The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondent, Community Housing Initiative, Inc. (Respondent), committed a discriminatory housing practice against Petitioner, Karen Lee Krason (Petitioner), in violation of Chapter 760, Florida Statutes (2008).
Findings Of Fact On or about June 11, 2009, Petitioner filed a Housing Discrimination Complaint with the Commission. Pursuant to the Commission's procedure, an investigation of the matter was completed that resulted in a Notice of Determination of No Cause. Essentially, the Commission found that based upon the allegations raised by Petitioner there was no cause from which it could be found that Respondent had violated the Florida Fair Housing Act. Thereafter, Petitioner elected to file a Petition for Relief to challenge the determination and to seek relief against Respondent for the alleged violation. The Commission then forwarded the matter to DOAH for formal proceedings. DOAH issued a Notice of Hearing that was provided to all parties at their addresses of record. The postal service did not return the notices as undelivered. It is presumed the parties received notice of the hearing date, time, and location. Petitioner did not appear at the hearing.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing Petitioner's claim of discrimination. DONE AND ENTERED this 4th day of February, 2010, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S J. D. PARRISH Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of February, 2010. COPIES FURNISHED: Karen Lee Krason 1715 Erin Court Northeast Palm Bay, Florida 32905 Larry Kranert, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 COPIES FURNISHED BY CERTIFIED MAIL Nicole Tenpenny, Registered Agent Community Housing Initiative, Inc. 3033 College Wood Drive Melbourne, Florida 32941 (Certified No. 91 7108 2133 3935 7995 3000) Nicole Tenpenny, Registered Agent Community Housing Initiative, Inc. Post Office Box 410522 Melbourne, Florida 32941-0522 (Certified No. 91 7108 2133 3935 7995 2997) Michael Rogers, Officer/Director Community Housing Initiative, Inc. 1890 Palm Bay Road, Northeast Palm Bay, Florida 32905 (Certified No. 91 7108 2133 3935 7995 2980)
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent, The Pines at Warrington, LP, et al., and Pinnacle, and American Management Service Company (The Pines), discriminated against Petitioner, Susan M. Walters (Ms. Walters), because of her disability and gender in violation of the Florida Fair Housing Act, Sections 760.20- 760.37, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Ms. Walters, during times pertinent, suffered from schizophrenia, chronic differentiated type alcohol abuse, and a personality disorder. The Pines is an apartment community consisting of 160 units. The community is managed by Pinnacle, a subsidiary of American Management Services, LLC. Approximately 90 percent of the residents at The Pines are women. Ms. Walters completed a detailed application for residency in The Pines with Joy John (Ms. John), the facility's leasing specialist. Ms. Walters signed the application on October 24, 2007. She entered into a lease for a term of one year on October 31, 2007. During the course of these events, Ms. Walters did not claim a disability or mention that she was disabled. No one in management at The Pines perceived Ms. Walters to be disabled. During the application and contract process, Ms. Walters was provided with copies of the rules and regulations governing residents of The Pines. The lease required Ms. Walters to provide management at The Pines 60 day's notice, if she wanted to vacate the premises. In or around February 2008, Ms. Walters acquired a dog. She informed management at The Pines, and in accordance with the lease agreement, began making payments toward the required pet deposit. During April 2008, Ms. John and Dawn Chapman, Property Manager, received complaints about Ms. Walters' dog. The dog's barking was disturbing residents of The Pines. Four to five complaints were received each week during April. Ms. John and Ms. Chapman advised Ms. Walters of the complaints and provided her with suggestions as to how to ameliorate the problem. Nevertheless, the barking continued. On May 13, 2008, Ms. Walters was provided a "Seven Day Notice of Noncompliance with Opportunity to Cure," addressing the dog issue. It informed Ms. Walters that she must prevent the dog from disturbing other tenants. It further informed her that if the problem continued, she might be evicted. Another week of barking precipitated a "Seven Day Notice of Noncompliance with Possible Lease Termination Following." This was dated May 21, 2008, and signed by Dawn Chapman. The notice again made clear to Ms. Walters that if the barking continued she might be evicted. These notices were often given to other residents of The Pines when their barking dogs annoyed other tenants. Many of the residents of The Pines were minorities. One of them, Rhonda Lavender, complained about Ms. Walters because she put up a sign in a stairwell that included the word "nigger." Another resident, a disabled man who lived in the unit above her, complained that she "lambasted him" because he dropped a boot and it made a loud noise. Others complained about her coming out of the door to her apartment and screaming. None of the residents, who complained about Ms. Walters' barking dog, or her other offensive actions, mentioned her gender or that she was disabled. At no time during the residency of Ms. Walters at The Pines did she provide Ms. John or Ms. Chapman information with regard to having a disability. The only evidence of a disability presented at the hearing was a form Ms. Walters referred to as "a doctor's release for medical records," signed by an unidentified "physician." It was also agreed that Ms. Walters received payments based on a disability from the U.S. Social Security Administration. However, no evidence was adduced that indicated Ms. Walters was limited in one or more major life activities. Ms. Walters' rent payment for June was due June 5, 2008, but was not paid. On June 6, 2008, a "Three Day Notice- Demand for Payment of Rent or Possession" was affixed to the door of her apartment. The notice demanded payment of the sum of $518.00 or delivery of possession of the premises. The notice informed Ms. Walters that eviction proceedings would ensue if she did not pay in three days. By June 6, 2008, however, Ms. Walters had determined that she was going to vacate the premises. She told Ms. Chapman that she would pay her June rent on June 20, 2008, but this was a prevarication because Ms. Walters had no intention of paying any more rent. On or about July 4, 2008, Petitioner vacated her apartment. She placed her keys in the drop box designated for rental payments. The rent for June was never paid. Ms. Walters testified under oath that during her occupancy of the dwelling her bank card went missing. She stated that on another occasion $20 went missing from her apartment and that subsequently $10 disappeared. She said the fire alarm rang once for two hours. She said she was disturbed by noisy neighbors and a loud maintenance man. She said that once after returning from her job she discovered a glass plate in her apartment that had been shattered. She did not reveal any of these allegations to management at The Pines when they occurred, if they did occur. Ms. Walters claimed that someone entered her apartment in May and sprayed a chemical that encouraged her dog to defecate inside the apartment. She said she could not check her mail because management at The Pines had locked her out of her mailbox. She said someone came in and scratched her Teflon frying pan and burned up her microwave oven. She did not make these allegations to management at The Pines when they occurred, if they did occur. Even if one believes that her property was violated, and evidence to that effect was thin, there is no indication at all that anyone involved in managing The Pines was involved. Moreover, no adverse action was taken toward Ms. Walters. Two notices about barking dogs and a written demand that she pay rent do not amount to an adverse action.
Recommendation Based upon the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Petition for Relief of Susan M. Walters be dismissed. DONE AND ENTERED this 16th day of October, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S HARRY L. HOOPER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of October, 2009. COPIES FURNISHED: Dawn Chapman The Pines at Warrington 4101 West Navy Boulevard Pensacola, Florida 32507 Angela North Olgetree, Deakins, Nash, Smoak & Stewart, P.C. 301 Congress Avenue, Suite 1150 Austin, Texas 78701 Susan M. Walters 1112 Bartow Avenue Pensacola, Florida 32507 Monica Jerelle Williams, Esquire Ogletree, Deakins, Nash, Smoak, and Stewart, P.C. 100 North Tampa Street, Suite 3600 Tampa, Florida 33602 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Larry Kranert, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue Whether Respondents Orion Real Estate Services (Orion) and the Housing Authority of the City of Winter Park (Housing Authority) subjected Petitioner April Williams to discriminatory housing practices based on her race (African American, non-Hispanic), in violation of the Florida Fair Housing Act, chapter 760, part II, Florida Statutes (2019) (FHA).1
Findings Of Fact Ms. Williams, an African American female, lives in an apartment in the Meadows, a low-income housing complex located in Winter Park, Florida. The Housing Authority is a governmental entity that provides low- income housing through federal funds provided by the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development. It contracts with outside companies to manage the properties it owns. The Housing Authority owns the Meadows. Orion is a real estate services company that manages residential properties for landlords and investors. At the time relevant to these proceedings, Orion managed the Meadows for the Housing Authority. Ms. Williams had to climb up a stairwell to reach her unit. Her apartment was located above one unit and next to another. She shared a front porch with her next-door neighbor. The Meadows housed 300 residents during the relevant time period. Of those residents, 264 identified themselves as "Black" and 280 identified themselves as "Ethnic." There was no testimony or evidence as to how many identified as Hispanic. The Housing Authority claims it took no action against Ms. Williams, and therefore cannot be liable for discrimination. The Community Manager for the Meadows, LiMarys Rivera, testified she was an employee of Orion. However, she issued documentation on letterhead titled "The Housing Authority of the City of Winter Park." Ms. Rivera's signature line states that her title is "Property Manager Agent for the Winter Park Housing Authority." As such, the undersigned finds Ms. Rivera was a dual agent for both Orion and the Housing Authority. Ms. Rivera testified that once she received a complaint against a tenant, regardless of who made the complaint, it was standard procedure to first reach out to the alleged violator by telephone as a courtesy, and then if there was a subsequent complaint to send out a written "Notice to Cure" or "Notice of Material Non-Compliance with Opportunity to Cure and Proposed Adverse Action" (non-compliance notice) to that tenant. Respondents provided numerous non-compliance notices to tenants regarding various types of complaints. Ms. Rivera testified these non- compliance notices were issued to tenants of all races, and both Hispanic and non-Hispanic tenants. Over the course of a year to 18 months, Ms. Williams had made somewhere between 20 and 29 complaints against her next-door neighbor and her downstairs neighbor. Ms. Williams described both of these neighbors as Hispanic. Ms. Williams complained that her next-door neighbor was noisy and would smoke (and allow guests to smoke) on the front porch even though her building was designated as a non-smoking area. Ms. Williams also complained that the downstairs neighbor left items on the stairwell causing a hazard. These items included pizza boxes, shoes, rugs, and bags of trash. As a result of these complaints, both of Ms. Williams's neighbors were issued non-compliance notices. The downstairs neighbor received a non- compliance notice for leaving pizza boxes, trash, and the other objects outside her front door. Similarly, the next-door neighbor received a non-compliance notice for smoking in her apartment and common areas. Additionally, Respondents issued community flyers to all the tenants in the Meadows reminding them of basic rules, including not smoking, not leaving trash and debris outside, and keeping front porches clean. Ms. Williams also complained to Respondents that workmen who were performing maintenance in her unit were speaking Spanish. She requested that Respondents provide workmen that speak only English while on the Meadows property. At some point, Ms. Williams's neighbors made noise complaints against her. Respondents did not initially issue a non-compliance notice to Ms. Williams because she and her neighbors had numerous complaints against each other. Instead, Ms. Rivera attempted to hold a conciliation or mediation meeting with all of them. Ms. Williams refused. She did not see the point of the meeting, and believed Ms. Rivera would take the neighbors' side because Ms. Rivera, like the neighbors, was Hispanic. After Ms. Williams refused to meet, Respondents issued her a non- compliance notice for excessive noise. There was no evidence that she was required to pay any fees or fines as a result of the non-compliance notice against her. Ms. Williams testified she felt Ms. Rivera gave preferential treatment to Hispanics. When asked how they were treated better, Ms. Williams testified that her neighbors were not evicted despite the complaints made against them. Ms. Williams admitted, however, that Respondents did not evict her either.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the undersigned hereby RECOMMENDS that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief filed by April Williams. DONE AND ENTERED this 21st day of August, 2020, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S HETAL DESAI Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of August, 2020. COPIES FURNISHED: Tammy S. Barton, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 4075 Esplanade Way, Room 110 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-7020 (eServed) Ricardo L. Gilmore, Esquire Saxon, Gilmore, Carraway and Gibbons, P.A. 201 East Kennedy Boulevard, Suite 600 Tampa, Florida 33602 (eServed) Kevin Fulton, Esquire Fulton Strahan Law Group, PLLC 7676 Hillmont Street, Suite 191 Houston, Texas 77040 (eServed) April Williams 746 Margaret Square Winter Park, Florida 32789 (eServed) Cheyanne Costilla, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 4075 Esplanade Way, Room 110 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 (eServed)
The Issue Whether Respondent, Palm Frond Condominium Association, discriminated against Petitioner, Hugo M. Villagra, in violation of the Florida Fair Housing Act.
Recommendation Based on Petitioner’s Notice of Voluntary Dismissal, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the Florida Commission on Human Relations dismissing the Petition for Relief filed by Petitioner. DONE AND ENTERED this 15th day of September, 2015, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LYNNE A. QUIMBY-PENNOCK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of September, 2015.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondents unlawfully discriminated against Petitioner on the basis of her race, religion, or disability in violation of the Florida Fair Housing Act.
Findings Of Fact Parklife is the owner of a mobile home community known as St. Lucie Mobile Village (the “Village”), which comprises approximately 220 homes. For the last 21 years, McGrath has leased a lot in the Village, upon which her double-wide mobile home sits. She is a white woman, approximately 60 years old, who claims to suffer from post-traumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”) and other unspecified anxiety disorders, and to be a practicing Jehovah’s Witness. This is a case of alleged housing discrimination brought under Florida’s Fair Housing Act (the “Act”). McGrath alleges that Parklife has discriminated against her in several ways, which can be classified as selective enforcement, disparate treatment, and retaliation. Specifically, McGrath alleges that Parklife required her to upgrade the skirting around, and also to re-level, her home, while excusing other (predominately Hispanic) residents, whose homes were in comparable condition, from making similar improvements. McGrath alleges that Parklife issued warnings to her for violating the “two vehicle” rule, while allowing other (predominately Hispanic) residents to keep three or more cars on their lots. She alleges that Parklife permitted Hispanic residents to shoot off fireworks and make noise in violation of park rules, depriving her of the peaceful enjoyment of her premises. Finally, McGrath alleges that Parklife commenced a retaliatory eviction proceeding against her for being a whistle blower. McGrath does not dispute that her home needed new skirting and to be leveled, and she admits having violated the two vehicle rule. She claims, nevertheless, that Parklife took action against her on the basis of her race (white), religion (Jehovah’s Witness), disability (PTSD), or some combination of these, as shown by its more lenient treatment of residents outside the protected categories. McGrath’s allegations are legally sufficient to state a claim of housing discrimination. That is, if McGrath were able to prove the facts she has alleged, she would be entitled to relief. She failed, however, to present sufficient, persuasive evidence in support of the charges. It is not that there is no evidence behind McGrath’s claims. She and her witness, Kassandra Rosa, testified that other residents have violated park rules regarding skirting, leveling, and allowable vehicles––seemingly without consequence. To determine whether the circumstances of these other residents were truly comparable to McGrath’s, however, so as to conclude that she was singled out for different treatment, requires more information than the evidence affords. Taken together, McGraths’s testimony and that of Ms. Rosa was simply too vague and lacking in relevant detail to support findings of disparate treatment or selective enforcement on the basis of race, religion, or handicap. Indeed, the persuasive evidence fails to establish that Parklife declined to take appropriate action with regard to similarly-situated violators, or that it otherwise condoned, or acquiesced to, the rulebreaking of such residents. At most, the evidence shows that other residents violated the same rules as McGrath––not that they got off scot-free, which is a different matter. As for the eviction proceeding, which was pending in county court at the time of the final hearing, there is insufficient evidence (if any) to support McGrath’s contention that Parklife is retaliating against her or using the legal process as a pretext for unlawfully depriving her of a dwelling in violation of the Act. In terms of timing, Parklife initiated the eviction proceeding before it became aware that McGrath had filed a complaint of housing discrimination, which tends to undermine the assertion that the eviction was brought to retaliate against McGrath for exercising her rights under the Act. More important is that Parklife has articulated and proved nondiscriminatory grounds for seeking to terminate McGrath’s lease. Residents have complained to the Village’s management that McGrath has harassed her neighbors at various times, in various ways. While there is insufficient nonhearsay evidence in the instant record for the undersigned to make findings as to whether McGrath did, in fact, harass other residents in violation of park rules, Parklife proved by a preponderance of the competent substantial evidence that it was on notice of such alleged misconduct on McGrath’s part. The fact that Parklife had such notice is sufficient to show that its bringing an action to evict McGrath was not merely a pretext for unlawful discrimination against her. Of course, the question of whether Parklife is entitled to terminate McGrath’s tenancy is one that need not, and cannot, be decided in this proceeding. It is determined as a matter of ultimate fact that McGrath has failed to establish by the greater weight of the evidence that Parklife or any of the Respondents, jointly or severally, committed an unlawful housing practice.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order finding Parklife not liable for housing discrimination and awarding McGrath no relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 2nd day of November, 2020, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JOHN G. VAN LANINGHAM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of November, 2020. COPIES FURNISHED: Tammy S. Barton, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 4075 Esplanade Way, Room 110 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-7020 (eServed) Laney H. McGrath 11500 Southwest Kanner Highway, Lot 317 Indiantown, Florida 34956 (eServed) Teresa Schenk St. Lucie Village Parklife, LLC 11500 Southwest Kanner Highway Indiantown, Florida 34956 (eServed) Cheyanne Costilla, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 4075 Esplanade Way, Room 110 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-7020 (eServed)
The Issue Whether Petitioner was the subject of unlawful discrimination in the provision of services or facilities in connection with his dwelling based on his handicap, and whether Respondent refused to make reasonable accommodations in its rules, policies, practices, or services necessary to afford Petitioner equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling in violation of the Florida Fair Housing Act, chapter 760, Part II, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a homeowner in the Royal Highlands community in Leesburg, Florida, and has been a member of the RHPOA since moving into his home in April 2001.1/ From September 2010, through February 2011, Petitioner served on the RHPOA Board of Directors. Respondent is a property owners? association, membership in which is limited to property owners in the Royal Highlands residential community in Leesburg, Florida. There are 1,499 homes in the Royal Highlands community. The community is divided into twelve “districts.” Respondent?s Board of Directors (Board) consists of one representative from each of the twelve districts. Meetings of the Board are held monthly, except for August when community activities are typically sparsely attended. Leland Management is a community association management company that provides management services to the RHPOA along with other community associations. Petitioner alleged that he suffers from a disability because he walks with the use of a cane, and that his ability to speak is impaired as a lingering effect of a 2004 neck surgery that involved insertion of an endotracheal tube during and immediately after the procedure. During the month of February 2011, Petitioner was running for reelection to the RHPOA Board of Directors. On the day of the election, and prior to the vote of the membership, Petitioner appeared at the RHPOA meeting to make a final statement and thank his supporters. He walked to the front of the community meeting room, known as the Great Hall, but did not want to take the steps up to the elevated stage for fear that he might lose his balance and fall off. Petitioner was given a microphone and he thanked his supporters from the base of the stage. Afterwards, he walked back to his seat. Petitioner was not reelected to the Board, but continued to attend meetings as a member of the RHPOA. A monthly meeting of the RHPOA was held on July 13, 2011. The agenda included four items, including an item that would authorize the Board of Directors to retain legal counsel in the event a threatened lawsuit was filed against Bob Fitzpatrick, who was then the president of the RHPOA. The nature of the potential lawsuit was not in evidence, except that it involved a complaint filed with the Lake County Sheriff by Petitioner against Mr. Fitzpatrick. Mr. Fitzpatrick recused himself from the vote, since any legal fees would be expended on his behalf as president. John Banahan, then the vice-president of the RHPOA, acted as chair during the consideration and vote on the agenda item. The RHPOA allows members to speak regarding any issue on the agenda. Members must sign a “Sign-Up Sheet to Speak to Agenda Item” for each item on which they wish to be heard. Members are allowed three minutes to speak on each issue for which they have signed up. The minutes regarding a particular agenda item typically reflect only whether a motion was made, who seconded the motion, who voted, and the results of the vote. When there is a significant amount of discussion, the minutes may, as did the minutes for the legal counsel agenda item of the July 13, 2011 meeting, include something no more detailed than “[m]uch discussion, residents and Board Members.” Neither the comments of property owners nor the discussions of the Board members as to an agenda item are recorded in the minutes of meetings of the RHPOA. When Petitioner was on the Board, he would routinely take notes at meetings, and then destroy the notes after the meeting was concluded. That was consistent with the practice described by other testifying members of the Board. Petitioner attended the July 13, 2011 meeting of the RHPOA with his wife. He entered the meeting room on his own power and without difficulty, though he used a cane, signed up at the door to speak on the agenda item regarding the Board?s proposal to retain legal counsel, and took a seat at one of the tables. Petitioner made no request for assistance of any kind at the time he signed up to speak. Stacey Peach attended the July 13, 2012 meeting as a representative of Leland Management. Ms. Peach periodically attends meetings of the various associations served by Leland Management. Her attendance at the July 13, 2012 RHPOA meeting was coincidental. Ms. Peach was seated at a table in front of Petitioner. When it was his turn to speak on the legal counsel agenda item, Petitioner was recognized by Mr. Banahan. Petitioner announced, without assistance of a microphone, that he could not go to the podium. Mr. Banahan noted “confusion” in the audience, but did not realize what was going on with regard to Petitioner?s request to speak on the agenda item, though he understood that Petitioner was unable to come to the podium at the front of the room. Mr. Banahan testified convincingly that he had no problem with Petitioner speaking from his seat. He was aware of at least two other instances in which a microphone was taken to an attendee of a Board meeting so as to allow them to speak while seated, one of which occurred when he was a member of the Board. Ms. Peach heard Petitioner state that he was not able to go to the podium to offer his comments. She thereupon got a portable microphone and handed it to Petitioner. Petitioner asked Ms. Peach if she would speak on his behalf. Petitioner had not spoken with Ms. Peach earlier, and his request caught her off guard. Not knowing what Petitioner wanted her to say, she declined to speak for him. Her refusal was based on surprise and uncertainty, and not on any discriminatory motive. After Ms. Peach declined to speak on Petitioner?s behalf, Petitioner took the microphone provided to him, and offered his comments on the agenda item from his seat. Petitioner testified that as long as the microphone was working, he saw no reason why he would not have been heard. Except for Ms. Hoffman, whose testimony is discussed below, the witnesses who were asked indicated they had no problem hearing what Petitioner had to say, though none could remember the substance. Petitioner testified that he made a specific request of Mr. Banahan to allow someone to speak on his behalf, and that Mr. Banahan refused the request. Petitioner?s testimony was contradicted by Ms. Peach, who was directly involved in the incident; Mr. Norden, who was seated next to Petitioner; Mr. Reichel, who attended the meeting as a Board member; and Mr. Banahan. The greater weight of the evidence establishes that no request for another person to speak on Petitioner?s behalf was made to any member of the Board, and that the only such request was made, without prior notice, to Ms. Peach. Petitioner?s claim that his request was denied by Mr. Banahan was supported only by the testimony of Ms. Hoffman. However, Ms. Hoffman?s testimony was undermined by the fact that her overall account of the incident differed in several significant and material respects from the testimony of other witnesses, including that of Petitioner. For example, Ms. Hoffman indicated that Ms. Peach was not asked to speak for Petitioner, that Petitioner asked someone seated next to him to speak, that Petitioner had difficulty reading his notes, that Petitioner was unable to complete his comments, and that Petitioner?s speech was, at best, marginal. Whether Ms. Hoffman?s description of events was the result of a poor vantage point or of poor memory, it is not credited. Mr. Banahan testified that if Petitioner had been unable to speak, he would have allowed someone to read a statement on his behalf.2/ However, Mr. Banahan testified that he was not asked to make such an accommodation, and that Petitioner was able to comment on the agenda item from his seat. Mr. Banahan?s testimony is credible and is accepted. Mr. Banahan testified that he has known Petitioner from his service as a member of the Board and never perceived him as having a handicap. Mr. Banahan knew that Petitioner walked with a cane. However, Mr. Banahan?s wife walks with a cane and he does not consider her to have a handicap. Petitioner provided Respondent with no medical records, letters from his physicians, or competent evidence of any kind to establish that he had a disability or that he required an accommodation in order to participate in the July 13, 2011 meeting, nor did he produce any such evidence at the hearing. At the hearing, based upon the undersigned's observation, Petitioner had little or no difficulty walking or speaking. Petitioner failed to prove that he has a physical impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities, or that he was regarded by any director or member of the RHPOA as having any such physical impairment. To the contrary, the greater weight of the evidence demonstrates that Petitioner does not suffer from a handicap as defined in the Fair Housing Act. Ultimate Findings of Fact There was no competent, substantial evidence adduced at the hearing that Petitioner suffered from a handicap that hindered his ability to actively participate in the July 13, 2011 RHPOA meeting. There was no competent, substantial evidence adduced at the hearing that Respondent knew of any alleged handicap or regarded Petitioner as being handicapped. There was no competent, substantial evidence adduced at the hearing that Respondent failed to reasonably accommodate Petitioner when he asserted that he would not be able to walk to the podium. The evidence adduced at the hearing established that Petitioner made no direct request to any member of the RHPOA Board of Directors to allow someone to speak on his behalf. The evidence adduced at the hearing established that Petitioner was able to clearly state his comments on the legal representation agenda item by using the portable microphone provided to him by Ms. Peach. The evidence did not establish that Petitioner was the subject of unlawful discrimination in the provision of services or facilities in connection with his dwelling based on his handicap, or that Respondent refused to make reasonable accommodations in its rules, policies, practices or services necessary to afford Petitioner equal opportunity to use and enjoy his dwelling.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief filed in FCHR No. 2012H0158. DONE AND ENTERED this 18th day of October, 2012, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S E. GARY EARLY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of October, 2012.
The Issue Whether Respondent discriminated against Petitioner in the rental of a dwelling based on her race, in violation of Florida Fair Housing Act, chapter 760, Part II, Florida Statutes (2015).
Findings Of Fact The following Findings of Fact are based on the exhibit admitted into evidence and testimony offered by witnesses at the final hearing. Ms. Smith is a Black female and currently resides in Gainesville, Florida. Saul Silber Properties is a company that manages Oak Glade located at 3427 Southwest 30th Terrace, Gainesville, Florida 32608. Respondent provides residential rental apartments in Gainesville, Florida. Saul Silber is the owner of Saul Silber Properties. Ms. Smith is a former resident of apartment number 54I of Oak Glade.1/ Ms. Smith rented the apartment pursuant to a residential lease agreement entered into on January 15, 2014.2/ The lease was for a one-year renewable term. Ms. Smith filed a complaint with the Commission alleging Respondent issued her a Notice of Non-Renewal of her lease agreement on the basis of her race. The Commission issued a “No Cause” determination and Ms. Smith filed a Petition for Relief, which is the matter before the undersigned. During her tenancy at Oak Glade, Ms. Smith had raised numerous complaints with the property manager regarding matters involving her neighbor, Anne E. Dowling. Ms. Dowling, who was White, was a former resident of apartment number 54H. Ms. Smith’s issues with Ms. Dowling included complaints concerning smoking, loud music, non-residents living in the apartment, the number of visitors outside Ms. Dowling’s apartment, and Ms. Dowling’s cat scratching her car. All of the complaints were addressed and resolved by the property manager. The incident that led to the major blow-up between the neighbors involved Ms. Smith and Ms. Dowling’s daughter. Ms. Smith and Ms. Dowling’s daughter were involved in a verbal altercation after Ms. Smith verbally reprimanded Ms. Dowling’s granddaughter (age range of 7-9 years old) and her friend. Ms. Smith testified that the two girls turned their backs to her, bent over, and wiggled their buttocks in a side-to-side motion. Ms. Smith understood this gesture to be disrespectful and a suggestion to “kiss their behinds.” Ms. Dowling’s daughter was not a resident of the apartment complex. The altercation was so loud that Ms. Osteen heard people “screaming” while she was in her office. Ms. Osteen discovered Ms. Smith and Ms. Dowling’s daughter involved in a screaming match. Ms. Osteen later consulted with the senior property manager about the incident and it was determined that both Ms. Dowling and Ms. Smith would be issued a Notice of Non-Renewal. On March 15, 2016, Respondent issued Ms. Smith and Ms. Dowling a Notice of Non-Renewal, which was posted on the door of each tenant’s respective apartment. The notices did not state a reason for non-renewal. Ms. Dowling’s lease would expire effective May 30, 2016; and Ms. Smith’s lease would expire effective December 30, 2016. Prior to expiration of her lease, Ms. Dowling advised Ms. Osteen that she was terminally ill and requested that she be permitted to stay at Oak Glade. Ms. Dowling explained that her support system was located in the area and due to financial limitations, moving from the complex would create a hardship for her. For these reasons, Ms. Dowling was permitted to enter a new lease and was moved to a different apartment. The decision to permit Ms. Dowling to remain at the complex was made by the senior property manager. Ms. Dowling passed away approximately four months later, on September 28, 2016. Other than her mistaken belief that Ms. Dowling did not receive a Notice of Non-Renewal, Ms. Smith did not offer any evidence to support her claim of housing discrimination in violation of the Florida Fair Housing Act.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a final order: finding that Respondent, Saul Silber Properties, LLC, did not commit a discriminatory housing practice against Petitioner, Ms. Smith; and dismissing the Petition for Relief filed in FCHR No. 2017H0320. DONE AND ENTERED this 29th day of August, 2018, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S YOLONDA Y. GREEN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of August, 2018.
The Issue Whether Petitioner's housing discrimination complaint alleging violations of the Florida Fair Housing Act, chapter 760, part II, Florida Statutes (2020) (FFHA), was timely filed.1 1 Unless otherwise indicated, all federal and state statutory and administrative rule references are to the 2020 versions.
Findings Of Fact The following Findings of Fact are made based on the exhibits and testimony offered at the final hearing, the stipulated facts, and the additional documents accepted for official recognition as indicated above. The Lease Petitioner, Ross Couples, leased a house located at 11635 Meadowrun Circle in Fort Meyers, Florida (Property), from Respondent Xuan Ren. At all times relevant to this case, Respondent Ren owned the Property. At all times relevant to this case, Respondent Timothy Cloud managed the Property and served as an agent for Respondent Ren. The Property was part of Marina Bay Homeowners' Association (HOA) and subject to the HOA's rules and regulations regarding lease arrangements. On December 12, 2018, Respondent Ren and Petitioner executed a year lease for the Property from January 15, 2018, to January 15, 2019. The lease included the following provision for its renewal: 18. RENEWAL/EXTENSION. The Lease can be renewed or extended only by a written agreement signed by both Landlord and Tenant, but the term of a renewal or extension together with the original Lease Term may not exceed 12 months. … A new lease is required for each period of lease. At some point prior to January 15, 2019, Respondent offered Petitioner another lease agreement. Petitioner refused to pay a $100 leasing fee required by the HOA. The parties did not renew or enter into another 12-month lease, nor did Petitioner move out. As a result, after January 15, 2019, the parties switched to a month-to- month arrangement.4 This arrangement, however, was not approved by the HOA. On February 23, 2019, Petitioner sent an email to the HOA manager and Respondent Cloud. In that email, Petitioner made numerous complaints and mentioned the need for a larger hot water heater for his hydrotherapy tub, which he claimed he needed for health issues. He also discussed at length his opposition to the $100 fee imposed by the HOA for entering into a new lease. On February 27, 2019, Respondent Cloud issued a "Notice of Termination of Month-to-Month Tenancy Notice to Vacate" (Notice) to Petitioner. The Notice indicated that the current leasing arrangement had 4 No written lease agreement for the month-to-month arrangement was offered into evidence. been terminated and Petitioner was to vacate the Property on or before May 15, 2019. Petitioner did not move out of the Property on or before May 15, 2019. On May 20, 2019, Respondent Ren filed the eviction action against Petitioner in the appropriate court. A final judgment in the eviction action was rendered on June 6, 2019, and a writ of possession was issued for the Property on June 7, 2019. Petitioner vacated the Property and turned over possession to the Lee County Sheriff on June 12, 2019. Housing Complaints Petitioner testified that on April 5, 2019, he filed a complaint of discrimination with the U.S. Housing and Urban Development (HUD) regarding his claim of disability discrimination against Respondents. On January 17, 2020, HUD issued a letter to Respondent Cloud (HUD Letter) indicating it was dismissing the case brought by Petitioner, and specifically finding "that no reasonable cause exists to believe that a discriminatory housing practice has occurred. … No evidence was found to support Petitioner's contention that his disability was used as a basis to evict him." The HUD Letter does not indicate Petitioner could re-open the HUD case or file anything else with HUD based on the same facts. It does not mention the FFHA or FCHR, and it does not provide any instruction or information on how to pursue claims pursuant to state housing discrimination laws.5 Petitioner claims a HUD employee, Mr. Jordan, told him he had a year from his last date of possession of the Property to "file the proper paperwork." 5 The HUD Letter does mention that Petitioner could file a civil lawsuit "in an appropriate federal district court or state court within two (2) years of the date on which the alleged discriminatory housing practice occurred or ended." The letter also has instructions as to what Petitioner may be able to file if he was retaliated against for filing the HUD complaint. This proceeding does not involve either of those situations. Petitioner also states Mr. Jordon told him he could file a claim with either HUD or the Florida Fair Housing Commission.6 It is unclear when this conversation occurred, what Mr. Jordan's role was at HUD, and whether the discussion was in person or over the phone. Regardless, this testimony is hearsay and not corroborated by any non-hearsay evidence or documentation. There is no credible evidence to establish that anyone at either HUD or FCHR informed Petitioner that he had one year from the last date of possession of the Property to file an FFHA discrimination complaint with FCHR. The date Petitioner filed his FFHA Complaint with FCHR is contested. Petitioner testified he contacted the "Florida Fair Housing Commission" on June 10, 2020, regarding his FFHA claim. He admits he did not file his FFHA complaint immediately. Rather, at that time, he spoke with an "intake clerk," who sent him a complaint form, which he then filled out and returned. There is no competent evidence corroborating Petitioner's assertion in his Response that he filed the Complaint with FCHR on June 10, 2021. Rather, the top of the front page of the Complaint is dated July 22, 2020, and indicates Petitioner verified the facts in the Complaint on July 21, 2020. Moreover, the Determination dated September 18, 2020, also references that the Complaint was submitted on July 21, 2020. Based on Petitioner's testimony and the date that Petitioner verified the Complaint with his signature, the undersigned finds Petitioner's Complaint was filed with FCHR on July 21, 2020. 6 The undersigned is unaware of an agency operating under the name of "Florida Fair Housing Commission." The undersigned assumes that Petitioner is referring to FCHR. See § 760.22(1), Fla. Stat. (defining “Commission” to mean the Florida Commission on Human Relations).
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief filed by Ross J. Couples. DONE AND ENTERED this 7th day of May, 2021, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. COPIES FURNISHED: Tammy S. Barton, Agency Clerk S HETAL DESAI Administrative Law Judge 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of May, 2021. Ross Joseph Couples Florida Commission on Human Relations 4075 Esplanade Way, Room 110 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-7020 Steven Klaus Teuber, Esquire Teuber Law, PLLC Post Office Box 49885 Sarasota, Florida 34230 Timothy Cloud D-15 # 514 106 Hancock Bridge Parkway Cape Coral, Florida 33991 Christopher J. DeCosta, Esquire Mahshie & DeCosta 1560 Matthew Drive, Suite E Fort Myers, Florida 33907 Suite 202-200 13650 Fiddlesticks Boulevard Fort Myers, Florida 33912 Xuan Ren D-15 # 514 106 Hancock Bridge Parkway Cape Coral, Florida 33991 Paul Edward Olah, Esquire Law Offices of Wells Olah, P.A. 1800 Second Street, Suite 808 Sarasota, Florida 34236 Cheyanne Costilla, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 4075 Esplanade Way, Room 110 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-7020
The Issue The issue to be determined is whether Respondents engaged in prohibited conduct against Petitioner by discriminating against him based on his race and/or national origin in the terms and conditions, privileges, or provision of services or facilities in the sale or rental of real property in violation of Section 760.23, Florida Statutes (2009).
Findings Of Fact Based on the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the final hearing and the entire record in this proceeding, the following Findings of Fact are made: The Florida Commission on Human Relations is the state agency charged with investigating complaints of discriminatory housing practices and enforcing the Fair Housing Act. It is also charged with investigating fair housing complaints filed with the federal Department of Housing and Urban Development under the Federal Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. Section 3601, et seq. Petitioner, Emmanuel Agbara, is an adult, black male, who is of Nigerian decent. On or about September 18, 2008, Petitioner submitted an offer to purchase Condominium 406 in Orchid Springs Village. Because the real property sought to be purchased was a part of a condominium, there were several contingencies imposed by the declaration of condominium and associated house rules. Respondent, Orchid Springs Condominium, No. 200, Inc., is a non-profit corporation charged with the management of the condominium. Incidental to this responsibility, in conjunction with Bay Tree Management Company, the board of directors has the responsibility to approve or disapprove of the sale of a condominium to a third party. In the event the board of directors or Bay Tree Management Company disapproves of the sale, the condominium documents outline a procedure wherein the proposed sale can be pursued by the property owner and prospective buyer (Petitioner herein). After Orchid Springs advised Petitioner that it had not approved his sale, this alternative was not pursued. Orchid Springs is a part of a mixed-use development of condominiums, patio homes, and private [single-family] residences and is diverse in terms of religion, national origin and income. Prospective buyers, and the Petitioner herein, were required to complete an application that inquired into the prospective buyer's background, intended use of the property, and required three character references. In addition, prospective buyers were required to pay for a "background" check. On September 20, 2008, Petitioner traveled from his home in Maryland to meet with Respondent, John Carroll, president of the condominium board of directors. As they met, an inspection of the condominium unit was being conducted by a home inspection professional. Petitioner anticipated that he would meet with Carroll and two other board members for the personal interview required by the condominium documents as a prerequisite for board approval. The two board members were not available to meet with Petitioner during his September 20, 2008, visit. During the course of the discussion between Petitioner and Carroll, it became apparent that Petitioner anticipated being an "absentee landlord." Carroll advised Petitioner that the owner/residents had various problems with renters, including recent police activity incidental to a drug laboratory in one of the rented condominium units. Carroll also related that four of the absentee owner units were in foreclosure and that placed an economic burden on the remaining owners. During the discussion between Petitioner and Carroll, Petitioner inquired as to whether he could do the three-board member interview by telephone. Mr. Carroll advised him that a telephone conference might be arranged, but that one board member could not do it alone. On October 8, 2008, Petitioner submitted his Association Application. As a part of the application process, Petitioner certified that he had been supplied copies of the Articles of Declaration of Condominium Ownership and By-Laws of Orchid Springs Village, No. 200, Inc.; the Service and Maintenance Agreement; and the manual, "Condominium Living--The Seville." The Association Application includes the following language: "[A]pplicant purchasing Condominium certifies that he/she has . . . read [and] agrees to abide by" the foregoing documents. The Association Application states that "[i]mmediately after submission of the application, Applicant is requested to arrange with the President for a personal interview with at least [three] Board Members present. Such personal interview is a firm requirement [and] may not be waived." Following receipt of a prospective buyer or renter's Association Application, the tasks of conducting the customary background and criminal checks are divided among board members. In this instance, Mrs. Thibodaux, now deceased, did the background check; and Mrs. Douglas did the criminal background check, which, apparently, was a local records check utilizing the county records available through the internet. Testimony reveals that Mrs. Thibodaux reported that she had some problems with two of Petitioner's character references and that the Social Security number he provided was incorrect. This testimony is discounted as Mrs. Thibodaux is dead and not available to testify, and there is no indication that Petitioner's Social security number is incorrect. In addition, two of Petitioner's character references testified at the final hearing. Mrs. Douglas' local criminal background check revealed a January 13, 1997, arrest for battery--domestic violence. The case was "nolle prossed" after the Petitioner was placed in pre-trial diversion. Orchid Spring's critical examination and appraisal of prospective buyers and renters is apparently "slipshod," but not atypical when the prospective cost of a thorough examination that would involve an investigation of an individual's credit history and a thorough criminal and background check. Concern raised by the background and criminal check prompted Carroll to contact Petitioner and request that he come to Florida and meet with three board members for the interview required by the condominium documents. Petitioner was unable to meet with the interview committee. On November 7, 2008, Petitioner was advised by Respondents that his application had been denied. No evidence of damages was advanced by Petitioner.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 22nd day of November, 2010, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JEFF B. CLARK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of November, 2010. COPIES FURNISHED: Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Lawrence F. Kranert, Jr., General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Emmanuel Agbara 1822 Metzerott Road, No. 206 Adelphi, Maryland 20783 Rex P. Cowan, Esquire Post Office Box 857 Winter Haven, Florida 33882-0857
The Issue Whether Petitioner is entitled to an award of attorney's fees and costs as a prevailing small business party in an adjudicatory proceeding initiated by a state agency as provided under the Florida Equal Access to Justice Act (FEAJA), Section 57.111, Florida Statutes. Whether the amount claimed by Petitioner for attorney's fees and costs is reasonable.
Findings Of Fact The Respondent agency is charged with the administration of the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992, as amended, Section 760.30, Florida Statutes (1995). If Petitioner is unable to obtain voluntary compliance with Sections 760.20 - 760.37, Florida Statutes, or has reasonable cause to believe a discriminatory housing practice has occurred, the Respondent agency may institute an administrative proceeding under Chapter 120, Florida Statues, on behalf of the aggrieved party. On February 3, 1993, Polly Leggitt filed a complaint with the Respondent agency and the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development. The Complaint named Carole Naylor, Property Administrator, as the person who discriminated against her. On March 24, 1993, the Respondent agency notified Regency Place Apartments and Carole Naylor that the Complaint had been filed, and stated that within 100 days, the Respondent agency would investigate the Complaint and give notice whether there was or was not reasonable cause to believe that a discriminatory housing practice had occurred. The notice further provided that final administrative disposition of the Complaint would be completed within one year from the filing of the Complaint, which would be on or about February 3, 1994. A Notice of Determination: Cause and Issuance of an Administrative Charge was made and issued and served on August 28, 1996. It named Regency Place Apartments; Carole Naylor, Frank Cutrona, Property Manager; and Robert Stitzel, owner. The notice was issued more than one year after the filing of the Complaint. Following the formal hearing, this Administrative Law Judge made certain findings of fact which were incorporated in the Recommended Order. Those findings held, inter alia: Robert Stitzel was the developer and owner of Regency Place Apartments. Carole Naylor, at the direction of the manager Frank Cutrona, sent Ms. Leggitt letters rejecting her application for an apartment unit at Regency Place Apartments because there was no apartment of the kind she wanted that was available and further that her income was insufficient to qualify her for housing at that place. Cutrona died on December 26, 1996. Carole Naylor did not work in the rental office. She made no judgments regarding the rental of the apartment, nor the creditworthiness of the prospective tenants. Robert Stitzel made no judgments regarding the tenants. Regency Place Apartments had a policy which requires income equaling three times the gross rental. The creditworthiness and the determination of who would rent apartments was left solely with the resident manager. Stitzel demonstrated that many disabled people had lived in the apartment complex. Accommodations were made for people with disabilities by the manager and such costs for these accommodations were paid by Regency Place Apartments. The agency made a prima facie case of discrimination in that Leggitt is a handicapped person, who is otherwise qualified to rent the apartment, and suffered a loss of a housing opportunity, under circumstances which lead to an inference that Stitzel based its action solely upon her handicap. Evidence was presented that Regency Place Apartment's requirement of gross income equaling three times the monthly rent had not been satisfied by Leggitt's mother's agreement to contribute $550 per month. Leggitt's income was $281.34 per month. Three times the monthly rent was $1,140.00, thus rendering her income short by $308.66 per month. The motivation for rejecting the application was that the apartment which Leggitt wanted was not available and Leggitt did not have sufficient income to qualify. There was no evidence of a discriminatory motive on the part of Cutrona, Naylor, Stitzel, or Regency Place Apartments, other than conjecture. There was no evidence that suggests the reasons given were not true at the time the letters were written or that they were merely pretextual. Further, it did not appear from the evidence that any discriminatory motive was proven. There was nothing in the evidence that proves that Leggitt's legal blindness was a cause of the rejection of her application. There was no evidence of any act or conduct which would suggest discriminatory conduct or a discriminatory animus by any of the persons named as Respondents in the Administrative Charge. Taken as a whole, the credible evidence indicated that the sole basis for rejecting Leggitt's application was the unavailability of the unit that she requested, and her failure to satisfy management of her financial ability to meet the financial requirements of Regency Place Apartments. Although Leggitt testified as to her inconvenience caused by the denial of her application, there was no evidence of any quantifiable damages presented at the hearing. In the Conclusions of Law, it was determined that the Motion to Dismiss should have and was granted on the grounds that the Respondent agency failed to comply with the statutory time requirements: Under the Federal Fair Housing Amendments Act, "the Secretary shall make an investigation of the alleged discriminatory housing practice and complete such investigation within 100 days after filing of the Complaint . . . unless it is impracticable to do so." 42 U.S.C. s 3610(a)(1)(B)(iv). The statute also provides that if "the Secretary is unable to complete the investigation within 100 days" after complainant files the complaint, the Secretary "shall notify the complainant and respondent in writing of the reasons for not doing so." 42 U.S.C. s. 3610(a)(1)(c). This same provision is found in the Florida Fair Housing Act. See Section 760.34, Florida Statutes (1995), and Chapter 60Y-7, Florida Administrative Code. The Florida Administrative Code provides as follows: "Section 60Y-7004(8)(b) If the Commission is unable to complete its investigation within 100 days, it shall notify the complainant and respondent in writing of the reasons for not doing so." Section 60Y-7.004(10) The Commission will make final administrative deposition of a complaint within one year of the date of receipt of the complaint, unless it is impracticable to do so. If the Commission is unable to do so, it shall notify the complainant and respondent in writing of the reasons for not doing so." It is undisputed in this case that the Respondent agency did not file its determination until August 28, 1996, over three and one-half years from the time Leggitt filed her complaint. It is also undisputed that the Respondent agency never notified Petitioner, or the other parties, that it would be unable to complete the investigation within 100 days as required by statute. Nor did it notify Stitzel in writing why an administrative disposition of a Complaint had not been made within one year of receipt of the Complaint. Petitioner established that the Respondent agency violated the statutory time limits and that the three and one- half year delay in filing the Respondent agency's Notice of Probable Cause caused the proceedings to be impaired and was to Petitioner's extreme prejudice. At the attorney's fee hearing, Respondent agency offered no testimony or other evidence as to the cause for the extreme delay in the filing of the Administrative Charge, or the rationale for filing the Charge two and one-half years after the expiration of the statutory deadline for filing said charges. At the attorney's fees hearing, Respondent agency offered no testimony or other evidence as to why it claimed to be substantially justified in finding probable cause and filing the Administrative Charge. The Petitioner, demonstrated that, at the time the matter was initiated, Regency Place Apartments was a business operating as a limited partnership and that Robert Stitzel was the general partner; that the principal place of business was in Florida; and that it did not have more than 25 full-time employees. Petitioner retained counsel to defend it on the charges contained in the Notice of Determination, Cause and Issuance of an Administrative Charge, and Petitioner was the prevailing small business party. Counsel for Petitioner expended 76 hours on this matter, not including time expended on the Petition for Attorney's Fees or time expended following his appearance before the Commission prior to the issuance of the final order. Counsel's billing for Petitioner's time at an hourly rate of $200 is reasonable in this case. The Petitioner's billable costs of $609.75 are reasonable.
