The Issue The issue is whether the Florida Commission on Human Relations (FCHR) properly dismissed this matter for lack of jurisdiction.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, as a first-time home buyer, applied for and was pre-approved by Cendant Mortgage Corporation d/b/a/ Century 21 Mortgage for a mortgage loan. The loan, in the amount of $28,687.00, was to be insured by the Federal Housing Administration (FHA). In February 2003, Respondent agreed to sell Petitioner his home. They agreed that Petitioner would pay Respondent $29,000.00 for the house. Respondent subsequently stated in writing that he agreed to sell his house to Petitioner for that amount. On March 5, 2003, Petitioner signed a form entitled No Brokerage Relationship Disclosure. The form made it clear that Century 21 Prime Property Resources, Inc., a local real estate agency, and its associates did not have a brokerage relationship with Petitioner. There is no evidence that the professional services of a licensed real estate agent was involved at all in this case. However, the local Century 21 real estate office gratuitously sent a few documents on Petitioner's behalf by facsimile transmission to Century 21 Mortgage in New Jersey. Respondent did not use the sales facilities or services of Century 21 for any purpose. On March 7, 2003, Cheryl Barnes, a certified appraiser, completed an appraisal of the property. The U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development and/or FHA required the appraisal in order for Petitioner to receive the loan insured by FHA. Neither Petitioner nor Respondent was required to pay for the appraisal. In a letter dated March 10, 2003, Century 21 Mortgage advised Petitioner that the closing date was scheduled for April 16, 2003. The letter enclosed additional forms that Petitioner needed to complete in order to close the loan. The Housing Department, Division of Planning and Development, in Sumter County, Florida, sent Petitioner a letter dated March 19, 2003. The letter advised Petitioner that she was eligible for an award of Supplemental Household Income Protection funds to cover the down payment and closing costs on the loan. Subsequently, Respondent refused to sign any papers related to the sale of the house. The loan could not be closed without Respondent's cooperation. Petitioner had placed $250 in an escrow account with Century 21 Mortgage. The mortgage broker refunded all of the money in the escrow account to Petitioner after Respondent refused to sign any more paperwork. Finally, there is no evidence of the following: (a) that Respondent owned more than three single-family houses at any one time; (b) that Respondent sold more than one single- family home within any 24-month period; (c) that Respondent had an interest in the proceeds from the sale or rental of more than three single-family houses at any one time; and (d) the sale of the subject house did not involve the posting, mailing, or publication of any written notice.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That FCHR enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 5th day of January, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S SUZANNE F. HOOD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of January, 2005. COPIES FURNISHED: Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Susan M. Parker 3840 East County Road 478 Apartment D-30 Webster, Florida 33597 Paul Moore 2396 County Road 608 Bushnell, Florida 33513
The Issue The issues in this case are: (1) whether, on three separate occasions, the Respondent raised the rent at Minerva Mobile Home Park without first delivering to the lessees an approved prospectus, as alleged in the Notice to Show Cause, Docket No. MH89446, issued on November 1, 1989; and (2), if so, what is the appropriate penalty.
Findings Of Fact The Respondent, Haines City Investment, Inc., is the owner of Minerva Mobile Home Park located in Haines City, Florida. There are approximately 72 lots for lease in Minerva Mobile Home Park. On or about January 6, 1988, a Final Order was entered by the Petitioner finding, among other things, that the Respondent had raised the rent on lots in Minerva Mobile Home Park, effective January 1, 1986, without first filing a prospectus with the Petitioner (and therefore also without delivering to the homeowners an approved prospectus.) Among other things, the Final Order fined the Respondent $3,000 and ordered the Respondent to deliver an approved prospectus to each homeowner entitled to receive one within 15 days. During the pendency of a court appeal of the Final Order, on or about April 29, 1988, the Respondent entered into an Agreement to Remit Civil Penalty and Annual Fees. Effective January 1, 1987, the Respondent increased the monthly lot rental in Minerva Mobile Home Park by $11. Effective January 1, 1988, the Respondent increased the monthly lot rental in Minerva Mobile Home Park by $4.50. Effective January 1, 1989, the Respondent increased the monthly lot rental in Minerva Mobile Home Park by $6. Effective January 1, 1990, the Respondent increased the monthly lot rental in Minerva Mobile Home Park by $12.50, to $134.50 per month. The 11 homeowners who testified all paid all rent increases charged by the Respondent. The Respondent first filed a prospectus for Minerva Mobile Home Park for approval by the Petitioner in October, 1986. By this time, the Respondent had given the homeowners a copy of the proposed, but unapproved prospectus. However, the proposed prospectus was not approved by the Petitioner, and several revisions were made. The final revision was not approved until May 20, 1987. The approved prospectus was not delivered to the homeowners of the Minerva Mobile Home Park until some time in March, 1990.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Petitioner enter a final order requiring that the Respondent refund the illegal rent increases to the homeowners (or former homeowners) in Minerva Mobile Home Park and requiring the Respondent to pay a $1,500 civil penalty. RECOMMENDED this 26th day of November, 1990, in Tallahassee, Florida. J. LAWRENCE JOHNSTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of November, 1990. COPIES FURNISHED: Debra Roberts, Esquire Assistant General Counsel Department of Business Regulation 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1007 Albert Labossiere, President Haines City Investment, Inc. 2800 Minerva Park Haines City, Florida 33844 E. James Kearney, Director Department of Business Regulation, Division of Florida Land Sales, Condominiums and Mobile Homes The Johns Building 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1000 Joseph A. Sole, Esquire General Counsel Department of Business Regulation 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee Florida 32399-1007
The Issue The issues are whether the respondents engaged in a discriminatory housing practice, in violation of the Florida Fair Housing Act, Sections 760.20 through 760.37, Florida Statutes (2007),1 by discriminating against Petitioner, on the basis of her alleged disability, and by harassing Petitioner and retaliating against her.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a former resident of Broadview Mobile Home Park (Broadview), located at 1701 Post Road, Melbourne, Florida. Petitioner resided in Broadview for approximately six years from an undisclosed date in 2002 through September 8, 2008. Mr. Lamont Garber holds an ownership interest in Broadview. The record does not quantify the ownership interest of Mr. Garber. Mr. Garber manages Broadview with his brother, Mr. Wayne Garber. Broadview rents sites within the mobile home park to residents who own mobile homes. Each site has access to water and electric service. Each resident arranges his or her water and electric service directly with the respective utility provider. Sometime in 2005, Petitioner purchased a mobile home for approximately $6,500.00 and moved within Broadview to Lot 24. The rental agreement for Lot 24 required rent to be paid on the first day of each month. The rent for July 2008 was due on July 1, 2008. Petitioner failed to pay the rent payment that was due on July 1, 2008. On July 9, 2008, Broadview served Petitioner, by certified mail, with a notice that she had five business days in which to pay the rent due (the five-day notice). Petitioner received the five-day notice on July 10, 2008. The five-day period expired on July 17, 2008, with no rent payment from Petitioner. Petitioner had paid rent late in the past, but Petitioner had never been more than four or five days late. After July 17, 2008, Broadview initiated eviction proceedings. Petitioner tendered the rent payment on July 20, 2008, but Broadview proceeded with the eviction. Petitioner did not appear and defend the eviction proceeding. On August 26, 2008, the County Court for Brevard County, Florida, issued a Final Default Judgment of Eviction awarding possession of Lot 24 to Broadview. Law enforcement officers thereafter executed the Court's order and evicted Petitioner from Broadview on or about September 8, 2008. After Petitioner received the notice of eviction, she filed a complaint with the Florida Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Division of Florida Condominiums, Timeshares, and Mobile Homes (DBPR). DBPR is the state agency responsible for regulating mobile home parks, including Broadview. The allegations in the complaint that Petitioner filed with DBPR were substantially similar to the claims of discrimination, retaliation, harassment, and unlawful rent increases Petitioner asserts in this proceeding. DBPR rejected Petitioner's allegations and found that Broadview lawfully evicted Petitioner for non-payment of rent. The final agency action of DBPR is substantially similar to that of HUD and the Commission's proposed agency action in this proceeding. Each agency found that Broadview lawfully evicted Petitioner for non-payment of rent and rejected the allegations of discrimination, harassment, and retaliation. The DOAH proceeding is a de novo consideration of the proceeding before the Commission. A preponderance of the evidence does not establish a prima facie showing that Petitioner is disabled or handicapped. Petitioner has cancer and is receiving chemotherapy and radiation treatment. A preponderance of evidence does not show that the medical condition substantially limits one or more major life activities of Petitioner. Petitioner also alleges that she is disabled and handicapped by a mental condition. Petitioner submitted no medical evidence of the alleged disability or handicap. A preponderance of evidence does not establish a prima facie showing that, if such a mental condition exists, the condition substantially limits one or more major life activities of Petitioner. Assuming arguendo that a preponderance of the evidence showed that Petitioner were disabled or handicapped, a preponderance of evidence does not establish a prima facie showing that either of the respondents discriminated against Petitioner, harassed her, or evicted her in retaliation for Petitioner's disability or handicap. It is undisputed that Petitioner conducted neighborhood organization efforts to protest a rent increase at Broadview and repeatedly called law enforcement officials to report alleged drug and prostitution activity in Broadview.2 However, Broadview did not evict Petitioner for those activities, and Petitioner's testimony to the contrary is neither credible nor persuasive. Rather, Petitioner engaged in other activities that the respondents found objectionable. Petitioner baby sat for one or more dogs in violation of Broadview's prohibition against pets. Some of the dogs were dangerous to other residents. Petitioner also verbally abused Mr. Wayne Garber when he attempted to mediate with Petitioner concerning the presence of dogs and Petitioner's conduct toward management at Broadview. On July 1, 2008, Broadview served Petitioner with a seven-day notice concerning Petitioner's compliance with lease requirements. The notice, in relevant part, alleged that Petitioner harassed management and impaired the ability of management to perform its duties. The testimony of respondents describing the activities of Petitioner that precipitated the seven-day notice is credible and persuasive. A preponderance of the evidence shows that the respondents had legitimate non-discriminatory reasons for requiring Petitioner to comply with the terms of the seven-day notice and for requiring Petitioner to comply with the requirement for rent to be paid on July 1, 2008. Petitioner failed to comply with either requirement, and Broadview evicted Petitioner for legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons. The respondents did not harass or retaliate against Petitioner.3
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Commission enter a final order finding that the respondents did not engage in an unlawful housing practice and dismissing the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 20th day of May, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DANIEL MANRY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of May, 2009.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondent unlawfully discriminated against Petitioner by refusing to rent her an apartment because she is legally blind and relies upon a service dog to ambulate independently.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner Lourdes Guzman (“Guzman”) is legally blind and relies upon a service dog (also referred to as a guide dog or “seeing eye” dog) to ambulate independently. Respondent Charles Harris (“Harris”) owns an eight-unit apartment building (the “Property”) located in Bay Harbor Islands, Florida. Harris, who is retired, holds the Property for investment purposes and lives on the rental income it generates. In or around April of 2002, Harris placed an advertisement in the newspaper seeking a tenant for one his rental units. Guzman saw this ad, was interested, and made an appointment to see the Property. A short time later, Guzman and her live-in boyfriend José Robert (“Robert”) met Harris and Paul Karolyi (“Karolyi”) late one afternoon at the Property. (Karolyi is a tenant of Harris’s who helps out at the Property; Guzman and Robert viewed him as the “building manager,” which was apparently a reasonable perception.) During their conversation, the prospective renters mentioned that they owned a dog. Upon hearing this, Harris explained that he had just finished renovating the advertised unit because the previous tenant’s dog had destroyed the rug and caused other damage to the premises. Thus, Harris told Guzman and Robert, he was not interested in renting this unit to someone with a dog. Robert then informed Harris that: (a) Guzman’s sight was impaired; (b) the dog in question was a service dog; and (c) Harris was legally obligated to let Guzman bring the dog into the unit, should she become Harris’s tenant, as a reasonable accommodation of her handicap. Once he understood the situation, Harris acknowledged that a service dog was different and stated that he would not refuse to rent the unit to someone with a service dog. Accordingly, Harris gave Guzman and Robert a rental application, which Guzman later completed and returned to Harris. After receiving Guzman’s application, Harris checked her references and discovered that Guzman’s two most recent landlords considered her to be a poor tenant. While Guzman disputes the veracity of some of the information that was provided to Harris, at hearing she admitted that much of what he learned was true. The following rental history is based on Guzman’s admissions. Town & Country Apartments. From October 2001 until January 24, 2002, Guzman lived at the Town & Country Apartments in Bay Harbor Islands, Florida. Her landlord was T & C Associates, Ltd. (“T & C”). At least six times during this 16-month period, Guzman failed to timely pay her rent and was required to pay a late fee. She also received at least five statutory “three-day notices” warning that her failure to pay the overdue monthly rent within 72 hours would trigger an eviction proceeding.1 T & C sued to evict Guzman after she failed to pay the rent due for December 2001. Consequently, when Guzman vacated the Town & Country Apartments on January 24, 2002, she did so pursuant to a writ of possession. Guzman claims that she chose to be evicted as an expedient means of breaking her lease with T & C. The Sahara. After being evicted from the Town & Country Apartments, Guzman moved into a unit at the “Sahara”—— which Guzman described at hearing as a “motel”——pursuant to a short-term lease. Guzman’s landlord at the Sahara was Allen L. Kaul (“Kaul”). Guzman lived at the Sahara for about two months.2 Guzman had some sort of dispute with Kaul, and when she moved out of the Sahara she took the keys to the unit she was vacating and the remote control device that opened a gate to the premises; these items were never returned to Kaul. These facts convinced Harris that Guzman was not an acceptable risk. He notified Guzman that he would not rent to her due to her “poor credit history.” Ultimate Factual Determinations Harris rejected Guzman’s rental application, not because of her handicap or service dog, but because he discovered, through a reasonable process of checking references, that Guzman had recently been evicted from one apartment and vacated another under suspicious (or at least questionable) circumstances, taking with her some personal property of the landlord’s that she never returned. There is no credible, competent evidence that Harris rented his apartments to non-handicapped persons having rental histories similar to Guzman’s. Nor does the evidence support a finding that Harris invoked Guzman’s negative rental history (the material aspects of which were undisputed) as a pretext for discrimination. In short, Harris did not discriminate unlawfully against Guzman; rather, he rejected her rental application for a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the FCHR enter a final order dismissing Guzman’s Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 1st day of May, 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. JOHN G. VAN LANINGHAM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of May, 2003.
Findings Of Fact The Respondent, Bertram Gould, is president and stockholder of Mohican Valley, Inc., d/b/a Indian Woods Subdivision. The Indian Woods Subdivision is located in Seminole County and consists of in excess of 150 subdivided lots. On May 20, 1982, Mohican Valley, Inc. purchased a mobile home park located in Seminole County, Florida, from Winter Springs Mobile Home Corporation. The park was formerly known as Mohawk Village, but is now known as the Indian Woods Subdivision. Bertram Gould and Mohican Valley, Inc. acquired their interest in the subdivision by virtue of a purchase and sale agreement, deed and assignment of lease indentures from Winter Springs Mobile Home Corporation. Individuals desiring to live in the mobile home park purchase their mobile home and contemporaneously sign a 99-year lease on the lots upon which the mobile homes are to be placed. The mobile homes purchased by prospective residents in the subdivision are typically purchased from Vaughn Motors, Inc., a corporation of which Mr. Gould is president. In 1981, Vaughn Motors, Inc. sold a mobile home to Alfred and Beverly Powers, which arrived at the park and was setup on November 30, 1981, or shortly thereafter. On March 1, 1982, Vaughn Motors, Inc. sold that mobile home to Warren E. and Sylvia Joyce Krummel, since the Powers had elected not to close the purchase. On the date of the sale to the Krummels, the mobile home was already setup on Lot 1, Block E, of the subdivision and ready for occupancy. On June 14, 1982, after the May 20 purchase of the subdivision by Mohican Valley, Inc, through its president, Bertram Gould, the Krummels executed an Indenture of Lease for Lot 1, Block E. There was thus a residential building on that property subject to the lease at the time the lease was entered into. On June 5, 1982, Dorothy Merritt signed a purchase agreement to buy a mobile home and the mobile home was delivered and setup on her lot on August 6, 1982. On that date she also signed a lease for the lot where the mobile home was placed. Thus, when the interest in that property was conveyed by lease, there was a residential building on the lot. Roy and Lydia Ardizzone initially leased a lot in the park from Winter Springs Mobile Home Corporation before the sale to Mohican Valley, Inc. and Bertram Gould. In August, 1982, after Mohican Valley, Inc. purchased the subdivision, the Ardizzones decided to place a mobile home on their lot, but since the Phase II portion of the subdivision in which their original lot was located was not completely developed, it was not feasible to place the home on the lot at that time. Accordingly, they asked Mr. Gould to substitute their lot for a lot in Phase I in order to facilitate placing a home on the lot and begin living in the park. Mr. Gould agreed and the substitution occurred on August 31, 1982, on which date the Ardizzones also signed a lease for the lot. They ordered a mobile home to be placed on that lot, which arrived some 10 days later, on September 9, 1982. It was immediately setup on the Ardizzone's lot. Thus, at the time the lease of August 31, 1982, was executed by the Ardizzones and Bertram Gould, the Ardizzones had already ordered the mobile home for immediate delivery, which was delivered and setup some 10 days later. Thus, there was an obligation on the part of the Respondent to provide a mobile home to them in less than two years and indeed within days. On or about September 4, 1982, Bertram Gould caused a mobile home to be placed on Lot 3, Block B of the subdivision and had it prepared for occupancy. On November 5, 1982, George W. and Alice H. Woodward signed a purchase agreement for the mobile home and ultimately executed a lease for the lot upon which that mobile home sat on January 10, 1983. They moved into their home on or about February 17, 1983. Thus, at the time the lease was executed by the Woodwards and Respondent, a residential building was present on the property subject to the lease. Mohican Valley, Inc.'s predecessor in title, Winter Springs Mobile Home Corporation, had, during the course of its development of the mobile home park, entered into approximately 156 ground leases for mobile home lots. In conjunction with the acquisition of title to the park by Mohican Valley, Inc., Mohican Valley Inc. was assigned all rights of Winter Springs Mobile Home Corporation in those 156 leases which had already been recorded by Winter Springs Mobile Home Corporation prior to the acceptance of assignment by Mohican Valley, Inc. It was not established that Mohican Valley, Inc. or Bertram Gould had participated in any offer or disposition of the property which was the subject of those leases prior to Mohican Valley, Inc.'s acceptance of their assignment. Prior to May 20, 1982, the Respondent had no ownership interest in either the mobile home park or in Winter Springs Mobile Home Corporation, which owned and managed the Park. He was not an officer, director, employee, salesman or any type of agent for the owner of the mobile home subdivision prior to May 20, 1982. The only nexus between the Respondent and the mobile home park prior to May 20, 1982, was his position as president of Vaughn Motors, Inc. which had sold mobile homes to some of the residents of the park who had executed leases which ultimately became assigned to Mohican Valley, Inc. The Respondent caused certain advertisements to be placed in the Orlando Sentinel newspaper. Although an advertisement was placed April 25, 1982, the Respondent was not involved in the publishing of that advertisement. It appeared in the newspaper approximately a month prior to purchase of the park by Mr. Gould's company. On June 4 and 5, 1982; September 19, 1982; October 10, 1982; and January 29, 1983, the Respondent admittedly placed advertisements in the Orlando Sentinel representing amounts of monthly lot rent, terms of available bank financing, the office address, the phone number and hours of operation, as well as representing the fact that mobile homes could be purchased at the park for a listed price, including certain optional features, as well as the representation that the mobile home park then owned by Mohican Valley, Inc. offered quarter-acre lots and double-wide homes with certain amenities. The price for lot rent was represented as never increasing. Bank financing was advertised as available variously at 14 and a quarter percent interest and 13 and a half percent interest. The representations contained in those advertisements were true, however, at the time Mohican Valley, Inc. took title to the mobile home park, a foreclosure action and lis pendens had been filed on that property by Florida Land Company, the mortgagee on a mortgage executed by Winter Springs Mobile Home Corporation, Mohican Valley, Inc.'s predecessor in title. That foreclosure had been filed on or before March 21, 1983, as evidenced by the Motion to Intervene (in evidence as Petitioner's Exhibit 4), which was filed in that foreclosure proceeding by Mohican Valley, Inc. No representation was made in these advertisements concerning the fact that the property which was the subject of the mobile home lot leases offered by Respondent was the subject of a mortgage encumbrance which was then in foreclosure, which foreclosure predated those advertisements. Bertram Gould, as president of Mohican Valley, Inc., as the movant in that Motion to Intervene, and as the successor in title to the mortgagor-in-foreclosure, knew of the existence of the facts surrounding that foreclosure as they related to the interest in the land he sought to convey and the effects such a foreclosure might have on the persons or residents of the park who executed those leases as lessee thereafter. Bertram Gould thus materially participated in the offer or disposition of the lots for lease in the subdivision and advertised those dispositions or offerings without representing that the real property to which they related was the subject of a pending foreclosure action. No reservation program has been approved by Petitioner for Bertram Gould, Mohican Valley, Inc. and/or Indian Woods, nor has any application for such been filed. No public offering statement for Bertram Gould, Mohican Valley, Inc. or Indian Woods, nor any application for such has, as of the time of the hearing, been filed and approved. The Indian Woods Subdivision has not been registered with the Petitioner by either Bertram Gould or Mohican Valley, Inc. Bertram Gould has engaged in the disposition of these subdivided lands directly as well as on behalf of Mohican Valley, Inc., of which corporation he is president and stockholder. Bertram Gould has offered, disposed of or participated in the offer or disposition of interests in the subdivided lands involved herein, which are located in Florida, by offering the subject land for leases to prospective mobile home purchasers and park residents.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, the evidence in the record and the candor and demeanor of the witnesses, it is, therefore RECOMMENDED: That Bertram Gould be found guilty of violations of Sections 498.023(1) and (2), and Section 498.049(4) and Sections 498.051(1)(a), (b), and (d); that a penalty of $2,000 be imposed and that the Respondent be ordered to cease and desist the above described activities until the requirements delineated above involving registration of the subject subdivision, approval and promulgation of a current offering statement have been accomplished. DONE and ENTERED this 31st day of January, 1984, in Tallahassee, Florida. P. MICHAEL RUFF Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 FILED with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of January, 1984. COPIES FURNISHED: Harold F. X. Purnell, Esquire Department of Business Regulation 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Ladd H. Fassett, Esquire Post Office Box 2747 Orlando, Florida 32802 E. James Kearney, Director Division of Florida Land Sales and Condominiums Department of Business Regulation 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Gary R. Rutledge, Secretary Department of Business Regulation 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue The issue to be resolved concerns whether the Petitioner was the victim of a discriminatory housing practice, by allegedly being denied the opportunity to rent an apartment from the Respondents, and by being falsely informed of its non- availability, based upon her race.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner is an African-American female. In early January 2007, she learned of an apartment for rent, owned or managed by the Respondents. She called to inquire about the apartment and was told by the Respondent, Ms. Lindsay, that the rent would be $625.00 per month, with a one-month rent amount and security deposit due in advance. She was told that the Lessee of a neighboring apartment, Clint Cook, would have a key and would show her the apartment. She went to view the apartment, and decided that she wished to rent it. She then telephoned Ms. Lindsay, and Ms. Lindsey faxed an application to her to complete. In the conversation, she told Ms. Lindsay she would not have the required deposit money until Friday. This was on a Monday or Tuesday. Ms. Lindsay then told her securing the apartment was on a “first come-first-served” basis. The Petitioner never completed the application and never tendered the security deposit. Shortly after that telephone conversation, Ms. Lindsay was contacted by Stacey Edwards, while the apartment was still available for rent, concerning rental. Ms. Edwards, on behalf of herself and her boyfriend/husband, submitted an application to rent the apartment, together with the appropriate required deposit and rental amount on January 15, 2007. Ms. Lindsay leased the apartment to the couple. They had a planned move-in date of February 1, 2007. They are a mixed-race couple, and Ms. Lindsay was aware of that fact when renting to them. Sometime after January 15, 2007, the Petitioner called Ms. Lindsay a second time, and was told that the apartment had been rented (to the Edwards couple) and was no longer available. Testimony to this effect is corroborated by the Edwards rental application and deposit receipt, which are in evidence. The Edwards rental was documented on January 15, 2007. Later that month, the Petitioner noticed the “for rent" sign displayed, or displayed again, and she and/or her witness, Lynn Kliesch, called about the apartment’s availability. Ms. Lindsay again stated that it was rented. Indeed, it was, to the Edwards. The rental sign had been left up because the Edwards couple were not scheduled to move in until February 1, 2007. This communication between the parties occurred before Ms. Edwards informed Ms. Lindsay that they would not be moving in. Shortly before February 1,2007. Ms Edwards and her husband/boyfriend learned that his employment had ended (or he was transferred to another job location). They therefore informed Ms. Lindsay that they had to re-locate to South Florida and could not take the apartment. She charged them for the two weeks of rental, and refunded their deposit. She then placed the apartment back on the rental market. On January 31, 2007, Ms. Mari Ferguson inquired of Ms. Lindsay about the apartment’s availability. This was after Ms. Edwards had informed Ms. Lindsay that she would not be renting the apartment. Ms. Lindsay told Ms. Ferguson that the property was available and she rented it to Ms. Ferguson that same day. Ms. Ferguson and her boyfriend, who occupied the apartment with her, were also a mixed-race couple, with children. In fact, the boyfriend is the nephew of the Petitioner herein. Ms. Ferguson and family moved into the apartment. Some months later a hostile situation arose between the Respondents and Ms. Ferguson. Ms. Lindsay apparently received reports that “drug dealing” was occurring in the apartment. Ms. Ferguson and/or the other occupants were responsible for some damage, and Ms. Ferguson became several months behind on rental payments. The Respondents therefore, through legal process, had her evicted. The Respondent, Ms. Lindsay, through her firm, Elite Properties of Northwest Florida, Inc., manages some 37 rental properties in Escambia and Santa Rosa Counties. She is the president and broker for the firm and has no employees or agents. Among the rental property owners she and her firm represent is her Co-Respondent, Michael Houser. Both Ms. Lindsay and Elite Properties, as well as Mr. Houser, have a significant number of minority tenants, both Hispanic and African-American. A substantial number of those, both historically, and at the time of the hearing are single, African-American females, as heads of households. There is no evidence, aside from the Petitioner’s unsubstantiated opinion, that either the Respondent has ever refused to rent to the Petitioner or anyone else, based upon race, nor that they have falsely denied availability of a dwelling for rent or sale for that reason. There is no evidence that they have refused or attempted to avoid holding out a property for rent or sale for reasons based on racial animus.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses, and the pleadings and arguments of the parties, it is, therefore, RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the Florida Commission on Human Relations, determining that the Respondents did not commit a discriminatory housing practice based upon the Petitioner's race and that the Petition be dismissed in its entirety. DONE AND ENTERED this 16th day of April, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S P. MICHAEL RUFF Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of April, 2009. COPIES FURNISHED: Sylvia Mims 3382 Greenbriar Circle, Apt. B Gulf Breeze, Florida 32561 Beverly Lindsay 5252 Springdale Drive Milton, Florida 32570 Michael Houser 3533 Edinburgh Drive Pace, Florida 32571 Larry Kranert, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue Did the action of Respondent, in denying Petitioner the use of an emotional support dog in her condominium unit for her son, violate a legal duty to reasonably accommodate the needs of her son, A.C.?
Findings Of Fact The undersigned makes the following findings of relevant and material facts: Facts From Pre-hearing Stipulation Filed June 20, 2016 Petitioner was aware that the Association had a "no pet" policy and signed a document acknowledging same. Petitioner was sent a letter on February 24, 2014, from the Association's then property manager advising Petitioner that the Association had been advised that a dog was being kept in their unit, and reminding Petitioner of the Association's no pet policy. A Fines Committee hearing was scheduled for March 10, 2014, in regard to Petitioner's violation of the no pet policy. Petitioner was not issued a fine for violating the pet policy. Prior to the Fines Committee hearing, Petitioner made her first claim that her son had a disability and required an emotional support animal. Prior to the Fines Committee hearing, Petitioner made her first request to the Association for a reasonable accommodation. The Association's Board of Directors scheduled an interview with Petitioner on April 30, 2014, wherein Petitioner would be able to explain her request for a reasonable accommodation, the need for the emotional support animal, and her son's disability. The Association advised Petitioner, prior to the scheduled interview, that Petitioner may provide the Association with any documents Petitioner believes support her position. An interview and/or meeting occurred on April 30, 2014, between Petitioner, her husband, Yovani Cabreriza, Petitioner's attorney, and certain members of the Board of Directors, along with the Association's attorney, to discuss Petitioner's request for an accommodation. The Association determined that Petitioner was not in need of a reasonable accommodation and requested that the dog be removed via written correspondence dated May 19, 2014. The Association again requested that the subject dog be removed via written correspondence dated May 22, 2015, and advised Petitioner that an arbitration action would follow if the dog was not removed. A Petition for Arbitration was filed on June 4, 2015. Petitioner's response to the arbitration petition was filed on September 14, 2015. The arbitrator issued an order striking the complainants' defense and requiring proof of filing a Fair Housing Complaint. Petitioner filed her housing complaint with FCHR and Housing and Urban Development on November 2, 2015. On March 8, 2016, the FCHR housing investigator issued a "Notice of Determination of No Cause," concluding that reasonable cause does not exist to believe that a discriminatory housing practice has occurred. On April 8, 2016, FCHR received a Petition for Relief from an Unlawful Housing Practice from Petitioner. Findings of Fact From the Hearing This case involves a family who lives at Respondent's condominium complex, Arlen House Condominium, located at 300 Bayview Drive, Sunny Isles Beach, Florida 33160. Petitioner owns condominium unit PH05. Petitioner resides at this location with her husband and minor son, A.C. Petitioner's son was 11 years old in 2014. Her son has suffered from an anxiety disorder since he was a young boy. A.C.'s anxiety disorder problem became worse in 2012. He cried every morning and did not want to go to school. Apparently, he had difficulty breathing during anxiety or panic attacks. His mother described him as being "completely withdrawn" at school.1/ To help her son cope with his anxiety problem, Petitioner bought him a small dog, Jake, in the latter part of 2012. When she bought the dog, she knew that the condominium had a "no pet policy," but failed to alert the condominium or request permission to keep the dog.2/ In early 2014, the Association discovered that the dog was being kept in violation of the Association's rules and regulations. It notified Petitioner in writing on February 24, 2014, and told her to remove the animal. Resp. Ex. 2(e). March 10, 2014, Meeting Petitioner met with the Association's Fine Committee on March 10, 2014. During the meeting, Petitioner presented, for the first time, a letter or letters from the child's doctor, Rasciel Socarras, M.D.3/ Resp. Ex. 2(f). After the meeting before the Fine Committee, counsel for the Association sent Petitioner's counsel a letter dated March 21, 2014. Resp. Ex. 2(g). Essentially, the letter reiterated the "no pet policy" and concluded that Petitioner had failed to demonstrate to the Fine Committee that her son had a disability that substantially limited a major life activity or that an accommodation was necessary to afford him an equal opportunity to use and enjoy their condominium unit. The letter also requested a meeting to help the Association "conduct a meaningful review of your client's request for an accommodation."4/ Prior to the next meeting between the parties on April 30, 2014, counsel for the Association sent a letter to Petitioner's counsel dated April 18, 2014. In that letter, counsel requested copies of any and all documents that may support the boy's disability and need for an accommodation, including but not limited to the medical records that demonstrate his disability.5/ April 30, 2014, Meeting As arranged, Petitioner and her husband, along with their legal counsel, met with the Board of Directors on April 30, 2014. At the meeting, Petitioner explained her son's anxiety problem.6/ Although the record was not clear on this point, based on the evidence and the reasonable inferences drawn from the evidence, the undersigned concludes that the two (2) letters (dated and undated) from Dr. Socarras were reviewed and discussed during the April 30, 2014, meeting with Petitioner.7/ The board members asked Petitioner several questions about her son's condition. Petitioner informed the Board of Directors that her son was not on any medication to treat his anxiety, nor was he receiving any mental health counseling or therapy. Petitioner told the Board of Directors that she had diagnosed the child as having problems with anxiety. The Board of Directors also asked her how her son was performing in school and learned that he was enrolled in the gifted learning program at his school.8/ As a result of the meeting, the Board of Directors concluded: (1) that it did not have enough information to determine whether the child was limited in his ability to live in the unit; (2) that he had a disability; or (3) that the pet was medically necessary for him. As a follow-up to that meeting, on May 19, 2014, the Association's counsel sent a letter to Petitioner. The letter outlined the Board of Directors' position and speaks for itself. See Resp. Ex. 2(i). The letter stated in relevant part: At this time, the Board of Directors can neither approve your request for an accommodation nor can it provide an exception to its "no pet" policy. You have been unable to provide information that supports that your son suffers from a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of his daily activities. There has been no documentation to support that your son has been diagnosed or treated for a disability. More importantly, you have not provided relevant information that your son has a disability or that the dog helps alleviate any identified symptoms. The letter concluded by demanding that the dog, Jake, be removed from the condominium unit no later than Monday, June 2, 2014.9/ Nearly a year of "radio silence" passed with no activity by either party. The Association did not check on the removal of the pet, and Petitioner did not remove the dog despite the demand by the Association. A year later, on May 15, 2015, the Association acted and sent another letter to Petitioner demanding that she remove the pet. Again, Petitioner did not remove the pet. On June 4, 2015, the Association filed a petition for mandatory non-binding arbitration with the Florida Department of Business and Professional Regulation. Ultimately, the arbitrator entered an order on November 19, 2015, staying the arbitration case until the resolution of the discrimination complaint filed by Petitioner with FCHR. Based on the evidence presented, the undersigned concludes that during the meeting on April 30, 2014, with the Board of Directors, that other than the letter(s) from Dr. Socarras, and an identification certificate for their pet dog Jake, there was no other medical information or documentation provided by Petitioner to assist Respondent in reviewing and evaluating her request for the accommodation to keep Jake in the unit.10/ As a related topic, the Board of Directors had previously approved service animals for at least two (2) other residents.11/ One resident had suffered a stroke and needed assistance to walk. Another resident had a serious medical condition and was allowed to keep a service animal which was trained to detect the onset of the person's medical condition. In both instances, the Board of Directors followed the same process followed in Petitioner's case. Letters were sent and meetings were held. However, in the cases where a service animal was approved, the Board of Directors requested and was provided medical records which it relied upon to conclude that a service animal was needed as a reasonable accommodation. Prior to this hearing before DOAH, the Board of Directors had not been informed, and no claim was made, that "learning" was a major life activity that was substantially impaired by A.C.'s anxiety.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing Petitioner's complaint for discrimination. DONE AND ENTERED this 31st day of August, 2016, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ROBERT L. KILBRIDE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of August, 2016.
The Issue Whether Respondent discriminated against Petitioner in the rental of a dwelling based on her race, in violation of Florida Fair Housing Act, chapter 760, Part II, Florida Statutes (2015).
Findings Of Fact The following Findings of Fact are based on the exhibit admitted into evidence and testimony offered by witnesses at the final hearing. Ms. Smith is a Black female and currently resides in Gainesville, Florida. Saul Silber Properties is a company that manages Oak Glade located at 3427 Southwest 30th Terrace, Gainesville, Florida 32608. Respondent provides residential rental apartments in Gainesville, Florida. Saul Silber is the owner of Saul Silber Properties. Ms. Smith is a former resident of apartment number 54I of Oak Glade.1/ Ms. Smith rented the apartment pursuant to a residential lease agreement entered into on January 15, 2014.2/ The lease was for a one-year renewable term. Ms. Smith filed a complaint with the Commission alleging Respondent issued her a Notice of Non-Renewal of her lease agreement on the basis of her race. The Commission issued a “No Cause” determination and Ms. Smith filed a Petition for Relief, which is the matter before the undersigned. During her tenancy at Oak Glade, Ms. Smith had raised numerous complaints with the property manager regarding matters involving her neighbor, Anne E. Dowling. Ms. Dowling, who was White, was a former resident of apartment number 54H. Ms. Smith’s issues with Ms. Dowling included complaints concerning smoking, loud music, non-residents living in the apartment, the number of visitors outside Ms. Dowling’s apartment, and Ms. Dowling’s cat scratching her car. All of the complaints were addressed and resolved by the property manager. The incident that led to the major blow-up between the neighbors involved Ms. Smith and Ms. Dowling’s daughter. Ms. Smith and Ms. Dowling’s daughter were involved in a verbal altercation after Ms. Smith verbally reprimanded Ms. Dowling’s granddaughter (age range of 7-9 years old) and her friend. Ms. Smith testified that the two girls turned their backs to her, bent over, and wiggled their buttocks in a side-to-side motion. Ms. Smith understood this gesture to be disrespectful and a suggestion to “kiss their behinds.” Ms. Dowling’s daughter was not a resident of the apartment complex. The altercation was so loud that Ms. Osteen heard people “screaming” while she was in her office. Ms. Osteen discovered Ms. Smith and Ms. Dowling’s daughter involved in a screaming match. Ms. Osteen later consulted with the senior property manager about the incident and it was determined that both Ms. Dowling and Ms. Smith would be issued a Notice of Non-Renewal. On March 15, 2016, Respondent issued Ms. Smith and Ms. Dowling a Notice of Non-Renewal, which was posted on the door of each tenant’s respective apartment. The notices did not state a reason for non-renewal. Ms. Dowling’s lease would expire effective May 30, 2016; and Ms. Smith’s lease would expire effective December 30, 2016. Prior to expiration of her lease, Ms. Dowling advised Ms. Osteen that she was terminally ill and requested that she be permitted to stay at Oak Glade. Ms. Dowling explained that her support system was located in the area and due to financial limitations, moving from the complex would create a hardship for her. For these reasons, Ms. Dowling was permitted to enter a new lease and was moved to a different apartment. The decision to permit Ms. Dowling to remain at the complex was made by the senior property manager. Ms. Dowling passed away approximately four months later, on September 28, 2016. Other than her mistaken belief that Ms. Dowling did not receive a Notice of Non-Renewal, Ms. Smith did not offer any evidence to support her claim of housing discrimination in violation of the Florida Fair Housing Act.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a final order: finding that Respondent, Saul Silber Properties, LLC, did not commit a discriminatory housing practice against Petitioner, Ms. Smith; and dismissing the Petition for Relief filed in FCHR No. 2017H0320. DONE AND ENTERED this 29th day of August, 2018, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S YOLONDA Y. GREEN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of August, 2018.
