Findings Of Fact Based on the stipulations of the parties, on the exhibits received in evidence, and on the testimony of the witnesses at the hearing, I make the following findings of fact. Petitioner, Department of Professional Regulation, is the state agency charged with regulating the practice of medicine pursuant to Section 20.30, Florida Statutes; Chapter 455, Florida Statutes; and Chapter 458, Florida Statutes. Respondent is, and has been at all times material hereto, a licensed physician in the state of Florida, having been issued license number ME 0036970. Respondent worked at the Cruz Blanca Clinic from approximately February of 1984 through either October or November of 1985. During that time Respondent worked as a general practitioner and was also the medical director of the Cruz Blanca Clinic. As medical director, Respondent was responsible for the supervision and control of all medical practice at the clinic. Respondent's normal working hours at the Cruz Blanca Clinic were from approximately 8:00 or 8:30 in the morning until approximately 2:30 or 3:00 in the afternoon. During those working hours, Respondent was usually the only licensed medical doctor present on the premises of the Cruz Blanca Clinic. The patients who attended the Cruz Blanca Clinic paid a fee for the privilege of attending the clinic and receiving medical services. The monthly fee was between ten and fifteen dollars per family. Patients requiring general medical services attended the clinic during Respondent's working hours. During the afternoon hours, from approximately 2:00 p.m. until 5:30 p.m., certain medical specialists would see clinic patients by appointment. At all times material, Julio Diaz owned the Cruz Blanca Clinic. At all times material, Julio Diaz, Norma Rodriguez, and Magali Acosta were licensed to practice medicine in a foreign country, but they were not licensed to practice medicine in the state of Florida, nor were they licensed as physician's assistants in the state of Florida. Respondent knew that Diaz, Acosta, and Rodriguez were not licensed to practice medicine in the state of Florida. During 1984 and 1985 while Respondent was the medical director at the Cruz Blanca Clinic, Julio Diaz, Norma Rodriguez, and Magali Acosta frequently and regularly held themselves out as, and acted as, medical doctors or physicians at the Cruz Blanca Clinic. Specifically, they regularly saw patients, took medical histories, checked blood pressure, drew blood samples, took urine and fecal samples, and performed physical examinations. Julio Diaz and Norma Rodriguez went far beyond the routine tasks described above and were in total charge of the medical treatment of some of their patients. Patients with gynecological problems were usually assigned to Norma Rodriguez, pediatric patients were usually assigned to Magali Acosta, and Julio Diaz usually saw the general practice patients. Respondent knew that Diaz, Acosta, and Rodriguez were examining, treating, diagnosing, and prescribing for patients at the Cruz Blanca Clinic. Respondent also knew that at least some of the examining, treating, diagnosing, and prescribing activities of Diaz, Acosta, and Rodriguez were being done without Respondent's supervision. During 1984 and 1985, Maria Rodriguez was a frequent patient at the Cruz Blanca Clinic during the time periods when Respondent was the only licensed medical doctor on the premises of the clinic. On only one occasion Maria Rodriguez was seen by Respondent. On all of her other visits the only doctors', she saw were Julio Diaz or Norma Rodriguez. When Maria Rodriguez was being seen by Julio Diaz or Norma Rodriguez, there was no one present supervising either of the "doctors." Maria Rodriguez believed that Julio Diaz was a medical doctor and he treated her for back problems. Thereafter, Maria Rodriguez was usually seen by Norma Rodriguez, who she also believed to be a doctor. In 1985 Norma Rodriguez injected Maria Rodriguez as part of the treatment of the latter's blood pressure problems. On several occasions Maria Rodriguez saw both Julio Diaz and Norma Rodriguez filling out prescriptions, and on several occasions they both diagnosed and treated her. The prescriptions filled out by Julio Diaz and Norma Rodriguez were signed by Respondent. Barbara Socorro was another patient of the Cruz Blanca Clinic during 1984 and 1985. She was treated at the Clinic for such conditions as common colds, stomach flu, viruses, and gynecological problems. The only "doctor" who examined or treated Barbara Socorro at the Cruz Blanca Clinic was Norma Rodriguez. Norma Rodriguez performed at least one gynecological examination on Barbara Socorro at the Cruz Blanca Clinic. Norma Rodriguez wrote several prescriptions for Barbara Socorro. Barbara Socorro never saw Respondent at the Cruz Blanca clinic. Barbara Socorro believed that Norma Rodriguez was a medical doctor and was told by the receptionist at the Cruz Blanca Clinic that Norma Rodriguez was a gynecologist. Marisol Vilato was another patient of the Cruz Blanca Clinic who during 1984 and 1985 was seen several times for gynecological problems. The only "doctor" seen by Marisol Vilato was Norma Rodriguez. Norma Rodriguez examined Marisol Vilato, including internal gynecological examination; diagnosed and treated her condition; and filled out prescriptions for her. While employed as the medical director at the Cruz Blanca Clinic, Respondent frequently and regularly signed prescriptions filled out by Diaz, Acosta, and Rodriguez because as unlicensed doctors their signatures on prescriptions would not be honored by pharmacies. Without this aid and assistance by Respondent, it would not have been possible for Diaz, Acosta, and Rodriguez to prescribe for the patients at the Cruz Blanca Clinic.
Recommendation Based on all of the foregoing, it is recommended that the Board of Medical Examiners enter a Final Order to the following effect: Dismissing the charges alleged in Counts, 2, 3, and 6 of the Administrative Complaint: Finding Respondent guilty of violations of Section 458.331(1)(g), (t), and (w)' Florida Statutes, as alleged in Counts 1, 4, and 5 of the Administrative Complaint, and Imposing on Respondent appropriate penalties authorized by Section 458.331(2), Florida Statutes. In determining the appropriate penalty to recommend, I have given particular consideration to the nature of the violations; to the fact that although unlicensed practice of medicine was permitted, there was no evidence of harm to any patient; and to the fact that Respondent appears to be an elderly man who is not in the best of health. With those considerations in mind, it is recommended that the Board's Final Order include the following specific penalties: (a) A So-day suspension of Respondent's license to practice medicine; |(b) A one-year period of probation to follow the suspension, with a condition of probation that Respondent work under the supervision of another licensed physician and that he attend continuing education courses specified by the Board with an emphasis on the legal duties and responsibilities of physicians; and (c) An administrative fine in the total amount of S. 00 DONE AND ORDERED this 28th day of October, 1986, at Tallahassee, Florida. MICHAEL M. PARRISH, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of October, 1986 COPIES FURNISHED: Michael J Cohen, Esquire CO BN & MEE, P A 517 Southwest First Avenue Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33301 Frank Diaz Silveira, Esquire DIAZ SILVEIRA 6 ASSOCIATES, P A 2153 Coral Way, Suite 607 Miami, Florida 33145 Dorothy Faircloth, Executive Director Board of Medical Examiners Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Wings Slocum Benton, Esquire General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Fred Roche, Secretary Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 APPENDIX The following are my specific rulings on each of the proposed findings of fact submitted by both of the parties. Proposed findings submitted by Petitioner Paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5: These paragraphs are accepted. Paragraph 6: The first sentence of this paragraph is rejected as constituting commentary about conflicts in the evidence rather than a proposed finding of fact. The remainder of this paragraph is accepted in substance. Paragraph 7: This paragraph is accepted in substance. Paragraph 8: The first eight sentences of this paragraph are accepted in substance. The last sentence is rejected as argument rather than a proposed finding of fact. (The argument is a correct argument, but it is not a proposed finding.) Paragraphs 9 and 10: These paragraphs are accepted. Paragraph 11 and the five unnumbered paragraphs following paragraph 11: These paragraphs are rejected as primarily constituting arguments rather than proposed findings of fact. (These arguments are essentially correct, but are nevertheless arguments and do not belong in the findings of fact.) Paragraph 12: This paragraph is also rejected as constituting argument rather than proposed findings. Proposed findings submitted by Respondent This paragraph is rejected as constituting a proposed conclusion of law rather than a proposed finding of fact This paragraph is rejected as constituting summaries of testimony (some of which is conflicting) rather than proposed findings of fact. Counsel for all parties are reminded that summaries of testimony may be a useful technique to support an argument in favor of a particular proposed finding, but such summaries do not constitute proposed findings, especially when the summaries include conflicting testimony. The findings of fact in this Recommended Order contain specific findings regarding the activities engaged in by unlicensed physicians, which findings are based on competent substantial evidence and are consistent with the greater weight of the evidence. The first sentence of this paragraph is rejected as constituting a summary of a portion of the testimony rather than proposed finding of fact. The second sentence of this paragraph is rejected as constituting a summary of a portion of the evidence rather than a proposed finding of fact. Further, the details summarized for the most part relate to subordinate details that are irrelevant or unnecessary to the disposition of this case. This paragraph is rejected as constituting a summary of a portion of the evidence, or as constituting argument about the evidence, rather than a proposed finding of fact. Further, the factual assumptions implicit in this paragraph are contrary to the greater weight of the evidence. This paragraph is rejected as constituting argument instead of proposed findings of fact. This paragraph is rejected as constituting a summary of testimony rather than proposed findings of fact. Further the details summarized are subordinate and irrelevant or unnecessary details. This paragraph is rejected as constituting argument instead of proposed findings of fact. ================================================================= AGENCY FINAL ORDER ================================================================= BEFORE THE BOARD OF MEDICINE DEPARTMENT OF PROFESSIONAL REGULATION, Petitioner, PEDRO F. BERNAL, M.D., DPR CASE NOS. 0055322 DOAH CASE NO. 85-1758 Respondent. LICENSE NO. ME 0036970 /
The Issue The issue is whether Petitioner may revoke Respondent's designation as a Gold Seal Quality Care (Gold Seal) provider of child care services, pursuant to section 402.281(4)(a) and (5), Florida Statutes (2017).
Findings Of Fact For over 20 years, Respondent has operated a licensed child care facility in Pompano Beach. For several years, Respondent has held a Gold Seal designation for this facility. On October 10, 2017, a County Office inspector observed 16 children exiting a "12-passenger" van owned and operated by Respondent for the transport of children enrolled in its day care facility. At the facility, the inspector prepared the NOV, which, citing rule 65C-22.001(6)(d), characterizes the offense as a Class I violation and, citing Ordinance section 7-11.11(g), gives Respondent 15 days within which to request a hearing on the alleged violation. The inspector served the NOV on Respondent on October 10, 2017. Respondent did not timely request a hearing on the violation alleged in the NOV. On May 20, 2018, the County Office issued the Administrative Complaint, which proposes an administrative fine of $100. The Administrative Complaint largely tracks the NOV, except that it contends in the alternative that rule 65C-22.001(6)(d) limits the maximum number of children who may be transported in the van to the manufacturer's designated seating capacity or the number of factory-installed seat belts.1/ The Administrative Complaint gives Respondent 15 days within which to request a hearing on the administrative fine. Again, Respondent took no action other than, at some point, to pay the fine. The present dispute arose when Petitioner issued the LOI to terminate Respondent's Gold Seal designation, which is unmentioned in the NOV and Administrative Complaint. Although the number of children on the van appears not to be in dispute, there are substantial disputed questions of fact concerning the passenger capacity of the van and the number of seat belts-- factory-installed and otherwise--present in the van on the date of the inspection. However, these issues could only have been addressed in a hearing on the NOV. Broward County is one of four counties in Florida to have entered into a contract with Petitioner to administer and discipline the licenses of child care providers. The record fails to reveal why Petitioner did not issue the LOI for more than one year after the deemed termination of Respondent's Gold Seal designation2/ or why Petitioner did not transmit the file to DOAH for nearly five months after the receipt of Respondent's request for hearing in response to the LOI. It is clear, however, that the responsibility for these delays does not rest with Respondent.3/
Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED THAT the Department of Children and Families enter a final order determining that Respondent's Gold Seal designation was terminated, and it was ineligible to apply for a new Gold Seal designation, from October 10, 2017, through October 10, 2019. DONE AND ENTERED this 4th day of October, 2019, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ROBERT E. MEALE Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of October, 2019.
The Issue Whether Respondent's license to practice veterinary medicine should be revoked or suspended for alleged violation 474.14(1), 474.15, and 474.31 (1), and (6), Florida Statutes. This case was consolidated by order of the Hearing Officer issued December 5, 1975, with Florida Board of Veterinary Medicine vs. Harold M. McGee, D.V.M., Docket No. 751926 because the cases involve similar issues of law and fact. At the hearing, Respondent was advised of his right to employ legal counsel at his own expense to represent him. He elected to appear in his own behalf. He was then advised of his rights under the Administrative Procedure Act, including the right to testify in his own behalf, if he so desired. He indicated that he understood these rights.
Findings Of Fact Respondent was licensed by the Board of Veterinary Medicine on July 27, 1975 and was not licensed on March 4, 1975. On March 4, 1975 Respondent was employed by Dr. Harold M. McGee, D.V.M., at his place of business located at 3520 Northwest 36th Street, Miami, Florida. On March 4, 1975, Chery Lynn Correa, along with Dr. Calvin Dugas, D.V.M., both employees of the Knowles Animal Hospital in Miami took a Doberman Pinscher to Dr. McGee's clinic. Their visit was prompted by a request of their employer, Dr. Knowles, who had asked them to check a complaint that there were unlicensed veterinarians working for Dr. McGee. Without disclosing their purpose, Correa informed the receptionist that she had brought the dog to get rabies and distemper shots and to have some bumps on its neck checked. She and Dr. Dugas were referred to Respondent in the treatment room. He checked the dog and told them that the bumps were due to an improper diet. He then administered inoculations for rabies and distemper and checked the animal for worms. He also looked at the dog's throat and diagnosed tonsilitis for which he prescribed tetracycline pills. He also procured liquid shampoo called Tergex for a skin problem and gave instructions to bathe the dog once a week. He gave two more injections of antibiotics and cortisone. The receptionist signed Dr. McGee's name to the certificate of rabies vaccination and to a form for issuance of a Dade County dog tag. Respondent signed Dr. McGee's name to a Canine Interstate Health Certificate reflecting the administration of the inoculations. Correa paid the bill of $43.00 and then she and Dr. Dugas departed. During the time they were at the clinic, they did not see Dr. McGee on the premises (Testimony of Correa, Dugas, Petitioner's Exhibit 3). However, Dr. McGee was in the back office at the time in question suffering from a headache and had asked his receptionist to have Respondent give routine shots to animals during the day and only call him if a diagnosis was necessary. In view of Respondent's lack of a Florida license, Dr. McGee did not permit him to diagnose, treat, or incise skin of an animal without supervision. In accordance with these directions, Respondent always checked with Dr. McGee on a diagnosis and the latter would then prescribe the proper treatment. Respondent followed this procedure with respect to the dog brought to the clinic by Correa and received instructions from Dr. McGee as to the treatment that was thereafter performed. Respondent was not licensed by the Florida Board of Veterinary Medicine until July 27, 1975. Dr. McGee professed the belief at the hearing that since secretaries could sign distemper and rabies certificates, he felt Dr. Mayo could sign an interstate health certificate although he normally signed such documents himself. Respondent testified that he had worked for the local humane society for over nine years and, during that period, had signed his own name to interstate health certificates by authorization of the board of directors of the society. The receptionist took the interstate health certificate in question to Respondent to sign because he had administered the shots to the animal. She was unaware of the fact that he was unlicensed (Testimony of McGee, Mayo, Uriquize, Petitioner's Exhibit 2). Respondent was head of the Veterinary Services of the Cuban rebel army at the time he came to the United States. He has been a veterinarian since 1948. He is active in the Cuban community of Miami and enjoys a good reputation for truth and veracity in the community (Testimony of Mayo, Reboso).
Recommendation That the charges against Cristobal M. Gonzalez Mayo, D.V.M., be dismissed. DONE and ENTERED day of February, 1976 in Tallahassee, Florida. THOMAS C. OLDHAM Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Carlton Building Room 530 Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Ronald C. LaFace, Esquire 101 East College Avenue P.O. Box 1752 Tallahassee, Florida Dr. Cristobal M. Gonzalez Mayo 971-A Southwest 8th Street Miami, Florida 33130
Findings Of Fact Petitioner was incorporated on July 27, 1987. The original incorporators were Irene M. Kent and her husband, Jay Easterbrook. The original directors were Ms. Kent and Mr. Easterbrook. Ms. Kent and Mr. Easterbrook have remained the only directors of Petitioner. They are also the only shareholders. Since the formation of Petitioner, Ms. Kent has owned 51% of the shares and Mr. Easterbrook has owned 49% of the shares. Mr. Easterbrook is the president, and Ms. Kent is the vice- president of Petitioner. Petitioner is in the business of general contracting. Prior to deciding to form petitioner, Ms. Kent had been a schoolteacher for five years. She had had no prior significant experience in contracting and holds no contracting license or registration. Her educational background is in education. Mr. Easterbrook is a licensed general contractor and is qualifying agent of Petitioner. He is a civil engineer with a college degree in engineering. When Petitioner was incorporated, Mr. Easterbrook was employed full- time by National Seal Company as manager of the southeast region. A substantial portion of the work that he supervised was the installation of industrial plastic liners manufactured by National Seal Company. Petitioner's first job, which was for $20,000, was for the installation of a National Seal liner in Ellaville, Georgia. Petitioner learned of the job through Mr. Easterbrook's contacts. Toward the end of the job, a welder who worked for National Seal assisted in the installation. However, Ms. Kent, not Mr. Easterbrook, performed the on-site supervision and inspections of the job, which was completed on October 26, 1987. Petitioner's second job, which was for less than $10,000, was for the installation of a National Seal liner in Bostwick, Georgia. Petitioner learned of the job through Mr. Easterbrook's contacts. The job was performed shortly after the Ellaville job. Petitioner's third job, which was for $15,000, was for the installation of a National Seal liner in Hardee County, Florida. The contract for this job, which Petitioner learned of through Mr. Easterbrook's contacts, was entered into at about the same time as the Bostwick contract. Petitioner's only other job to date was as the general contractor responsible for the construction of 14 relocatable classrooms for various public schools in Seminole County, Florida. Ms. Kent learned of this job, which was for about $300,000, through an announcement in the local newspaper. This job was completed on March 31, 1988 and earned Petitioner a profit of $40,000. Mr. Easterbrook does all of the estimating for Petitioner in the preparation of its bids for contracts and interpretation of blueprints and specifications contained in invitations for bids. Ms. Kent assists in this part of the work by pricing materials. She also hires, supervises, and pays the subcontractors; purchases materials and equipment; and performs the bookkeeping, although Petitioner also employs an independent public accountant. Mr. Easterbrook quit his job with National Seal Company effective February 16, 1988, and took another week to close his office. He has since worked exclusively for Petitioner. Prior to his departure from National seal Company, Mr. Easterbrook devoted considerable time, although often by telephone only, rendering technical assistance to his wife with respect to the above- described jobs. In February, 1988, be spent 40-50 hours a week working for Petitioner where he has been on the payroll since January or February, 1988.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered denying the application of Petitioner for certification as a minority business enterprise. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 10th day of June, 1988, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT E. MEALE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of June, 1988. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 88-0355 Treatment Accorded Respondent's Proposed Findings 1-3. Adopted. 4-5. Rejected as unnecessary. 6 and 9. Adopted in substance. 7-8. Adopted. 10. Adopted, except that first sentence is rejected as legal argument and reference to licensure in eight other states is rejected as unnecessary. 11, 14 and 16. Rejected as unnecessary. 12-13, 15. Adopted. 17. Adopted, except that reference to Ms. Kent's work hours is rejected as unsupported by the greater weight of the evidence. 18-19. Adopted. 20, 24-25. Adopted in substance. 21. Rejected as legal argument. 22-23 and 26-27. Adopted. COPIES FURNISHED: Irene M. Kent Diversified Tech, Inc. 2296 Matthew Circle Deltona, Florida 32738 Deborah S. Rose, Esquire Department of General Services 452 Larson Building 200 East Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0955 Ronald W. Thomas Executive Director Department of General Services Room 133, Larson Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0955 Susan Kirkland General Counsel Department of General Services 457 Larson Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0955
