The Issue The issue in this case is whether the termination of Respondent was in accordance with the personnel policy and procedures established by Emerald Coast Utility Authority.
Findings Of Fact ECUA was created in 1981 pursuant to Chapter 81-376, Laws of Florida. By law, it provides utility services throughout Escambia County, Florida. On September 25, 2006, Respondent was employed by Petitioner as a lead service worker. At the time, Respondent was given a copy of the employee handbook and the Drug Free Work Place Program notice. Receipt of both documents was acknowledged by Respondent. Until the time of the incident described in this order, Respondent was considered an excellent employee with high potential for advancement. The handbook is a summary of Petitioner’s human resource policies. Specific human resource policies are contained in Petitioner’s Human Resource Policy Manual. The Human Resource Policy Manual states, in relevant part, as follows: * * * Section F-4 Disciplinary Offenses (29) Use of or Being Under the Influence of any Controlled Substance as Defined in Section 893.03, Florida Statutes or Federal regulation, Not Pursuant to Lawful Prescription While on Duty; or Possession, Sale, ‘Illegal drug’ means any controlled substance as defined in Section 893.03, Florida Statutes or Federal regulation, which is not possessed, sold, distributed, or dispensed in accordance with law. * * * (33) Violation of ECUA Rules or Policies or State or Federal Law. The failure to abide by ECUA rules, policies, directives or state or federal statutes . . . . Chapter G Drug and Alcohol Abuse Policy It is a condition of employment with the Escambia County Utilities Authority for an employee to refrain from reporting to work or working with the presence of drugs and alcohol in his or her body. If an employee tests positive for alcohol or drugs, his or her employment may be terminated . . . Section G-2 Definitions B. ‘Drug abuse’ means the use of any controlled substance as defined in Section 893.03, Florida Statutes, as amended from time to time, not pursuant to lawful prescription. The term ‘drug abuse’ also includes the commission of any act prohibited by Chapter 893.03, Florida Statutes, as amended from time to time. The use of illegal drugs, or being under the influence of illegal drugs on the job, by ECUA employees is strictly prohibited. Section G-5 Rehabilitative/Corrective Action B. Any employee found to have possessed, used or been under the influence of illegal drugs or alcohol while on duty shall be subject to disciplinary action, up to and including dismissal . . . . E. Any employee who tests positive for alcohol or who tests positive for illegal drugs on a confirmation test shall be subject to disciplinary action, up to and including dismissal . . . . On August 14, 2009, Respondent was driving an ECUA vehicle while performing his job duties for Petitioner. Respondent did not see a low-hanging tree branch and struck the branch with the vehicle, causing minor damage to the vehicle. Respondent contacted his supervisor to report the accident. Respondent’s supervisor met Respondent at the accident site. He did not observe any behavior by Respondent that would indicate he was under the influence of any substance. However, because a vehicle accident had occurred, Respondent was required by ECUA policy to undergo a urine test for drugs and alcohol. That day, Respondent reported to LabCorp, ECUA’s occupational testing services company. LabCorp is a licensed facility under state and federal law to obtain urine samples for drug-testing purposes. Respondent was seen by a LabCorp technician who was well-qualified to obtain and process urine samples. The technician checked Respondent’s identification and had him empty his pockets prior to the test. The technician gave Respondent a sample cup, with a temperature strip on it. The temperature strip helps ensure that the liquid in the cup is close to body temperature indicating the liquid is urine and has not been adulterated. Respondent took both cups in the bathroom and urinated in them. Respondent returned the sample to the technician. In the presence of Respondent, the technician checked the temperature of the sample, which was normal. The technician then split the sample into to two test tubes, sealed each tube, labeled them and had Respondent initial each tube. The technician recorded her activity in processing the sample on a custody and control form which Respondent then signed, acknowledging the sample-taking process. Again in the presence of Respondent, both the custody and control form and the two samples were placed in a sample bag which was sealed with an evidence sticker and placed in a locked specimen box for transport to a licensed testing facility in North Carolina. There was no evidence that appropriate procedures were not followed by LabCorp in processing Respondent’s urine sample. Respondent’s sample arrived at LabCorp’s testing facility at Triangle Park in North Carolina on August 17, 2009. Sample A was used for initial testing and Sample B was frozen to preserve it for later testing if required. The sample was tracked through the test process by number and the name of Respondent is not known to the technician performing the tests. The first test performed on Respondent’s sample A was an immunoassay test. The sample was initially tested with a cut-off level of 15 nanograms per milliliter. The cut-off level is used to limit the possibility of a positive result due to secondhand exposure. Respondent’s sample tested positive for Cannabis. Since the sample was positive, it was sent for gas chromatography/mass spectrometry (GCMS) confirmation testing. GCMS tests for the presence of THC, the exact metabolite of marijuana. Respondent’s sample produced a positive result for THC. The results were reported to ECUA’s medical review officer and to ECUA. Upon learning of the positive test results, Respondent requested that the second sample be tested by another lab. The sample was sent to another LabCorp testing facility in Houston, Texas. Unfortunately, the second sample tested positive for marijuana. Respondent had no explanation for the positive test results and testified that he had not used marijuana for some 15 years. However, no credible evidence was produced at hearing that demonstrated the samples were adulterated, mixed up or improperly tested. Given these facts, Petitioner has established that Respondent tested positive for marijuana and that such results violate its drug policy.
Recommendation Based upon the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is Recommended that the Executive Director of the Emerald Coast Utility Authority find that Respondent violated its Human Resource Policies F-4 (29) and (33) and impose such discipline on Respondent as determined appropriate. DONE AND ENTERED this 27th day of May, 2010, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DIANE CLEAVINGER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of May, 2010. COPIES FURNISHED: John E. Griffin, Esquire Carson & Adkins 2930 Wellington Circle, North, Suite 201 Tallahassee, Florida 32309 Terrance D. Peace 5748 Juergen Way Milton, Florida 32570 Richard C. Anderson, SPHR Director of Human Resources & Administrative Services Emerald Coast Utilities Authority 9255 Sturdevant Street Pensacola, Florida 32514 Steve Sorrell, Executive Director Emerald Coast Utilities Authority 9255 Sturdevant Street Pensacola, Florida 32514
The Issue The issue is whether the termination of Respondent's employment was in accordance with the personnel policy and procedure established by Emerald Coast Utilities Authority (ECUA).
Findings Of Fact ECUA was created in 1981 pursuant to chapter 81-376, Laws of Florida. By law, it provides utility services throughout Escambia County, Florida. Respondent was employed by Petitioner in May 2010. On May 3, 2010, Respondent signed a written acknowledgement of ECUA's drug-free workplace program and agreed to be tested according to section 440.101-.102, Florida Statutes, and ECUA's Drug and Alcohol Policy. Respondent also acknowledged, in writing, receipt of the ECUA Employee Handbook on May 10, 2010. Until the incident described in this order, Respondent was considered by his direct supervisor to be an excellent employee. The handbook is a summary of Petitioner's human resource policies. Specific human resource policies are contained in Petitioner's Human Resource Policy Manual. The manual states, in relevant part: Section F-4 Disciplinary Offenses (29) Use of or Being Under the Influence of any Controlled Substance as defined in Section 893.03, Florida Statutes or Federal regulation, Not Pursuant to a Lawful Prescription While on Duty; or Possession, Sale, "Illegal drug" means any controlled substance as defined in Section 893.03, Florida Statutes or Federal regulation which is not possessed, sold, distributed, or dispensed in accordance with law. * * * (33) Violation of ECUA Rules or Policies or State or Federal Law. The failure to abide by ECUA rules, policies, directives or state or federal statutes. . . . * * * CHAPTER G DRUG AND ALCOHOL ABUSE POLICY It is a condition of employment with the Escambia County Utilities Authority for an employee to refrain from reporting to work or working with the presence of drugs or alcohol in his or her body. * * * If an employee tests positive for alcohol or drugs, his employment may be terminated . . . . * * * Section G-2 Definitions "Drug abuse" means the use of any controlled substance as defined in Section 893.03, Florida Statutes, as amended from time to time, not pursuant to lawful prescription. The term "drug abuse" also includes the commission of any act prohibited by Chapter 893.03, Florida Statutes, as amended from time to time. The use of illegal drugs, or being under the influence of illegal drugs on the job, by ECUA employees is strictly prohibited. Section G-5 Rehabilitative/Corrective Action B. Any employee found to have possessed, used or been under the influence of illegal drugs or alcohol while on duty shall be subject to disciplinary action, up to and including dismissal . . . . * * * E. Any employee who tests positive for alcohol or who tests positive for illegal drugs on a confirmation test shall be subject to disciplinary action, up to and including dismissal . . . . On August 4, 2011, Respondent was driving an ECUA vehicle, a knuckle boom truck used for picking up large garbage items, while performing his job duties for Petitioner. After making a trip to the Perdido Landfill, Respondent failed to completely lower the boom on the truck. As he drove the truck from the landfill, the boom made contact with some power lines and brought them down. While there was no damage to the ECUA truck, the damage to the power lines was estimated to be $3,000. Power was disconnected to the downed lines and no injuries occurred. Respondent called his supervisor, Mike Emmons, who went to the scene of the accident, secured the area, and called his supervisor, Randy Rudd, to report the downed power lines. Mr. Emmons also called Carrie Langley, the ECUA Human Resources Director. He did not witness any behavior to indicate Respondent was under the influence of alcohol or drugs. Since a vehicle accident had occurred, and in accordance with ECUA policies, Respondent was required to undergo a urine test for drugs and alcohol. After Respondent signed a consent form for the drug and alcohol test, Mr. Emmons drove Respondent to LabCorp, ECUA's occupational testing services company. LabCorp is a licensed facility under state and federal law to obtain urine samples for drug testing purposes. Respondent was seen by a LabCorp technician, who was well-qualified to obtain and process urine samples. The technician checked Respondent's identification and had him empty his pockets prior to the test. The technician gave Respondent a sample cup with a temperature strip on it. The temperature strip helps ensure that the liquid in the cup is close to body temperature indicating the liquid is urine and has not been adulterated. Respondent took the cup into the bathroom and urinated into it. Respondent returned the sample to the technician. In the presence of Respondent, the technician checked the temperature of the sample which was normal. The technician then split the sample into two test tubes, sealed each tube, labeled them, and had Respondent initial each tube. The technician recorded her activity in processing the sample on a custody and control form which Respondent then signed, acknowledging the sample-taking process. Again in the presence of Respondent, both the custody and control form and the two samples were placed in a sample bag which was sealed with an evidence sticker and placed in a locked specimen box for transport to a licensed drug testing facility in North Carolina. There was no evidence that appropriate and thorough procedures were not followed in the collection and processing of Respondent's urine sample. Respondent's sample arrived at LabCorp's testing facility at Research Triangle Park in North Carolina on August 5, 2011. Sample A was used for initial testing and Sample B was frozen to preserve it for later testing if required. The sample was tracked through the testing process by number and the name of Respondent is not known to the technician performing the tests. The first test performed on Respondent's Sample A was an immunoassay test. The sample was initially tested with various cut-off levels for the types of drugs tested, ranging from 15 nanograms per milliliter (ng/mL) for Cannabis to 2000 ng/mL for Opiates. The cut-off levels are used to limit the possibility of a positive result due to secondhand exposure. Respondent's sample tested presumptive positive for Benzoylecgonine, a metabolite which demonstrates the presence of cocaine in the subject's system. Since the sample was positive, it was sent for gas chromatography/mass spectrometry (GCMS) confirmation testing. GCMS tests with greater specificity for the presence of Benzoylecgonine. Respondent's sample tested positive at a level of 506 ng/mL, a significant amount above the screening threshold of 300 ng/mL. The results were reported to ECUA's medical review officer and to ECUA. Upon learning of the positive test results, Respondent, at his own expense, requested that the second sample be tested by another lab. The sample was sent to another LabCorp testing facility in Raritan, New Jersey. The second sample also tested positive for cocaine. As an explanation for the positive test for cocaine, Respondent testified that his dentist had given him anesthetics for some serious dental work that may have included cocaine. Respondent produced his medical records, but no cocaine or cocaine derivative (including the metabolite for cocaine) was listed among the anesthetics given by the dentist. Septocaine, one of the anesthetics used, is not cocaine or a cocaine derivative according to Dr. Carol Law, from LabCorp. Respondent further attempted to explain the presence of cocaine in his urine by stating that the dentist had given him some anesthetics for pain that he did not put on the charts because they were illegal substances, such as cocaine. This testimony is not credible, and no credible evidence was produced at hearing to demonstrate any of the samples were adulterated, mixed up, or improperly tested. Given these facts, Petitioner has established that Respondent tested positive for cocaine in violation of ECUA drug policy.
Recommendation Based upon the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, RECOMMENDED that the Executive Director of ECUA find that Respondent violated sections F-4(29) and (33) of the ECUA Human Resources Policy Manual and impose such discipline on Respondent as deemed appropriate. DONE AND ENTERED this 31st day of January, 2012, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ROBERT S. COHEN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of January, 2012. COPIES FURNISHED: John Edmund Griffin, Esquire Carson and Adkins 2930 Wellington Circle, North, Suite 201 Tallahassee, Florida 32309 A. J. Stovall, II 8351 Calvert Street Pensacola, Florida 32514 Richard C. Anderson, Director Human Resources and Administrative Services Emerald Coast Utilities Authority 9255 Sturdevant Street Pensacola, Florida 32514 Steve Sorrell, Executive Director Emerald Coast Utilities Authority 9255 Sturdevant Street Pensacola, Florida 32514
The Issue The issues to be resolved in this proceeding concern whether the Respondent is guilty of conduct which violates certain provisions of the Emerald Coast Utilities Authority (ECUA) policy manual, amounting to "conduct unbecoming a ECUA employee" and "sexual harassment."
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner, ECUA, is an agency of local government, established pursuant to an enabling act of the Florida Legislature at Chapter 81-376, Laws of Florida, as amended. It is a "regional water supply authority" for purposes of Sections 163.01 and 373.1962, Florida Statutes (2008). It is thereby given authority to supply utility services to persons and businesses residing in a defined area in Escambia County, Florida, including the provision of water and wastewater utility service. It is authorized in that act to employ personnel to secure the provision of such utility services and to regulate the conditions and terms of their employment, their retention, their hiring, and their termination, as well as other forms of employee discipline. It has provided for such regulation of its personnel through the adoption of a "Human Resources Policy Manual" (Manual). That manual was adopted in accordance with Part III, Chapter 112, Florida Statutes. The Petitioner also has promulgated an "Employee Handbook," in evidence as ECUA Exhibit Two. Page 32 of that Handbook addresses "rules of conduct" and Rule 4 of those rules of conduct precludes an employee from engaging in "conduct unbecoming a ECUA employee." Sexual harassment is also prohibited, by Employee Handbook Rule 24, at page 32. Sexual harassment is then defined at Section A- 4, page 4 of the Human Resources Policy Manual, in evidence as ECUA Exhibit 1. Ms. Deni Deron was hired as a "Utility Worker I" beginning on June 1, 2008. Nathan Thomas, a witness in this case, was hired as a Utility Worker I on a permanent basis on June 16, 2008. He had been a temporary worker before that time. The Respondent, Emmett R. Woods, Jr. (Woods or Respondent), was the supervisor of Ms. Deron and Mr. Thomas. Both were probationary employees for six months after their hiring date. The Respondent's job title was "Lead Worker," which is a sort of foreman. He was assigned responsibility for a "camera truck," a work truck carrying a television camera projection apparatus, designed to use a television camera to observe inside waste water mains, accessible at manholes, in order to determine sources of leakage, breakage or other issues related to wastewater main repair and maintenance. Sometime in early October 2008, Ms. Deron, the complainant, was assigned to the Respondent's camera truck, to be supervised by him in the duties performed through the use of that truck. Early in her period of assignment to the truck and the company of the Respondent, probably on the first day, while they were alone in the truck, the Respondent began kissing her without her permission. This made her uncomfortable, although she did not take any particular overt action about it at the time. Later in that day, however, she told the Respondent that it had made her feel uncomfortable and that he should leave her alone and "be just friends." The Respondent behaved in a normal fashion for the next couple of days and engaged in no harassment of her. Thereafter, however, he began inappropriately touching her on one occasion or another, principally while they were riding in the work truck, on almost a daily basis. He engaged in vulgar, sexually related conversation with her. This was without her invitation, although she admittedly engaged in some of such conversation with him as well. Such talk on her part, however, was in a joking vein and was usually in a situation where several employees were together at lunch, or on occasions of that nature, when such joking conversation would begin, in which she admittedly participated. This was not the situation when the Respondent and Ms. Deron were alone in the work truck and elsewhere on the job. The Respondent engaged in inappropriate touching of Ms. Deron on a frequent basis. He touched her by unclasping her bra through her shirt, by unexpectedly running his hand beneath her shirt and grabbing her breast, and at various times grabbing her breast and crotch. All this activity was uninvited and uninitiated by Ms. Deron. She was upset by it and did not enjoy it, as her testimony shows, as corroborated by that of her co- worker, Nathan Thomas, who observed much of the conduct. Nathan Thomas, in fact, observed such conduct make her cry on a number of occasions. The Respondent alluded to his close relationship with the director of their department and intimated to both Ms. Deron and Mr. Thomas that he and the director fished together, were good friends, and that he could get them fired if he chose. Ms. Deron told Nathan Thomas about the Respondent's conduct about two weeks after they had been assigned to his truck (and he observed much of it as well). She told him that she was going to try to video his conduct when it happened again. Mr. Thomas described her demeanor as being upset and crying at the time. In fact, Ms. Deron did use her video cell phone to video some of the Respondent's inappropriate touching and conduct, both physical and verbal. This was stored on an ECUA computer and displayed to the undersigned, and all parties, at the hearing. This tends to corroborate the testimony of Ms. Deron and Nathan Thomas. Nathan Thomas, in fact, testified that he observed the Respondent touch Ms. Deron inappropriately, in one way or another, approximately every other day. Ms. Deron admitted that she did some flirting when she first came to work at ECUA. She described it as being a function of being single and was flirting mostly as a mechanism to "fit in, in an all male staff." That fact, however, does not obviate the clear import of her testimony, that of Nathan Thomas, and that of Sharon Griffin. Ms. Griffin is a Human Relations Generalist II, working in employee relations for ECUA. She does recruiting, knows Ms. Deron and helped her get hired and "processed-in" to her job. Just before Thanksgiving in November 2008, she observed Ms. Deron outside her office and had a conversation with her. She noticed Ms. Deron appeared somewhat nervous and asked her how she was getting along with an all male crew. At that point they agreed to have a private talk within Ms. Griffin's office. Ms. Deron at that point tearfully told her of the conduct of the Respondent. Ms. Deron also gave Ms. Griffin access to the video made on Ms. Deron's cell phone. The gravamen of Ms. Griffin's testimony is that Ms. Deron clearly appeared sincere and genuinely upset about the matter and this helped to convince Ms. Griffin that it was a truthful account of what had happened. Nathan Thomas, in his testimony, stated that the Respondent made him afraid for his job so he did not report what he had observed. He testified that he felt, at first, that it was not his place to report the Respondent's conduct. When he saw how upset Ms. Deron was he apologized to her for not reporting it, and realizes that he should have. The Respondent's testimony, and that of his witnesses, was to the general effect that Ms. Deron was not a "quiet person" and freely engaged in sexually suggestive joking conversation with them, and other workers, regarding sexual matters such as "penis size" and how long it had been since one had sex. The Respondent and his witnesses described Ms. Deron as being flirtatious. The Respondent, for his part, testified that "me and Deni did fool around" but the Respondent contends that it was just flirting, was not forced and was consensual. In considering the testimony of Ms. Griffin, Ms. Deron and Mr. Thomas, versus that of the Respondent and the Respondent's witnesses, it is observed that the Respondent's witnesses are his co-workers, in a relationship that pre-dates Ms. Deron's employment. Their testimony may cast Ms. Deron in a less favorable light by inferring that the activity may have been consensual. It does not establish that fact, however, and does not refute the Respondent's perpetration of the above- described conduct. They did not observe the conduct. Ms. Deron and Mr. Thomas did observe it and the manner of its occurrence is corroborated by Ms. Griffin's testimony. The testimony of Ms. Deron, Mr. Thomas, and Ms. Griffin is more germane, credible and worthy of belief and is accepted. It is thus established that the inappropriate touching and other sexually-related behavior, inflicted by the Respondent on Ms. Deron occurred in the manner described above. It was not consensual. Even if Ms. Deron attracted such behavior, or seemed to invite it, based upon being somewhat flirtatious, the behavior of the Respondent was still not appropriate and, by any measure, constitutes sexual misconduct and harassment, occurring in the course of employment. This is particularly so since the Respondent occupied a position of superior power, as the supervisor of Ms. Deron and Mr. Thomas, and in fact threatened their employment, at least implicitly, if they revealed the subject conduct. Moreover, even if the Respondent's version were somewhat true (which is not accepted), and Ms. Deron invited this conduct, and was a willing participant in it, it is still a violation of the above-referenced rules applying to ECUA employees. Engaging in such conduct, even if consensual, on the employer's truck, when attention should be paid to duties, and with all the negative circumstances that such sexually-related conduct can cause, displays extremely bad judgment on the part of the Respondent. Such a lavish display of poor judgment, even if the conduct did not amount to sexual harassment, clearly is conduct unbecoming a ECUA employee within the meaning of the Petitioner's above-referenced rule.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner graduated from a technical high school in Massachusetts and studied electricity at the Wentworth and Coyne Institutes. He served a three year apprenticeship and subsequently obtained the Massachusetts journeyman and master electrician licenses. He entered the electrical contracting business in 1960 and thereafter engaged in commercial, industrial, and residential electrical contracting work in Massachusetts. All projects were completed without default. Petitioner moved to Florida one year ago intending to set up an electrical contracting business here. However, Respondent denied his application for licensure by endorsement and he has deferred his business plans until the licensing issue is resolved.
Recommendation From the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Petition of Robert F. Toscano for licensure as an electrical contractor by endorsement be denied. DONE AND ENTERED this day of March, 1981 in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. R. T. CARPENTER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6 day of March, 1981. COPIES FURNISHED: Susan Tully, Esquire Assistant Attorney General Department of Legal Affairs The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Mr. Robert F. Toscano Post Office Box 1563 Belleview, Florida 32620
The Issue Whether Petitioner, Karen L. Ehlers was wrongfully terminated from her position with Respondent, Florida Employers Insurance Service Corporation because of her handicap or perceived handicap in violation of Section 760.10(1)(a), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following relevant findings of fact are made: FEISCO is a Florida corporation which is in the business of providing insurance-related services to insurance companies, self-insurer funds and self- insured employers, and is an employer as that term is defined in Section 760.02(6), Florida Statutes. FEISCO has a department called Information Services (formerly known as Management Information Services) which is responsible for providing the computer information systems within FEISCO and maintaining the many applications and data bases used by other FEISCO departments. The Petitioner, Karen L. Ehlers, was employed by FEISCO from July 17, 1989, to November 15, 1990, as a computer programmer in the Information Services department. The minimum education requirement for the position of computer programmer was two years' computer science education or equivalent Micro/Mini exposure. Petitioner holds a bachelor's degree in mathematics with an emphasis in computer science. As a computer programmer, Petitioner's job duties included writing computer programs, designed by analysts, using several computer languages and working and communicating with analysts and program users to correct design problems to assure the final program fit the user's needs. At all times during her employment with FEISCO, Petitioner was supervised by Joan Zare, Production Supervisor, Information Services department. Zare was responsible for overseeing Petitioner's training during her probationary period and for all formal evaluations of Petitioner's work. John Keegan, Manager of FEISCO's Information Services department, was Zare's immediate supervisor at all times relevant to this proceeding. Keegan reviewed and approved the written evaluations of Petitioner by Zare, but did not review Petitioner's work. Keegan did not have any direct knowledge of Petitioner's competence, and did not interview either Zare or Petitioner regarding the evaluations. Jim Venza, Director of Information Services for FEISCO, was Keegan's immediate supervisor at all times relevant to this proceeding. Venza had no direct knowledge of Petitioner's work performance. Upon being hired by FEISCO, Petitioner was subject to a ninety-day probationary period. After this probationary period (July 7, 1989 to October 13, 1989), Zare gave Petitioner a positive evaluation which included ratings of "Achieves" in all performance standards. Zare viewed Petitioner's overall performance during her probationary period as satisfactory and recommended Petitioner for full employee status. In January, 1990, Petitioner received a salary adjustment upward from $20,000.00 to $20,500.00 In June, 1990, Petitioner received a congratulatory memorandum and a $50.00 bonus for successfully completing a Property and Liability Insurance course and examination. FEISCO encouraged its employees to take course work to increase their knowledge of insurance and to join Toastmasters, a group organized to help its members improve self-confidence and public speaking skills. Petitioner participated in outsider course work and Toastmasters. On July 4, 1990, Petitioner was diagnosed as having chronic fatigue syndrome. This condition did not restrict Petitioner in her job as a computer programmer or effect her work negatively. On July 9, 1990, Petitioner advised Zare that she had chronic fatigue syndrome. On July 17, 1990, Zare gave Petitioner her first annual performance evaluation. Although Petitioner had experienced some problems with her work during the period after her probationary performance evaluation, Zare felt that her job performance in the latter part of the evaluation period indicated that Petitioner had overcome those problems. Zare rated the Petitioner as achieving at or above the standards expected of her in all areas of her job performance. In one area of work Petitioner was rated as "Exceeds". While Zare considered Petitioner as performing satisfactory at the time of her first annual performance evaluation, it was understood between Petitioner and Zare that continued improvement by the Petitioner would be necessary in order for Petitioner to maintain a satisfactory performance rating. On October 15, 1990, Keegan and Bob Burgoon, a program analyst, assigned Petitioner to the extra duty of Problem Manager. The duties of Problem Manager involved reviewing and solving problems with programs which were called in by users, and required being on-call to assist operations during off-hours. The job of Problem Manager had previously been rotated among analysts and not assigned to programmers. However, the job of Problem Manager was assigned to Petitioner because Keegan and Burgoon felt that she could handle the job. On October 16, 1990, Petitioner advised Keegan of her previously diagnosed medical condition, and presented Keegan with a written statement from her doctor recommending that Petitioner restrict herself to a forty-hour week. Petitioner advised Keegan that she still wanted to try the Problem Manager's job. However, Keegan decided not to "second guess" the doctor and removed Petitioner from the Problem Manager duties. There is insufficient evidence to establish facts to show that Keegan at any time, including the meeting with Petitioner on October 15, 1990, advised the Petitioner that her medical condition would adversely affect her job with FEISCO. Petitioner became concerned about her job after the meeting with Keegan on October 15, 1990 and discussed this matter with Frances White in personnel on October 22, 1990. Petitioner also shared these same concerns about her job with Zare on October 23, 1990. At this meeting with Zare there was no reference to Petitioner's job performance by Zare. On this same day, Zare met with Venza and Keegan together and with White individually in regard to Petitioner's concerns. On October 24, 1990, Petitioner met with Zare and White. At this meeting, Zare and Petitioner discussed concerns about Petitioner's job performance. They also discussed Zare's intention to develop a detailed list of skills necessary for the satisfactory performance of the programmer position which would be used to revise the current programmer position description, and would involve a self-assessment by all programmers. The purpose of the self- assessment was to identify the areas in which the programmers felt they needed improvement. After each programmer finished their respective self-assessment, Zare reviewed the self-assessment individually with each programmer. In reviewing Petitioner's self-assessment, Zare concluded that Petitioner had overrated her abilities in several areas. After Zare concluded the review of the individual self-assessments with each programmer, Zare prepared a memorandum of her findings to all programmers. The memorandum outlined a proposed training project that was to be given in conjunction with the individual self-assessment. As with other programmers, Petitioner was assigned a series of projects to be completed as part of this training. As each part of the project was completed, Zare orally evaluated the Petitioner's performance and tested the program and reviewed the coding used by Petitioner. Errors were pointed out to Petitioner and she was given an opportunity to correct the errors. On November 14, 1990, after completion of the entire project, Zare reviewed Petitioner's work and prepared a written appraisal of Petitioner's performance on the project. The written appraisal described Petitioner's shortcomings but also included some positive criticism. Zare concluded that Petitioner's work on the project was below the expected standard. Basically, the written appraisal was contradictory to all performance evaluations previously given to Petitioner by Zare. The programmers, other than Petitioner and Chris Brady, were unable to begin work on the project due to prior work commitments before Zare was transferred to another department. After Zare was transferred this project was terminated. While Zare did verbally counsel Brady about his work, Brady did not receive a written appraisal by Zare before her transfer. Therefore, Petitioner was the only programmer to receive a written appraisal of her work on the project. On November 14, 1990 when Petitioner met with Zare to review Zare's written appraisal of her performance, the Petitioner became upset and defensive. Therefore, Zare suggested that the Petitioner review the appraisal overnight and come back the next day to discuss the appraisal. Petitioner did not return to discuss the appraisal with Zare. Petitioner's failure to return and discuss the appraisal with Zare resulted in Zare concluding that Petitioner was unwilling to accept constructive criticism of her performance. This precluded Zare from working with Petitioner to attain any progress. Therefore, Zare concluded that nothing could be accomplished in attempting to work with Petitioner in the future. Therefore, Zare recommended to Keegan and Venza that Petitioner be terminated. Although Zare considered Petitioner's work performance to be below standards, Zare would not have recommended Petitioner's termination had it not been for Petitioner's very negative reaction and her unwillingness to discuss the appraisal with Zare. Petitioner's employment with FEISCO was involuntarily terminated on November 15, 1990. Between being terminated with FEISCO and being re-employed, Petitioner lost ten weeks of pay at $418.00 per week, an annual bonus equal to one month's pay and other monetary damages in the form of lost medical benefits. Although FEISCO had several employees that suffered a medical condition during times relevant to this proceeding, there was no evidence that FEISCO discriminated against any of these employees because of their medical condition. There was insufficient evidence to establish facts to show that FEISCO discriminated against Petitioner because of her medical condition, chronic fatigue syndrome, when FEISCO terminated Petitioner on November 15, 1990.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Commission enter a Final Order finding that the Petitioner, Karen Ehlers, was not discharged due to her handicap or perceived handicap in violation of Section 760.10, Florida Statutes, and that the Petition For Relief be dismissed. RECOMMENDED this 26th day of May, 1993, at Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM R. CAVE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of May, 1993. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 92-3782 The following constitutes my specific rulings, pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on all of the proposed findings of fact submitted by the parties in this case. Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact. 1. Proposed Findings of Fact 1 through 31 have been adopted in substance as modified in the Recommended Order, except where they may be subordinate, cumulative, unnecessary, irrelevant, immaterial or a restatement of testimony, with the exception of the second sentence of Proposed Finding of Fact 30 which is rejected as not being supported by competent substantial evidence in the record. Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact. Proposed Findings of Fact 1 through 18 and 22 through 55 have been adopted in substance as modified in the Recommended Order, except where they may be subordinate, cumulative, unnecessary, irrelevant, immaterial. Proposed Findings of Fact 19 through 21 are rejected as not being supported by competent substantial evidence in the record. COPIES FURNISHED: Snowden S. Mowry, Esquire KANETSKY, MOOR & DEBOER, P. A. Post Office Box 1767 Venice, Florida 34284-1767 David J. Stefany, Esquire HOGG, ALLEN, NORTON & BLUER, P. A. S. Hyde Park Avenue, Suite 350 Tampa, Florida 33606 Sharon Moultry, Clerk Human Relations Commission John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahasse, Florida 32303-4149 Dana Baird, General Counsel Human Relations Commission 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149
The Issue Whether Respondent knowingly submitted an inaccurate timesheet for April 4, 2018, as charged in the agency action letter dated May 11, 2018.
Findings Of Fact ECUA is a public utility that provides water, wastewater, and sanitation services to customers in Escambia and Santa Rosa counties. ECUA’s mission statement specifies that the Board and employees of ECUA “are committed to providing the highest quality service” and that “ECUA will always provide cost- effective services.” The Manual sets forth the terms and conditions of employment with ECUA. The Manual specifies that: Overtime work should be for emergency or unforeseen situations and to solve problems which are not a part of the daily activities. Supervisors are expected to use overtime work sparingly and employees should respond when called upon. Overtime and compensatory time authorization will be established by the supervisor with the approval of the department director. During the relevant time period, ECUA employed Mr. Boyd as an Industrial Plant Mechanic I. On June 26, 2012, Mr. Boyd signed a document acknowledging that a copy of the Manual was available to him in his supervisor’s office, via ECUA’s intranet, in ECUA’s Human Resources Department, and via compact disc upon request. Mr. Boyd also acknowledged on June 26, 2012, that it was his “responsibility to read the entire Manual/Handbook and to comply with the plans, guidelines, directives, and procedures contained in the Manual/Handbook and any revisions to it.” As an Industrial Plant Mechanic I, Mr. Boyd works under the supervision of a senior mechanic. He normally begins his workday by reporting to the Central Wastewater Reclamation Facility (“CWRF”) at 7:00 a.m. and is dispatched to assigned worksites. He uses an ECUA truck to travel to and from those sites. Mr. Boyd has a 30-minute lunch break for which he is not compensated. He is also allowed one 15-minute break in the morning and another in the afternoon. Mr. Boyd’s typical workday ends at 3:30 p.m. With a 30-minute lunch break, that amounts to an eight-hour workday. In April of 2018, ECUA needed to replace all of the diffusers at its Bayou Marcus Water Reclamation Facility (“the BMWRF”). Mack H. Weeks, ECUA’s Plant Maintenance Manager at the time, had supervisory authority over Mr. Boyd. Shortly before April 4, 2018, Mr. Boyd mentioned to Mr. Weeks that he wanted to stop at the BMWRF on April 4, 2018, prior to reporting to the CWRF, in order to see if the water level had decreased to a point where the diffusers in question were visible. According to Mr. Boyd, that information would enable him and the three other members of his four-person work crew to ascertain what parts they needed to complete the repair. However, there was no benefit for Mr. Boyd to stop at the BMWRF prior to reporting to the CWRF.3/ At 6:32 a.m. on April 4, 2018, ECUA’s security system recorded Mr. Boyd passing through a gate at the BMWRF. Mr. Boyd took a picture of a portion of the BMWRF a few minutes later. The security system at the CWRF recorded Mr. Boyd entering the facility at 7:13 a.m. on April 4, 2018. Mr. Boyd traveled back to the BMWRF with Kevin Spinks, an ECUA co-worker, in an ECUA work truck that had been assigned to Mr. Spinks. Carl Ayliffe and another ECUA employee were the remainder of the four-person work crew assigned to that job, and they traveled to the BMWRF in a separate ECUA truck. The tank at the BMWRF was on-line by 3:00 p.m. on April 4, 2018. Every ECUA truck has a global positioning system that enables ECUA to know precisely where each truck is at virtually any given point in time. The GPS on Mr. Spinks’ truck was not functioning because the antenna had been disconnected. However, the GPS on Mr. Ayliffe’s truck was functioning and recorded that he was done working at 4:29 p.m., on April 4, 2018.4/ Rather than returning his truck to the CWRF, Mr. Ayliffe drove the truck to his home because he was on call that night. A camera at the back gate of the CWRF recorded Mr. Spinks returning his truck at 5:07 p.m. on April 4, 2018. ECUA’s security system recorded Mr. Boyd using his employee badge to enter the CWRF through the southeast shop door at 5:09 p.m. on April 4, 2018. In consideration of a need to gather any belongings and/or complete paperwork, Mr. Boyd’s work on April 4, 2018, should have ended at approximately 5:30 p.m. on April 4, 2018. On April 16, 2018, Mr. Boyd, Mr. Spinks, and Mr. Ayliffe submitted timesheets indicating that they each worked eight regular hours and three overtime hours on April 4, 2018. Ultimate Findings The greater weight of the evidence demonstrates that there was no benefit to Mr. Boyd stopping at the BMWRF on April 4, 2018, prior to reporting for work at the CWRF. The greater weight of the evidence also demonstrates that his stop at the BMWRF was unauthorized by anyone who supervised Mr. Boyd. As a result, Mr. Boyd’s stop at the BMWRF on April 4, 2018, was an attempt to accumulate unnecessary overtime pay. The undisputed evidence demonstrates that Mr. Boyd began his workday at 7:13 a.m. on April 4, 2018, and his workday should have ended at approximately 5:30 p.m. after he reported back to the CWRF at 5:09 p.m. Given that Mr. Boyd was entitled to a 30-minute, unpaid lunch break, the undisputed evidence indicates that he worked 9.75 hours on April 4, 2018, rather than the 11 hours indicated on his timesheet.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Executive Director of the Emerald Coast Utilities Authority find that Robert D. Boyd, II, violated Section B-3, attendance records; Section B-13 A (4), conduct unbecoming an ECUA employee; Section B-13 A (13), falsification of records; and Section B-13 A (33), violation of ECUA rules or guidelines or state or federal law. DONE AND ENTERED this 17th day of September, 2018, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S G. W. CHISENHALL Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of September, 2018.
