The Issue Whether Respondent violated the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992, as alleged in the Charge of Discrimination filed by Petitioner on May 4, 2001.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is an African-American woman who was employed by Respondent from July 2000 until her termination on January 24, 2001. At the time she was hired, the staff at the store location where Petitioner was employed was comprised of mostly black females. Initially, Petitioner held the position of hotline operator. In December 2000, she became an assistant manager of the store and another African-American woman, Latasha Green became the store manager. According to Petitioner, problems began to arise after she and Ms. Green were promoted to managerial positions. While an assistant manager, Petitioner's duties included closing the store and taking deposits to the bank where she had a key to the store's safe deposit box. On January 5, 2001, Petitioner and Ms. Green attended a meeting with their supervisor, Jason Rudd, a white male. This meeting was upsetting to Petitioner because of comments made to her and to Ms. Green by Mr. Rudd. In particular, Mr. Rudd commented that there were too many "dark clouds" in the store, which Petitioner interpreted to be racist remarks. At the January 5, 2001, meeting, Petitioner learned that a white male, Jason Smith, was going to be brought in as the new store manager. With this change in personnel, Ms. Green was demoted from store manager to assistant manager and Petitioner was demoted from assistant manager to hotline operator. When Petitioner was demoted, she did not receive a cut in pay. Petitioner informed Mr. Rudd that it was her intention to leave her employment with Respondent because her sister was ill. She informed Mr. Rudd that January 25, 2001, would be her last day. However, she was terminated on January 24, 2001. Between January 4 and January 24, 2001, three white males were hired, and four black females, including Petitioner and Ms. Miller, were discharged. The reason for her termination on the Report of Employee's Termination form was "not working out." However, on the same form, her job performance, attendance, and cooperation were rated as "good." Additionally, the form had a blank following the question, "Would you rehire this employee?" The blank was filled in, "yes." Petitioner filed for unemployment compensation and initially received $512.00 in unemployment benefits. However, after a telephone hearing, the Division of Unemployment Compensation informed her that she must repay the $512.00. At the time of her discharge, Petitioner was earning approximately $250.00 per week. Petitioner seeks back pay, the $512.00 in unemployment compensation, and a verbal apology from Respondent.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law set forth herein, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order finding that Respondent engaged in unlawful discrimination and paying Petitioner $50.00 in back pay. DONE AND ENTERED this 18th day of September, 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S BARBARA J. STAROS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of September, 2003.
The Issue The issues are whether Petitioner has shown, by clear and convincing evidence, that he is rehabilitated from his disqualifying offense, and if so, whether Respondent's intended action to deny Petitioner's request for an exemption from disqualification from employment would constitute an abuse of discretion.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a 32-year-old male who seeks to qualify for employment in a position of trust having direct contact with children or developmentally disabled persons served in programs regulated by the Agency. The Agency is the state agency responsible for regulating the employment of persons in positions of trust for which Petitioner seeks to qualify. In a letter dated February 20, 2015, the Agency's Director, Barbara Palmer, notified Petitioner that his request for exemption from disqualification from employment in a position of special trust was denied. The letter advised Petitioner that this decision was based upon "the serious nature of the offense(s), the lack of sufficient evidence of rehabilitation, and [his] failure to sustain [his] burden of demonstrating by clear and convincing evidence that [he] should not be disqualified." Resp. Ex. C. Before Director Palmer made her decision, Petitioner's request for an exemption was reviewed by a Department of Children and Families (DCF) screener who compiled a 120-page report entitled "Exemption Review" dated November 17, 2014. See Resp. Ex. B. The Exemption Review did not make a recommendation one way or the other, but simply compiled all relevant information that would assist the Director in making her decision. The report was first given to the Agency Regional Operations Manager in Orlando, who reviewed it and then made a preliminary recommendation to the Director. The Agency decision was triggered after Petitioner applied for a position of special trust on October 24, 2014. To qualify for the position, Petitioner was required to undergo a level 2 background screening performed by the DCF. The screening revealed that Petitioner had six disqualifying offenses between 1995 and 2005. Those offenses are listed below: May 17, 1995 -- burglary of a dwelling; Petitioner pled guilty and adjudication was withheld; April 10, 1997 -- robbery; Petitioner pled guilty and adjudication was withheld; May 9, 1997 -- robbery; Petitioner pled guilty, adjudication was withheld, and he was placed on probation; June 17, 1997 -- battery by detainee in a detention facility; Petitioner pled nolo contendere, was adjudicated delinquent, and placed on probation; January 18, 2001 -- possession of cocaine with intent to sell; Petitioner pled nolo contendere, was adjudicated guilty, placed on probation, and ordered to serve 86 days in the County Jail; and February 1, 2005 -- possession of cocaine; Petitioner pled guilty, was adjudicated guilty, placed on probation, and ordered to serve six months in the County Jail. Besides the disqualifying offenses, Petitioner has a number of arrests and/or convictions for non-disqualifying offenses beginning in 1995. Two offenses, disorderly conduct and trespass on a property or conveyance, occurred in July 2012, or seven years after his last disqualifying offense. For that offense, he pled nolo contendere and was adjudicated guilty. He was also ordered to serve one day in the County Jail and required to complete a four-hour anger management class. The Exemption Review shows that in May 2000, Petitioner earned his high school diploma. In June 2009, he earned an associate's degree in Network Administration from the TESST College of Technology in Baltimore, Maryland. In May 2014, he earned a bachelor's degree in psychology from Morgan State University located in the same city. The Exemption Review also shows: from January 2008 through September 2008, Petitioner worked as a cashier and sales consultant at a retail store; from May 2009 through January 2010, he worked as an activities coordinator; from June 2011 through August 2013, he worked as a youth counselor; from February 2014 through May 2014, he worked as a records and registration clerk at the university from which he received his degree; and from June 2014 through August 2014 he worked as a behavior technician. At hearing, he testified that he is currently employed by Quest Diagnostics in the Orlando area. Most of Petitioner's disqualifying offenses occurred at a very early age. For example, in May 1995, while in middle school and just before he turned 12 years of age, he committed his first disqualifying offense, burglary of a dwelling. When he was arrested for his last disqualifying offense in February 2005, possession of cocaine, he was 21 years old. Petitioner attributes his criminal conduct to immaturity, peer pressure, and what he characterized as "environmental exposure." He expressed remorse, he takes full responsibility for his actions, and he acknowledges he could have handled his life better. He is currently in a committed relationship, has a new-born child, and serves as a mentor in the community. In short, Petitioner says he has changed his life for the better. Besides two witnesses who spoke highly of his recent volunteer work with children, an Orlando City Commissioner submitted a letter of recommendation. If his application is approved, Petitioner has a pending job offer with Lodestone Academy in Orlando, which works with Agency clients. An Agency representative testified that the Agency's clients are at a heightened risk of abuse, neglect, and exploitation because of their developmental disabilities and inability to self-preserve. They often have severe deficits in their abilities to complete self-tasks and communicate their wants and needs. For this reason, the Agency undertakes a heightened scrutiny of individuals seeking an exemption. In explaining the Agency's rationale for denying the application, the Regional Operations Manager listed the following factors that weighed against a favorable disposition of Petitioner's request: the frequency of the criminal offenses; criminal behavior that has consumed one-half of his life; the limited time (three years) since his last arrest, albeit for a non-disqualifying offense; and Petitioner's lack of specificity and accountability in his Exemption Questionnaire and testimony regarding the disqualifying offenses. As to the last factor, Petitioner could recall very few facts regarding his early arrests, saying they occurred at a very young age. He also denied that there were any injuries to his victims. However, one offense involved battery on a detainee in a juvenile facility, and in another, he ripped two gold chains from a victim's neck.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Agency for Persons with Disabilities enter a final order denying Petitioner's application for an exemption from disqualification. DONE AND ENTERED this 17th day of June, 2015, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S D. R. ALEXANDER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of June, 2015.
The Issue Whether Mike Futch, d/b/a Futch Construction Company, (Respondent) violated Sections 440.10 and 440.38, Florida Statutes, and if so, what penalty should be imposed. References to sections are to the Florida Statutes (2004).
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the state agency responsible for enforcing provisions of Florida law, specifically Chapter 440, Florida Statutes, which requires that employers secure workers’ compensation coverage for their employees. At all times material to this case, Respondent was engaged in the construction business within the meaning of Chapter 440, Florida Statutes. Its individual principal, Mike Futch (Mr. Futch), was responsible for the day-to-day operations of the business. At all times material to this case, Respondent is an employer within the meaning of Section 440.02(16)(a), Florida Statutes. At all times material to this case, Respondent was legally obligated to provide workers' compensation insurance in accordance with the provisions of Chapter 440, Florida Statutes, for all persons employed by Respondent to provide construction services within Florida. Chapter 440 requires that the premium rates for such coverage be set pursuant to Florida law. It is undisputed that Respondent had not furnished the required coverage, and that there was no valid exemption from this requirement. Accordingly, on May 12, 2004, the Stop Work Order was properly entered. Thereafter, Petitioner reviewed Respondent's payroll records, which revealed that Respondent employed individuals whose identities are not in dispute, under circumstances which obliged Respondent to provide workers' compensation coverage for their benefit. Based upon Respondent’s payroll records, Petitioner correctly calculated the penalty amount imposed by law under all the circumstances of the case, and issued the Amended Order imposing a penalty assessment in the amount of $198,311.82. Respondent did not persuasively dispute the factual or legal merits of Petitioner's case. Rather, Respondent suggested that this forum has some type of general equity powers to lessen the penalty on the grounds that Respondent made a good faith effort to provide coverage for its workers. The record does demonstrate that Mr. Futch in good faith engaged a Georgia insurance agent and instructed him to obtain workers' compensation coverage which would satisfy the requirements of Florida law with respect to Respondent's Florida operations. The Georgia agent's failure to obtain coverage that satisfies Florida's requirements is a regrettable circumstance, but it raises no issue over which this forum has authority.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Department of Financial Services, Division of Workers’ Compensation, enter a final order that affirms the Amended Order in the amount of $198,311.82. DONE AND ENTERED this 28th day of January, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S FLORENCE SNYDER RIVAS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of January, 2005. COPIES FURNISHED: Joe Thompson, Esquire Department of Financial Services 200 East Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-4229 Patrick C. Cork, Esquire Cork & Cork 700 North Patterson Street Valdosta, Georgia 31601 Honorable Tom Gallagher Chief Financial Officer Department of Financial Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Pete Dunbar, General Counsel Department of Financial Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300
The Issue The issue is whether this case should be dismissed based on Petitioner's failure to appear at the hearing.
Findings Of Fact The Notice of Hearing in these consolidated cases was issued on November 17, 2010, setting the hearing for January 24 and 25, 2011, in Tallahassee, Florida. The hearing was scheduled to commence at 9:30 a.m. on January 24, 2011. Also on November 17, 2010, an Order of Pre-hearing Instructions was entered. Neither the Notice of Hearing nor the Order of Pre- hearing Instructions was returned as undeliverable to Petitioner. On January 19, 2011, Petitioner filed a letter at the Division of Administrative Hearings requesting that the hearing be delayed until after February 18, 2011, due to various appointments she had made that conflicted with the hearing dates. This letter indicated that Petitioner was aware of the scheduled hearing dates. By order dated January 20, 2011, the undersigned declined Petitioner's request for failure to state grounds sufficient to warrant a continuance over the objection of Respondent. Several attempts to reach Petitioner by telephone were unavailing. At 9:30 a.m. on January 24, 2011, counsel and witnesses for Respondent were present and prepared to go forward with the hearing. Petitioner was not present. The undersigned delayed the commencement of the hearing by fifteen minutes, but Petitioner still did not appear. The hearing was called to order at 9:45 a.m. Counsel for Respondent entered her appearance and requested the entry of a recommended order of dismissal. The hearing was then adjourned. As of the date of this recommended order, Petitioner has not contacted the Division of Administrative Hearings, in writing or by telephone, to explain her failure to appear at the hearing.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the Petitions for Relief in these consolidated cases. DONE AND ENTERED this 26th day of January, 2011, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LAWRENCE P. STEVENSON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of January, 2011. COPIES FURNISHED: Kimberly D. Dotson 825 Briandav Street Tallahassee, Florida 32305 Kim M. Fluharty-Denson, Esquire Department of Financial Services 612 Larson Building 200 East Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Mary Kowalski Department of Financial Services Human Resource 200 East Gaines Street, Suite 112 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Larry Kranert, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue The issues in this case are: (1) whether Petitioner has been rehabilitated from her disqualifying offense(s); and, if so, whether the intended action to deny Petitioner's exemption request pursuant to section 435.07(3), Florida Statutes (2015),1/ would constitute an abuse of discretion by Respondent.
Findings Of Fact Based on the evidence adduced at the hearing, and the record as a whole, the following material Findings of Fact are made: Petitioner was a 52-year-old female who sought to qualify, pursuant to section 435.07, for employment in a position of trust as a direct service provider for physically or mentally disabled adults or children. This position requires the successful completion of a Level 2 background screening. See § 435.04, Fla. Stat. APD is the state agency responsible for licensing and regulating the employment of persons in positions of trust. Specifically, the mission of the Agency includes serving and protecting the vulnerable population, including children or adults with developmental disabilities. In conformance with the statute, Petitioner was screened by APD since she applied for a position of special trust as a direct service provider of APD. The screening revealed, and the parties stipulated at the hearing, that Petitioner was convicted of the following disqualifying offenses: Theft by Shoplifting--Felony--1987 Theft by Shoplifting--Felony--1987 Forgery (4 counts)--Felonies--1993 Theft by Shoplifting--Felony--1993 Battery-Family Violence--Misdemeanor-- 1996 Forgery--Felony--1998 The stipulation also included the fact that 17 years have elapsed since the last disqualifying offense was committed. The screening revealed, and the parties also stipulated at the hearing, that Petitioner was arrested or convicted of the following non-disqualifying offenses: Simple Battery--Misdemeanor--arrested-- dismissed--1987 Theft by Conversion--convicted--1993 Driving Under the Influence--convicted-- 1994 Criminal Trespass--Misdemeanor-- convicted--2000 The stipulation also included the fact that 15 years have elapsed since the last non-disqualifying arrest or conviction was committed. Rosita Martin At the time of the hearing, Petitioner was unemployed. She had last been employed at Martin's Group Home as a caregiver of vulnerable children who had disabilities or behavioral problems. Her duties included giving out medicines, assisting clients with bathing, and taking kids on outings and to church. She also helped to cook. She explained that most of her convictions occurred during a period of her life when she was in an abusive marriage and suffered from depression. She acknowledged that, during that time period, she was abusing drugs (cocaine) and alcohol. During that same period of time, she admitted that she had purchased and also possessed marijuana. She explained that her battery conviction in 1996 related to a domestic dispute with her husband. She called the police, and they took them both to jail. Although she said she was defending herself, she admitted that she had been convicted and found guilty of battery. Petitioner testified that she is a "good girl now." She attends church every Sunday and "left her problems with drugs." She got sick and tired and "told God to take it away from me and he did." Petitioner testified that she has not used any type of illegal drugs for 20 years. Her sister operates four group homes for children with disabilities. Petitioner worked at one of the homes, and her sister wrote her a letter of support in this case. The evidence was undisputed that she received "excellent" evaluations while at Martin Group Home. Currently, she lives with her daughter, and a granddaughter who is two years old. As a result of one of Petitioner's various felony convictions, she testified that she was ordered to attend in- house drug treatment at the Willingway Hospital in Statesboro, Georgia. Upon questioning by the undersigned, Petitioner stated that she was in rehabilitation at the hospital for "like 6 months" back in the 1990's.2/ The various letters of support and reference provided by Petitioner came from her relatives. These included her sister and father. The record reflects that Petitioner attended and successfully completed numerous training courses (e.g. medicine administration, CPR training, blood borne pathogens, HIV safeguards, etc.) that related to the caretaker work she performs.3/ Other than two certificates for domestic violence training in 2011 and 2012, the other training and educational completion certificates did not relate to treatment or counseling programs related to her drug use, alcohol use, psychological counseling, or financial training-–the personal issues she struggled with in her past when the disqualifying events took place. The evidence reflected that she had numerous and chronic driving violations, pertaining primarily to failing to pay road tolls. She claimed that all of these toll violations occurred when her daughter was driving her car.4/ On cross-examination, Petitioner conceded that she failed to provide a detailed version of the facts or a full explanation for each criminal offense listed on her exemption form.5/ Petitioner claimed that she was "new at this" and did not understand the details she was supposed to provide. For the criminal offenses involving theft of property, she claimed on the form, and testified, that there was "no harm" to the victim. Again, she claimed some confusion and stated that she thought that they were talking about harm in the "violent" sense. She was also cross-examined about the six-month drug treatment program that she testified she had attended at Willingway Hospital. She was asked why she did not provide that information to the Agency in the exemption form or provide the agency with a copy of a completion certificate. Inexplicably, she was unable to provide a satisfactory explanation during the hearing for why she did not disclose the drug treatment program on the exemption questionnaire. She claimed that since the court had ordered her into treatment, she did not think it was necessary to specifically list or describe it. She was asked why she was not able to provide a letter of recommendation from her church pastor. She did not provide an adequate explanation and simply stated that she attends church but is not a church member, that she just goes to church there every Sunday. She worked briefly at a company called Best Walks of Life. Her supervisor was her son, Mr. Walker. No details were provided concerning what she did there. She acknowledged that much of her criminal activity arose from or was related to problems with monetary or financial issues; yet, she conceded that she had not taken any financial courses or other classes to obtain financial or budgeting training or counseling. After working for her sister at Martin Group Home, she has not made any attempts to work in any other places or group homes since leaving. Darnisha Johnson Petitioner is her mother. The witness is 24 years old and lives with her daughter at her mother's house. She testified that her mother is "a great person today. She's great." She also stated that her mother is a "much better person" then when she was involved in criminal activity.6/ She also felt that her mother is not using any drugs now. She acknowledged that she has a car, but that it is in her mother's name. In the context of who pays the bills today and supports her financially, she characterized her mother's role as being her "support system." She also admitted that any failures to pay tolls while driving the vehicle registered in her mother's name were her responsibility. Molita Cunningham She is a friend of Petitioner's. She works as a certified nursing assistant and is certified as such with the State of Florida. She has known Petitioner for a little over three years and met her at a Family Dollar store. She wrote a letter of support for Petitioner. She was not aware of any facts to suggest that Petitioner was engaged in criminal activity, drug abuse, or abuse of her clients in any manner. She acknowledged she had a background similar to Petitioner's. She was "out there in the streets" and is a convicted felon. Other than being a general character witness, the witness offered no substantive evidence touching upon Petitioner's rehabilitation from the disqualifying offenses. Evelyn Alvarez Ms. Alvarez is employed with the Agency as the regional operations manager for the Southern Region.7/ She obtained a master's degree in public administration from Florida International University in 2000. APD serves individuals that have specific developmental disabilities. The disabilities include intellectual disabilities, autism, cerebral palsy, spina bifida, and the like. Her role in this case was to review the background information gathered by both the Department of Children and Families and APD on Petitioner. After her review, the package of information was sent to an exemption committee. That committee then independently reviewed the exemption package and made its own recommendation to the Director of APD. Before deciding on the exemption request, the Director reviewed both Ms. Alvarez's recommendation and the recommendation of the exemption committee. She correctly acknowledged that the applicant for an exemption from disqualification must prove rehabilitation by clear and convincing evidence. She also correctly noted that the Agency should consider the circumstances of the disqualifying offense(s), the nature of the harm caused to any victims involved, the history of the employee since the incident and any other evidence indicating that the employee will not present a danger to the vulnerable or disabled adults or children they serve. APD was concerned that Petitioner failed to follow directions and provide the details for each disqualifying criminal event.8/ Also, Ms. Alvarez was concerned that Petitioner's failure to acknowledge that someone was "harmed" by the theft or forgery crimes ignores that there were victims involved, and the response fails to show an acceptance of responsibility for the crime(s). Ms. Alvarez testified that the Agency has no idea what happened with each of the disqualifying events, or of any circumstances that were happening at the time that would allow APD to understand why Petitioner would commit the offenses, and that there was no acknowledgment of any harm to any victims. In the opinion of Ms. Alvarez, the training certificates provided by Petitioner were not persuasive evidence of rehabilitation. More specifically, they were only indicative of employment training and did not include anything in terms of addressing Petitioner's substance abuse issues, her inability to manage her finances, or her involvement in acts of domestic violence. In APD's opinion, the lack of any treatment or professional counseling for those issues militated against a finding of rehabilitation. Likewise, Petitioner did not describe her alleged six- month, in-house drug rehabilitation program in the exemption application, nor was there any certificate of completion of drug treatment provided. APD concluded that Petitioner used poor judgment during an incident when she invited her friend, Ms. Cunningham, to spend a day on the job at Martin Group Home with Petitioner's disabled and vulnerable children. APD felt that this was a breach of client confidentiality, HIPAA rights, and may have put some of the children at risk around a visitor who did not have a background check or clearance to be at the facility. There were no professional references or letters of support offered by Petitioner from past employers (other than from group homes involving her relative). Likewise, there were no letters attesting to her good moral character from her church or other faith-based relationships she may have established. Ms. Alvarez testified that the reason the Agency wants letters of reference from individuals who do not have a conflict of interest is to show her character. Examples of letters of reference would be from a pastor or from an organization where someone had volunteered. The letters provided by Petitioner, while useful, did not reflect an impartial view of her character.9/ The Agency determined that it had no basis of reference for the character of Petitioner due to her failure to provide more impartial references.10/ In Ms. Alvarez's opinion, after reviewing the completed application, Petitioner had not provided any evidence, and APD had no knowledge, to support a finding of rehabilitation. Furthermore, APD did not have any knowledge of any financial planning or budgeting courses that Petitioner may have taken to show rehabilitation in the area of her finances. APD considered it significant during its review that Petitioner had been charged with driving while license suspended ("DWLS") (a criminal traffic offense) in 2012 and again in 2013, less than two years before the application. (Both DWLS offenses were subsequently dismissed.) Respondent's Exhibit 9, Petitioner's Florida Comprehensive Case Information System driving record, reflects in excess of 20 failures to pay required highway tolls in a two-year period from 2012 to 2013.11/ Petitioner did not provide any explanation for her driver's license problems to the Agency at the time of her Exemption Application. The Agency had no knowledge of the facts and circumstances surrounding the DWLS citations. Ms. Alvarez testified that traffic offenses and driving habits are important considerations, since direct service providers are often required to transport persons with developmental disabilities In essence, APD concluded that Petitioner had fallen short of her burden of showing rehabilitation by clear and convincing evidence.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Agency for Persons with Disabilities confirm its previous intended denial and enter a final order denying Petitioner's application for an exemption from disqualification. DONE AND ENTERED this 27th day of July, 2016, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ROBERT L. KILBRIDE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of July, 2016.
The Issue Whether Respondent violated chapter 440, Florida Statutes (2016), by failing to secure payment of workers’ compensation coverage, as alleged in the Stop-Work Order (“SWO”) and Third Amended Order of Penalty Assessment (“Third AOPA”); and, if so, whether Petitioner correctly calculated the proposed penalty assessment against Respondent.
Findings Of Fact Based on the oral and documentary evidence admitted at the final hearing, and the entire record in this proceeding, the following Findings of Fact are made: Background The Department is the state agency responsible for enforcing the requirement of the Workers' Compensation Law that employers secure the payment of workers' compensation coverage for their employees and corporate officers. § 440.107, Fla. Stat. The Department is the agency responsible for conducting random inspections of jobsites and investigating complaints concerning potential violations of workers’ compensation rules. Gregg Construction is a corporation engaged in business in the State of Florida. Gregg Construction has been operating as a business since November 9, 2007. William Gregg is the owner of Gregg Construction and its sole employee. The address of record for Gregg Construction is 166 Big White Oak Lane, Crawfordville, Florida 32327. On June 15, 2017, the Department’s investigator, Lewis Johnson, conducted a routine visit to a jobsite to conduct a compliance investigation. Mr. Johnson observed Mr. Gregg use a table saw, measure, and cut a piece of wood. Mr. Johnson then observed Mr. Gregg nail the wood to the exterior wall of the home at the jobsite. After Mr. Johnson inquired about the work Mr. Gregg was performing, Mr. Gregg ultimately told Mr. Johnson that he was working as a subcontractor for Respondent. Based on Mr. Johnson’s observations, Mr. Gregg was performing construction-related work at the job site. Mr. Johnson then conducted a search of the Department’s Coverage and Compliance Automated System (“CCAS”), which revealed that Respondent did not have active workers’ compensation coverage for Mr. Gregg. Based on the results of his investigation, on May 10, 2017, Mr. Johnson issued a SWO to Respondent for failure to maintain workers’ compensation coverage for its employees. On May 10, 2017, Mr. Johnson hand-served a Request for Production of Business Records for Penalty Assessment Calculations (“Records Request”) on Respondent. The Records Request directed Respondent to produce business records for the time period of May 10, 2015, through May 11, 2017. While Respondent provided tax returns, it did not provide sufficient business records to the Department. Penalty Assessment To calculate the penalty assessment, the Department uses a two-year auditing period looking back from the date of the SWO, May 10, 2017, also known as the look-back period. Generally, the Department uses business records to calculate the penalty assessment. If the employer does not produce records sufficient to determine payroll for employees, the Department uses imputed payroll to assess the penalty as required by section 440.107(7)(e) and Florida Administrative Code Rule 69L-6.028. Eunika Jackson, a Department penalty auditor, was assigned to calculate the penalty assessment for Respondent. Based upon Mr. Johnson’s observations at the jobsite on May 10, 2017, Ms. Jackson assigned National Council on Compensation Insurance (“NCCI”) classification code 5645 to calculate the penalty. Classification code 5645 applies to work involving carpentry. Ms. Jackson applied the approved manual rates for classification 5645 for the work Mr. Johnson observed Mr. Gregg perform. The application of the rates was utilized by the methodology specified in section 440.107(7)(d)1. and rule 69L- 6.027 to determine the penalty assessment. The manual rate applied in this case was $15.91 for the period of May 11, 2015, through December 31, 2017; and $16.92 for the period of January 1, 2016, through June 10, 2017. The statewide average weekly wage, effective January 1, 2017, was used to calculate the penalty assessment. Mr. Johnson discovered that Mr. Gregg previously held an exemption, which expired on April 26, 2013. Although Mr. Gregg currently has an exemption, his exemption was not in effect during the audit period. On June 6, 2017, the Department issued its first AOPA that ordered Respondent to pay a penalty of $46,087.72, pursuant to section 440.107(7)(d). On August 1, 2017, Petitioner issued the Second AOPA based upon records submitted by Respondent, which reduced the penalty assessment to $14,752.62. After this matter was referred to the Division, on January 23, 2018, Petitioner filed a Motion for Leave to Amend Order of Penalty Assessment and issued the Third AOPA based upon records submitted by Respondent. Based on the Department’s calculation, the record demonstrates that the penalty assessment, based on records provided by Respondent, would be $9,785.50.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Financial Services, Division of Workers’ Compensation, enter a final order finding the following: that Respondent failed to secure and maintain workers’ compensation coverage for Mr. Gregg; and that Respondent shall pay a penalty of $9,785.50.1/ DONE AND ENTERED this 23rd day of March, 2018, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S YOLONDA Y. GREEN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of March, 2018.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Petitioner’s application for licensure as a resident all-lines adjuster should be approved or denied.
Findings Of Fact DFS is the state agency responsible for licensing and regulating insurance adjusters and agents pursuant to chapters 624 and 626, Florida Statutes. On April 20, 2016, Petitioner filed with DFS his application to become licensed as an all-lines adjuster in the state of Florida. On the second page of the application form, Petitioner answered “yes” to the question asking whether he has ever pled nolo contendere, no contest, or guilty to, or ever had adjudication withheld for, or ever been convicted of or found guilty of, any felony crime under the laws of any state. Despite answering yes to that question, on the third and fourth pages of the application, Petitioner answered “no” to the following three questions: First, Petitioner was asked whether his felony crime(s) fell within the following categories: any first-degree felony; a capital felony; a felony involving money laundering, fraud of any kind, or embezzlement; or a felony directly related to the financial services business. Second, Petitioner was asked whether his felony crime(s), if not falling in one of the above categories, were crimes involving moral turpitude. Lastly, Petitioner was asked whether his felony crime(s) were within the category of “all other felonies.” The questions asking how to categorize the felony crime(s) that Petitioner acknowledged on page two of the application correlate to the statute prescribing a range of consequences depending on the type of felony criminal background an applicant has. According to the statute, an applicant with felony criminal history falling in the first group above (first degree felony, etc.) is permanently barred from applying for licensure in Florida as an insurance agent or adjuster. For an applicant whose felony criminal history does not fall in the first group, but is categorized as a felony (or felonies) involving moral turpitude, the statute provides for a long period of disqualification. If an applicant’s felony criminal history does not fall in either of the first two categories, then a shorter period of disqualification is provided by the statute. See § 206.207, Fla. Stat., adopted in its current form in 2011 (with one immaterial amendment in 2014 to change a statutory cross-reference). Petitioner’s admitted felony history must, of necessity, fall within one of the three groups: the felony history must have involved one or more felonies identified for permanent bar, other felonies involving moral turpitude, and/or all other felonies. The application answers were internally inconsistent and at least one of the answers on pages three and four was wrong. At hearing, Petitioner did not offer any explanation for his incorrect answer(s).1/ Petitioner did not file with his April 2016 application submitted to DFS, and did not offer into evidence at hearing any proof of the felony criminal history to which he admitted in his application. Petitioner gave little information at all about his criminal background at hearing. He testified that he identified his prior criminal history on page two of the application (by answering “yes” to the question asking whether he had ever been convicted, etc. of any felony crimes). The only detail he was asked by his counsel to address was as follows: Q: Now the criminal history that you identified, is that something that occurred a while ago? A: Yes, sir. Q: And can you give me the approximate time period? A: The offense? It was in 1994, I believe. Q: Okay. And do you recall when you finished all your restitution and probation concerning any of these prior convictions? A: 1999. (Tr. 32). Petitioner later acknowledged on cross-examination, as suggested by his attorney’s attempted correction in his follow-up question, that there was not just one (“the”) offense--there was more than one offense and more than one conviction. Other than correcting that error, Petitioner volunteered no information regarding his prior convictions. He did, however, offer into evidence documentation generally corroborating his testimony regarding when he completed probation for his prior convictions. Two letters from New Jersey Superior Court personnel state that court records reflect that Mr. Bivona completed three different probationary terms associated with three different indictment numbers, as follows: for indictment number 96-03-0031-I, probation was completed as of August 9, 1999; for indictment number 95-10-0453-I, probation was completed as of May 2, 1999; and for indictment number 95-05-0206-I, probation was completed as of September 27, 1998. Although Petitioner offered no details or documentation for his prior felony convictions, either with his application or at hearing (other than the letters documenting when he completed probation), Petitioner said that he had previously provided documentation to Respondent regarding his felony convictions, a fact confirmed by Respondent. Respondent had in its files certified copies of court records for Petitioner’s felony convictions in New Jersey, obtained by Respondent in 2010 in connection with a prior license application by Petitioner.2/ Respondent offered into evidence at hearing certified copies of court records regarding Petitioner’s felony criminal history, including indictments issued by grand juries setting forth the original charges, and the subsequent judgments of conviction issued by New Jersey Superior Court judges. Because Respondent was willing to use the criminal history documentation previously provided by Petitioner that was already in Respondent’s files, Respondent did not require Petitioner to obtain or submit the same documentation again in connection with his new license application.3/ The indictment numbers identified in the three judgments of conviction match the three indictment numbers contained in Petitioner’s exhibit offered to prove when he completed his probationary terms for his prior convictions. Thus, although Petitioner was evasive at hearing, unwilling to identify the court records of his prior convictions, the records themselves establish the missing information about Petitioner’s felony criminal history that Petitioner only alluded to at hearing. In a September 28, 1995, judgment of conviction issued by Judge Leonard N. Arnold, New Jersey Superior Court for Somerset County, Mr. Bivona pled guilty to, and was convicted of, the charges set forth in indictment 95-05-0206-I. As enumerated in the judgment of conviction, these were: four counts of fraudulent use of a credit card, a third-degree felony; one count of unlawful theft or receipt of a credit card, a fourth-degree felony; four counts of forgery, a fourth-degree felony; and one count of theft by deception, a fourth-degree felony. For sentencing purposes, the court merged nine of the counts into count two (one of the charges for fraudulent use of a credit card), and imposed the following sentence: three years of probation, restitution of $271.60, a $500.00 fine, and other monetary assessments. On May 3, 1996, another judgment of conviction was issued by Judge Leonard N. Arnold. The judgment of conviction shows that Mr. Bivona pled guilty to, and was convicted of, the charges set forth in indictment 95-10-0453-I. As enumerated in the judgment of conviction, these were: three counts of fraudulent use of a credit card, a third-degree felony; and one count of theft, a fourth-degree felony. The sentence imposed by the judgment of conviction was incarceration for 180 days in the county jail, a three-year probationary term, restitution of $380.02, and monetary assessments. On August 9, 1996, a judgment of conviction was issued by Judge Marilyn Hess, New Jersey Superior Court for Hunterdon County. As shown on the judgment of conviction, Mr. Bivona pled guilty to, and was convicted of, the charges set forth in indictment 96-03-00031-I. As enumerated in the judgment of conviction, these were: one count of theft by deception, a third-degree felony; one count of forgery, a fourth-degree felony; and one count of credit card theft, a fourth-degree felony. The sentence imposed by the judgment of conviction was a three-year probationary term, restitution of $2,488.30, and monetary assessments. As noted, Mr. Bivona testified that he completed the probationary terms for his prior convictions in 1999. He provided documentation corroborating that he served the three probationary terms and completed them on three different dates in 1998 and 1999, the last of which was August 9, 1999. No evidence was presented to prove that Mr. Bivona has paid all restitution, fines, and other monetary assessments imposed in the three judgments of conviction, and, if so, when all payments were completed. Petitioner’s application was initially denied by DFS because of Petitioner’s felony criminal history. DFS determined that at least two of the judgments of conviction, and possibly all three, were for felony crimes involving fraud. DFS did not undertake a review of Petitioner’s rehabilitation from his past crimes or his present trustworthiness and fitness to serve as an insurance adjuster, because in DFS’s view, Petitioner was subject to the statutory permanent bar from applying for licensure. DFS did not determine that Petitioner did not otherwise meet the requirements for licensure as a resident all-lines adjuster. At hearing, neither party went into any detail regarding the requirements for licensure as an all-lines adjuster. Instead, the focus of both Petitioner and Respondent was on whether Petitioner’s criminal history renders him disqualified from applying for licensure as an adjuster, either permanently or for a period of time, and, if the latter, whether mitigating circumstances reduce the disqualifying period. No evidence was offered of aggravating circumstances. Respondent has not disputed whether, aside from the implications of Petitioner’s criminal history, Petitioner otherwise qualifies for licensure. Therefore, it is inferred that Respondent was and is satisfied that, aside from the implications of Petitioner’s criminal background (including questions about rehabilitation, trustworthiness, and fitness), Petitioner otherwise meets the requirements for licensure as an all-lines adjuster. Petitioner presented evidence addressed to the mitigating factors in Respondent’s rule to shorten the period of disqualification in certain circumstances, where there is no permanent bar. Petitioner testified that he moved to Florida with his wife in 1998 (apparently before he had completed his probationary terms for at least two of his convictions). He and his wife started a business in the Sarasota area, a corporation that has operated under two different names, but has remained essentially the same since 1998. The business has always been small; although it has gone up and down in size over the years, Petitioner said that the business has had at least five employees for over three years. Since 1998, the nature of his business has been to provide technical support and assistance to insurance adjusters. The business has not been engaged in the actual adjuster work; instead, his clients are licensed adjusters who perform the actual adjuster work. Petitioner testified that he has been employed by the corporation he owns, working at least 40 hours per week for a continuous two-year period within the five years preceding the filing of his application. This parrots one of the mitigation factors in Respondent’s rule, and although no documentation of his employment hours was provided for any period of time, the undersigned accepts Petitioner’s testimony as sufficient under the mitigation rule. If Petitioner is determined to be disqualified for a period of years and subject to the mitigation rule, this mitigation factor would reduce the disqualification period by one year. To meet another mitigation factor, Petitioner submitted five letters of recommendation in evidence. Three of those letters appear to be from someone who has known Petitioner for at least five years (one undated letter states that the author has known Petitioner for three years; another letter, more of a business reference from an insurance company representative in Maryland, does not state how long the author has known Petitioner). Those letters that are dated bear dates after the license application was submitted and initially denied, but there is no impediment to receiving and considering them in this de novo hearing. The letters meet the requirement in Respondent’s rule for mitigation. If Petitioner is determined to be disqualified for a period of years and subject to the mitigation rule, this mitigation factor would reduce the disqualification period by one year. Although the letters satisfy one of the mitigation factors in Respondent’s rule, the contents of the letters are hearsay, as none of the authors testified. The matters stated in the letters, for the most part, do not corroborate any non- hearsay evidence, except in a few immaterial respects (such as that Petitioner runs his own business and has daughters who play volleyball). Petitioner did not present any testimony from witnesses at hearing who could attest to his character, his business reputation, or his trustworthiness. Petitioner testified that he does volunteer work on a “sporadic” basis. He is active as a volunteer for his three daughters’ schools and travel volleyball activities, and he also works with youth groups in his church. Although Petitioner testified that he believes he has volunteered at least 180 hours over the three years preceding the filing of his application, Petitioner did not present any documentation from one or more charitable organizations confirming the number of his volunteer hours. It is undisputed that Petitioner held an insurance adjuster license in Florida for some period of time, until, according to DFS, the license expired by operation of law. Although Petitioner admitted that since 1998, his business has not been engaged in insurance adjuster work, merely holding a license appears to at least superficially satisfy a mitigation factor in Respondent’s rule. No evidence was presented to show that Petitioner has been arrested or charged with any criminal violations since he completed his third probation in August 1999, more than 17 years ago. The length of time without any additional criminal incidents is a positive consideration. Notably lacking from Petitioner were: an explanation for the circumstances underlying the multiple crimes he committed that involved fraud, theft, forgery, and deception, through use of other people’s credit cards and checks; express acceptance of responsibility for his criminal past; the expression of genuine remorse for his wrongdoing; and an explanation as to why his criminal history should not present concerns if Petitioner becomes authorized to engage in insurance adjusting. As Petitioner acknowledged, a licensed adjuster “would negotiate settlement [of claims under insurance policies], would offer payment, [and] would have authority to write payment and receive payments” (Tr. 35), placing the adjuster in a position of trust and responsibility in dealing with other people’s money. Simply noting that it has been a good number of years since Petitioner completed his probations, that he is running his own business (that does not engage in insurance adjusting), that he has a family, that he is involved with church, and that he does volunteer work is not enough, when Petitioner’s past crimes and the concerns they present go unexplained, to support a finding of rehabilitation, moral fitness, and trustworthiness today. It may well be that Petitioner could prove these things if he had addressed them; it may have been an unfortunate strategic choice to avoid any mention of Petitioner’s past crimes in anything but the most general and vague terms. Perhaps in light of decisional law discussed in the Conclusions of Law below, Respondent’s licensure application form asks applicants who disclose criminal history whether they have had their civil rights restored. Petitioner answered yes. He was asked to explain, and his response was: “Rights were restored and I have the ability to vote and act as a standard US Citizen.” (Pet. Exh. 11 at 4). In the initial review of Petitioner’s application, DFS staff apparently accepted Petitioner’s representation that his civil rights had, in fact, been restored.4/ However, in a “deficiencies” listing at the end of the application, DFS noted that Petitioner failed to provide a certificate of civil rights restoration, or other proof of restoration of his civil rights. Petitioner’s application was not denied because of these omissions, and Petitioner’s failure to provide such evidence in his application would not have been an impediment to receiving and considering proof of restoration of Petitioner’s civil rights at hearing, had such evidence been offered. At hearing, Petitioner attempted to prove that his civil rights were restored. However, Petitioner presented no evidence that he ever applied for restoration of his civil rights, or that his civil rights have been restored by order of the governor in the exercise of clemency power. Instead, the only evidence offered by Petitioner was a Florida voter status printout showing that he is an active registered voter. The exhibit was admitted for the limited purpose of showing that Petitioner was registered to vote in Florida. However, this fact is insufficient to support an inference that Petitioner’s civil rights must have been restored or he would not have been allowed to register to vote. If Petitioner has actually had his civil rights restored, there would be direct evidence of that, and Petitioner had no such evidence. It is equally or more plausible that Petitioner was allowed to register to vote in Florida by mistake; Petitioner acknowledged that he represented in his voter registration application that his civil rights were restored (just as he represented to DFS in his license application). Petitioner’s counsel argued that Petitioner was allowed to register to vote in Florida because Florida gave full faith and credit to what New Jersey had done. This argument was unsupported by evidence of how Petitioner became registered to vote in Florida. Regarding what was done in New Jersey, the only evidence offered by Petitioner was a “voter restoration handbook” from the state of New Jersey, which indicates as follows: “In New Jersey, any person who is no longer in prison or on parole or probation, can register to vote. . . . In New Jersey, unlike some other states, those who have been convicted of felony offenses in the past are not forever barred from voting. . . . Any ex-felon who has satisfactorily completed the term of his or her sentence can register to vote.” (Pet. Exh. 7, admitted for a limited purpose, at 1 - 2). The rest of the handbook simply describes how one goes about registering to vote in New Jersey. Under New Jersey law, then, one particular civil right--the right to vote--is taken away from convicted felons only until they complete their sentence, parole, and probation. This is confirmed by a New Jersey statute that has been officially recognized, providing that the right of suffrage--the right to vote--is taken away from any person “[w]ho is serving a sentence or is on parole or probation as the result of a conviction of any indictable offense under the laws of this or another state or of the United States.” § 29:4-1(8), N.J. Stat.5/ The right to vote is only one of the civil rights that may be lost by reason of being convicted of a crime. For example, under another New Jersey law officially recognized in this proceeding, persons convicted of a crime are disqualified from serving on a jury. See § 2C:51-3b., N.J. Stat. Petitioner presented no evidence to prove that he ever sought or received a restoration of his civil rights by executive order of the governor pursuant to an exercise of executive branch clemency power, either in the state of New Jersey or in Florida. In New Jersey, restoration of civil rights and privileges (one of which may be the right to vote) is accomplished pursuant to section 2A:167-5, New Jersey Statutes, officially recognized in this proceeding and providing in pertinent part: Any person who has been convicted of a crime and by reason thereof has been deprived of the right of suffrage or of any other of his civil rights or privileges . . . may make application for the restoration of the right of suffrage or of such other rights or privileges . . . which application the governor may grant by order signed by him. (emphasis added). Similarly, the Florida Constitution vests in the executive branch the following clemency powers: [T]he governor may, by executive order filed with the custodian of state records, suspend collection of fines and forfeitures, grant reprieves not exceeding sixty days and, with the approval of two members of the cabinet, grant full or conditional pardons, restore civil rights, commute punishment, and remit fines and forfeitures for offenses. (emphasis added). Art. IV, § 8(a), Fla. Const. Petitioner admitted that he did not apply to the governor for a restoration of civil rights in New Jersey, and he has no order from the governor restoring his civil rights. Similarly, Petitioner did not apply for and receive an order from the governor restoring his civil rights in Florida. Instead, he admitted that he is relying on whatever happened in New Jersey. The following testimony reveals Petitioner’s misconception of the process in New Jersey for restoration of civil rights: Q: Okay. Mr. Bivona, what’s your understanding of how your civil rights were restored in New Jersey? A: My understanding is that once probation and restitution and everything is completed, that civil rights are restored in the State of New Jersey. Q: And did that happen, to your knowledge? A: The completion? Q: Yes. A: Yes, sir. I also verified that with the State of New Jersey. I called them. The Court: I can’t consider that.[6/] A: I understand. I’m sorry. The Court: Do you have any exhibits that show that civil rights have been restored? Mr. Terrell: There’s a handbook from New Jersey that’s also how the rights are restored. [Pet. Exh. 8, in evidence for limited purpose] (Tr. 44).
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Financial Services issue a final order denying Petitioner’s application for licensure as a resident all-lines insurance adjuster. DONE AND ENTERED this 14th day of April, 2017, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ELIZABETH W. MCARTHUR Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of April, 2017.
The Issue The issue is whether the Stop Work Order issued on July 27, 2007, and the Amended Order of Penalty Assessment were lawful.
Findings Of Fact The Division is a component of the Department of Financial Services. The Department is charged with the administration of portions of the "Workers' Compensation Law." Versa-Tile is a corporation headquartered in Mary Esther, Florida. Versa-Tile is engaged in flooring, which is a construction activity. Michelle Newcomer is an Insurance Analyst II with the working title of Workers' Compensation Compliance Investigator. She maintains an office in Pensacola, Florida. It is her job to travel to work sites and to verify compliance with the Workers' Compensation Law. She is authorized by the Division to issue an SWO and to calculate and assess penalties. On July 24, 2007, Ms. Newcomer was conducting compliance investigations at random sites in the Alys Beach area of Walton County, Florida. While doing so she noticed three individuals in the garage at the rear of a house at 23 Whitby. They were removing tools from a toolbox and "working." Ms. Newcomer identified the men as Adrian Womack and Kent Degallerie. The third man on the site was named "Barker." Barker asserted that he was not doing any work, but was there just to give the men a ride. He was deemed not involved in the work being accomplished at the site. Ms. Newcomer interviewed Adrian Womack and Kent Degallerie. They both told her that they were exempt officers of Versa-Tile. It is found as a fact that the 2006 For Profit Corporate Annual Report of Versa-Tile signed on April 26, 2006, and filed with the Department of State on May 1, 2006, listed Adrian Womack and Kent Degallerie as corporate officers of Versa-Tile. They were not corporate officers of Versa-Tile prior to April 26, 2006. Adrian Womack worked for Versa-Tile from July 29, 2005, until April 25, 2006, as an employee. He was not an officer and was not, and could not be, exempt. Kent Degallerie worked for Versa-Tile from May 6, 2005, until April 25, 2006, as an employee. He was not an officer and was not, and could not be, exempt. Nicholas Womack, who was not present at the Alys Beach site, is listed therein as president of Versa-Tile and has been exempt during all times pertinent. As corporate officers, Adrian Womack and Kent Degallerie could be exempt from the usual requirement that workers be covered by workers' compensation insurance even though they were also employees of Versa-Tile who were paid wages. Ms. Newcomer obtained their full names and social security numbers so that she could verify their claimed exemption. She determined from the Department's Coverage and Compliance Automated System that there were no records of exemption being obtained for them. Ms. Newcomer confirmed with an examiner in the Pensacola office that Adrian Womack and Kent Degallerie were not on the list of exempt persons. She issued a Request for Production of Business Records dated July 24, 2007. She personally served these documents on Adrian Womack and Kent Degallerie. She issued an SWO, dated July 27, 2007, and personally served it on Nicholas Womack. If a person is a ten percent owner of a corporation or limited liability company they are entitled to obtain an exemption from the Department. An exemption is obtained by completing the "Notice of Election to be Exempt" form. This form when properly completed and accompanied by certain required documents, a $50 application fee, and submitted to the Division, will cause the Division to grant an exemption. If the Department determines that a person is exempt upon receiving a properly submitted form and payment, the Department will issue a card reflecting exemption. Neither Adrian Womack nor Kent Degallerie had such a card on July 24, 2007. During all times pertinent, the Department had no record indicating it had received any payment from Nicholas Womack, Adrian Womack, or Kent Degallerie that would have been tendered on behalf of Adrian Womack or Kent Degallerie. On July 27, 2007, Ms. Newcomer met with Nicholas Womack, president of Versa-Tile in her office in Pensacola and personally served him a Request for Production of Business Records. Later, Nicholas Womack provided employment records to Ms. Newcomer. On July 30, 2007, the Department and Versa-Tile entered into an agreement that permitted Versa-Tile to go back to work. Using workers' compensation class code 5348 for employees Adrian Womack and Kent Degallerie, Ms. Newcomer correctly calculated the premium that should have been paid, if they were mere employees, as $8,455.56, and multiplied that figure by the statutory penalty of 1.5. She correctly determined the total to be $12,683.35. The parties stipulated that to the extent the figure applies, it is correct. Nicholas Womack at all times pertinent had an exemption. Adrian Womack and Kent Degallerie were granted exemptions by the Department on July 30, 2007. These were the first exemptions from workers' compensation coverage that they had ever received while in a business relationship with Versa- Tile. The Division receives from 90,000 to 96,000 construction exemption applications yearly. They also receive between 30,000 to 35,000 non-construction exemption applications annually. The applications may be provided by applicants to the Department by hand-delivery at a field office or to the Department headquarters in Tallahassee, or by mail to a field office or to the Department headquarters in Tallahassee. Errors may occur in this process because of mistakes or omissions in the applications filed by the applicant or because of data entry errors by personnel in the Department. However, the process is sufficiently simple and automated that usually, when a complete application is filed, the exemption issues, and the applicant is, thereafter, provided a card reflecting the exemption via mail. There are ten field offices in the state to which applicants may file applications for exemptions. The field office in Panama City, Florida, at least the portion that accepted exemption applications, closed in 2005. However, the forms still listed Panama City as an address to which one might mail an application for exemption. The president of Versa-Tile, Nicholas Womack, has filed for and obtained three exemptions since he created Versa- Tile. Prior to incorporating Versa-Tile, he owned another business by the name of Nicholas Womack Flooring, Inc. He previously had two officers, Michael Smith and Mitchell Smedley, working with him at Versa-Tile, but he removed them as corporate officers so that Adrian Womack and Kent Degallerie could be corporate officers. Mr. Smith's exemption was revoked April 27, 2006, by the filing of a Notice of Revocation of Election to be Exempt with the Department. This roughly coincided with the naming of Adrian Womack and Kent Degallerie as corporate officers. Department of State corporate records, as of May 1, 2006, reflected that Versa-Tile had three officers: Nicholas Womack, Adrian Womack, and Kent Degallerie. In order to obtain a certificate of exemption, Nicholas Womack filed the appropriate form with the Department, along with proof that he held a contractor's license, stock certificates, and $50.00. He followed this process on three occasions while president of Versa-Tile. The evidence of record reveals exemptions granted to Nicholas Womack on January 25, 2005, and May 18, 2006, while president of Versa-Tile. He claims not to ever have received a certificate evidencing exemption from the Department while president of Versa-Tile. Nicholas Womack testified that on only one of the occasions, when he was operating Nicholas Womack Flooring, Inc., did the Department mail him a card reflecting his exemption and stated that occurred in 2001 or 2002. Nicholas Womack understands that by not obtaining coverage under workers' compensation insurance he and the other two corporate officers of Versa-Tile would not be compensated should they be injured on the job. Nicholas Womack explained to Adrian Womack and Kent Degallerie that they were eligible for an exemption, and if they got an exemption and were injured, they would not be covered by workers' compensation insurance. Nicholas Womack testified that thereafter he helped the two men fill out the appropriate forms and ensured that all necessary attachments, including two money orders in the correct amount, were present and then mailed the applications, one in each envelope, to the Department's Panama City office. As soon as the applications were mailed, Nicholas continued allowing the men to work for Versa-Tile without waiting for the exemptions to be granted. Adrian Womack and Kent Degallerie first received exemption on July 30, 2007. Subsequent to July 30, 2007, Nicholas asked Adrian Womack if he had received an exemption card. Adrian Womack said that he had not. Adrian Womack and Kent Degallerie both stated that they had not received an exemption card after filing for exemption in July 2007. Nicholas Womack's testimony that he only received one certificate of exemption in seven years of enjoying an exempt status lacks credibility. Even considering that the Department is large and it annually processes huge amounts of paperwork, it is quite improbable that on six occasions they would fail to send Nicholas Womack a certificate. That being the case, Nicholas Womack's testimony that he mailed completed applications for Adrian Womack and Kent Degallerie to the Department's Panama City office and never received any type of response, when considered in concert with his other testimony, is not credible. It is a fact that Nicholas Womack, Adrian Womack, and Kent Degallerie were eligible for an exemption subsequent to April 26, 2006. If exempt, they were responsible for their own expenses should they suffer an injury while on the job. If they failed to get an exemption, they were likewise responsible for their own expenses should they suffer an injury while on the job. This situation is very different from that where an employer fails to obtain coverage for workers not having an ownership interest in the employer, as was the case with Versa- Tile prior to April 26, 2006.
Recommendation Based upon the forgoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Financial Services enter a final order requiring Versa-Tile and Marble, Inc., to pay a penalty of $12,683.35. DONE AND ENTERED this 25th day of January, 2008, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S HARRY L. HOOPER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of January, 2008. COPIES FURNISHED: Kristian E. Dunn, Esquire Department of Financial Services Division of Workers' Compensation 200 East Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-4229 Michael James Rudicell, Esquire Michael J. Rudicell, P.A. 4303 B Spanish Trail Road Pensacola, Florida 32504 Daniel Sumner, General Counsel Department of Financial Services Division of Legal Services 200 East Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Honorable Alex Sink Chief Financial Officer Department of Financial Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300
The Issue The issue to be determined is whether Respondent complied with coverage requirements of the workers' compensation law, Chapter 440, Florida Statutes. A determination of whether Respondent functioned as an employer is a preliminary issue to be resolved.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the agency of state government currently responsible for enforcing the requirement of Section 440.107, Florida Statutes, that employers secure the payment of compensation for their employees. Respondent works in the fence construction industry and employs four people. Petitioner's investigator identified three people preparing a worksite for the erection of a privacy fence at 3000 Majestic Oaks Lane South in Jacksonville, Florida. The investigator then contacted Respondent and confirmed that the three identified individuals in addition to Respondent, were employed by Respondent for a total of four employees. The investigator determined none of the employees had workers’ compensation exemptions nor had Respondent secured the payment of workers’ compensation to his employees. On April 27, 2005, the investigator served a SWO on Respondent. The SWO required Respondent to cease all business operations in Florida. At the same time, the investigator served a Request for Business Records for Penalty Calculation on Respondent, requesting payroll records from Respondent for the period April 27, 2002, through April 27, 2005 (the audit period for penalty calculation). Respondent provided no records to the investigator. On May 23, 2005, the investigator determined 520 days had passed between the beginning of the audit period and September 30, 2003, and the penalty for noncompliance during this period was $52,000.00. The investigator also determined that during the period October 1, 2003, through the end of the audit period, the statewide average weekly wage paid by employers was $651.38; Respondent had four (4) employees; the imputed weekly payroll for Respondent’s employees was $320,848.00; using approved manual rates Respondent should have paid $97,969.40 in workers’ compensation premium; and the penalty for noncompliance during this period was calculated to be $146,954.12. On May 26, 2005, Investigator Bowman served the Amended Order of Penalty Assessment on Respondent. The Amended Order assessed Respondent with a penalty for the entire audit period in the amount of $198,954.12. The investigator obtained records created by Respondent demonstrating Respondent placed a bid on a job on June 1, 2005, and Respondent completed the job on July 1, 2005. On July 19, 2005, the investigator served a Corrected Amended Order of Penalty Assessment on Respondent, which assessed a penalty in the amount of $3,000.00 for violating the terms of the SWO. Respondent violated the SWO on two separate days, the day of the bid and the day the work was completed. No competent substantial evidence was presented regarding intervening business operations.
Recommendation Based on the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner enter a final order affirming the Stop Work Order and Order of Penalty Assessment, Amended Order of Penalty Assessment, and Corrected Amended Order of Penalty Assessment, requiring Respondent to pay a penalty in the amount of $200,594.12 to Petitioner, and requiring Respondent to cease all business operations in Florida. DONE AND ENTERED this 15th day of September, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DON W. DAVIS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of September, 2005. COPIES FURNISHED: John M. Iriye, Esquire Department of Financial Services Division of Workers Compensation 200 East Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-422 Martin D. Snyder 10367 Allene Road Jacksonville, Florida 32219 Honorable Tom Gallagher Chief Financial Officer Department of Financial Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Carols G. Muniz, General Counsel Department of Financial Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300
The Issue The issues are whether Petitioner has shown, by clear and convincing evidence, that she is rehabilitated from her disqualifying offense, and if so, whether Respondent's intended action to deny Petitioner's request for an exemption from disqualification from employment would constitute an abuse of discretion.
Findings Of Fact The Agency is the state agency responsible for regulating the employment of persons in positions of trust for which Petitioner seeks to qualify. Petitioner is a 38-year-old female who seeks to qualify for employment in a position of special trust with Success for All of Florida, Inc., a service provider regulated by the Agency. Because she wishes to work as a direct service provider, Petitioner was required to undergo a background screening. The results of that screening identified a history of criminal offenses, including a disqualifying offense in 2003. Accordingly, Petitioner filed a request for exemption from disqualification, which triggered the instant proceeding. In a letter dated July 27, 2015, the Agency's Director, Barbara Palmer, notified Petitioner that after reviewing all information that led to her disqualification, her exemption request was denied. The letter advised Petitioner that this decision was based upon Petitioner's failure to "submit clear and convincing evidence of [her] rehabilitation." Resp. Ex. C. Before Director Palmer made her decision, Petitioner's request for an exemption was reviewed by a Department of Children and Families screener who compiled a 34-page report entitled "Exemption Review" dated June 10, 2015. See Resp. Ex. B. The packet of information contains Petitioner’s Request for Exemption, Exemption Questionnaire, various criminal records, and two character references. The Exemption Review did not make a recommendation one way or the other, but simply compiled all relevant information that would assist the Director in making her decision. The report was first given to the Agency Regional Operations Manager in Orlando, who reviewed it and then made a preliminary recommendation to the Director. In 2003, Petitioner had a disqualifying offense, Grand Theft, a third-degree felony, which automatically disqualified her from employment in a position of special trust. Around the same time, she committed a second-degree misdemeanor, Trespassing in a Structure or Conveyance, a non-disqualifying offense. Both offenses occurred at a JC Penney store in Lakeland. Petitioner pled guilty to both offenses and was adjudicated guilty. For the felony conviction, she was placed on probation for 25 months, given credit for time served in jail, and ordered to pay various fines and costs. Petitioner was then 26 years old. Petitioner's account of her disqualifying offense differs in several respects from the account memorialized in the Lakeland Police Department reports and is inconsistent with her plea of guilty. In her Exemption Questionnaire, she stated that the criminal offense was actually committed by her younger sister and not her. She wrote that "I didn't tell on my sister because she was only 16 at the time so I took the charge for her." Resp. Ex. A, p. 3. This version of events was never presented to the court. At hearing, she also stated that she pled no contest to the crime, but court records indicate she pled guilty. In January 2004, while on probation for the Grand Theft charge, Petitioner violated her probation by committing a non- disqualifying offense and was sentenced to 60 days in jail. In November 2005, Petitioner violated her probation a second time by testing positive for cocaine during a probationary drug screening. The record is unclear if Petitioner served any jail time for this violation. In September 2012, or approximately three years ago, Petitioner committed the non-disqualifying offense of Use or Possession of Drug Paraphernalia, a first-degree misdemeanor. She pled nolo contendere, was adjudicated guilty, placed on probation for 12 months, and ordered to pay various fines and costs. At hearing, Petitioner blamed her cousin for the arrest and stated that she was unaware her purse contained drug paraphernalia (a straw and cocaine residue), as she had not used cocaine since 2005. In any event, she stated that her drug of choice was previously ecstasy and not cocaine, and admitted that she had used that drug while working at Success for All in Florida, Inc., from 2001 until around 2005. Between 2006 and 2014, Petitioner was employed as a warehouse worker by Publix. Along with five other workers, she was terminated by Publix in 2014 for improperly accepting damaged merchandise from a co-worker. There is no record of any employment since that time. Petitioner blamed her criminal arrests on stress in her life, mainly due to a lack of family support and raising two children as a single parent, and being just "plain stupid" while she was young. She expressed remorse for her mistakes and now wishes to help others as a direct service provider. Three witnesses testified on Petitioner's behalf. They described her as being a good worker, a caring individual, dependable, and very determined to improve her life. The Agency's rationale for denying the application is Petitioner's failure to take responsibility for her actions, that is, blaming her arrests on others, and a failure to provide a truthful and full account of the circumstances surrounding her disqualifying offense. The Agency also expressed concerns over Petitioner's lack of specificity regarding her criminal background, and the short period of time (three years) since her latest arrest, albeit for a non-disqualifying offense. Finally, the Agency noted that Petitioner has never had counseling, she lacks any specialized training, and there is no record of employment since being terminated by Publix more than a year ago.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Agency for Persons with Disabilities enter a final order denying Petitioner's application for an exemption from disqualification. DONE AND ENTERED this 7th day of December, 2015, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S D. R. ALEXANDER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of December, 2015. COPIES FURNISHED: David M. De La Paz, Agency Clerk Agency for Persons with Disabilities 4030 Esplanade Way, Suite 380 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950 (eServed) LaShae Thomas 3217 Julia Court Lakeland, Florida 33810-5510 Michael Sauve, Esquire Agency for Persons with Disabilities 400 West Robinson Street, Suite 430 Orlando, Florida 32801-1764 (eServed) Richard D. Tritschler, General Counsel Agency for Persons with Disabilities 4030 Esplanade Way, Suite 380 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950 (eServed) Barbara Palmer, Director Agency for Persons with Disabilities 4030 Esplanade Way, Suite 380 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950 (eServed)
