The Issue Whether respondent's certification as a correctional officer should be revoked for having pled nolo contendere to a felony.
Findings Of Fact Respondent, Leland M. Large (Large), was certified by petitioner, Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission (Commission), on July 1, 1974, and was issued certificate number A-2364. Currently, Large is employed as a correctional officer by Metropolitan Dade County, Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (County), and has been so employed for 16 years. On October 15, 1985, Large entered a plea of nolo contendere to the felony offense of arson, Section 806.01, Florida Statutes, before the Circuit Court, in and for the Eleventh Judicial Circuit of Florida. The court accepted the plea, withheld an adjudication of guilt, and placed Large on a 12-month period of probation. On May 15, 1986, the court granted a motion for early termination of Large's probation. Regarding the crime with which he was charged, the proof demonstrates that in September 1985, Large owned a Toyota Corolla automobile which, because of an accident, was not road worthy. At that time, Large did not have the money to repair the car, was unable to sell it, and was having problems maintaining the payments on the vehicle. Accordingly, to relieve himself from the car payments, Large took the car to a secluded location and burned it. At hearing, Large testified that although he did take the car to a secluded location with the intention of burning it, and in furtherance of such intent smashed a window in the car and poured gasoline at its rear, that the actual burning of the car was an accident. According to Large, after having poured gasoline at the rear of the car, "I got disgusted with myself and I was going to change my mind and I threw a cigarette down and that is what started the fire." Large's testimony that the burning of the car was accidental is not credited, and it is found that he did intentionally burn the subject vehicle to relieve himself of the obligation to make further payments on it. To mitigate the gravamen of his offense, Large offered proof at hearing that at the time he burned the car he was an alcoholic who was not fully cognizant of his actions, but has since recovered. Regarding his rehabilitation, the proof demonstrates that following the entry of his plea of nolo contendere to the crime of arson, Large was suspended by the County for 28 days. During this period, Large was an inpatient at an alcohol rehabilitation center and successfully completed the program. Since such time, Large has remained sober and current in his financial obligations. To date, Large, who is currently 38 years of age, has been employed by the County as a correctional officer for 16 years, and his annual evaluations have ranged from satisfactory to outstanding. By those who know of him, he is considered an excellent employee, observant of the rules, honest, fair, respectful of the rights of others, and otherwise of good moral character.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered which revokes the certification of respondent, Leland M. Large. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 17th day of July 1989. WILLIAM J. KENDRICK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of July, 1989. APPENDIX Petitioner's proposed findings of fact are addressed as follows: Addressed in paragraph 1. Addressed in paragraph 2. Respondent's proposed findings of fact are addressed as follows: 1-4. Addressed in paragraphs 1 and 6 to the extent pertinent. 5. Addressed in paragraph 5. 6-13 and 15-39. These proposed findings are not relevant to the disposition of this case, but have been addressed in paragraphs 3-5 so that respondent's position could at least be depicted. 14. Addressed in paragraph 2, otherwise rejected as not shown to be relevant. COPIES FURNISHED: Joseph S. White, Esquire Florida Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 James C. Casey, Esquire 10630 N.W. 25th Street Miami, Florida 33172 Jeffrey Long, Director Criminal Justice Standards Training Commission Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302-1489 Daryl McLaughlin Executive Director Florida Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302
The Issue The issue presented is whether Respondent is guilty of the allegations contained in the Administrative Complaint filed against him, and, if so, what disciplinary action should be taken against him, if any.
Findings Of Fact Respondent, Melvin Roberts, was born on July 14, 1967. He was certified by the Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission on March 1, 1993, and was issued correctional certificate numbered 151525. Respondent has been employed as a certified correctional officer with the Florida Department of Corrections since January 29, 1993. On October 28, 1994, Officer Elise Dillard-Gonzalez of the Miami-Dade Police Department was working as part of an undercover prostitution sting at Southwest 8th Street and 69 Avenue. At approximately 11:10 p.m., Respondent, who was alone, pulled over to the curb and motioned to her to approach his vehicle. When she did, he requested a "fuck for $20." She signaled to the undercover officers across the street, and Respondent was arrested for soliciting prostitution, in violation of Section 796.07, Florida Statutes. On November 10, 1994, Officer Sonja Crespo of the City of Miami Police Department was working as part of an undercover prostitution sting at Biscayne Boulevard and Northeast 73rd Street in Miami. Respondent, who was alone, approached her and gestured at her by placing a finger on one hand through a circle made by the fingers on his other hand. When she went over to Respondent's vehicle, he offered her $20 for a "fuck." She signaled to other near-by police officers, and Respondent was arrested for soliciting prostitution, in violation of Section 796.07, Florida Statutes. Rather than going forward on the charges for the two arrests, the State Attorney's Office agreed to place Respondent in some type of pre-trial diversionary program. Respondent was suspended from his employment with the Florida Department of Corrections for 10 consecutive days beginning April 17, 1995, for failing to report his arrests to his employer within 3 days and for being arrested, conduct unbecoming a correctional officer. Other than the October and November 1994 arrests, Respondent has not been arrested. Other than the disciplinary action imposed in April 1995, Respondent has had no disciplinary action taken against him as a correctional officer for the State of Florida. The superintendent at the Dade Correctional Institution where Respondent is employed considers Respondent to be a good employee and would like to continue Respondent's employment.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered finding Respondent guilty of the allegations contained in the Administrative Complaint filed against him, finding mitigating factors to be present, and suspending Respondent's certification as a correctional officer for 20 days. DONE AND ENTERED this 7th day of May, 1999, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. LINDA M. RIGOT Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of May, 1999. COPIES FURNISHED: James D. Martin, Esquire Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 H. R. Bishop, Jr., Esquire 300 East Brevard Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 A. Leon Lowry, II, Program Director Division of Criminal Justice Professionalism Services Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Michael Ramage, General Counsel Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302
Findings Of Fact The Respondent holds law enforcement certificate number 4519, issued February 3, 1972. On March 5, 1981, in the Circuit Court of Duval County, Florida, the Respondent plead nolo contendere to the charge of aggravated assault. Pursuant to Section 784.021(2), Florida Statutes, aggravated assault is a felony.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that law enforcement certificate number 4519 held by the Respondent, Nathaniel Frederick, Jr., be revoked. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 18th day of April, 1983, in Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM B. THOMAS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of April, 1983. COPIES FURNISHED: Susan Tully, Esquire Assistant Attorney General Suite 1601 - The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Lacy Mahon, Jr., Esquire 350 East Adams Street Jacksonville, Florida 32202 G. Patrick Gallagher, Director Criminal Justice Standards Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Robert Dempsey, Commissioner Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302
The Issue The issue to be resolved in this proceeding concern whether, because of a prior regulatory and criminal history, the Petitioner is entitled to licensure in Florida as a nonresident life, health and variable annuity agent.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner, Eugene P. Kent, at times pertinent hereto was a licensed insurance agent in South Dakota. He was apparently an agent or broker for the Independent Community Banker's Association of South Dakota and engaged in the insurance business with regard to the various group benefits coverage for that association. Apparently in 1995, he become involved in a dispute between the Independent Community Banker's Association of South Dakota and United of Omaha Life Insurance Company. This dispute, the exact nature of which is not of record in this case, resulted in the Petitioner being charged with mail fraud by the United States Attorney for the District of South Dakota. He was prosecuted for mail fraud and ultimately was convicted by jury verdict on or shortly after October 26, 1996. He was sentenced to two years' imprisonment. The Petitioner believed that evidence existed in the home office of United of Omaha Life Insurance Company, which would exonerate him, and that his counsel during the criminal prosecution had, for unknown reasons, failed to subpoena and obtain such evidence for use in his criminal trial. He obtained new counsel who was successful in obtaining the evidence in question, which indeed proved to be exculpatory. It resulted in the presiding judge in the criminal case vacating the order of conviction, resulting in the Petitioner's release from incarceration. Because of his conviction, the insurance departments of South Dakota, as well as North Dakota and Nebraska, had revoked his insurance licenses, based upon the criminal conviction. On October 26, 1996, during the progress of the criminal trial referenced above, the Petitioner and his wife became concerned that she would not have funds to pay for his counsel, to operate her home and the business and to pay for her son's alcohol rehabilitation expenses if the jury returned a guilty verdict resulting in his incarceration. Consequently, on that day, the Petitioner made a withdrawal from his business account, drawn upon the Kent Insurance, Inc., account in the amount of $9,900, by writing a check on that account. On the same day, the Petitioner went to a different branch of the same bank and negotiated a second check on this same account also made payable to him, again, in the amount of $9,900, drawn upon the Kent Insurance, Inc., business account. The bank officer upon the occasion of the second withdrawal that same day told him that a currency transaction report would have to be filed. The Petitioner readily agreed to file the report and assisted the bank officer in completing and executing the transaction report. Thereafter, the United States Attorney secured an indictment of the Petitioner, during his incarceration for the earlier criminal conviction, before it was vacated by the trial judge. He prosecuted the Petitioner for "attempting to cause a financial institution not to file a report." During the pendency of this second criminal proceeding, the Petitioner remained incarcerated from the earlier proceeding, which was later vacated. Because of this, his counsel in the second criminal proceeding advised him to plead guilty to the second charge in return for a light penalty, because his counsel believed that if he attempted to litigate the second criminal matter to trial, he would have difficulty convincing a jury of his innocence because he was already incarcerated on the earlier mail fraud charge. Consequently, on May 20, 1998, the Petitioner pled guilty to attempting to cause a financial institution not to file a report. He was sentenced to five months' imprisonment as a result of that plea, which ran concurrently with the sentence imposed on February 24, 1997, regarding the mail fraud charge. After release, he was sentenced to supervised release for a period of approximately two years. The preponderant evidence in this proceeding shows that the Petitioner did not attempt to defraud the federal government or to prevent the bank involved from filing the report. Upon being informed of the requirement of filing the report, he freely consented and helped execute the report form involved at his bank. The funds he withdrew with the two checks were his funds from an account over which he had ownership and signatory authority. There is no evidence that the funds in the account withdrawn by the Petitioner had been obtained through an criminal alleged enterprise or that the Petitioner contemplated using them for such a purpose. The post-conviction evidence that was obtained by the Petitioner and his counsel resulted in the judge vacating the first conviction for mail fraud. This new evidence was also the basis for the South Dakota Insurance Regulatory Agency reinstating his licensure. Ultimately, the other states which had revoked his licensure reinstated his licenses. The Petitioner is now similarly licensed in 17 or 18 states. He applied for licensure as a non-resident life, health, and variable annuity agent in Florida and that application was denied by the Department due to his criminal history and the prior administrative actions against his licensure in the other states. That denial resulted in this proceeding. The other states which have since either reinstated his licensure or licensed him did so with knowledge, as reported by the Petitioner, of his prior criminal and administrative proceedings. The Department has a rule listing various crimes (in Classes A, B, and C) such that, if a petitioner has been so convicted, then that petitioner cannot be licensed for periods of times stated in that rule. Class A crimes listed in that rule carry the longest period of time during which licensure is prohibited with a waiting period extending as much as 15 years. The Division of Licensing of the Department decided that the crime involved herein was a "Class A crime." The rule allows the Department to analogize the crime of which a petitioner or applicant has been convicted with one of the crimes listed in this rule if the crime, of which an applicant was convicted, is not itself listed in the rule. The Division of Licensing thus decided to classify the crime of "attempting to cause a financial institution not to file a report" as analogous to "defrauding the government" or "obstruction of justice." The Petitioner was not charged with either defrauding the government or obstruction of justice and was not convicted of those crimes. Although the stipulation of facts between the Petitioner and the United States Attorney, attendant to the Petitioner's plea in the second federal criminal case (Petitioner's Exhibit G), shows that the Petitioner knowingly attempted to avoid the reporting requirement imposed by Title 31 U.S.C. § 5313(a) on the bank for currency transactions of more than $10,000 in one day, there is no persuasive evidence that he did so for any illegal purpose or fraudulent intent, or intent to in any way "obstruct justice," or engage in dishonest conduct. There was no demonstrative harm to the public nor was there any "victim" of his purported crime. If the Petitioner had truly wanted to conceal the transaction or induce the bank to fail to report it, he could simply have presented the second $9,900 check on another day for cashing, or had his wife negotiate such a check on a different business day. Instead, when told by the bank employee, on presenting the second check, that a currency transaction report would have to be filed, he freely assented and assisted in the preparation of the report form; even the above-referenced stipulation of facts attendant to his criminal plea shows this. There was no requirement that a report be made until the second check was negotiated on the same day. The Petitioner's testimony in evidence, including the fact that 18 states have licensed him or re-instated his licensure since the criminal and administrative proceedings at issue herein, with knowledge of those proceedings, shows preponderantly that his crime did not "involve moral turpitude" and that he is fit and trustworthy for engagement in the practice of insurance. The crime to which he pled did not involve any significant, rational relationship or nexus to the two "analogized crimes" involving "obstruction of justice" or "defrauding the government" for purposes of the Department's rule cited below. Two affidavits, admitted as Petitioner's Exhibits J and K, as corroborative hearsay, in accordance with Section 120.57(1)(c), Florida Statutes, bear out this finding and are worthy of quotation. The first affidavit is that of attorney James L. Volling, the Petitioner's counsel for purposes of appeal and post-conviction challenge to his first conviction, and his counsel for purposes of the second criminal case. Mr. Volling practices in Minneapolis, Minnesota, and is admitted to practice by the Minnesota Supreme Court, as well as by the United States District Court for the District of Minnesota and for the District of North Dakota. He is also admitted to practice in the courts of appeal for the District of Columbia Circuit, the Eighth Circuit and the Fifth Circuit, as well as the United States Supreme Court. He testified in pertinent part as follows: Following Mr. Kent's conviction on two counts of mail fraud, I was retained to represent him for purposes of appeal and post-conviction challenge to the conviction as well as in connection with a second case brought against him. Upon reviewing the facts and the law in Mr. Kent's case, I became convinced that his conviction was defective and inappropriate. Ultimately, the trial court agreed and his petition for post-conviction relief was granted and his conviction and sentence were vacated. The government chose not to appeal that decision which I believe clearly would have been upheld by the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit. During the pendency of post-conviction proceedings in Mr. Kent's case, the government brought a second case against Mr. Kent involving allegations of an attempt to avoid currency transaction reporting requirements. In my view, these allegations were petty at best, especially considering that the bank involved did file a currency transaction report and Mr. Kent expressly permitted them to do so. Mr. Kent was simply withdrawing his own money and there was no claim that those funds were the product of any illegal activity [or for any illegal purpose]. The government's second case was only technical in nature and, in my view, would not have been charged in any other jurisdiction with which I am familiar. Indeed, the assistant United States attorney representing the government told me that the only reason the government brought the second case was their concern that Mr. Kent's conviction in the first case would ultimately be overturned, which of course it was. With regard to the currency transaction reporting matter, Mr. Kent elected to enter a plea bargain to avoid further expense and burden, and which did not augment the punishment that had been given to him in the first case. I have no doubt that, if Mr. Kent, had not been convicted in the first case so that he would not have had that stigma at the time of the second case, he would have elected to try the currency transaction reporting case rather than to enter into a plea agreement. It was after that plea agreement, that the conviction and sentence in Mr. Kent's first case were vacated. I have known and dealt with Eugene Kent for approximately five years now. During that entire time, he has always been a man of his word. He has done exactly what he said he would do and has told me the truth in every respect. I have great respect and admiration for Mr. Kent as person and as a client. I believe he has suffered unfairly throughout this entire ordeal, but he has remained steadfast and persevered through some truly difficult times. I have been proud to serve as his legal counsel, and I would recommend him unhesitatingly to anyone in terms of employment or any business relationship. The second affidavit is by Mark F. Marshall. Mr. Marshall is now a lawyer and at times pertinent hereto has been admitted to the practice of law by the South Dakota Supreme Court. He has been in the active practice of law since 1981. At times pertinent hereto from January 1, 1996, until August 1, 2000, Mr. Marshall served as a United States Magistrate Judge for the District of South Dakota. Mr. Marshall testified pertinently as follows: From January 1, 1996 until August 1, 2000, I served as a United States Magistrate Judge for the District of South Dakota. In my capacity as a United States Magistrate Judge, I conducted the initial appearance and detention hearings in a matter styled the United States of America v. Eugene P. Kent, CR. 96-40002-01. Over the objection of the United States, I ordered Mr. Kent released on conditions. A copy of the Order Setting Conditions of Release, as well as Mr. Kent's Appearance Bond in the Amount of $100,000.00 is attached hereto as Exhibits A and B respectively. [released on a non-surety bond requiring no security.] In my capacity as a United States Magistrate Judge, I conducted a hearing on the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss in a matter styled the United States of America v. Eugene P. Kent, CR. 97-40111. [the currency transaction prosecution.] I denied the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss as I believed that an issue of fact existed as to the Defendant's intent. While I believed that it would be improper to dismiss the case because of that issue, I also know that if I had been the finder of fact I would have found the Defendant not guilty of all of charges in the indictment. Perhaps more so than any defendant who appeared before me, Mr. Kent comported himself with grace, dignity, and the utmost of integrity with regard to both criminal cases. Since being exonerated from all underlying criminal counts regarding this matter, Mr. Kent has asked me to submit an affidavit on his behalf. Initially, I was reluctant to do so not because Mr. Kent was unworthy of support, but because I was concerned about whether doing so would reflect adversely on my former judicial office. I have concluded that the interests of justice compel me to provide this affidavit on behalf of Mr. Kent. I am firmly of the belief that Mr. Kent committed no criminal acts in either of the cases venued in the United States District Court for the District of South Dakota and as such he should not bear the stigma of any criminal record. I have been a member of the South Dakota Board of Pardons and Paroles since July of 2002. During my tenure as a member of the Parole Board, I have reviewed hundreds of applications for pardons. I have reviewed all public filings in Mr. Kent's civil actions arising from his conviction as well as all filings in the criminal action itself. Based on my experiences as a Parole Board member, my knowledge of Mr. Kent individually and professionally, and as well as my knowledge of the role that pardons serve in the state and federal judicial system, I believe that Mr. Kent is an unusually worthy applicant for such extraordinary relief. It is my personal belief that Mr. Kent poses no threat to society whatsoever. Society's interests, as well as those of Mr. Kent, would be well served by granting him the relief he seeks . . . . Dated this 11th day of November, 2003.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing findings of fact, conclusions of law, the evidence of record, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses and the pleadings and arguments of the parties, it is, therefore, RECOMMENDED that the Petitioner be granted licensure. DONE AND ENTERED this 3rd day of September, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S P. MICHAEL RUFF Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of September, 2004. COPIES FURNISHED: Honorable Tom Gallagher Chief Financial Officer Department of Financial Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Pete Dunbar, General Counsel Department of Financial Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Ladasiah Jackson, Esquire Department of Financial Services 612 Larson Building 200 East Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0333 Eugene P. Kent 1209 West 37th Street Sioux Falls, South Dakota 57105
The Issue At the commencement of the hearing, the parties stipulated that Petitioner had filed applications for Class "A" and Class "C" licenses and was qualified except for the failure to demonstrate good moral character. The bases for the dispute over Petitioner's character were: Petitioner's arrest record; Petitioner's alleged falsification of his applications as to his employment with the Pittsburgh Police Department; and Petitioner's check for the application fee was dishonored for insufficient funds.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner duly filed applications with the Department of State, Division of Licensing for Class "A" and Class "C" licenses. Except for matters related to Petitioner's good moral character, Petitioner is qualified for licensure. Petitioner's application reflects that he answered the question whether he had been arrested affirmatively with the following comment: The Courts of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania in all five cases from 1965 to 1974 - ruled that as a Police Officer, I acted within the scope of my authority - These cases stem from being an undercover Narcotics Officer. The Petitioner's arrest records as maintained by the Federal Bureau of Investigation reveal several juvenile offenses, not considered by the Department and not at issue. This record also reveals the following arrests of Petitioner as an adult: Date Place Charge Disposition 06/09/66* Pittsburgh VDD & CA Not guilty 08/15/66* Pittsburgh VUFA Not guilty 08/20/66* Allegheny County VDDCA 06/24/67* Allegheny County VUFA Unavailable per contra 06/30/70 *Only one offense with different charges made on different dates 09/05/74 Allegheny County Theft, VUFA Discharged 09/23/74 05/07/75 Allegheny County Fraud - imper- sonating a public servant 12/19/79 Office of Provost No charge No charge Martial Petitioner presented testimony and supporting documentary evidence that the arrests reported on the FBI criminal history for the dates 06/09/66 through 06/24/67 were all related to the same offense, and that these charges were resolved in favor of the Petitioner by a verdict of not guilty. See Petitioner's Exhibit #1. The judge arrested judgment of the two years' probation for the charge of 05/07/75. See Respondent's Exhibit #2. Petitioner stated that based upon his status as a capital police officer he was not guilty of fraud or impersonation of a public servant. The Petitioner's remaining arrest was on 09/05/74, and was discharged. Petitioner's explanation of these arrests is not consistent with the explanation stated on his application form. According to the resume accompanying his application, Petitioner was employed on the indicated dates in the following positions: Date Position 1963 to 1965 Globe Security 1965 to 1970 Pittsburgh Police Department, special patrolman 1970 to 1973 NAACP special investigator and Bucci Detective Agency 1972 to 1976 Commonwealth Property Police with State of Pennsylvania 1973 to 1974 Part-time security guard in addition to employment listed above May, 1976 January, 1977 Federal Civil Service guard March, 1977 September, 1977 Part-time security guard with A&S Security December, 1978 Sears, Roebuck and Company as to June, 1980 undercover security investigator February, 1979 Security guard to June, 1980 September, 1979 VA, guard at VA Hospital GS5 to June, 1980 June, 1980 Came to Florida Petitioner stated that his check for the application fee bounced because of his travel back and forth to Pennsylvania to try to develop the data to support his application, which depleted his bank account. He has since made the check good and paid the fees by money order.
Recommendation The Petitioner has failed to establish that he has the requisite good character for licensure; therefore, it is recommended that the Petitioner's applications for Class "A" and Class "C" licensure be denied. DONE and ORDERED this 19th day of April, 1982, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. COPIES FURNISHED: Mr. James Barnett 758 Woodville Road Milton, Florida 32570 James V. Antista, Esquire Assistant General Counsel Department of State Division of Licensing R. A. Gray Building, Room 106 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 STEPHEN F. DEAN, Hearing Officer Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of April, 1982. George Firestone, Secretary Department of State The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32301
Findings Of Fact Respondent holds a Class "C" Private Investigator License, license number C86-00509. The Respondent has held that license at all times material to this proceeding. On July 4, 1994, the Respondent intentionally struck N.S. (a minor) with a flashlight. The striking of N.S. took place immediately after, and was in response to, N.S.'s act of kicking the Respondent while the Respondent was on a stairway landing and was in reasonable fear that his attacker (N.S.) might push him down the stairs. Under the circumstances, the Respondent's act of striking N.S. was a reasonable act of self-defense in the lawful protection of himself from physical harm.
Recommendation On the basis of all of the foregoing it is recommended that a Final Order be issued in this proceeding dismissing all charges against the Respondent. DONE AND ENTERED this 9th day of February, 1996 in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. 1550 _ MICHAEL M. PARRISH, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399- (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of February, 1996. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 95-5321 The following are the Hearing Officer's specific rulings on all proposed findings of fact submitted by all parties. Proposed findings submitted by Petitioner: Paragraph 1: Accepted. Paragraphs 2, 3, and 4: Rejected as irrelevant or as subordinate and unnecessary details. (For reasons discussed in the Conclusions of Law, the details regarding the criminal prosecution of the Respondent are not competent substantial evidence of the facts alleged in the Administrative Complaint.) Proposed findings submitted by Respondent: The Respondent's proposed recommended order does not contain any specific portion designated as "findings of fact." Rather, the Respondent has intertwined his proposed findings, his proposed conclusions, and his arguments throughout his proposal. It appears to be sufficient to note that the findings of fact in this recommended order are generally consistent with the substance of the Respondent's version of the facts. COPIES FURNISHED: Douglas D. Sunshine Assistant General Counsel Department of State, Division of Licensing The Capitol, Mail Station Number 4 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0250 Mr. Stephen A. Shields 9441 Southwest 4th Street, Number 311 Miami, Florida 33174 Honorable Sandra B. Mortham Secretary of State The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0250 Don Bell General Counsel Department of State The Capitol, PL-02 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0250
The Issue The issue in this case is whether the Petitioner should be placed on the convicted vendor list.
Findings Of Fact On May 31, 1990, Borden pled guilty to commission of a public entity crime, as defined by Section 287.133(1)(g), Fla. Stat. (Supp. 1996), for: a conspiracy to rig bids for the award and performance of contracts to supply milk to school boards within Peninsular Florida, lasting from the early 1970's through July, 1988; a conspiracy to rig bids for the award and performance of contracts to supply milk to school boards within the Florida Panhandle, lasting from the early 1970's through July, 1988; and a conspiracy to rig bids for the award and performance of contracts to supply dairy products for use at federal military installations within Peninsular Florida and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and at the Kings Bay Naval Submarine Base in Georgia, lasting from the early 1970's through July, 1988. As a corporate entity, Borden was culpable of the crimes committed by its employees or agents. However, as set out in more detail in the Joint Stipulation, when the crimes came to the attention of Borden's corporate management, Borden cooperated with state and federal investigations and prosecutions of the crimes, promptly terminated the employees and disassociated itself from individuals implicated in the crimes, and promptly paid the damages and penalties resulting from Borden's conviction. As set out in more detail in the Joint Stipulation, Borden notified the Department of Management Services within 30 days of its conviction. As set out in more detail in the Joint Stipulation, in addition to terminating the employees implicated in the crimes, Borden has instituted self- policing to prevent public entity crimes. As set out in more detail in the Joint Stipulation, after a period of suspension by the Defense Logistics Agency of the federal government in relation to Borden's public entity crime, the suspension was terminated, and Borden's Dairy Division has been reinstated as a qualified government contractor. As set out in more detail in the Joint Stipulation, Borden has demonstrated its good citizenship with the exception of the public entity crime of which it was convicted. As set out in more detail in the Joint Stipulation, other than the public entity crime conviction itself, there was no evidence that it is in the best interest of the public to place Borden on the convicted vendor list.
