Petitioner's innocence. The Nolle Prosse Memorandum and the Response do not constitute verifiable and substantial evidence of Petitioner’s innocence. The testimony of Horn and Novicki as to what they considered during their investigations does not constitute verifiable and substantial evidence of Petitioner’s innocence. Lastly, Petitioner’s own testimony denying his guilt is not verifiable and substantial evidence of his innocence. Simply put, the evidence in this proceeding does not establish Petitioner’s actual innocence. Since Chapter 961, Florida Statutes, does not provide a definition of “actual innocence,” Petitioner argues that the definition should be that based upon the evidence it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted him. That definition is found in Supreme Court of the United States and Supreme Court of Florida cases. Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614 (1998); Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298 (1995); Tompkins v. State, 994 So. 2d 1072 (Fla. 2008); Mills v. State, 786 So. 2d 547 (Fla. 2001). Petitioner’s argument is not persuasive. All of those cases involved motions for post-conviction relief, not claims for money damages. That definition of actual innocence was likely utilized when Petitioner was granted post-conviction relief by having his conviction and sentence vacated and being released from prison, which is the relief which results from meeting that definition. That definition of actual innocence tests the legal sufficiency of evidence. The Statute regulating this proceeding does not consider legal sufficiency; rather, it considers factual sufficiency by requiring the undersigned to make findings of fact as to Petitioner’s actual innocence if proven by verifiable and substantial evidence. In other words, proof of factual innocence is required. Perhaps the reason the Statute does not contain its own definition of actual innocence is that the Legislature intended the words to have their plain, ordinary meaning. A review of the two investigations of Petitioner’s prosecution clearly shows an absence of evidence proving Petitioner guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. However, a review of the two investigations does not show that Petitioner is actually innocent. Accordingly, Petitioner has failed to meet his burden of proving actual innocence by clear and convincing evidence and, thus, has failed to establish that he is a wrongfully incarcerated person eligible for compensation under the Victims of Wrongful Incarceration Compensation Act. RECOMMENDED DETERMINATION Based on the record in this proceeding and the above Findings of Fact, it is RECOMMENDED that an order be entered by the Circuit Judge determining that Petitioner has failed to meet his burden of proving actual innocence by clear and convincing evidence, denying Petitioner’s claim for compensation, and dismissing his Petition. DONE AND ENTERED this 21st day of August, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LINDA M. RIGOT Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of August, 2009. COPIES FURNISHED: Robert I. Barrar, Esquire Law Offices of Ellis Rubin & Robert I. Barrar 6619 South Dixie Highway, No. 311 Miami, Florida 33143 Raul C. De La Heria, Esquire 2100 Coral Way, Suite 500 Miami, Florida 33145 Dennis Nales, Esquire Office of the State Attorney 2071 Ringling Boulevard, Suite 400 Sarasota, Florida 34237 Earl Moreland, Esquire Office of the State Attorney 2071 Ringling Boulevard, Suite 400 Sarasota, Florida 34237
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Fort Myers Broadcasting Company (FMBC or Respondent) committed an unlawful employment practice against Jaziah Rivera (Ms. Rivera or Petitioner) on the basis of her sex and in retaliation for engaging in a protected activity, in violation of the Florida Civil Rights Act (FCRA).
Findings Of Fact FMBC operates in an office building located at 2824 Palm Beach Boulevard, Fort Myers, Florida. For at least 20 years prior to September 2018, FMBC outsourced its cleaning needs. In or around August 2018, a management team at FMBC met to discuss its custodial services. The team included Joseph Schwartzel, Jim Schwartzel, Mark Gilson (Mr. Gilson), and Mr. Mayne. Joseph Schwartzel is the general manager of FMBC, and has served in that role for approximately 25 years. Jim Schwartzel, Mr. Gilson, and Mr. Mayne are all senior managers who report directly to Joseph Schwartzel. After the discussion, the management team decided to terminate FMBC’s contract for outside custodial services and hire an in-house custodian. General Manager Joseph Schwartzel was the final decision maker on this matter. In September 2018, FMBC hired Ms. Rivera as a full-time custodial worker. Ms. Rivera was the first in-house custodian hired by FMBC in its history. Her job duties included generalized cleaning like sweeping, mopping, taking out the trash, dusting, restocking supplies in the bathrooms, and vacuuming. Ms. Rivera reported directly to Mr. Mayne, who served as FMBC’s Chief Engineer. During Ms. Rivera’s entire time at FMBC, Mr. Mayne was her direct supervisor. Ms. Rivera’s weekly scheduled hours were Monday through Friday, 9:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m. She sometimes altered those hours and worked from 10:00 a.m. to 7:00 p.m. Ms. Rivera testified that she would sometimes work “after hours or on the weekend” if she had to make up missed time. FMBC received complaints from employees that some areas at FMBC were not being stocked/cleaned properly or in a timely fashion. Mr. Mayne spoke to Ms. Rivera about the complaints. Ms. Rivera complained to Mr. Mayne that the amount of cleaning she was required to complete was too much for one person and that she needed assistance. In or around December 2018, FMBC hired an in-house, part-time custodial worker to assist Ms. Rivera with the cleaning duties. The part-time custodian was quickly relieved of her duties, because she proved to be unreliable. In April 2019, Ms. Rivera complained that she was experiencing back pain and was unable to take out the trash. She provided FMBC with a doctor’s note which stated that she was not allowed to lift items that weighed more than 15 pounds. FMBC proposed several accommodations to assist Ms. Rivera in taking out the trash, including providing a rolling bin to push the trash to the dumpster. On several occasions, Mr. Mayne also provided two to three non- custodial employees, from the engineering department, to assist Ms. Rivera with taking out the trash. In April 2019, FMBC hired another part-time employee, Imari Porter (Ms. Porter), to help Ms. Rivera with the cleaning duties. Ms. Porter is Ms. Rivera’s sister. In April 2019, FMBC’s upper management team—Joseph Schwartzel, Jim Schwartzel, Mr. Gilson, and Mr. Mayne—met several times over a two- week period to discuss its custodial needs. The team made the decision to eliminate the full-time and part-time in-house custodian positions and return to outsourcing the custodial services. As the general manager, Joseph Schwartzel was, again, the final decision maker. Joseph Schwartzel testified about the reasoning behind FMBC’s decision to move back to its out-sourced custodial services model. He stated as follows: Well, basically, I think, we discovered that we had made a mistake trying to have an in-house custodial position. We thought it was a good idea to begin with as we could have someone work during the day when most the employees were there and provide cleaning services while people were at the office. And if there were spills or things like that, there would be someone immediately available to try and remedy the situation. So it sounded good. What we didn’t realize is how difficult it would be to cover if someone wasn’t there. If they were out sick, if they were on vacation, things of that nature. In Ms. Rivera’s case, where she had a health issue, all of a sudden we were scrambling, trying to figure out how to get the facility cleaned. And we didn’t have anyone else that could do that on the long- term basis. So it became very problematic. Thus, instead of, you know, having an in-house custodial position, we elected to go back to a third party to do it. On April 22, 2019, FMBC terminated Ms. Porter, less than one month after hiring her. The next day, on April 23, 2019, Mr. Mayne and Karen Seiferth (FMBC’s human resources manager) met with Ms. Rivera. Mr. Mayne terminated Ms. Rivera. FMBC immediately returned to its past arrangement of outsourcing its cleaning needs—on April 23, 2019, the same day Ms. Rivera was terminated, FMBC signed a contract with ABC International Cleaning Service. As of the date of the final hearing, FMBC continued to outsource its cleaning and still contracts with ABC International Cleaning Service. Sexual Harassment Allegations Ms. Rivera testified that Mr. Mayne sexually harassed her during her entire period of employment with FMBC. Ms. Rivera testified that Mr. Mayne subjected her to sexual harassment in the following ways: by staring at Ms. Rivera and looking at her body parts, as if he was “undressing [her] with his eyes”; brushing past her on one occasion, causing his leg to “graze” her buttocks; and making comments about her khaki pants and her buttocks being “big.” Ms. Rivera also testified that Mr. Mayne frequently asked her “to go out for drinks” and that she perceived those invitations as sexual advances. Ms. Rivera testified that she rejected Mr. Mayne’s advances, but did not complain about his behavior to anyone at FMBC. Ms. Rivera alleges that she was terminated for refusing to engage in a sexual relationship with Mr. Mayne. Ms. Rivera claims that after she was fired, Mr. Mayne sent her inappropriate sexual messages, pictures, and a video through social media. It is undisputed that, to the extent this claim is true, it happened well after Ms. Rivera was terminated from FMBC. Ms. Rivera submitted a Technical Assistance Questionnaire (TAQ), dated April 9, 2020, to FCHR, which initiated an investigation into her complaints against FMBC. In the TAQ, Ms. Rivera set out the events that occurred during her time at FMBC that she believed to be discriminatory. The majority of Ms. Rivera’s complaint was based on what appears to be allegations of disability discrimination. The only mention of sexual harassment was at the conclusion of her statement. Therein, she stated: “Now present day Mike Mayne is harrassing me by pursuing me thru social media planforms, sending inappropriate images (private part) to try to get me to engage is some type of sexual relationship & offering support to me.” (errors in original). Ms. Rivera’s allegations that Mr. Mayne was sexually harassing her through social media were described as occurring “now” in the “present day,” which, at that time, would have been nearly a year after she was terminated from FMBC. Ultimate Findings of Fact Ms. Rivera’s testimony that Mr. Mayne sexually harassed her while she worked at FMBC is not credible. Ms. Rivera failed to prove that Mr. Mayne sexually harassed her at work, that she was subjected to a hostile work environment, or that she was terminated for not acquiescing to quid pro quo sexual harassment. Accordingly, Ms. Rivera failed to meet her burden of proving that FMBC committed an unlawful employment action against her in violation of the FCRA.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a final order dismissing Ms. Rivera’s Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 10th day of May, 2021, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JODI-ANN V. LIVINGSTONE Administrative Law Judge 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of May, 2021. COPIES FURNISHED: Tammy S. Barton, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 4075 Esplanade Way, Room 110 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-7020 Zandro E. Palma, Esquire Zandro E. Palma, P.A. Suite 1500 9100 South Dadeland Boulevard Miami, Florida 33156 Suzanne M. Boy, Esquire Boy Agnew Potanovic, PLLC 4415 Metro Parkway, Suite 110 Fort Myers, Florida 33916-9408 Cheyanne Costilla, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 4075 Esplanade Way, Room 110 Tallahassee, Florida 32399
The Issue The issue at the hearing was whether Petitioner is entitled to an exemption from disqualification of employment as a person who has direct contact with aged or disabled adults.
Findings Of Fact In 1993, Petitioner was 25 years old. Petitioner was employed by Sunland to care for its disabled clients. Petitioner's duties included direct contact with the clients of Sunland. The background screen revealed that on November 9, 1993, Petitioner plead guilty to two counts of battery (domestic violence). The conviction was the result of a physical altercation between Petitioner and Petitioner's live-in boyfriend, during which Petitioner threw an iron at her boyfriend missing him and striking her 3 year-old child. As a consequence of the conviction, Petitioner was fined the minimum amount and sentenced to two years' probation. She was adjudicated guilty. Contrary to Petitioner's testimony, the evidence showed that Petitioner has had at least two other encounters with the criminal justice system. The greater weight of the evidence showed that Petitioner has a problem with controlling her anger and in controlling her violent response thereto. Based on the record in this case, Petitioner has not established by clear and convincing evidence that she will not be and is not a danger to disabled or elderly persons with which she might come into contact and that she has not learned to control her anger and use of physical aggression. The Petitioner is therefore not entitled to an exemption from disqualification from employment.
Recommendation Based upon the findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Department of Children and Family Services enter a Final Order denying Petitioner, Tammie Collins, an exemption from disqualification from employment. DONE AND ENTERED this 11th day of February, 1999, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DIANE CLEAVINGER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of February, 1999. COPIES FURNISHED: Steven Wallace, Esquire Department of Children and Family Services Suite 252 2639 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2949 Tammie Collins Post Office Box 208 Greenwood, Florida 32444 Gregory D. Venz, Agency Clerk Department of Children and Family Services Building 2, Room 204 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 John S. Slye, General Counsel Department of Children and Family Services Building 2, Room 204 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700
The Issue Should Respondent's Law Enforcement Certificate be revoked, suspended, or otherwise disciplined?
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following relevant findings are made: Respondent was certified by the Commission on June 10, 1977, and was issued Law Enforcement Certificate Number 41580. The Administrative Complaint alleges that: (a) On or between January 1, 1973, and December 31, 1974, Respondent did unlawfully handle, fondle, or make an assault in a lewd, lascivious, or indecent manner upon Deborah Brice, a child under sixteen years of age, by fondling her breasts and kissing her neck; (b) On or between January l, 1976, and December 31, 1979, Respondent did unlawfully handle, fondle, or make an assault in a lewd, lascivious, or indecent manner upon Dorothy Spickard, a child under sixteen years of age, by putting her on his lap and tickling her near her vaginal area; (c) On or between January 1, 1976, and December 31, 1979, Respondent did unlawfully handle, fondle, or make an assault in a lewd, lascivious, or indecent manner upon Dawn Whitehead, a child under sixteen years of age, by digitally penetrating her vagina areas and placing her hands on his penis; and (d) On or between June 1, 1969, and December 31, 1971, Respondent did unlawfully handle, fondle, or make an assault in a lewd, lascivious, or indecent manner upon Susan Kleine, a child under sixteen years of age, by kissing her on the neck, French-kissing her, and forcing her on a bed and getting on top of her, simulating sexual intercourse. Debra Brice, Dorothy A. Spickard, Dawn Allison Steward (f/n/a Dawn Allison Whitehead), and Susan Kleine testified that Respondent touched them inappropriately during the middle 1970's while they were under the age of 18 years. Debra Brice, Dorothy Spickard, and Susan Kleine were around the age of 14 to 15 years at the time the inappropriate touching was alleged to have occurred. Dawn Steward was around the age of 8 to 9 years at the time the inappropriate touching was alleged to have occurred. Debra Brice, Dorothy Spickard, and Dawn Steward are nieces of Respondent's ex-wife, Carol, who was married to Respondent during the time that the alleged incidents were supposed to have occurred. Susan Kleine is a sister of Respondent's ex-wife, Carol. Respondent and Carol were married in 1966, and were divorced sometime around 1978-79. It was not until the latter part of 1993, approximately 20 years later, that Debra Brice, Dorothy Spickard, Dawn Steward, and Susan Kleine told anyone of this alleged inappropriate touching. Sometime around the latter part of 1993, Carol discussed this inappropriate touching with Debra Brice, Dorothy Spickard, Dawn Steward, and Susan Kleine. Sometime around the latter part of 1993, this alleged inappropriate touching was discussed in the presence of Debra Brice or Dorothy Spickard or Dawn Steward or Susan Kleine during therapy sessions involving Carol's and Respondent's child. While Debra Brice, Dorothy Spickard, Dawn Steward, and Susan Kleine appeared to be relatively clear on the facts concerning the alleged inappropriate touching, they were not clear on all the facts surrounding the alleged incidents. There was no evidence presented to corroborate the testimony of Debra Brice, Dorothy Spickard, Dawn Steward, or Susan Kleine. Respondent denies any inappropriate touching of Debra Brice, Dorothy Spickard, Dawn Steward, and Susan Kleine. Respondent admits tickling and wrestling with Debra Brice, Dorothy Spickard, Dawn Steward, and Susan Kleine in a playful manner but denies touching any of them in an inappropriate manner, specifically in an inappropriate sexual manner. There is insufficient evidence to establish facts to show that Respondent touched Debra Brice, Dorothy Spickard, Dawn Steward, and Susan Kleine in an inappropriate manner, sexually or otherwise, notwithstanding the testimony of Debra Brice, Dorothy Spickard, Dawn Steward, and Susan Kleine to the contrary which I find lacks credibility due to the reasons set forth in Findings of Fact 5 through 9.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law it is, accordingly, Recommended that the Administrative Complaint filed against the Respondent be dismissed. DONE AND ENTERED this 26th day of June, 1997, in Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM R. CAVE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of June, 1997. COPIES FURNISHED: Richard D. Courtemanche, Jr., Esquire Florida Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Thomas M. Lindsey 21367 Anderson Road Brooksville, Florida 34601 A. Leon Lowry, II, Director Division of Criminal Justice Standards and Training Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Michael Ramage General Counsel Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302
The Issue Whether Respondent failed to maintain good moral character, in violation of sections 943.1395(7) and 943.13(7), Florida Statutes (2015), and Florida Administrative Code Rule 11B- 27.0011(4)(a); and, if so, the appropriate penalty.
Findings Of Fact Respondent is a certified corrections officer in the State of Florida. Petitioner issued Corrections Certification No. 320518 to Respondent on December 15, 2014. The Florida Department of Corrections employed Respondent between July 1 and September 30, 2015. Between July 1 and September 30, 2015, the minor child, who was related to Respondent by marriage, resided with Respondent at his residence. Between July 1 and September 30, 2015, the minor child was 12 years of age or older, but younger than 18 years of age. The minor child’s parents each executed documents evidencing their intent that Respondent’s wife, Jessica Emanuel, act as guardian of the minor child. These documents indicated that Ms. Emanuel could enroll the minor child in school, make health care decisions, and make other decisions concerning the minor child’s general welfare. In October 2015, Monica Lange, a case coordinator for the Child Protection Team in the Children’s Advocacy Center, received a referral from the Department of Children and Families in Charlotte County, Florida, concerning the minor child. Ms. Lange testified that she conducted a video interview of the minor child on October 19, 2015, in Fort Myers, Florida (the CPT interview). Ms. Lange credibly testified that when she interviewed the minor victim, the minor victim (who was 17 years old at the time of the interview) did not appear to be impaired, appeared to have the skill set to answer the questions asked, and understood everything that Ms. Lange asked. Ms. Lange also credibly testified that the minor victim understood the concept of being truthful, and was responsive to the questions Ms. Lange asked. The CPT interview revealed the following recollections of the minor victim: Shortly after the minor victim (who was then 16 years old) began living with Respondent and Jessica Emanuel, Respondent and the minor child began consuming alcohol together and engaging in conversations of a sexual nature; Respondent and the minor child thereafter engaged in sexual activity over 30 times in Respondent’s house and truck; The minor child described many of these incidents of sexual activity with detail as to time and location; The minor child stated that Respondent and the minor child engaged in sexual activity with and without a condom; and The minor child stated that the minor child was exposed to a sexually transmitted disease during this time period. After the CPT interview, Ms. Lange contacted Jason Cook, an investigator with the Washington County Sheriff’s Office. Mr. Cook testified that he reviewed the CPT interview, and then called and scheduled appointments with Jessica Emanuel and the minor child’s mother. Based on those interviews, Mr. Cook contacted Respondent, and, on November 2, 2015, interviewed Respondent at Mr. Cook’s office for approximately two hours and 15 minutes. Mr. Cook testified that he provided Respondent with a Miranda warning, informed Respondent that he was not being charged with a crime at that time, and that Respondent was free to leave the interview at any point. The undersigned’s review of the interview confirms Mr. Cook’s testimony. Mr. Cook testified that for the first 40 to 50 minutes of the interview, Respondent’s demeanor was nervous, guarded, and defensive. However, according to Mr. Cook, Respondent later seemed to open up and spoke more freely.2/ Throughout the interview, Respondent stated that he and his wife provided the basic necessities to the minor child, including room and board. Additionally, Respondent stated that the minor child attended school. During the first 40 to 50 minutes of the interview, Mr. Cook testified that when he asked Respondent whether he engaged in sexual activity with the minor child, Respondent stated many times that he was not sure or could not remember. The undersigned reviewed Mr. Cook’s interview of Respondent. During the first approximately 40 minutes of the interview, when Mr. Cook asked Respondent whether he engaged in sexual activities with the minor child, Respondent provided various non-denials of such activity, stating, at various points: he had psychological issues, so he could not give Mr. Cook an honest answer; (b) he did not feel that he had sexual activities with the minor child; (c) he did not know if he had sexual activities with the minor child; (d) he could not believe engaging in sexual activities with the minor child was something he would do; and (e) he did not know if he engaged in sexual activities with the minor child, but it was a possibility. After approximately 40 minutes of the interview, Mr. Cook and Respondent discussed various disciplinary measures Respondent took with the minor child. After this discussion, Respondent stated that he engaged in sexual activities with the minor child. Respondent stated that these allegations were true, and that he was “tired” of trying to remember or think about this subject. Respondent further stated that he did not engage in sexual activities with the minor child more than 30 times, as the minor child reported. Instead, he stated that he engaged in sexual activities with the minor child between 10 and 20 times. Respondent also stated that the local health department prescribed him medication for either an infection or a sexually transmitted disease, but he could not recall which. At multiple times during the interview, Respondent vaguely referred to mental health issues he felt he suffered, including “bipolar schizophrenia.” When pressed by Mr. Cook, Respondent stated that he had not sought treatment for any mental health issues and had essentially self-diagnosed these issues. Respondent has not otherwise presented any evidence of such mental health issues in this proceeding and recanted this self- diagnosis at the final hearing. At the final hearing, Respondent testified that he did not engage in any sexual activity with the minor child. Respondent further stated that if he had engaged in sexual activity with the minor child, he would have been tried and convicted. Respondent testified that the state attorney dropped the charges against him in the criminal case. At the final hearing, Respondent stated that Mr. Cook did not force him to make any statements or admissions during the November 2, 2015, interview. Respondent provided various documents concerning the criminal case demonstrating that the State dismissed criminal charges concerning the same conduct alleged in this proceeding. The undersigned notes that the “Order Dismissing Charges” in the criminal case found that “the State will be unable to prove the charges against the Defendant without the testimony of the alleged victim, and the alleged victim’s testimony has been excluded by the Court because the alleged victim has repeatedly failed to appear for her deposition . . . .” The undersigned also notes that a Subpoena for Telephonic Deposition to be served on the minor victim indicates that the Charlotte County Sheriff’s Office was unable to serve the subpoena, stating, “THIS SUBJECT MOVED OUT IN MARCH, SHE IS HOMELESS LIVING IN THE WOODS SOMEWHERE, NO CONTACT INFORMATION AVAILABLE, WHEREABOUTS UNKNOWN.” The undersigned has considered evidence of the disposition of Respondent’s criminal case in this proceeding. Despite the disposition of the criminal case against Respondent, the undersigned finds that Mr. Cook’s testimony, and the November 2, 2015, interview of Respondent in which Respondent ultimately admits to engaging in sexual activity with the minor child, corroborates the minor victim’s statements in the interview with Ms. Lange that the minor victim engaged in sexual activity with Respondent while Respondent was in a position of familial or custodial authority. The undersigned finds the testimony of Mr. Cook and Ms. Lange to be credible. The undersigned further finds the minor victim’s statements in the CPT interview to be clear, precise, and distinctly remembered. The undersigned further finds that Respondent ultimately admitted to engaging in sexual conduct with the minor victim, as alleged, and that Mr. Cook did not force or coerce Respondent to provide this admission.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission enter a final order finding that Respondent Taylor L. Landry has failed to maintain the qualifications for good moral character for a correctional officer, established under section 943.13(7), and defined in rule 11B-27.0011(4)(a). It is further RECOMMENDED that Petitioner revoke Respondent Taylor L. Landry’s Corrections Certification No. 320518. DONE AND ENTERED this 24th day of September, 2018, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ROBERT J. TELFER III Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of September, 2018
The Issue Whether Rule 33ER91-3, Florida Administrative Code, constitutes an invalid exercise of delegated authority? Whether a proposed amendment to Rule 33-6.0045(2), Florida Administrative Code, constitutes an invalid exercise of delegated authority?
Findings Of Fact Standing. The Petitioner, David Ansgar Nyberg, is an inmate in the custody of the Respondent, the Department of Corrections, at Marion Correctional Institution. The Petitioner is subject to the rules of the Respondent, including the rules at issue in this proceeding. The Petitioner is not currently eligible for minimum custody classification even if the rules at issue did not apply to the Petitioner. Nor was the Petitioner eligible for minimum custody during the period of time that the policy challenged in case number 91-6699RX was in effect or the period of time during which the Emergency Rule applied. The Respondent. Section 944.09, Florida Statutes, requires that the Respondent adopt rules governing the administration of the correctional system in Florida. Among other things, Section 944.09, Florida Statutes, requires that rules be adopted by the Respondent governing all aspects of the operation of the prison system in Florida. The Emergency Rule and Rule 33-6.0045(2)(g), Florida Administrative Code. Rule 33-6.0045, Florida Administrative Code, establishes custody classifications for inmates. Custody classifications determine, among other things, the facility to which an inmate may be assigned and the degree of security an inmate is subjected to. Inmates are classified as minimum, medium, close or maximum custody, with minimum being the least restrictive and maximum being the most restrictive. The procedure to be followed in classifying each inmate is provided in Rule 33-6.0045(2), Florida Administrative Code. The Emergency Rule and the Proposed Rule amend Rule 33-6.0045(2), Florida Administrative Code, by adding three paragraphs, including the following pertinent paragraph challenged by the Petitioner: (g) Any inmate who has been certified as a mentally disordered sex offender pursuant to ch. 917, FS shall not be assigned to minimum custody status unless they have successfully completed the mentally disordered sex offender program. The Emergency Rule and the proposed amendment to Rule 33-6.0045, Florida Administrative Code (hereinafter referred to as the "Proposed Rule"), include the same substantive amendments to Rule 33-6.0045, Florida Administrative Code. The Emergency Rule was only effective during part of 1991, prior to promulgating the Proposed Rule. Relevant Effect of the Emergency Rule and the Proposed Rule. Chapter 917, Florida Statutes (1975), which is titled "mentally disordered sex offenders" provided, in pertinent part, the following: 917.14 Certifying defendant for hearing.-- The court may suspend the sentence and certify a defendant for a hearing and examination in the circuit court to determine whether the person is a mentally disordered sex offender if: The person is convicted of a felony or misdemeanor for which he is currently being prosecuted, whether or not the crime is a sex offense; There is a probable cause to believe that the person is a mentally disordered sex offender; and The mental disorder has existed for at least the immediately preceding 4 months. The court may certify a person under subsection (1) on its own motion, on motion by the State Attorney, or on application by affidavit of the defendant. A "mentally disordered sex offender" is defined in Section 917.13, Florida Statutes (1975), as follows: "Mentally disordered sex offender" means a person who is not insane but who has a mental disorder and is considered dangerous to others because of a propensity to commit sex offenses. Any person determined to be a mentally disordered sex offender was to be committed "to the custody of the Department of Offender Rehabilitation for care, treatment, and rehabilitation." Section 917.19, Florida Statutes (1975). The definition of a "mentally disordered sex offender" was modified in 1977. Pursuant to Section 917.13, Florida Statutes (1977), a "mentally disordered sex offender" was defined as follows: A "mentally disordered sex offender" or "offender is a person who: Has been convicted of or pleaded guilty or no contest to a sex offense or attempted sex offense in a current prosecution; Suffers from a nonpsychotic mental or emotional disorder, yet is competent; and Is likely to commit further sex offenses if permitted to remain at liberty. Subsequent to 1977, the classification of an offender as a mentally disordered sex offender was repealed. Pursuant to the Emergency Rule and the Proposed Rule, any person who has been determined to be a mentally disordered sex offender who has NOT successfully completed the mentally disordered sex offender program may not be classified as minimum custody. The Statutory Authority for the Emergency Rule and the Proposed Rule. The specific authority for the Emergency Rule and the Proposed Rule is Sections 20.315, 944.09 and 958.11, Florida Statutes. The specific laws implemented by the Emergency Rule and the Proposed Rule is Sections 20.315, 921.20, 944.09 and 958.11, Florida Statutes. The Respondent intends to add by technical amendment the following additional statutory authority for the Emergency Rule and the Proposed Rule: Sections 944.17 and 944.1905, Florida Statutes. The Rationale for the Emergency Rule and the Proposed Rule. The immediate danger to the public health, safety and welfare which the Respondent indicated justified promulgating the Emergency Rule pursuant to Section 120.54(9), Florida Statutes, was set out in the Notice of Emergency Rulemaking: The rule is necessary in order to prevent convicted sex offenders, inmates certified as mentally disordered sex offenders, and aliens who are subject to deportation from being assigned minimum custody status. The department's current classification policy permits the classification of minimum custody for these inmates who, by their nature, present an extraordinary threat to public safety should they escape, or, in the case of aliens, present an inordinate escape risk because of the threat to deportation. The sex offenders being addressed are those who are or have been previously convicted of sex offenses listed in s.944.277(1), which are those sex offenses which exclude inmates from awards of provisional credits, and therefore identify them as a category of offenders who present a threat to public safety. The rule also addresses those persons certified as mentally disordered sex offenders under ch. 917 FS, who are considered dangerous to others because of a propensity to commit sex offenses. Experience has shown that one of the categories of inmates that are the greatest risk of escape are those subject to deportation, which in certain cases, would subject them to severe penalties in their native countries. Without an emergency rule, these categories of offenders could be reduced to minimum custody and permitted placement on public work squads or other outside work assignments with little or no supervision. The emergency rule presents a mechanism to ensure that these inmates are retained in a secure perimeter or under direct supervision. Although the Notice of Emergency Rulemaking indicates that there are only two inmates who are classified as mentally disordered sex offenders under Chapter 917, Florida Statutes, there may be more. The number referenced in the Notice does not include former inmates who have been released, with or without further supervision, who may commit offenses in the future which could result in their return to prison. Additionally, it is possible that Chapter 917, Florida Statutes, or a similar statute, could be enacted in the future resulting in the classification of additional inmates as mentally disordered sex offenders. In fact, Chapter 917, Florida Statutes, has been repealed and then reenacted in the past. Even if there are only two inmates classified as mentally disordered sex offenders, the evidence failed to prove that the potential threat from a single inmate classified as a mentally disordered sex offender is not sufficient justification for the Emergency Rule and the Proposed Rule. Although the Respondent was aware at the time of promulgating the challenged rules that the Emergency Rule and the Proposed Rule would apply to the Petitioner, who is one of the inmates currently in prison who is classified as a mentally disordered sex offender, the weight of the evidence failed to prove that the Respondent was "out to get the Petitioner." The Petitioner failed to prove that the Petitioner adopted the Emergency Rule or the Proposed Rule only because they apply to the Petitioner. The purpose for promulgating the Emergency Rule and the Proposed Rule was to protect the public. By the very definition of a mentally disordered sex offender under Chapter 917, Florida Statutes, persons determined to be mentally disordered sex offenders are considered likely to constitute a continuing threat. Pursuant to the definition of a mentally disordered sex offender contained in the 1975 statutes, such a person "is considered dangerous to others because of a propensity to commit sex offenses." Section 917.13, Florida Statutes (1975). As defined in the 1977 statutes, such a person "[i]s likely to commit further sex offenses if permitted to remain at liberty." Section 917.13(1)(c), Florida Statutes (1977). Persons classified as minimum custody are subject to less security. They may be placed on work programs which take them out of the institution. Allowing a person who has been determined by the courts of Florida to be likely to commit further sex offenses or to have a propensity to commit sex offenses and who have not completed programs intended to correct such tendencies, has the potential of placing the public at unnecessary risk. The Impact of the Emergency Rule and the Proposed Rule on the Petitioner and the Petitioner's Challenge. The Petitioner was charged with, and convicted of, first degree murder in 1975. He was sentenced to life imprisonment and was required to serve a minimum of 25 years. The Petitioner was not charged with any sex offense. Subsequent to the Petitioner's conviction, his defense attorney suggested that the Petitioner request that he be classified as a mentally disordered sex offender pursuant to Chapter 917, Florida Statutes (1975). The Petitioner did in fact request that he be classified as a mentally disordered sex offender. Pursuant to Section 917.14(2), Florida Statutes (1975), such a request was required to be made by "affidavit of the defendant." The Petitioner's request to be classified as a mentally disordered sex offender was granted on December 19, 1975, by then Circuit Court Judge Charles Scruggs, III. There was no requirement that a person classified as a mentally disordered sex offender in 1975 actually be convicted of having committed a sex offense. There was, however, a requirement that the sentencing judge determine that the person being classified as a mentally disordered sex offender: Have a mental disorder; and Be considered dangerous to others because of a propensity to commit sex offenses. It was not necessary under Chapter 917, Florida Statutes (1975), that it be shown that the person ever actually committed a sex offense. It was only necessary that the person show a propensity or inclination to commit a sex offense in the future. On April 1, 1976, the Petitioner was transferred from a correctional institution to the state mental hospital in Chattahoochee, Florida. In March, 1980, the Petitioner was resentenced and returned to a correctional institution. Judge Scruggs recommended that the Petitioner be placed in minimum custody. The Petitioner is currently classified as medium custody. Even without the Emergency Rule or the Proposed Rule, the Petitioner has not been eligible for classification as minimum custody. Nor is the Petitioner currently eligible for minimum custody. Should the Petitioner, who has had no disciplinary reports during his seventeen years incarceration by the Respondent, otherwise become eligible for minimum custody in the future, he will not be so classified because of the Proposed Rule. In light of the fact that the Petitioner was not eligible for minimum custody during the period of time that the Emergency Rule was effective, the Emergency Rule had no impact on the Petitioner and he lacks standing to challenge the Emergency Rule. The Petitioner failed to prove that he has successfully completed the mentally disordered sex offender program. The Petitioner was involved in a sex offense committed against him when he was a child. Pursuant to the Emergency Rule and the Proposed Rule the Petitioner will not be eligible for minimum custody because he was classified as a mentally disordered sex offender and has apparently not successfully completed the mentally disordered sex offender. Nor can the Petitioner successfully complete the program since it is no longer provided. The Petitioner has alleged that the Emergency Rule and the Proposed Rule are invalid because they are arbitrary and capricious. The Petitioner has also alleged that the Emergency Rule is invalid because no emergency existed when it was promulgated.
Findings Of Fact The Respondent holds law enforcement certificate number 4519, issued February 3, 1972. On March 5, 1981, in the Circuit Court of Duval County, Florida, the Respondent plead nolo contendere to the charge of aggravated assault. Pursuant to Section 784.021(2), Florida Statutes, aggravated assault is a felony.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that law enforcement certificate number 4519 held by the Respondent, Nathaniel Frederick, Jr., be revoked. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 18th day of April, 1983, in Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM B. THOMAS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of April, 1983. COPIES FURNISHED: Susan Tully, Esquire Assistant Attorney General Suite 1601 - The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Lacy Mahon, Jr., Esquire 350 East Adams Street Jacksonville, Florida 32202 G. Patrick Gallagher, Director Criminal Justice Standards Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Robert Dempsey, Commissioner Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302
The Issue Whether petitioner should suspend or revoke respondent's certification as a correctional officer for the reasons alleged in the administrative complaint?
Findings Of Fact Respondent Edward L. Bonifay, III has held a correctional officer's certificate at all pertinent times. From October 1, 1980, till November 3, 1982, he worked for the Escambia County Sheriff's Department. When he left, his certificate automatically became inactive. (Testimony of Frick) Except in emergency circumstances not pertinent here, the Escambia County Sheriff's Department has a firm, written policy against male correctional officers entering the female housing area in the Escambia County Jail unless accompanied by a female correctional officer. The Jail Operations Manual, which Mr. Bonifay purported to have read more than once, states the policy. He was told about it. Everybody who works at the jail is aware of the policy. (Testimony of Eddings) The Jail Operations Manual also stated the requirement that any escape attempt be reported in writing. Nell Vaughn shared a cell with several other women at the Escambia County Jail in September of 1982, at a time when Minnie Squires had the adjacent cell to herself. On several occasions, including at least two in September of 1982, Ms. Squires asked other inmates to summon respondent Bonifay. At least twice in September of 1982 he arrived at her cell door alone and touched her when she came to the door undressed. Ms. Vaughn, who sometimes monitored events next door through a peephole, observed this. Bonifay admitted as much to two fellow officers, although he claimed, in one rendition, that she was trying to escape and that he was obliged to grab her breast to prevent the escape, although, he conceded, maybe he did leave his hand on her breast "too long" and maybe his hand did "slide down her stomach." To Nell Vaughn it looked like he was fondling her breasts while they were both inside the cell, after any conceivable risk of escape must have been well past. Nor does the escape hypothesis explain why Ms. Vaughn saw his hand in Ms. Squires' crotch. Respondent Bonifay never made any written report of an escape attempt on Ms. Squires' part, and made no written report of having visited a woman prisoner's cell unaccompanied by a female correctional officer. Once the events of September came to light, his superiors lost confidence in him and he was unable to function as a correctional officer in the jail. His credibility was called into question and his effectiveness was lost. (Testimony of Eddings, Jones) Petitioner filed its proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law, and the proposed findings of fact have been adopted, in substance for the most part. To the extent they have been rejected, they have been deemed immaterial, cumulative, subordinate or unsupported by the weight of the evidence.
Recommendation Upon consideration of the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That petitioner revoke respondent's certification as a correctional officer. DONE and ENTERED this 8th day of February, 1984, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT T. BENTON II Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of February, 1984. COPIES FURNISHED: Dennis S. Valente, Esquire Post Office Fox 1849 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Edward L. Bonifay, III 228 Cordoba Street Gulf Breeze, Florida 32561 Robert Dempsey, Commissioner Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302
The Issue Whether Petitioner, Andrew Anthony Taylor (“Petitioner”), timely filed a petition under the Victims of Wrongful Incarceration Act, chapter 961, Florida Statutes (2016)(“the Act”); and, if so, whether Petitioner demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence, his actual innocence, thereby entitling him to monetary compensation under the Act.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner seeks compensation pursuant to the Act after serving a prison term of 25 years for the sexual abuse of his stepdaughter, C.J. The jury verdict was vacated after C.J., in 2014, recanted her accusation that Petitioner sexually abused her in 1990, when she was eight years old. The undersigned will begin with a discussion of the events in 1990, when C.J. first reported the allegation of sexual abuse against Petitioner to Dr. Valerie Rao, a rape treatment medical examiner. On the evening of March 10, 1990, C.J. was brought to the Jackson Memorial Hospital Roxcy Bolton Rape Treatment Center by her mother and grandmother, at which time C.J. came under the care of Dr. Rao. Dr. Rao obtained a detailed history from C.J., during which C.J. reported that she had been sexually abused by her stepfather, “Andrew,” at two different locations--her old house and her new house. According to C.J., the most recent sexual encounter was when she was awoken by Petitioner on “Friday night,” March 8, 1990, and told to get up and go to her mother’s bed. C.J. did so, and Petitioner then told her to take off her pajamas, which she did. According to C.J., Petitioner got on top of her, put his “private part” in her, began kissing her, and put his mouth on her “private part.” C.J. also stated Petitioner made her touch his “private part,” and that he touched her in the anal area. C.J. also stated Petitioner often put his “private part” in her mouth. C.J. also stated Petitioner told her that if she told anyone, he would kill her. After obtaining the history, Dr. Rao examined C.J. and observed multiple bruises on her right arm and thighs, and abrasions on her back and on her left breast. The bruises and abrasions were caused when C.J.’s mother beat her with a baseball bat after C.J. told her mother of Petitioner’s sexual abuse. Dr. Rao immediately reported the mother to law enforcement, and C.J.’s mother was arrested at the rape treatment center for aggravated child abuse. Dr. Rao conducted a vaginal examination of C.J. and used a colposcope to observe and document the status of C.J.’s hymen. Dr. Rao observed and documented several healed tears of the hymen, which made the opening of C.J.’s hymen bigger than it should be for a child of her age. According to Dr. Rao, C.J. did not show any natural signs of progression of the hymen tissue that might be present due to a child approaching puberty. Dr. Rao persuasively and credibly testified at hearing that C.J.’s history was consistent with her physical examination. According to Dr. Rao, the healed tears could have resulted from Respondent “trying to push his penis into her” consistent with C.J.’s history. Dr. Rao acknowledged the tears also could have been caused by a finger, a pencil, or any object that is bigger than the opening of the hymen. However, no evidence was presented at hearing indicating that a finger, pencil, or any other object was placed in the opening of C.J.’s hymen. Dr. Rao further acknowledged there was no physical evidence that she could discern or collect that identified Petitioner as the assailant in this case. However, in 1990, obtaining DNA samples and the gathering of other types of physical evidence in an effort to specifically identify perpetrators of sexual abuse were not as advanced and reliable as it is today. Following Dr. Rao’s examination on March 10, 1990, C.J. was separated from her mother, and her mother no longer had custody of her. C.J. lived with her maternal great grandmother, and without her mother in her life, until she was 16 years old. On March 27, 1990, Mercy Restani, a trained interviewer who was employed by the Dade County Children’s Center within the office of the State Attorney, interviewed C.J. at the children’s center. C.J. provided a detailed history to Ms. Restani. C.J. told Ms. Restani that the sexual abuse by Petitioner happened in the old house and at the new house. C.J. told Ms. Restani that Petitioner would get her out of her bedroom and take her into her mother’s bedroom. C.J. told Ms. Restani that Petitioner would touch her “pocketbook” (the child’s word for a vagina) with his “private” (the child’s word for penis). C.J. told Dr. Restani that Petitioner got on top of her, that he moved very fast, and that it hurt when he did so. C.J. said Petitioner touched her breasts, put his mouth on her “pocketbook,” and his “private” in her mouth. C.J. also told Ms. Restani that Petitioner told her he would kill her if she told anyone. Ms. Restani asked C.J. if she had told her mother or anyone about what had happened to her. C.J. told Ms. Restani that she did not tell her mother because she was afraid. C.J. told Ms. Restani that her mother “had been asking her for several days if Andrew had been messing with her.” When C.J. eventually told her mother what had happened, C.J. said her mother beat her with a baseball bat. On April 3, 1990, C.J. was interviewed by a clinical forensic psychologist, Manuel E. Alvarez, Ph.D. The purpose of the interview was to assess C.J.’s current mental status and emotional therapeutic needs. According to Dr. Alvarez, C.J. was able to distinguish between the truth and a lie. C.J. had the intelligence to comprehend what had happened to her, to be able to relate it to others, and she was competent to testify. C.J. provided a detailed history to Dr. Alvarez. Dr. Alvarez observed that C.J. was able to provide a synopsis of her living arrangements at the time of the incidents. C.J. identified her stepfather, “Andrew,” as the perpetrator of the sexual abuse. C.J. told Dr. Alvarez it occurred at the old house and current house. C.J. told Dr. Alvarez it occurred when Petitioner would wake her, take her into the room, and tell her to get onto the bed. C.J. was reluctant to verbally tell Dr. Alvarez what Petitioner did to her, but C.J. wrote it down on a piece of paper (Petitioner’s Exhibit 4) in her own handwriting: He would get on me. He would start moving fast on me. He would take out his private part. On my private part and In my mouth. C.J. also told Dr. Alvarez that after the incidents, Petitioner threatened to kill her if she told anyone about it. On April 5, 1990, C.J. executed an affidavit, attesting to the fact of her name, that she was eight years old, that she lived with her mother and Petitioner at a specific street address in Dade County, Florida, and that: Early in the morning on Friday, March 9, 1990, Andrew woke me up and took me to his bedroom. Andrew told me to take off my panties. He touched my breasts. He put his private part into my pocketbook. It hurt. He kissed me on my mouth and on my pocketbook. He had done this before. He told me he would kill me if I told. My mother asked me if anyone was messing with me. For several days I wouldn’t tell her. When I did tell her what Andrew did, she beat me with a baseball bat. In August 1990, C.J.’s mother entered a plea of nolo contendere to the offense of aggravated child abuse against C.J. She was adjudicated guilty, sentenced to community control, and ordered not to have any contact with C.J. until approved by the court. On October 22, 1990, C.J. gave a videotaped deposition in Petitioner’s criminal case, in which she provided details of the sexual abuse by Petitioner. In the deposition, C.J. described how Petitioner woke her up, took her to her mother’s room, touched her “pocketbook” with his mouth, and placed his “wee-wee” in her “pocketbook.” C.J. testified he moved his body around while putting his “wee-wee” in her “pocketbook,” and that it hurt when he did so. She testified that on another evening, Petitioner woke her up again, took her to her mother’s room, and touched her “pocketbook” with his hand moving up and down as he did so. She testified it happened at the new house and at the old house. Petitioner’s criminal jury trial was held in March 1991, before the Eleventh Judicial Circuit in and for Dade County, Florida, in the case of State of Florida v. Andrew Anthony Taylor, Case No. F90-009928. At Petitioner’s criminal trial, C.J. testified via closed circuit television that Petitioner came to her bedroom, woke her up, and took her to her mother’s room. C.J. testified that she was wearing pajamas and panties and that Petitioner removed them. Using anatomically correct dolls, C.J. showed the jury that Petitioner touched her vagina with his hand and put his mouth on her breasts. She further indicated that Petitioner put his mouth on her vagina and demonstrated how he put his penis in her mouth and vagina. C.J. testified that it hurt when Petitioner placed his penis in her “private part.” She testified she did not tell her mother about this that night because Petitioner said he would do something bad to her. C.J. testified that another incident occurred that same week where Petitioner did the same things to her. C.J. also testified Petitioner put something “greasy” on his “private part” before he put his “private part” in her “private part.” C.J. indicated Petitioner’s sexual abuse of her also occurred at the old house. C.J. testified that when she told her mother about Petitioner’s sexual abuse of her after the last incident, her mother became upset and hurt her. C.J. testified that when she told Dr. Rao she got all the bruises when her mother hit her with a baseball bat, it was the first time her mother ever hit her with a bat. C.J. testified she has not been able to live with or have contact with her mom since her mother hurt her. C.J.’s mother did not testify at the criminal trial against Petitioner because she had an open warrant for her arrest at the time for violating her community control. Petitioner testified at his criminal trial. Although Petitioner denied he sexually abused C.J., he acknowledged that he was C.J.’s stepfather; he married C.J.’s mother in 1989; he had a son with C.J.’s mother in 1998; he was having an extramarital affair with another woman; and while he divided his time between Maryland and Miami because of work, he was sleeping in the same home as C.J. during the timeframe that C.J. indicated she had been sexually abused by him. Following the criminal trial, Petitioner was convicted on March 15, 1991, of three counts of capital sexual battery and one count of lewd and lascivious behavior for the sexual abuse of C.J. Petitioner was sentenced to life in prison on the three capital offenses. The judgment and sentences were per curiam affirmed on appeal in Taylor v. State, 610 So. 2d 644 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992). After reporting the incidents of sexual abuse, C.J. went through counseling two times per week for several years. At no time did C.J. tell any therapists that she was not sexually abused by Petitioner. In 2006, C.J. was approached at her grandmother’s home by a male private investigator for Petitioner. The investigator wanted to ask C.J. questions about what happened with Petitioner, but C.J. refused to speak with the investigator. In either late 2013 or early 2014, C.J. was again approached by a private investigator for Petitioner, this time a female who came to C.J.’s place of employment (“Walmart”). The investigator wanted to ask C.J. if anything had happened with Petitioner. In response, C.J. immediately told her “no.” The investigator then gave C.J. a card, and C.J. told the investigator she would call her in couple of weeks. On February 17, 2014, C.J. executed an affidavit formally recanting the accusation that Petitioner sexually abused her when she was eight years old. In this affidavit, C.J. asserted now, at the age of 32, that she made the allegation because her mother was either drunk or high on drugs who would ask her “if anybody touched me inappropriately.” C.J. asserted that late one night after telling her mother that nobody touched me, her mother beat her with a baseball bat and started yelling, “did Andrew touch you.” C.J. asserted that after telling her mother no, her mother began to beat her and beat her for hours. C.J. asserted that after an extensive beating, she told her mother that “Andrew” had touched her so that she would stop beating her, and after telling her that Andrew touched her, the beating stopped. However, by this time, C.J. had developed a close relationship with her half-brother Andrew Taylor, Jr. C.J. further asserted: A while back, I began to talk with my half- brother, Andrew Jr., and would see him interacting with his own son. This started me thinking about what I had done and only I knew the real truth that Andrew was innocent. My conscience started bothering me every time I would see Andrew, Jr. playing and interacting with his son and it got to the point where I couldn’t sleep and hardly eat. I finally called my half-brother, Andrew Jr., and told him I needed to meet with him and explain what had happened regarding his father. I told Andrew Jr. that his father never touched me or bothered me sexually and that I was so sorry for his dad not being in his life because of what I did. I asked Andrew Jr. to forgive me and he agreed. I also asked Andrew Jr. what I should do and who I could write in order to correct this situation. Investigator Jeannie Rogers came to see me a few months ago and spoke to me about coming forward. I have finally gotten the courage to stand up and do what is right. On June 23, 2014, Petitioner filed a Motion for Post- Conviction Relief Based on Newly Discovered Evidence in Case No. F90-009928. The newly discovered evidence was C.J.’s recantation of the sexual abuse allegation against Petitioner. On April 2, 2015, an evidentiary hearing was held on the motion before Circuit Court Judge Diane Ward. At the hearing before Judge Ward, Petitioner presented the live testimony of C.J., who testified she made up the allegation that Petitioner sexually abused her because her mother beat her with a baseball bat to make her provide a false allegation against Petitioner. C.J. testified she told her mother Petitioner sexually abused her because she wanted the beating to stop. However, C.J. also testified when she told her mother that Petitioner sexually abused her, the beating did not stop, and her mother continued to beat her with the baseball bat for not telling her about the sexual abuse sooner. During the hearing before Judge Ward, C.J. acknowledged she provided specific details of sexual abuse by Petitioner to Dr. Rao, Ms. Restani, Dr. Alvarez, and in her prior testimony in the underlying criminal proceedings involving Petitioner. C.J. was asked how she could have had such knowledge of sexual activity as an eight year old in order to provide the details that she did to Dr. Rao, Ms. Restani, Dr. Alvarez, and in her testimony in the underlying criminal proceedings. In response, C.J. testified she came up with the details by watching cable television and walking in on her mother and Petitioner while they were having sex. At the hearing before Judge Ward, Respondent presented the live testimony of C.J.’s mother, who acknowledged she was a cocaine addict in March 1990. C.J.’s mother testified on direct examination that she recalled an incident in which she had returned home one night on March 5, 1990, and found C.J. lying in bed with her hands covering her front “private parts.” She testified that she could smell a “sexual scent” in the room and that she asked C.J. “what was wrong.” She testified C.J. did not indicate anything was wrong, but she was still suspicious something was wrong because of the sexual odor in the room. C.J.’s mother testified that due to this suspicion, she asked C.J. a second time on March 9, 1990, if “anyone had been messing with her.” According to C.J.’s mother, C.J. indicated this time that Petitioner “[h]ad been bothering her,” which meant that he had been sexually molesting her. C.J.’s mother testified on direct examination that when C.J. began telling her specific details of the abuse by Petitioner, she became irate and beat C.J. with a baseball bat. However, C.J.’s mother’s testimony as to when she began to beat C.J. with a baseball bat is inconsistent. C.J. and her mother acknowledged their relationship over the past several years has been good, and there is no current animosity between them. At the conclusion of the evidentiary hearing, Judge Ward orally announced her ruling that C.J.’s change in testimony is newly discovered evidence. In reaching this conclusion, Judge Ward specifically found C.J.’s testimony “reliable and credible.” Judge Ward commented she “had the opportunity to view her, and observe her during the testimony, and as well as consider any motive that she had for the recantation of her testimony.” On the other hand, Judge Ward specifically found the live testimony of C.J.’s mother to be “incredible.” In reaching this conclusion, Judge Ward commented that at the time of the events, she was by her own admission using drugs, and she had a poor recollection of the events, which is attributable to her drug use rather than to the passage of time. Judge Ward further stated: There were multiple lengthy pauses between the attorney’s questions and her answers where she seemed to be searching in her memory for answers. The Court observed that she seemed very hesitant and unsure of her own recollection of the events, and I further find that this is attributable to her extensive drug use, and that, and her intoxication on drugs at the time that this occurred. With regards to the beating, but with a baseball bat, although at some times she did acknowledge, did state that she beat her child with the baseball bat after she implicated the Defendant in the sexual assault, there were times that she said that she couldn’t recall and it could have been before she implicated her. And this is the most damaging testimony you could possibly have given the fact that there was no direct evidence otherwise implicating the Defendant as the person who sexually assaulted her. She did have six healed tears on her hymen which could have occurred at any time, and been caused by any other person. There was no DNA, blood evidence, semen, eyewitnesses, or a confession, so the only evidence that the State had, or the strongest evidence that the State had was the victim’s testimony, which was obviously obtained through a beating with a baseball bat by her mother when she was a very tiny child. The pictures of her are very sad at such a young age. There is no doubt that if a jury were to hear that the victim, hear from the victim that the Defendant was not the person that sexually abused her, and that she lied because her mother beat her with a baseball bat when she was eight years old, would have produced an, could have, would have produced an acquittal on retrial, and that the Defendant would probably be acquitted on retrial, so based on the foregoing I’m going to grant the motion for post-conviction relief. We need to schedule it for trial now. I think it has to be set in ninety days; isn’t that correct? Okay, I’ll answer my own question yes. Pet. Ex. 14, pp. 245-247. On April 2, 2015, a written order was entered vacating the finding of guilt, judgment, and sentence, and a hearing was scheduled for April 10, 2015, at which time a new trial date would be set. On April 10, 2015, the State announced a nolle prose of all criminal charges against Petitioner. On June 30, 2015, Petitioner timely filed a Petition to Establish Wrongful Incarceration in Case No. F90-009928. On July 31, 2015, Respondent filed a response contesting the petition. After the filing of the initial petition, a grand jury returned an indictment recharging Petitioner for the same crimes. C.J. was notified of the grand jury proceeding, but she did not appear or request a continuance. After the criminal case was re-filed, Respondent and Petitioner were unable to reach a settlement. On December 12, 2016, the second set of charges were nolle prossed. On January 25, 2017, Petitioner filed an amended petition. On March 17, 2017, pursuant to section 961.03(4)(a), Judge Ward issued an “Order Finding That Defendant Was a ‘Wrongfully Incarcerated Person’ and Is ‘Eligible for Compensation’ Pursuant to Section 961.03, Florida Statutes.” Judge Ward held that the petition was timely filed and that Petitioner met his burden of establishing, by a preponderance of the evidence, his “actual innocence” of the charges. Central to Judge Ward’s conclusion that C.J.’s recantation is reliable and that Petitioner met his burden of establishing his actual innocence by a preponderance of the evidence is that she had the opportunity to observe C.J. and her mother’s demeanor when they testified live at the April 2, 2015, evidentiary hearing on Petitioner’s motion for post-conviction relief. Judge Ward’s findings are largely based on credibility assessments of C.J. and her mother based on observations of their demeanor while testifying. In concluding that Petitioner established his “actual innocence” by a preponderance of the evidence, Judge Ward relied on the evidence presented at the April 2, 2015, evidentiary hearing on Petitioner’s motion for post-conviction relief. In the instant proceeding, however, Petitioner failed to meet his burden of establishing his actual innocence by clear and convincing evidence. Whether Petitioner is actually innocent turns on whether Petitioner presented clear and convincing evidence that C.J.’s recantation is reliable. The evidence presented in this case does not clearly and convincingly establish the reliability of C.J.’s recantation. To begin with, C.J. consistently provided details about sexual conduct perpetrated against her by Petitioner in her visits with Dr. Rao, Ms. Restani, and Dr. Alvarez, and in her prior deposition and trial testimony in the underlying criminal proceeding against Petitioner. C.J. gave details about how Petitioner would wake her up and take her to another room. She gave details about oral sex by Petitioner on herself and that she performed on Petitioner. She gave details about Petitioner using a lubricant on his penis. She gave details about how he would place his penis in her vagina and move up and down really fast. She said it hurt when he did so. Dr. Rao persuasively and credibly testified that the injuries to C.J.’s hymen were consistent with her history. C.J. consistently stated in 1990 and 1991 that her mother beat her with a baseball bat after she told her of the sexual abuse by Petitioner. Over 20 years later, C.J.’s story changed, and she stated that her mother beat her with a baseball bat before she told her of the sexual abuse by Petitioner. In her recantation affidavit, C.J. stated that after telling her mother that Petitioner touched her, the beating stopped. However, in the hearing before Judge Ward, C.J. testified that her mother continued to beat her with the baseball bat after she told her about the abuse for not telling her about the abuse sooner. From March 10, 1990, when C.J. was removed from her mother until she was 16 years old, C.J. had many opportunities to come forward and recant the allegation of abuse against Petitioner. During this time, there was no reason for C.J. to fear her mother because her mother was not in C.J.’s life. Subsequently, C.J. and her mother developed a good relationship. However, Petitioner waited almost 24 years to recant. C.J. recanted after developing a relationship with her half-brother, Andrew Taylor, Jr. When Andrew Taylor, Jr., turned 18 years old, he began a relationship with his father, Petitioner. Prior to recanting, C.J. regretted her half-brother did not get to spend quality time with Petitioner because Petitioner was in prison. C.J.’s development of a relationship with her half-brother and her desire that he have a strong relationship with Petitioner could be a motive for her recantation. C.J. did not appear before the grand jury, she did not request a continuance, and she was not called as a witness at either of the hearings in the instant matter. The undersigned lacked the opportunity to observe C.J.’s demeanor because she was not called to testify as a live witness. However, the undersigned had the opportunity to observe C.J.’s demeanor while testifying in her videotaped deposition in 1990, at which time she testified credibly and persuasively to facts demonstrating that Petitioner sexually abused her. Petitioner was called as a witness at the August 8, 2017, hearing, at which he was simply asked on direct examination if he ever molested C.J., to which he responded no. Petitioner’s testimony at the hearing was unpersuasive.
The Issue The issue is whether Petitioner, Juan F. Ramos (Petitioner), is entitled to compensation pursuant to sections 961.01 through 961.07, Florida Statutes (2013). Unless otherwise stated, all references to the law will be to Florida Statutes (2013).
Findings Of Fact Petitioner immigrated to the United States from Cuba in 1980. In April of 1982, Petitioner resided in Cocoa, Florida, within walking distance of his employer, Armor Flite Southeast. Mary Sue Cobb, the victim of a murder, also lived in the area near Petitioner’s home and Armor Flite Southeast. Petitioner and Mrs. Cobb knew one another. Prior to April 23, 1982, Petitioner had placed an Amway order with the victim and her husband. The Cobbs sold Amway products and solicited Petitioner to purchase items and/or become a salesperson for the company. Prior to April 23, 1982, Petitioner had been at the Cobb residence five or six times. Petitioner had been inside the Cobb home. For the two days prior to April 23, 1982, Petitioner had been sick, unable to go to work, and had not been at the Armor Flite Southeast property. At all times material to this case, Manuel Ruiz was the general manager at Armor Flite Southeast. Mr. Ruiz served as Petitioner’s supervisor. From the Armor Flite Southeast property, it was possible to view the Cobb residence. On the morning of April 23, 1982, Petitioner told his wife he was going to work. Petitioner did not, however, enter the Armor Flite property at the beginning of the work day when Mr. Ruiz opened the shop at approximately 6:45 a.m. Moreover, Mr. Ruiz did not see Petitioner at the Armor Flite Southeast property until he came to pick up his check at 11:30 a.m. or noon on April 23, 1982. Instead of a paycheck, Mr. Ruiz gave Petitioner a letter on April 23, 1982, that notified him he was being laid off effective April 21, 1982. Armor Flite Southeast was in Chapter 11 and the trustee for the company gave Mr. Ruiz a list of four persons who were to be laid off. Petitioner was among those four. Petitioner was invited to attend a meeting with the trustee on April 23, 1982, at approximately 3:30 p.m. In theory, the employees were being laid off due to lack of work, but they could be re-hired if the work volume improved. Mr. Ruiz explained the foregoing to Petitioner. Mr. Ruiz and Petitioner had no difficulty communicating as both men were fluent in Spanish. At some time after the meeting with Mr. Ruiz, Petitioner returned home and was there when family members came over later in the afternoon. During the morning of April 23, 1982, Mrs. Cobb was murdered. Following an investigation of the crime, Petitioner was charged with the first degree murder of Mrs. Cobb, was convicted, and was incarcerated. Subsequent to the conviction and sentencing, Petitioner’s conviction was overturned and his case was remanded for a new trial. The second trial resulted in an acquittal on April 24, 1987. On June 28, 2010, Petitioner filed a petition for compensation and alleged he is entitled to relief pursuant to chapter 961, Florida Statutes. An Amended Petition was filed on October 20, 2010, and resulted in an order entered May 13, 2013, by Circuit Court Judge Charles Roberts that provided as follows: The Defendant’s [Petitioner herein] Amended Petition to Victims of Wrongful Incarceration Compensation Act shall be transferred to the Division of Administrative Hearings for findings of fact and a recommended determination of whether the Defendant has established that he is a wrongfully incarcerated person who is eligible for compensation.
