The Issue Whether respondent should admit petitioner to the examination for Class B Wastewater Treatment Plant Operator certification or deny admission for failure to comply with Rule 17-602.300(3), Florida Administrative Code?
Findings Of Fact At the time and place set for final hearing, neither petitioner nor respondent presented any evidence on which findings of fact could be based.
Recommendation It is, accordingly recommended that respondent deny petitioner's application for certification as a Class B Wastewater Treatment Plant Operator, without prejudice to the filing of a subsequent application. RECOMMENDED this 13th day of March, 1991, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT T. BENTON, II Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of March, 1991. COPIES FURNISHED: Charles H. Colvin 2140 Bay Road Neptune Beach, FL 32233 William H. Congdon, Esquire Twin Towers Office Building 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, FL 32399-2400 Carol Browner, Secretary Department of Environmental Regulation Twin Towers Office Building 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, FL 32399-2400 Daniel H. Thompson, General Counsel Department of Environmental Regulation 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, FL 32399-2400
Findings Of Fact Petitioner began employment with Respondent in November 1983. He was assigned to the Water and Sewer Department as a laborer. In 1986, Petitioner was transferred by the Respondent to the Water and Sewer Department water meter shop to be a water meter repairman. Petitioner continued his employment in that section until the spring of 1993. At that time, Petitioner accepted status under the Respondent's Disability Income Replacement policy. This arrangement is for an employee who is absent due to disability for more than 60 days. He then becomes eligible to receive payment of 60 percent of the employee's regular earnings. From the years 1986 into 1990, Petitioner enjoyed good health. During that period his employee work evaluations ranged from satisfactory to above satisfactory. In 1990, Petitioner developed psoriasis. In the beginning, the condition was controlled through medical treatment. However, in 1991, Petitioner was diagnosed with bladder cancer. As a result, while being treated for the bladder cancer in 1991 and 1992, to include two surgeries, Petitioner was unable to receive medical treatment for his psoriasis. Consequently the psoriasis became more severe. There was a change in supervisory personnel on April 4, 1991, which affected Petitioner's employment status together with that of other employees within the Water and Sewer Department. The change came about when Richard Davis, who headed the Water and Sewer Department was replaced by Henry Hicks. Respondent had found it necessary to replace Davis, because in Respondent's view Davis was not satisfactorily addressing the personnel issues within the Water and Sewer Department. When hired, one of the issues which Hicks felt he needed to address was a morale problem caused by employee perceptions that the Department of Water and Sewer employee rules were not being enforced in a consistent manner. Hicks was of the opinion that this perception existed, in part, because supervisors maintained a casual approach to employee counseling and discipline. Hicks, in his tenure, reminded the supervisors to formalize their procedures in dealing with employee counseling and disciplining. He required the supervisor provide documentation of any disciplinary action whether verbally given or by a written reprimand. This change in direction tended to increase the number of documented incidences of imposition of employee discipline within the Water and Sewer Department. The first employee evaluation which Petitioner received after Hicks' assumption of his position of director of the Water and Sewer Department was in 1991. The 1991 evaluation which Petitioner was given contained positive and negative remarks about Petitioner's work performance. In the spring of 1991, the Water and Sewer Department held a picnic, an activity in which the employees were encouraged to participate. As in prior years the Petitioner volunteered to be a member of the food committee for the picnic and was appointed to that committee. Members of the food committee would serve food at the picnic. At that time, the Petitioner's psoriasis was such that he was noticeably peeling and flaking. Howard Johnson, a supervisor with Respondent approached Hicks and told Hicks that several employees had stated that they, the employees, would not go to the picnic if Petitioner served food because they were afraid that Petitioner's skin would flake into the food. Having been apprised of this situation, upon a date prior to the picnic, Hicks met with Petitioner and told Petitioner what had been reported to Hicks and asked Petitioner to serve the needs of the picnic activity in some other manner than food service. Specifically, the Petitioner was offered the opportunity to help "set up" the picnic area. Petitioner did not accept the alternative offer to assist in the outing. Instead, Petitioner was offended and felt that he was unreasonably singled out due to his psoriasis. Nonetheless, the reaction by other employees to having Petitioner serve food and the response by Hicks to offer an alternative opportunity to assist in the activity did not constitute harassment or unreasonable conduct toward Petitioner. In association with the picnic for the spring of 1991, Bobby Thigpen, a supervisor with Respondent, made a comment to Petitioner about Petitioner's psoriasis and Petitioner's participation on the food committee at the picnic. Although Petitioner was mindful of Thigpen's candor about the subject, Thigpen's remarks contributed to Petitioner's hurt feelings concerning other employees not wishing Petitioner to serve food at the picnic. The remarks by Thigpen were not designed to harass Petitioner based upon Petitioner's physical condition. In addition, Petitioner did not report Thigpen's remarks to his supervisor pursuant to Respondent's "No times relevant to the inquiry, prohibited harassment on the basis of handicap status as well as other protected categories. The policy instructed the employee who believed that he had been harassed to bring the matter to the supervisor or to the Human Resource Department within the organization if the employee did not feel that he could discuss the matter with his supervisor. Respondent's employees are required to attend an annual meeting to review this policy. Petitioner did not complain to the Human Resource Department that he had been harassed by Thigpen through Thigpen's remarks regarding Petitioner's service on the food committee. No other competent proof was offered to the effect that Respondent's employees had made derogatory comments about Petitioner's physical disabilities. Because Petitioner's psoriasis was in a more severe condition, Petitioner would leave flakes of skin on chairs in the Water and Sewer Department break-room. When the Petitioner's co residue they would switch chairs rather than sit in the chair on which Petitioner had left flakes of skin. Although Petitioner found out that the other employees were switching chairs due to the flakes of Petitioner's skin being found on the initial chair, there is no competent proof that any employee ever commented to the Petitioner that the employee would be opposed to the Petitioner eating in the break-room due to his physical condition. Petitioner, together with other employees who were supervised by Dan Miller, had been harassed by Miller at times relevant to the inquiry. In Petitioner's instance, Miller's harassment was not directed to Petitioner's physical disabilities. Some of the remarks made by Miller to Petitioner were that Petitioner was short and fat and further derogatory comments about Petitioner's haircut and clothes. Miller had also called the Petitioner dumb or stupid because Petitioner asked Miller to repeat instructions over the radio that was used for communicating between the supervisor and his respective employees. Notwithstanding Petitioner's contention that he had told Miller that he was having trouble hearing because of psoriasis that had spread to Petitioner's ears, Miller denies that Petitioner had told Miller that psoriasis was affecting Petitioner's hearing, and Miller's testimony is credited. On the contrary, without knowledge of any physical disability concerning hearing which Petitioner had, and without regard for the reaction any other employees which Miller supervised might have, Miller made insulting comments to employees which he supervised when talking to them on the radio. Employees other than Petitioner to whom the insulting comments were directed had no known physical disabilities. James Scarberry, a co-employee who worked for Miller, overheard Miller yell at Petitioner on occasion having to do with Petitioner's job performance, not Petitioner's physical disability related to hearing. Petitioner asked Miller and a co-worker not to smoke in his presence because he had recently had bladder cancer surgery. Petitioner contends that this request was met with laughter and jokes. Miller testified that the request was not met with jokes or laughter. Instead, Miller recalls, and his testimony is credited, that Petitioner complained that Al Nichols, a co-worker, had smoked excessively in Petitioner's presence. The subject of Nichols' and Miller's smoking in Petitioner's presence was discussed among Miller, Nichols and Respondent, and it was agreed that Nichols and Miller would try not to smoke excessively in Petitioner's presence. No medical evidence was presented which tended to identify the necessity for Petitioner to be afforded a smoke environment due to his medical condition or that Petitioner had ever made requests other than that directed to Miller and Nichols regarding not smoking in his presence at work. Petitioner had made requests that he be provided light duty because of the problems he experienced with his knees due to psoriasis. These requests were directed to Miller, Petitioner's immediate supervisor. The requests were not always granted. When Petitioner was turned down for light duty it was based upon the fact that light duty was generally not available in the Water and Sewer Department for any employee. Moreover, at that time, employees in Petitioner's work assignment usually worked alone and it would adversely affect the production of the unit if two repairmen were dispatched to do a job which would ordinarily take only one repairman to complete. Petitioner presented no proof concerning denial of light duty at a time when a physician may have specifically recommended light duty for Petitioner. Concerning discipline directed to the Petitioner, on March 18, 1982, Petitioner stopped at a job site to which he had not been assigned. There he engaged David Lipps, an employee of Respondent, in a conversation. Lipps was a supervisor at the site and the conversation had to do with the meal policy which had been applied at the site. Eventually the conversation became an argument, at which point Lipps told Petitioner that he did not belong at the job site and asked him to leave. Lipps then reported the incident to his supervisor, Rodney Thompson and the matter eventually came to the attention of Hicks. Hicks discussed the matter with the Petitioner and Lipps and concluded that Petitioner had no business purpose for being at the Lipps' job site and that Petitioner was responsible for causing the argument with Lipps. Petitioner was issued a written warning on March 26, 1992. The disciplinary reprimand was not related to Petitioner's physical disabilities. On May 18, 1992, Petitioner received a written reprimand. The reprimand was based upon the Petitioner's conduct while on weekend standby duty. This assignment was in keeping with the periodic requirement to serve on weekend standby. On May 16, 1992, Petitioner was on a standby status with Lipps. Lipps was referred to as the "A" worker and Petitioner was the "B" worker. The "A" worker was in charge of the work team. Petitioner arrived at the first job site 34 minutes before Lipps. When Lipps arrived, Petitioner complained that Lipps was an hour late. Petitioner then told Lipps that he had somewhere else to go that day. Lipps and Petitioner went to a second job and by that time Lipps told Petitioner that he was tired of Petitioner's complaining about having to work that day and concluded that Lipps did not have Petitioner's full cooperation. As a result, Lipps determined to leave the completion of the second job until the following Monday. Lipps reported the incident to his supervisor, Rodney Thompson. Petitioner had been previously counseled about his attitude concerning standby duty. Hicks reviewed the facts surrounding Lipps' complaint and decided to issue a written reprimand to Petitioner for making negative verbal remarks about Petitioner's duties and for failing to cooperate with his supervisor on standby duty. The disciplinary action was not for purposes of discriminating against Petitioner because of Petitioner's physical disabilities. Moreover, Hicks had reprimanded two other employees, Ed Swift and Bob Buckley for making negative verbal comments about job duties. Hicks did not know these other individuals to be suffering from any form of physical disability. In June of 1992, Petitioner applied for and was granted a leave of absence for an unspecified period. By June 2, 1992, Petitioner knew that he would need to go on extended leave beginning June 8, 1992. He failed to inform any of his supervisors that he was going on this medical leave. He did not show up for work on June 8, 1992. Hicks inquired of Petitioner on June 8, 1992, about not telling his supervisor that he was going to be on medical leave. Petitioner responded to the inquiry by indicating that he had told Scarberry, Petitioner's co-worker, of his intention to go on medical leave and that he had told a city clinic nurse that he was going on leave of absence. Hicks pointed out, correctly, that telling the nurse and Scarberry of Petitioner's intentions to take medical leave did not relieve Petitioner of the duty to directly inform a supervisor of that intention. Moreover, Scarberry had told the Petitioner that he, Scarberry, would not be at work the first day of Petitioner's medical leave, making it questionable that Scarberry would have advised a supervisor that Petitioner was hoping to be absent from work that day. Scarberry made Hicks aware that Scarberry had pointed out to Petitioner that he would not be at work on June 8, 1992. Petitioner's assertion that he wrote a note to his immediate supervisor, Miller, regarding the plan to be out on June 8, 1992, if true, is of no utility because the note was not given directly to Miller and was never indirectly received by Miller. Miller had not been at work June 5, 1992, the friday before Petitioner was missing from his job duty on June 8, 1992. Petitioner knew that Miller was not at work on June 5, 1992. As a consequence of not informing a supervisor that he was going to be on extended medical leave, Petitioner was disciplined. The action by Respondent on which Petitioner was given a written reprimand for failure to inform a supervisor that Petitioner was going to take extended medical leave did not constitute discrimination against Petitioner based upon his physical disabilities. Petitioner was allowed to take the extended medical leave. Noel Werner, a secretary in the Water and Sewer Department had also been reprimanded by Hicks for failing to follow proper procedures for obtaining authorization to take medical leave. Hicks is unaware of any physical disability that Ms. Werner may have. When Petitioner took leave in June of 1992, he believed that he would be eligible for Disability Income Replacement. However, in August 1992, Petitioner was informed that the Respondent's Risk Management Department had determined that he was ineligible because he was under the care of a licensed health counselor as opposed to an M.D. or a Ph.D. Carol Ingham, Respondent's Human Resource Director, learned of this circumstance and contacted the Assistant City Manager, Dick Lewis, and requested that Petitioner be granted an exception to the policy of not being eligible for Disability Income Replacement when using a licensed health counselor. As a result, Petitioner's request was reevaluated and he was ruled eligible for Disability Income Replacement through the policy pertaining to that status for the period August 4 through 30, 1992. Concerning his physical condition, in the spring of 1992, Petitioner was diagnosed with osteoarthritis in his knees. This meant he was disabled to do any persistent bending or kneeling, which was a requirement of his employment in the Water and Sewer Department. His condition also disabled him from doing his assigned work because his work as a water meter repairman involved walking distances of a 100 feet or more on a persistent basis and standing all day. Concerning the medical leave of absence which Petitioner took in the summer of 1992, this subject was discussed by Ingham in conversation with the city clinic nurse, Holly McLaughlin. They talked about the stress which Petitioner seemed to be experiencing and the failure to follow the policy of informing his supervisor of his intention to take medical leave. On June 15, 1992, Ms. Ingham met with Petitioner and his wife to discuss Petitioner's stress. At that time, Petitioner reported to Ms. Ingham that Petitioner's supervisor Miller had treated him badly and that Miller had also treated other employees badly. Petitioner told Ingham that Miller had called Petitioner stupid and had been abusive in conversation over the radio. No claim was made by Petitioner that Miller had made comments directed to Petitioner's physical disabilities. As a follow Ingham discussed Petitioner's remarks about Miller's conduct with a number of the Petitioner's co-workers. Ingham decided that Miller had, in fact, yelled and cursed at a number of employees he supervised, to include Petitioner. No other employee reported to Ingham that Miller had made derogatory comments in their presence concerning Petitioner's physical disabilities. Based upon Ingham's findings, Hicks determined to discipline Miller for his conduct directed toward employees whom Miller supervised. Miller received a written reprimand and was given the option of being demoted or seeking counseling through an employee assistance program. Miller opted to go to the employee assistance program. Moreover, Miller was told that if conduct toward subordinates continued that he would be subject to more severe discipline to include discharge. Miller's treatment of the employees he supervises has improved since the imposition of discipline. Petitioner returned to work in August 1992, following his leave of absence for medical purposes. At that time, he was issued a service truck which another employee had been using. Petitioner felt that he should have been issued a new truck which the Water and Sewer Department operated. The truck that Petitioner had been issued was dirty and smelly. Miller told Petitioner that the newer truck was assigned to an employee who needed the larger truck because that employee would be performing heavier work than Petitioner would be called upon to perform. Miller offered to have the truck which Petitioner had been issued cleaned up or detailed. Petitioner declined that offer. Petitioner complained about the truck that he had been assigned to a co-worker, Fred Sauls. He told Sauls that he was going to take the truck he was issued and drive it to city hall to show Ingham, the Human Resource Director. In fact, Petitioner reported the incident to Ms. Ingham. The Petitioner received a letter of reprimand on September 4, 1992, for complaining to a co-worker and Ms. Ingham about an everyday work related problem rather than following the chain of command. Prior to receiving that written reprimand, Petitioner had been specifically counseled by Hicks concerning handling everyday work related problems through Petitioner's supervisor. Those specific instructions on everyday work related problems were not countermanded by the general opportunity which Hicks had described for employees to go outside the chain of command when they did not feel that they would get satisfaction from an immediate supervisor, and the open door opportunity to consult with the Human Resource Director. In this instance, the response from Miller was adequate to meet Petitioner's needs in confronting an everyday work related problem and Petitioner had no reason to complain to Sauls or to complain to Ingham. The written reprimand given to Petitioner was not designed to discriminate against Petitioner based upon his physical disabilities. Hicks and Ingham became aware of the Petitioner's inability to perform his assigned job duties due to his physical disabilities and they looked for other duties that the Respondent might be able to perform in view of his physical disabilities. The only positions that were found for which Petitioner was otherwise qualified and physically able to perform were part-time positions that did not offer medical benefits. Upon further reflection, Ingham and Hicks offered to combine these two positions in the Respondent's Recreation Department into a single job which would allow Petitioner to continue working and to receive benefits. The combined position was at a lesser pay than the present position which he held. Petitioner decided that he would prefer to be placed in the status of Disability Income Replacement in lieu of the combined jobs. In April 1993, Petitioner accepted the status of Disability Income Replacement and has not returned to work.
Recommendation Based upon the findings of fact and conclusions of law reached, it is, RECOMMENDED: That a final order be entered by the Florida Commission on Human Relations which dismisses the Petitioner's claims. DONE and ENTERED this 13th day of June, 1994, in Tallahassee, Florida. CHARLES C. ADAMS, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of June, 1994. APPENDIX The following discussion is given concerning the Proposed Findings of Fact of the parties: Petitioner's Facts: Paragraphs 1 through 6 are subordinate to facts found. Paragraphs 7 through 14 are contrary to facts found. Respondent's Facts: Paragraphs 1 through 26 are subordinate to facts found. COPIES FURNISHED: William A. Ramputi, Esquire Scott, Gleason & Pope, P.A. 409 Southeast Fourteenth Street Ocala, Florida 34471 David H. Spalter, Esquire Fisher & Phillips 2310 One Financial Plaza Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33394 Sharon Moultry, Clerk Human Relations Commission Building F Suite 240 325 John Knox Road Tallahassee FL 32303-4149 Dana Baird, General Counsel Human Relations Commission Building F Suite 240 325 John Knox Road Tallahassee FL 32303-4149
The Issue The issues are whether Respondent violated Florida Administrative Code Rules 64E-6.022(1)(b)2., 64E-6.022(1)(d), and 64E-6.022(1)(p) by repairing an onsite sewage disposal system without a permit, resulting in missed inspections, and if so, what penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the state agency charged with enforcing the statutory and regulatory provisions pertaining to the practice of septic tank installations and repairs in Florida. See § 381.0065(3), Fla. Stat. (2003). Repair of onsite sewage treatment and disposal systems must be performed under the supervision and control of a registered septic tank contractor. Respondent is the qualifying registered septic tank contractor for All Florida Septic Tank Service, Inc., having been issued the registration number SR00011389. Respondent has 15 years of experience in the field of septic system construction and repair. The qualifying registered septic tank contractor for Simmons Septic and Tractor Service, Inc., is Joey Wayne Simmons. The qualifying registered septic tank contractor for AA Septic Tank Service, Inc., is Billy Wayne Joyner. However, Mr. Simmons, Mr. Joyner, and Respondent work closely together, sometimes working together on a job and/or acting as the qualifying registered septic tank contractor on each other's behalf. On September 2, 2003, the septic disposal system at the residence of Jack Young was not functioning properly. Mr. Young contracted with one of the above-referenced septic tank services to repair the system. On September 2, 2003, Respondent and another employee of All Florida Septic Tank Service, Inc., along with two employees from AA Septic Tank Service, Inc., went to Mr. Young's residence to repair Mr. Young's onsite sewage disposal system. No one applied for a permit to make any repairs to Mr. Young's system. With Respondent acting as the registered septic tank contractor, the men used a backhoe to dig up the septic tank, which was buried three feet in the ground. Respondent then repaired the pump and ran a new one and one-quarter force main line to the existing header because the old line had been compromised by roots. Respondent also cleaned roots from inside the distribution box. Respondent then sealed the tank and directed the men to cover it up. No one called Petitioner's local office, the Duval County Health Department, to request an inspection of the repair before covering the tank. The work on Mr. Young's septic system involved the replacement of an effluent transmission line. It required a permit because it constituted more than a minor repair to the pump and distribution box. Respondent should not have performed the work without a permit from the Duval County Health Department. Because there was no permit, there was no request for inspection by the Duval County Health Department. When the work was completed, Mr. Young gave Respondent a check in the amount of $1,000, payable to Mr. Simmons. The check reflected payment for repair to the filter bed, otherwise known as the drainfield. Respondent indicated his receipt of the check by signing the AA Septic Tank Service, Inc.'s Daily Truck Log and Maintenance Report. In February 2004, Mr. Young's septic system began to fail once again due to root blockage in the lines. Respondent advised Mr. Young that a permit would be required in order to make any further repairs. Mr. Young refused to pull a permit or to pay for any additional costs. On February 17, 2004, Mr. Young contacted Petitioner to report the failure of his system's drainfield. On February 18, 2004, Petitioner's inspector confirmed that Mr. Young's drainfield had failed and was causing a sanitary nuisance. During the hearing, Respondent admitted that there are no disputed issues of material facts in this case. He stated that he agreed with everything. However, he did not agree that the work he performed for Mr. Young required a permit from and inspections by Petitioner's Duval County Health Department.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That Petitioner enter a final order, finding that Respondent violated the standards of practice and imposing an administrative fine in the amount of $1,000. DONE AND ENTERED this 6th day of December, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S SUZANNE F. HOOD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of December, 2005. COPIES FURNISHED: Catherine R. Berry, Esquire Department of Health 515 West Sixth Street Jacksonville, Florida 32206-4311 James L. Smith All Florida Septic Tank Service, Inc. 8300 West Beaver Street Jacksonville, Florida 32220 R. S. Power, Agency Clerk Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin A02 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1701 Timothy M. Cerio, General Counsel Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin A02 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1701 Dr. John A. Agwunobi, Secretary Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin A00 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1701
Findings Of Fact On May 6, 1986, George Bailey, doing business as Bailey's Septic Tank Service pursuant to a permit to operate a septic tank cleaning service, pumped out and cleaned the septic tank located at 474 Hinton Street, Port Charlotte, Florida, owned by Davina Hall. On May 21, 1986, upon inspection of that septic tank by Warren McDougall and Dale Holcomb on the complaint of the owner, it was determined that the septic tank inspection hatch lid was not properly sealed. There was a hole where the corner of the inspection hatch lid had been broken off and the soil over the tank was not properly replaced and compacted. The only evidence as to whether anyone else did work on that septic tank after Bailey's and before the inspection was the testimony of the inspectors and Bailey about what they were told by others. That evidence is all hearsay and cannot be relied upon to base a finding under these circumstances. Accordingly, it cannot be found that Bailey's left this tank unsealed and damaged. On September 26, 1985, Bailey's serviced the septic tank located at 1043 Webster Avenue, Port Charlotte, Florida, at the request of Robert Keniston acting as agent for the owners, Mr. and Mrs. Caggiano. The house was vacant when the work was done, but Keniston observed the work in progress. On May 27, 1986, an inspection of the septic tank by Warren McDougall and Emmery Wuthrich of the Charlotte County Health Department revealed that the access lid was broken and had not been sealed. David Sandefer, the employee of Bailey's who performed the work, acknowledged that he left the tank with a broken lid and unsealed because Keniston told him to do so and would not pay the $40 to replace the lid. Keniston denies this and says he did not know of the broken lid until the inspection. Having observed the demeanor of the witnesses, it is found that Keniston's testimony is more reliable and credible in this regard. On June 10, 1986, the Sarasota County Health Department received a complaint that a Chevrolet pump truck, white cab with a red tank, was dumping sewage and had magnetic signs saying it was a pressure cleaning service. The complaint was being investigated by John Madrak that same day when he saw a truck fitting the description parked at the Frosted Mug, a restaurant in Venice, Florida. There were no signs on the truck. Madrak also observed a puddle under the tank caused by a leak from the outlet valve on the tank. Madrak saw work order forms in the cab of the truck saying Bailey's Septic Tank Service. Madrak talked to the driver of the truck, David Sandefer, and was told that the truck was owned by Bailey, but was not being used for septic tank cleaning. Sandefer said it had just been repainted. The driver left the Frosted Mug and Madrak followed at the instruction of his supervisor. After a lengthy chase, the truck stopped at a convenience store and Bailey, Madrak, Venice Police Officer Dodd and Sheriff's Deputy Lowen converged on the scene. Bailey acknowledged ownership of the truck, but indicated that it was being used as a water tank truck in a pressure cleaning business and not as a septic tank pump truck. It had been repainted and had not been used for septic tank service for 4 to 6 weeks prior thereto. Bailey owns two other pump trucks that were being used in the septic tank business. The truck had hoses and shovels consistent with use for pumping septic tanks. The truck had no signs indicating by whom it was being used. The truck was leaking from the outlet valve, but no evidence was presented as to the substance leaking from the truck. No one sampled, touched or smelled the leaking material and no one looked in the tank to see what was inside. At no time did anyone observe the truck in the act of pumping sewage.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services enter a Final Order and therein Dismiss the complaint in Case No. 86-2107. Find the Respondent guilty of the violations alleged in Case No. 86- 2633. Dismiss the complaint in Case No. 86-2624. Suspend the septic tanking cleaning service permits of George E. Bailey, doing business as Bailey's Septic Tank Service, for a period of one year and impose a fine of $500.00. DONE and ORDERED this 15th day of October, 1986, in Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE K. KIESLING Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of October, 1986. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER The following constitute my specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on all proposed findings of fact submitted by the parties to this case. Specific rulings on proposed findings of fact of Petitioner Case No. 86- 2107 Each of the following proposed findings of fact are adopted in substance or as modified in the Recommended Order. The number in parentheses is the Finding of Fact which so adopts the proposed finding of fact: 1(1); 2(2); 3(2). Proposed findings of fact 4 and 5 are unnecessary. Specific rulings on proposed finding of fact of Petitioner Case No. 86-2623 Each of the following proposed findings of fact are adopted in substance or as modified in the Recommended Order. The number in parentheses is the Finding of Fact which so adopts the proposed finding of fact: 1(5); 3(5); 5(4); 6(4); 7(5); 8(4). Proposed findings of fact 4, 9 and 10 are unnecessary. Proposed finding of fact 2 is subordinate to the facts actually found. Specific rulings on proposed finding of fact of Petitioner Case No. 86-2624 Each of the following proposed finding of fact are adopted in substance or as modified in the Recommended Order. The number in parentheses is the Finding of Fact which so adopts the proposed finding of fact: 1(7); 1(7); 3(7); 4(8); 5(8); 6(8); 8(9); 9(10); 10(11); 11(11); 12(12). Proposed findings of fact 13, 14, 15, and 17 are unnecessary. Proposed findings of fact 7 and 16 are subordinate to the fact actually found. Specific rulings on proposed findings of fact of Respondent Case No. 86- 2107 Proposed finding of fact 1 is adopted in substance as modified in Finding of Fact 1 and proposed finding of fact 2 is similarly adopted in Finding of Fact 2. Proposed findings of fact 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 are subordinate to the facts actually found. Proposed finding of fact 8 is unnecessary. Specific rulings on proposed findings of fact of Respondent Case No. 86- 2623 Each of the following proposed findings of fact are adopted in substance or as modified in the Recommended Order. The number in parentheses is the Finding of Fact which so adopts the proposed finding of fact: 1(4); 2(4);; 3(4); 4(5). Proposed findings of fact 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, and 10 are subordinate to the facts actually found. Proposed findings of fact 11 and 12 are unnecessary. Specific rulings on proposed findings of fact of Respondent Case No. 86- 2624 Each of the following proposed findings of fact are adopted in substance or as modified in the Recommended Order. The number in parentheses is the Finding of Fact which so adopts the proposed finding of fact: 1(7); 3(13); 4(12); 6(8); 7(13); 8(13); 10(11); 11(11); 12(11). Proposed findings of fact 2 and 9 are subordinate to the facts found. Proposed finding of fact 5 is rejected as not supported by the credible evidence. Proposed finding of fact 13 is unnecessary. COPIES FURNISHED: Anthony N. DeLuccia, Jr., Esquire Post Office Box 06085 Fort Myers, Florida 33906 Robert B. Bennett, Jr., Esquire 46 N. Washington Boulevard, Suite 13 Sarasota, Florida 33577 William Page, Jr., Secretary Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue The issue to be resolved in this proceeding concerns whether the Petitioner is entitled to the grant of a variance for the installation of an onsite sewage disposal system ("OSDS") for his property on the Santa Fe River in Gilchrist County, Florida, in accordance with Section 381.272, Florida Statutes, and Chapter 10D-6, Florida Administrative Code.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner is the owner of certain real property located in Gilchrist County, Florida, more particularly described as Lot 4, Unit 4, Ira Bea's Oasis, a subdivision. The evidence is not clear concerning whether the plat of the subdivision was actually recorded, although the evidence and the Petitioner's testimony indicates that the lots in the subject subdivision were subdivided in 1965. The evidence does not clearly reflect whether the subdivision was ever platted, however. On April 2, 1990, the Petitioner filed an application for an OSDS permit regarding the subject property. The application was for a new OSDS on the above-described property; and the system was intended to serve a single- family residence, which the Petitioner desires to construct on the subject property for a vacation and retirement home. The proposed residence would contain three bedrooms and a heated or cooled area of approximately 1,100 square feet. In the permit application process, at the Respondent's behest, the Petitioner had a survey performed by Herbert G. Parrish, registered land surveyor. That survey, in evidence as the Respondent's Exhibit 1, reveals a benchmark elevation of 21.65 feet above mean sea level ("MSL"). The proposed installation site is at an elevation of 22.5 feet above MSL. A report by the Suwannee River Water Management District, which is admitted into evidence and was submitted to the Respondent by the Petitioner with the application for the OSDS permit, shows a ten-year flood elevation for the subject property, and River Mile 10 of the Santa Fe River, at 31 feet above MSL. Thus, the subject property is located beneath the ten-year flood elevation. The property is also located within the regulatory floodway of the Santa Fe River, as that relates to required engineering certification and calculations being furnished which will assure that if OSDS's are constructed employing mounding or sand filters, and like constructions, that such related fill deposited on the property within the regulatory floodway will not raise the level of the "base flood" for purposes of the rules cited hereinbelow. No evidence of such certification by an appropriately-registered engineer was offered in this proceeding concerning the installation of a mounded system and its effect on the base flood level. The surface grade level of the subject property at the installation site is 9.5 feet below the ten-year flood elevation. The grade elevation of the subject property is also .5 feet below the "two-year flood elevation", and the property has been flooded once in the past three years and has been flooded approximately four times in the past 15 years. It has thus not been established in this proceeding that the property is not subject to frequent flooding. On April 18, 1990, the Respondent denied the Petitioner's application for an OSDS permit by letter of that date. The Petitioner did not make a timely request for a formal administrative hearing to dispute that denial. The Petitioner maintained at hearing that this was, in essence, because the Respondent's personnel informed him that he should seek a variance instead, which is what he did. The testimony of Mr. Fross reveals, however, that, indeed, he was advised of his opportunity to seek a variance but was also advised of his right to seek a formal administrative hearing to contest the denial of the permit itself. Nevertheless, either through the Petitioner's misunderstanding of his rights or because he simply elected to choose the variance remedy instead, the fact remains that he did not timely file a petition for formal proceeding to contest the denial of the OSDS permit itself. Even had a timely petition for formal proceeding concerning the denial of the OSDS permit application been filed, the evidence of record does not establish the Petitioner's entitlement to such a permit. As found above, the property lies beneath the ten-year flood elevation and, indeed, lies below the two-year flood elevation, which subjects the property to a statistical 50% chance of being flooded each year. This and the other findings referenced above indicate that the property has not been established to be free from frequent flooding; and although appropriate "slight-limited" soils are present at the proposed installation site, those soils only extend 50 inches below the surface grade. That leaves an insufficient space beneath the bottom of the drainfield trenches where they would be located so as to have a sufficient volume and distance of appropriate treatment soil available beneath the drain field, if one should be installed. Below 50 inches at the subject site is a limerock strata which is impervious and constitutes a barrier to appropriate percolation and treatment of effluent waste water. Thus, for these reasons, especially the fact that the property clearly lies beneath the ten-year flood elevation and because adequate proof in support of a mounded system which might raise a septic tank and drainfield system above the ten-year flood elevation has not been adduced, entitlement to the OSDS permit itself has not been established. Concerning the variance application actually at issue in this proceeding, the Petitioner has proposed, in essence, two alternative systems. The Petitioner has designed, and submitted as an exhibit, a plan for a holding- tank-type- system. By this, the Petitioner proposes a 250-gallon holding tank, with a venting pipe extending approximately three feet above the level of the ten-year flood elevation, with an attendant concrete retaining wall and concrete base to which the tank would be securely attached. The Petitioner thus postulates that flood waters would not move or otherwise disturb the holding tank and that he would insure that the holding tank was pumped out at appropriate intervals and the waste there from properly deposited at a treatment facility located above the ten-year flood elevation. The precise method of such disposal and its location was not disclosed in the Petitioner's evidence, however. Moreover, the testimony of Dr. Hunter establishes that the deposition of waste water and human waste into the tank, either through pumping, or by gravity line, if the residence were located at an elevation above the inlet to the tank, might well result in a hydraulic condition which would cause the untreated sewage to overflow from the vent pipe of the tank. Moreover, such systems do not insure that public health, the health of the occupants of the site, and ground or surface waters will not be degraded since it is very costly to pump such a tank out which would have to be done on a frequent basis. This leaves the possibility that the user of such a holding-tank-facility could surreptitiously drain the tank into nearby receiving waters or otherwise improperly empty the tank. Even though the Petitioner may be entirely honorable in his intentions and efforts in this regard and not violate the law and the rules of the above-cited chapter in his manner of disposal of the holding-tank effluent, there is no practical, enforceable safeguard against such illegal activity, especially if one considers that the property may later be conveyed to a different landowner and user of the system. The Petitioner also proposes in his testimony and evidence the possibility of using a nondischarging, composting-toilet-type system to handle sewage involving human excreta. Such a system has been shown by the Petitioner's evidence to adequately treat human sewage so that public health and the ground and surface waters involved in and near the site could be adequately safeguarded. The problem with such a system, however, is that the "gray water", that is, waste water from bathtubs, showers, lavatories and kitchens, cannot be disposed of in the composting-toilet system. Such gray water, which also contains viruses, coliform bacteria and nutrients, must be disposed of, according to the rules at issue, in an appropriate sewage disposal system, be it in a septic tank and drain field or through pumping to an appropriate disposal and treatment facility located above the ten-year flood elevation. The Petitioner's proof does not establish how such gray water could be appropriately and safely disposed of in the environmental and public health context at issue herein. Thus, the proposed alternatives suggested by the Petitioner's proof do not constitute minor deviations from the minimum requirements for OSDS's specified in Chapter 10D-6, Florida Administrative Code. Ironically, the composting-toilet system, coupled with a proper disposal system for household gray water, could constitute a reasonable alternative to a conventional system. Thus, the Petitioner's proof, itself, shows that a reasonable alternative may exist, which militates against the granting of the variance, although he did not prove how it could feasibly be accomplished. In summary, therefore, the Petitioner's proof failed to establish that no reasonable alternative exists and that the proposed system would only be a minor deviation from the minimum requirements of the Respondent's rules concerning OSDS's and their installation and operation. The Petitioner established that a reasonable alternative to a conventional OSDS might exist for purposes of granting an OSDS permit itself, had that issue been formally placed before the Hearing Officer, but did not prove how it could feasibly be accomplished and operated. This proof shows, however, that such a reasonable alternative might be found operable which, thus, fails to justify the granting of a variance based upon hardship. If the Petitioner could come forward with proof to establish the feasibility of disposal and treatment of the household gray water involved in an appropriate treatment and disposal site and facility above the ten-year flood elevation, in conjunction with use of a composting- toilet system, a later permit application might be entertained in which could be justified the granting of an OSDS permit.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses, and the pleadings and arguments of the parties, it is therefore, RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered by the Respondent denying the Petitioner's application for a variance from the statutory and regulatory requirements, cited above, for the issuance of permits. At such time as the Petitioner is able to show changed factual circumstances, as for instance, that a reasonable, feasible alternative system, which will adequately treat and dispose of all household waste water effluent in a manner comporting with the rules of Chapter 10D-6, Florida Administrative Code, a permit application should be entertained. DONE AND ENTERED this 27th day of February, 1991, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. P. MICHAEL RUFF Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of February, 1991. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER IN CASE NO. 90-4569 The Petitioner did not file proposed findings of fact. Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact 1-16. Accepted. 17. Rejected, as not supported by the preponderant evidence of record. COPIES FURNISHED: Sam Power, Agency Clerk Department of HRS 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, FL 32399-0700 Linda K. Harris, Esq. General Counsel Department of HRS 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, FL 32399-0700 Mark Moneyhan, pro se Route 3, Box 407 Perry, FL 32347 Frances S. Childers, Esq. Department of HRS District III Legal Office 1000 Northeast 16th Avenue Gainesville, FL 32609
The Issue Whether the objections of the City of Pembroke Pines and the Green Meadows Civic Association to South Broward Utility, Inc.'s, proposal to extend its water and sewer service area should be sustained.
Findings Of Fact South Broward Utility, Inc. (South Broward), is a corporation engaged in the business of providing water and wastewater service to the public in Broward County, Florida. That business is subject to regulation by the Florida Public Service Commission (PSC). South Broward's water and wastewater treatment facilities are located in the Town of Davie, and it currently provides water and sewer services to residents of that municipality. Included within the area of the Town of Davie currently served by South Broward are the lands bordered on the north by Sterling Road, the south by Sheridan Street, and the west by Dykes Road (S.W. 160th Avenue). On February 4, 11, and 18, 1989, South Broward published a notice of extension in the Florida Lauderdale News/Sun-Sentinel, a daily newspaper of general circulation published in Broward County, Florida, in accordance with Rule 25-30.030(2), Florida Administrative Code. The notice provided that South Broward would file an application with the PSC pursuant to Section 367.061, Florida Statutes, to amend its certificates of public convenience and necessity to allow South Broward to provide water and sewer service to the east half of Section 5, Township 51 South, Range 40 East, Broward County, Florida. Such area may commonly be described as those lands lying immediately west of Dykes Road to S.W. 166th Avenue, and from Stirling Road on the north to Sheridan Street on the south. On February 24, 1989, South Broward mailed a copy of the aforementioned notice to all local, county and state governmental agencies and all other persons required by Section 367.041(4), Florida Statutes, and Rule 25-30.030(2), Florida Administrative Code. Objections to the notice were filed with the PSC by the City of Pembroke Pines (Pembroke Pines) and the Green Meadows Civic Association (Green Meadows). In its objection, Pembroke Pines contended that it had invested over 30 million dollars to expand its municipal water and sewer service west to the Conversation Area from Sheridan Street on the north to Pembroke Road on the south, that this expansion project was anticipated to provide water and sewer service for its existing municipal boundaries as well as the area proposed to be served by South Broward, that it was preparing an annexation report for the proposed area, and that if South Broward's application were approved it would be precluded from servicing its own residents should annexation occur. At hearing, the proof demonstrated that Pembroke Pines had expanded its municipal water and sewer service such that its water and wastewater treatment plants and related facilities have adequate present capacity to meet the current and anticipated future water and wastewater needs in the disputed service area. The Pembroke Pines water lines are currently located on the south side of Sheridan Street, which street forms the southerly boundary of the disputed service area. Its wastewater treatment lines are, however, located approximately one and one-half miles south of Sheridan Street and would require several months and considerable expense to extend them to the disputed service area. Notably, however, no proof was offered that Pembroke Pines had any current intention to annex the disputed service area, or that it had otherwise evidenced any intent to, or taken any action to, provide service to the area. Green Meadows is an association of residents of this area of unincorporated Broward County, some of whom reside within the service area in dispute. The gravamen of Green Meadows' objection is its concern that sewer lines for a centralized sewer system would leak into its member's ground water supply, and that the increase in population density caused by a centralized water and sewer system would adversely affect the area's ecosystem. Neither Green Meadows nor Pembroke Pines contended, however, that the subject extension of service would violate any land use plan, zoning ordinance or other state or local law, and no credible proof was offered that, if built consistent with existent law, the sewer lines would adversely impact the ground water supply or ecosystem. Until recently, all of the lands lying in the disputed service area were located in unincorporated Broward County. However, in September 1988 a parcel of approximately 15 acres which abutted Dykes Road was annexed into the Town of Davie, and in May 1989 a parcel of approximately 80 acres, which abutted the previously annexed parcel on the east, Sterling Road on the north, and S.W. 166th Avenue on the west, was annexed into the Town of Davie. These lands comprise approximately 30 percent of the lands within the disputed service area, and it is the desire of the Town of Davie that water and sewer service to such lands be provided by South Broward. To date, South Broward has entered into a developer's agreement with the owner of the 80-acre parcel to provide such services, and is in the process of executing such an agreement with the owner of the 15-acre parcel. Pembroke Pines does not object to South Broward's expansion into these areas. As to the remaining acreage within the proposed service area, the owners of the vast majority of those lands have expressed a preference for South Broward to provide water and sewer service to their properties, and South Broward has expressed its desire and ability to provide such services. South Broward's water plant has an existing capacity of 500,000 gallons per day (GPD), and has sufficient capacity to address the current need for water service in the proposed area. Upon completion of its current expansion, which is anticipated in October 1989, South Broward's water plant will have a capacity of 1,250,000 GPD, and adequate capacity to address any future demand for water service in the proposed area. South Broward's wastewater treatment plant, with a capacity of 500,000 GPD, currently has sufficient capacity to satisfy the present and future demand for such services in the proposed area. An expansion of that plant is expected to be in service by 1991, which will double the plant's capacity and provide additional capacity. Currently, South Broward has water and sewer lines adequate to serve the proposed area in place, and located under Dykes Road at the eastern edge of the service area. Such lines are adequate to meet all present and anticipated future needs for such service in the area, and the water lines are adequate to provide fire protection to the area. South Broward has the present financial, managerial, operational, and technical ability to provide the present and anticipated needs for water and wastewater service in the proposed area, and the public interest will be best served by the extension of South Broward's water and wastewater systems to that area. Such expansion will not be in competition with or a duplication of any other system in the area.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the objections filed by Pembroke Pines and Green Meadows be denied. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 21st day of August 1989. WILLIAM J. KENDRICK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2900 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of August, 1988. APPENDIX The proposed findings of fact filed by South Broward are addressed as follows: Addressed in paragraph 1. Addressed in paragraph 3. Addressed in paragraph 4. Addressed in paragraph 5. 5-10. Addressed in paragraph 9. 11-14. Addressed in paragraphs 10-13. 15 & 16. Addressed in paragraphs 6 and 7. Addressed in paragraph 13. To the extent pertinent, addressed in paragraph 8. Addressed in paragraph 8. 20 & 21. Addressed in paragraph 13. The proposed findings of fact filed by the PSC are addressed as follows: 1 & 2. Addressed in paragraph 3. Addressed in paragraph 9. Addressed in paragraph 3, and paragraphs 2 and 3 of the conclusions of law. Addressed in paragraph 8. 6-12. Addressed in paragraphs 9-13. Addressed in paragraph 7. Addressed in paragraph 9. Addressed in paragraph 8. Addressed in paragraph 12. COPIES FURNISHED: Mitchell S. Kraft, Esquire Josias & Goren, P.A. 3099 East Commercial Boulevard Suite 200 Fort Lauderdale, Florida 32308 Deborah Simone, President Green Meadows Civic Association 5831 S.W. 162nd Avenue Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33331 James L. Ade, Esquire Martin, Ade, Birchfiled & Mickler, P.A. 3000 Independent Square Post Office Box 59 Jacksonville, Florida 32201 Randy Frier, Esquire Public Service Commission Fletcher Building 101 East Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0870 Mr. Steve Tribble, Director Records and Reporting Public Service Commission Fletcher Building 101 East Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0870 David Swafford, Executive Director Public Service Commission Room 116 101 East Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0870 Susan Clark General Counsel Public Service Commission Room 116 101 East Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0870
The Issue Whether the Petitioner's request for variance should be granted.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner owns an undeveloped parcel of land in Palm Beach, County which is zoned industrial and on which he intends to construct a storage building to house and repair farm equipment. To provide sewage treatment at the site, Petitioner had designed an on site sewage disposal system and applied for a septic tank permit which was denied as was his variance request. The closest public sewage treatment plant to the property is over five miles from the site, and the closest private treatment is approximately three miles from the subject site. Petitioner has no easement to either site if capacity were available and if he chose to connect. However, the proof did not show capacity at either site. Although Petitioner does not intend to pollute the groundwater, the proof demonstrated that waste disposal into a septic tank from the maintenance and repair of farm equipment could result in the disposition of prohibited hazardous waste into the groundwater. Alternative methods of waste disposal are available which would properly dispose of the waste and, yet, protect the groundwater from contamination by hazardous waste. Such systems include certain aerobic treatment units and package plants. The monetary costs of these systems is greater than the septic tank proposal; however, the proof did not demonstrate that the cost was prohibitive or a hardship. Although the hardship, if any, caused by the denial of the variance was not caused by Petitioner, the proof failed to demonstrate lack of reasonable alternatives of waste disposal and the absence of adverse effect of the operation to the groundwater. Additionally, the proof failed to establish the ameliorating conditions of soil, water table or setback conditions although a survey of the property dated September 3, 1985, indicates that the subject parcel was not platted. Accordingly, the denial of the variance was proper.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered denying the variance. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 6th day of July 1989. JANE C. HAYMAN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of July 1989. COPIES FURNISHED: Lee B. Sayler, Esquire 50 South U.S. Highway One Suite 303 Jupiter, Florida 33477 Peggy G. Miller, Esquire Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 111 Georgia Avenue Third Floor West Palm Beach, Florida 33401 Sam Power, Clerk Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Gregory L. Coler, Secretary Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 John Miller General Counsel Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700
The Issue The issues to be resolved in this proceeding concern whether the Petitioner is entitled to a permit permitting installation of an on-site sewage disposal system (OSDS) on his property located in Dixie County, Florida, in the vicinity of the Suwannee River and whether he is entitled to seek a variance from the statutes and rules concerning permitting of such systems.
Findings Of Fact The department hereby adopts and incorporates by reference the findings of fact set forth in the Recommended Order.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses and the pleadings and arguments of the parties, it is therefore RECOMMENDED: That a Final Order be entered denying the Petitioner's application for an OSDS permit, without prejudice to the applicant applying for and seeking a variance from the statutory and rule requirements related to permitting for the reasons found and concluded above, and without prejudice to applying for and pursuing an OSDS permit application should the applicant, at a later time, be able to demonstrate that alternative methods of treatment and disposal of the sewage effluent at issue can feasibly be performed, within the bounds of the standards enunciated in the above-cited statutes and rules concerning on- site sewage disposal permitting. DONE and ENTERED this 21st of December, 1990 in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. P. MICHAEL RUFF Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of December, 1990. APPENDIX TO THE RECOMMENDED ORDER IN CASE NO. 90-2487 PETITIONER'S PROPOSED FINDINGS-OF FACT Accepted. Accepted. 5-14. Accepted. RESPONDENT'S PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT 1-7. Accepted. COPIES FURNISHED: Sam Power, Agency Clerk Department of HRS 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, FL 32399-0700 Linda K. Harris, Esquire General Counsel Department of HRS 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, FL 32399-0700 John K. McPherson, Esquire 22 South Main Street Gainesville, FL 32601 Frances S. Childers, Esquire Assistant District III Legal Counsel Department of HRS 1000 Northeast 16th Avenue Gainesville, FL 32609 =================================================================
The Issue Whether Petitioner must be discharged from his position as a sanitation equipment operator II because he can no longer perform the essential functions of that job, with or without a reasonable accommodation.
Findings Of Fact Chapter 2001-324, Laws of Florida, declared the Escambia County Utilities Authority an independent special district with transferred assets and enumerated powers. Chapter 2004-398, Laws of Florida, changed the Escambia County Utilities Authority’s name to ECUA. By law, ECUA provides utility services throughout Escambia County, Florida, and has the power to appoint, remove and suspend its employees, and fix their compensation within the guidelines of Escambia County Civil Services Rules. ECUA’s mission statement specifies that ECUA and its employees “are committed to providing the highest quality service” and that “ECUA will always provide cost-effective services.” ECUA has adopted standards set forth in the Manual in order to govern employee conduct. For instance, Section B-11 provides that “[r]easonable accommodation is available to all disabled employees, where his or her disability affects the performance of job functions.” Section B-13 A (10) of the Manual requires ECUA employees to maintain all capabilities that are necessary for them to perform their assigned duties. Mr. Smith is 52 years old and initially worked for ECUA as a sanitation equipment operator from March 1997 through October 2002. He returned to his previous position at ECUA in January 2018. ECUA’s description of the sanitation equipment operator II position describes the “essential job functions” as follows: Operates a heavy duty, highly technical, and specially designed, one-person automated residential or commercial refuse collection truck equipped with a hydraulically operated container loading and waste packing mechanism in order to remove solid waste on an assigned collection route. Required to manually load yard trash, brush, or bulk waste when assigned to yard-trash duty. Operates a heavy duty residential rear-loading, semi-automated refuse collection truck equipped with a hydraulically operated container leading and waste packing mechanism in order to remove solid waste on an assigned collection route, while acting as crew leader for the two/three person assigned crew. Other “essential job functions” include activities such as manually picking up waste containers for disabled customers, climbing in and out of trucks, climbing stairs and ladders, and walking refuse containers to and from residences. As for the position’s physical requirements, the job description states that: While performing the essential functions of this job the employee is regularly required to sit, stand, or walk, use hands to finger, handle, or feel, reach with hands and arms, stoop, kneel, jump, step, or crouch, and lift and/or move up to 100 pounds and occasionally required to lift over 100 pounds. On June 25, 2019, Mr. Smith’s right knee collided with the rear door or bumper of a refuse truck while he was dumping refuse into a landfill. He sought medical attention that day, and the resulting “work status report” from the Sacred Heart Medical Group indicated he could return to work on June 26, 2019, but was prohibited from bending at the waist, stooping, kneeling, crawling, climbing, or squatting for the next eight days. ECUA learned of Mr. Smith’s injury on June 25, 2019, and he was promptly placed on leave pursuant to the Family and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”). The standardized form memorializing that action advised Mr. Smith that “[y]ou will be required to present a fitness-for-duty certificate to be restored to employment.” Mr. Smith’s injured knee did not improve to a point at which he could return to his position as a sanitation equipment operator II, and he exhausted his 12 weeks of FMLA leave in September of 2019.1 At that point, ECUA’s Human Resources department placed him in two light-duty positions. The first was a temporary position counting inventory. That temporary position comes open for a week at the end of every ECUA fiscal year. After Mr. Smith completed that work, he was assigned to removing paper and plastic from ECUA’s composting operation. Mr. Smith’s tenure with the compost operation was brief because he was unable to walk or stand for long periods of time.2 1 Mr. Smith enjoyed working for ECUA and was interested in other employment opportunities there following his accident. Because he has 20 years of customer service experience and associates degrees in culinary management and hotel and restaurant management, Mr. Smith inquired about becoming a customer service representative. However, ECUA only had one such opening between March and November of 2019 and typically receives hundreds of applications when such a position comes open. Also, ECUA’s Human Resources department does not have the authority to reassign employees from one department to another. An employee interested in a position outside his or her department must apply for the position, and the department seeking to fill that opening makes the final decision as to who is hired. 2 The witnesses disagreed about how long Mr. Smith worked at the compost operation. Chiquita Payne, a senior human resources generalist at ECUA, and Tim Dean, ECUA’s lead compost technician, testified that Mr. Smith spent no more than a few days with the compost operation. Mr. Smith testified that he was there for 2.5 weeks. Mr. Smith never returned to his position as a sanitation equipment operator II. The medical restrictions prohibiting Mr. Smith from activities such as bending at the waist, stooping, kneeling, crawling, climbing, or squatting were not lifted. A note from Dr. Juliet De Campos, Mr. Smith’s attending physician at the Andrews Institute of Orthopedics & Sports Medicine, gave the following assessment of Mr. Smith: This 52-year-old male, truck driver had an impact injury to the anterior [of] the right knee in the patellofemoral area with a fall to the ground which may have twisted his knee. He had a laceration which healed uneventfully but had recurrent swelling and giving way of his knee. X-ray showed no fracture or loose body. MRI suggested abnormal MRI and medial meniscus. What was not read was a prepatellar bursitis and contusion. The contusion has resolved but the patient still has recurrent swelling, catching, and giving way. He has had physical therapy and a knee sleeve. Exam today shows findings consistent with medial meniscus tear but no ACL injury, atrophy. Prepatellar bursitis has resolved. He continues to have recurrent swelling and instability. He has been in physical therapy which has helped but [has not restored] normal function. Within a reasonable degree of medical certainty, this injury was caused by the job injury and treatment is necessary on that basis. The note continued by recommending that Mr. Smith have right knee surgery, and he ultimately did so on January 22, 2020. Following the surgery, Mr. Smith’s attending physician anticipated that Mr. Smith would have a “permanent impairment rating” and recommended that he do no stooping, squatting, or kneeling. The attending physician also recommended that Mr. Smith not lift anything over 10 pounds. Thus, the attending physician noted that “[o]ffice work would be appropriate” and counseled against Mr. Smith engaging in “commercial driving.” Section D-16 of the Manual contains a section on workers’ compensation providing that: Employees will return to work anytime they are medically able, with or without reasonable accommodations, within six (6) months of the date of injury. If after six (6) months from the date of injury the employee remains unable to perform the essential functions of his or her job, with or without reasonable accommodation, the employee’s department director, in consultation with the Human Resources Director, shall consider the employee’s prognosis and anticipated return-to- work date, the department’s present and projected workload and needs, and all other relevant factors in determining whether additional leave is appropriate under the circumstances. Should the employee remain unable to perform the essential functions of his or her job, with or without reasonable accommodation, after passage of six (6) months from the date of the injury and any extension thereof, if any, he or she shall retire, resign, or be terminated. Keith Kyles Sr., ECUA’s sanitations collections manager, issued a letter to Mr. Smith on December 3, 2019, stating the following: The most recent medical note in your file shows you were last seen by your treating physician, Dr. DeCampos, on November 19, 2019. Regarding your ability to return to work to perform the essential functions of your job, Dr. DeCampos stated, “No change – will need to schedule surgery.” Based on the above, it is clear you are unable to perform the essential functions of your position as a Sanitation Equipment Operator II. Moreover, a return to work date is unknown and there is no estimated date for your return to work at this time. Your continued absence, without a probable date of your return to work, creates a substantial hardship on the operational needs of the Sanitation Department and impairs ECUA’s ability to properly fulfill its responsibilities to its ratepayers. ECUA is also unaware of any reasonable accommodations which would enable you to perform the essential functions of your job. Moreover, ECUA cannot indefinitely hold your position open, as the duties which it entails simply must be performed. We have done everything reasonably possible to accommodate your work restrictions. However, we can no longer allow your continuing inability to perform the essential functions of your job, with or without a reasonable accommodation, to create a substantial hardship and impair ECUA’s ability to properly fulfill its business obligations. The letter closed by notifying Mr. Smith that Mr. Kyles had scheduled a predetermination hearing for December 10, 2019, so that Mr. Smith could have an opportunity to discuss whether he could perform the essential functions of a sanitation equipment operator II, with or without a reasonable accommodation. After the predetermination hearing, Mr. Kyles issued another letter to Mr. Smith on December 12, 2019, notifying him that his employment with ECUA had come to an end: During your hearing, you provided information that your knee surgery is scheduled for December 26, 2019. After surgery, you stated that you would be required to be on crutches for 10 days, followed by an additional eight weeks off work for recovery post-surgery. Based on the information provided, I have determined your continued inability to perform the essential functions of your position, with or without reasonable accommodation, creates a substantial hardship and impairs ECUA’s ability to properly fulfill its business obligations. Your inability to perform the essential functions of your job, with or without reasonable accommodations, constitutes a violation of Section B-13 A (10) . . . of ECUA’s Human Resources Manual Therefore, it is with regret I notify you that your employment with ECUA is hereby terminated effective close of business December 12, 2019. The preponderance of the evidence demonstrates that Mr. Smith cannot tolerate the physical demands associated with his former position as a sanitation equipment operator II, nor is there any reasonable accommodation that could be made that would allow him to perform the duties of a sanitation equipment operator II. Thus, Mr. Smith is not in compliance with Section B- 13 A (10) of the Manual. Mr. Smith did not meaningfully contest ECUA’s argument that he could no longer perform the physical tasks associated with a sanitation equipment operator II. Instead, Mr. Smith’s case focused on arguing that there are other, less demanding positions, within ECUA’s Sanitation Department and that assigning him to one of those positions would be a reasonable accommodation. However, Mr. Smith failed to prove that he was capable of handling the physical demands associated with those positions. For instance, Mr. Smith raised the possibility of being assigned to ECUA’s “miss truck.” ECUA’s standard refuse trucks occasionally miss refuse pick-ups due to inadvertence on the drivers’ part or residents’ failure to place their garbage on the curb in a timely manner. The miss truck is not as large as a typical refuse truck and is more automated. Therefore, miss truck duty is not as physically demanding as driving a typical refuse truck. Nevertheless, Mr. Kyles’s testimony demonstrated that miss truck duty is still a physically demanding position in that the miss truck driver must be capable of transporting large refuse cans to and from residences over all types of surfaces and distances. Because ECUA’s standard refuse trucks typically miss 40-50 refuse pickups a day, the preponderance of the evidence indicates that the physical demands associated with miss truck duty are not appropriate for someone with Mr. Smith’s physical limitations. Mr. Smith also raised the possibility of transporting ECUA’s fuel trailer. ECUA obtains fuel for its refuse trucks by transporting a fuel trailer to the Alabama-Florida line, acquiring the fuel, and transporting it back to ECUA. While this work is probably not as physically demanding as operating a refuse truck, Mr. Kyles testified that a fuel trailer operator would still have to satisfy the physical requirements associated with the sanitation equipment operator II position. Mr. Smith did not present any evidence to rebut Mr. Kyles’s testimony, and it is therefore accepted. Finally, Mr. Smith mentioned “monitoring piles” during his direct testimony. However, he presented no details about such duty. As a result, there is no competent, substantial evidence indicating that pile monitoring would be within his physical limitations, or that it would be a reasonable accommodation.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the executive director of the Emerald Coast Utilities Authority find that James V. Smith, Sr., is no longer qualified to perform the functions of a sanitation equipment operator II and take such action as deemed appropriate under the pertinent provisions of the Human Resources Manual and Employee Handbook. DONE AND ENTERED this 26th day of March, 2020, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S G. W. CHISENHALL Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of March, 2020. COPIES FURNISHED: Kimberly E. Scruggs Emerald Coast Utilities Authority Post Office Box 17089 Pensacola, Florida 32522-7089 James V. Smith, Sr. 901 Booker Street Cantonment, Florida 32533 Jessica L. Scholl, Esquire Moore, Hill & Westmoreland, P.A. Post Office Box 13290 Pensacola, Florida 32591 (eServed) Steve E. Sorrell, Executive Director Emerald Coast Utilities Authority 9255 Sturdevant Street Pensacola, Florida 32514 (eServed) Cynthia Sutherland, Director Human Resources and Administrative Services Emerald Coast Utilities Authority 9255 Sturdevant Street Pensacola, Florida 32514 (eServed)
