The Issue Whether the Florida Commission on Human Relations (“the Commission”) has jurisdiction over Petitioner’s claim against Respondent.
Findings Of Fact The Commission conducted an investigation of GHA’s allegations. That investigation determined that GHA had not been acting as Ms. Duff’s attorney and that the assistance provided to Ms. Duff was mostly clerical in nature. The investigation also determined that GHA suffered no harm related to housing. As a result, the Commission determined that it had no jurisdiction over GHA’s claim. On November 18, 2016, the Commission issued a “Notice of Determination of No Jurisdiction.” In addition to notifying GHA of its decision, the Commission advised GHA that it could challenge its determination by requesting an administrative hearing. GHA filed a Petition for Relief with the Commission on January 30, 2017, and took issue with the Commission’s determination that it lacked jurisdiction over this matter. With regard to the Commission’s determination that GHA was not Ms. Duff’s attorney, GHA stated the following: Patrick Coleman did admit that he was not an attorney, however Patrick Coleman confirmed on several occasions that he and GHA have in fact been Ms. Kelly Duff’s representative by means of a Power of Attorney since May 11, 2016. Please see the attached Power of Attorney signed by Ms. Duff. Patrick Coleman of GHA admitted to not performing traditional phone testing or in person testing at the respondent[‘s] property – that is correct. However, GHA has stated that their Testing Investigation process included an investigation of the respondent’s housing process, including: the Concord Rental Agreement, the Service Animal Addendum, an in depth review of the Concord Rents website and their published documents, and a review of the Reserve at Brookhaven website followed by a review of their published materials. It was GHA’s investigation, recovery, and scrutiny of the Service Animal Responsibility Addendum that uncovered the potentially discriminatory language which prompted an inquiry regarding the Respondent’s policy addressing assistance animals in the pool area. As for the Commission’s determination that GHA’s assistance to Ms. Duff was mostly clerical in nature, GHA stated that it assisted Ms. Duff with protecting her “Fair Housing Rights” in the following ways: (1) interviewed Ms. Duff in order to verify that she was a bona fide victim of discrimination; (2) provided Ms. Duff with fair housing education via a webinar; (3) wrote two reasonable accommodation requests for Ms. Duff; (4) worked with Ms. Duff’s physician in order to draft a letter describing Ms. Duff’s disability and her need for an assistance animal; (5) wrote, reviewed, and approved all written communications from Ms. Duff to Respondent; (6) interviewed Ms. Duff’s employer; (7) wrote and filed Ms. Duff’s fair housing complaint; and (8) represented Ms. Duff during every phone interview conducted by the Commission. The Commission referred the instant case to the Division of Administrative Hearings (“DOAH”) on January 30, 2017. On February 14, 2017, the undersigned sua sponte issued an “Order to Show Cause” requiring GHA to “show cause on or before March 1, 2017, why the instant case should not be dismissed based on a lack of standing.” GHA did not file any response to the Order to Show Cause.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the Florida Commission on Human Relations dismissing Gratus Housing Advocates’ Petition for Relief due to a lack of jurisdiction. DONE AND ENTERED this 22nd day of March, 2017, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S G. W. CHISENHALL Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of March, 2017. COPIES FURNISHED: Tammy S. Barton, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations Room 110 4075 Esplanade Way Tallahassee, Florida 32399 (eServed) Cheyanne Costilla, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 4075 Esplanade Way, Room 110 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 (eServed) Patrick Coleman Gratus Housing Advocates, Inc. 3513 Provine Road Mckinney, Texas 75070 Brookhaven Development Land LTD Suite 101 700 West Morse Boulevard Winter Park, Florida 32789 Andrew Kemp-Gerstel, Partner 44 West Flagler Street Miami, Florida 33130 (eServed)
The Issue Whether Respondent committed the violations alleged in the Administrative Complaint and, if so, what penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Based on the evidence adduced at hearing, and the record as a whole, the following findings of fact are made: At all times material to the instant case, Respondent operated the House of India (Restaurant), an eating establishment located in Coral Gables, Florida. Respondent is now, and was at times material to the instant case, the holder of a license issued by Petitioner (license number 2313769) authorizing it to operate the Restaurant as a public food service establishment. On the morning of September 28, 2006, Douglas Morgadanes, a Sanitation and Safety Specialist with Petitioner, conducted an inspection of the premises of the Restaurant. His inspection revealed, among other things, that there were, what he believed to be, "rodent droppings" present in the Restaurant, creating "an unsanitary condition [that] could lead to food borne illnesses" if the food served to patrons became contaminated with these droppings. Before leaving the establishment, Mr. Morgadanes advised Respondent that this "unsanitary condition" had to be corrected within 24 hours. The Restaurant closed immediately following the inspection and an extensive cleanup operation was undertaken. In addition, Respondent had "[its] pest control company," Rentokil Pest Control (Rentokil), come to the Restaurant during or around the early morning hours of September 29, 2006, to perform "follow-up" rodent control services. (Rentokil had just made a "routine service" call to the Restaurant on September 27, 2006.) Mr. Morgadanes conducted a "callback" inspection of the Restaurant on September 29, 2006. His inspection revealed that, notwithstanding Respondent's cleanup and rodent control efforts, there were, what appeared to him to be, rodent droppings4 in an unused attic area above, and "a little bit to the side" of, the Restaurant's kitchen. Respondent was unable to produce for Mr. Morgadanes during the "callback" inspection documentation reflecting that Rentokil had been to the Restaurant to provide rodent control services. Respondent subsequently sent such documentation to Mr. Morgadanes' office by facsimile transmission. The documentation for the September 29, 2006, service call (9/29 Documentation) contained the following entries under "Service Performed by Rentokil" and "Cooperation Requested from Customer": Service Performed by Rentokil: Inspected and service[d] facility for pest[s]. Found no activity. Put out glue in kitchen underneath kitchen sink around hole near the back door. Cooperation Requested from Customer: Proofing Adequate? ? Yes ? No Please fix hole underneath sink to prevent rodent harborage. Sanitation Needed? ? Yes ? No Please clean dishwashing station. These entries on the 9/29 Documentation clearly and convincingly establish that, although Respondent had done cleanup work and retained the services of Rentokil in an effort to minimize the presence of rodents in the Restaurant, it had not eliminated harborage conditions on the premises.5 After receiving the documentation from Respondent, Petitioner issued the Administrative Complaint that is the subject of the instant controversy. This was the second time in less than a year that Petitioner had charged Respondent with violating Section 6-301.14 of the Food Code. A prior charge (filed in DBPR Case No. 2005064978) had been disposed of by stipulation, the terms of which were "adopted and incorporated" in a Final Order issued by Petitioner on January 12, 2006. There was no admission or finding of guilt. The "stipulated disposition" of the charge was Respondent's payment of a fine of $500.00 and attending a hospitality education program.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that Petitioner issue a final order finding that Respondent committed the violations alleged in the Administrative Complaint and disciplining Respondent therefor by imposing a fine of $1,000.00 and directing that Respondent attend, at its own expense, a hospitality education program. DONE AND ENTERED this 22nd day of August, 2007, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S STUART M. LERNER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of August, 2007.
The Issue Whether the Respondent committed the violations set forth in the Administrative Complaint dated February 15, 2001, and, if so, the penalty that should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Based on the oral and documentary evidence presented at the final hearing and on the entire record of this proceeding, the following findings of fact are made: 1. The Division is the state agency charged with regulating pari-mutuel wagering pursuant to Chapter 550, Florida Statutes. 2. At all times material to this proceeding, Mr. Haber held an Unrestricted "U1" General pari-mutuel wagering occupational license, number 0097388-1081, issued by the Division. Mr. Haber has held this license for 20 years, and has never been subject to discipline by the Division. 3. Mr. Haber is the owner, with his two brothers, of Haber Kennels, Inc., which was started by his father and has been in business for 30 years. 4. At the times material to this proceeding, Mr. Haber kept in the Palm Beach Kennel Club compound in Palm Beach County, Florida, greyhounds both that he owned and that were owned by others; Mr. Haber trained these greyhounds for racing at the Palm Beach Kennel Club. Mr. Haber and Dale Wilson, his helper, took care of the greyhounds, and Mr. Haber was responsible for feeding and caring for the dogs, as well as for maintaining them in "racetrack form." 5. The greyhounds were kept in two kennels in the compound, Kennel Number 11 and Kennel Number 24. Both kennels have a "turnout area" where the greyhounds are kept when they are let outside the kennel. There is no shade cover in the turnout area of Kennel 24. 6. On August 5S, 2000, Mr. Haber was responsible for caring for the greyhounds housed in Kennel 24. The dogs were let out into the turnout area after they were fed, around 10:00 a.m. The female and male greyhounds were separated, and, after a time, the females were let back into the kennel, while the males were switched to the pen that the females had just vacated. 7. After letting the female greyhounds back into the kennel, Mr. Haber and Mr. Wilson left the compound to pick up some carpet. Mr. Haber thought that Mr. Wilson had put the male greyhounds back in the kennel. 8. Mr. Haber received a telephone call at about 2:00 p.m. from Stacy McClellan, who also trains racing greyhounds at the Palm Beach Kennel Club, and she told him that there had been an accident at the kennel. Mr. Haber rushed back to Kennel 24 and found two greyhounds dead, one greyhound in convulsions and dying, and one greyhound apparently in good health. When he arrived at the kennel, Ms. McClellan and two others were pouring water on the dog that was having convulsions. Ms. McClellan described Mr. Haber as "hysterical" and "upset" when he arrived at the kennel and saw the dead greyhounds. 9. Mr. Haber moved the greyhound that was having convulsions into the air-conditioned kennel, but the dog died while he was trying to cool him down. A fourth greyhound in Mr. Haber's care was found dead in another kennel, which he reached by jumping two fences; this greyhound was named Positive Thought .? 10. Mr. Haber cut off the ears of the dead greyhounds. The ears were tattooed with marks that identified the greyhounds, and Mr. Haber kept the ears until they rotted and the tattoos were illegible. Mr. Haber attributed his actions to panic and fear, and he admitted that it was a mistake to cut the ears off the dogs. 11. Mr. Haber also buried three of the greyhounds, named Haberfield, Mask of Courage, and Tiebreak Winner, on the grounds of the compound, near a sprint track.? 12. The Division was notified of the incident by an official of the Palm Beach Kennel Club on August 30, 2000, and an investigator was sent to look into the incident. 13. As a result of the death of the greyhounds, Mr. Haber was charged in an Information with four misdemeanor counts of cruelty to animals pursuant to Section 828.12(1), Florida Statutes, and four misdemeanor counts of abandonment of an animal pursuant to Section 828.13(3), Florida Statutes. Mr. Haber plead guilty to the four counts of cruelty to animals, and, pursuant to the pleas, the court adjudicated him guilty of Count 1 of the Information and withheld adjudication on Counts 2 through 4. Counts 5 through 8 of the Information, in which Mr. Haber was charged with abandonment of an animal, were disposed of by nolle prosequi. 14. Mr. Haber was sentenced to one year's probation for Count 1 and to six month's probation for Counts 2 through 4, to run consecutively, for a total of 18 month's probation. 15. Mr. Haber was also given six-month's probation by the National Greyhound Association for cutting the ears off of the greyhounds. 16. Mr. Haber expressed remorse at the hearing for the death of the greyhounds, and he testified that leaving the greyhounds outside was accidental. He further testified that he plead guilty to Counts 1 through 4 of the Information because he wanted to get past the incident and to go on with his life. 17. Mr. Haber also testified that he plead guilty on the advice of his attorney and in reliance on her assurance that she had been told by an employee of the Division that the Division would take no action against Mr. Haber for the incident. 18. Mr. Domanic Esposito testified that Mr. Haber trained several greyhounds that he owned and that, in his dealings with Mr. Haber, Mr. Haber was very concerned with the welfare of Mr. Esposito's two greyhounds and put the best interest of the dogs before other considerations. 19. The evidence is uncontroverted that Mr. Haber plead guilty to four misdemeanor counts of cruelty to animals pursuant to Section 828.12(1), Florida Statutes, that he was adjudicated guilty of one count, and that adjudication was withheld on three other counts of cruelty to animals pursuant to Section 828.12(1), Florida Statutes. 20. The uncontroverted evidence is also sufficient to support a finding of fact that the death of the four greyhounds on August 5, 2000, was the result of a miscommunication between Mr. Haber and his helper. The evidence presented by Mr. Haber is sufficient to establish that he did not intentionally leave the greyhounds outside and without shade on a very hot day in August, and no evidence was presented by the Division to dispute Mr. Haber's contention that he had never "had a problem before this incident of losing dogs." The evidence is also sufficient to establish that Mr. Helton used poor judgment after the greyhounds died when he tried to conceal the death of the greyhounds and their identities.
Conclusions Joseph M. Helton, Jr., Esquire Department of Business and Professional Regulation Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering Northwood Centre 1940 North Monroe Street, Suite 60 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2202 Ann Porath, Esquire 12773 Forest Hill Boulevard Suite 209 Wellington, Florida 33414
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered revoking Mitchell Haber's pari-mutuel wagering occupational license. DONE AND ENTERED this 4 Fh aay of June, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. . yi Ahh beg. L/ DYiloae PATRICIA HART MALONO Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 49/4 day of June, 2001.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondent, Christina Viering, discriminated against Petitioner, Bahiyyih Watson, on the basis of Watson's race and/or religion in violation of the Florida Fair Housing Act.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Bahiyyih Watson ("Watson") is a light-skinned Black American3/ female. Watson is an adjunct professor at Valencia Community College, where she teaches cultural anthropology. Watson holds a Ph.D. in anthropology. Watson practices the religion known as Yoruba, which has a tradition of Orishas and places a great emphasis on ancestors. The religion emphasizes African traditions and a respect for elders as well. At all times relevant hereto, Watson was residing in a house at 1830 Dover Road, Winter Park, Florida (the "House"). The House is owned by Respondent, Christina Viering ("Viering"). The House is a three-bedroom house in a residential neighborhood. It has a dining room, living room, kitchen and sun room, each of which was considered a common area for all residents. On August 2, 2008, Watson and Viering entered into a legal document erroneously entitled, "Assignment of Lease" (hereinafter the "Lease"), which called for Viering to rent a room in the House. The Lease has a term of six months, i.e., from August 30, 2008, until February 28, 2009. Viering identified the Lease as a month-to-month lease, but there is no language in the Lease to confirm that description. There is a document attached to the Lease entitled, "Tenant Policies," setting forth various issues relating to the Lease. The attachment contains a provision which states: "MONTH TO MONTH LEASE TERMINATING WITH PROPER NOTICE. WHEN TERMINATING YOUR LEASE, A 30 DAY WRITTEN NOTICE IS REQUIRED." The provision does not explain how it would be interpreted in contravention of the plain language of the Lease. There is nothing in the Lease specifying a particular room for Watson, but the parties testified that Watson occupied the bedroom with a bath, presumably the master suite. The Lease did not identify a specific room for Viering. Viering testified that she resided at the House during the term of the Lease between her and Watson, but did not sleep there every night. Watson said Viering never slept at the House while she, Watson, was there. One neighbor who lived across the street said she believed Viering lived at the House during the time Watson lived there. Another neighbor said she never saw Viering's car at the House overnight and only rarely during the day. The greater weight of the evidence suggests that Viering was at the House only sporadically and probably did not reside there as a residence. At the time Watson signed the Lease, she was working as an adjunct professor at Valencia Community College. She was in the process of submitting an application, including extensive paperwork, to become a tenured professor at the University of South Florida. The application process was intense and required considerable concentration and attention to detail to complete. The application was the most important matter in Watson's life at that time. One of her reasons for selecting the House as a residence was because it was on a quiet street and appeared to be a place where she could work without major distractions. Viering was made aware of this situation. On or about March 17, 2008, another resident, Abbey Nichols, moved into one of the other bedrooms in the House. On October 17, 2008, yet another resident, Kristen Bryan, moved into the third bedroom. Both of the two new tenants were young (twenty-ish) Caucasian women who were of the Christian faith. Each of the new tenants entered into an agreement identical to the Lease, but with different dates of residency. The two new tenants were not inclined to help Watson clean or maintain the House. Viering testified that she slept overnight at the House only two or three times a month. When she slept there, she slept in the Florida room at the rear of the House. The washer and dryer were located in the Florida Room. Again, Watson does not remember Viering ever staying overnight at the House, taking her meals there, or otherwise treating it as her place of residence. Landlord-Tenant Disputes Almost immediately upon Watson taking residence in the House, she and Viering began to have disputes about various and sundry issues. For example: Watson complained that Viering was moving her personal belongings around; Viering said she only moved items off the kitchen table so that she could wash the tablecloth. Watson said that Viering had thrown away some of Watson's kitchenware; Viering said she threw away a styrofoam cup when she was cleaning the kitchen. The disputes soon escalated. On September 17, 2008, less than one month into the six-month lease, Viering sent Watson a notice to vacate the premises within 30 days. The parties must have worked out an agreement, however, because Watson remained in the House after the proffered termination date. The relationship between Viering and Watson, however, did not improve. They continued to disagree about things and communication between the two seemed quite strained. On or about November 8, 2008, Viering went to the House to check on a leak which had been reported. A neighbor from across the street, Ms. Wilson, accompanied her as she looked around the House. Viering testified under oath that while doing the inspection, she noticed mail in Watson's room that appeared to belong to Viering. When she inspected the mail and determined that it belonged to her, Viering was concerned about possible identity theft. Viering then went to the local post office and requested an address change so that her mail would not go to the House. Wilson remembers the event somewhat differently: She says that Viering said she (Viering) believed Watson had some of her mail and wanted to go into the room to check. Watson saw Viering take some mail that she claimed belonged to her, but Watson never personally identified the names on the letters. Watson denies ever having mail that belonged to Viering. The only certain fact concerning this situation was that Viering did go into Watson's room and retrieved some mail. It is not certain who the mail belonged to or whether Viering identified the mail as hers before going into Watson's room. Plumbing Problems Two days later, one of the tenants reported to Viering that the plumbing at the House was stopped up. Viering told the tenants that it was their responsibility to call a plumber and get the stoppage cleared up. She took this stance because, some ten years prior, some of Viering's tenants had flushed items down the toilet, causing a back-up in the plumbing. Viering believed her current tenants had done the same. One of the young tenant's fathers then called Viering and suggested that the plumbing problem could be caused by roots growing into the pipes, and, if so, then the problem would be the landlord's responsibility. Viering agreed then to call the plumber herself. Jamaal Crooks, a plumber working for Bryan Plumbing, came to the House on November 14, 2008, to work on the problem. He went into the House, but only into the hallway bathroom. He did not enter Watson's room or the bathroom in her room. Crooks then went outside and used a cable to reach inside the main sewer line. He pulled three tampons out of the line, thus, clearing the blockage. Crooks could not say if there were more tampons in the line at that time, but the ones he removed were sufficient to allow the sewage to flow. Crooks apparently gave Viering a bill for his services at that time. The amount on the bill was $178.00. Viering demanded that Watson pay the bill or that she at least pay her one-third share. Viering did not believe she should share in the cost, because she was not staying at the House on a permanent basis. That testimony contradicts her statements that she was at the House regularly and that it was her residence at that time. Watson refused to pay the bill, because she did not feel responsible for the stoppage. Some six days later, Bryan Plumbing issued another invoice in the amount of $178.00. The invoice included a note that said, "Tenant refused to pay bill. Christina was present the whole time." It is unclear from the testimony why this invoice was issued if a bill had been presented on the day of service. Viering ultimately paid the plumbing bill and asked each of her tenants to pay a portion of it. Watson said the plumbing worked for only four or five hours after Crooks left the premises. Viering says the plumbing was working for up to a week. It is clear the plumbing problem was not totally resolved. When a tenant would attempt to shower or flush the toilet, sewage would back up into the bathtub and shower stall. The tenants were afraid to drink water from the faucet because they did not know if it was contaminated or not. As will be discussed below, the two Caucasian tenants left the House soon after the November 14, 2008, plumbing issue. Watson, who could not afford to move and had no friends or family with space to accommodate her, remained at the House. There was no working toilet, so Watson had to find other means of performing daily hygiene. She would bathe as well as possible at local stores or gas stations. She would drive to stores to use their restrooms. At night when the stores were closed, she would reluctantly go into the backyard and dig a hole to use as a latrine. By that time she was becoming physically ill from all the stress. When she needed to vomit, she would have to use the hole in the ground for that purpose as well. Watson endured this situation for almost three weeks before finally finding another place to live. On December 19, 2008, a little over a month after the initial plumbing problem, Crooks came back to the House to fix the plumbing again. By that time, all three tenants, including Watson, had already moved out of the House. Although Crooks had no independent recollection of being at the House on that date, he identified a written statement he had made on that date saying he had "found more tampons in line [sic]." Crooks could not say if the tampons were left over from the prior visit, but inasmuch as the plumbing was not working in the interim, that is probable. Notices to Vacate On November 12, 2008, just two days after receiving her initial notice about the plumbing problem, Viering gave all three tenants a Lease Violation Warning setting forth certain alleged violations and giving the tenants three days to come into compliance. Two days later, on the day the plumbing was initially fixed, Viering gave each tenant a 30-day notice to vacate the premises. The basis for the notices, as set forth in another letter from Viering to the tenants, was that a police officer had advised her that she should evict the three tenants. Viering said that action was "radical" and that she opted for a 30-day notice of termination of the Leases instead. On the same day she gave the tenants the 30-day notice, she gave each of them a seven-day notice which specified lease violations. The notice to Bryan set forth the following violations: Failure to maintain plumbing Failure to pay share of utilities and repairs Unauthorized guests on property Unauthorized overnight guests Harassment by unauthorized guests Disturbing the peace Failure to maintain sanitary conditions The notice to Nichols set forth very similar violations, to wit: Failure to maintain premises in a sanitary manner Negligent use of plumbing Failure to pay plumbing repair Unauthorized guests on the property Unauthorized overnight guests on the property Destruction of property belonging to the landlord or permitting another person do so The notice given to Watson contained the following alleged violations: Failure to maintain plumbing Failure to comply with payments due [sic] Share of utilities to be paid Share of repair to plumbing Disposal of garbage in sanitary manner Maintaining the premises in sanitary condition Unauthorized overnight guests on a regular basis Harassment to me by yourself and guests On the same date that Viering gave the tenants their seven-day notices and 30-day termination notices, she gave Watson two additional letters: One was a letter advising Watson that her security deposit amount was being increased by an additional $100.00; the second was a demand to have Viering's dresser (which Watson was using) ready to be picked up on the upcoming weekend. Religious Controversy The rash of notices on November 14, 2008, indicates some irrationality on Viering's part. It also indicates that the landlord-client relationship was not working effectively. On that same day, Watson called the police to report Viering for harassment. While waiting for the police, Watson went into the backyard to avoid contact with Viering. Viering, however, came into the backyard and confronted Watson. Watson remembers Viering coming toward her with something in her hand, raised above her head. Viering was chanting some incantations and acting bizarre. Viering remembers only that she wanted to talk to Watson and was going to use her cell phone to videotape Watson as she talked. As she approached Watson, she recited the Lord's Prayer to cover herself with God's protection.4/ On November 15, 2008, one day after the aforementioned notices, Viering posted a Notice of Non-Renewal at the House, advising Nichols that her lease would not be renewed and that Nichols must vacate the premises no later than December 1, 2008. On that same day, Viering cut out cross-shaped designs from some magazines and posted them around the House. Viering did so as a part of her Christian religious beliefs, thinking there was "evil" in the House and hoping to eradicate it. When Watson took the crosses down because she considered them offensive, Viering made replacement crosses. Watson says Viering used paper from Watson's room to make the crosses; Viering says she used liner paper from her dresser and a Home Depot catalogue. The crosses were placed on various windows around the House. Watson states that she sent Viering a letter complaining that the crosses were traumatizing to her as a black woman. Viering does not remember any complaint from Watson about the crosses. Watson's written missive to Viering on this subject could not be produced. Watson says she also left voice messages on Viering's telephone. Viering said that she does not remember any such message, but since Watson sent her so many text and emails that were harassing in nature, Viering would frequently delete messages before reading them. The following day, Sunday, November 16, 2008, Viering returned to the House and put up wooden crosses in the front flower beds. She also painted black crosses on each slat of the privacy fence behind the House and on some windows in the House. The crosses were accompanied by messages such as, "The pure white light of Christ" and other inspirational sayings from Viering's Christian literature. The black crosses were crudely painted using a paper towel because Viering could not find a paint brush. Watson arrived home after dark and found the large cross in the front yard and the crosses painted on all the windows, which frightened her, so she asked a male neighbor to accompany her into the House to make sure no one was there. Inside the House, there were numerous crosses painted on windows and doors. All of this made Watson extremely frightened, so she called the police. She was told that unless the crosses were on fire, they could not investigate. Additional Disputes On November 17, 2008, Viering provided additional notices to the tenants: Watson was advised that her bedroom would be inspected, that she should return all items that were not her property, and that she should remove her property from the common areas of the House. Bryan received yet another Notice of Termination, effective immediately. Both Bryan and Nichols moved out of the House shortly thereafter. At some point, Watson remembers receiving a written notice telling her to vacate within seven days. The reason for the notice was that Viering had gotten into a confrontation with a black woman outside the House and presumed that the woman was Watson's friend. In fact, the woman was the mother of one of Bryan's friends.5/ Viering had borrowed a bicycle off the front porch of the House. The bike belonged to a young man who was visiting Bryan, and he thought someone had stolen the bike. The young man's mother accosted Viering for taking the bike without asking. That altercation appears to have been the genesis of the notice to Watson. On November 19, 2008, Watson contacted the Seminole County Sheriff's Office and filed a complaint against Viering. The complaint was for harassment and violation of landlord- tenant laws. Watson also contacted every state agency she could think of to seek some sort of redress from the conditions she was living in. She called, by her account, the Public Works department, the Utilities Commission, Health and Safety, and Sanitation, to name a few. None of the agencies acknowledged jurisdiction over the matter. On December 9, 2008, Viering received a letter from a local television station stating that a consumer had filed a complaint alleging denial of basic services by Viering. Thereafter, the television station broadcasted a consumer human-interest story concerning Watson's plight. At some point in time, Watson filed a Petition for Temporary Injunction against Viering, claiming some sort of violence by Viering. The Injunction proceeding was dismissed on January 6, 2009, when Watson failed to appear at the court hearing on the matter. By that date, Watson was no longer residing at the House. On or about November 30, 2008, Watson had vacated the House, ending the relationship between herself and Viering. Watson alleges discrimination based on her race due to the fact that she received more notices than the other (Caucasian) tenants from Viering. However, Watson was the longest serving tenant and had the most interaction with Viering, so there is no way to establish discrimination based solely on the number of notices. Watson alleges religious discrimination based on the bizarre behavior of Viering, such as placing crosses and religious sayings around the House, chanting the Lord's Prayer or other incantations, and referencing evil in the House. However, there is no persuasive evidence that Viering was aware of Watson's religion, Yoruba. Although Viering was in Watson's room on occasion and must have seen Watson's shrines, there is no evidence that Viering was aware of what the shrines stood for. Watson claims discrimination based on the fact that Viering was less tolerant of her than of the white, Christian tenants. The other tenants did not testify at final hearing, so it is impossible to compare their treatment to Watson's. Viering clearly acted in a very strange and unusual fashion. She was not a pleasant landlord. However, her actions appear to be based on her own personality and demeanor, rather than on any intent to discriminate based on race or religion.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the Florida Commission on Human Relations dismissing the Petition for Relief filed by Bahiyyih Watson in its entirety. DONE AND ENTERED this 11th day of May, 2011, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S R. BRUCE MCKIBBEN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of May, 2011.
The Issue Whether Petitioner is handicapped within the meaning of the Florida Fair Housing Act (Sections 760.20 – 760.37, Florida Statutes) or the Federal Fair Housing Act (42 USCA § 3601 et seq.).1 Whether Respondent discriminated against Petitioner in violation of either Act by refusing to waive its no pets policy, which would require Petitioner to remove his “emotional support animals” (two cats) from his condominium unit. Whether Respondent retaliated against Petitioner for his refusal to remove his cats from his condominium unit.
Findings Of Fact At all times relevant to this proceeding, Petitioner owned and resided in Unit 206 of the condominium building managed by Respondent. Petitioner is a male, born February 5, 1951. Respondent is the Board of Directors of the condominium building in which Petitioner resides. At all times relevant to this proceeding, Respondent had the following written policy (the no pets policy), which it routinely enforced2: 12. No Unit [sic] owner or lessee shall acquire a pet to be maintained in his or her unit, or shall such persons already possessing pets replace them when such pets die or are otherwise disposed of. No unit owner or lessee shall keep visiting pets in their unit. Petitioner bought Unit 206 in January 1999 and has since then lived alone in that unit with two cats. These cats have received no special training and have no special attributes. These cats were born to a cat that Petitioner and his late mother kept as a pet. Since his mother’s death in 1996, Petitioner has viewed these cats as his surrogate family. Respondent and Petitioner have engaged in a dispute regarding Petitioner’s alleged violation of its no pets policy that began in 1999 and is on-going. This dispute has involved multiple forums, with the current proceeding being the latest development. Respondent has received complaints from other residents of the condominium building that an unpleasant odor comes from Petitioner’s unit and that fleas have been found in the vicinity of his unit. On December 23, 2003, Dr. Seth Gottlieb, Petitioner’s physician, wrote the following: “To: Whom It May Concern:” William Kleinschmidt is a patient of mine. Mr. Kleinschmidt has a long-time severe physical disability and it is medically necessary that he his [sic] emotional support companion animals – his cats, to control the frequency and severity of his physical disability. By letter to Respondent’s president dated January 10, 2004, Petitioner asserted the following: While I realize that the Board and I disagree as to the interpretation of the condominium rules regarding pets, as my interpretation is based on the plain reading of the language within the common meaning of the said words, is that if a potential unit owner already has pets, they are acceptable and that no replacement pets will be brought in after the purchase. I may add that as a pre-condition to purchase of my unit, the board DID [sic] agree to my companion animals for my physical disability – the witnesses are both the buyer and the seller real estate brokers and others. I am requesting a special waiver of the pet rules as the board currently views them be made in my situation due to my disability. Please find attached a letter from my physician Seth Gottlieb, M.D., certifying that my companion animals are “medically necessary” for my disability. Please advise me in writing whether or not we have a special waiver as a reasonable accommodation. Although Respondent had been trying to force Petitioner to remove his cats from his unit since 1999, the letter of January 10, 2004, was the first time that Petitioner asserted that he was disabled and it was the first time he requested a waiver of the no pets policy to accommodate his disability. Prior to that letter, Respondent did not know and had no reason to know that Petitioner believed himself to be disabled. On April 19, 2004, Dr. Gottlieb wrote the following: “To: Whom It May Concern:” William Kleinschmidt is my patient, who has a significant emotional disability, as well as a long history of significant asthma. His asthma unfortunately has not been currently under good control. William clearly has a significant emotional component to his asthma, that is, his asthma is easily exacerbated by emotional triggers. William has companion animals which greatly help his emotional status. If he is not able to keep these companion animals there is a great likelihood that the emotional distress this will bring will significantly worsen his asthma. Therefore, it is medically necessary for William to have these emotional support animals to control the severity and frequency of his asthmatic disability. Dr. Gottlieb has no special training in psychiatry or psychology, and he did not treat or diagnose Petitioner’s anxiety. Dr. Gottlieb recommended to Petitioner that Petitioner seek professional help from a clinical psychologist or a psychiatrist. Petitioner refused to follow that recommendation. Petitioner has multiple allergens, one of which is cat dander. Dr. Gottlieb recommended to Petitioner that Petitioner seek professional help from an allergist. Petitioner refused to follow that recommendation. Dr. Gottlieb’s letters of December 23, 2003, and April 19, 2004, were written at Petitioner’s request and were based on statements made to him by Petitioner and on his observations of Petitioner. Dr. Gottlieb testified that he had never known Petitioner to be without his cats and he had no way of knowing what the consequences would be if Petitioner was unable to keep his cats. Dr. Gottlieb’s testimony does not establish that it is medically necessary for Respondent to waive its no pets policy as a reasonable accommodation of Petitioner’s handicapping conditions. Petitioner is a person with a handicap within the meaning of the Acts.3 At all times relevant to this proceeding, Petitioner has suffered from persistent asthma and emotional problems. There was no expert testimony as to the nature and extent of Petitioner’s emotional problems, but it is clear from the evidence that his emotional problems are debilitating. Petitioner is receiving no treatment for his emotional problems. Petitioner is receiving treatment from Dr. Gottlieb for his asthma. His asthma responds to medication prescribed by Dr. Gottlieb, but his asthma is not controlled by that medication and he suffers periodic asthma attacks of undetermined frequency and severity. Petitioner failed to establish that his two untrained cats are necessary for him to have equal opportunity to use and enjoy his dwelling within the meaning of either of the Acts. Petitioner’s cats are pets and while they undoubtedly provide emotional support as any pet should, they are not service animals4 and they have no special training that would enable them to assist Petitioner to overcome limitations imposed by his handicaps. Whether Petitioner’s cats help him avoid anxiety attacks, which could, in turn, trigger an asthma attack, is speculative. Petitioner asserts that two incidents prove that Respondent harassed him and retaliated against him because of his refusal to remove his cats from his unit. The first incident occurred in 2001 while Respondent was attempting to serve Petitioner with a subpoena during an arbitration proceeding. Because Respondent had difficulty serving a subpoena on Petitioner, Respondent had the arbitrator issue an order authorizing Respondent to have a locksmith open the door to Petitioner’s unit so the subpoena could be left in the unit. On September 21, 2001, Respondent hired a locksmith who unlocked the front door to Petitioner’s unit by drilling the lock on the door. A representative of Respondent thereafter entered Petitioner’s unit and left the subpoena for Petitioner inside the unit. An armed police officer was present when the door was opened and when Respondent’s representative entered the unit, left the subpoena, and exited the unit. These events occurred before Respondent had any reason to believe that Petitioner considered himself disabled or that he considered his cats to be emotional support animals. Respondent established that it was acting on advice of counsel and pursuant to the arbitrator’s order on September 21, 2001. Petitioner failed to establish that the events of September 21, 2001, were done to harass him or retaliate against him for asserting his rights under either Act. The second incident occurred in October 2003, when Respondent failed to give Petitioner proper credit for a maintenance assessment Petitioner had made. As a result of the error, Respondent wrote Petitioner a dun letter which reminded Petitioner that the failure to pay maintenance assessments could result in the imposition of a lien against his unit. Respondent failed to properly credit Petitioner’s payment as the result of a bookkeeping error. Respondent corrected the error as soon as Respondent’s bookkeeper discovered it. Soon thereafter, Respondent provided a written explanation of the error to Petitioner and apologized to him for the error. Petitioner failed to establish that the events of October 23, 2003, were done to harass him or retaliate against him for asserting his rights under either Act.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the FCHR enter a final order dismissing Petitioner’s Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 25th day of, May 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S CLAUDE B. ARRINGTON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of May, 2005.
The Issue Whether Respondents, Wayne Jones, manager (Mr. Jones), and Sun Key Village (Sun Key), are entitled to an award of attorney's fees and costs pursuant to sections 57.105(5) and 120.595, Florida Statutes (2010),1/ and ,if entitled to an award, then the determination of a reasonable amount.
Findings Of Fact The Beaulieus are residents of Sun Key, a mobile home park located at 8607 26th Avenue, East, Palmetto, Florida. Mr. Jones is the manager of Sun Key. Sun Key is a mobile home park as defined by section 723.003(6), Florida Statutes. On March 25, 2010, the Beaulieus filed a Petition for Relief with the Commission stating: I still feel this is discrimination-- Mr. Jones states I am violating park rules by having a dog over 20 lbs this dog is a Visitor not a resident pet. It is my sons' dog--visits on occasion. There are many dogs over 20lbs & living in Sun Key. This is selective enforcement!!! Ms. Beaulieu attached to her Petition for Relief a lengthy hand-written document, alleging that other residents were violating Sun Key park rules concerning the size and number of permissible dogs. On March 30, 2010, the Commission forwarded the Beaulieus' petition to DOAH. An Initial Order was issued, requiring the parties to respond concerning, in part, the amount of time required for the hearing and the date and location for the hearing. On April 6, 2010, Carol S. Grondzik, Esquire (Ms. Grondzik), of Lutz, Bobo, Telfair, Eastman, Gabel & Lee, filed a response for Respondents. On April 8, 2010, the Beaulieus, acting as their own attorneys, filed a response. Based on the responses, the Administrative Law Judge set the case for final hearing on August 3, 2010. On April 12, 2010, Respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss. In the Motion to Dismiss, Respondents argued that the Beaulieus "have not alleged they are members of a protected class under fair housing law." Further, the motion referenced Ms. Beaulieu's letter dated March 8, 2010, requesting an appeal of the Commission's no cause determination. Specifically, the Motion to Dismiss stated that the Beaulieus' complaint was for "selective enforcement" and not tied to retaliation based on the prior housing complaint filed by Ms. Beaulieu's sister. Thus, the Motion to Dismiss concluded that: [B]ecause Petitioners do not assert that they are members of a protected class under fair housing law, because they do not pursue a claim of retaliation against Respondents Wayne Jones and Sun Key, and because Bert Blanchard and the Sun Key Village Homeowners Association, Inc., are not providers of housing subject to fair housing laws, this Petition should be dismissed as a matter of law. On April 12, 2010, Ms. Grondzik served, by U.S. mail, a copy of the Motion for Attorney's Fees and Costs, pursuant to section 57.105, with a letter to the Beaulieus. Specifically, Ms. Grondzik's letter states: A Motion for Attorney's Fees and Costs is also enclosed for your review. I will hold this motion for at least 21 days before filing with the Division as required by Florida law. This allows you time to analyze the relevant facts and law, to seek advice as necessary, and to take action. On April 19, 2010, DOAH issued a Notice of Ex-parte Communication after it had received a copy of a letter that had been sent by Kenneth Wiggins (Mr. Wiggins), an attorney for the Beaulieus, to Ms. Grondzik. The terms of the letter sought to settle the dispute between the Beaulieus and Respondents. Mr. Wiggins, however, did not make an appearance for the Beaulieus before DOAH, and it was unclear who mailed the letter to DOAH. In any event, the Beaulieus continued to represent themselves in the proceedings before DOAH. On July 7, 2010, the Beaulieus filed a motion for continuance of the August 3, 2010, hearing date. The Administrative Law Judge denied the motion. On July 19, 2010, the Beaulieus filed a Notice of Voluntary Dismissal of their petition. On July 21, 2010, Respondents filed the Motion for Attorney's Fees and Costs and Notice of Filing Affidavit of Carol S. Grondzik. Ms. Grondzik's affidavit set out the hourly rate and the scope of work performed to date in the case. On July 29, 2010, Respondents filed a Memorandum of Law in Support of Respondent's [sic] Motion for Attorney's Fees and Costs. At the January 14, 2011, hearing, Ms. Beaulieu testified about instances where the mobile home park failed to enforce its rules and regulations concerning the pet size for residents. Further, she testified that she had brought the DOAH proceeding to address the unfair and selective enforcement of the mobile home park's rules. Sun Key Village Mobile Home Park, Park Rules and Regulations provides, in pertinent part, that: 9. Pets: A maximum of two small pets are permitted, which at maturity must not weigh greater than 20 pounds each. Pets must be confined to the interior of the home when the resident is not present and must be on a leash at all times when outside of tenant's home. They must be transported to areas outside of residence or common areas for exercise. The record shows that the Beaulieus were provided a copy of the rule when moving into Sun Key. Mr. Wayne Jones testified that there were instances when exceptions had been made for residents to have dogs larger than 20 pounds. For example, he identified that residents, who had large, elderly dogs when they moved into Sun Key, were allowed to keep their pets. Mr. Peterson, an attorney who has extensive experience in representing mobile home park owners, testified concerning the reasonableness of the attorney's fees and costs. Mr. Peterson testified that he considered the factors outlined in Florida's Patient's Compensation Fund v. Rowe, 472 So. 2d 1145 (Fla. 1985), and reviewed the legal file in this case. Based on his review, Mr. Peterson found that 57.2 hours were reasonable in defense of this case and that the blended hourly rate of $235.92 was reasonable. Therefore, Mr. Peterson testified the reasonable attorney's fees to be $13,494.40 and the amount of taxable costs to be $575.00. Mr. Peterson also testified that Respondents would be entitled to attorney's fees for having to litigate the issue of fee entitlement. Mr. Peterson testified that 14 hours would not be an unreasonable amount of time for preparing and attending a hearing concerning the entitlement to fees, for a total of $3,302.88 using the blended hourly rate of $235.92. Based on a review of the record and testimony offered at trial, 71.2 hours is a reasonable amount of time spent on the defense of the instant case and litigating the issue of entitlement to attorney's fees. A review of the record and testimony shows that $235.92 an hour is a reasonable prevailing blended hourly rate. The parties stipulated that the Beaulieus are not members of a protected class under the fair housing law.
The Issue Whether Respondents discriminated and retaliated against Petitioner because of her disability, in violation of the Florida Fair Housing Act; and, if so, the relief to which Petitioner is entitled. More specifically, the issues raised in this case are (1) whether Petitioner’s dog was a “service animal” pursuant to section 413.08, Florida Statutes (2018)1/; (2) whether Respondents took adverse action against Petitioner because of her disability; and (3) whether Respondents retaliated against Petitioner by not renewing her lease after she filed a housing discrimination complaint.
Findings Of Fact The parties stipulated at the final hearing that Petitioner suffers from anxiety and neck issues; and she qualifies as a person who is disabled for the purposes of the Florida FHA. Parties and Property Respondent Pelican Bay is a residential community owned and operated by Sun Homes. Respondent Cheryl Merrifield is the manager of Pelican Bay and an employee of Sun Homes. On June 24, 2016, Petitioner entered into a Manufactured Home Option to Purchase Agreement with Sun Homes (Agreement). The Agreement gave Petitioner a two-year period to lease the manufactured home located on Lot 56 of the Pelican Bay residential community. The Agreement allows the purchase of the home, but not the Lot in Pelican Bay. The Agreement contained a “rent to own” component which also allowed Petitioner to be credited 50% of her first year’s lease payments, and 25% of her second year’s lease payments towards the purchase of the manufactured home. Under the terms of the Agreement, after the first two years, the Petitioner would not accrue any credits toward the purchase of the home. The Agreement clearly anticipated that if Petitioner was to exercise the option to purchase, she would do so within two years. The Agreement refers to separate “Home Lease” and “Site Lease” agreements, but neither was admitted into evidence. Petitioner moved into the property in July 2016 with her five-pound Chihuahua, Buttons. At the time she moved into Pelican Bay, Petitioner informed Respondents she suffered from anxiety and needed Buttons for psychological and emotional support. As a result Pelican Bay waived the pet deposit and fees for Button. Petitioner claims she was discriminated against because she had a service dog and cites the following incidents: (1) in July 2016, she was prohibited from bringing Buttons into the Pelican Bay Clubhouse (Clubhouse) during a Fourth of July neighborhood party; (2) in November 2016, she was told that Buttons could not be in the kitchen or on the furniture in the Clubhouse and must be on a leash and controlled at all times during a Thanksgiving event; and (3) she was harassed by her neighbors and Pelican Bay staff for having the dog in the pool area. Petitioner also alleges she was retaliated against for filing a housing discrimination complaint when Pelican Bay did not renew her lease in July 2018. Respondents dispute Petitioner’s version of the facts and deny that their actions were discriminatory. Buttons As an initial matter, there is a factual dispute as to whether Buttons is a “service animal” for the purposes of the Florida FHA. Although it is unclear when Buttons became her service animal, Petitioner had Buttons as a pet prior to being prescribed a service animal for her anxiety by her psychologist, Dr. Donna Marks. Dr. Marks is certified in addiction therapy, psychoanalysis, and Gestalt psychology. She has no training in orthopedics or treating back and neck injuries. Dr. Marks has been treating Petitioner for anxiety intermittently since 2009. In 2014, Petitioner began regular twice a week therapy sessions with Dr. Marks. Thereafter, Dr. Marks prescribed a “psychological service animal” for Petitioner’s anxiety disorder. In a letter dated January 21, 2016, to allow Buttons to ride on an airplane, Dr. Marks wrote: Ms. Taylor has been seen by me and I am familiar with her history and with function limitations and needs imposed by an anxiety order. In order to help alleviate these difficulties and to enhance her ability to function independently, I have prescribed Ms. Taylor to obtain a psychological service animal. The presence of this animal is necessary for her emotional health because it will mitigate the symptoms she experiences and a preferable alterative to medication. (emphasis added). Later, after Petitioner moved into Pelican Bay, Dr. Marks changed her prescription for Petitioner from a “psychological service animal” to a “service animal.” Although no written prescription of this change was admitted into evidence, Dr. Marks claimed she made this change due to Petitioner’s neck and back surgeries. On cross-examination, however, Dr. Marks admitted she altered the prescription for Petitioner’s convenience. Petitioner had reported to her that she was having difficulty at Pelican Bay and was not allowed to take Buttons to neighborhood events. Dr. Marks felt a “service animal” would have more access than an “emotional support animal.” When asked what service Buttons provides or tasks Buttons performs for Petitioner, both Petitioner and Dr. Marks testified Buttons calms Petitioner and keeps her from becoming anxious. In addition, Petitioner testified she has difficulty turning her neck and needs Buttons to warn Petitioner when people are approaching and warn people not to come to close to her. Buttons does this by barking. Buttons did not go through any professional training to learn to keep Petitioner calm or how to bark. Dr. Marks was not involved in training Buttons, made no recommendations on how Buttons should be trained, and did not know of a training protocol for teaching animals anxiety-reducing techniques or conduct. Petitioner claimed she trained Buttons by giving it treats when it behaved the way she wanted, but admits she did not follow any specialized training program. Buttons is registered with the United States Animal Registry (USAR) as an “Emotional Support Dog” and a “Service Dog.” Based on her USAR identification and letters from Dr. Marks, Buttons has been allowed to accompany Petitioner at restaurants, the hospital, and on airplanes. Petitioner, however, provided no evidence of the requirements for registering Buttons with the USAR registry. For example, there was no evidence of an USAR application or questionnaire; nor was there evidence Buttons had been evaluated or tested by USAR as part of the registration process.3/ As explained below, the undersigned finds Buttons is not a “service dog” for purposes of the Florida FHA. Fourth of July In early July 2016, a Fourth of July potluck celebration was held in the Clubhouse. When Petitioner arrived at the Clubhouse with her potluck contribution she was told by Reni Thompson that she could not bring Buttons into the area where the food was being served. Upon hearing this, Petitioner immediately left the Clubhouse and did not participate in the event. The uncontroverted evidence established the celebration was not sponsored by Pelican Bay, nor was staff in attendance. Instead it was arranged by the Pelican Bay Home Owner’s Association (HOA). Although Petitioner testified Ms. Thompson told her she was an HOA board member, Ms. Merrifield testified Ms. Thompson was not on the HOA board, nor was Ms. Thompson a Pelican Bay employee. Other than Petitioner’s hearsay there is no evidence that Ms. Thompson was a board member. Moreover, the HOA was not affiliated with or managed by Pelican Bay, nor were its board members employees of Pelican Bay. As such, any conduct by Ms. Thompson cannot be imputed onto Pelican Bay. Regardless, when Ms. Merrifield received Petitioner’s complaint about what had occurred at the Fourth of July incident, she immediately arranged a meeting with Petitioner. Ms. Merrifield also met separately with Ms. Thompson to inform Ms. Thompson that Petitioner should be allowed in the Clubhouse with Buttons. The undersigned finds Respondents are not liable for Ms. Thompson’s conduct, and took corrective measures once it learned of the incident. Thanksgiving Restrictions on Buttons On November 1, 2017, Ms. Merrifield sent an email titled “Thanksgiving Dinner Nov. 23” to the residents of Pelican Bay. That email stated as follows: Attached to this email is what Sandy Weidner is posting in the Clubhouse today. If anyone is interested please go and sign up. She also has a list of what will be needed if anyone wants to help with the side dishes. The email then listed the side dishes that were needed and contact information for Sandy Weidner for any questions. The evidence established the event was not sponsored by Pelican Bay (although it was contributing the turkey) and Ms. Weidner was not a Pelican Bay employee. Instead of contacting Ms. Weidner, Petitioner emailed Ms. Merrifield and asked, Cheryl, Is this an Event that Buttons, “My Service Dog” and I will be welcomed to without anyone rejecting us or harassment?” Ms. Merrifield replied, In response to your request we understand your dog is an emotional support animal. It may be with you in the clubhouse. It may not go in the kitchen, it may not be put on furniture. It must be on a leash and controlled at all times. It is unclear whether this response deterred Petitioner from attending the Thanksgiving event. Nonetheless, the undersigned finds Ms. Merrifield’s actions did not constitute a violation of the Florida FHA. Pool Incidents In July 2017, Pelican Bay staff received a complaint from residents that Buttons was in the community pool, in violation of the community pool rules. Later, Ms. Merrifield spoke to Petitioner who admitted she had taken Buttons in the pool. Ms. Merrifield told Petitioner Buttons was not allowed inside the pool and should not be left in the pool area unrestrained. Petitioner later researched the issue and agreed she would not take Buttons in the pool in the future. In August 2017, Josephine Hillier, a Sun Homes employee, received another complaint from residents that Buttons was in the pool. When Ms. Hillier investigated the complaint she did not see the dog in the pool, but did find Petitioner with Buttons in the pool area. At the time, Petitioner denied Buttons was in the pool and claimed Ms. Hillier’s questioning was harassment in violation of housing discrimination laws. At the hearing, Petitioner testified that after researching and learning Buttons could not be in the pool, she continued to sit in the pool with Buttons on her shoulder. Petitioner did not consider this to be a violation of the pool rules as long as Buttons was not in the water. She also allowed Buttons to sit on the pool furniture unrestrained while she was in the pool, because her veterinarian told her Buttons was too small for a leash. Regardless, Pelican Bay took no further action against Petitioner regarding Buttons being in the pool. Petitioner complains Respondents repeatedly questioned her about Buttons being in the pool. Ms. Merrifield testified she was aware of two complaints of Petitioner letting Buttons in the pool; Ms. Hillier testified she was aware of two complaints about Buttons being in the pool, one of which she investigated. The undersigned finds that although Petitioner may have been approached by residents with complaints about Buttons, Respondents only spoke with her about Buttons being in the pool twice. The undersigned finds Pelican Bay’s conduct in questioning Petitioner about Buttons being in the pool, and warning her Buttons must be restrained did not constitute harassment. As explained below, this was justified under the circumstances. Non-Renewal of Purchase Agreement On March 20, 2018, Sun Homes sent an unsigned form letter to Petitioner stating her lease would not be renewed and that she would be required to vacate the property on or before June 30, 2018. Petitioner believes she received this letter because she filed a complaint of housing discrimination. The Agreement allowing the option to purchase the home anticipates a lease period of two years, although a longer period is not prohibited. Respondents asked Petitioner after the first year if she was planning to exercise her option to buy the home. At that time, June 2017, she declined because she felt it was too expensive and did not make financial sense. Petitioner did not take any steps toward exercising her option to purchase the home at the end of the second year because she was recovering from neck and back surgeries, her son was living with her, and she was not financially able to purchase it. Ms. Merrifield testified that it was common business practice to not allow renters to remain in Pelican Bay for more than two years. Sun Homes’ business model was to sell the manufactured homes; it was not interested in long-term rental relationships. The evidence established Petitioner was not the only resident that received the form non-renewal letter. The renters in the homes on Lot 48 and Lot 30 also received similar letters. Ms. Merrifield was unaware of whether these other residents had disabilities, but neither had made any kind of housing complaints. Based on the evidence and testimony presented at the final hearing, Petitioner did not demonstrate, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Respondents discriminated against her based on her disability or retaliated in violation of the FHA.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a final order finding that Respondents, Pelican Bay Communities, LLC, and Cheryl Merrifield, did not commit a discriminatory housing practice against Petitioner, Paula C. Taylor, and dismiss her Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 14th day of November, 2018, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S HETAL DESAI Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of November, 2018.
The Issue Whether Petitioner's housing discrimination complaint alleging violations of the Florida Fair Housing Act, chapter 760, part II, Florida Statutes (2020) (FFHA), was timely filed.1 1 Unless otherwise indicated, all federal and state statutory and administrative rule references are to the 2020 versions.
Findings Of Fact The following Findings of Fact are made based on the exhibits and testimony offered at the final hearing, the stipulated facts, and the additional documents accepted for official recognition as indicated above. The Lease Petitioner, Ross Couples, leased a house located at 11635 Meadowrun Circle in Fort Meyers, Florida (Property), from Respondent Xuan Ren. At all times relevant to this case, Respondent Ren owned the Property. At all times relevant to this case, Respondent Timothy Cloud managed the Property and served as an agent for Respondent Ren. The Property was part of Marina Bay Homeowners' Association (HOA) and subject to the HOA's rules and regulations regarding lease arrangements. On December 12, 2018, Respondent Ren and Petitioner executed a year lease for the Property from January 15, 2018, to January 15, 2019. The lease included the following provision for its renewal: 18. RENEWAL/EXTENSION. The Lease can be renewed or extended only by a written agreement signed by both Landlord and Tenant, but the term of a renewal or extension together with the original Lease Term may not exceed 12 months. … A new lease is required for each period of lease. At some point prior to January 15, 2019, Respondent offered Petitioner another lease agreement. Petitioner refused to pay a $100 leasing fee required by the HOA. The parties did not renew or enter into another 12-month lease, nor did Petitioner move out. As a result, after January 15, 2019, the parties switched to a month-to- month arrangement.4 This arrangement, however, was not approved by the HOA. On February 23, 2019, Petitioner sent an email to the HOA manager and Respondent Cloud. In that email, Petitioner made numerous complaints and mentioned the need for a larger hot water heater for his hydrotherapy tub, which he claimed he needed for health issues. He also discussed at length his opposition to the $100 fee imposed by the HOA for entering into a new lease. On February 27, 2019, Respondent Cloud issued a "Notice of Termination of Month-to-Month Tenancy Notice to Vacate" (Notice) to Petitioner. The Notice indicated that the current leasing arrangement had 4 No written lease agreement for the month-to-month arrangement was offered into evidence. been terminated and Petitioner was to vacate the Property on or before May 15, 2019. Petitioner did not move out of the Property on or before May 15, 2019. On May 20, 2019, Respondent Ren filed the eviction action against Petitioner in the appropriate court. A final judgment in the eviction action was rendered on June 6, 2019, and a writ of possession was issued for the Property on June 7, 2019. Petitioner vacated the Property and turned over possession to the Lee County Sheriff on June 12, 2019. Housing Complaints Petitioner testified that on April 5, 2019, he filed a complaint of discrimination with the U.S. Housing and Urban Development (HUD) regarding his claim of disability discrimination against Respondents. On January 17, 2020, HUD issued a letter to Respondent Cloud (HUD Letter) indicating it was dismissing the case brought by Petitioner, and specifically finding "that no reasonable cause exists to believe that a discriminatory housing practice has occurred. … No evidence was found to support Petitioner's contention that his disability was used as a basis to evict him." The HUD Letter does not indicate Petitioner could re-open the HUD case or file anything else with HUD based on the same facts. It does not mention the FFHA or FCHR, and it does not provide any instruction or information on how to pursue claims pursuant to state housing discrimination laws.5 Petitioner claims a HUD employee, Mr. Jordan, told him he had a year from his last date of possession of the Property to "file the proper paperwork." 5 The HUD Letter does mention that Petitioner could file a civil lawsuit "in an appropriate federal district court or state court within two (2) years of the date on which the alleged discriminatory housing practice occurred or ended." The letter also has instructions as to what Petitioner may be able to file if he was retaliated against for filing the HUD complaint. This proceeding does not involve either of those situations. Petitioner also states Mr. Jordon told him he could file a claim with either HUD or the Florida Fair Housing Commission.6 It is unclear when this conversation occurred, what Mr. Jordan's role was at HUD, and whether the discussion was in person or over the phone. Regardless, this testimony is hearsay and not corroborated by any non-hearsay evidence or documentation. There is no credible evidence to establish that anyone at either HUD or FCHR informed Petitioner that he had one year from the last date of possession of the Property to file an FFHA discrimination complaint with FCHR. The date Petitioner filed his FFHA Complaint with FCHR is contested. Petitioner testified he contacted the "Florida Fair Housing Commission" on June 10, 2020, regarding his FFHA claim. He admits he did not file his FFHA complaint immediately. Rather, at that time, he spoke with an "intake clerk," who sent him a complaint form, which he then filled out and returned. There is no competent evidence corroborating Petitioner's assertion in his Response that he filed the Complaint with FCHR on June 10, 2021. Rather, the top of the front page of the Complaint is dated July 22, 2020, and indicates Petitioner verified the facts in the Complaint on July 21, 2020. Moreover, the Determination dated September 18, 2020, also references that the Complaint was submitted on July 21, 2020. Based on Petitioner's testimony and the date that Petitioner verified the Complaint with his signature, the undersigned finds Petitioner's Complaint was filed with FCHR on July 21, 2020. 6 The undersigned is unaware of an agency operating under the name of "Florida Fair Housing Commission." The undersigned assumes that Petitioner is referring to FCHR. See § 760.22(1), Fla. Stat. (defining “Commission” to mean the Florida Commission on Human Relations).
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief filed by Ross J. Couples. DONE AND ENTERED this 7th day of May, 2021, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. COPIES FURNISHED: Tammy S. Barton, Agency Clerk S HETAL DESAI Administrative Law Judge 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of May, 2021. Ross Joseph Couples Florida Commission on Human Relations 4075 Esplanade Way, Room 110 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-7020 Steven Klaus Teuber, Esquire Teuber Law, PLLC Post Office Box 49885 Sarasota, Florida 34230 Timothy Cloud D-15 # 514 106 Hancock Bridge Parkway Cape Coral, Florida 33991 Christopher J. DeCosta, Esquire Mahshie & DeCosta 1560 Matthew Drive, Suite E Fort Myers, Florida 33907 Suite 202-200 13650 Fiddlesticks Boulevard Fort Myers, Florida 33912 Xuan Ren D-15 # 514 106 Hancock Bridge Parkway Cape Coral, Florida 33991 Paul Edward Olah, Esquire Law Offices of Wells Olah, P.A. 1800 Second Street, Suite 808 Sarasota, Florida 34236 Cheyanne Costilla, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 4075 Esplanade Way, Room 110 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-7020
The Issue Whether Petitioner was the subject of discriminatory housing practices based on his race or his handicap, in violation of the Florida Fair Housing Act, chapter 760, Part II, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact At all times relevant to this cause, Petitioner was a tenant of a rental apartment located at 284 South First Street, Apartment 6, Macclenny, Florida (the Apartment). Petitioner?s tenancy was established by a lease agreement with a final effective date of November 24, 2009. Petitioner moved out of the apartment on May 3, 2012. Respondent is a Florida Limited Liability Company. Among its other holdings, Respondent owns four 4-plex units located on First Street, Second Street, and Third Street in Macclenny, one of which includes the Apartment. The racial make-up of the tenants occupying Respondent?s apartments in the vicinity is roughly 50 percent African-American and 50 percent Caucasian. Petitioner is African-American. Petitioner has an unspecified mental condition. He takes medications for management of his symptoms, and receives periodic visits from Ms. Gadsby to ensure that he is complying with his medication regimen. Petitioner does not receive disability benefits from the Social Security Administration. Petitioner holds a bachelor?s degree in criminal justice from Benedict College in South Carolina. As part of the application for rental of the Apartment, Petitioner was asked “[h]ave you been arrested or had criminal charges filed against you? (If yes, please list them).” In response to the application question, Petitioner answered “yes Trepass [sic.].” The trespass charge was related to a misdemeanor incident that occurred at an unspecified time in Fort Lauderdale, Florida. Petitioner failed to disclose a felony conviction for an incident that had occurred in South Carolina. Petitioner stated that he thought the requirement to disclose criminal charges applied only to charges arising from incidents having occurred in Florida. However, nothing in the application can be read to support that limitation. As such, Petitioner materially falsified his lease application. Petitioner cut hair for members of his church, neighbors, family, and friends at the Apartment, and had done so for the two-and-one-half years of his tenancy. He equipped the Apartment with a barber chair and a small waiting area. He accepted “donations” of food, clothes, and cash for his services. The cash receipts were used to pay his electric and water bills, among other things. Thus, despite its small scale and limited clientele, Petitioner operated what can only be described as a barbershop from the Apartment. The Lease Agreement between Petitioner and Respondent provides that the Apartment was not to be used “for any other purpose than as a private dwelling unit.” The Lease Agreement also provides that Petitioner was to comply with all applicable building and housing codes. The Macclenny Code of Ordinances, Part III, Section 4-105, provides that home occupations are subordinate and incidental to a residential neighborhood, but that certain occupations, including barbershops, “shall not be considered as home occupations under any circumstance.” Thus, Petitioner?s operation of a barbershop from the Apartment was a violation of the Lease Agreement. There were no apparent landlord/tenant disputes involving Petitioner?s tenancy until late 2011. Mr. Stivender testified that he began to receive periodic complaints from tenants in the area regarding the Apartment, including cars being parked on the grass and in the road, loud music, and people milling about the premises. He testified that at least one tenant advised Respondent that she was afraid to venture out of her apartment due to the number of people in the area. The testimony of Mr. Stivender regarding complaints of other tenants would be hearsay if taken for the truth of the matters asserted. However, the undersigned accepts his testimony as evidence, not of the facts surrounding the alleged complaints, but of a non-discriminatory reason for actions to be described herein, most notably the events of March 6, 2012. At the end of October 2011, Petitioner was cited by Respondent for having more than one car regularly parked at the Apartment. Petitioner?s car was not in running condition. The other cars parked at the Apartment belonged to friends or relatives. Petitioner subsequently sold his vehicle, and would borrow his father?s or his cousin?s car when needed. The incident caused bad feelings between the parties. On November 1, 2011, Respondent sent a notice to each of its tenants in Macclenny. Although the notice was precipitated by the complaints against Petitioner and Respondent?s observations of activities in and around the Apartment, the notice was not limited to Petitioner. The notice cited provisions of the common lease agreement regarding the use of the premises and tenant conduct, and advised that excessive noise, driving on the grass, and “loitering” would be cause for eviction. The notice further advised that the landlord would “be patrolling the area on a regular basis at night to check for violations.” On March 6, 2012, Mr. Ferreria was driving by the Apartment at approximately 10:30 p.m. There were, along with Petitioner and his daughter, three guests at the Apartment, Bianca Gaines-Givens, Jacoby Givens, and Misty Lee. They were playing music on an electronic keyboard. Mr. Ferreria stopped his car on the side of the road. He called his property manager, Mr. Stivender, and advised him that he was going to go speak with Petitioner about the noise coming from the Apartment. Mr. Stivender works for a gas company, and was at work routing gas trucks. Mr. Stivender advised that he was going to come to the Apartment, and asked Mr. Ferreria to wait for him before speaking with Petitioner. Ms. Gaines-Givens and Mr. Jacoby Givens left the Apartment after Mr. Ferreria?s arrival in the neighborhood, and noticed Mr. Ferreria sitting in his vehicle. They drove away from the Apartment, but decided to return shortly thereafter. By the time they returned, Mr. Ferreria and Mr. Stivender were leaving. Thus, they did not witness the confrontation described herein. After Ms. Gaines-Givens and Mr. Jacoby Givens drove off, Mr. Ferreria, disregarding Mr. Stivender?s request, went to the Apartment and knocked on the door. It was, by then, approximately 10:45 p.m. When Petitioner answered the door, the two immediately began a heated discussion over the music and the cars. Ms. Lee went to the back of the Apartment when Mr. Ferreria arrived. She heard yelling, but heard nothing of a racial nature. Shortly after Mr. Ferreria arrived at the Apartment, Mr. Stivender arrived on the scene. Mr. Stivender is a solidly built man, and could be an intimidating presence under the right circumstances. These were the right circumstances. Mr. Stivender physically moved Mr. Ferreria out of the way, and came between Mr. Ferreria and Petitioner. He was primed for a confrontation. He had his hand in his pocket, but testified convincingly that he was not armed.1/ He and Petitioner had a loud and angry exchange of words, and Mr. Stivender forcefully suggested to Petitioner that it would probably be best if he moved out of the Apartment. After Mr. Stivender appeared on the scene, Ms. Lee came out from the back of the Apartment. She recognized Mr. Stivender as Respondent?s “office manager.” She noted that Mr. Stivender had his hand in his pocket, and was talking loudly and pointing his finger in Petitioner?s face. Ms. Lee went outside and spoke with Mr. Ferreria. She testified that Mr. Ferreria indicated that some of the neighbors were afraid of Petitioner because of the noise and the number of people who hung around the Apartment. The confrontation ended with Mr. Ferreria and Mr. Stivender leaving the premises. The police were not called. The next morning, Petitioner called Ms. Gadsby. Petitioner frequently called Ms. Gadsby when he was feeling “stressed.” She went to see him that morning, and testified that he was very upset over the events of the previous evening. She returned that afternoon for a “well-check,” and he was doing better. On March 15, 2012, Petitioner called the Baker County Sheriff?s Office to report the March 6, 2012, incident. A deputy went to the Apartment, spoke with Petitioner and Ms. Lee, took their sworn statements, and prepared an offense report. The description of the incident as reflected in the report, including statements made by Petitioner and Ms. Lee, did not contain any account of racial threats or epithets, or any allegation of discriminatory intent based on race or handicap.2/ Other than Mr. Stivender?s statement made in the heat of the March 6 argument, Respondent made no effort to evict or otherwise remove Petitioner from the Apartment. On March 31, 2012, Petitioner noticed water coming from behind a wall of the Apartment. He called Respondent, and Mr. Stivender came to the Apartment to inspect. Mr. Stivender first suspected that the air-conditioning unit was leaking. The air conditioner was turned off and Mr. Stivender left, intending to contact an air-conditioning repair service. By 6:00 p.m. on March 31, 2012, the rate of the leak was such that it was determined that a water pipe had burst under the foundation of the Apartment. Petitioner did not know where the shut-off valve was located, and was unable to stop the flow, which began to cover the floor in several rooms of the Apartment. Mr. Stivender returned to the Apartment, and determined that a car owned by one of Petitioner?s guests was parked on the grass, and was over the meter box with the shut- off valve. The car was moved, and the water turned off. Respondent called a plumber to fix the pipe. Since the pipe was under the foundation, and in order to avoid breaking up the slab, the repair was accomplished by re-routing the pipe in the wall of the Apartment. The repair entailed cutting an access hole in the drywall. That hole was not immediately repaired. Respondent also called Servpro to perform water cleanup services. The standing water was vacuumed up, and large fans and dehumidifiers were placed in the Apartment to dry it out. While the repairs and drying activities were ongoing, Respondent paid for Petitioner and his daughter to stay in a motel in Macclenny. They were there for three to four days. Respondent paid Petitioner?s power bill for the days that Petitioner was unable to use the Apartment. Petitioner returned to the Apartment, and stayed there for some time. He was upset that the access hole for the pipe repair had not been closed up, and that the baseboards had not been replaced in some areas. On April 9, 2012, Petitioner wrote to Respondent about the effects of the water leak. After thanking Respondent for the “compassion” shown to Petitioner and his family during the event, he complained about the damage to his personal property resulting from the water leak, and an odor “suggesting the presence of mold.” He stated his belief that his daughter?s preexisting asthma was aggravated by the smell in the Apartment. In his April 9, 2012, letter, Petitioner also stated that “due to my mental health condition, I am on prescribed medicine that has now been adjusted to assist me through this stressful situation.” Petitioner?s statement, which was not accompanied by any form of medical evidence, was not sufficient to place Respondent on notice that Petitioner had a record of having, or was regarded as having, any form of mental disability. Mr. Stivender testified that no one ever advised Respondent that Petitioner had a mental disability, and that Respondent had no such knowledge. The April 9, 2012, letter being insufficient on its own to convey such information, Mr. Stivender?s testimony is credited. On May 3, 2012, Petitioner moved out of the Apartment. He had been served with no eviction notice or other written request to vacate. Petitioner gave no notice to Respondent, but dropped off his key at Mr. Ferreria?s business on the day he moved out. Mr. Stivender testified that Petitioner left the Apartment in a filthy, deplorable condition. As a result, Respondent withheld Petitioner?s $400.00 security deposit to offset the costs of returning the Apartment to rentable condition. Petitioner testified that the Apartment was not in poor condition when he moved out, and that some of the damage was the result of the pipe leak. However, Petitioner did not testify, or even suggest, that the decision to withhold the deposit was the result of any racial hostility or animus, or of any reaction to his handicap. Petitioner failed to introduce any evidence that he was treated differently under similar circumstances than were tenants of Respondent who were not African-American, or who did not have comparable mental disabilities. Ultimate Findings of Fact There was no competent, substantial evidence adduced at the hearing that Respondent undertook any act pertaining to Petitioner?s occupancy of the Apartment based on Petitioner?s race. Petitioner failed to prove that Respondent knew of Petitioner?s mental disability or handicap, or that Respondent regarded Petitioner as having any such mental disability or handicap. Petitioner failed to prove that Petitioner?s race or handicap caused or contributed to the March 6, 2012, confrontation. Rather, the evidence demonstrates that the confrontation resulted from noise, issues with cars and parking, and complaints directed to Petitioner by other tenants. Petitioner failed to prove that he was ready, willing, and able to continue to rent the Apartment, but that Respondent refused to allow him to do so. Petitioner failed to prove that Respondent took any action to evict him from the Apartment, or to otherwise intentionally interfere with Petitioner?s occupancy of the premises. To the contrary, the evidence supports a finding that Respondent took reasonable and appropriate steps to repair and remediate the Apartment after the water line break, and provided no-cost accommodations to Petitioner while the Apartment was not habitable. The repairs may not have been completed to Petitioner?s satisfaction, but any such deficiency was not the result of discrimination against Petitioner based on his race or his handicap. Petitioner failed to prove that Respondent?s decision to withhold his security deposit was based on Petitioner?s race or handicap. In sum, the evidence did not establish that Petitioner was the subject of unlawful discrimination in the provision of services or facilities in connection with his dwelling based on his race or his handicap.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief filed in FCHR No. 2013H0034. DONE AND ENTERED this 7th day of February, 2013, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S E. GARY EARLY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of February, 2013.
The Issue Whether Respondents discriminated against Petitioner, Nisrine Smith, on the basis of her disability, in violation of the Florida Fair Housing Act (FHA), chapter 760, part II, Florida Statutes; and, if so, the appropriate penalty.
Findings Of Fact Respondent Ocean Towers is a residential condominium facility in Volusia County, Florida, with numerous condominium units. Respondent Sentry managed Ocean Towers during the time period relevant to the instant matter, but it no longer serves as the manager of Ocean Towers. Ms. Smith leased a furnished condominium unit from its owner and resided at Ocean Towers, beginning in January 2019. Ms. Smith paid monthly rent to the condominium unit’s owner, which also included all utility charges. Ms. Smith is a person with a nonvisible disability, which she described as post-traumatic stress disorder, depression, and anxiety, who requires the use of an emotional support animal (ESA).3 On September 8, 2019, Ms. Smith brought an approximately 14-week- old female Rottweiler puppy named Vida to live with her at Ocean Towers. At that time, the “Daytona Beach Ocean Towers Rules & Regulations” provided, in part, as follows: Respondents’ Proposed Recommended Order concedes certain dispositive facts, and also includes contradictory factual findings—both within the Proposed Recommended Order itself, as well as when compared to evidence presented—that the undersigned considered and discusses in this Recommended Order. 3 Both Petitioner’s Proposed Recommended Order, as well as Respondents’ Proposed Recommended Order (which, as discussed in footnote 2 above, is largely duplicative of Petitioner’s Proposed Recommended Order), assert—in identical fashion—that Ms. Smith has a disability and requires the use of an ESA. While the evidence at the final hearing was not entirely clear on this point (a point which resulted in FCHR finding no reasonable cause), Respondents, in their Proposed Recommended Order, concede this point. The undersigned has thus based this Finding of Fact on this stipulation. Confusingly, other “original” or “nonduplicated” portions of Respondents’ Proposed Recommended Order state that Ms. Smith never provided documentation to it that she had a disability, which required an ESA, but Respondents have clearly conceded this particular factual finding in their Proposed Recommended Order. PETS: Guests may not have pets in the building. All authorized small pets except certified service dogs must be carried while in public areas of the building and garage. Unless inside units, pets must be on a leash and owners are responsible for cleaning up after their pet while on [Daytona] Towers property. Ms. Smith had not informed Ocean Towers about Vida’s arrival prior to bringing her to Ocean Towers. On September 12, 2019, Maria Montgomery, who was the administrative assistant for Ocean Towers, emailed Ms. Smith concerning Vida. The email stated that “new pets are to be firstly reported to the office and rules apply as I am sure you are aware.” It further states that “Service animal or companion pets all need to have registered papers copied to the office[,]” and further states “[w]e do not need to know ‘why’ if it is a companion animal-we just need to have the authorization on file for Security, etc. in the event someone asks why an animal not in the ‘normal’ pet description of 20 pounds or less is living in the building ” Ms. Montgomery’s September 12, 2019, email to Ms. Smith was likely precipitated by Ocean Towers resident Ms. Honeycutt, who was also the condominium association president in 2019. Ms. Honeycutt—who has been paralyzed since birth and uses a wheelchair—testified that she encountered Ms. Smith and Vida on two occasions. On the first occasion, in an elevator, Ms. Honeycutt testified that Vida jumped on her lap. On the second occasion, in the condominium lobby, Ms. Honeycutt testified that Vida again jumped on her lap, but that she was able to move away from Vida. Mr. Zehrung, who was the manager at Ocean Towers in 2019 (and employed by Sentry), testified that he received numerous complaints from other tenants about an unleashed Rottweiler, and was aware of Ms. Honeycutt’s encounters with the dog as well. After determining that Ms. Smith was the owner of the dog, he informed her of the Ocean Towers “Rules and Regulations” concerning pets; he stated that Ms. Smith did not initially tell him that Vida was an ESA, but did so about one week after this conversation. In response to Ms. Montgomery’s email request, Ms. Smith provided Ocean Towers with a letter, dated September 17, 2019, from the “Medical & Psychiatric Clinic of Florida, Inc.,” from “Yessica Sanchez, Office Coordinator, ARNP.” That letter stated: Ms. Nisrine Smith is currently being treated at the Medical & Psychiatric Institute of Florida, Inc. Ms. Smith presently has her pet Rottweiler, also known as Vida, with her in her apartment. It would be beneficial for her to have her pet if the apartment complex allows her to keep it. The September 17, 2019, letter, which is not from a treating physician, makes no reference to whether Ms. Smith has a disability, and further makes no reference to her dog as an ESA, but rather refers to the dog as a “pet.” Ms. Smith testified that, after submitting the September 17, 2019, letter to Ocean Towers, she felt everything would be “okay,” and that she would be able to keep Vida as an ESA. However, she testified that she was “rudely treated” by other residents, including comments about the dog’s size, and the Ocean Towers rules that require a resident to carry their pet while in the lobby and indoor common areas. Ms. Smith felt that she was being discriminated against by Ocean Towers because of Vida’s dog breed, Rottweiler. Both Ms. Honeycutt and Mr. Zehrung testified that the September 17, 2019, letter that Ms. Smith submitted to Ocean Towers was not a sufficient request for an ESA. They both testified that had Ms. Smith submitted an appropriate “ESA letter” with “correct documentation,” Ocean Towers would have allowed Ms. Smith to keep Vida at Ocean Towers. Mr. Zehrung testified that there were three or four other tenants of Ocean Towers who had ESA’s, with “documentation.” On September 19, 2019, Ocean Towers, through its attorney, sent, via certified and regular mail, a letter to Ms. Smith and the owners of the condominium unit, that stated, in pertinent part: It is our understanding that your current tenant has a rottweiler within the unit. Said possession of the dog in the unit in common elements of the Association is a violation of the governing documents of the Association. * * * The Association received a letter from your tenant indicating that the rottweiler is an emotional support animal; however, regardless if it is an emotional support animal, the Association will not permit this animal to reside at the property because it is a dangerous breed on the Association’s insurance and only small animals are permitted. The dog is not a service animal, and therefore must be removed from the property by September 30, 2019. Furthermore, prior to the removal of the pet from the property, the owner must carry the pet when the pet is not within their unit, the dog must be on a leash, the dog may not be in the common elements of the Association and must only use the facilities that are designated for relieving pet waste. At no point is this dog allowed to be not on a leash or not hand-carried. In the event that the dog is not removed by September 30, 2019, the Association will file before the Department of Business and Professional Regulation a petition for injunctive relief seeking the permanent removal of the dog. In the event that this is necessary, the Association will be entitled to recover their reasonable attorney’s fees and cost. The September 19, 2019, letter from Ocean Towers to Ms. Smith directly contradicts the testimony of Ms. Honeycutt and Mr. Zehrung in two important ways: (a) it admits that Ms. Smith’s September 17, 2019, letter was a request for an ESA; and (b) it denies Ms. Smith’s request (“regardless if is an emotional support animal”), based on the dog’s breed, labeling it a “dangerous breed on the Association’s insurance[.]”4 The undersigned further notes that the September 19, 2019, letter from Ocean Towers makes no reference to any incident of Vida jumping on Ms. Honeycutt, or any other incident of alleged aggressive behavior of Vida. Although Ms. Honeycutt’s testimony that Vida jumped on her lap on two occasions is credited, Respondents failed to present any other credible evidence that Vida was an “aggressive animal,” or whether Vida posed any direct threat to the safety of the residents of Ocean Towers, as Respondents contend in their Proposed Recommended Order. Additionally, Respondents did not present any evidence that demonstrated that a rottweiler was forbidden under any insurance policy that covered the Respondents. Ms. Smith testified that she felt that Ocean Towers and its residents discriminated against and harassed her, and as a result, she decided to move out of her condominium unit the weekend of September 21 to 23, 2019. She testified that she received the September 19, 2019, letter during the weekend that she moved out. 4 The September 19, 2019, letter also contradicts numerous proposed findings of fact in Respondents’ Proposed Recommended Order which contest whether Ocean Towers ever received “proper documentation” of Ms. Smith’s request for an ESA. Respondents’ Proposed Recommended Order states that the September 19, 2019, letter, and a September 25, 2019, letter “were silent as to the need of an ESA and neither letter addressed that Smith suffered from a disability that would entitle Smith to have an ESA animal[,]” and, ultimately, that “Towers did not discriminate against Smith because Smith never provided documentation to the Association that she had a disability that required her to have an Emotional Support Animal.” Resp. Proposed Recommended Order at p. 5, ? H. The undersigned notes that the September 19, 2019, letter, which contradicts these proposed findings, was written by Ms. Kirian, who is counsel of record in this matter, and who authored the Proposed Recommended Order. Additionally, as stated in note 3 above, Respondents concede, in their Proposed Recommended Order (which is identical to Petitioner’s Proposed Recommended Order on this point), that Ms. Smith “is a person with a non-visible disability who requires the use of an Emotional Support Animal (ESA).” Resp. Proposed Recommended Order, p. 3, ? A. After moving out, on September 25, 2019, Ms. Smith provided another letter from the “Medical & Psychiatric Institute of Florida, Inc.,” from “Asad H. Kahn, M.D.,” to Ocean Towers, which stated: Attention: Current Housing Manager Ms. Nasrine [SIC] Smith is currently receiving treatment at our office for psychiatric condition. She has a pet dog. It would not be emotionally beneficial for her to lose her pets at this point. We do not have any opinion on risk of safety of the residential area due to the animal. The safety of the area needs to be assessed by the security of the housing project. Ms. Smith testified that after moving out, she was able to purchase a home. She contends that she incurred moving expenses when she vacated Ocean Towers, and that her current monthly mortgage payments, which do not include utilities, are more expensive than her previous rental payments at Ocean Towers. However, Ms. Smith did not present any persuasive evidence that quantified any damages she contends that she incurred as a result of Respondents’ discriminatory housing practices. The undersigned finds that Ms. Smith established, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Respondents discriminated against her based on her disability, by failing to provide a reasonable accommodation—an ESA—in violation of the FHA.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the undersigned hereby RECOMMENDS that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a final order granting Nisrine Smith’s Petition for Relief, in part, as follows: (a) finding that Respondents engaged in a discriminatory housing practice based on Ms. Smith’s disability, by failing to provide a reasonable accommodation to Ms. Smith in the form of an ESA; (b) ordering Respondents to prohibit the practice of denying reasonable accommodations to individuals and tenants who request a reasonable accommodation on the basis of their disability; and (c) ordering Respondents to pay for the reasonable attorney’s fees and costs incurred by Ms. Smith’s counsel in this proceeding. DONE AND ENTERED this 30th day of March, 2021, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. COPIES FURNISHED: Tammy S. Barton, Agency Clerk S ROBERT J. TELFER III Administrative Law Judge 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of March, 2021. Nisrine Smith Florida Commission on Human Relations Room 110 4075 Esplanade Way Tallahassee, Florida 32399-7020 Joseph John St. Angelo, Esquire Community Legal Services of Mid-Florida 122 East Colonial Drive, Suite 200 Orlando, Florida 32801 Laura Qualatone Daytona Beach Ocean Towers, Inc 4188 South Atlantic Avenue New Smyrna Beach, Florida 32169 5143 Taylor Avenue Port Orange, Florida 32127 Marlene Kirtland Kirian, Esquire South Milhausen, P.A. Gateway Center 1000 Legion Place, Suite 1200 Orlando, Florida 32801 Cheyanne Costilla, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations Room 110 4075 Esplanade Way Tallahassee, Florida 32399-7020
