Findings Of Fact By addition to Section 633.081(2), Florida Statutes, in 1981, the Florida Legislature required the State Fire Marshal to renew, on a triennial basis, the certification of fire inspectors in the State of Florida and to, by January 1, 1982, establish procedures to do so by rule. This statute and the 1979 edition thereof stipulated that all required fire inspections be conducted by a person certified as having met the inspection training requirements set by the State Fire Marshal and charged that individual with maintaining current files on all certified inspectors. Consistent with that mandate, on October 16, 1981, a representative of the Bureau of Fire Standards and Training of the State Fire Marshal, by memorandum to all "Incumbent Fire Safety Inspectors," forwarded the procedures established by the Bureau to initiate the required certification process. The memorandum clearly indicated the test to be given during December, 1981, at various locations throughout the state would be to any "qualified' inspector. The term "qualified" was defined in the attachment to the memo as being: ndividuals who are currently functioning as fire inspectors provided they meet the requirements specified below. Have a minimum of one year of experience as a full-time fire safety inspector as of January 1, 1982, and have successfully completed a 40 hour course of instruction in Codes and Standards; or Have a minimum of five years experience as a full-time fire safety inspector as of January 1, 1982. This incumbent test was an open-book examination in all sections, and was not to be used to test new inspectors who had not been serving in that job. The test for new inspectors is open book in only one of five sections. On November 9, 1981, Respondent, John M. McCarthy, then serving as Fire Chief for the Fort Myers Beach (Florida) Fire Control District (FMBFCD), submitted his request to take the Incumbent Fire Safety Inspector examination. The application form Respondent submitted, verifying he had served as a full- time fire inspector for four years beginning September 11, 1977, to the date the application was signed by Respondent, as fire chief, as the certifying agent. Respondent contends he was advised to do just that by a representative of Petitioner in a phone call to Petitioner's Ocala office prior to the application. Mr. Stark, currently the bureau chief, was not serving in that capacity at that time. The then-incumbent is no longer at that office and did not testify. On the basis of Respondent's application and the verification of status appearing thereon, he was permitted to take the incumbent exam, which he passed, and was subsequently certified as a fire safety inspector. In early April, 1983, John Dahlgren, Jr., Vice Chairman of the Board of Fire Commissioners, FMBFCD, in the company of Mr. Robert J. Weatherbee, then lieutenant in the Fort Myers Beach Fire Department, came to Mr. Frederick C. Stark, Bureau Chief, Bureau of Fire Standards and Training, Office of the State Fire Marshal, and presented a letter to him to the effect that it was the majority opinion of the members of the Board, FMBFCD, that Respondent was not qualified to take the incumbents' fire inspector examination when he did because he had not had the required one year experience as a full-time fire inspector and, therefore, his certification as such was in error. A letter to that effect, dated April 7, 1983, was also delivered. The following day, April 8, 1983, Mr. Stark wrote to Respondent, informing him of this allegation and offering him the opportunity to refute the allegation. Apparently, that same date, Mr. Stark sent a similar letter to Mr. Keith Hiatt, Chairman of the FMBFCD; and on April 12, 1983, Mr. Hiatt responded by letter, indicating that Respondent was, at the time of taking the exam, the full-time paid inspector, as well as full-time paid fire chief, citing the training that Respondent and another fire official gave to Mr. Weatherbee to qualify him for the position of fire marshal. Similar sentiments were contained in a letter, same date, from Mr. Frederick Bruchner, member of the Board, to Mr. Stark. Also on April 12, 1983, Respondent responded by letter to Mr. Stark, outlining his experience in fire prevention and detailing that his position as fire chief gives him final review and decision-making authority on the operation of the department's fire inspector, Mr. Weatherbee. Shortly thereafter, on April 29, 1983, Mr. Weatherbee and Charles Mulac, former Fire Marshal and acting Fire Chief, signed affidavits which subsequently got to Mr. Stark on May 2, 1983, which indicated that during their tenure in their respective offices, going back to June, 1979, Respondent had not served that department as a full-time inspector. Prior to signing his affidavit, Mr. Weatherbee personally went through all the inspection files, including approximately 180 residentials, 100 Businesses, 100 mercantiles, 5 schools, and some industrials. He recalls that Respondent was with him on some of his inspections, but does not recall any cases where Respondent did the inspection alone. During this period, Respondent called Mr. Stark and told him there were documents in the department files which showed he had done fire inspections, so on May 2, 1983, Mr. Stark wrote to Mr. Mulac, as acting Chief, and requested he search the department's fire inspection records for the period 1977-1980 for any documentation, such as inspection records, surveys, or the like, to indicate inspections done by Respondent. On May 5, Mulac responded in writing, indicating that a thorough search of the records in question disclosed no documentation on inspections by Respondent, nor did the records show Respondent was ever a part-time or full-time, paid or nonpaid, inspector during the period 1977-1980. In addition to the lack of full-time inspector employment, the Bureau also concluded that Respondent's training records did not reflect the required training in that it is felt he did not have training in: Blueprint reading and plan examination; Inspection procedures; (a) Private protection systems (sprinklers, alarms); and (d) Causes and origins of fires. Without this background, the Bureau concluded Respondent could not function as an inspector, as all are pertinent to that operation, especially in light of current building methods. Further, concerning the experience requirement, this was considered to be imperative because there are many aspects of fire safety which are learned only through experience. Without the experience, even the training would not, in Stark's opinion, make an individual a qualified inspector. Respondent's duties as fire chief, which required him to oversee inspections done by others, was not, in Stark's opinion, sufficiently connected to the inspection process to allow him to sit for the incumbents' examination. Therefore, on May 11, 1983, Mr. Stark, as Bureau Chief, voided Respondent's Municipal Fire Inspector certificate and advised him of that fact by letter. Respondent contends that Mr. Stark's action was taken without adequate investigation and was based on irrelevant matters. As to the latter issue, Mr. Stark admits that the discussion he had in his office with Dahlgren and Weatherbee related to the rules and procedures as they applied to Respondent. Mr. Stark assured these two gentlemen only that he would look into their allegations. Prior to this visit, he had no indication there was anything wrong with Respondent's certification or that of Mr. Taylor, also from the Fort Myers Beach Fire Department. About a week after this visit, Mr. Stark received a package in the mail that consisted mostly of newspaper clippings concerning Respondent and alleged improprieties in the District, but, he contends, he read only one, and none of this had any bearing on the decision to decertify Respondent as a fire inspector. He also received numerous phone calls from individuals in Fort Myers regarding Respondent's status, and he referred them all to the Fire Marshal's Office in Tallahassee. Without concluding at this point whether that decision was appropriate or not, it is clear there is no reason to disbelieve Mr. Stark in this regard or to conclude the decision was based on any improperly considered evidence. As to the adequacy of the investigation into the allegations, it is also clear that Mr. Stark could have improved little on what he did. He could have, himself, examined the department's records and, in light of the fact that at the time in question Respondent had been suspended as chief and was barred from the department offices (he could not, therefore, get to the files to secure copies of his inspection reports, if any existed), perhaps should have done so. However, at no time did Respondent contend he had done inspections himself, but instead, in his response to Mr. Stark's initial letter, relied solely on his supervisory position, the responsibility that went with it, and his efforts on behalf of the Interlocal Agreement. In light of the evidence presented to him, Mr. Stark had no requirement to go further, and it is clear his inquiry into the matter was adequate. At the time of the test, no rule had been promulgated for the certification process. The Fire Marshal's Office took the statutory language calling for "certification" of inspectors as the authority to give the test to incumbents to certify them. It is the opinion of Mr. Stark that some of the 400 to 500 individuals who took the incumbent test, out of the 23,000 inspectors working in this state, had very little fire inspection training or experience at all. However, since the Training Bureau has only two individuals to do the checking for the entire state, he had to rely on the integrity of the individual who verified the experience claimed on the application form. If, however, the Bureau received information that someone was not qualified, it decertified that individual, utilizing the same procedure as done in the instant case; that is, to decertify after investigation, but without hearing prior to the decertification action. In fact, to the best of Mr. Stark's knowledge, there were five other cases where certificates were looked into because of alleged irregularities such as here. Respondent applied for employment with the FMBFCD on May 15, 1976. Prior to coming to Florida, he worked as a fire fighter in New York since 1965 and while there took numerous fire fighting courses and officers' training. After coming to Florida, he enrolled in St. Petersburg Junior College and Edison Community College by which latter institution he was awarded the Associate of Science Degree in Fire Administration. During the course of study, he took courses in: Introduction to Fire Protection; Fire Protection Systems; (a) Fire Company Leadership; Fire Fighting I; Fire Company Management; Fire Codes; Protection Organizations; Fire Prevention Investigation; Hazard Material; Fire Fighting II; and graduated in the winter of 1983 from Edison Community College with an overall grade point average of 3.22 out of a possible 4. Respondent submitted extensive documentation in the form of memoranda, notations, calendar memos, and newspaper articles to show that he was actively engaged in fire inspection. However, careful review of these documents reveals that while he was frequently embroiled in controversy over the inspections of various commercial and residential establishments in Fort Myers Beach, and while he may, from time to time, have actually been personally involved in inspections, for the most part he was the upper echelon supervisor who was called upon to resolve disputes over inspections conducted by others, on the basis of policy or whatever other concern was pertinent to the issue. Whatever else he did, it is clear Respondent was not a full-time fire inspector. In fact, Respondent admits that though he has personally participated in many inspections in the field, assisting Mr. Weatherbee, who was, at the time, the Fire Inspector (Marshal) for the FMBFCD, and bringing to his attention various aspects of the fire codes, he did not do the actual inspection and has never done one by himself. However, because of the periodic friction between Weatherbee and Mulac, then the Assistant Fire Chief, he found himself going out into the field with both, frequently to do inspections. Respondent contends that the area of fire prevention and code enforcement, into which fire safety inspection falls, is the biggest part of his job, which also entails fire suppression and rescue. During the period in question, Fort Myers Beach did more building in general than the rest of the county. As a result, he was always out at the site looking at plans and consulting with the builder. In that regard, however, he has, by his own admission, taken no course work in blueprint reading or plans review that was certified by the State Fire Marshal. Finally, concerning this particular subject, when Respondent was temporarily suspended from his job as fire chief in April, 1983, he was contacted by a reporter from the local paper who read to him, over the phone, from the long list of charges laid against him, of which, prior to that moment, he had no knowledge and had not seen. In response to the reporter's question about inspections, 1/ Respondent is quoted as having denied participating in fire inspections and indicating he had nothing to do with fire codes.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is, therefore, RECOMMENDED THAT: Respondent's certification as a fire safety inspector be rescinded. RECOMMENDED this 22nd day of May, 1984, in Tallahassee, Florida. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of May, 1984.
The Issue Whether Respondent's renewal facilities licensure application for a group home contained a falsified fire inspection report, as alleged in the Administrative Complaint; and, if so, what is the appropriate penalty?
Findings Of Fact APD is the state agency charged with regulating the licensing and operation of foster care facilities, group home facilities, residential habitation centers, and comprehensive transitional education programs pursuant to sections 20.197 and 393.067, Florida Statutes. Rivero is an applicant for renewed licensure of a group home facility in Dania Beach, Florida. At all times material to the Administrative Complaint, Yitzhak Rivero was a corporate officer of Rivero. Mr. Rivero, was a psychiatrist in Cuba treating patients with mental and intellectual disabilities before he moved to the United States and became a citizen. He became a licensed mental health counselor, and for the past ten years has operated group homes in an effort to serve disabled persons, owning as many as seven group homes, employing 30 people at one time, and currently owning and operating three licensed group homes. On June 20, 2019, Sally Vazquez, then administrator for Rivero, submitted a license renewal application on behalf of Rivero’s Dania Beach group home to APD by hand delivering it to APD employee Patricia White, who was on the premises. On that same day, fire inspectors were also at the Dania Beach property to conduct an inspection. Prior to submitting the renewal application and supporting documents to APD on June 20, 2019, Ms. Vazquez prepared the application and compiled or prepared the supporting documents in the renewal application. The handwriting on pages 1 through 11 of the renewal application is that of Ms. Vazquez. Ms. Vazquez is listed as backup manager supervisor for Rivero on page 7 of the renewal application. After Ms. Vazquez prepared the renewal application and compiled the supporting documents, Mr. Rivero, as the group home owner, did a brief review of the application and supporting documents before he signed it. Before he signed it, Mr. Rivero identified nothing unusual in the application packet. When Mr. Rivero signed the attestation on the renewal application, which read, “Under penalty of perjury…all information contained in and submitted with application is true and accurate to the best of my knowledge,” he believed that the information in the application and supporting documents was true and correct. Unbeknownst to Mr. Rivero, the renewal application contained a document purporting to be a fire inspection report dated May 1, 2019, that was falsified. Mr. Rivero did not know the fire inspection was false when he reviewed the renewal application and signed it on June 7, 2019, or when Ms. Vazquez submitted it to APD on behalf of Rivero on June 20, 2019. In fact, the only email or communication Mr. Rivero received about the Dania Beach group home in regard to fire safety was a June 20, 2019, email sent by Fire Inspector Braun at 12:49 p.m., stating it was “From: Broward Sheriff’s Office Fire Rescue,” identified by the subject, “Inspection Report,” which contained an attachment related to the Dania Beach home from “Broward Sheriff’s Office Fire Rescue” bearing the agency’s logo that stated: “An annual fire inspection of your occupancy revealed no violations at the time of this inspection. Thank you for your commitment to maintaining a fire safe occupancy.” On August 21, 2019, when asked in an email from APD representative Kimberly Carty to provide the fire inspection report for Rivero, Mr. Rivero forwarded the email he had received from the Broward Sheriff’s Office Fire Rescue indicating no violations, the only fire inspection report for this home he had ever received, and the only fire inspection report regarding this property of which he was aware. On August 23, 2019, Ms. Carty sent Mr. Rivero a fire inspection report showing violations noted from the June 20, 2019, fire safety inspection of the Dania Beach group home. The report notes six, of what fire safety inspector Craig Braun described as less serious, non “critical-life” violations. Rivero was given 30 days to correct the violations.1 The day after he was sent the full fire inspection report for the Rivero Dania Beach group home, Mr. Rivero corrected the “easily corrected,” relatively minor violations in approximately three hours. Mr. Rivero then contacted the fire department to re-inspect the facility. When no fire inspector came to re-inspect for over a month, on September 30, 2019, Mr. Rivero sent an email to Mr. Zipoli, the fire inspector who had signed the inspection report showing the minor violations. Nevertheless, the fire department has never re-inspected the facility. Fire Prevention Officers Braun and Zipoli testified unequivocally and without contradiction that the document Mr. Rivero forwarded to APD’s Kimberly Carty on August 23, 2019 (the document indicating, “An annual fire inspection of your occupancy revealed no violations at the time of this inspection”), was a genuine and authentic document. Further, Officer Braun indicated that on June 20, 2019, he was Officer Zipoli’s supervisor, and that on that date Officer Braun and Zipoli “went together to inspect the Rivero Group Home.” “[U]sually…just [one] fire safety inspector goes,” and it was “not the norm” for two fire safety inspectors to go together. In this unusual situation, Fire Safety Inspector Zipoli wrote the report of the June 20, 2019, inspection, and Fire Safety Inspector Braun “wrote a report,” a separate report, indicating that he “assisted him [Zipoli] on another 1 These violations included: front and rear door of the group home (two doors) had a key lock instead of a “simple thumb turn or something that does not require special knowledge”; a fire alarm needed to be updated with its annual fire inspection from a private contractor; a fire extinguisher needed to be mounted on its mounting on the wall instead of placed on the ground beneath the mounting; the fire extinguisher needed to have its annual certification updated for 2019; the smoke detector located in the kitchen needed to be moved to a different location. form.” It was this other form that Officer Braun completed--this fire safety “Inspection Assist” for--that was emailed to Mr. Rivero on June 20, 2019. It was this form that stated, “[a]n annual fire inspection of your occupancy revealed no violations at the time of this inspection.” Officers Braun and Zipoli confirmed that the Broward Sheriff’s electronic streamline system “had a ‘glitch,’” “a default problem at that time,” the period including June 20, 2019, that caused the “template of an assist” ( i.e., an Inspection Assist form) to generate the statement indicating, “[a]n annual fire inspection of your occupancy revealed no violations at the time of this inspection,” and the system gave fire safety inspectors no option or ability to remove this statement. When APD’s Kimberly Carty requested that Mr. Rivero send the most recent fire inspection report for the Rivero Dania Beach group home, Mr. Rivero forwarded to Ms. Carty the document he received on June 20, 2019, from Broward Sheriff’s Office Fire Rescue without altering or changing the document in any way. The first time Mr. Rivero was notified that the fire inspection report submitted with the renewal application at issue here was false was when he received the Administrative Complaint in this case on October 23, 2019. In addition to the June 20, 2019, document Mr. Rivero received from Broward Sheriff’s Office Fire Rescue that indicated “no violations,” and the fire inspection report indicating six violations that was sent to Mr. Rivero by APD on August 23, 2019, this case involves a document dated May 1, 2019, purporting to be a Broward Sheriff’s Office Fire Rescue fire inspection that was fabricated (“the false fire inspection report”). The false fire inspection report was submitted to APD by Ms. Vazquez during APD’s June 20, 2019, inspection of the Rivero’s Dania Beach group home. At the time she submitted the application with the false fire inspection report, Ms. Vazquez had worked for Rivero for at least six years, and for at least two years as an administrator for between four and seven group homes. At the time she submitted the application at issue in this case to APD, Ms. Vazquez had prepared more than 20 APD renewal applications for Mr. Rivero’s group homes. In short, Ms. Vazquez was a “trusted employee,” whom Mr. Rivero relied on to accurately prepare applications and the documents submitted with the applications, and to handle the inspections conducted by APD. After Mr. Rivero learned, by receiving the Administrative Complaint in this case on October 23, 2019, that an altered or falsified document had been submitted as a fire inspection report with Rivero’s Dania Beach group home’s annual renewal application to APD, he conducted an investigation to determine how it had happened. When Mr. Rivero determined Ms. Vazquez was to blame for the false fire inspection report being submitted with the application, he fired her. The evidence presented indicates Ms. Vazquez created and submitted the falsified fire inspection report in violation of her job duties and professional obligations, and without the knowledge or consent of Mr. Rivero or Rivero.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Agency for Persons With Disabilities enter a final order dismissing the Administrative Complaint filed against Respondent. DONE AND ENTERED this 17th day of April, 2020, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S MARY LI CREASY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of April, 2020. COPIES FURNISHED: Sean Michael Ellsworth, Esquire Ellsworth Law Firm, P.A. 1000 5th Street, Suite 223 Miami Beach, Florida 33139 (eServed) Trevor S. Suter, Esquire Agency for Persons with Disabilities 4030 Esplanade Way, Suite 380 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950 (eServed) Anthony Vitale, Esquire The Health Law Offices of Anthony C. Vitale, P.A. 2333 Brickell Avenue, Suite A-1 Miami, Florida 33129 (eServed) Daniel Ferrante, Esquire Health Law Offices Of Anthony C. Vitale, P.A. 2333 Brickell Avenue, Suite A-1 Miami, Florida 33129 (eServed) Danielle Thompson Senior Attorney/Agency Clerk Agency for Persons with Disabilities 4030 Esplanade Way, Suite 309 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950 (eServed) Francis Carbone, General Counsel Agency for Persons with Disabilities 4030 Esplanade Way, Suite 380 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950 (eServed) Barbara Palmer, Director Agency for Persons with Disabilities 4030 Esplanade Way, Suite 380 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950 (eServed)
The Issue The issue is whether Florida Administrative Code Rules 69A- 62.001, 69A-62.003, 69A-62.006, and 69A-62.007, constitute an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority as defined in Sections 120.52(8)(d), 120.52(8)(e), and 120.52(8)(f), Florida Statutes (2004).
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is and, at all times material to this case, was a volunteer firefighter. The size of the volunteer firefighter population is dependent on the ability of volunteer fire departments to attract and keep volunteers. People are willing to volunteer as firefighters if the experience is rewarding, training is not excessive, and conflict is minimized. However, the greater weight of the evidence indicates that the subject rules do not detract from the volunteer experience, impose excessive training, or create between conflict between professional and volunteer firefighters. Petitioner testified that a reduction in volunteer population will result in increased hazards to volunteers and a reduction in the delivery of services to citizens. This testimony is not persuasive for two reasons. First, there is no persuasive testimony that the subject rules will result in a reduction of the number of volunteer firefighters. Second, the most persuasive evidence indicates that the subject rules will reduce hazards to volunteers without impairing the delivery of services to Floridians. Some labor unions that represent career firefighters discourage their members from volunteering their services with volunteer fire departments. The competition between the unions and the volunteer fire departments is commonly referred to as the "turf-war." There is no persuasive evidence that the subject rules contribute to the tension between the two groups of firefighters. The firefighter labor unions are usually very active in the political arena. It is undisputed that the unions support legislation that benefits their members. However, the subject rules were not promulgated to eliminate or place hardships on volunteer fire departments and volunteer firefighters. The safety needs and concerns of firefighters have evolved over time. Technology has improved firefighting equipment to such an extent that the greatest threat to firefighters is from heart attacks and transportation accidents. Nevertheless, the fact that the subject rules focus on safety enhancement at the scene of a fire instead of firefighter health and transportation safety does not render them invalid. Florida Administrative Code Rule 69A-62.003 provides as follows in pertinent part: (3) With respect to 29 C.F.R. Section 1910.134(g)(4), the two individuals located outside the immediately dangerous to life and health atmosphere may be assigned to an additional role, such as incident commander, pumper operator, engineer, or driver, so long as such individual is able to immediately perform assistance or rescue activities without jeopardizing the safety or health of any firefighter working at an incident. (a)1. Except as provided in subparagraphs 2., 3., and 4., no firefighter or any other person under the authority of the firefighter employer at the scene of a fire is permitted to participate in any operation involving two-in, two-out as one of the two or more persons inside the IDLH atmosphere or as one of the two or more persons outside of the IDLH atmosphere unless such firefighter or other person at the scene of a fire is certified in this state by the division as a Firefighter I or a Firefighter II, as established in subsections (1) and (2) of Rule 69A-37.055, F.A.C. Such training shall consist of the training described in subsection (6) of Rule 69A-37.055, F.A.C. This requirement specifically applies to volunteer fire departments and volunteer firefighters but is also applicable to any other person working under the authority of the Firefighter Employer at the scene of a fire. 2.a. A volunteer firefighter who possesses the State Basic Volunteer certificate previously issued by the division is exempt from the Firefighter I and Firefighter II requirement in subparagraph 1. The training encompassed in the basic volunteer certificate in itself may not meet “trained commensurate to duty” as defined depending upon duties or tasks assigned or undertaken in the exclusionary zone. A volunteer firefighter who provides evidence of having completed curriculum equivalent to the Florida Firefighter I course of study as provided in subsection 69A-37.055(6), F.A.C., prior to January 1, 2004, is exempt from the Firefighter I and Firefighter II requirement in subparagraph 1., if The fire chief or other chief administrative officer of the fire department of which the firefighter is a member files with the State Fire Marshal form DFS-K4-1594, “Firefighter I Training Exemption Application,” which is hereby adopted and incorporated by reference, and The said form is accepted by the State Fire Marshal after confirmation of the evidence provided. Form DFS-K4-1594 may be obtained by writing the Bureau of Fire Standards and Training, 11655 Northwest Gainesville Road, Ocala, Florida 34482-1486. Any volunteer exempted by sub- subparagraph a.or b. is permitted to take the Florida Firefighter I examination until December 31, 2005, upon the completion and filing with the division of form DFS-K4- 1380, “Firefighter I Training Record,” Rev. 03/00, adopted in Rule 69A-37.039, F.A.C., by a Florida certified instructor that verifies equivalent training and demonstration of competency. The above-referenced rule sets forth ways that a firefighter, trained prior to the current regulations, may keep his or her interior-firefighter status without becoming certified as a Firefighter I or Firefighter II. The rule will not disqualify all previously qualified firefighters as long as they are "trained commensurate to duty" for any type of work they are requested to perform. There is no persuasive evidence that Florida Administrative Code Rule 69A-62.003(3)(a) will cause a reduction in the number of volunteer firefighters due to newly created administrative hurtles. The rule, which has its basis in safety enhancement, clearly is not arbitrary or damaging to the safety of volunteers. Florida Administrative Code Rule 69A-62.003(3)(a)4. states as follows: 4. Volunteer firefighters having NWCG S- 130, S-190, and Standards for Survival certification by the Florida Division of Forestry are permitted to participate in wild land fire suppression without the Firefighter I certification. The above-referenced rule allows a volunteer to fight wild-land fires without earning Firefighter I certification. The rule sets forth an exception to the Firefighter I certification requirement; it does not mandate that the NWCG courses are the exclusive means to qualify as a wild-land firefighter. Florida Administrative Code Rule 69A-62.003(3)4. is not invalid or arbitrary because it requires volunteers to pass training courses that are accepted as setting national standards or because the training courses teach firefighting techniques that are applicable across the nation as well as Florida. Petitioner presented no persuasive evidence to the contrary. Florida Administrative Code Rule 69A-62.006 states as follows: 69A-62.006 Requirements for Recognition as a Fire Department. To be recognized as an organized fire department by the division, compliance with the following must be documented: Capability of providing fire protection 24 hours a day, seven days a week; Responsibility for response in an area capable of being depicted on a map; and Staffing with a sufficient number of qualified firefighters who are employed full-time or part-time or serve as volunteers and who shall have successfully completed an approved basic firefighting course recognized by the Bureau of Fire Standards and Training. (2)(a) A fire department shall meet the requirements of the Insurance Services Office (ISO) for Class 9 Protection, the 2003 edition, the Fire Suppression Rating Schedule, effective February, 2003, which is hereby adopted and incorporated by reference and which may be obtained from Insurance Services Office (ISO), 545 Washington Blvd., Jersey City, NJ 07310-1686 or at www.iso.com. If the fire department does not meet the requirements of this section, the fire department shall submit a plan of compliance which provides for meeting these requirements within 90 days of the date of submission of the plan. ISO measures the major elements of a community’s fire-suppression system and develops a numerical grade ranging from 1 to 10. Class 1 represents the best public protection rating and Class 10 indicates no recognized protection. The requirements for ISO 9 may be obtained at the ISO website located at www.iso.com, or it may be obtained by writing to the Division of State Fire Marshal, Bureau of Fire Standards and Training, 11655 Northwest Gainesville Road, Ocala, Florida 34482-1486. Florida Administrative Code Rule 69A-62.006(1)(a) is not invalid because it requires fire departments to document their capability of providing fire protection 24 hours a day/seven days a week. The requirement for full-time availability will provide significant safety enhancement for the communities being served. This is true because some voluntary fire departments in rural communities historically have provided only part-time service. There is no persuasive evidence that requiring full- time fire protection will result in the following: (a) the creation of a fire-suppression performance standard that is unauthorized by law; (b) the closing of some volunteer fire departments; (c) a reduction in services to the public; and (d) uncorrectable rule-violations; an increase in conflict between professional and volunteer firefighters. Florida Administrative Code Rule 69A-62.006(1)(c) requires that each fire department be staffed with a sufficient number of qualified firefighters. The rule is not vague because it uses the word "sufficient" to determine the number of firefighters that are required. One must read the applicable rules in their entirety and consider the needs of each community to determine adequate staffing. There is no persuasive evidence that the staffing requirement fails to establish adequate standards for determining compliance. Florida Administrative Code Rule 69A-62.006(2) requires fire departments to meet certain requirements of the Insurance Services Office (ISO) for Class 9 protection. This requirement determines the minimum equipment that is necessary to safely fight a structure fire. There is no persuasive evidence that requiring a fire department to provide Class 9 protection will make it impossible to start a new voluntary fire department. The rule clearly is not arbitrary in setting this minimum standard. Florida Administrative Code Rule 69A-62.007(1) states as follows in pertinent part: 69A-62.007 Minimum Requirements for Class 9 Protection. To be considered for Class 9 protection, the following minimum facilities must be available: Organization: The fire department shall be organized on a permanent basis under applicable state or local laws. The organization shall include one person responsible for operation of the department, usually with the title of chief. The fire department must serve an area with definite boundaries. If a municipality is not served by a fire department solely operated by or for the governing body of that city, the fire department providing such service shall do so under a contract or resolution. When a fire department’s service area involves one or more jurisdictions, a contract shall be executed with each jurisdiction served. Membership: The department shall have a sufficient number of firefighters/members to assure the response of at least 4 firefighters/members that can assemble at the scene of a fire as contemplated by subsection (1) of Rule 69A-62.003, F.A.C., to be compliant with Rule 69A-62.003, F.A.C., the two-in, two-out rule. The fire chief may be one of the 4 responding firefighters/members. The above-referenced rule does require fire departments to have four "interior-qualified" firefighters at the scene of a structure fire. The requirement is necessary to comply with the longstanding "two-in, two-out" rule. However, the rule does not preclude a fire department from relying on mutual-aid from other fire departments in order to comply with the rule. The rule clearly is not vague. Florida Administrative Code Rule 69A-62.007(4)(a) states as follows in relevant part: (4)(a) The chief of any fire department that includes volunteer firefighters shall annually submit a Roster of Volunteer Firefighters to the State Fire Marshal utilizing form DFS-K4-1581, effective 05/04, which is hereby adopted and incorporated by reference, no later than June 30 of each year. Form DFS-K4-1581 may be obtained by contacting the Division of State Fire Marshal, Bureau of Fire Standards and Training, 11655 Northwest Gainesville Road, Ocala, Florida 34482-1486 or at the division’s website located at http://www.fldfs.com/SFM/. The roster shall include: The fire department name, The fire department identification number (FDID), The complete fire department address, The fire department contact person, telephone number and the fire department fax number, if any, The certification level for each firefighter reported and, if any equivalency exemption has been issued, the number of persons for whom such exemption has been issued, and The firefighter certification number, the issue date of the certification, the status of the certification, i.e., volunteer or career, and the status of each firefighter who has been issued an equivalency exemption, i.e., volunteer or career, if any. The above-referenced rule requires the chief of a fire department to submit an annual roster of volunteer firefighters. Petitioner objects to the rule because some career firefighters volunteer their off-duty hours with the local volunteer fire department. Career firefighters who also perform volunteer work may do so contrary to their union rules. Publication of the roster might keep some professional firefighters from volunteering their services. Nevertheless, there is no persuasive evidence that losing some speculative number of career/volunteer firefighters will undermine the safety of firefighters or the public. The information that the roster contains is a public record. The information is necessary so that Respondent can perform statutorily-mandated studies involving injuries to firefighters. The rule clearly is not arbitrary.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Petitioner, Marlene Serrano ("Serrano"), should be awarded certification as a firefighter or, in the alternative, whether Serrano should be allowed to re-take the hose operation and ladder operation portions of the Firefighter Minimum Standards Written and Practical Examination.
Findings Of Fact Serrano was a candidate for certification as a firefighter in the State of Florida. The Department is the state agency responsible for testing all candidates for certification as a firefighter, for conducting such tests, and for issuing a certification upon successful completion of minimum requirements by a candidate. One such examination administered by the Department is the Firefighter Minimum Standards Written and Practical Examination ("Firefighter examination"). The Firefighter examination has a written portion, as well as three practical components: Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus, Hose Operations, and Ladder Operations. In order to meet the minimum requirements for certification, a candidate must obtain at least a 70-percent score on each component of the Firefighter examination. If a candidate fails the test, he or she is afforded one chance to take a re-test. The ladder component of the Firefighter examination is scored using a form listing five mandatory steps which the candidate must pass and ten evaluative component steps worth ten points each. A candidate taking the ladder component, who successfully passes the five mandatory steps, receives a total score of the sum of the scores from the ten evaluative component steps. A candidate who does not successfully complete one or more of the mandatory steps automatically fails the ladder component section and receives a score of zero out of 100 points. Serrano initially took the Firefighter examination on December 22, 2010. That test was administered at the Firefighter Academy, a more controlled environment. She failed to obtain a passing grade on two components of the examination, the hose operations component and the ladder operation component. Specifically, she failed to successfully complete the components within the required time limit of two minutes, 20 seconds; and one minute, 25 seconds, respectively. Her times were two minutes, 40 seconds; and one minute, 41 seconds, respectively. As allowed by law, Serrano was given the opportunity to re-take those components of the examination one time only. On February 15, 2011, Serrano went to a training facility in Ocala, Florida, to re-take the examination. The Ocala site was more open than the Academy site; there were other non-firefighter personnel engaged in activities in close proximity. Thomas Johnson and Kenneth Harper were the examiners assigned to administer the examination to Serrano. Serrano received a score of 100 on the hose operation component of the examination. She completed that portion of the test in one minute and 25 seconds, within the prescribed time. When Serrano finished the hose operation component, she was going to begin the ladder operation section. However, one of the examiners "yelled" at her that her protective face shield was not in place. That is, the shield had been raised to the top of her helmet, rather than being in the lowered position required during testing. The instructor yelled for her to "put your shield down." Serrano interpreted that instruction as a sign that she had failed the prior (hose operation) test. She began to walk toward the examiners, but they pointed her back in the direction of the ladder test. Serrano was confused, but undertook the ladder operation component of the examination anyway. Her concentration was somewhat broken by the examiner's comments, and she was flustered. Then she heard loud noises coming from the field next to the testing site. Apparently, there were military maneuvers of some type going on at the adjacent field. Furthermore, there was a four-wheeler driving around the training ground, creating more distraction for Serrano. However, the Department's field representative said he had administered over 1,000 tests in the same conditions as were present for Serrano's test. During the test, ten points were deducted from Serrano due to her inability to maintain the ladder in a vertical position. Further, Serrano did not complete the ladder operation component of the examination within the prescribed time frame for that section of the test. Her recorded time was two minutes and 49 seconds, some 29 seconds longer than allowed. The examiner also noted that Serrano almost lost control of the ladder twice during the examination and struggled with the halyard and safety lines. There are numerous events going on at the training site during testing. The training grounds are intentionally somewhat hectic in order to simulate real "fire ground" conditions. There is no attempt made by the examiners to keep the testing site quiet. Conversely, at the Firefighter Academy where firefighters are initially trained, there is less noise and distraction.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by Respondent, Department of Financial Services, dismissing the Petition of Marlene Serrano, in full. DONE AND ENTERED this 7th day of July, 2011, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. R. BRUCE MCKIBBEN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of July, 2011.
The Issue The issues in this case are whether Respondent’s participation in the John M. McKay Scholarships for Students with Disabilities Program (McKay Scholarships) and the Corporate Income Tax Credit Scholarship Program (CTC Scholarships) should have been suspended, and whether Respondent’s eligibility to participate in the programs should be revoked.
Findings Of Fact CHC is a private school located in Merritt Island, Florida. Lara Nichilo is the owner and head administrator of CHC. Ms. Nichilo was also the owner and head administrator of another private school located in Cocoa, Florida. For the purposes of this proceeding, the school located in Cocoa, Florida, will be referred to as CHC 2.2 CHC and CHC 2 had participated in the McKay Scholarships and CTC Scholarships programs. Section 1002.39, Florida Statutes, authorizes the McKay Scholarships program, which affords a disabled student an opportunity to receive a scholarship to defray the cost of attending a private school of choice. Section 220.187, Florida Statutes, authorizes the CTC Scholarships program, which enables taxpayers to make private, voluntary contributions so that students who qualify for free or reduced-price school lunches under the National School Lunch Act may receive a scholarship to defray the cost of attending a private school of choice. The Department of Education has the responsibility to annually verify the eligibility of a private school to participate in these scholarship programs. Private schools participating in the McKay Scholarships and CTC Scholarships programs are required to comply with Section 1002.421, Florida Statutes, and must meet applicable state and local health, safety, and welfare laws, codes, and rules, including laws, codes, and rules relating to firesafety and building safety. If a private school participating in the McKay Scholarships and CTC Scholarships programs desires to renew its participation in the programs, the school must file a signed, notarized Form IEPC SCF-1 affidavit with the Department of Education by March 1 of each year for participation in the subsequent school year. The Form IEPC SCF-1 affidavit contains a list of requirements to which the private school must certify that it meets or does not meet. If the school certifies that it does not meet a requirement, such certification constitutes an outstanding compliance issue, which must be resolved by the school prior to May 1 of each year for the school to remain eligible to participate in the scholarship programs. Specifically, the signature page of the Form IEPC SCF-1 affidavit states in part: “I understand that in answering ‘No’ to any requirement in Section 9: School Facility, the provision of a reason for answering ‘No’ shall not make the school compliant with the reporting requirement and will be considered an outstanding compliance issue for resolution as described in State Board of Education Rules 6A-6.03315, 6A-6.0960, and 6A- 6.0970, Florida Administrative Code.” Florida Administrative Code Rule 6A-6.03315(2) requires that every third year a school applies for renewal of eligibility for the scholarship programs there must be a review of compliance documentation. This means that the school must submit documentation to support its eligibility along with the affidavit. For the renewal of eligibility for the 2009-2010 school year, CHC had to submit compliance documentation for review. On November 6, 2008, Ms. Nichilo executed and mailed the Form IEPC SCF-1 affidavit for CHC for renewal of CHC’s eligibility to participate in the McKay Scholarships and CTC Scholarships programs for the 2009-2010 school year. Subsection 1 of Section 9 of the Form IEPC SCF-1 affidavit requires the school to answer the following question: Does the school facility possess a current, violation free or satisfactory Fire Code Inspection and compliance report in accordance with Section 1002.421(2)(g)1., Florida Statutes, State Finance Services Rule 69A-58.004, Florida Administrative Code, and county and/or municipal ordinance? Ms. Nichilo answered “Yes” to the question. CHC submitted a fire inspection certificate for CHC with a date of February 22, 2008. At the time Ms. Nichilo executed and submitted the Form IEPC SCF-1 affidavit in November 2008, CHC did not have a current Fire Code Inspection and compliance report. The last fire inspection certificate was dated February 22, 2006, and had expired on February 22, 2007. Ms. Nichilo executed and submitted a Form IEPC SCF-1 affidavit for the 2007-2008 school year, certifying that CHC had a current, violation-free fire inspection report. The certificate affidavit which Ms. Nichilo signed stated: I have read the applicable scholarship program rules and understand that by signing this form I am certifying that the school is currently in compliance and agrees [sic] to remain in compliance with all scholarship program rules and reporting requirements. If at any point, the school is not in compliance with scholarship rules, or if there is a change in the status of any reporting requirement, the school will have 15 days to notify the Department of Education and will provide all information necessary to document its continued compliance with program rules and requirements. At the time the certification was submitted on January 11, 2007, CHC did have a current, violation-free fire inspection report; however, CHC did not have a current, violation-free fire inspection report that was valid for the entire 2007-2008 school year. CHC did not notify the Department of Education that it was not in compliance with the fire safety inspections during the 2007-2008 school year. On December 5, 2007, Ms. Nichilo executed and submitted a Form IEPC SCF-1 affidavit for the 2008-2009 school year, certifying that CHC had a current, violation-free fire inspection report. At the time of submission of the affidavit, CHC did not have a current, violation-free fire inspection report, and, from the beginning of the 2008-2009 school year until December 23, 2008, CHC did not maintain a current, violation-free fire inspection report nor did CHC notify the Department of Education as late as December 11, 2008, that CHC was not in compliance with the fire inspection requirement. On November 19, 2008, Assistant Fire Marshall Doug Carter of Brevard County Fire Rescue (BCFR) received a complaint concerning CHC and CHC 2 from an anonymous caller. It is the policy of BCFR to follow up on all complaints. On November 20, 2008, Lead Fire Inspector William Morissette, following up on the anonymous complaint, went to CHC for the purpose of performing a fire inspection. On November 20, 2008, Mr. Morissette performed a fire inspection on CHC and noted some violations. During the inspection on November 20, 2008, Mr. Morissette noticed that the fire inspection certificate that was posted at CHC was partially obscured, and he could not see the school’s address. On November 20, 2008, Mr. Morissette performed a fire inspection of CHC 2 and noted some violations. He observed the posted fire certificate at CHC 2 during his inspection. The fire certificate had an account number 23832 and was dated February 22, 2008. The font used in the printing of the certificate did not appear to be the same type as used by BCFR. While at CHC 2, Mr. Morrissette called Assistant Fire Marshall Carter and learned that account number 23832 was for CHC and not CHC 2 and that no fire certificate had been issued to CHC 2 on February 22, 2008. The last fire certificate that had been issued to CHC 2 was on December 15, 2005, and had expired on December 16, 2006. On November 6, 2008, CHC sent a copy of the fire inspection certificate dated February 22, 2008, to the Department of Education as part of the documentation supplied to verify CHC’s eligibility for renewal. The fire inspection certificate was a forgery. Ms. Nichilo testified that she did not send the forged certificate to the Department of Education and that some disgruntled former employee who had access to CHC’s files must have sent the certificate to the Department of Education or must have put the forged certificate in the envelope containing the renewal information that was sent to the Department of Education. Ms. Nichilo’s testimony is not credible. The certificate came in the same envelope as the other material which CHC submitted in November 2008. Ms. Nichilo signed and mailed the renewal information on November 6, 2008. Her testimony that the envelope must have been in the mail room a couple of days before it was mailed, thereby allowing the disgruntled employee an opportunity to slip the forged certificate in the envelope, is not credible. After the renewal package was sent to the Department of Education, Ms. Nichilo asked her secretary to contact BCFR to schedule a fire inspection. Ms. Nichilo knew that she needed a fire inspection because she knew that she did not have a current fire inspection certificate when she sent the renewal submittal to the Department of Education. Based on the clear and convincing evidence presented, it can only be concluded that Ms. Nichilo knew the fire inspection certificates, which she included with the renewal submittals, were forgeries. On or about December 5, 2008, Mr. Carter contacted the Department of Education and informed the Department of Education that he had concerns about CHC’s and CHC 2’s fire inspection certificates. Mr. Carter sent a memorandum dated December 9, 2008, to Riley Hyle with the Department of Education, explaining BCFR’s observations and concerns relating to the fire inspection certificates. After learning from Mr. Carter that CHC’s and CHC 2’s fire inspection certificates were in question, Mr. Hyle checked the Department of Education’s renewal files on CHC and CHC 2. Mr. Hyle found forged fire inspection certificates in both files. When CHC’s and CHC 2’s submittals arrived on November 10, 2008, in the same envelope, Mr. Hyle reviewed the submittals and verified that both submittals contained fire inspection certificates. He received no further documentation from CHC or CHC 2 from November 10, 2008, and the time he talked to Mr. Carter on December 5, 2008. On December 8, 2008, Mr. Morrissette returned to CHC 2 to do a follow-up inspection. CHC 2 had not corrected all its violations. Mr. Morrissette was advised by the principal at CHC 2 that CHC also had not corrected all of its violations. One of the violations CHC had was a broken lockbox. On December 7, 2008, CHC had called BCFR and requested an application for a lockbox. Thus, on December 8, 2008, CHC would still have not corrected its lockbox violation. On December 11, 2008, Ms. Nichilo signed a revised version of the Form IEPC SCF-1 affidavit3 for CHC for the 2009- 2010 school year. The question posed in the affidavit submitted in November 2008 concerning whether the facility had a current, violation-free fire code inspection remained the same in the revised affidavit. Again, CHC stated that it did have a current, violation-free Fire Code Inspection and compliance report. The revised affidavit also contained the same language as the November 2008 affidavit that answering a question in the negative in Section 9 would result in an out-of-compliance issue. Both the November affidavit and the revised affidavit contained the following language: I have read the applicable scholarship program rules and understand that by signing the form I am certifying that the school is currently in compliance and agrees [sic] to remain in compliance with all scholarship program rules and reporting requirements. If at any point, the school is not in compliance with the scholarship rules, or if there is a change in the status of any reporting requirement, the school shall have 15 days to notify the Department of Education and will provide all information necessary to document its continued compliance with program rules and requirements. The revised affidavit was submitted to the Department of Education, which received the affidavit on December 16, 2008. At the time CHC submitted the affidavit, it did not have a current, violation-free Fire Code Inspection and compliance report. On December 23, 2008, the BCFR re-inspected CHC and found that the violations had been corrected. After its inspection on December 23, 2008, BCFR issued a fire inspection certificate backdated to November 20, 2008, which was the date of the original inspection. On December 17, 2008, the Agency issued an Administrative Complaint, suspending CHC’s eligibility for the McKay Scholarships and CTC Scholarships programs for failure to have a current fire inspection report. By letter dated December 23, 2008, and received by the Department of Education on December 29, 2008, CHC advised that the school had been re- inspected and now had a current fire code inspection certificate. On January 2, 2009, CHC sent a 12-page facsimile transmission to the Department of Education. One of the pages of the transmission was a copy of a facsimile transmission coversheet dated December 31, 2008, with the BCFR letterhead concerning inspection reports. The comments section of the coversheet read “Please read letter.” The second page of the transmission was an unsigned to-whom-it-may-concern letter dated December 30, 2008. At the top of the letter, printed in large, bold type was the following: “Brevard County Fire Rescue.” The letter stated: To whom it may concern, In reviewing and trying to figure out what happen with the 2007 inspection reports this is the conclusion we have come to. If you review the two reports on both CHC-1 and CHC-2 the visiting inspection times over lap each other making it seem like a 2007 inspection was done when in reality it was not. CHC-1 inspection has a date on it February 22, 2006 to February 2007. CHC-2 inspection shows January 12, 2006 (re-inspection) January 2007. I believe that this was just an over site on both our parts due to the fact that the fire department does come in regularly every year even without an appointment. Lara Nichilo did notify us to come in ASAP when the reports could not be found. But as of November 20, 2008 all her inspections were done and her follow up correction reports have been completed putting her in good standing with the fire and inspections department. CHC-1 and CHC-2 (inspection reports provided to you with this letter) For more information you may contact us at 321-455-6383 Thank you for your time, The telephone number given in the letter was the telephone number for CHC. The original letter submitted at the final hearing by CHC was written on stationary bearing the CHC watermark. The letter received by the Department of Education had no visible watermark. The facsimile transmission coversheet that accompanied the letter was a coversheet which BCFR had sent to CHC on December 31, 2008. The statements in the comments section that BCFR sent had been deleted and replaced with “Please read letter.” The following are the comments which BCFR had written: There are no reports or certificates for 690 Range Road for 2006 or 2007. There are no inspection reports or certificates for 55 McLeod for 2007. Certificates will be issued upon receipt of payment. Laura Harrison, the director of the McKay Scholarships and CTC Scholarships programs at the Department of Education, transmitted a copy of the letter to BCFR and asked if the letter had originated from BCFR. Mr. Carter advised Ms. Harrison that the letter did not come from BCFR. Ms. Nichilo wrote the letter. A person reading the letter would be led to believe that the letter came from BCFR. The letter was accompanied by a facsimile transmission coversheet bearing the BCFR letterhead and the coversheet comments said “Please read letter.” The letter refers to Ms. Nichilo in the third person and uses first person plural pronouns to refer to BCFR. The letter purports to bear the letterhead of BCFR. It must be concluded that Ms. Nichilo intended the Department of Education to rely on the letter as a letter transmitted by BCFR to Ms. Nichilo to explain the situation. If Ms. Nichilo had intended the Department of Education to treat the letter as a letter written by her, she would have written the letter using CHC letterhead, signed the letter, not referred to herself in the third person, not referred to BCFR in the first person, and not used a transmission coversheet from BCFR in which the comments section had been altered. In a conversation on December 30, 2008, Ms. Nichilo advised Mr. Hyle that she was sending him a letter that would explain everything and would resolve the situation concerning the fire inspections. Ms. Nichilo testified that she told Mr. Hyle that she was writing the letter. Mr. Hyle did not recall whether Ms. Nichilo said that she was writing a letter. Jade Quinif, who was Ms. Nichilo’s administrative assistant on December 30, 2008, listened to the conversation between Mr. Hyle and Ms. Nichilo on speakerphone. She recalls Ms. Nichilo asking Mr. Hyle if he would like her to write a letter regarding Ms. Nichilo’s conversations with BCFR. Mr. Hyle said that would be fine. Ms. Nichilo typed a letter and asked Ms. Quinif to send it to the Department of Education. Ms. Quinif sent a letter to the Department of Education dated December 30, 2008. Based on the evidence presented, the letter that Ms. Quinif sent was a letter dated December 30, 2008, written on CHC letterhead and signed by Ms. Nichilo.4 It was not the letter dated December 30, 2008, which appeared to be from BCFR (purported BCFR letter). The only evidence of receipt of the purported BCFR letter by the Department of Education is in a 12-page facsimile transmittal, which was transmitted twice on January 2, 2009. Ms. Quinif credibly testified that she did not send a 12-page transmission and that she did not send the doctored transmission coversheet from BCFR. She also credibly testified that the letter that she sent was a few days after Christmas and was not more than a week after Christmas. Ms. Nichilo testified that Ms. Quinif did sent the transmittal coversheet from the BCFR on December 30, 2008; however, Ms. Nichilo’s testimony is not credible given that the transmittal coversheet from BCFR was dated December 31, 2008, and showed a transmission date of December 31, 2008, to CHC. The clear and convincing evidence is that Ms. Nichilo wrote and sent the purported letter from BCFR and the doctored transmittal coversheet from BCFR in an attempt to make it appear that BCFR was taking some of the blame for CHC not having maintained current fire inspection certificates. BCFR does not automatically do an annual inspection of schools. If a school desires to have a fire inspection, the school must notify BCFR and arrange for a fire inspection. The failure to have current, violation-free fire inspection reports rests with CHC and not with BCFR. The bogus letter was an effort by CHC to seek mitigation for its failure to adhere to the requirements for eligibility for the scholarships programs. After learning that the letter transmitted on January 2, 2009, was not from BCFR, the Agency issued an Amended Administrative Complaint on January 23, 2009, which superseded the December 17, 2008, Administrative Complaint. The Amended Administrative Complaint deleted the allegations concerning the failure to have a current, violation-free fire inspection report and added allegations involving fraud and failure to maintain current, violation-free fire inspection reports.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered sustaining the suspension of CHC’s eligibility for the McKay Scholarships and CTC Scholarships programs and revoking CHC’s eligibility for the McKay Scholarships and CTC Scholarships programs. DONE AND ENTERED this 4th day of May, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S SUSAN B. HARRELL Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of May, 2009.
The Issue Whether the Respondent committed the violations alleged in the Administrative Complaint dated October 22, 2001, and, if so, the penalty that should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Based on the oral and documentary evidence presented at the final hearing and on the entire record of this proceeding, the following findings of fact are made: The Office of the State Fire Marshall is the governmental entity responsible for regulating fire safety in Florida, including the installation, maintenance, and inspection of fire protection systems. Section 633.01, Florida Statutes (2000). Mr. Cabrera is currently licensed by the State Fire Marshall as a Class C and D fire equipment dealer (Class 0703 and 0704) and as a fire extinguisher and preengineered systems permittee (Class 0903 and 0904).2 At the times material to this proceeding, Mr. Cabrera was issued preengineered systems permit number 435249000198. At the times material to this proceeding, Mr. Cabrera was the qualifier for A Fire Prevention Company, was authorized to act for the business organization in all matters connected with the business, and was required to supervise all activities undertaken by A Fire Prevention Company. A Fire Prevention Company has been in business since 1998. Prior to this time, a company referred to as "South Florida Fire" employed Mr. Cabrera. Mr. Cabrera currently holds, and, at the times material to this proceeding, held jointly with A Fire Prevention Company, a certificate qualifying A Fire Prevention Company to engage in business as a fire equipment dealer. At the times material to this proceeding, A Fire Prevention Company and Mr. Cabrera engaged in the business of servicing, repairing, recharging, testing, inspecting, and installing fire extinguishers and preengineered fire suppression systems. At the times material to this proceeding, Banner Beef and Seafood operated an industrial food processing facility in Miami, Florida. In the facility, meat and seafood moved through an industrial deep fat fryer on a conveyor belt and were then frozen, packaged, and sold for resale. An oil-heating unit, located in an alcove off the room containing the deep fryer, was attached to but separate from the deep fryer, and hot oil moved from the oil-heating unit through a filter into the deep fryer. The oil-heating unit held 200 gallons of oil, which was heated to 460 degrees Fahrenheit before flowing into the deep fryer. The oil-heating unit was made of stainless steel, with a stainless steel lid. The oil-heating unit was protected by a Kidde Sentinel HDR 25DC, DOT E-7042-360-K, Serial #33996, ("Kidde HDR 25DC") preengineered dry chemical fire protection system. On June 19, 2000, approximately three months after Mr. Cabrera performed a semi-annual inspection and maintenance of the Kidde HDR 25DC system, a fire originating in the oil- heating unit destroyed much of the Banner Beef facility. The Kidde HDR 25DC system was probably installed at Banner Beef in or around 1981. Mr. Cabrera was not involved in the installation of the system, but he began inspecting and maintaining the system approximately ten years before the fire. He occasionally performed the semi-annual inspection and maintenance of the Banner Beef system when he was employed by South Florida Fire, and he performed all of the semi-annual inspections and maintenance subsequent to March or July 1998, after he left South Florida Fire and established A Fire Prevention Company. Mr. Cabrera completed an inspection report and an invoice each time he inspected the Kidde HDR 25DC system. Mr. Cabrera was, however, able to produce to the State Fire Marshall only an invoice for a semi-annual inspection on October 5, 1998; an invoice and "Range Hood Inspection Report" for a semi-annual inspection on April 12, 1999; an invoice and "Range Hood Inspection Report" for a semi-annual inspection on September 27, 1999; and an invoice for a "semi-annual inspection and maintenance" on March 15, 2000. The Kidde HDR 25DC is a preengineered system, which means that components manufactured by Kidde were put together into a system designed to protect against a particular hazard. Kidde publishes a manual, bulletins, and memoranda that specify how the Kidde HDR 25DC system is to be installed, serviced, repaired, maintained, tested, and inspected. The Kidde HDR 25DC system was submitted to the Underwriters Laboratory ("UL") for testing. The system was found to be effective and to operate as specified, and the system and the manual for the system received UL approval. Once the system and manual received UL approval, the components of the system could not be changed except in accordance with the UL listing and the approved manufacturer's specifications. The Kidde HDR 25DC system uses a dry chemical as a fire suppressant. The NFPA Standard 17 contains requirements for the installation, maintenance, operation, and care of dry chemical fire suppression systems. The Kidde HDR 25DC system is approved by the UL to protect commercial cooking installations, specifically hoods, ducts, and cooking appliances. Cooking appliances are classified into two categories in the manufacturer's specifications, surface appliances and broilers; deep fryers are considered surface appliances. Commercial cooking installations are used in food preparation areas of restaurants. The oil-heating unit and deep fryer used by Banner Beef are considered industrial appliances because they were designed to process a high volume of food to be sold for resale rather than to be consumed on the premises. The Kidde HDR 25DC system was composed of several components, including a cylinder containing dry chemical fire suppressant under 360 pounds of pressure; a valve assembly attached to the cylinder; a manual release mechanism; an elbow mounting bracket that connected the cylinder to discharge piping; a nozzle attached to the discharge piping through which the dry chemical fire suppressant would be discharged on the hazard protected by the system; a fusible link designed to melt at a specified temperature; a control head, with a control head cover, that was attached to the cylinder valve assembly; cables running from the fusible link to the control head; electrical metal tubing protecting the cables; and corner pulleys that allowed the cables to change direction at a 90-degree angle. The Kidde HDR 25DC system was designed so that, when the fusible link melted, the cables would release, causing the system to actuate and discharge the dry chemical fire suppressant. Banner Beef's 200-gallon oil-heating unit protected by the Kidde HDR 25DC system was located in an alcove opening off of a larger room that housed the deep fryer. The cylinder containing the dry chemical fire suppressant was mounted on the outside wall of oil-heating unit, at the far end of the alcove, only a few inches away from oil that was maintained at 460 degrees Fahrenheit when the oil-heating unit was in operation. The oil-heating unit was turned off at the end of each workday, and the cylinder was regularly exposed to a cycle of high temperatures when the unit was in operation and cooler temperatures when it was not. Because it was attached to the hazard it was intended to protect, the cylinder would be exposed to any fire that originated in the oil-heating unit, and, in fact, the exterior of the cylinder at Banner Beef was damaged by the fire and covered in grease when it was inspected after the fire. NFPA Standard 17-8, Section 3-8.3, 1994 edition,3 specifies that "[t]he dry chemical container and expellant gas shall be located near the hazard or hazards protected, but not where they will be exposed to a fire or explosion in those areas." NFPA Standard 17-8, Section 3-8.3.1, provides that "[t]he dry chemical container and expellant gas assemblies shall be located so as not to be subjected to severe weather conditions or to mechanical, chemical, or other damage." The location of the cylinder at Banner Beef was not consistent with these NFPA requirements. A manual release handle, or manual pull station, is used to manually actuate the Kidde HDR 25DC system. At Banner Beef, the manual release handle was located on the far end of the oil-heating unit, at the top of the dry chemical cylinder and next to the controls used to operate the oil-heating unit. The means of exiting the alcove containing the oil-heating unit was through the room containing the deep fryer, although Banner Beef advised Mr. Cabrera that someone was always standing at the controls of the oil-heating unit whenever the unit was in operation. NFPA Standard 17-8 provides in pertinent part: 3-7 Operation and Control of Systems 3-7.1 Methods of Actuation. Systems shall be provided with both automatic and manual means of operation. 3-7.1.1 Operation of any manual actuator shall be all that is required to bring about the full operation of the system. At least one manual actuator shall be provided for each system. * * * 3-7.1.3 At least one manual actuator shall be located no more than 5 ft (1.5 m) above the floor and shall be convenient and easily accessible at all times, including the time of fire. Although only one manual actuator was required, the location of the manual release handle was not consistent with NFPA Standard 17-8, Section 3-7.1.3. The date of manufacture was stamped into the metal of the cylinder containing the dry chemical fire suppressant. The system's serial number and a United States Department of Transportation exemption code, DOT-7042, were also stamped into the metal of the cylinder. The Kidde Guidelines for Hydrostatic Retest & Qualification of Kidde Models HDR, IND, WHDR, and DRS- 700 System Cylinders provides that "[d]ry chemical and wet chemical agents, when super-pressurized with nitrogen, are classified as hazardous materials and must be shipped in DOT approved cylinders (containers). The United States Department of Transportation has jurisdiction during cylinder manufacturer, testing, marking, retest and shipment." According to the information contained in the Guidelines, Kidde cylinders manufactured under the DOT E-7042 exemption must be hydrostatically tested, using "the water jacket volumetric expansion method or the direct expansion method," at least every 12 years by a retester authorized by the United States Department of Transportation. According to the Guidelines, after the hydrostatic retest, the federal Department of Transportation requires that the cylinder must be stamped, "'plainly and permanently,'" with a marking that includes the date of the retest and the designation "3AL"; such a stamp is usually imprinted into the metal of the cylinder. The Guidelines include a warning, identified as such and set off from the rest of the text, that provides: "Use of pressure sensitive hydrostatic test labels, in lieu of stamping the cylinder, DOES NOT comply with the DOT requirements." (Emphasis in original.) Because the cylinder installed with the Kidde HDR 25DC system at Banner Beef was manufactured in 1981, the cylinder should have been hydrostatically tested in 1993. The cylinder did not, however, bear a permanent stamp with the "3AL" designation and the date of a hydrostatic test. Mr. Cabrera nonetheless reported on the Range Hood System Report dated April 12, 1999, that the system had been hydrostatically tested in April 1998, and he reported on the Range Hood System Report dated September 27, 1999, that the system had been hydrostatically tested and recharged in 1998. Mr. Cabrera obtained this information from labels carrying the name of South Florida Fire that were affixed to the outside of the cylinder; a few remnants of the labels remained on the outside of the cylinder after the fire. Pursuant to the federal DOT requirements and the manufacturer's specifications, Mr. Cabrera could not rely on these labels as proof that the cylinder had been subjected to hydrostatic testing. An examination of the cylinder after the fire revealed that the outlet valve on the cylinder and the elbow mounting bracket attached to the valve were completely blocked by a caked, rock-hard white substance, and the area around the cylinder's relief valve was also coated with white powder. In addition, there were chunks of hardened white powder loose in the discharge piping that connected the cylinder to the nozzle inside the oil-heating unit, although the discharge piping was not blocked. The white powder was identified as dry chemical fire suppressant, which had discharged from the cylinder but had not been discharged through the nozzle into the oil-heating unit because of the complete blockage of the valve outlet and elbow mounting bracket. Finally, there was a residue of what appeared to be grease in the discharge piping connected to the elbow mounting bracket. The manufacturer's specifications require that, at the semi-annual inspection of the Kidde HDR 25DC system, the person providing the maintenance should "[c]heck the discharge piping for obstructions. Remove cylinder and valve. Blow out piping with clean dry air or nitrogen." Mr. Cabrera blew out the piping with nitrogen to clear obstructions each time he performed a semi-annual inspection of the Banner Beef system. The discharge piping was clear when he completed the semi-annual inspection and maintenance on March 15, 2000. In the Banner Beef system, approximately six inches of discharge piping ran from the elbow mounting bracket through the exterior wall of the oil-heating unit, where it emerged just above the level of the oil when the oil-heating unit was full. The discharge nozzle for the system was attached to a portion of the pipe that extended a few inches into the oil-heating unit, where it would be exposed to grease splatter. The male coupling on the discharge nozzle should have threaded into a female coupling in the pipe. However, the inside of the pipe was not threaded to receive the nozzle, and it appeared that the person installing the system had "screwed" the nozzle into a smooth pipe. Because the seal was not tight, grease had accumulated on the threads of the nozzle, and the nozzle might have blown off if the system had actually discharged. There are four nozzle configurations available for the Kidde HDR 25DC system, two of which are relevant to this proceeding: The SP-2 nozzle is designed to protect the plenum4 and exhaust duct of a commercial cooking installation; the SW-2 nozzle is designed to protect surface cooking appliances. One SP-2 nozzle was used with the Kidde HDR 25DC system at Banner Beef, which was inconsistent with NFPA Standard 17-6, Section 2- 3.1, which requires that "[d]ischarge nozzles shall be listed for their intended use," and with the manufacturer's specifications for the system. First, there is no recognized nozzle configuration for the system using only one SP-2 nozzle. Second, the SP-2 nozzle was not appropriate for the Banner Beef system: Deep fryers are classified in the manufacturer's specifications as surface appliances, and the proper nozzle was the SW-2 nozzle. The discharge pattern of the SP-2 nozzle is horizontal, and, had the dry chemical fire suppressant actually been discharged through the nozzle into the oil-heating unit, the dry chemical would have blown across the surface of the hot grease; the SW-2 nozzle is designed to be installed above the appliance, so that its discharge pattern is vertical, with the spray distributed over the surface of the oil. Protective grease covers are required by the manufacturer's specifications and by NFPA Standard 17-6, Section 2-3.1.4, which provides: "Discharge nozzles shall be provided with blowoff caps or other suitable devices or material to prevent the entrance of moisture or other environmental materials into the piping. The protective device shall blow off, open, or blow out upon agent discharge." When Mr. Cabrera inspected the Banner Beef system in March 2000, a grease cover protected the discharge nozzle, but, after the fire, no grease cover for the nozzle could be located. In addition, an examination of the nozzle and discharge piping after the fire revealed grease build-up on the inside of the nozzle and in the discharge piping. Protective nozzle covers are easily lost; Mr. Cabrera had advised Banner Beef to call him if they needed a replacement cover, but he was never asked for a replacement cover. To the best of Mr. Cabrera's recollection, there was always a grease cover on the nozzle whenever he conducted his inspections of the system. A fusible link is designed to melt at a specific temperature, releasing cables that run from the fusible link to a control head attached to the dry chemical cylinder; this is the means by which the system is actuated. The fusible link of the Kidde HDR 25DC system at Banner Beef was located in the duct venting the oil-heating unit to the roof. The invoice for the September 27, 1999, semi-annual inspection at Banner Beef reflects that Mr. Cabrera replaced the 500-degree fusible link in the Kidde HDR 25DC system. He used the 500-degree link because the oil-heating unit heated the oil to 460 degrees Fahrenheit. The manufacturer's specifications provide that "[t]he fusible link assembly . . . is used to detect excessive temperatures in the area above cooking appliances and in the duct. The actuation temperature is 360ºF (182ºC). For higher temperatures use a 500ºF quartzoid bulb, or fusible link." The manufacturer's specifications also provide: The exposure temperature is the maximum temperature to which a fusible link may be exposed for any period of time, no matter how short. After reaching the exposure temperature, the link will eventually release even though it may never reach the rating temperature. WARNING: To avoid accidental system discharge, a temperature survey must be made of all locations where the fusible link will be installed. Links must have an exposure temperature rating above the maximum peak survey temperature. The maximum exposure temperature for any fusible link is 300ºF. If the peak survey temperature is above 300º F, use a quartzoid bulb link. (Emphasis in original.) Only two fusible links were available for the Kidde HDR 25DC system, a fusible link with a rating temperature of 350 degrees Fahrenheit and a maximum exposure temperature of 300 degrees Fahrenheit and a quartzoid bulb, also referred to as a fusible link, with a rating temperature of 500 degrees Fahrenheit and a maximum exposure temperature of 475 degrees Fahrenheit. The exposure temperature at the location of the fusible link is not known, but the convected heat in the duct over the oil-heating unit, where the fusible link was installed, would not have reached the 460-degree temperature of the oil. However, the fusible link was installed only six inches above the maximum level of the oil in the oil-heating unit, and, had the 350-degree fusible link been used, it would have continually actuated the system. Pursuant to the manufacturer's specifications, the fusible link on the system should have been mounted using Kidde fusible-link brackets. The fusible link installed on the Banner Beef system was housed in a welded metal bracket fabricated by whoever installed the system. The fusible link is connected to the system's control head by a system of cables. The manufacturer's specifications require that the fusible link be attached to the cables using Kidde cable crimps crimped with a Kidde crimping tool. Mr. Cabrera did not use either a Kidde cable crimp or a Kidde crimping tool when he installed the new fusible link on the Banner Beef system during the September 27, 1999, inspection. The manufacturer's specifications require that the cables connecting the control head to the fusible link be "housed and protected by 1/2-inch electrical metal tubing." The portion of the cable running on the outside of the oil-heating unit, from the control head mounted near the cylinder into the exterior wall of the oil-heating unit was housed in electrical metal tubing; that portion of the cable running inside the oil- heating unit, from the fusible link to the exterior wall of the oil-heating unit, was not housed in electrical metal tubing but was left bare. According to the manufacturer's specification, all cable in the Kidde HDR 25DC system must run either horizontally or vertically. Consequently, corner pulleys are used to make 90-degree changes in direction. Three corner pulleys were used in the Banner Beef system; one was manufactured by Kidde, but two were manufactured by Pyro-Chem. In addition, the first corner pulley was clogged with grease, indicating that the system was not properly maintained. The cables leading from the fusible link are attached to a control head, and the system actuates when the fusible link melts and the cables are released. A cover plate protects the control head, and is attached to the control head with five screws. Kidde Field Memo #84-8, provides as follows: When installing the cover plate on any preengineered system control head, remember to install all five cover screws. The fifth screw that attaches to the hex post just above the local manual release handle is important for the stability of the cover plate when operating the handle. Leaving out the fifth screw could cause movement of the cover plate and render the local manual release handle inoperative. . . . Three of the five screw holes on the control head cover plate recovered from Banner Beef were covered with grease; only two of the five screw holes were clean. This indicates that the cover plate was attached to the control head by only two screws at the time of the fire. Mr. Cabrera did not note any discrepancies or deficiencies in the Kidde HDR 25DC system installed at Banner Beef in the inspection reports that he completed after his April 12, 1999, and September 27, 1999, inspections, which were the only reports provided to the State Fire Marshall and introduced into evidence at the final hearing. In these two reports, Mr. Cabrera checked the "Yes" boxes for the following items, among others: All appliances properly covered w/ correct nozzles System installed in accordance w/ MFG UL listing Inspect cylinder and mount Clean nozzles Check fuse links and clean Piping and conduit securely bracketed System operational & seals in place Clean cylinder and mount Mr. Cabrera signed the two reports, thereby certifying that "[o]n this date, the above system was tested and inspected in accordance with procedures of the presently adopted editions of NFPA Standard 17, 17A, 96 and the manufacturer's manual and was operated according to these procedures with results indicated above." The licensure files maintained by the State Fire Marshall for A Fire Prevention Company indicated that the company's insurance policy with Frontier Insurance Company expired on March 25, 2000. Mr. Cabrera testified, however, that the company did have insurance at the time of the fire, and this testimony is unrefuted. Summary The State Fire Marshall's expert witnesses disagreed as to whether the system could have controlled the fire had it functioned properly. They each conceded, however, that all components of the system functioned perfectly and actuated the system. They attributed the sole cause of the system's failure to the blockage in the valve outlet and elbow mounting bracket that prevented the dry chemical fire suppressant from discharging out of the cylinder. The State Fire Marshall's experts and Mr. Cabrera agreed that the cause of the blockage was dry chemical in the cylinder valve assembly and elbow mounting bracket that had hardened into a rock-hard substance. All of the State Fire Marshall's experts and Mr. Cabrera agreed that the chemical hardened as a result of its coming into contact with a significant amount of moisture and/or grease. No one, however, provided a satisfactory explanation of the time within which the chemical would have hardened after it came into contact with the moisture and/or grease. In Mr. Cabrera's opinion, the blockage was caused when grease and/or moisture entered the system at the time of the fire and caused the dry chemical to immediately harden. On the other hand, the State Fire Marshall's expert witnesses opined that the moisture and/or grease causing the blockage of the cylinder valve outlet and elbow mounting bracket did not necessarily accumulate in the system over an extended period of time but, rather, could have been introduced into the system all at once. They also agreed that the dry chemical would harden gradually over time and that the blockage was probably present at the time Mr. Cabrera performed the March 2000 inspection. However, none of the State Fire Marshall's experts provided a persuasive basis to support a finding that the blockage had been present in the system at the time Mr. Cabrera inspected the system in March 2000, and the evidence is, therefore, insufficient to establish with the requisite degree of certainty that Mr. Cabrera should have discovered the blockage when he performed the inspection and maintenance in March 2000. The evidence presented by the State Fire Marshall is likewise not sufficient to establish that Mr. Cabrera deviated from the requirements of the manufacturer's specifications by installing a 500-degree fusible link in the system in September 1999. The evidence presented by the State Fire Marshall is, however, sufficient to establish clearly and convincingly that the Kidde HDR 25DC preengineered fire protection system installed at Banner Beef was not designed to protect an industrial oil-heating unit containing approximately 200 gallons of hot oil, that the system was not installed in accordance with the manufacturer's specifications, that the system contained parts that were not manufactured by Kidde, that the system was not properly maintained with respect to the build-up of grease in and around the discharge nozzle and in the corner pulleys, and that Mr. Cabrera did not use the appropriate crimp and crimping tool when he replaced the fusible link in September 1997. The evidence presented by the State Fire Marshall is also sufficient to establish clearly and convincingly that Mr. Cabrera did not provide the State Fire Marshall with proof of insurance subsequent to March 25, 2000, although the evidence is insufficient to establish that he did not, in fact, have insurance coverage subsequent to that time. Finally, the evidence presented by the State Fire Marshall is sufficient to establish with the requisite degree of certainty that the reports Mr. Cabrera prepared following his semi-annual inspections in April and September 1999 did not accurately reflect the condition of the system and did not include a statement of the system's deficiencies. In addition, Mr. Cabrera's failure to provide the State Fire Marshall with copies of the inspection reports for the semi-annual inspections he performed on the Kidde HDR 25DC system at Banner Beef for the three years prior to the fire supports the inference that he failed to retain copies of the inspection reports in his records. However, Mr. Cabrera's testimony that he always prepared the necessary reports is uncontroverted.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the State Fire Marshall enter a final order: Finding Hector Cabrera and A Fire Prevention Company guilty of having violated Sections 633.061(9), 633.065(1)(c), 633.065(2), 633.071(1), and 633.162(4)(c) and (e), Florida Statutes (2000), as well as Rules 4A-21.302 and 4A-21.304(1) and (2), Florida Administrative Code; and Suspending the licenses and permits of Hector Cabrera and A Fire Prevention Company for a period of two years, pursuant to Section 633.162(1) and (4), Florida Statutes (2000). DONE AND ENTERED this 25th day of June, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. PATRICIA HART MALONO Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of June, 2002.
Findings Of Fact At all times, material to this case, Petitioner has been licensed by the Department to operate an adult congregate living facility (ACLF) which is located at 6200 West Fairfield Drive, Pensacola, Florida, and is known as the Warrington House. Francis Cooper is the sole shareholder and operator of the Warrington House. Prior to 1984, the Warrington House was known as the Heritage House and was owned by a Mr. Mitchell. Sometime in 1984, Mr. Mitchell was criminally charged with elderly abuse on his residents and the Heritage House went into receivership. Another branch of HRS who was represented by Esther Ward, asked Ms. Francis Cooper to take over the facility. HRS was apparently well satisfied with Ms. Cooper's qualifications in running an ACLF since she had another such facility. When Ms. Cooper took over the Heritage House the electrical power to the facility was about to be turned off. Only by Ms. Cooper's pleading with Gulf Power was that circumstance forestalled. There were only thirteen (13) patients at the facility out of the sixteen (16) that were supposed to have been there. Three (3) of the patients had been mysteriously removed during the night. The residents that were at the house could not identify themselves and very few resident records were at the facility. The building was infested with roaches, there was raw sewage in the yard and the sewage system was completely blocked to the extent that sewage came up through the showers when a toilet was flushed. There was urine in every carpet. None of the appliances in the house worked. There were no air conditioners, fans or plastic dishes. The floors were in bad shape. In fact, Ms. Cooper fell through two of the bathroom floors. When Ms. Cooper questioned HRS representatives about the appalling conditions of the facility, she received no responsive answer. After Ms. Cooper had taken over the facility, she discovered that Mr. Mitchell had absconded with three months advance rent from the residents. Ms. Cooper, therefore, had to operate the premises for three months without income from the residents that were there. She used her own money. Ms. Cooper started with the air conditioning, flooring and carpeting. All these items were replaced. The bathrooms were tiled and additional bathrooms were added. She put in a $6,000.00 sewage system, a lift station and paid $1,000.00 to hook the building onto city sewage. She also brought in an exterminator to get rid of the bugs. All of this took place over a period of two years wherein Ms. Cooper worked diligently to bring the building up to "snuff." In fact, in the time since she has had the facility she has accomplished wonders in improving conditions at the house. These conditions clearly did not appear overnight, but over several years and were apparently overlooked by Respondent until the crisis with Mr. Mitchell had occurred. Ms. Cooper went into the house with the understanding that the corporation would eventually build another facility and close what had become the Warrington House. The reason for the new construction was that the current building, regardless of the amount of repair, was still an old building not worth maintaining and which was allowed to deteriorate badly prior to her stewardship. However, due to a falling out with her brother, who was then a co- shareholder of the corporation, Ms. Cooper was unable to complete her plans for moving the residents of the Warrington House to a new facility. She continues to attempt to obtain financing to build a new facility. At least once a year, HRS does a full survey on a ACLF like the Warrington House. A full survey is simply an inspection of the property in order to determine the degree of compliance with HRS rules and regulations. Upon completing the inspection, the inspector goes through an exit briefing with the ACLF's management. During the exit briefing, the inspector will go over any deficiencies he or she has discovered and attempt to establish mutually agreeable correction dates. The inspector also explains that these time periods are the best estimates that they can come up with at that point to allow a reasonable amount of time for the required corrections to be made. If any problems should arise, the inspector requests that the manager communicate with his or her office and ask for an extension. Extensions are not always forthcoming. After the full survey inspection is done, a follow-up visit is normally scheduled to determine whether the earlier cited deficiencies have been corrected. If, after the follow-up survey there are items that are still not corrected, the inspector will explain to the person in charge that they are subject to administrative action and that he or she will report he facility's noncompliance to his or her office. Whether or not administrative action is taken is determined at a level above the inspector. However, it appears that the customary practice of the office is to pursue an administrative fine for any noncompliance after the correction date has been passed. After the first follow-up survey has been made it depends on the particular factual situation whether or not further follow-up surveys are made until compliance is achieved. If there are efforts being made to correct the problems further follow-up surveys will be made. If not, further follow-up surveys may not be made. In this case, James Temkin, an HRS Fire Protection Specialist, performed a full survey fire safety inspection on the Warrington House on September 24, 1986. During that survey, he cited 11 deficiencies. Various compliance dates were established for the deficiencies. A follow-up survey was conducted by Mr. Temkin on January 14, 1987. During that survey, he noted that 6 of the previously cited deficiencies had not been corrected. He recommended administrative action on all the uncorrected deficiencies. The six remaining uncorrected deficiencies were as follows: No up to date fire plan and the July 7th fire drills were not documented; No fire alarm test since July 1986 and fire alarm zones were not shown on the actuator panel; Smoke detectors not working in four (4) rooms; Exit sign lights burned out at the front and center exits, emergency lights not working at the front, rear and upstairs exit halls; Sleeping rooms had hollow core doors; and There was no documentation of fire safety on the wood paneling and tile ceilings on the first and second floors. All other deficiencies cited during the September 24, 1986 full survey were corrected. As to the alleged deficiencies contained in the latter half of (b) and (c)-(f) above, none appear at any point in HRS' rules governing ACLF's. Supposedly, these deficiencies are cited in the NFPA life safety code, which is incorporated by reference in the Fire Marshal's rule on ACLF's, Rule 4A-40, Florida Administrative Code. The 1984 version of Rule 4A-40, Florida Administrative Code is incorporated by reference in HRS' rule, Rule 10A-5, Florida Administrative Code. Both HRS' rule and the Fire Marshal's rule are contained in the Florida Administrative Code. However, the 1984 version of NFPA is nowhere to be found in the Administrative Code. The current Fire Marshal's rule adopts portions of the 1985 NFPA life safety code. However, the HRS' rule adopts the 1984 version of the Fire Marshal's rule. No showing was made by Respondent as to what the 1984 version of the NFPA code contained. The HRS inspector's testimony regarding a particular deficiency's inclusion in the NFPA cannot be relied on since both inspectors apparently used the 1985 version of the NFPA which is not the 1984 version included in HRS's rule. Without proof of the contents of the NFPA, HRS has failed to prove any deficiencies for which it may take administrative actions. As to the other deficiencies, attempts to comply were in fact made by the Warrington House. The facility's personnel in fact thought they had complied with HRS' desires based upon previous inspections. However, for one reason or another, these attempts were rejected by the HRS inspector and the deficiency was cited again, but because of another reason. The lack of an up- to-date fire plan (cited in (a) above) was met by the Warrington House when they obtained a fire plan prior to the established correction date from another arm of HRS responsible for devising such plans. However, upon the January 14th follow-up inspection, the plan obtained from HRS by Petitioner was considered insufficient in that it did not outline staff responsibilities during a fire. The same thing occurred with the lack of fire alarm tests, cited in the latter part of (a) and the first part of (b) above. The Warrington House obtained the testing document and test from another branch of HRS responsible for such testing. However, the inspector at the follow up survey did not deem his own agency's testing documents sufficient since it did not show a different type sending unit was being tested at least once a year. 1/ These are simply not repeat deficiencies since in each instance the earlier grievance had been met and it was another grievance which cropped up. On July 9, 1987, a second follow-up survey to the Temkin September 24, 1986, full survey was performed by O.B. Walton, an HRS fire safety inspector. The evidence was not clear as to any remaining uncorrected deficiencies, if any, he found. Therefore, Respondent failed to establish any repetitive deficiencies as a result of the July 9 follow-up survey. Apparently, however, Mr. Walton, did perform another full survey on July 9, 1987. Several additional deficiencies were cited by him. A follow-up visit was conducted by Mr. Walton on October 23, 1987. Four alleged deficiencies remained uncorrected as follows: Ceiling not repaired in hot water heater closet, i.e. not taped; Kitchen fire door latch was jammed open so it would not latch, but it would stay closed; Plug by hot water heater had no cover; No documentation that drapes were fire retardant. Again, none of the above alleged deficiencies appear in HRS' rules or in the fire marshal's rule and a reasonable person could not glean from any of the other provisions contained in HRS' rules that the above conditions might be included in these provisions. The lack of clarity or uniformity in interpretation of HRS' rules is especially born out in this case since two different inspectors while inspecting the same building cited different deficiencies under their respective interpretation of the rules. When the experts differ it is difficult to see how a reasonable lay person could even begin to know or understand the contents of HRS or the Fire Marshal's rules. This lack is especially true since the relevant contents of the 1984 NFPA life safety code are not contained in the Florida Administrative Code and were not demonstrated by HRS. HRS, therefore, failed to prove any repeat deficiencies from the October 23, 1987 follow-up survey. A third fire safety follow-up visit was conducted by Pat Reid, a human services program analyst, on January 21, 1988. She has no expertise or license to perform fire safety inspections. She found all of the earlier cited uncorrected deficiencies corrected except for the documentation on the drapes. That alleged deficiency was partially corrected since Petitioner was replacing the drapery with metal blinds. However, as indicated earlier the lack of documentation for fire retardant drapes was not proven to be a violation by Respondent. Ms. Reid had previously conducted a full survey of Petitioner on August 17 and 18, 1987 in her area of expertise operation and general maintenance of an ACLF. Several deficiencies were cited and correction dates were established. Ms. Reid conducted a follow-up survey to the August 17 and 18 full survey on October 23, 1987. The following alleged deficiencies had not been corrected: Facility staff do not have documentation of being free of communicable diseases; The physical examination (Health Assessment) of resident identified as M. B. does not indicate that the resident is free from communicable disease; Broken or cracked window panes in windows of second floor exit door, both first floor bathrooms nearest kitchen, and resident rooms identified as C. W., W. S., and W. L.; Shower tile missing in second floor bathroom nearest exit door; Linoleum of first floor bathroom is loose as well as badly stained with cigarette burns; Hole in wall next to sink and toilet of second floor bathroom nearest exit door and square hole in wall of second floor blue bathroom; Faucet of first floor bathroom is loose; Carpeting in first floor resident room (#7) is badly stained; Three vinyl chairs in dining room have tears, exposing foam padding; Second floor bathroom faucet nearest exit does not clearly distinguish between hot and cold water taps. As to the alleged deficiency contained in (a) above, the regulations do not contain a requirement that any documentation be kept regarding staff members being free of communicable disease. The regulations only require that the facility administrator assure that staff is free of communicable disease. The evidence showed that Petitioner had in fact assured that the staff was free of communicable disease. Therefore, no violation occurred. The alleged deficiency cited in (b) above does constitute a violation of Rules 10-5.081(1)(b), (2)(a)4.d., and (2)(b), Florida Administrative Code. However, in this instance, there are several mitigating circumstances. Foremost is the fact that Petitioner attempted on several occasions to obtain this information from another arm of HRS who had M. B. under its care prior to his admission to Petitioner's facility and had actually failed to complete M. B.'s Health Assessment form properly. Petitioner received many assurances from HRS that it would obtain and forward the information. HRS failed to do so. Moreover, after several years of M. B. living at the Warrington House and after several years of HRS care prior to his admission, common sense would dictate that M. B. is free of communicable diseases. Petitioner has in fact received confirmation of that fact from an examining physician who certified M. B. free of communicable diseases. 2/ As to (c) above, the evidence showed that the windows were only cracked and not broken. No evidence was presented as to the severity of the cracks. Cracked windows are not included in Rule 10A-5.022(a), Florida Administrative Code, which only addresses broken window panes. Moreover, cracked windows without proof of the severity of the cracks is not sufficient evidence of the lack of good repair or other hazardous conditions similar to those listed in Rule 10A-5.022(a), Florida Administrative Code. The Rule requires proof of the hazardous nature of such a condition. Cracked windows are not hazardous in and of themselves and no showing was made that these cracked panes constituted a hazard. Nor do cracked window panes standing alone constitute a violation of Rule 10A-5.022(d). The rule requires evidence that such cracked panes are unreasonably unattractive and no showing was made that the cracks were unreasonably unattractive. Likewise, the missing shower tile in (d) above fails to constitute a violation of Rule 10A-5.022(a) since the deficiency is not listed, and no showing was made that the missing tile constituted a hazardous condition. Similarly, the missing tile, by itself, does not constitute a violation under Rule 10A-5.022(d) since no showing was made that the missing tile was unreasonably unattractive. The same failure of proof occurs with the alleged deficiencies listed in (e), (f), (g), (h) and (i). See Rules 10A-5.022(c), (e) and (i). The alleged deficiency cited in (j) above does constitute a violation of 10A-5.023(9)(e). However, the violation was not repeated after October 1, 1987, the effective date of Section 400.414(2)(d), Florida Statutes. Ms. Reid conducted a second follow-up survey to the August 17 and 18 full survey when she performed the fire safety follow-up on January 21, 1988. All previously cited deficiencies had been corrected except for: Facility staff do not have documentation of being free of communicable diseases. The physical examination (Health Assessment) of resident identified as M. B. does not indicate that the resident is free from communicable diseases. The following maintenance problems exist: broken or cracked window panes in windows of second floor exit door, both first floor bathrooms and resident room identified as W. S. A third follow-up was conducted by Ms. Reid on April 15, 1988. All the previously cited deficiencies had been corrected except for: The physical examination (Health Assessment) of resident identified as M. B. does not indicate that the resident is free from communicable disease. Broken or cracked window panes in windows of second floor exit door, both first floor bathrooms nearest kitchen, and resident rooms identified as C. W., W. S., and W. L.; Shower tile missing in second floor bathroom nearest exit door; Linoleum of first floor bathroom is loose as well as badly stained with cigarette burns; Hole in wall next to sink and toilet of second floor bathroom nearest exit door and square hole in wall of second floor blue bathroom. All of the alleged deficiencies cited in the January 21, 1988 follow- up and the April 15, 1988 follow-up survey were carried forward from the alleged deficiencies discussed above, cited in the October 23, 1987 follow-up survey. The same findings are made as to the alleged deficiencies which were carried forward. Only the physical health assessment of M. B. was cited by Respondent and shown to be a repeated deficiency since the information was not obtained by the established correction dates occurring after October 1, 1987. By the date of the hearing all the above alleged deficiencies had been corrected. Respondent notified Petitioner that it proposed to deny renewal of Petitioner's license to operate the Warrington House on December 23, 1987. The basis for the denial was Section 400.414(1) and (2)(d) which states: 400.414 Denial, revocation, or suspension of license; imposition of administrative fine; grounds. The department may deny, revoke or suspend a license or impose an administrative fine in the manner provided in chapter 120. Any of the following actions by a facility or its employee shall be grounds for action by the department against a licensee: * * * (d) Multiple and repeated violations of this part or of minimum standards or rules adopted pursuant to this part. The language of Subsection (d) was added to Section 400.414 F.S. on October 1, 1987. Prior to that date Respondent had no authority to take punitive action against the license of an ACLF licensee for multiple and repeated violations of Respondent's statutes and rules. The only action Respondent could take against a facility for such violations was in the form of a civil fine the amount of which could be raised if the violation was repetitive. Section 400.426, Florida Statutes. No multiple violations were shown by the evidence through the April 15, 1988 follow-up survey. More importantly, however, no multiple violations were shown by Respondent after October 1, 1987, the effective date of the statutory language at issue in this case. No showing was made by Respondent as to any legislative intent that the statute operate retrospectively. The statute operates only prospectively. Therefore, any alleged deficiencies cited prior to October 1, 1987 are irrelevant for purposes of imposing the punishment contemplated under Section 400.414, Florida Statutes.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services renew Petitioner's license. DONE and ENTERED this 9th day of November, 1988, in Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE CLEAVINGER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of November, 1988.
The Issue Petitioner, Danny Rhoda, has applied for eligibility to take the competency examination for licensing as a fire protection system Contractor IV. The issue in this proceeding is whether Mr. Rhoda’s application should be approved.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby, RECOMMENDED that the Department of Insurance enter its Final Order denying Danny D. Rhoda’s application for eligibility to take the Contractor IV licensing examination. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 7th day of January, 1997. MARY CLARK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of January, 1997. COPIES FURNISHED: Danny D. Rhoda Post Office Box 232 Fruitland Park, Florida 34731 Lisa S. Santucci, Esquire Division of Legal Services 612 Larson Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0333 Daniel Y. Sumner, Esquire General Counsel Department of Insurance & Treasurer The Capitol, LL-26 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Bill Nelson State Treasurer and Insurance Commissioner The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3000
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Petitioner’s application for certification as a firesafety inspector should be granted.
Findings Of Fact The Department is the state agency responsible for the certification of firesafety inspectors in the State of Florida pursuant to Chapter 633, Florida Statutes (2009).1 In September 2008, Mr. Bates completed his coursework for certification as a firesafety inspector. In November 2008, Mr. Bates submitted an application for certification as a firesafety inspector. Sometime between November 19, 2008, and December 5, 2008, the Department notified Mr. Bates that the Department did not have a copy of his high school diploma and the certificate showing that course work for the building construction for the fire service had been completed. On December 5, 2008, the Department received documentation showing that Mr. Bates had graduated from high school and had completed the course work for the building construction for the fire service. Scheduling a time to take the firesafety inspector examination can be done online by going to the Pearson Vue testing center website and entering the ID and password provided by the Bureau. Mr. Bates attempted to schedule the examination by telephone and was unsuccessful, but he did not attempt to schedule the examination online. Sometime during January or February 2009, Mr. Bates was able to obtain a date for the examination. Mr. Bates took the examination for firesafety inspector certification for the first time on February 13, 2009. A passing score on the examination was 70 percent. The Bureau sent a notice to Mr. Bates that his score was 56 percent. The notice of the test results advised that he could retake the examination within six months of his test date of February 13, 2009, and that he could review his test questions by contacting the Promissor at www.promissor.com. On April 3, 2009, Mr. Bates contacted Charles Brush, who was the standards supervisor for the Bureau, to schedule a review of his examination taken in February. Mr. Brush was responsible for the testing for certifications and renewals issued by the Bureau. Due to miscommunications with the Bureau, Pearson Vue testing center, and Mr. Bates, Mr. Bates was not scheduled for a review of his examination until May 2009. Mr. Bates reviewed his examination in May 2009; however, after he had gone through the examination one time, he was not allowed to again review the examination. This restriction on the review process is designed to prevent applicants from memorizing questions from the examination. Many of the questions on the examination may be used again in another examination. Because of the communication issues concerning the test review, Mr. Brush gave Mr. Bates an open-ended time extension to retake the examination. Sometime between February 13, 2009, and June 27, 2009, Mr. Bates took a weekend course to practice for the examination. On June 27, 2009, Mr. Bates retook the firesafety inspector examination and again scored 56 percent, which was a failing score. The notice of the test results provided that “[s]hould you fail the retest or waive your right to a retest, the only way to obtain certification is retake the course(s) required, submit a new application for approval, and pass the certification examination.” Mr. Bates does not contest the scores that he received on the examinations. He contends that he should be entitled to be certified as a firesafety inspector due to the amount of time that passed between the completion of his coursework in September 2008 and the taking of the examinations in February and June 2009. He was not able to retain coursework information from September 2008, when he completed his courses, until February 2009, when he first took the test.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered denying Mr. Bates’ request that he be certified as a firesafety inspector. DONE AND ENTERED this 20th day of April, 2010, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S SUSAN B. HARRELL Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of April, 2010.
