The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondent, Cordell John, (Landlord) discriminated against Petitioner, Denise Johnson- Acosta (Johnson) on the basis of her or her daughter’s alleged handicap in violation of the Florida Fair Housing Act.
Findings Of Fact Johnson is a Hispanic woman. She has asthma and other medical conditions. Johnson has a teenage daughter, Ashley Denise Rivera. Ashley has a seizure disorder and has bipolar disorder. Johnson is engaged to Alexis Pons. The Landlord is an African-American male. He owns the property located at 13847 Beauregard Place in Orlando, Florida (the Property). The Property is a single-family residential townhouse. At some unspecified time during calendar year 2012, Johnson approached the Landlord expressing an interest in leasing the Property. At that time, another tenant was living in the Property but was in the process of moving out. The Landlord showed Johnson the Property. Johnson expressed her complete satisfaction with the Property and that she would like to lease it (and possibly buy it in the future). At first sight, Johnson liked everything about the Property except for the back yard. On September 10, 2012, the Landlord emailed a Rental Application to Johnson. The email advised Johnson that there would be a $50 application fee which must be paid when the application was delivered. In response to the email, Johnson confirmed that she wanted to view the Property on the upcoming Thursday. On September 11, 2012, Johnson filled out the Rental Application and provided it to the Landlord for review. The application listed Johnson as the primary tenant and Ashley and Pons as additional residents. The application also noted that Johnson had a pet, a petite Chihuahua, which would be living in the unit. After reviewing the application, the Landlord notified Johnson via email that he would need pictures of the Chihuahua. He also asked how much the dog weighed. The Landlord also told Johnson that the rent would be $1,250 per month and that a $200 nonrefundable pet fee must be paid. Johnson replied that the dog weighed four pounds. She was concerned that the Landlord was now quoting $1,250 per month when earlier discussions had indicated the rent would be $1,200 per month. Johnson thanked the Landlord and agreed to provide a picture of the dog. The Landlord replied to Johnson that when pets are involved, the rent is increased slightly. Johnson and the Landlord had a conversation on September 17, 2012. By email dated September 18, 2012, Johnson told the Landlord that she had decided to withdraw her application because of “multiple misunderstandings” between the parties. At some point thereafter, Johnson decided to go through with the lease after all. On October 20, 2012, Johnson did a walk-through inspection of the Property. By way of her signature on the walk-through check list, Johnson agreed that the living room, kitchen, dining room, both bathrooms, both bedrooms, and all other portions of the Property were satisfactory. The only caveat was that there was stain on a counter in the kitchen area. Johnson said she would “advise at time of move” as to her feelings about the parking areas and the patio/terrace/deck area. On November 2, 2012, Johnson and the Landlord entered into a binding Residential Tenancy Agreement. Johnson initialed each page and signed the agreement. The agreement was witnessed by two individuals. On or about that same date, Johnson gave the Landlord several money orders: A $250 money order for the pet deposit; $50 for Pons’ application fee, and $880 for prorated rent for November. Johnson did not complain about the pet deposit at that time. Johnson moved into the Property on or about November 2, 2012. About two months later, on January 1, 2013, Johnson mailed a letter to the Landlord via certified mail, return receipt requested. The letter advised the Landlord that Johnson would be moving out of the Property on or before January 14, 2013. The letter cited several bases for the decision to move out, including: Air condition vents were “visibly covered with dust and dark surroundings”; Johnson and her daughter have severe allergies; Johnson has acute asthma and bronchitis; and The dwelling is unlivable. Johnson also claimed many violations of Florida law by the Landlord concerning the lease, including: Taking a deposit for a pet when that pet was in fact a companion dog. (Johnson submitted a letter into evidence from a behavioral health care employee. The letter, dated some five months after Johnson vacated the unit, said that Ashley would benefit from having a companion dog as she did not have many friends. There was no evidence that the Chihuahua was ever registered or approved as a companion dog.); Smoke alarms which were not in working order; Electrical breakers tripping throughout Property; Unreimbursed expenses, e.g., for changing locks; Failure to put Pons on the lease agreement despite doing a background financial check on him; and Harassment from Bank of America employees trying to collect the Landlord’s mortgage payment for the Property. In the letter stating she would be moving, Johnson expressed her sorrow that the housing situation did not work out. She then set forth the amount of deposit money she believed should be returned to her. In response, she received a letter from the Landlord’s counsel advising that her security and pet deposits had been forfeited. On January 4, 2013, the Landlord posted a notice on the Property door demanding payment of outstanding rent within three days. In lieu of payment, Johnson could vacate the premises within three days. Johnson vacated the premises. On January 14, 2013, Johnson did an exit walk-through of the Property, along with the Landlord, his mother, and Pons. At the completion of the walk- through, Johnson turned over the keys for the Property to the Landlord. Johnson claims discrimination on the part of the Landlord because he failed to recognize or accept the companion dog, failed to put Pons on the lease agreement, and failed to make accommodations for Johnson’s claimed health conditions.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the Florida Commission on Human Relations dismissing the Petition for Relief filed by Denise Johnson-Acosta in its entirety. DONE AND ENTERED this 3rd day of December, 2013, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S R. BRUCE MCKIBBEN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of December, 2013. COPIES FURNISHED: Violet Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations Suite 100 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Cordell John 2921 Swoops Circle Kissimmee, Florida 34741 Denise Johnson-Acosta Post Office Box 453347 Kissimmee, Florida 34745 Cheyanne Costilla, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations Suite 100 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue The issue for determination is whether Celina Hills Property Owner’s Association (the Association) violated the Fair Housing Act, in its enforcement of the Association’s deed restrictions. The Association refused to allow a homeowner within the Association’s community to put a fence around the front of the homeowner's property to accommodate the disability of the homeowner's son. A secondary issue, if the Association violated the Fair Housing Act, is whether the Association's action is sufficient to permit the award of damages to the Florida Commission on Human Relations (FCHR) for frustration of agency purposes in this matter.
Findings Of Fact Sheila and Fred Swasey purchased a home in the Celina Hills Community in 2001, where they currently reside. When they purchased their home, the Swaseys had full knowledge that the home was part of a homeowner’s association which had certain deed restrictions and covenants. The Swaseys furthermore understood that they were subject to the deed restrictions, and at the time of purchase, had no concerns regarding such restrictions. One such restriction was that they could not have a fence in the front yard of their property. The Swaseys have a 22-year-old, mentally retarded son, named Brad. The Swasey’s son has the mental capacity of a two- year-old, certain gait difficulties, and by stipulation of the parties, qualifies under the applicable Fair Housing Act as a handicapped individual in that he has physical and mental impairments that substantially limit one or more major life activities. The Association is a not-for-profit corporation organized in the mid 70's for the sole purpose of operating and maintaining the Celina Hills Community. Every home owner in Celina Hills is a member of the Association, and is subject to the deed restrictions, and covenants that attach to each of the properties within the Association. The Association is operated by a board of directors, which consists of volunteer homeowners, and is charged with the responsibility of enforcing the covenants, restrictions and other governing documents of the Association. The Association, through its officers, was fully aware of Brad's disability. As established by testimony of two of Brad’s doctors, Brad has the mental capacity of a young child approximately two to three years old. Although in the short term his mental capacity has stabilized and will probably not improve, his long- term capacity will be accelerated in regard to dementia, making him much harder to control or exhibit control. The supervisor of Brad’s sheltered workshop testified that, based on her observations, she believes he has the mental capacity of less than a two or three year old. Brad has recently, within the last 3 years, grown dramatically (from 5’3”/160 pounds to 6’2”/240 pounds) and, although he walks with a wide gait and has trouble walking on uneven surfaces, has become significantly harder to control and catch. His parents are in their fifties, and increasingly, subject to the health deficits imposed by the process of aging. Brad’s doctors have advised the Swaseys to have Brad spend time outside, breathe fresh air and get exercise. Brad’s parents’ testimony and observation of Brad at the final hearing establishes that he has the capacity of a two-year-old, but with no fear and no understanding of dangers that confront him in life. Further, he has only recently exhibited a predilection to run towards the street and trucks and cars that attract his attention. Brad is attracted to trucks and cars, especially yellow school buses and blue mail trucks, and attempts to run towards them when possible. With regard to motorists going up the hill on the street in front of the Swaseys and Brad’s home, visibility from the road to the yard (and yard to the road) is poor and cars on the street drive fast. The Swaseys’ home is located in the middle of the block and not at an intersection. The decision of the Swaseys to fence their front yard results in the provision of the best setting for Brad to fully enjoy the premises and gain needed fresh air and exercise. This choice by the Swaseys also provides better observation for them over Brad and more shade and opportunities for him to observe surrounding life and activities. Such a fence would protect Brad from running into the street and provide his parents an opportunity to allow Brad some “independence” while still being under their direct supervision when they work in the front yard. The fence would also keep him from running away from them into the street before they can catch him. Such a front yard fence requires an accommodation from the Association in order to build higher than the Association's allowable three feet and also along the required county set-back line for fences. The Swaseys' backyard has severe slopes, contains the screened-in pool and is generally unusable as an outside area for Brad because of his walking disability. Nevertheless, his parents also plan to fence the side and back- yards as well, which requires only the standard approval as to style, material and installation and no accommodation. Should they fence just the back and side yard, however, a problem would result in the form of entry problems, since the only direct entry to the backyard is through the pool area. Such an entry would redirect Brad’s attention to areas of the home and yard where the pool is located. Unfortunately, the backyard alone would not allow Brad full enjoyment because of the nature of the property (uneven with major slopes) and his walking disability. Further, direct observation of Brad would be difficult in some areas, if not impossible. On April 8, 2003, Brad's mother submitted a written request to the Association for a fence on the front, side and backyards. She also indicated that they would have the fence removed if they ever sold the house. On May 1, 2003, the Association's Board of Directors had a meeting at which Brad's father presented the request of he and his wife. Simply put, their request was to erect a front fence in a wooden picket style and an electric wood-faced gate for the front of the property (more in keeping with the covenants and restrictions placed on the property). As affirmed by Brad's father at the final hearing, he has no desire to denigrate property values in the community due to his own home investment. This summarizes the request of Brad's parents for need of an accommodation from the Association. The relevant restriction for which an accommodation was requested is found on page 6 of the Celina Hill’s Property Owners Handbook (January 2002 edition) which provides: No fence or wall shall be erected or maintained in the front beyond the front building setback line. No wire, chain link, or cyclone is permitted on any lot. No fence or hedge over three (3) feet in height shall be permitted along the front. No fence or hedge shall be erected or maintained which shall: i) unreasonably restrict or obstruct sight lines at corners and at intersections or driveways with streets; ii) detract from the overall appearance of the property (the use of rough hewn woods or natural plantings as fencing and screening materials is encouraged); or iii) stand greater than four (4) feet in height. The Swaseys met all conditions, except for the deed restriction, in their request for a front yard fence. As established by witnesses for the Swaseys, inclusive of the school bus driver who frequently drives a school bus by the Swaseys' property, there are no safety concerns about the proposed front yard fence obscuring motorists' view since it is not going to be at an intersection. On May 24, 2003, the Association denied the Swaseys' request stating that, “We cannot authorize your request for a fence of any style in your front yard, the Celina Hills Homeowners manual makes clear that no fence can be installed beyond the front setback line and that setback line is the front of your house.” In the same letter, the Association indicated it had no problem with the Swaseys' pursuing fencing the side and backyards since there was no deed restriction and only a style, materials and installation review. On June 18, 2003, FCHR issued a determination that there was reasonable cause to believe that the Association was engaging in a discriminatory housing practice in violation of Section 760.23, Florida Statutes. FCHR’s efforts to conciliate the case failed as stated in its Notice of Failure of Conciliation on July 30, 2003. FCHR also placed into evidence its calculation of damages, in addition to attorney’s fees and costs to be determined upon completion of the case, for “frustration of agency purpose.” These damages were calculated at $1,035.40 consisting of $358.70 for 20.6 investigative hours; $600.00 for legal review and advisor hours; $66.70 in direct travel costs; and $10.00 in photographic development costs.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter an order finding Respondent guilty of a discriminatory housing practice against the Complainant and her son in violation of Section 760.23 (7) and (9), Florida Statutes; prohibiting further unlawful housing practices by Respondent; and allowing the building of an esthetically acceptable fence in the front yard as necessary to provide containment and safety for Brad Swasey to use and enjoy his dwelling, with the proviso that such fence be removed when Brad is no longer a regular resident in the Swasey home. DONE AND ENTERED this 1st day of December, 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DON W. DAVIS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of December, 2003. COPIES FURNISHED: Barry A. Postman, Esquire Cole, Scott & Kissane, P.A. Pacific National Bank Building 1390 Brickell Avenue Miami, Florida 33131 Sheila Swasey 2125 East Celina Street Inverness, Florida 34453 William J. Tait, Jr., Esquire Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301-4830 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue Whether Respondent is liable to Petitioner for discrimination in the sale or rental of housing because of Petitioner’s alleged disability, in violation of the Florida Fair Housing Act.
Findings Of Fact In June 2016, Gaudina and Grand Lifestyle executed a document, entitled “GLC III/LLLP Lease – Basic Rental Agreement or Residential Lease” (lease), in which Gaudina leased from Grand Lifestyle a residence at 3346 East Dale Street, Leesburg, Florida, in the Lakeside Village mobile home park (premises). The lease provided that Gaudina pay to Grand Lifestyle $656.00 per month to lease the premises. The lease further provided that at the end of three consecutive years of living at the premises, Grand Lifestyle would provide Gaudina the option of purchasing the premises for $1,000.00. Gaudina testified that his primary residence is in Colorado, but that he wished to lease the premises so that he had a residence when he visited his wife, who lived nearby in Lake County, Florida. As he did not reside permanently at the premises in Leesburg, Gaudina subleased the premises to another individual, possibly in violation of the lease. That individual reported to Gaudina numerous issues with the premises, which Gaudina testified he brought to the attention of Grand Lifestyle.2/ Both parties testified that they sought various remedies in other courts concerning these issues. The undersigned finds that these issues are not relevant to Gaudina’s allegations concerning discrimination under the Florida FHA. Gaudina testified that he possesses a disability that requires use of an emotional support animal. The only evidence Gaudina submitted in support of this contention was a letter, dated February 24, 2015, from Emilia Ripoll, M.D. (Ripoll), located in Boulder, Colorado, and a “Health Care Provider Pet Accomodation Form,” also from Ripoll. This letter states: Mr. Jan Gaudina is currently my patient and has been under my care since 1998. I am intimately familiar with his history and with the functional limitations imposed by his medical condition. Due to his diagnosis of bladder cancer and bilateral ureter cancer, Jan has certain emotional limitations including stress which may cause his cancer to recur. In order to help alleviate these difficulties, and to enhance his ability to cope and live independently, I have prescribed Jan to obtain his pet for emotional support. The presence of this animal is necessary for the mental health of Jan. The Health Care Accomodation Form prescribed the use of Gaudina’s dog, a golden retriever, as an emotional support animal. Gaudina did not present the testimony of Ripoll or any other health care provider concerning his alleged disability. The letter and form, which are inadmissible hearsay that Gaudina failed to corroborate with admissible non-hearsay evidence, attempt to establish that Gaudina required an emotional support animal to prevent a recurrence of cancer. The undersigned cannot consider these documents to support a finding that Gaudina is disabled and in need of an emotional support animal. See Fla. Admin. Code R. 28-106.213(3).3/ Therefore, the undersigned finds that Gaudina has failed to establish that he suffers from a disability that requires the accommodation of his golden retriever as an emotional support animal. Principe, the owner of Grand Lifestyle, testified that the prospectus for the premises restricted pet ownership to pets that weigh less than 20 pounds. The parties acknowledged that a golden retriever weighs in excess of 20 pounds. Principe testified that, during a telephone conversation, Gaudina asked whether he could bring his golden retriever to the premises, but never mentioned his alleged disability. Principe also testified that he asked Gaudina whether Gaudina’s golden retriever was a trained service dog. Gaudina testified that his golden retriever was not a “service dog,” as defined under section 413.08, Florida Statutes.4/ Principe further testified that Gaudina rarely visited the premises. Gaudina testified that, in total, he visited the premises in Leesburg three or four times over the period of approximately one year. Gaudina presented no credible evidence that he qualifies as a person who is disabled for the purposes of the Florida FHA. Further, there is no competent, persuasive evidence in the record upon which the undersigned could make a finding of discrimination in the sale or rental of housing because of Petitioner’s alleged disability, in violation of the Florida FHA.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a final order finding that Petitioner, Jan Gaudina, did not prove that Respondent, Grand Lifestyle Communities III/IV, LLLP, committed discrimination in the sale or rental of housing because of Petitioner’s alleged disability, in violation of the Florida Fair Housing Act, and dismissing his Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 18th day of January, 2019, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ROBERT J. TELFER III Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of January, 2019.
The Issue Whether Respondent violated the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992, as alleged in the Charge of Discrimination filed by Petitioner on October 29, 2002.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is an Hispanic woman who was employed by Respondent from December 1997 until her termination on October 2, 2002. She worked in Alachua County Animal Services (Animal Services) as an animal control officer. Animal Services control officers are supervised by the Animal Services field supervisor who reports to the director of Animal Services. Petitioner received a bachelor's degree in 1983 in agriculture with a concentration in animal production and agricultural management courses, has experience in animal nutritional research, and has one published paper in that field.2/ Prior to working for the Alachua County, Petitioner managed a small pest control business. By the time she applied for the supervisory position, she had obtained Florida Animal Control Association (FACA) Level I, euthanasia, and chemical immobilization certifications. An animal control officer is responsible for enforcing state laws and county ordinances regarding small animals. Animal control officers impound animals at-large, issue warnings and citations, handle citizen complaints, and investigate animal bites and cruelty to animals. Petitioner served as interim Animal Services supervisor for a little over one month in June 2000. When the position of Animal Services field supervisor became vacant in December 2001, Petitioner applied for the job. Penny Lefkowitz, a newly hired Animal Services officer, also applied for the job. At that time, Ms. Lefkowitz had seven years of animal control experience in Arizona as lead officer. In that capacity, she was a sworn officer with firearm authority, a field training officer, and handled over 1,000 calls per year in that position. She held National Animal Control Association (NACA) Level I and II certifications. She was euthanasia- certified and had 25 years' experience breeding dogs and horses. Ms. Lefkowitz has a high school diploma. Ms. Lefkowitz was placed in the interim field supervisor position for a period of approximately three months, during which time she received supervisory pay. The record is not clear whether there was a separate application process for the permanent position following the appointment of the interim supervisor position. In any event, Respondent hired Bill Burris as Animal Services supervisor in March 2002. At the time he applied, Mr. Burris had nine years of animal control experience in Arkansas, where he was the animal control officer and shelter assistant. He held a high school G.E.D. Additionally, he held NACA Level I, II, and III certifications. Petitioner's Charge of Discrimination regarding failure to promote only references Ms. Lefkowitz's appointment to the interim director position, "[i]n December 2001, a newly hired officer, white female with less experience was hired as interim supervisor." It does not reference Mr. Burris as being hired in the director position. Her Petition for Relief alleges, "[t]hose less qualified individuals were hired and promoted in violation of county/company policy." Thus, it is not clear that Respondent hiring Mr. Burris for the permanent position is properly within the scope of this case. Nonetheless, the evidence presented at the hearing regarding Mr. Burris' qualifications is addressed herein. Mr. Burris held the position of field operation supervisor from March 2002 until his resignation in September 2003. Based upon the evidence in the record, at the time the decision was made to place Ms. Lefkowitz in the temporary supervisory position, she and Petitioner met the qualifications for the job. Ms. Lefkowitz had significantly more supervisory and field experience than Petitioner. At the time he was placed in the job, Mr. Burris met the qualifications for the job and had significantly more supervisory experience than Petitioner. Petitioner held a college degree, which neither Ms. Lefkowitz or Mr. Burris had. However, according to Mr. Burris, a college degree was not a minimum requirement of the job, but two years' animal control or animal shelter experience were required. There is nothing in the record to contradict his testimony in this regard. When Mr. Burris became field supervisor, he held a staff meeting and told the animal control officers he supervised that he would start fresh as far as performance and discipline issues. He handed them an empty folder and informed them that he would only consider their past performance if he saw a pattern that caused him to look at past personnel records. Mr. Burris called staff meetings to discuss policies that were not up-to-date or in need of updating. Prior to the staff meeting, Mr. Burris sent a memorandum to the animal control officers informing them that there would be a staff meeting. Officers were expected to attend and were excused only if they were on an emergency call. If an officer was absent from a meeting, Mr. Burris would promptly notify them in memorandum format as to what happened at the meeting. When changes were made in policies or procedures, Mr. Burris would put a copy of the policy changes in every officer's box. Each officer had his or her box where they would receive their mail. Each officer was expected to check that box daily. The boxes were accessible to everyone so that when there was a confidential document, such as payroll information, that document was placed in an envelope and then put in the officer's box. Petitioner's mid-year performance review was due in April 2002, approximately six weeks after Mr. Burris became the supervisor. Petitioner received an overall rating of "exceeded expectation." There are five categories of performance ratings, and "exceeded expectation" is the second highest category. That rating was consistent with ratings Petitioner received from previous supervisors. On April 24, 2002, Mr. Burris held a staff meeting to discuss a new policy regarding issuance of warnings and citations. The new policy required officers to give animal owners in violation of vaccination or licensing requirements 15 days to come into compliance. Previous to this, some officers had given animal owners 30 days to come into compliance. Under extenuating circumstances and upon seeing reasonable attempts to achieve compliance, the officer could extend an owner's deadline by 15 more days. Testimony is conflicting as to whether Petitioner attended this meeting. Petitioner insists she was not at this meeting. Mr. Burris insists that she was and that this issue was discussed in great detail. In any event, Mr. Burris put the new policy in writing a few days after the April 24, 2002, meeting, and the new written policy was given to all the officers. The weight of the evidence establishes that even if Petitioner did not attend the April 24, 2002, meeting, she would have been notified of the policy change shortly thereafter. On April 29, 2002, Petitioner issued a warning to a dog owner, which allowed the dog owner 30 days to achieve compliance with licensing and vaccinations for 24 dogs. According to Petitioner, she considered 30 days to be ample time for the owner to come into compliance. Petitioner maintains that at the time she issued this warning, she was not aware of the change in policy from 30 to 15 days. She acknowledges that Mr. Burris later explained the change in policy to her. It is clear that Mr. Burris informed Petitioner of this policy change and directed her to follow these procedures. In June or July 2002, Mr. Burris designed a policy and procedure manual incorporating all policies and procedures. A manual was issued for each truck used by the animal control officers. On July 31, 2002, Mr. Burris issued a memorandum entitled, "Bite Priority," to the animal control officers. Following a staff meeting where this memorandum was given to the officers, an informal discussion took place around the dispatch area. During this informal discussion, Petitioner questioned Mr. Burris as to whether he had ever read a document called the rabies compendium. Mr. Burris described Petitioner as speaking in a disrespectful, challenging tone. Ms. Lefkowitz witnessed the exchange and described it as disrespectful and condescending.3/ This statement made in front of other officers was inappropriate. The "Bite Priority" memorandum reads, in pertinent part, as follows: All Bites will be priority. Stand-by officers will be required to respond if the bite is after hours during their on-call shift. Bites will not be passed on to the next day. Shifts are 10 hour shifts, not 9 1/2 hours, if you end up working over you are compensated. Officers will not pass calls off to the stand-by person. Priority calls will be taken by Officers during their regular shift. The remainder of the memorandum dealt with off-premise bites. In early August 2002, Mr. Burris decided to "work the roads on a Saturday to take up some of the slack" because the animal control officers were overworked. Late one afternoon, Mr. Burris attempted to reach Petitioner on the radio, but was unable to do so. He asked the dispatcher to contact Petitioner. Petitioner acknowledges that she was contacted by the dispatcher and received Mr. Burris' request to fill up the truck she was driving and to leave the keys and the fuel card on Mr. Burris' desk. Petitioner had already filled up the truck that day in the late morning. She did not fill up the truck again at the end of the day, but described the truck as being seven-eighths full at the end of her shift, after making ten to 12 calls after stopping for fuel. Petitioner believed her actions complied with Mr. Burris' instructions. Mr. Burris described finding the truck the next morning as half-full of gas. Mr. Burris concluded that Petitioner did not follow his instructions. Mr. Burris' conclusion in this regard was not unreasonable. The truck incident gave rise to Mr. Burris' first written warning about her conduct. On August 5, 2002, Mr. Burris issued a memorandum to Petitioner for "failure to follow verbal instruction." The memorandum noted a safety concern in that he was not able to reach Petitioner by radio and his concern that she did not follow his directive. On August 6, 2002, Mr. Burris called Petitioner into his office to discuss the written memorandum. Mr. Burris described Petitioner's behavior when he handed her the memorandum to be disrespectful. As a result, Mr. Burris went to the director's office to explain the circumstances surrounding this incident. This resulted in a meeting in the director's office at which the director, Mr. Burris, and Petitioner were present. Petitioner acknowledges that she made the statement, "I guess one out of a hundred is unacceptable" during this meeting, and that she said it using a sarcastic tone. Later on August 6, 2002, Mr. Burris issued Petitioner another in-house written warning, the subject of which was "improper conduct" about her conduct in the director's office, which read in part: I informed Dr. Caligiuri of Blanca's discourtesy and or improper conduct. I had Blanca meet with me in Dr. Caligiuri's office to discuss her comment and the way in which it was stated. During our conversation in Dr. Caligiuri's office Blanca used mild sarcasm, expressing, "I guess one time out of a hundred is unacceptable" as we discussed the importance of responding to her radio. At this time, I do not want to write this up as a group I #19 Discourtesy to another employee or a Group II #7 Improper conduct which would effect the employees relationship with co-workers. However, if this behavior continues I will be left with no alternative. I know Blanca is capable of doing her job in a professional manner. I only want this as a written documentation of what occurred on this day, to prevent future occurrences of this same behavior. Petitioner refused to sign the August 6, 2002, memorandum. On August 13, 2002, Animal Services received a call about a dog bite at a residence. Animal control officer Jay Butts was dispatched on the call. When he arrived, he saw two or three dogs inside the home, and he could not determine which dog was involved in the reported bite. The owner of the dog was not at home. He left without leaving a written warning because, "I did not have the correct owner or dog, so I didn't know which dog or which owner to leave a written warning to. . . So I wanted to come back and find out which dog actually was involved in the bite." The following morning, Mr. Butts received information from the Health Department regarding the dog's owner and learned that the dog was not currently vaccinated or licensed. Mr. Butts returned to the residence where the bite occurred. He posted a notice to the dog's owner. Apparently the owner was still not home because he posted a warning which included the following necessary corrective action: "Your dog must be placed into quarantine by 5:00 pm on 8-14-02 at our shelter or a licensed vet. If you do not have this done today your animal will be impounded and you will receive a citation of $200.00 per day." The warning required the owner to correct the violation by 5:00 p.m. that day. Officer Butts proceeded to handle other calls until his shift was over. He did not make contact with the dog's owner before his shift ended. His shift ended before 5:00 p.m. The dog's owner called Animal Services after 5:00 p.m. on August 14, 2002. Petitioner took the call. After speaking to the dog's owner, she called a veterinarian and learned that the dog's vaccination had expired by a few months. She did not pick up the dog. She gave the following reason: Yeah, it happened on property. The dog was confined to his property. We had contacted the owner. And basically even though the vaccination had expired, even a one-year vaccination is good for three years. This is a known fact of any vaccine, any rabies vaccine manufactured in the United States, a one-year vaccine has an efficacy of three years. So I take all that matter into consideration when I have to make a decision as to what to do with a bite dog. Petitioner told the dog's owner that he had to comply with the written warning given by Mr. Butts. According to Petitioner, she told the dog's owner that he had to quarantine the dog off the property either at the shelter or at a veterinarian clinic. She also informed him that the only person who could reverse that decision was her supervisor. The next morning, August 15, 2002, the dog's owner called Mr. Burris. Mr. Burris spoke to the dog's owner and then questioned Petitioner to get her side of the story. He then instructed Petitioner to pick up the dog. She did not pick up the dog as instructed; another officer picked up the dog later that day. Mr. Burris gave a verbal warning to Officer Butts regarding his handling of the dog-bite incident. Mr. Butts had received previous disciplinary actions, including suspensions, prior to Mr. Burris becoming the field supervisor. However, on August 20, 2002, Mr. Burris initiated a Notice of Proposed Disciplinary Action (Notice) to Petitioner in which he recommended a three-day suspension without pay. The reasons referenced in the Notice were willful negligence in the performance of assigned duties or negligence which would endanger the employee, other employees, or the public; and refusal to perform assigned duties or to comply with written or verbal instructions of a higher level supervisor. The narrative of the Notice referenced the dog-bite incident and the August 6, 2002, improper conduct memorandum. Mr. Burris explained his decision to give different disciplinary actions to Officer Butts and Petitioner: Q What should she have done with the dog? A She should have impounded it immediately. If the owner refused her, she should have issued him a citation for failure to comply. Q Jay Butts participated in this. We had some testimony about that. Jay Butts participated in this event two days prior and one day prior to Ms. Carbia getting involved. Why wasn't Butts given any suspension on the same matter? A Jay Butts was given the same verbal consultation that Officer Carbia had received. The only thing Jay Butts could have done differently would have perhaps left a posted notice the day of or given a notice to the roommate with generic information. Jay Butts received consultation pertaining to that. He did not receive disciplinary action because he never made any contact with the owner. The officer that made contact with the owner and had the first opportunity to take the dog was Officer Carbia. Q So there is a difference in the seriousness of her offense and Jay Butts' offense? A Absolutely. Q Hers was more serious? A Yes. As a result of the Notice, a grievance hearing took place on August 26, 2002, in the director's office. Wayne Mangum, who at that time was the union steward, Mr. Burris, and Petitioner were there, as well as the director, Dr. Caligiuri. During the meeting, Petitioner explained her position. At some point in the meeting, Dr. Caligiuri made a comment to the effect that 80 years ago women could not vote.4/ Petitioner found that comment to be discriminatory toward women. When asked whether Dr. Caligiuri's demeanor in that meeting was aggressive or not cordial, Mr. Mangum replied that his demeanor was "uncordial." In any event, Dr. Caligiuri's comment was offensive and inappropriate. During the August 26, 2002, meeting, Mr. Burris instructed Petitioner to discontinue striking the word "within" from the form used when giving an animal owner a time frame within which to bring in an animal to be impounded. She had not been instructed regarding that previously. Mr. Burris received a copy of a warning form dated August 28, 2002, on which Petitioner had crossed out the word "within" contrary to his instructions. He took no action at the time since he thought it might have been a "slip of the pen." He then received another warning form dated September 9, 2002, regarding a dog bite which Petitioner had again altered by crossing out the word "within." Petitioner had written on the form that the warning had been posted. Posting is a procedure officers follow when the animal owner cannot be found. The notice is posted on the door of the residence for the owner to find upon returning home. Based upon his telephone call to the dog's owner and the information on the form, Mr. Burris was of the belief that the form had not been posted, and that Petitioner's indication on the form that it had been posted was inaccurate. Mr. Burris met with Petitioner regarding this incident. Petitioner acknowledged at hearing that she spoke to the dog's owner, but was intimidated and confused when questioned by Mr. Burris about whether or not she had spoken to the owner. Petitioner contends that she did not lie to Mr. Burris, that initially the owner did not come to the door but later did come to the door. According to Petitioner, she simply neglected to cross out the word "posted" or ask the owner to sign the form. On September 18, 2002, Mr. Burris signed and provided a Notice of Proposed Disciplinary Action to Petitioner which proposed her termination from employment. The stated reasons for the proposed action were willful negligence in the performance of assigned duties or negligence which would endanger the employee, other employee, or the public; deliberate falsification and or destruction of county records; and refusal to perform assigned duties or to comply with written or verbal instruction of a higher level supervisor. The Notice referenced the August 28, 2002, warning notice with the word "within" crossed out; the September 10, 2002, warning notice with the word "within" crossed out; the written word "posted" on a warning when she had personally spoken to the dog's owner; and the meeting on August 26, 2002, which resulted in her three-day suspension. The Notice concluded: This is the same type of circumstance concerning the same written instruction after meeting with Blanca and her union rep. This time Blanca was untruthful in her statements, even after I gave her three opportunities to tell me that she had personally spoken to the dog owner. By writing "posted" on the notice which indicates the owner was not home, she falsified a county document. Blanca hand delivered the notice to the dog owner and did not impound the dog when she had the opportunity. Petitioner was terminated from her employment with Respondent effective October 2, 2002. There is no evidence in the record that Petitioner complained to anyone that she felt she was discriminated against on the basis of her gender or national origin. The only evidence presented regarding her national origin was Petitioner's brief testimony: Q Were there any other Hispanics employed at animal services during the time frame that Mr. Burris was there? A No. Do you feel that your national origin had something to do with the way Mr. Burris treated you? A Certainly just—basically I felt that I was treated differently, yeah.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law set forth herein, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the Charge of Discrimination and Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 27th day of July, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S BARBARA J. STAROS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of July, 2004.
The Issue Whether Petitioner is handicapped within the meaning of the Florida Fair Housing Act (Sections 760.20 – 760.37, Florida Statutes) or the Federal Fair Housing Act (42 USCA § 3601 et seq.).1 Whether Respondent discriminated against Petitioner in violation of either Act by refusing to waive its no pets policy, which would require Petitioner to remove his “emotional support animals” (two cats) from his condominium unit. Whether Respondent retaliated against Petitioner for his refusal to remove his cats from his condominium unit.
Findings Of Fact At all times relevant to this proceeding, Petitioner owned and resided in Unit 206 of the condominium building managed by Respondent. Petitioner is a male, born February 5, 1951. Respondent is the Board of Directors of the condominium building in which Petitioner resides. At all times relevant to this proceeding, Respondent had the following written policy (the no pets policy), which it routinely enforced2: 12. No Unit [sic] owner or lessee shall acquire a pet to be maintained in his or her unit, or shall such persons already possessing pets replace them when such pets die or are otherwise disposed of. No unit owner or lessee shall keep visiting pets in their unit. Petitioner bought Unit 206 in January 1999 and has since then lived alone in that unit with two cats. These cats have received no special training and have no special attributes. These cats were born to a cat that Petitioner and his late mother kept as a pet. Since his mother’s death in 1996, Petitioner has viewed these cats as his surrogate family. Respondent and Petitioner have engaged in a dispute regarding Petitioner’s alleged violation of its no pets policy that began in 1999 and is on-going. This dispute has involved multiple forums, with the current proceeding being the latest development. Respondent has received complaints from other residents of the condominium building that an unpleasant odor comes from Petitioner’s unit and that fleas have been found in the vicinity of his unit. On December 23, 2003, Dr. Seth Gottlieb, Petitioner’s physician, wrote the following: “To: Whom It May Concern:” William Kleinschmidt is a patient of mine. Mr. Kleinschmidt has a long-time severe physical disability and it is medically necessary that he his [sic] emotional support companion animals – his cats, to control the frequency and severity of his physical disability. By letter to Respondent’s president dated January 10, 2004, Petitioner asserted the following: While I realize that the Board and I disagree as to the interpretation of the condominium rules regarding pets, as my interpretation is based on the plain reading of the language within the common meaning of the said words, is that if a potential unit owner already has pets, they are acceptable and that no replacement pets will be brought in after the purchase. I may add that as a pre-condition to purchase of my unit, the board DID [sic] agree to my companion animals for my physical disability – the witnesses are both the buyer and the seller real estate brokers and others. I am requesting a special waiver of the pet rules as the board currently views them be made in my situation due to my disability. Please find attached a letter from my physician Seth Gottlieb, M.D., certifying that my companion animals are “medically necessary” for my disability. Please advise me in writing whether or not we have a special waiver as a reasonable accommodation. Although Respondent had been trying to force Petitioner to remove his cats from his unit since 1999, the letter of January 10, 2004, was the first time that Petitioner asserted that he was disabled and it was the first time he requested a waiver of the no pets policy to accommodate his disability. Prior to that letter, Respondent did not know and had no reason to know that Petitioner believed himself to be disabled. On April 19, 2004, Dr. Gottlieb wrote the following: “To: Whom It May Concern:” William Kleinschmidt is my patient, who has a significant emotional disability, as well as a long history of significant asthma. His asthma unfortunately has not been currently under good control. William clearly has a significant emotional component to his asthma, that is, his asthma is easily exacerbated by emotional triggers. William has companion animals which greatly help his emotional status. If he is not able to keep these companion animals there is a great likelihood that the emotional distress this will bring will significantly worsen his asthma. Therefore, it is medically necessary for William to have these emotional support animals to control the severity and frequency of his asthmatic disability. Dr. Gottlieb has no special training in psychiatry or psychology, and he did not treat or diagnose Petitioner’s anxiety. Dr. Gottlieb recommended to Petitioner that Petitioner seek professional help from a clinical psychologist or a psychiatrist. Petitioner refused to follow that recommendation. Petitioner has multiple allergens, one of which is cat dander. Dr. Gottlieb recommended to Petitioner that Petitioner seek professional help from an allergist. Petitioner refused to follow that recommendation. Dr. Gottlieb’s letters of December 23, 2003, and April 19, 2004, were written at Petitioner’s request and were based on statements made to him by Petitioner and on his observations of Petitioner. Dr. Gottlieb testified that he had never known Petitioner to be without his cats and he had no way of knowing what the consequences would be if Petitioner was unable to keep his cats. Dr. Gottlieb’s testimony does not establish that it is medically necessary for Respondent to waive its no pets policy as a reasonable accommodation of Petitioner’s handicapping conditions. Petitioner is a person with a handicap within the meaning of the Acts.3 At all times relevant to this proceeding, Petitioner has suffered from persistent asthma and emotional problems. There was no expert testimony as to the nature and extent of Petitioner’s emotional problems, but it is clear from the evidence that his emotional problems are debilitating. Petitioner is receiving no treatment for his emotional problems. Petitioner is receiving treatment from Dr. Gottlieb for his asthma. His asthma responds to medication prescribed by Dr. Gottlieb, but his asthma is not controlled by that medication and he suffers periodic asthma attacks of undetermined frequency and severity. Petitioner failed to establish that his two untrained cats are necessary for him to have equal opportunity to use and enjoy his dwelling within the meaning of either of the Acts. Petitioner’s cats are pets and while they undoubtedly provide emotional support as any pet should, they are not service animals4 and they have no special training that would enable them to assist Petitioner to overcome limitations imposed by his handicaps. Whether Petitioner’s cats help him avoid anxiety attacks, which could, in turn, trigger an asthma attack, is speculative. Petitioner asserts that two incidents prove that Respondent harassed him and retaliated against him because of his refusal to remove his cats from his unit. The first incident occurred in 2001 while Respondent was attempting to serve Petitioner with a subpoena during an arbitration proceeding. Because Respondent had difficulty serving a subpoena on Petitioner, Respondent had the arbitrator issue an order authorizing Respondent to have a locksmith open the door to Petitioner’s unit so the subpoena could be left in the unit. On September 21, 2001, Respondent hired a locksmith who unlocked the front door to Petitioner’s unit by drilling the lock on the door. A representative of Respondent thereafter entered Petitioner’s unit and left the subpoena for Petitioner inside the unit. An armed police officer was present when the door was opened and when Respondent’s representative entered the unit, left the subpoena, and exited the unit. These events occurred before Respondent had any reason to believe that Petitioner considered himself disabled or that he considered his cats to be emotional support animals. Respondent established that it was acting on advice of counsel and pursuant to the arbitrator’s order on September 21, 2001. Petitioner failed to establish that the events of September 21, 2001, were done to harass him or retaliate against him for asserting his rights under either Act. The second incident occurred in October 2003, when Respondent failed to give Petitioner proper credit for a maintenance assessment Petitioner had made. As a result of the error, Respondent wrote Petitioner a dun letter which reminded Petitioner that the failure to pay maintenance assessments could result in the imposition of a lien against his unit. Respondent failed to properly credit Petitioner’s payment as the result of a bookkeeping error. Respondent corrected the error as soon as Respondent’s bookkeeper discovered it. Soon thereafter, Respondent provided a written explanation of the error to Petitioner and apologized to him for the error. Petitioner failed to establish that the events of October 23, 2003, were done to harass him or retaliate against him for asserting his rights under either Act.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the FCHR enter a final order dismissing Petitioner’s Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 25th day of, May 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S CLAUDE B. ARRINGTON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of May, 2005.
The Issue Whether Respondents, Wayne Jones, manager (Mr. Jones), and Sun Key Village (Sun Key), are entitled to an award of attorney's fees and costs pursuant to sections 57.105(5) and 120.595, Florida Statutes (2010),1/ and ,if entitled to an award, then the determination of a reasonable amount.
Findings Of Fact The Beaulieus are residents of Sun Key, a mobile home park located at 8607 26th Avenue, East, Palmetto, Florida. Mr. Jones is the manager of Sun Key. Sun Key is a mobile home park as defined by section 723.003(6), Florida Statutes. On March 25, 2010, the Beaulieus filed a Petition for Relief with the Commission stating: I still feel this is discrimination-- Mr. Jones states I am violating park rules by having a dog over 20 lbs this dog is a Visitor not a resident pet. It is my sons' dog--visits on occasion. There are many dogs over 20lbs & living in Sun Key. This is selective enforcement!!! Ms. Beaulieu attached to her Petition for Relief a lengthy hand-written document, alleging that other residents were violating Sun Key park rules concerning the size and number of permissible dogs. On March 30, 2010, the Commission forwarded the Beaulieus' petition to DOAH. An Initial Order was issued, requiring the parties to respond concerning, in part, the amount of time required for the hearing and the date and location for the hearing. On April 6, 2010, Carol S. Grondzik, Esquire (Ms. Grondzik), of Lutz, Bobo, Telfair, Eastman, Gabel & Lee, filed a response for Respondents. On April 8, 2010, the Beaulieus, acting as their own attorneys, filed a response. Based on the responses, the Administrative Law Judge set the case for final hearing on August 3, 2010. On April 12, 2010, Respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss. In the Motion to Dismiss, Respondents argued that the Beaulieus "have not alleged they are members of a protected class under fair housing law." Further, the motion referenced Ms. Beaulieu's letter dated March 8, 2010, requesting an appeal of the Commission's no cause determination. Specifically, the Motion to Dismiss stated that the Beaulieus' complaint was for "selective enforcement" and not tied to retaliation based on the prior housing complaint filed by Ms. Beaulieu's sister. Thus, the Motion to Dismiss concluded that: [B]ecause Petitioners do not assert that they are members of a protected class under fair housing law, because they do not pursue a claim of retaliation against Respondents Wayne Jones and Sun Key, and because Bert Blanchard and the Sun Key Village Homeowners Association, Inc., are not providers of housing subject to fair housing laws, this Petition should be dismissed as a matter of law. On April 12, 2010, Ms. Grondzik served, by U.S. mail, a copy of the Motion for Attorney's Fees and Costs, pursuant to section 57.105, with a letter to the Beaulieus. Specifically, Ms. Grondzik's letter states: A Motion for Attorney's Fees and Costs is also enclosed for your review. I will hold this motion for at least 21 days before filing with the Division as required by Florida law. This allows you time to analyze the relevant facts and law, to seek advice as necessary, and to take action. On April 19, 2010, DOAH issued a Notice of Ex-parte Communication after it had received a copy of a letter that had been sent by Kenneth Wiggins (Mr. Wiggins), an attorney for the Beaulieus, to Ms. Grondzik. The terms of the letter sought to settle the dispute between the Beaulieus and Respondents. Mr. Wiggins, however, did not make an appearance for the Beaulieus before DOAH, and it was unclear who mailed the letter to DOAH. In any event, the Beaulieus continued to represent themselves in the proceedings before DOAH. On July 7, 2010, the Beaulieus filed a motion for continuance of the August 3, 2010, hearing date. The Administrative Law Judge denied the motion. On July 19, 2010, the Beaulieus filed a Notice of Voluntary Dismissal of their petition. On July 21, 2010, Respondents filed the Motion for Attorney's Fees and Costs and Notice of Filing Affidavit of Carol S. Grondzik. Ms. Grondzik's affidavit set out the hourly rate and the scope of work performed to date in the case. On July 29, 2010, Respondents filed a Memorandum of Law in Support of Respondent's [sic] Motion for Attorney's Fees and Costs. At the January 14, 2011, hearing, Ms. Beaulieu testified about instances where the mobile home park failed to enforce its rules and regulations concerning the pet size for residents. Further, she testified that she had brought the DOAH proceeding to address the unfair and selective enforcement of the mobile home park's rules. Sun Key Village Mobile Home Park, Park Rules and Regulations provides, in pertinent part, that: 9. Pets: A maximum of two small pets are permitted, which at maturity must not weigh greater than 20 pounds each. Pets must be confined to the interior of the home when the resident is not present and must be on a leash at all times when outside of tenant's home. They must be transported to areas outside of residence or common areas for exercise. The record shows that the Beaulieus were provided a copy of the rule when moving into Sun Key. Mr. Wayne Jones testified that there were instances when exceptions had been made for residents to have dogs larger than 20 pounds. For example, he identified that residents, who had large, elderly dogs when they moved into Sun Key, were allowed to keep their pets. Mr. Peterson, an attorney who has extensive experience in representing mobile home park owners, testified concerning the reasonableness of the attorney's fees and costs. Mr. Peterson testified that he considered the factors outlined in Florida's Patient's Compensation Fund v. Rowe, 472 So. 2d 1145 (Fla. 1985), and reviewed the legal file in this case. Based on his review, Mr. Peterson found that 57.2 hours were reasonable in defense of this case and that the blended hourly rate of $235.92 was reasonable. Therefore, Mr. Peterson testified the reasonable attorney's fees to be $13,494.40 and the amount of taxable costs to be $575.00. Mr. Peterson also testified that Respondents would be entitled to attorney's fees for having to litigate the issue of fee entitlement. Mr. Peterson testified that 14 hours would not be an unreasonable amount of time for preparing and attending a hearing concerning the entitlement to fees, for a total of $3,302.88 using the blended hourly rate of $235.92. Based on a review of the record and testimony offered at trial, 71.2 hours is a reasonable amount of time spent on the defense of the instant case and litigating the issue of entitlement to attorney's fees. A review of the record and testimony shows that $235.92 an hour is a reasonable prevailing blended hourly rate. The parties stipulated that the Beaulieus are not members of a protected class under the fair housing law.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondent unlawfully discriminated against Petitioner in violation of the Fair Housing Act by refusing to allow her to keep a dog in her condominium as an accommodation.
Findings Of Fact On April 5, 2006, Petitioner purchased a condominium (hereinafter "condo") at Point East Three Condominium Association, Inc. She has resided in Unit N-508 continuously since she purchased the condo. Breziner was provided the Association's Declaration of Condominium and Rules and Regulations, which both prohibited unit owners from keeping pets in their units. Point East is the entity responsible for operating and managing the condo property in which Breziner's unit is located. Breziner signed the association rules when she moved into the condo. At all times relevant to this proceeding, Respondent had a no pets written policy. Section 10.3 of the Declaration states in relevant part: No animals, birds, fish, reptiles, amphibians or pets of any nature and description shall be raised, bred, or kept in any apartment, the limited common elements or the common elements. Point East's rules that Breziner signed state in relevant part: 6. I understand that there is a restriction on pets and that I may not bring a pet, nor may any guest, visitor or tenant bring a pet into POINT EAST THREE CONDOMINIUM nor acquire one, either temporarily or permanently after occupancy. Petitioner's son gave her an American Cocker Spaniel dog after she moved into the condo. She keeps the dog in her unit. The dog is named Oossa. Breziner took the dog to 10 classes for 10 weeks, and the dog was trained to be obedient, sit, to listen to her, to walk near her, and not to eat food from the street. Oossa received a diploma from the local Pet Smart store for completion of the training. Oossa did not receive any training as an emotional support animal and has not been trained to perform tasks to assist with a disability. However, Petitioner paid $107.00 to Goldstar German Shepherds: All Breed Dog Training & Service Dogs training facility in Nevada to receive a certificate that says Oossa is a service animal. The certificate states: Goldstar dog training is a private entity not affiliated with the Dept. of Justice or any other state or Federal Agency. Goldstar dog training is not empowered to make legal decisions pertaining to your rights. Should you encounter issues pertaining to access for your service animal, use the number above to contact the United States Department of Justice (Disability Rights Section). Breziner is a holocaust survivor and on July 10, 1998, she was robbed, beaten and left to die. The incident caused her to be unconscious for several days and have major surgery. From the assault, she also lost her business. On July 18, 2007, Petitioner by letter requested a meeting with Point East regarding her dog. She indicated that she had a doctor's note for the dog. On July 19, 2007, Breziner requested that Point East allow her to keep her dog as a service dog under Section 413.08, Florida Statutes. On September 6, 2007, Point East sent Petitioner a letter notifying her of a violation of Section 10.3 of the Declaration of Condominium and informed Petitioner that she needed to remove the dog. On September 28, 2008, Petitioner provided Point East with documentation asserting emotional and physical disabilities and a request to keep her dog as a reasonable accommodation. Petitioner wants to keep the dog because Oossa provides companionship and comfort, which makes Petitioner happy. In addition, the dog has motivated Breziner to be more active. Breziner has an emotional bond with her dog. Petitioner saw Dr. Judith Chavin on July 3, 2006, and was given a prescription that stated: "Please allow Ms. Lillian Breziner to have her dog at her home. The dog is beneficial to her health." Dr. Cauvin also wrote a letter on September 27, 2007, that stated that "[i]t would be tragic if Mrs. Breziner were to lose her dog. I believe that her depression would be worse and that would impact on her mental and physical well being." On July 10, 2008, Dr. Vindimir Derenoncount, a family medical doctor, filled out a Medical Certification form for Petitioner. He noted that "I am a Physician temporarily covering the clinic which Mrs. Breziner attends. The following information has been gathered from her chart . . ."suffers from chronic severe depression and anxiety . . . partially deaf in l[eft] ear."1 Derenoncount did not independently diagnose or evaluate Breziner. Marilyn Miller, Breziner's Holocaust Survivor Case Manager, has known Breziner for nine years. She visits Petitioner's home and tracks her status. She works with Breziner because she is a holocaust survivor. Miller testified that she does not diagnose patients because she is a social worker. However, she reviewed Breziner's records and testified that the records indicate that she has anxiety and depression. Breziner takes antidepressant and anxiety medicine daily prescribed by her primary care doctor. Prior to January 12, 2009, Breziner's dosage of Celexa prescription was 20mm. The doctor increased it on January 27, 2009, to 30mm and to 40mm on Febraury 12, 2009. On September 11, 2008, Dr. Jose Rivas did a psychiatric evaluation on Breziner. He referred Petitioner to Richard Walsh at Bayview Center for Mental Health, Inc., for individual counseling regarding her multiple losses. Walsh is a licensed clinical social worker but has no advanced degrees in medicine. He agrees with the multiple diagnoses Breziner received prior to seeing him of post traumatic stress syndrome, anxiety and depression. Breziner's depression and anxiety do not substantially limit any life activities. She goes everywhere and takes Oossa with her to stores and restaurants. Breziner is capable and performs all life activities she chooses. Oassa is Breziner's companion.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing Petitioner's Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 29th day of April, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JUNE C. McKINNEY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of April, 2009.
The Issue Whether Petitioner was subjected to housing discrimination by Respondent based on Petitioner's national origin, Puerto Rican, in violation of the Florida Fair Housing Act.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner Rosa M. Cabrera is of Puerto Rican descent and, therefore, belongs to a class of persons protected from discrimination based on national origin under the Florida Fair Housing Act, Sections 760.20 through 760.37, Florida Statutes, (2009). On September 17, 2009, she filed a complaint for housing discrimination against the management of Costa del Sol, LLC. Respondent, Monica Londono, is employed by Morgan Whitney, Inc., the company that manages Costa del Sol, a sixteen-unit apartment complex at 7425 Byron Avenue, Miami Beach, Florida 33141. Ms. Cabrera lived at Costa del Sol for 4 years. In her complaint, she alleged discrimination in the conditions and services provided to her as a tenant based on her national origin. The Housing Authority of Miami Beach inspected Ms. Cabrera's unit annually as required for units subsidized under the Housing Choice Voucher Program, also known as Section 8. On March 23, 2009, a notice was mailed to Ms. Cabrera to inform her that her annual inspection was scheduled for April 10, 2009, between 10:00 a.m. and 1:00 p.m. Mr. Cabrera was not there, on April 10, 2009, when the inspector arrived, so a door handle notice and a letter mailed the same day notified her that the inspection was rescheduled for April 13, 2009. About the same time, Ms. Cabrera said she had trouble with her hot water heater. On April 13, 2009, the unit failed inspection. The inspector found that a bedroom air conditioner was not cooling properly, that a sink stopper was missing, and that a closet door mirror was cracked. A re-inspection was scheduled for May 11, 2009. On April 22, 2009, Ms. Cabrera was offended and apparently turned away, what she said was, a group of six people who came to make repairs without giving her prior notice. On May 11, 2009, the same defects were noted and, on May 29, 2009, the Housing Authority abated the rent and terminated its contract for the unit with Costa Del Sol effective June 30, 2009. Ms. Cabrera was scheduled to meet her Section 8 case worker, Housing Authority Specialist Felipe Roloff, to "start the moving process" at 4:00 p.m., on June 5, 2009. Ms. Cabrera did not keep the appointment and it was rescheduled for June 16, 2009. On June 9, 2009, however, an "abate-cure" inspection was conducted and the unit passed. On July 21 and 23, 2009, Ms. Cabrera contacted Mr. Roloff to tell him that her refrigerator was not working and the landlord was given 24 hours to repair or replace it. When a handyman came alone to make repairs, Ms. Cabrera was afraid to let him in her apartment fearing sexual battery. So Ms. Londono accompanied the handyman when they attempted to deliver a refrigerator. They were unable to exchange the refrigerators because Ms. Cabrera had changed the locks without giving the manager a new key a violation of the terms of her lease, and she would not unlock the door. Ms. Cabrera's son arrived home at the same time and he also did not have a new key. At his suggestion, the refrigerator was left in the hallway for him to exchange it with the one in Ms. Cabrera's apartment later. Ms. Cabrera claimed, without any supporting evidence, that Ms. Londono publicly embarrassed her by calling her a "fucking Puerto Rican bitch" and a "ridiculous old lady." Ms. Londono, who is also of Puerto Rican descent, denied the allegation. Someone, Ms. Londono believes it was Ms. Cabrera, called the Miami Beach Code Compliance Division, to report that the refrigerator was left in the hallway and it was hauled away as household waste. Ms. Cabrera said the refrigerator left in the hallway was in poor condition. Ms. Londono, according to Ms. Cabrera, called the police and accused her of stealing the refrigerator. There is no supporting evidence of their accusations and suspicions about each other. When she finally got a replacement refrigerator, Ms. Cabrera said it was missing one of the crisper drawers. Ms. Cabrera believed she was being discriminated against in receiving poor services and also when Ms. Londono required her to move a plant from the hallway, but did not make another tenant move his motorcycle from the area where it was parked. Ms. Londono notified Mr. Roloff of Ms. Cabrera's lack of cooperation, and that she intended to collect August rent and to withhold a portion of the security deposit to cover the cost of the missing refrigerator. On August 5, 2009, the Housing Authority issued to Ms. Cabrera a Notice of Termination of Housing Assistance effective September 30, 2009. The Notice cited her failure to allow the landlord to enter to make necessary repairs and her failure to report the income of her son who was living with her. When the rent was not paid on August 5, 2009, Ms. Londono delivered a three-day notice to pay rent or vacate to Ms. Cabrera's unit. Ms. Cabrera did not vacate. Eviction proceedings were begun in September. Ms. Cabrera was evicted on November 22, 2009. After Ms. Cabrera moved the report of the inspection of the unit indicated that, among other damage, it was infested with fleas, supporting Ms. Londono's previous claim that Ms. Cabrera was leaving her window open to allow cats to come and feed in her unit, in violation of Section 8 rules. Ms. Cabrera's claim of discrimination based on national origin is not supported by the evidence.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Face and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Petition for Relief be denied. DONE AND ENTERED this 12th day of March, 2010, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ELEANOR M. HUNTER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of March, 2010. COPIES FURNISHED: Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Larry Kranert, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Rosa M. Cabrera 7851 Northeast 10th Avenue, Apt. 26 Miami, Florida 33138 Monica Londono Morgan Whitney, Inc. Costa del Sol, LLC 1385 Coral Way, Penthouse 403 Miami, Florida 33145
The Issue Whether Respondents, Donna and Randy Morrison, managers of Hillside Mobile Home Park, discriminated against Petitioners, Linda Parah and Andrew Loveland, Sr., by failing to make reasonable accommodation for Petitioners' service animal necessary to afford equal opportunity to use and enjoy the rental premises in violation of the Fair Housing Act, Sections through 760.37, Florida Statutes (2004).1
Findings Of Fact Based upon observation of the witnesses' demeanor and manner while testifying, character of the testimony, internal consistency, and recall ability; documentary materials received in evidence; stipulations by the parties; and evidentiary rulings during the proceedings, the following relevant and material facts are found: On June 24, 2004, Andrew Loveland, Sr., made application for tenancy at Hillside Mobile Home Park, Inc. (Hillside), 39515 Bamboo Lane, Zephyrhills, Florida 33542, when he completed and signed Respondents' "Application for Tenancy" form. The prospective tenants listed were Andrew Loveland, Sr., and Linda Parah. Ms. Parah did not sign the application. As of June 24, 2005, Petitioners listed their then-current address as 5824 23rd Street, Lot 1, Zephyrhills, Florida 33542. The application for tenancy form listed Ms. Parah as one of the persons to reside in the rental dwelling and, as such, was a "person associated with the intended renter," Mr. Loveland. The tenancy application signed by Mr. Loveland contained the following acknowledgement: [U]nder penalty of perjury, I declare that I have read the foregoing and the facts alleged are true to the best of my knowledge and belief. I hereby acknowledge that I have received a copy of the Prospectus and Rules and Regulations of Hillside Mobile Home Park, Inc. Mr. Loveland, though present at the proceeding, chose not to challenge his written acknowledgment of receiving a copy of the Prospectus and the Rules and Regulations of Hillside, and the undersigned accordingly finds that Mr. Loveland received a copy of the Prospectus and the Rules and Regulations of Hillside on June 24, 2004, and was fully informed of his duties and obligations as a tenant of Hillside therein contained. On June 24, 2004, neither Mr. Loveland nor Ms. Parah informed or advised management of any medical disability(s) suffered, requiring companionship (living in the trailer) of a dog (comfort or service). Petitioners did not, at that time, request Respondents to make any reasonable accommodations for any mental and/or physical disability(s) that required the presence of their service dog in the rented premises. No copy of management's park prospectus or rules was offered in evidence, and, accordingly, a finding of receipt thereof is made, but no findings herein are based on the specific content therein. On or after June 24, 2004, Petitioners and their dog occupied the leased premises 6528 Pecan Drive, Hillside Mobile Home Park, Zephyrhills, Florida 33542. The credible evidence of record convincingly demonstrated management had knowledge that Petitioners and several other park tenants owned dogs. Tenants, often times together, walked their dogs about the trailer park in sight of management and other residents. Based upon the above, it is concluded that management was or should have been aware that other tenants, including Petitioners, had dogs in the trailer park. On October 21, 2004, management, by and through its attorney, by certified mail, made demand upon Petitioners to cure noncompliance within seven days (October 28, 2004) or vacate premises for noncompliance with the park prospectus or rules, to wit: You have been driving your golf cart behind and between mobiles. Residents must govern themselves in a manner that does not unreasonably disturb or annoy other residents. We have had several complaints regarding this issue. Please drive and walk on the streets only. (Emphasis added) Ms. Parah acknowledged the golf car incident, explaining that Mr. Loveland occasionally drove his golf cart through the trailer park and not always on the walkways during the evening hours. She insisted, however, that after receipt of the October 21, 2004, notice to cease from management, Mr. Loveland discontinued driving his golf cart behind and between mobile homes during the evenings and nights and, during the day, restricted his cart driving to only the park roadways. By letter dated November 5, 2004, to Mr. Loveland, Respondents issued a "Notice of Termination of Tenancy," for failure to correct the (October 21, 2004, notice of violation-- driving golf cart) within seven days. Accordingly, his tenancy was to be terminated 35 days from the postmarked date of delivery of the notice. On November 11, 2004, S. D. Hostetler, a tenant whom management did not call to testify, allegedly filed the following hand-written complaint letter to management: On 11-3-04 at around 3 am I was awaken by a loud sound. I got up to see what it was and it was an older red golf cart going through the camping section, it must not have a muffler on it, that morning I did complain to the management about some one going around the Park that early in the morning with such a noisey [sic] scooter. I later found out it was Andrew Loveland. The above-written document was not notarized; the author was not made available and subject to cross-examination. This document therefore is unsupported hearsay and insufficient to support and establish the factual content therein to wit: "[O]n 11-3-04 around 3 a.m., Mr. Loveland was driving his golf cart through the camping section and, thus, failed to correct the October 21, 2004, notice of violation--driving golf cart, within 7 days." This complaint did, however, establish the fact that management received a complaint about Mr. Loveland from another tenant after having given him notice to cease and desist. On November 18, 2004, two weeks after the golf cart notice of noncompliance termination, Respondents, by certified mail delivered on November 22, 2004, made demand upon Petitioners to cure noncompliance within seven days or vacate premises for a second noncompliance with the park prospectus or rules, to wit: "(A) You have a dog and dogs are not allowed in the park." The November 22, 2004, copy of the notice to cure noncompliance was received by Mr. Loveland as evidenced by a copy of a U.S. Certified Mail delivery receipt signed by Mr. Loveland. In the December 13, 2004, letter from Attorney Schlichte addressed to Andrew Loveland (only), Re: Notice of Termination of Tenancy (reference November 18, 2004, 1st Notice of Rule Violation; i.e. you have a dog and dogs not allowed), Petitioners were given 30 days to vacate the premises. It is significant and noted that as of December 13, 2004, Ms. Parah had not made a demand or request upon management for "reasonable accommodations for her service animal necessary to afford the Petitioner an equal opportunity to use and enjoy the rental premises," as alleged in the administrative complaint. Ultimate Factual Determinations On February 28, 2005, 76 days after receipt of management's December 13, 2004, first Notice of Rule Violation (no dog allowed) and filing of Eviction Compliant in Pasco County Court,2 Petitioners made their first written request to management for reasonable accommodation under the American Disabilities Act as follows: Dear Sir: I am requesting reasonable accommodation under the American with Disability Act to have rules and regulations of the Park (Hillside) sent to me. On my pet. I have documentation from my physician Joseph Nystrom, M.D. on my service, my comfort dog. And this can be furnished upon request! Rules and Regulations were not clear to fact that Mr. Andrew Loveland, Sr. never had them unless you can show pictures on the grass 10/21/2004. I feel that your violating Mr. Loveland and my civil right under fair housing rules. [sic] Please acknowledge our reasonable accommodation as stated above by Tuesday of next week 3/8/2005. Accordingly, Linda Alan Parah Andrew Alton Loveland, Sr. cc: C.J. Miles Deputy Dir. Fair Housing Continu [sic], Inc., 1-888-264-5619. Having provided a copy of the Prospectus and the Rules and Regulations of Hillside on June 24, 2004, to Mr. Loveland, management's refusal to provide a second copy was a reasonable nondiscriminatory business decision. The offer to provide "documentation from my physician Joseph Nystrom, M.D. on my service, my comfort dog," imposed no obligation upon management to accept such offer. Within the totality of circumstances then present, ignoring Petitioners' offer to provide medical and/or willingness statements regarding their medical, physical, and mental disabilities, requiring the presence of a service/comfort dog by Respondents, is not found to have been discriminatory. On or about May 19, 2005, Pasco County Court entered Final Judgment of Eviction against Andrew Loveland and Unknown Tenant (i.e. Linda Parah). The Pasco County Sheriff's Office, pursuant to Final Judgment of Eviction for Removal of Tenant entered by the Pasco County Court, evicted Petitioners from Respondents' rented premises of Hillside, 39515 Bamboo Lane, Zephyrhills, Florida 33542. Petitioners submitted an abundance of credible evidence relating to their physical and mental health conditions. As to Mr. Loveland, Dr. Nystrom's written and signed notation concluded that Mr. Loveland's condition required: "Motorized wheelchair multi-level spinal stenosis- medically necessary and due to his illness, the presence of his little Dog is medically necessary." The document contained hearsay evidence to which counsel for Respondents did not raise an objection and is, thus, accepted by the undersigned. This document was dated after the date Mr. Loveland received his second notice regarding failure to correct and the filing of the complaint for eviction. As to Ms. Parah, Tracey E. Smithey, M.D., East Pasco Medical Group, reported her medical conclusion stating in part that: "Linda Parah, was seen in my office on 11-20-03, 01-19-04 and today (April 8, 2004). She had been diagnosed with Bipolar Disorder, Depressed type. She is prescribed Paxi, Xanax, and Ambien. She has been referred for psychotherapy also." Dr. Smithey did not include in her written document that Ms. Parah had to have a dog for her condition. Dr. Smithey, as had Dr. Nystrom, signed the document. The document contained hearsay evidence to which counsel for Respondents did not raise an objection and is, thus, accepted by the undersigned. Had Petitioners made their request for reasonable accommodations and presented their medical reports, evidencing their medical conditions and limitations, to include the need of Mr. Loveland for his comfort dog, to Respondents on or before June 24, 2004, or even as late as on or about November 18, 2004, Petitioners would have, arguably, established the requisite basis for finding of a request for reasonable accommodation. There is, however, insufficient evidence of record to support a finding that Petitioners, Mr. Loveland nor Ms. Parah, made a reasonable accommodation request to Respondents for the housing of the comfort dog for Mr. Loveland. The sequence of dated events and documented evidence is an inference that after receiving the notice to vacate for the two alleged rule violation(s), Petitioners did not make a request for reasonable accommodation to management for Mr. Loveland's dog, but rather offered to provide medical support of Mr. Loveland's need for a comfort dog should Respondents request such proof. Respondents were under no duty or obligation to do so and did not make such a request.3 Petitioners failed to establish that either Mr. Loveland or Ms. Parah: (1) made a request for reasonable accommodation based upon the demonstrated disability of Mr. Loveland; (2) the animal in question was a medically required service (comfort dog) animal for Mr. Loveland; (3) the requested accommodation was necessary to permit full enjoyment by Mr. Loveland of the rental premises; and (4) thereafter, management denied their reasonable accommodation request for Mr. Loveland. In short, and based upon the findings of fact herein, Respondent did not unlawfully discriminate against Petitioners; rather, management terminated Petitioners' tenancy for legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons, to wit: off-road driving of a golf cart and unapproved dog within the rental unit in violation of park rules and regulations after written notice to correct the noted violations. Management's Counsel's Motion for Attorney's Fees and Costs There is not a scintilla of evidence to substantiate a finding that Petitioner, Mr. Loveland, who did not testify, knew or should have known that his claim and defense presented during this proceeding was not supported by material facts. Likewise, Respondent made no query of Ms. Parah (referred to in the eviction complaint as "unnamed tenant") that elicited statements or acknowledgements from which reasonable inference could be drawn to demonstrate that within the situational circumstances Ms. Parah knew or should have known the claim herein made was not supported by material facts.4
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Commission enter a final order: Dismissing Petitioners', Linda Parah and Andrew Loveland's, Petition for Relief; and Denying Respondents' counsel's motion for an award of attorney's fees and costs. DONE AND ENTERED this 16th day of March, 2006, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S FRED L. BUCKINE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of March, 2006.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondents, Hugh and Betty Dalton (the "Daltons"), discriminated against Petitioner, Verita Holder ("Holder"), on the basis of her race (African- American) or familial status (single mother) in violation of the Florida Fair Housing Act.
Findings Of Fact Holder is an African-American woman who is raising her children as a single mother. At all times relevant hereto, Holder resided at 1219 Japonica Lane, Cocoa, Florida, in a house owned by the Daltons. Holder was renting the house from the Daltons with the assistance of a Section 8 federal housing grant. Holder entered into a Residential Lease with the Daltons on July 22, 2009. The lease period was to begin on August 1, 2009, and run through July 31, 2010. Holder's share of the lease payment started at $3.00 in the first month, which increased to $15.00, then $27.00, and, on the first anniversary date of the lease, $287.00 per month. In April 2010, there was a leak in the plumbing at the house. The Daltons were contacted and had the leak repaired by E.K. Coggin Plumbing. Beginning in June 2010, i.e., 11 months into the lease, Holder discovered the existence of some mold under the carpet in a portion of the house. The Daltons resolved the problem by having the carpet removed and cleaned, then replacing the matting under the carpeted area. When Holder was not satisfied, the Daltons eventually replaced the portion of the carpet that had been wet. Holder and her family began having health issues at about the same time, but there was no credible evidence that those health problems were directly connected to the mold issue. Holder became a hold-over tenant at the house when her lease expired on July 31, 2010. In September 2010, Holder stopped making required payments under the lease. In November 2010, the City of Cocoa performed an inspection of the property and found some Class B violations. Those violations were deemed not to pose an immediate threat or danger to the life, health, safety or welfare of the tenants. The Daltons made repairs necessary to bring the house into conformance with required regulations. When the inspector went to the house with the Daltons, he heard Mrs. Dalton say that the tenants were dirty people. That comment was overheard by Holder's daughter. The Daltons filed an eviction action against Holder, but that action was ultimately dismissed as a result of a settlement between the parties dated March 24, 2011. Pursuant to the settlement, the Daltons waived all back rent from Holder. However, Holder was to commence paying rent again as soon as the Daltons replaced the carpet over the area where mold had been found. The carpet was replaced on March 27, 2011. On or about April 11, 2011, Holder moved out of the house.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the Florida Commission on Human Relations dismissing the Petition for Relief filed by Verita Holder in its entirety. DONE AND ENTERED this 4th day of January, 2012, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S R. BRUCE MCKIBBEN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th of January, 2012. COPIES FURNISHED: Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Larry Kranert, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Hugh Dalton Betty Dalton Post Office Box 541564 Merritt Island, Florida 32954 Verita Holder Post Office Box 3032 Winter Haven, Florida 33885
