The Issue Whether Petitioner is entitled to additional credit for his answer to Item 264 on the "Principles and Practice" part of the October 1993 Fire Protection Engineer Examination.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner applied for licensure as a Fire Protection Engineer with Respondent, the state agency responsible for the licensure of Fire Protection Engineers in Florida. Petitioner was required to successfully complete an examination administered by the Respondent to become licensed as a Fire Protection Engineer. Petitioner sat for the licensing examination for Fire Protection Engineer administered by Respondent on October 29 and 30, 1993. A score of 70 is required to pass the "Principles and Practice" part of the licensure examination. Petitioner received a score of 66.30 on that part of the examination, which is a failing grade. Item 264 is a question for which a completely correct answer would have been awarded 10 points. Item 264 contained a diagram of a building and required the applicants to properly space heat or smoke detectors in the building and to justify the type of detection device used in a particular area. Petitioner was awarded a total of four points for his partially correct answer to Item 264. Petitioner would have passed the "Principles and Practice" portion of the examination had he been awarded eight or more points for his answer to Item 264. At Petitioner's request, his response to Item 264 was regraded by the National Council of Examiners for Engineering and Surveying (NCEES), a consulting firm utilized by Respondent to develop and score licensure examinations. When Petitioner's response to the exam was initially scored, he received a score of 4 points. The regrading of the examination did not change that score. The report prepared by NCEES in conjunction with the regrading of Petitioner's answer to Item 264 stated the following 1/ in explaining the score awarded for Petitioner's answer: The examinee did not reference the NFPA 72 A, D, and E standards 2/ to answer the question. The lounge area requires heat detectors rather than smoke detectors. The smoke detectors would be sending false alarms and they would be disconnected to stop the alarms. The heat detectors would be more reliable. The examinee's solution did not show detectors in the corridor, locker room, and boiler room; all of which are required. The examinee's solution did not space the detectors according to NFPA 72. According to the NCEES approved scoring plan, the examinee's solution demonstrates less than minimum competence (score of 4 points). Pursuant to the scoring standards that have been adopted, a score of four represents a borderline unqualified response, which is explained as being: Applicant has failed to demonstrate adequate knowledge in one or more categories. For example, approach may be correct but the solution is unreasonable. Significant constraints may have been overlooked. Solution is unacceptable, but marginally so. Petitioner's answer to Item 264 failed to properly space detectors in his answer, failed to place detectors in the corridor, locker room, and boiler room, and incorrectly placed smoke detectors in the lounge area instead of heat detectors. Petitioner did not establish that the standards used to score the examination were arbitrary, capricious, or devoid of logic. Petitioner did not establish that the application of those scoring standards to Petitioner's response to Item 264 was arbitrary, capricious, or devoid of logic. Item 264 is a reliable and valid test item. Respondent established that Petitioner's response to Item 264 was fairly graded. Petitioner is not entitled to additional credit for his response to Item 264.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Respondent enter a final order that adopts the findings of fact and the conclusions of law contained herein and which DENIES Petitioner's challenge to the scoring of his answer to Item 264 of the October 1993 Fire Protection Engineer Examination. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 10th day of November 1994. CLAUDE B. ARRINGTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of November 1994.
Findings Of Fact Based upon my observation of the witnesses and their demeanor while testifying, the documentary evidence submitted and the entire record complied herein, I hereby make the following Findings of Fact: Respondent, John Anthony Fantasia, is, and has been at all times material hereto, a certified air conditioning contractor in the State of Florida, having been issued license number CA C024378. Mr. Joseph Wilensky resides in a single family home at 1020 N.E. 160th Terrace in North Miami Beach, Florida. On December 23, 1983 there was a fire at Wilensky's home. The fire was primarily located in the basement near the oil heating unit, some type of electric heating device which utilized a heat strip and part of the central air conditioning unit. The air conditioning and heating systems all sustained damage in the fire. A few days after the fire, an insurance adjuster went to Wilensky's home and recommended a general contractor by the name of H. E. Nason. Nason inspected the damage at the Wilensky home and later sent Respondent over to inspect the damage for an estimate. Nason had previously used Respondent as a sub- contractor on other projects. The Respondent submitted a bid of $2,600 to Nason to install an air conditioning system with a heat strip in the Wilensky home. Thereafter, Nason entered into a contract with Wilensky to make the repairs and sub-contracted the entire job to Respondent. In January 1984, approximately one week after the contract was signed, Respondent, with the assistance of a single helper, removed the old air conditioning and heating units and installed a new central air conditioning/heating unit. Mr. Wilensky was at home while the work was performed. Wilensky observed the Respondent perform some of the work but did not watch Respondent the whole time. Wilensky was talking with his wife either in the dining room or in the kitchen when Respondent informed him that he had just finished with the switch and that the unit was "all set." Prior to installing the new unit, no work permits were pulled nor inspections called for by either Respondent or Mr. Nason. The Respondent believed that Nason, as general contractor, was obligated to pull all necessary work permits. The Respondent connected the new air conditioning/ heating unit to an electrical box which served as an on/off disconnect switch. The on/off disconnect switch was wired to the power source "ahead of the main." "Ahead of the main" is a term used in the electrical industry meaning that an apparatus is wired directly to a power source, by-passing the fuse box or main circuit breaker entirely. In this manner, the apparatus cannot be turned off from the fuse box. Such wiring violates the National Electrical Code, presents a serious hazard of fire and reflects gross negligence and incompetence. The evidence did not establish that the Respondent wired the on/off disconnect switch to the power source when he installed the new unit. There was at least an equal amount of credible evidence that the disconnect switch had been utilized with the previous unit and was in place prior to Respondent's installation work. Shortly after the unit was installed, Wilensky became dissatisfied because he believed that the unit was not heating or cooling properly and that his electricity bills were too high. Respondent returned to Mr. Wilensky's home on several occasions to do additional work on the unit, such as changing thermostats, in an attempt to satisfy Mr. Wilensky. Wilensky was not satisfied with the additional work performed by Respondent and their previously good relationship deteriorated rapidly. Wilensky called Florida Power & Light Company to complain about the high electric bills and an inspector went out to his home. The inspector informed Wilensky that the wiring leading to the air conditioning/heating unit was not done properly. On March 4, 1985, at the request of Mr. Wilensky, Benny Biscotti, an electrical building official for the City of North Miami Beach, performed an inspection at the Wilensky residence. In his inspection, Biscotti confirmed that the wiring leading to the air conditioning/heating unit was hooked up "ahead of the main." The wiring in Wilensky's home was corrected by AVI/AMEX Electric Company on January 16, 1986. The City of North Miami Beach has adopted the South Florida Building Code (SFBC). The SFBC required that a mechanical permit be obtained for the installation of the air conditioning/heating unit. The SFBC did not require an electrical permit in this instance because there was no showing that the installation of the unit required new permanent wiring or an alteration or change to the existing electrical system. The evidence did not establish that electrical upgrading (an increase in capacity for voltage and amperage) was required to accommodate the new air conditioning/heating unit.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law it is RECOMMENDED that the Amended Administrative Complaint filed herein be dismissed. DONE and ORDERED this 27th day of July, 1987 in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. W. MATTHEW STEVENSON Hearing Officer, Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 FILED with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of July, 1987. APPENDIX The following constitutes my specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on all of the Proposed Findings of Fact submitted by the parties to this case. Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by the Petitioner Adopted in Finding of Fact 2 Adopted in substance in Finding of Fact 2. Adopted in substance in Finding of Fact 3. Adopted in substance in Finding of Fact 5. Rejected as not supported by the weight of credible testimony. Adopted in Finding of Fact 5. Partially adopted in Finding of Fact 5. Adopted in Finding of Fact 5. Adopted in substance in Finding of Fact 5. Rejected as not established by the weight of the evidence. Adopted in substance in Finding of Fact 7. Partially adopted in Finding of Fact 5. Mr. Wilensky's testimony that he saw Respondent connect the switch to the fuse box is unpersuasive, particularly in view of the fact that he did not observe all of the work performed by Respondent, his admitted lack of knowledge of air conditioning and electrical matters and his intense negative feelings regarding Respondent resulting from this entire incident. Adopted in substance in Finding of Fact 5. Rejected as subordinate and/or unnecessary. Adopted in substance in Finding of Fact 8. Rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in substance in Finding of Fact 8. Rejected as subordinate and/or unnecessary. Adopted in substance in Finding of Fact 8. Rejected as not supported by credible evidence. Rejected as not supported by credible evidence. Rejected as subordinate and/or unnecessary. Adopted in substance in Finding of Fact 14. Adopted in Finding of Fact 13. Adopted in Finding of Fact 13. Adopted in Finding of Fact 13. Rejected as not supported by credible evidence. Biscotti's testimony that the wiring was "recent" was based on the history of the work related to him by Mr. Wilensky. Although Biscotti testified that it looked as if "recent work" had been done, the admitted that his opinion was primarily based on Wilensky's statement to him that Respondent had installed new wiring. Rejected as not established by the weight of the evidence. Rejected as not established by the weight of the evidence. Adopted in Finding of Fact 1. Adopted in substance in Finding of Fact 1. Adopted in substance in Finding of Fact 4. Rejected as not established by the weight of the evidence. Rejected as not contrary to the weight of the evidence. Addressed in Conclusion of Law section. Addressed in Conclusions of Law section. Adopted in Finding of Fact 6. Adopted in Finding of Fact 6. Adopted in Finding of Fact 6. Rejected as a recitation of testimony/evidence. Rejected as a recitation of testimony/evidence. Rejected as a recitation of testimony/evidence. Rejected as a recitation of testimony/evidence. Rejected as a recitation of testimony/evidence. Rejected as subordinate and/or unnecessary. Addressed in Procedural Background section. Addressed in Procedural Background section. Addressed in Procedural Background section. Rejected as subordinate. Rejected as subordinate. Rejected as subordinate. Rejected as subordinate. Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by the Respondent (The Respondent's Proposed Recommended Order is written in the form of Conclusions of Law only and includes no specific findings of fact upon which a ruling can be made.) COPIES FURNISHED: Gus Vincent Soto, Esq Joe Sole, Esq. Department of Professional Department of Professional Regulation Regulation 130 North Monroe Street 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, FL 32301 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0750 Edward Bringham, Esq. Fred Seely 25 West Flagler Street Executive Director City National Bank Bldg. Department of Professional Suite 933 Regulation Miami, FL 33130 P.O. Box 2 Jacksonville, FL 32201 Van Poole Secretary Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0750
Findings Of Fact In February, 1990, Respondent Paul Muniz (Muniz), was a duly appointed member of the City of Cape Coral Contractors' Regulatory Board (Board). He was appointed to the Board in 1986. As a member of the Board, Muniz was subject to the provisions of Chapter 112, Part III, Florida Statutes. A scheduled meeting of the Board took place on February 28, 1990, at which time two cases were heard concerning allegedly inappropriate actions by general contractor David Tracey doing business as Tracey Construction, Inc. (Tracey Construction). On February 28, 1990, the Board had authority to hold hearings on alleged violations of the City of Cape Coral's (City) Building Codes, authority to suspend, deny or revoke a contractor's license to operate within the City for violations of the City's Building Codes, and authority to impose fines up to $2,500.00, to issue reprimands, and to order restitution for violations of the City's Building Codes. On February 28, 1990, Muniz and his wife were the sole stockholders, officers, and directors of Delta T Air Conditioning Inc. (Delta T). Muniz owned 75 percent of Delta T's stock. Delta T does heating, ventilating, and heating construction work and services and some refrigeration work. Muniz oversees the work of Delta T, does the estimating and acts as general manager of the company. Muniz usually knows where Delta T's job sites are and who the general contractor is on each job. Tracey Construction is a residential construction company owned by David G. Tracey. Delta T has subcontracted with Tracey Construction to do air conditioning work on a number of occasions prior to February 28, 1990. Delta T had routinely subcontracted with Tracey Construction for several years before February, 1990. Over a number of years prior to February 28, 1990, Delta T had subcontracted with Tracey Construction on more than 200 jobs. Delta T was a subcontractor for Tracey Construction on about 50 jobs from 1989 through 1990. Tracey Construction paid Delta T more than $50,000 for air conditioning subcontractor work in 1989. In 1990, Tracey Construction paid Delta T at least $30,295.60 for air conditioning work. In the course of dealings between Delta T and Tracey Construction, Muniz depended on David Tracey to notify him of potential jobs and invite his company to bid on that job. Delta T competes with other air condition companies for Tracey Construction's business. At the February 28, 1990 Board meeting, two cases came before the Board concerning David Tracey and Tracey Construction: Contractor Board Case Nos. 90-01 and 90-02. Muniz recommended to the Board that they table Case No. 90-01. In Case No. 90-02, Muniz seconded a motion to find David Tracey and Tracey Construction not guilty of the alleged violation of the building code. Muniz voted in both cases to acquit Mr. David Tracey and Tracey Construction of all charges. At the time of the February 28, 1990, Board meeting, Delta T had contracts with Tracey Construction for at least seven jobs. On each of these jobs, either the air conditioning work had been begun but not yet completed, or the work had been completed and final payment had not yet been made by Tracey Construction. Muniz was aware that his company had active contracts with Tracey Construction. Muniz did not file a written conflict of interest form until 28 days after the February 28, 1990 Board meeting. Muniz did not disclose his company's business relationship with Tracey Construction prior to participating in the discussion of and voting on Case Nos. 90-01 and 90-02. Muniz is the same Paul Muniz as is mentioned in Commission on Ethics Opinion No. 91-3.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order and Public Report be entered finding that Paul Muniz violated Sections 112.3143(2)(b), and (3), Florida Statutes; imposing a civil penalty of $750 for each violation (a total of $1500); and issuing a public censure and reprimand. DONE AND ENTERED this 31st day of October, 1994, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. SUSAN B. KIRKLAND Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of October, 1994. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 93-5806EC To comply with the requirements of Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes (1993), the following rulings are made on the parties' proposed findings of fact: Advocate's Proposed Findings of Fact. Paragraphs 1-19: Accepted. Paragraphs 20-23: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 24: Rejected as unnecessary detail. Paragraph 25: Rejected as irrelevant since the facts established that Muniz did not file a conflict of interest form within the time frames established in Sections 112.3143(2)(b) and (3). Paragraph 26: Rejected as unnecessary. Paragraph 27: The first sentence is rejected as constituting argument. The remainder is rejected as subordinate to the facts actually found. Paragraph 28: Rejected as constituting argument. Paragraph 29: Rejected as subordinate to the facts actually found. Paragraphs 30: The first sentence is accepted in substance. The second sentence is rejected as constituting argument. Paragraph 31: Accepted. Paragraph 32: The last sentence is rejected as subordinate to the facts found. The remainder is accepted in substance. Paragraph 33: Rejected as subordinate to the facts found. Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact. Paragraphs 1a-1q: Accepted. Paragraphs 2a-2f: Rejected as recitation of testimony. Paragraph 3a: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 3b: Accepted in substance to the extent that there was no evidence presented which established that Delta T and Tracey Construction had entered into a formal continuing contract; however the evidence did establish that Delta T and Tracey Construction had routinely done business together prior to February 28, 1990. Paragraph 3c: Accepted in substance to the extent that there was no evidence presented that Paul Muniz had a contract with Tracey Construction; however the evidence did establish that the company, of which Paul Muniz owned 75 percent, did have a contractual relationship with Tracey Construction. Paragraph 3d: Rejected as immaterial. Paragraph 3e: Rejected to the extent that there would have been no affect on Delta T's business and rejected that there would have been little impact on Delta T's business as immaterial. Paragraphs 3f-3g: Rejected as immaterial since the Board did have the authority to do so. Paragraph 3h: Rejected as immaterial because the Board had the authority to suspend or revoke the license. Paragraph 3i: Rejected as immaterial because the Board had the authority to do so. Paragraph 3j: Rejected as not supported by the greater weight of the evidence. See 3i above. Paragraph 3k: Rejected as constituting argument. Paragraph 3l: Rejected as constituting a conclusion of law. Paragraph 3m-3q: Rejected as not supported by the greater weight of the evidence. COPIES FURNISHED: Stuart F. Wilson-Patton Assistant Attorney General Advocate for the Florida Commission on Ethics Office of the Attorney General The Capitol, PL-01 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 John Charles Coleman, Esquire 2300 McGregor Boulevard Post Office Box 2089 Fort Myers, Florida 33902-2089 Bonnie Williams Executive Director Florida Commission On Ethics Post Office Drawer 15709 Tallahassee, Florida 32317-5709 Phil Claypool, Esquire General Counsel Ethics Commission 2822 Remington Green Circle, Suite 101 Post Office Drawer 15709 Tallahassee, Florida 32317-5709
Findings Of Fact On February 16, 1977, Joe Hodges, an inspector in petitioner's employ, inspected respondent's premises in the normal course of his duties. On a form styled "Public Food Service Inspection Record," Mr. Hodges noted that respondent's refrigerators lacked thermometers; that the dishwasher needed a new temperature gauge; that a screen door opening onto the outside from the kitchen was not in good repair; that the employees' restroom had no soap and towels and had a window screen in need of repair; that the surfaces of some work tables were not smooth; that the employees' hair restraints were ineffective; and that there were many roaches. After this inspection, respondent Laramore acquired thermometers for the refrigerators, caused the area outside the premises to be cleaned, put soap and towels in the employees' restroom and caused the restroom window screen to be repaired. On March 22, 1977, Mr. Hodges returned to respondent's premises, inspected again and issued a formal directive to respondent to exterminate roaches, clean the kitchen floors, repair certain nozzles on the dishwasher, clean certain equipment, store food elsewhere than on the floor of the walk-in refrigerator, lower the temperature in certain refrigerators, provide additional refrigerator thermometers, repair the lining of a freezer lid, and furnish effective hair restraints to employees. On the following day, respondent contacted Larry Farris of Panhandle Pest Control, who regularly sprayed the restaurant for bugs, and asked him to take whatever extra steps were necessary to exterminate the roaches. On the same day, respondent contacted Easom Plumbing Company and arranged for the dishwasher to be repaired. The screen door was fixed, although it was broken subsequently by men using dollies to deliver supplies. Respondent caused the freezer lining to be replaced, certain table tops to be sanded down, a sink drain to be repaired, and the entire kitchen to be steam cleaned. On March 21, 1977, Mr. Hodges returned to respondent's premises and filled out a call back inspection report which listed the items set forth in the notice to show cause, petitioner's exhibit No. 1. On December 30, 1977, together with Mr. George Parish, Mr. Hodges made another visit to respondent's premises. Mr. Parish and Mr. Hodges found roaches, a torn screen on the back door, dirty equipment and a refrigerator containing salad and pastries stored at a temperature of 56-60 degrees. Mr. Parish saw live German cockroaches in many places, notably near an oven no longer used for cooking. This oven, certain other equipment, aswell as dish and pot storage shelves were dirty and needed to be cleaned. Mr. Parish noticed roach excrement caked alongside one of the tables in the kitchen. Mr. Parish and Mr. Hodges found that the sink drain leak had been fixed. They perceived no deficiency in respondent's employees' hair restraints, even though these did not differ significantly from restraints used in the spring of 1977. They also found that respondent's dishwasher had been repaired. At the time of the inspection on December 30, 1977, the dishwasher operator, who was washing one load after another, made a wash cycle last two and a half minutes and followed up with a rinse cycle lasting a minute and a half. The dishwasher contained a hot water heater to boost the temperature of the water used for washing and rinsing dishes in the machine. Although this was in good working order, the dishwasher was being operated with a rinse water temperature of only 172 degrees. The normal wash cycle is 30 seconds and the rinse cycle normally lasts only 12 seconds. With repeated loads of dishes and abnormally long cycles, the water used for dishes in later loads does not reach the same high temperature as at first.
Recommendation Upon consideration of the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That petitioner assess a civil penalty against respondent in the amount of one hundred dollars ($100.00). DONE and ENTERED this 31st day of January 1978, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT T. BENTON, II Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Mr. Lawrence D. Winson, Esquire The Johns Building 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32304 Mr. Herman D. Laramore, Esquire Post Office Box 793, Courthouse Marianna, Florida 32446
Findings Of Fact Petitioner Scott Eric Baker ("Petitioner"), took the Certified Air Conditioning Class A Contractor examination in June 1991. The examination consists of two parts, Part One on business and financial management, and Part Two on actual air conditioning system mechanics. The Petitioner informally challenged the scoring of certain questions and received additional points but his total score of 68% was below the minimum passing score of 69.01%. Part One, Question 6 of the June 1991 directs the applicant to estimate the cost of refrigeration piping and related hardware shown in a related schematic. The schematic illustrates proposed refrigerant piping between a 15 ton air-cooled condensing unit and an air handler unit. Pipe joint connections are identified by standard symbols. The question states as follows: Refer to the Refrigeration System shown in Figure 1. Estimate the cost of the Refrigeration Piping. Add 6% Florida State Sales Tax to the total cost. The multiple choice list of possible answers to the question are: Less than $500.00. (B) Between $500.00 and $600.00 (C) Between $600.01 and $700.00 (D) More than $700.00 The pipe joint segments identified by the symbols on the schematic are 90-degree elbow joints. Elbow joints can connect pipe segments which have different elevations. Elbow joints can also be connected to construct a "swing joint" which provides for pipe alignment. Swing joints do not change the elevation between the pipe segments connected at the joint. According to the schematic, the first pipe segments, (two feet two inch pipes), run from the air-cooled condensing unit to a joint. The schematic does not identify the elevation of the air-cooled condensing unit or of the first pipe segments. The second pipe segments lie at an elevation of 104 feet 4 inches and connect via a pipe joint to the third pipe segments, which lie at an elevation of 104 feet 0 inches. The third segments connect via a pipe joint to the fourth pipe segments which are at an elevation of 103 feet 8 inches. The fourth segments connect to the pipe segments leading from the air handling unit (AHU 1). The correct answer to Question 6 is (B). The total cost for piping and hardware shown on the schematic is approximately $557. There are 83.3333 lineal feet of 1 and 3/8 inch diameter pipe at $3.96 per lineal foot, totaling about $330.00. There are 75.7527 lineal feet of 7/8 inch diameter pipe at $2.35 per lineal foot, totaling about $178.02. There are fourteen 90-degree elbows, (seven 1 and 3/8 inch elbows at 1.71 each and seven 7/8 inch elbows at .79 each) totaling 17.50. The total of materials is 525.52. Inclusion of the 6% tax results in an estimated cost of $557.05. Because there was no elevation shown for the first pipe segment between the condenser unit and the pipe joint, the Petitioner assumed that the pipe joint symbol indicated an elevation change and that the condenser unit could be located substantially above or below the identified 104 feet 0 inches elevation of the second segment. Accordingly, his answer to Question 6 was "(D) More than $700.00." The Petitioner's answer is based, not on the information provided in the schematic, but on unreasonable assumptions as to the condenser unit location, and is incorrect.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Department of Professional Regulation, Construction Industry Licensing Board, enter a Final Order dismissing Scott Eric Baker's challenge to the grading of his responses to the June 1991 examination for licensure as a Certified Air Conditioning Class A Contractor. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 29th day of April, 1992, in Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM F. QUATTLEBAUM Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of April, 1992. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER The following constitute rulings on proposed findings of facts submitted by the parties. Petitioner The Petitioner's proposed findings of fact are accepted as modified and incorporated in the Recommended Order except as follows: 4. Rejected, unnecessary. 10-14. Rejected, recitation of testimony. Respondent The Respondent did not file a proposed recommended order. Copies furnished to: Daniel O'Brien, Executive Director Construction Industry Licensing Board Post Office Box 2 Jacksonville, FL 32202 Jack McRay, General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0792 Scott Eric Baker 13438 Caribbean Boulevard Fort Myers, Florida 33095 Vytas J. Urba, Esq. Assistant General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street, Suite 60 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792
Findings Of Fact The Respondent, Mary Anne Shiell, is a licensed real estate salesman holding license No. 0044116. The Petitioner, the Department of Professional Regulation, Board of Real Estate, is an agency of the State of Florida, having jurisdiction over licensing and the regulation of licensure status of real estate salesmen. This dispute arose out of a business transaction involving the showing by the Respondent and others of a piece of residential real property to the complaining witnesses, William G. and Geraldine Fellows (son and mother). On March 6, 1979, the Respondent, Juanda Marsh and Skip Mark were employed as real estate salesmen by Mannix, Inc. On that day Juanda Marsh, while attempting to find residential property listings, became aware of a home owned by Paul E. Phipps and his wife which was for sale. After talking to the owners of the house, Mr. and Mrs. Phipps, Ms. Marsh went back to the Mannix realty office where she spoke to the Respondent and advised the Respondent of the Phippses' home being for sale. Ms. Marsh then met the complaining witnesses, the Fellowses, and took them to meet Mr. Phipps at the home in question. This was late in the afternoon of March 6, 1979, and the electricity had been turned off in the home. Mr. Phipps was then in the process of wallpapering and painting the dwelling, which he used as rental property. After leaving the home that evening, the complainants decided to offer the Phippses $37,000 for the property. The complainants and Ms. Marsh prepared the contract, which was executed that evening by the complainants. The sellers executed the contract the following day, and the transaction was closed March 15, 1979. The complainants did not take possession of the premises until sometime in April of 1979. On March 6, 1979, when the complainants first viewed the premises, the Respondent, Marsh, Mark, as well as Phipps, the seller, were present. The complainant addressed the group of people generally, asking what kind of condition the roof was in. All concerned looked toward Mr. Phipps; he nodded his head, assenting that the roof was in good condition. There was a general agreement that the house appeared to be in good condition. Neither the Respondent nor Ms. Marsh nor Skip Mark had any additional knowledge regarding the condition of the house other than that which they saw that day in the presence of the complainants. All were seeing it for the first time. The Respondent did not give any assurance to the complainants that the roof was in good condition; she relied, as did all present, on the assurance given by Mr. Phipps at the time. Immediately prior to the drafting of the contract on that evening, the complainants were advised by the Respondent that if an "as is" clause were placed in the contract it might induce the seller to accept the lower offer which the complainants had in mind, and the complainants agreed. Accordingly, Ms. Marsh inserted in the contract the "as is" clause on the face of the contract, meaning that the purchasers, the Fellowses, would buy the property in the condition it was in at the time for the price they were offering and which, ultimately, the owner accepted. Prior to the closing of the transaction, the Fellowses called the Respondent by telephone to ascertain that all checks had been made pursuant to the Buyer Protection Plan and the Respondent advised that she thought everything was in good working condition, but she would attempt to inspect the premises to ascertain for sure if all equipment and appliances were working. The Respondent attempted to make an inspection of the premises a day or two before closing and there was no electricity or water turned on so that the various appliances could not be tested. She informed the complainants of this, but they said they could not afford to have the utilities turned on. The Respondent then called Mr. Phipps and explained the situation to him. She asked if he was in a position to tell the complainants what condition everything was in and he told her that so far as he knew the only thing in the house that might not function properly was the dishwasher. Mr. Phipps told the Respondent that the air conditioner functioned properly and indeed the vents were in the walls or ceiling and appeared to be in order. The Respondent looked in the oven door of the range in the kitchen and the oven element appeared to be in good condition, although it was impossible to test it because the utilities were not on. The Respondent removed the kitchen range elements and visually inspected them. Again, no electricity was available to test them after this fact had been disclosed to the complainants. Upon taking possession of the property in April, 1979, the complainants discovered certain defects consisting of: a leaky roof; duct work missing from the air conditioning system; the oven was inoperable; the range had several inoperative elements; the plumbing in the toilets leaked; the hot water heater was inoperable; and the disposal was not connected. Witness Ralph Porch inspected the air conditioning system and found that no duct work existed in the hall ceiling to connect the air conditioning system to the mechanical unit. He did not try to turn on the air conditioner. He did recall seeing the air supply grills and stated that the only way one could find out that there were no ducts in place was to climb up in the attic and look; that it was not a defect observable from the normal living areas of the house. The Respondent, in addition to inspecting the kitchen appliances, inspected but saw no evidence of a mineral deposit or other symptoms of leaks around the toilets. Mr. Phipps had represented that the hot water heater was not very old and so the Respondent had no reason to believe that the hot water heater was inoperable. She looked beneath the sink to examine the garbage disposal and did not notice any pipes or electrical wiring absent. The complainants maintained that the Respondent represented to them that the electricity had been turned on for one day and that all the appliances had been checked out and were in working order. The Hearing Officer finds this testimony not credible inasmuch as the Respondent testified that she had never made such a representation, but rather had visually inspected them to the best of her ability with no electricity available to actually test the functioning of the appliances, which testimony was corroborated by the testimony of Bernice Shackleford from the Orlando Utilities Commission, who established that the electricity was turned off March 5, 1979, the day before the property was first shown to the Fellowses and to the Respondent. Ms. Shackleford also testified that the utilities were inactive continuously until April 20, 1979, long after the closing and long after the alleged inspection of the appliances took place. The undersigned thus finds that the Respondent never represented to the Fellowses that the electricity had been turned on for a day, nor that she had thus tested the appliances and found them all in working order. The Respondent did not make any statement to the effect that the roof did or did not leak. A reasonable inspection of the residence would not disclose that the air conditioning vents or air supply grills were not connected by ducts to the mechanical portion of the air conditioning system. Subsequent to their taking possession of the house and initially complaining to the Respondent and Mannix, Inc., concerning the defects in the dwelling, the complainants filed a civil action regarding their complaints. The complainants sued the Phippses, who were the sellers; Juanda Marsh; Mannix, Inc.; the Respondent; and Electronic Realty Associates, Inc. Although the complainants denied settlement of the case, in their testimony in the instant proceeding, the civil litigation was in fact dismissed by their attorney (see Notice of Voluntary Dismissal; Respondent's Exhibit A). In that civil action, only Juanda Marsh and Skip Mark were alleged to have made false representations to the complainants. In summary, the Respondent was not shown to have had any knowledge regarding the condition of the premises which she failed to reveal to the complainants and sometime after the controversy arose, the Respondent offered, on behalf of Mannix, Inc., to purchase the property back from the complainants for what they had paid for it, but this offer was rejected.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the evidence in the record, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses and the pleadings and arguments of counsel, it is, therefore, RECOMMENDED that the Administrative Complaint filed herein against Mary Anne Shiell be dismissed. DONE AND ENTERED this 29th day of July, 1982, at Tallahassee, Florida. P. MICHAEL RUFF Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 FILED with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of July, 1982. COPIES FURNISHED: Joseph Doherty, Esquire 3220 Chelsea Street Orlando, Florida 32803 Charles N. Prather, Esquire 17 South Lake Avenue, Suite 103 Orlando, Florida 32801 Frederick H. Wilsen, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation 400 West Robinson Street Orlando, Florida 32801 C. B. Stafford, Executive Director Florida Real Estate Commission Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802 Samuel R. Shorstein, Secretary Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the evidence presented, including the demeanor and credibility of the witnesses, the following facts are determined: [NATURE OF OCEANSPRAY'S CITRUS PROCESSING PLANT OPERATIONS] OCEANSPRAY owns and operates a citrus concentrate processing plant in Vero Beach, Florida. The plant processes grapefruit received from local growers into grapefruit concentrate which is stored and later transported elsewhere for further processing, distribution, and sale to the public. During 1978, the plant also produced livestock feed as a by-product of the citrus concentrate process. (Testimony of Childs, Henly.) The business operates on a seasonal basis. Ordinarily, the plant begins processing operations in October or November, when the first grapefruit begin to arrive. As the grapefruit season progresses and fruit becomes more plentiful, additional shifts are added and more employees hired. Finally, as the growing season ends and grapefruit becomes less available, the cycle reverses itself: the number of shifts are reduced, and employees are laid off. The fruit processing season normally ends in June or July. Since fruit processing machinery will not be operated again until the next October or November, machine operators are ordinarily laid-off. The only employees that ordinarily remain employed, on a year-round basis, are mechanics, security guards, janitors, And certain key personnel of the company. (Testimony of Childs, Henly, Calfee.) I. [UNEQUAL PAY AND RECLASSIFICATION OF FEMALES AS GENERAL PAINTERS] Instead of laying-off all machine operators at the close of the fruit processing season in July, 1978, OCEANSPRAY retained several seasonal employees during the summer off-season. These employees, with their seasonal and summer job classifications, and salaries are indicated below: E Males: Job Classification Hourly Salary Job Classification Hourly Salary Willie Billie Alford Production Leadman Norsworthy Assistant 4.35 3.85 Extractor Operator Assistant 4.35 3.05 Extractor Operator Extractor Operator Floyd Brennan Ramp Driver Johnny Norsworthy Extractor 4.45 4.10 Ramp Driver Extractor 4.45 4.10 Operator Don Thompson Limer 3.65 Operator Limer 3.65 Richard Oliver Dryer Operator 4.10 Dryer Operator 4.10 Ann Pyle Taste Evapo- 4.10 rotor Operator General Painter 3.65 2/ Jennie Gilyard Waste Heat 4.10 General Painter 3.65 2/ EMPLOYEE SEASONAL SUMMER Women: Evaporator Operator 4.10 General Painter 3.65 2/ 4.10 General Painter 3.65 2/ 3.25 General Painter 3.65 2/ 4.10 General Pointer 3.65 2/ Elaine Rinker Waste Heat Evaporator Operator Katherine Hughes Waste Heat Evaporator Operator Veronica McCarty Outside Grader Ruby Simpson Waste Heat Evaporator Operator (Testimony of Childs, Hill; P.E. 2, 5, 6, 9.) At OCEANSPRAY, hourly employees are paid salaries in accordance with job classifications established by the company. During the summer of 1978, the six (6) seasonal male employees retained their seasonal job classifications and salaries; the females did not. The six (6) females were placed in a new classification established by the company--General Painter--and paid a salary of $3.65 an hour. 2 For five (5) of the six (6) females, this represented a cut in pay from their seasonal salaries. (Testimony of Childs, Hill; P.E. 2, 5, 6, 9.) Although the six (6) male employees retained their seasonal job classifications and salaries, their work duties during the summer of 1978 did not conform to their job classification. Alford, classified as Production Leadman, worked as a painter; B. Norsworthy, classified as Assistant Extractor Operator, worked as a painter; Brennan, classified as Ramp Driver, worked as a mechanic; J. Norsworthy, classified as an Extractor Operator, worked as a painter; Thompson, classified as a Limer, worked as a Spray Field Attendant; Oliver, classified as Dryer Operator, worked as a mechanic. In contrast, the six (6) female employees were reclassified as General Painters, and painted walls, buildings, and plant equipment. (Testimony of Childs, Hill; P.E. 2, 5, 6, 9.) The three (3) male employees who worked primarily as painters during the summer--Alford, D. Norsworthy, and J. Norsworthy (for only part of the summer) --painted loading bins and elevators outside the buildings using a scaffold 25-30 feet high. The scaffold, consisting of one-inch pipe, required assembly, had no hand-rails, and was not very steady. The six (6) females painted bins, machinery, and walls inside the plant and at ground level. Vern Dost, the Cold Room Operator, frequently performed similar inside painting after completing his primary work as Cold Room Operator. When he performed such painting, he was paid his regular Cold Room Operator salary-- $4.00 an hour. Alford and the Norsworthys also performed inside painting, similar to that performed by the females, when rain interfered with their outside scaffold painting. (Testimony of Childs, Hill, Gilyard, Pyle.) When several female painters, including Ms. Gilyard, complained that their salaries were less than those paid the male painters, the plant manager told them that if they wanted to paint on the scaffold, they would get the same rate as the men, i.e. their seasonal salaries. This offer was refused by Ms. Gilyard; it was not extended to Ms. Pyle. The only difference between the painting performed by the females, and the scaffold painters was the increased danger associated with painting at 25- 30 foot elevations. However, no separate job classification was established for scaffold painting. (Testimony of Childs, Hill, Gilyard, Pyle.) Alford and 13. Norsworthy, the primary scaffold painters, were initially retained for summer employment "to do whatever . . . we (management) wanted them to do" (Tr. 150) The job that was later assigned them, and which ultimately took most of their time, was the painting of the bin posts. (Testimony of Childs.) When Ms. Gilyard and Ms. Pyle initially sought summer employment, OCEANSPRAY did not inform them that they could retain their seasonal salaries if they were willing to paint from scaffolds. (Testimony of Pyle, Gilyard.) OCEANSPRAY's actions in cutting the salaries of five (5) of six (6) female summer workers, and continuing the male employees at their seasonal salaries prompted the company's accountant/bookkeeper to send to the plant manager a memorandum containing the following excerpt: [it] doesn't seem fair that women went to painter and Billy Norsworthy, Richard Oliver and Don Thompson stayed at their season rate. What do they get ad- justed to?" (Tr. 425.) (Testimony of Calfee.) Between July 30, 1978, and September 3, 1978, Ms. Gilyard worked 247 hours for OCEANSPRAY as a General Painter at $3.65 an hour. After receiving a rate adjustment on September 10, 1978, she was paid $3.85 an hour from September 4, 1978, for 287.5 hours, extending through October 21, 1978. If her seasonal salary of $4.10 had been paid during this period, she would have received an additional $183.03. In like fashion, Ms. Pyle worked 135.5 hours at $3.65 an hour as a General Painter at OCEANSPRAY from July 30, 1978, through September 3, 1978. From September 4 through October 21, 1978, she was paid $3.85 an hour for 335.5 hours. If she had been paid during this time at her seasonal salary of $4.10 an hour, she would have received an additional $144.86. (P.E. 4.) II. [UNEQUAL LAYOFF POLICY AND HOURS] From May through July, 1978, as grapefruit became less available, OCEANSPRAY reduced its-three fruit processing shifts to one, and laid off certain seasonal employees. On some days, no fruit would arrive, and fruit processing employees would perform other work, such as maintenance and cleanup. On other days, grapefruit concentrate would be reprocessed for subsequent shipment. Such reprocessing consisted of dumping juice from barrels, then blending and rebarreling it. A forklift is used to pick up the barrels and place them on rollers, where they are conveyed into a tilt mechanism. The barrels are then strapped or chained and, by hydraulic mechanism, are tilted and dumped. One person would normally operate the forklift, while others would perform the other related tasks. This reprocessing of grapefruit concentrate is of medium physical difficulty, and not beyond the physical capabilities of female employees. (Testimony of Childs, Gilyard.) During this three-month slump period, George Dest, the plant manager, decided which employees would be laid off and which would remain. His selections were ordinarily based on seniority. However, he departed from this policy by retaining "key people" to work during reprocessing days. "Key people" were those employees holding two principle jobs in fruit processing-- evaporator operators, extractor operators, lab technicians, and dryer operators for the feedmill. Such "key people" were retained on full employment during fruit reprocessing days. Although Ms. Pyle and Ms. Gilyard were Evaporator Operators and considered "key people", they were not retained for employment on reprocessing days. OCEANSPRAY asserts that the reason for their exclusion is that neither was qualified to operate a forklift. It is true that no female employees during this period of 1978 were qualified to operate a forklift. (Testimony of Childs, Gilyard, Pyle, Hill, Rinker, Hughes, Williams.) Ms. Pyle and Ms. Gilyard were not called in for reprocessing work because of OCEANSPRAY's plant manager's decision to "keep the guys because . . . they would be dumping barrels." (Tr. 137.) While the manager did not mention Ms. Pyle and Ms. Gilyard by name, he told his subordinate: "Let the girls be off and bring guys in." (Tr. 138.)(Testimony of Childs.) 14.. OCEANSPRAY's weekly pay records for the weeks of April 9 through July 16, 1978, indicate that the average weekly number of hours worked by male employees consistently exceeded the average weekly hours worked by females. (Testimony of Calfee; P.E. 5, 12.) Ms. WILLIAMS admits that she was selected not to work on certain days during the shipping period based on her seniority. (Testimony of Williams.] After July 1, 1978, due to their exclusion from fruit reprocessing Ms. Pyle and Ms. Gilyard worked less weekly hours than the average number worked by male employees. If they had worked hours equivalent to the average number worked by male employees, Ms. Pyle would have received an additional $27.68, and Ms. Gilyard, an additional $22.55. (Testimony of Calfee; P.E. 4.) III. [UNEQUAL WAGES] During 1978, out of a workforce of 150 employees (100 males, 50 females), OCEANSPRAY paid three male employees at a rate in excess of the rate corresponding with their official job classifications: Employee Official Job Classification Rate for Job Classification Pay Rate Received Floyd Brennan Ramp Driver $3.75 $4.45 Bill Ware lead Mechanic 4.85 5.40 Willie Alford Extractor Operator 4.10 4.30 No female employees at OCEANSPRAY were paid, in like fashion, amounts in excess of the rates warranted by their job classifications. (Testimony of Calfee, Hill; P.E. 2, 3, 4.) However, in two of the three cases listed above, the employees received pay which was justified by new or additional assigned duties. Brennan discharged the duties of a Fruit Leadman, in addition to those of a Ramp Driver. Indeed, "Rec. leadman" is noted on Brennan's payroll record. In the case of Alford, he was promoted to Production Leadman in June of 1978. His new and different responsibilities were assumed due to the vacancy in the Production department caused by the promotion of Hill to Production Supervisor. (Testimony of Hill; P.E. 2, 4, 9.) In the remaining case, Ware was promoted to Lead Mechanic in July of 1978--with a job classification pay rate of $4.85 an hour. However, he was paid the proposed higher future rate for that classification--$5.40 two months before its effective date. This admitted overpayment was caused by OCEANSPRAY's inadvertent error. (Testimony of Hill.) Numerically equivalent treatment of OCEANSPRAY's male and female employees--with a work force of two males to one female--would allow two males and one female to receive pay in excess of their official job classifications. In this case, OCEANSPRAY's slight disparity in treatment of males and females is not statistically significant and is insufficient to establish a prima facie claim of discrimination, or disparate treatment. Numerically equivalent treatment, for all practical purposes, would be achieved if only one additional female, or one less male employee, had received pay in excess of their official job classifications; such equivalency would preclude a bona fide disparate treatment claim. (Testimony of Hill, Calfee.) IV. [AS TO MOTION FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION] No evidence was presented which establishes that OCEANSPRAY's alleged unlawful employment practices continued beyond the summer of 1978. The Human Rights Act does not apply to employment practices which occurred prior to its effective date-- July 1, 1978. Thus, the time period within which the membership of potential classes must vest is limited. There are two potential classes of female employees which are indicated by the evidence: (1) seasonal female employees who were classified as General Painters for the summer of 1978, and whose pay was reduced, accordingly; (2) "key" seasonal female employees who were laid-off and not employed for fruit Concentrate reprocessing work during July, 1978. The Potential membership of these two classes is not so numerous that joinder of all members would have been impractical. (Testimony of Childs; P.E. 11, I.E. 1, 2, 3.)
Conclusions Respondent is guilty of violating Section 23.167, Florida Statutes (1979), by engaging in discriminatory employment practices (1) and (2) above; and not guilty of (3) Affirmative relief, in the nature of compensatory damages, should be granted Petitioners. Background On August 3, September 25, and October 10, 1978, Petitioners Jennie Cilyard ("Ms. CILYARD") , Anne Pyle ("Ms. Pyle") and Diane Williams ("NS. WILLIAMS"), respectively, filed separate complaints with Intervenor, Norman A. Jackson, Executive Director, Florida Commission on Human Relations " COMMISSION") These complaints accused Respondent Oceanspray Cranberries, Inc., ("OCEANSPRAY") of engaging in several unlawful employment practices which discriminated against them on the basis of sex. In September, 1979, after investigation, the COMMISSION found "reasonable cause" to believe that the complained of unlawful employment practices had occurred. After the parties conciliation efforts were unsuccessful, the COMMISSION issued its Notice of Failure of Conciliation in November, 1979. In December, 1979, the three female Petitioners filed separate petitions for relief with the COMMISSION, alleging sexual discrimination b OCEANSPRAY and relying upon the COMMISSION' s "reasonable cause" determination. These three petitions were consolidated for hearing, and the COMMISSION's motion to intervene as a party was granted. Two weeks before final hearing, Petitioners filed a notion to certify this cause as a class action, consisting of all past, present, and future female employees of OCEANSPRAY. Ruling was reserved pending final hearing, and the parties were required to limit evidence relating to the class action allegations to those matters encompassed by COMMISSION Rule 9D-9. 08(6)(a) through (d), Florida Administrative Code. At final hearing, Petitioners testified in their own behalf, and called Lealan Herbert Childs, farmer OCEANSPRAY plant superintendent, and Marcy Calfee, COMMISSION investigator, as their witnesses. They also offered Petitioners' Exhibits 1/ 1 through 13, each of which was received into evidence. The COMMISSION offered Intervenor's Exhibits 1/ 1 through 3, each of which was also received into evidence. At the conclusion of the Petitioners' case-in-chief, OCEANSPRAY moved to dismiss that part of the petitions incorporating charges contained in paragraphs D, E, and G of the COMMISSION's reasonable cause" determination, on the ground that no evidence had been offered to support such charges. The motion was granted, as to paragraphs D and E, and denied as to paragraph G. Respondent OCEANSPRAY called as its witnesses George Russell Hill, OCEANSPRAY production superintendent, Elaine Rinker, former OCEANSPRAY scale and evaporator operator, and Katherine L. Hughes, OCEANSPRAY evaporator operator. At their request, the parties were granted forty-five (45) days from filing of the transcript to submit past-hearing proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law. Petitioners and Respondent timely filed their post-hearing filings on August 18, 1980. The parties agreed that the time period for submittal of the Recommended Order would commence at that time.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Florida Commission on Human Relations find that OCEANSPRAY engaged in unlawful employment practices and grant Petitioners affirmative relief, as described above. DONE AND ORDERED this 7th day of October, 1980, in Tallahassee, Florida. R. L. CALEEN, JR. Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 101, Collins Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675
