The Issue The issues presented for decision herein are whether or not the Respondent's physician license number ME 0034228 should be disciplined based on allegations set forth hereinafter in detail, that he violated various provisions of Section 458.331, Florida Statutes, as set forth in the consolidated administrative complaints filed under DOAH Case Numbers 83-1819 and 84-3052, as amended.
Findings Of Fact Based on my observation of the witnesses and their demeanor while testifying, documentary evidence received and the entire record compiled herein, I hereby make the following relevant factual findings. Respondent is a licensed physician and has been issued license number ME 0034228 in the State of Florida. Between December 31, 1981, and at least December 1982, Respondent's license to practice medicine was placed on inactive status because of nonpayment of licensing fees. (Petitioner's Exhibit 10 and TR page 31) During the above-referenced time periods, Respondent performed or aided in the performance of medical abortions in Miami, Florida, including ones relating to Janet Lee Miller, Myrtha Baptiste, and Yvonne Bruno. (TR pages 326- 347 and 350- 377) On dates that Respondent performed or assisted in the performance of medical abortions previously mentioned, Respondent did not have an active license to practice medicine in the State of Florida. Myrtha Baptiste died following an abortion. In conjunction with criminal investigations of the death of Myrtha Bactiste, Respondent was interviewed by Nelson Andreu, a homicide detective with the City of Miami Police Department and George Sanchez, who was then an investigator with the State Attorney's Office. During the course of those interviews, Respondent advised Andreu and Sanchez that he had personally mailed in the items required for renewal of his license and that, as far as he knew, his license was valid. Megaly Lorenzo, a secretary in the Santa Rosa Medical Center where Respondent worked in 1981 and 1982, testified that Respondent gave Lorenzo his renewal fees in cash for 1982. Lorenzo did not renew Respondent's license because she forgot to. She informed Respondent of that omission during 1983. (TR pages 309-312) When Megaly Lorenzo renewed a license, she received a wallet-sized license from the Board of Medical Examiners which was then placed in the mirror in the offices at the Santa Rosa Medical Center. Between approximately January 15, 1981 and December 1982, Respondent worked as a physician at the Women's Care Center located at 5601 Biscayne Boulevard, Miami, Florida. At times material hereto, Hipolito Barreiro was the owner and director of Women's Care Center. At all times material hereto, Hipolito Barreiro was not licensed to practice medicine in the State of Florida. (Petitioner's Exhibit 3 and testimony of Elaine Prater, TR page 268) Between approximately January 15, 1981, and December 1982, Barreiro was engaged in the practice of medicine at the Women's Care Center located at 5601 Biscayne Boulevard, Miami, Florida. During the relevant time period, Hipolito Barreiro performed various procedures which constitute the practice of medicine. As example, during February 1982, Barreiro inserted an intrauterine contraceptive device into Carmen Moses' cervix. In July 1982, Barreiro gave Patricia Humbert an injection and later performed an abortion on Humbert. In September 1982, Barreiro performed a gynecological examination on Etta Annette Brown to determine the status of her pregnancy. In December, 1982, Respondent performed a vaginal examination on Debra Plez confirming the fact that Plez was 6 1/2 months pregnant. Barreiro gave Plez a prescription, placed an IV in Plez's arm and finally performed an abortion on her (Plez). Elaine Prater, an employee at the Women's Care Center, observed Barreiro perform abortions on several occasions while Respondent was employed as a physician at the Women's Care Center. Respondent would sign patient charts as the physician performing the abortion when, in fact, the abortion was performed by Barreiro. These occurrences would usually take place in those instances where Respondent either arrived at work late or left work early. Additionally, it was noted that Respondent maintained a separate list of those patients on whom he performed an abortion and those patients for whom he had not operated or aborted. Ms. Prater acknowledged that Respondent was confronted on several occasions by her (Prater) and Trudy Ellis about his practice of signing charts for those patients whose abortions he had not performed. Finally, Respondent admitted to Roger Stefins that he knew that Barreiro was not licensed to practice medicine in Florida. Also, evidence reveals that Respondent confronted Barreiro on more than one occasion asking, "Haven't I told you not to examine girls before?" (TR page 80) As stated, Respondent maintained a separate list of patients on whom he had performed abortions for his own use. (See Petitioner's Exhibits 3 and 4) On several occasions, Respondent was presented "physician's reports of the termination," for abortions performed by Barreiro and was asked to sign the reports as a "physician" performing the termination. Respondent signed these reports even though he knew that the actual abortions had been performed by Barreiro. (TR pages 269-275) Respondent knew, or should have known, that the abortions had been performed by Barreiro as he was on duty, and because the patients would already be in the recovery room when he (Respondent) arrived for work. (TR page 278) During May 1982, Yvonne Bruno, a twenty-eight year old Haitian woman, went to the Women's Care Center for the purpose of having an abortion performed. Initially, Bruno went to the Women's Care Center on May 4, 1982, with $160. She was told to come back to the Center on the following Saturday, May 8, 1982, with $200. Bruno was not examined during that initial visit. On May 8, 1982, Ms. Bruno returned for the purpose of having an abortion. She only had $190. After arriving at the clinic, Bruno changed into a paper gown. Bruno signed several papers on May 8, 1982. One such paper was a sheet entitled, "Important Information Which Every Patient Should Know Concerning The Termination Of Pregnancy Procedure," which was a form maintained by the Women's Care Center. On the information sheet, Bruno's last menstrual period was listed as January 23, 1982. The appointment date for Bruno's abortion was listed on the information sheet as "5-9-82." In addition to the information sheet, Bruno also signed a form giving her consent for the Respondent to perform a pelvic examination. The consent form bore the date "5-8-82." Finally, Bruno signed a "Patient Information And Medical History" form which was dated May 9, 1982. (Petitioner's Exhibit 8) On May 8, 1982, Respondent performed an abortion on Bruno, using the dilation and aspiration method, followed by curretage. During the course of the abortion, Bruno's uterus was perforated. Respondent knew that Bruno's uterus was perforated almost immediately following perforation. (Petitioner's Exhibits 3, 4, 8, 9 and testimony of Pedro Ramos) On the physician's report of the termination, the term of Yvonne Bruno's pregnancy was listed as twelve (12) weeks. The form indicated that the termination was performed on May 9, 1982. Examination of the facts reveal that this was incorrect. The physician's report of the termination for Bruno indicated that the following complications occurred: "Complications: After aspirations with vacuum, the use of curette reveals perforation of uterus. We stop the operation and the patient is taken to the hospital." The physician's report of the termination for Bruno was signed by Respondent. (Petitioner's Exhibit 8) Ms. Bruno awoke after the abortion and was put in the recovery room. She was cold and experienced stomach pain more severe than she ever experienced before. The pain was persistent. Bruno informed the doctor who performed the abortion that she was having pains while she was still in the recovery room at the Women's Care Center. (TR pages 360-362) While Bruno was in the recovery room, the doctor who performed the abortion told Bruno that she has something in her uterus and that he (the doctor) had cleaned it out. He told Bruno that if she felt any more pain to call him, regardless of time. He also gave Bruno the telephone numbers for his house and the clinic. (TR pages 361, 362) Ms. Bruno remained at the Women's Care Center in the recovery room only long enough for a taxi to arrive. Immediately upon being taken to the recovery room, her friend, Amelia Ingrid Previle, called for a taxi. Bruno was in the recovery room less than an hour. While in the recovery room, Ms. Bruno's condition was not monitored. That is, no one took her blood pressure, respiration or pulse rates. (TR pages 363, 364 and 367-370) When the taxi arrived, Ms. Bruno left the Women's Care Center unable to walk because "her feet were so heavy." Therefore, the taxi driver and her friend, Previle, had to help Bruno to her friend's car. (TR pages 362, 363) It took Ms. Bruno approximately 15 minutes to get home from the Women's Care Center. When she arrived home, she felt intense pain which she credited to the fact that perhaps she had not eaten before she went to the Center. She drank tea and put some ice on her stomach. Bruno's pain intensified and her friend, Previle, started trying to contact Respondent in the late afternoon on May 8, 1982, by phone. Previle continued to try to contact the doctor until the early morning on May 9, 1982. When Previle finally contacted the doctor, Bruno was directed to come to the Women's Care Center. Bruno did so and, upon arrival at the Women's Care Center, she was given a pill. She was then taken to American Hospital in Miami, Florida. At approximately 6:30 a.m. on May 9, 1982, Hipolito Barreiro contacted Pedro M. Ramos, a physician specializing in gynecology and informed him that he had an abortion clinic. Barreiro also told Ramos that "they" thought that "they" had perforated a uterus during an abortion. Dr. Ramos agreed to meet the patient at the emergency room of American Hospital. (TR pages 326, 327) Once Dr. Ramos arrived at American Hospital, he attempted to obtain a patient history from Bruno; however, this was difficult because of Bruno's limited ability to speak English. With the help of Barreiro and Previle, Dr. Ramos was able to obtain some information. However, on the patient history, Dr. Ramos made the notation that "unable to verify (past illness) properly. Pt. speaks little english." (TR pages 329, 350-377 and Petitioner's Exhibit 9) When Dr. Ramos arrived at American Hospital, he was given the following patient history for Bruno: "25-year old black female complaining of abdominal pain of 4-6 hours onset with fever (? chills) with brownish discharge from vagina after an abortion performed on May, 1983 . . ." (Testimony of Pedro Ramos, M.D. and Petitioner's Exhibit 9) Based on the available information, Dr. Ramos diagnosed Bruno as suffering from a perforated uterus and possibly peritonitis. After performing the necessary laboratory tests, Bruno was taken to surgery for an exploratory laparotomy which revealed a perforated uterus. The uterus was perforated at the fundus on the right side. The perforation was more than 4 centimeters long. The exploratory laparotomy also revealed fetal parts in Bruno's abdomen. Dr. Ramos found at least the head and spine remaining in Bruno's abdomen. (TR page 329 and Petitioner's Exhibit 9) After the exploratory laparotomy, Dr. Ramos also determined that, in addition to the items noted above, an inflammation process had begun (peritonitis), affecting Bruno's ovaries. Dr. Ramos removed the fetal parts from Bruno's body, irrigated the area and performed a complete hysterectomy, removing both the ovaries and uterus which were beyond repair. The head of the fetus removed from Bruno's uterus measured four centimeters by two centimeters. Therefore, Dr. Ramos opined that the fetus would have been approximately 17 to 18 weeks of age. At this stage of development, fetal parts are very hard. When suction is applied to the uterus, the solid parts are moved around. The fetal parts are, at this stage, too large to go through the suction tube and remain in the uterus after suction. Following the use of suction, curretage follows. The manipulation of the curette in the uterus will then result in movement of the fetal parts. Usually, it is the spine or an arm which actually causes the perforation. By manipulating the fetal parts, the physician can cause the fetal part to perforate the uterine wall which is very soft at this stage. Bleeding can be ascertained through a monitoring of the patient's vital signs and by observation of the patient's general appearance. (TR page 224) In determining how long a patient should be monitored after an abortion has been performed, it is important to know the stage of pregnancy. With an early pregnancy, i.e., 10 - 12 weeks, the patient may be observed for a shorter period of time. Where there are no complications, the patient should be observed for between 1/2 to 1 hour. (TR pages 222 - 225) With an advanced pregnancy, i.e., one in the second trimester, the patient should be monitored for two hours after the abortion is completed. The patient might be monitored for a longer period of time if there are difficulties after the abortion is completed. Monitoring should include checking vital signs such as blood pressure, pulse and respiration rates and checking the patient for hemorrhaging and infection. Usually, with a perforated uterus, the patient experiences abdominal pain immediately following the abortion. A doctor who recognizes that he has perforated a uterus during an abortion should transfer the patient to the hospital for observation. If a patient complains of severe abdominal pain immediately upon completion of an abortion, the doctor should observe the patient until the pain disappears or until the cause of the pain is determined and dealt with. In this regard, Respondent admitted that he perforated Bruno's uterus during the performance of an abortion. (Petitioner's Exhibit 3, pages 20-23) Noteworthy is the fact that Respondent, when questioned by Investigator Stefins, an Assistant State Attorney, stated that punctures of the uterine wall should never be treated in the clinic and that on the occasions when he punctured a uterus, he would take that patient to the hospital. Perforation of a uterus is not, in and of itself, malpractice or negligence. It is below minimal standards of care, skill and treatment for a reasonably prudent physician to fail to carefully monitor a patient, by checking blood pressure, pulse and respiration rates, as well as checking the patient's general appearance after an abortion performed during the second trimester, for a sufficient period of time to determine the existence of complications. If the patient complains of persistent abdominal pain, it is below minimally acceptable standards of care, skill and treatment, as recognized by reasonably similar prudent physicians, under such conditions as are described above to release the patient without first carefully monitoring the patient until the pain disappears or until cause of the pain can be determined and dealt with. (Testimony of Doctors Ghali and McLeod)
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is hereby recommended that the Respondent's physician license number ME 0034228 shall be suspended for a period of two years and a civil penalty of $2000 shall be imposed. RECOMMENDED this 12th day of July, 1985, in Tallahassee, Florida. JAMES E. BRADWELL Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of July, 1985.
Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to the issues involved in this hearing, Respondent was licensed by the State of Florida as a chiropractor under license number CH 0000997, first issued on January 12, 1952. In mid-April, 1983, Karen Surrency, a 35-year old divorced heavy equipment operator, suffering from low back pain resulting from a hip problem, went to Respondent at his office in Ft. Meade, Florida for assistance and treatment of the condition. When she arrived at the Respondent's office, which was located in his home, Respondent and his wife were both there. Shortly thereafter, Respondent's wife went back into the house. Respondent took a 10- minute history from Ms. Surrency in which she explained her physical problem. When the history was completed, Respondent asked her to go into the examining room where, he said, he was going to take x-rays. He advised her to go into the dressing area and disrobe, removing everything, including her underwear. He gave her a hospital gown to put on. Ms. Surrency did not question his request to remove all her clothing. When she came out of the dressing area wearing the hospital gown, Respondent placed her in front of the x-ray unit and told her he could get a better picture if she would throw the gown up over her shoulder. She did this and he placed her at the machine with her back to it, facing him. In the course of doing this, he placed his hand under her right breast, jiggled it, and advised her that her muscle sagged there. After completion of the x-ray, Respondent asked Ms. Surrency to sit on the examining table. He then told her to walk around the room with the robe pulled up over her shoulder so that he could see her posture. During this period, Respondent was seated on a chair observing her and when she asked him why the gown had to be placed up on her shoulder, he replied that he could see her hip and leg better that way. When this was finished, however, Respondent sat in the middle of one side of the table and had her stand between his legs. He then put his arm around her and turned her so that she faced off to one side with her side toward him. In so doing, he touched her breast, through the material of the gown, with his left hand. After this, he told her to lay face down on the examining table and when she did, he adjusted her back with the gown open from the neck down. After completing the spinal adjustment, Respondent indicated he would like to see Ms. Surrency twice a week and set up a second visit for her two days later. When she came for this second visit, Respondent again asked her to disrobe. She asked him if it was necessary to fully disrobe and he indicated it would be better. Once she had done so, wearing a hospital gown again, Respondent had her walk around with the robe up over her shoulders as he had done on the previous visit while he observed her and then told her to do some push-ups. She got down on the floor and complied and when she did the gown, which was open at the back, fell down to her sides and she was bare. Neither at this time nor prior to this visit had Respondent indicated or instructed Ms. Surrency to exercise at home. Once she completed the push ups, Respondent advised her to again lay face down on the examining table and when she did so, he completed another spinal adjustment. While she was still laying face down, he spread her buttocks apart and told her she did not have any hemorrhoids. This struck her as odd since she had not complained to him about any problem of that nature and there was no need for him to do this. In any event, Respondent then told her to turn on to her back. When she did so, Respondent sat on one end of the table facing inward, with one of his legs over each side. This put him in a position of facing the patient. He then told her to slide down closer to him and place her spread legs one over each of his. He told her he was going to massage her muscles which he did by rubbing in a circular motion starting above the pubic hair and working down inside her thighs. At no time, according to Ms. Surrency, did he touch her in the vaginal area. Respondent then, upon completing this procedure, told her to get dressed. Ms. Surrency did not go back to Respondent for any further treatment after this second visit because, in her opinion, she did not believe Respondent should have done the things to her that he did. In the first place, she did not think it was appropriate for him to examine her nude without a witness, preferably a female present. In the second place, on one of the two occasions, while she was getting dressed, though she had not complained about having any difficulty in removing her clothing, Respondent asked her if he could help her with her bra. Ms. Surrency subsequently went to another chiropractor, Dr. Tucker, for the same physical complaints. Dr. Tucker took x-rays of her but she was allowed to wear a robe, her panties, and socks. Dr. Tucker also had her walk but in so doing, she was allowed to wear her uniform pants, her bra, and the hospital gown. Dr. Tucker never asked her to remove all her clothing or to pull the hospital gown up over her shoulders as Respondent did. He also did not touch her breasts or check her for hemorrhoids. He did not perform a massage of the pubic area. In addition to Dr. Tucker, Ms. Surrency also visited a Dr. Haig, also practicing in Ft. Meade, for the same problem. Dr. Haig, who also took x- rays and also had her walk, treated her the same as Dr. Tucker did. Ms. Surrency did not complain either to or about Respondent at the time he did the things to her which offended her as described above nor did she attempt to stop him from doing them while he was doing them. In fact, she has no quarrel with the diagnosis that Respondent made of her condition and his suggested course of treatment which included several subsequent spinal adjustments. In fact, the other two chiropractors to whom she went after leaving Respondent's care suggested the same treatment. Her complaint is more toward the method of examination; the failure to have a witness present and the requirement for nudity in the course of the examination. Ms. Surrency did not actually complain to anyone until some five or six months after leaving Respondent's care. At that time she filed a complaint with the Petitioner, Board of Chiropractic Examiners. She had in the interim, however, called Respondent on the phone on several occasions regarding securing his signature on certain insurance papers and getting a release of her records. On one of these occasions, Respondent asked her why she had stopped coming to see him. Thereafter, when she went to his office to pick up her papers, Respondent refused to give them to her until she went in to talk with him about her alleged complaint. Dr. Tucker was visited by Ms. Surrency, in June, 1983, when she complained of an unusual indentation in her left hip and pain between her shoulder blades. This pain radiated down through the lower back to her leg. On her first visit, she advised Dr. Tucker that she had seen the Respondent prior to that time for two visits but did not want to talk about what had happened. It was only after she had seen Dr. Tucker two or three times that she began to describe her problems with the Respondent and asked if the procedures he had followed were normal. Whenever she would talk of these incidents she would break down and cry. It was the opinion of Dr. Tucker and that of Dr. Walper as well, both qualified chiropractors licensed in Florida, that the procedures followed by Respondent in many respects were outside the boundaries of normal and proper chiropractic treatment. For example, when Dr. Tucker does an x-ray of a female patient, depending upon the area to be photographed, the patient is not required to be totally nude. In a situation such as Ms. Surrency's, the patient would wear a hospital gown and keep her underpants on. In Dr. Tucker's opinion, contrary to that of the Respondent, it is quite possible to get an x-ray of good quality with the patient wearing a gown and nonmetallic underclothing, and has never had a patient completely nude with the gown up over her shoulder. As to requiring the patient to walk, a patient with Ms. Surrency's complaint would do so wearing a gown with her underwear. There is no medical reason for total nudity and for the patient to have a gown up over her shoulder. Since this was a hip problem, it would be necessary to observe the hip but caution is required not to embarrass the patient as was done in this case. Dr. Tucker could see no reason for an examination of the buttocks area as was accomplished by Respondent for the complaints that Ms. Surrency had. Dr. Walper, who has practiced as a chiropractor since 1950 and in Florida since 1976, did not examine Ms. Surrency but did review the report of investigation completed by Petitioner's investigator which included the statements given under oath by the patient. Based on this review, be concluded that Respondent's techniques were totally unacceptable and did not meet community standards. As to the nudity involved in the x-ray, be was of the opinion that it was totally unnecessary because the x-rays will penetrate clothing except metal and there is no reason to require the patient to pull the hospital gown up over her shoulder. Admitting that substantial medical authority indicates that clothing should be removed for x-rays as far as possible, he contends that the operative words here are "as far as possible" and this does not envision the necessity for total nudity inasmuch as the shadow created by something as flimsy as underpants would be inconsequential to an adequate evaluation of the radiographic picture. With regard to the walk Respondent had Ms. Surrency perform, Dr. Walper agrees that it would be appropriate for a patient with Ms. Surrency's problem to be asked to walk so that the physician might observe the gait. However, the technique used here, requiring the patient to walk nude with the gown up over her shoulder, was inappropriate and unnecessary. There was, in his opinion, no need whatever for the patient to be naked. Dr. Walper can also see no medical reason for Respondent to touch the patient's breasts, even though the second touching was done through the gown and to do so would be inappropriate. As to the buttocks examination, this would not be medically necessary for the type of complaint this patient had. It would be appropriate if the patient had complained of hemorrhoids or if it were accomplished during a routine physical. However, Ms. Surrency had not complained of a hemorrhoid problem and had come in with a specific complaint, not for a routine and general physical examination. Walper is unable to understand any reason for requiring the patient to do push-ups. Admittedly there are some exercises to be done for Ms. Surrency's condition after the symptoms have been relieved, but certainly not push-ups and not in the nude during a physical examination. As to the pubic and thigh rubbing accomplished by Respondent when he had Ms. Surrency place her legs over his, this type of touching for this patient's complaint, in his opinion, would be most inappropriate. Dr. Walper indicated, and it is so found, that practice standards for chiropractors are reasonably similar throughout the State of Florida. In his opinion, the treatment afforded Ms. Surrency by Respondent in the incidents set out in the Administrative Complaint, were outside the scope of chiropractic and Respondent did not perform here with reasonable skill or in a manner which would be followed by a reasonably prudent doctor of chiropractic under the circumstances. What Respondent did here, in Dr. Walper's opinion, constitutes sexual impropriety and misconduct. Respondent has been a chiropractor since 1952 when he graduated from the Lincoln Chiropractic College and has practiced in Florida since 1953. He located his practice in Ft. Meade in 1960. Chiropractic education is divided into two schools of thought. One is made up of "mixers" and the other is made up of "straights." Respondent attended a "mixer" school. The difference in his education was that he was taught to (a) take a good case history, (b) treat for any problem found; and (c) treat to cure the problem rather than the symptoms. He defines chiropractic medicine as dealing primarily with the skeletal system, the joints, and adjacent tissues. Respondent recalls the first visit he had from Ms. Surrency and basically confirms her comments regarding it. While he indicates that it is routine for him to require total nudity under the gown on a first x-ray, from that point on, be says, the patient is allowed to keep their underpants on. He requires the patients to remove the clothing so that it does not get into the way of the x-ray and also because he wants to cut down on the strength of the x- ray required to accomplish the picture. Respondent contends that synthetic fibers such as found in women's underwear are metal and require the use of stronger x- ray. There is no evidence, save Respondent's allegations, to support this theory and it is rejected. Respondent denies that when he spread Ms. Surrency's buttocks he was examining the rectum. Instead, he claims, he was palpating the large muscle of the buttocks area during the examination of everything as he was taught. His examining table has a pelvic roll, he says, which would present the buttocks of a patient on her stomach more prominently than would a table used by graduates of a Palmer school of chiropractic medicine. There is a substantial difference between palpating of muscle and the spreading apart of a buttock and the comment which Ms. Surrency made regarding her hemorrhoids supports a finding that he did in fact spread her buttocks since it would be impossible to see hemorrhoids were the buttocks not spread apart. Respondent admits that he may have touched Ms. Surrency's breast and if he commented on it, he claims, it was merely a casual observation of something he saw. He meant nothing by it. As to the requirement that Ms. Surrency walk nude in front of him, he contends he wanted to observe her feet, knees, and shoulders to see how she looked all over. He again wanted to see her walk after he had performed the adjustment to see if the treatment had done any good. He admits having required the patient to pull the gown up over her shoulder contending that it was just some procedure he picked up during his practice. It works for him and as far as he is concerned, that's all that matters. When Ms. Surrency returned to him the second day before the examination he sat with her and discussed what he had found on the x-rays he had taken during the first visit. He told her that her spine was off center and there were five areas in it that required adjustment. He also told her he could not tell her how long it would take to resolve the problem because the numerous variables involved made it impossible for him to accurately predict a course of treatment. He also admits that he had Ms. Surrency place her legs over his as described in her testimony but defends it on the basis that because he suffers from phlebitis and cannot stand long on his legs, this being the end of the day and since he was tired and his leg was hurting, he utilized this procedure so that he could be sufficiently comfortable to apply equal pressure to the area he was massaging. He applied the "goading" technique of accupressure to various areas above and on the pubic bone to get the patient's muscles to relax and to prompt the lymphatic system to start flowing. Respondent contends this method of treatment is a long standing and accepted practice. The massage technique may well be an accepted practice but the method applied here by Respondent in having the nude patient's legs draped over his with her genital area facing him was not. Respondent then had the patient do the push-ups to determine her muscle balance, a factor important in relationship to the adjustment of the spine. This was related to the pain in between the shoulder blades, not for the low back. Respondent's testimony was not based on his actual recollection but instead is primarily his speculation as to what happened based on his normal practice. He does not recall a majority of the events on either day he saw Ms. Surrency. She is quite sure of her testimony. There is little equivocation and even less speculation. On balance, then, it is clear that the story as told by Ms. Surrency is more credible and worthy of belief. Consequently, it is found that her allegations as to the actual occurrences are accurate. Respondent's explanations do not deny the occurrences, but tend to present some self justification for it. In 1977, a Final Order of the Board of Chiropractic revoked Respondent's license to practice in the State of Florida based on an administrative hearing which resulted in findings that Respondent was guilty of unprofessional conduct the circumstances of which we are not concerned with here. An appeals court subsequently sustained the findings of fact but reduced the revocation to a suspension for six months and Respondent's license was subsequently reinstated after he had served the period of suspension.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is, therefore, RECOMMENDED that the Respondent, IVAN C. ROSS' license as a chiropractor in the State of Florida, Number CH 0000997, be revoked. RECOMMENDED in Tallahassee, Florida, this 18th day of February, 1985. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904)488-9675 FILED with the Clerk of the Division Administrative Hearings this 18th day of February, 1985. COPIES FURNISHED: Edward Hill, Jr., Esquire Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Douglas H. Smith, Esquire Post Office Box 1145 Lake Alfred, Florida 33850
The Issue The issues in this case are whether Respondent violated section 458.331(1), Florida Statutes, by committing medical malpractice or by failing to keep legible medical records that justify the course of treatment of a patient, as set forth in the Amended Administrative Complaint, and, if so, what is the appropriate sanction.
Findings Of Fact The Department is the state agency charged with regulating the practice of medicine pursuant to section 20.43, chapter 456, and chapter 458, Florida Statutes (2015). The Board of Medicine is charged with final agency action with respect to physicians licensed pursuant to chapter 458. At all times material to the complaint, Dr. Tsinker was a licensed medical doctor within the state of Florida, having been issued license number ME 39408. Dr. Tsinker's address of record is 2500 East Hallandale Beach Boulevard, Suite 207, Hallandale Beach, Florida 33160. D.G. was pregnant and sought care from Bellymama Midwifery Services (Bellymama Midwifery). On May 16, 2013, she signed a Bellymama Midwifery Services VBAC Consent Form. It generally advised of risks and benefits in attempting a vaginal birth after having had a cesarean section (VBAC). It included the following statements, among others: 3. I understand that 70-80% of women who undergo VBAC will successfully deliver vaginally, and that this percentage increases in relation to the amount of support women receive in making the decision to try a VBAC. * * * 7. The exact frequency of death or permanent injury to the baby when the uterus ruptures is uncertain, but has been reported to be as high as 50% in cases of complete rupture. * * * 9. Probable contraindications to VBAC include a classical uterine incision, multiple gestations, and breech. Each of these statements on the form was initialed by D.G. At the end of the form was a place for the patient to choose to either attempt VBAC or elect a repeat cesarean, as well as a place to explain that choice. After the form's statement "I want to attempt a VBAC because," the following entry was made in script, "I don't agree that my previous C-section was necessary and I disagree w/ interventions for the sake of convenience." D.G.'s printed name and her signature appear at the bottom of the form. At hearing, D.G. testified that the cesarean section with her first daughter had been a difficult experience. The baby had complications arising from induction which led to the emergency cesarean. D.G. stated that she wished to avoid interventions unless they were medically necessary. D.G.'s first prenatal visit was conducted on May 17, 2013, by Corina Fitch, R.N., a licensed midwife. Nurse Fitch has a degree in midwifery and provides prenatal care and assistance with home deliveries. She has worked with many patients wanting to attempt a VBAC. D.G. testified that after it was determined, at about 35 and one-half weeks gestation, that the fetus was in breech position, she had a discussion with Nurse Fitch as to the best way to proceed. They decided that they should wait to see if the baby changed position. Nurse Fitch testified that the baby did change to vertex position, but then changed again, back to breech. Nurse Fitch testified that she had advised D.G. generally of the risks and benefits of a vaginal delivery and that she specifically briefed D.G. about some of the additional risks of TOLAC1/ with a breech presentation, but not completely: Well, I think that I-–according to what I told you before, I didn't give her all the risks. I talked about cord prolapse, and I talked about head entrapment. So, potentially, no, she did not receive enough information. At slightly over 40 weeks, D.G. telephoned Nurse Fitch to advise that her water had broken (spontaneous rupture of membrane (SROM)). D.G. and Nurse Fitch decided that D.G. should to go to the hospital to deliver there. Based upon information that Dr. Tsinker had successfully delivered breech babies vaginally, D.G. and her husband had decided to seek care from Dr. Tsinker. Nurse Fitch called Dr. Tsinker. She told Dr. Tsinker that D.G. was a 37-year-old pregnant woman at 40 weeks and four days gestation, that D.G. had previously undergone a cesarean section with her first child, that the fetus was in frank breech presentation, and that she wished to deliver vaginally if possible. Nurse Fitch testified that she did not believe that her conversation with Dr. Tsinker included discussion about consent forms or whether the patient had been advised of the risks of attempting a VBAC under all of these circumstances. However, Nurse Fitch testified that Dr. Tsinker had accepted patients from her before and that she always provided a copy of the consent form that her patients signed to him on those occasions, so he was generally familiar with the consent form. Dr. Tsinker agreed to accept D.G. as a patient. Records of Bellymama Midwifery dated December 10, 2013, indicate: Received T.C. from pt reporting SROM @ 10 a.m., mild cramping. Home visit made. FHT's 140's, all VS WNL, baby in breech presentation, VE done to report findings to OB for transfer of care, 1 cm, 100%, 0 station. Dr. Tsinker called as pt desires vaginal birth, he agreed to do delivery, pt transported to hospital in own car in stable condition for augmentation and delivery, CF. At about 1247 hours on December 10, 2013, D.G. presented to the Broward Health Medical Center in Fort Lauderdale with ruptured membrane and fetus in breech position. Her husband was with her. Based upon communications from Dr. Tsinker, she was expected, and the hospital had the admissions paperwork ready for her. D.G. signed a General Consent form at the time of her admission. At about 1320 hours, a labor assessment was conducted by nursing staff. It indicated, among other things, that the reason for admission was spontaneous rupture of membrane, that D.G. was calm, and that her obstetrical history included a previous cesarean section due to low amniotic fluid at 37 weeks. Electronic fetal monitoring begun at 1317 hours showed no decelerations and active movement. Examination confirmed that the fetus was in breech presentation. D.G. told the nursing staff that she wanted to labor without pain medications. The LD-Flowsheet BG indicates that at about 1334 hours, Dr. Tsinker was made aware of the examination and that he issued orders. Dr. Tsinker testified that he was told that the baby was in frank breech position and that there was only "mild" labor activity. Dr. Tsinker testified that he gave the order to start D.G. on oxytocin (or Pitocin). A Maternal Child Inter-Disciplinary Patient Education Record indicates that D.G. was advised of potential side effects from the use of Pitocin at about 1400 hours. This was the only entry in the "Medications" content area. The form contains the initials "SY" and contains a signature that appears to read "Simone Young, RN." The form contains no mention of misoprostol (or Cytotec). D.G. signed a Vaginal Delivery Consent form at about 1410 hours on December 10, 2013. The form had Dr. Tsinker's name filled in and, in a typed line which had been added, indicated that he was authorized to perform "delivery of baby, possible cesarean section, possible use of forceps or vacuum extractor, possible episiotomy." The form itself contained no information about the risks of vaginal delivery, no information about the risks of vaginal delivery after cesarean section, and no information about the risks of vaginal delivery after cesarean section with a baby in breech presentation. The only provision related to risks stated: The Physician has explained to me, and I understand, the potential benefits, risks, or side effects of the procedure, including potential problems related to recuperation; the likelihood of achieving goals; the reasonable alternatives to the procedure; and the relevant risks, benefits, and side effects related to alternatives, including the possible results of not having the procedure. The document contains a signature in the "witness" space which appears to read "S. Young, RN." It was uncontroverted, however, that D.G. had not actually talked with the attending physician about anything before she signed the form. Dr. Tsinker testified that it is his signature which appears at the bottom of the form in the "Physician Signature" space. While there was some question about the date Dr. Tsinker signed the form, this is of no significance. The form does not show that Dr. Tsinker advised D.G. of the risks of TOLAC under her circumstances, and its statement that this had been done was completely rebutted by all of the other evidence, including testimony of Dr. Tsinker. Dr. Tsinker never advised D.G. of the particular risks involved in a vaginal delivery, given her previous cesarean section and breech presentation. He never advised her that a cesarean section was indicated. Further, he admitted that D.G. never told him she was unwilling to have a cesarean section. He simply assumed, based upon the information that had been provided to him by others, that she would decline a cesarean section even if he strongly recommended it to her. He testified that he came to that conclusion because: The patient never, A, asked me any additional questions that she may have had--you know I'm not her mind reader--at time when she was admitted and I showed up after that, right. She knew about her right to ask these questions and to have them answered to her full satisfaction. When I showed up, she didn't have that opportunity when she came in because I wasn't there. But when I showed up, she had all in the world opportunity, if she was even a little bit still in the dark or had reservations or any problems, she had the opportunity to ask me that and I would have definitely given her a complete answer. She never mentioned she had regret her opinion or she wants to stop and revert to a cesarean section, or to do anything but to continue the trial of TOLAC. Some of D.G.'s medical records, such as the medications list, suggest that misoprostol, a drug used to make the patient more receptive to oxytocin, was never ordered in D.G.'s case. Other records suggest that it may have been administered to D.G. Dr. Tsinker stated in response to interrogatories and testified at hearing that misoprostol was not used in D.G.'s case. As for entries appearing to indicate that misoprostol was discontinued, Dr. Tsinker's uncontroverted testimony was that you cannot "discontinue" misoprostol because it is introduced intravaginally in the form of a small pill. The only drug that could be discontinued is oxytocin, which is introduced intravenously. Dr. Tsinker maintained that any references to "discontinue" are references to oxytocin, not misoprostol. He further maintained that misoprostol is used when the cervix needs ripening and noted that, in this case, it was already thinned, with D.G's records showing 100 percent effacement, so that there would have been no need to order misoprostol. Hospital records of Pharmacy Orders reference that administration of Pitocin through continuous infusion began at 1514 hours. An accompanying note provided, "6 milliunit/min = 0.3 mL/min = 18 mL/hr – Start at 6 milliunit/min. Increase by 3 milliunit Q15 min until contractions are Q2 min apart, 40 sec in duration & moderate to strong by palpation – continuous infusion (not to exceed 20 MU/min). Hold for non reassuring FHR pattern or tachysystole." Dr. Tsinker did not perform an examination of D.G. in order to determine whether D.G.'s fetus was in frank, footling, or some other breech position prior to the administration of Pitocin to D.G. As Dr. Tsinker testified, he had been informed that the fetus was in frank breech position. There was some conflicting evidence as to whether the fetus was in frank breech or in foot breech position. The Discharge Summary form, dictated by Dr. Siegel and signed by Dr. Tsinker, indicates that the "patient was delivered vaginally, foot breech," and the Newborn Consultation form of Dr. Otero similarly had a block indicating "foot breech" checked. However, Nurse Fitch testified that she determined the baby was in frank breech position earlier, and, consistent with the testimony of Dr. Tsinker, the Baby's Delivery Record indicated "Breech Position: Frank." Norman Donald Diebel, M.D., later testified that although he could not be sure, he concluded that the baby was in frank breech position. Dr. Tsinker had never met D.G. in person, or spoken to D.G. prior to December 10, 2013. He saw her for the first time around 1635 hours on that day. At some point, Dr. Tsinker prepared an OB/GYN History and Physical form. It was dated December 10, 2013, but no time was given. No pelvic examination was recorded which could be used to determine when it was prepared. As Dr. Tsinker admitted, the notes are untimed and mostly abbreviated. It records the presentation as "breech" and the membranes as "ruptured." While it has a few spaces left blank, it was substantially completed, albeit with little detail. During D.G.'s labor, Dr. Tsinker did not dictate or write any progress notes. Dr. Tsinker maintained that because he believed everything was progressing well, he did not think it necessary. At 2031 hours, the flowsheet records Dr. Tsinker at bedside and indicates that he reviewed the fetal strip. At 2051 hours, the flowsheet records that Dr. Tsinker responded to a page and was "notified/updated" and notes that there were "no new orders." Nurse Radhiya Walther could not remember these entries when asked about them, or recall if they were in fact entered about ten hours after the events they describe. Dr. Tsinker disputed that he was ever contacted at this time. At 2130 hours, the flowsheet records that "augmentation D?c'd unable to continuously monitor doula and pt instructed to assist with FHR monitoring while on ball." Nurse Walther stated she discontinued oxytocin because the patient was sitting on the ball, and she was unable to monitor the strip. She admitted in cross-examination that if oxytocin was discontinued, the physician should be notified. She admitted that the records did not indicate that Dr. Tsinker was notified. The fetal monitor strip indicates noticeable loss of variability in the trace and some early decelerations. These were not yet clear signs of fetal distress, but as Dr. Diebel testified, would have caused a reasonably prudent obstetrician/gynecologist to remain with the patient. At 2203 hours, the flowsheet records a vaginal exam by Dr. Tsinker, with dilatation at 10 cms, and effacement at 100 percent. Dr. Tsinker requested that D.G. demonstrate how she was going to push so that he could evaluate the effectiveness of her pushing. D.G. testified later, "Dr. Tsinker asked me to push, I attempted to push with all of my might, they were unproductive pushes. He told me continue to labor, I'll come back later and he left the room." Dr. Tsinker testified that at that time he directed the delivery nurse to have D.G. start pushing, but neither D.G. nor Nurse Walther recall that order. Additional comments recorded for this time indicate "Dr. Tsinker at bedside strip reviewed Pt attempted pushing will labor down." Nurse Fitch, who had arrived in the labor and delivery room about 2000 hours, did not recall Dr. Tsinker ever telling D.G. or the labor and delivery nurse that D.G. could "labor down." As Nurse Fitch testified: I don't recall that. What I do recall is, when [Dr. Tsinker] left the room, she was very distraught because the exam was extremely painful and she didn't have a sensation to push that was very-–she tried. She gave it her best. And she said "Corina, I don't know if I can do this." And the nurse-—I remember the nurse saying, "Don't worry. There's no urgency. We'll just let her wait till she has the urge. Nurse Walther recalled that D.G. stated she did not want to push because she did not feel any pressure, which is why Nurse Walther recorded the "labor down" comment. Nurse Walther testified she would have called Dr. Tsinker if she had felt this was contrary to his orders in any way, but she did not, because she had not been told to make the patient push. D.G. spent much of her labor on the birthing ball, next to the bed. With D.G. in this position, it was more difficult to monitor fetal heart rate because the monitoring belts can more easily shift and not provide clear readings. Also, D.G., who declined a bedpan, made several trips to the bathroom. Portions of the fetal monitor strips have missing or sketchy readings. By 2230 hours on December 10, 2013, D.G.'s fetal monitor had begun to show clear signs of fetal distress, evidenced by late decelerations. D.G. was never advised by anyone that there were signs of fetal distress, or told of the advisability of having a cesarean section in light of that new information. At 2300 hours, under "Interventions," in D.G.'s records, it is stated that "IV Bolus; Discontinue Uterine Stimulants; O2 On; other Interventions – Please Annotate Annotation: Pitocin remains off O2 remains in place." At 2304 hours, the flowsheet records "MD notified that patient is on ball and unable to get cont tracing and having variable decelerations. Pt instructed to return to bed." Under care provider status it is recorded, "Responded to Page; Report Given; In Department; Notified/Updated See SBAR; No New Orders." Dr. Tsinker again disputes that he was given this notification. Nurse Walther stated she could not remember how Dr. Tsinker was notified. She could not recall if Dr. Tsinker showed up personally in response, or called. She could not remember if she repeated the call to him. The flowsheet records a late deceleration at 2316 hours and another at 2320 hours. As Nurse Walther acknowledged in cross-examination, repetitive late decelerations are dangerous and constitute "category 3," the most serious category. Nurse Walther stated she did not know if she notified Dr. Tsinker after these decelerations. She later conceded that three late decelerations constitute an emergency that required that the attending physician be notified. Nurse Walther testified she walked outside to tell the charge nurse, but could not recall what the charge nurse told her in response. There was no evidence of any actions taken by the charge nurse. Under Additional Comments at 2330 hours, it is noted, "Pt found off monitor in restroom, family at bedside safety precautions maintained. Pt instructed to return to bed, assisted to Labor Bed." Nurse Walther's testimony was generally not very clear or credible and many of the entries in the flowsheet record are found to be unreliable, especially those concerning events that supposedly took place after the visit at 2203 hours by Dr. Tsinker. The stored fetal strip, incomplete in places as it is, is the best evidence of the progress of labor. It was not clearly shown that Dr. Tsinker ever reviewed the fetal monitor strip or was otherwise made aware of the late decelerations occurring after 2200 hours at any time before his return to the room shortly before midnight. When Dr. Tsinker returned to the room before midnight, D.G. and Nurse Fitch were in the bathroom. He asked D.G. to come out. The patient was returned to bed. At about 0003 hours, D.G. was placed in foot pedals and partially elevated. Under Additional Comments, it is noted "audable fhr 147 pt prepped for pushing Dr. Tsinker." The Mother's Delivery Record prepared by Nurse Walther indicated that the Neonatal Intensive Care Unit (NICU) was called at midnight and arrived at 0005 hours. Dr. Tsinker asked D.G. to push. There was some difficulty in hearing the fetal heart monitor. It was a fairly quick delivery, taking about 11 minutes or so. On December 11, 2013, around 0014 hours, D.G. delivered a stillborn male infant. NICU recorded "0" for all Apgar score factors at both one minute and five minutes after birth. Despite multiple efforts, the NICU was unable to resuscitate the baby. The efforts of the NICU team caused D.G. to have feelings of panic; she testified that she was expecting to hear a baby crying and did not realize until then that there was any issue. After about 20 minutes or half an hour, the NICU team came to D.G.'s bedside and informed her that they were unable to resuscitate the baby. A Vaginal Delivery Summary form completed by Dr. Tsinker and dated December 11, 2013, at 1214 hours, briefly described the placenta, blood loss, laceration, and suturing after delivery, as well as the failure of the NICU team to resuscitate the stillborn child, but it said almost nothing of the labor and delivery itself, noting only that Dr. Tsinker "assisted breech delivery" and that the Apgar scores were "0" at one and five minutes. There was no evidence of any other delivery note prepared by Dr. Tsinker. Dr. Tsinker did not talk with D.G. after the delivery, or at any time on December 11, 2013, although D.G. had been requesting to speak with him to find out what had happened. On the morning of December 12, 2013, Dr. Tsinker came to D.G.'s hospital room, but D.G. was in the bathroom. Dr. Tsinker told D.G.'s husband that he would return. D.G. came out of the bathroom and waited for Dr. Tsinker to return. When he did not, D.G. went to the nurse's station and again asked to see him. When D.G. learned that he was no longer in the ward, she asked for her discharge papers. Dr. Tsinker appeared, and they returned to D.G.'s room. In the brief discussion about the course of labor and delivery which followed, D.G. believed that Dr. Tsinker was insensitive and blamed her for the outcome. After receiving further care not relevant to this case, D.G. was discharged from Broward General Medical Center at 1220 hours on December 12, 2013. Standards Dr. Diebel is an obstetrician/gynecologist who has been licensed in Florida since 1977. He is board-certified by the American Board of Obstetrics and Gynecology and was an examiner for the board for 18 years. He has previously served as an expert witness in administrative proceedings for the state of Florida. Dr. Diebel is an expert in obstetrics/gynecology and has knowledge, skill, experience, training, and education in the prevailing professional standard of care recognized as acceptable and appropriate by reasonably prudent obstetricians/gynecologists in Florida. Dr. Diebel reviewed D.G.'s medical records from Broward Health, the fetal monitor tracings, the midwife records, the autopsy report, and the Amended Administrative Complaint filed in this case. As Dr. Diebel testified, a vaginal delivery after cesarean section has some risks, but they are still performed. A vaginal delivery with breech presentation has some risks, but they are performed. However, he testified that to attempt a VBAC with a breech presentation was below the standard of care recognized as acceptable and appropriate by reasonably prudent obstetricians/gynecologists in Florida. As Dr. Diebel testified, you have two risky procedures, and "nobody would recommend" doing TOLAC and breech together. While Dr. Diebel acknowledged that this standard of care was not expressly set forth in American Congress of Obstetricians and Gynecologists' Practice Bulletin Number 115, August 2010, entitled "Vaginal Birth After Previous Cesarean Delivery," Dr. Diebel's testimony was clear and convincing and is credited.2/ Dr. Diebel credibly testified that it was below the standard of care to place the burden on the patient to "ask" about a cesarean section. The standard of care in labor and delivery requires that there be an agreement between the physician and the patient, as a part of which the patient is clearly presented with the potential hazards of what she is about to undertake. Dr. Tsinker should have discussed the potential benefits and risks of D.G. undergoing TOLAC, as well as the option to elect a repeat cesarean delivery, with D.G. as soon as possible after her arrival at the hospital. As Dr. Diebel testified, Dr. Tsinker should have advised D.G. that it was a very risky procedure for D.G. to undergo TOLAC because the baby was in breech position, that this is not currently an acceptable procedure, and that she should have a cesarean section. The standard of care required Dr. Tsinker to advise D.G. of the additional risks involved in attempting a VBAC due to her breech presentation. It was Dr. Tsinker's responsibility to fully explain those risks, recommend a cesarean section, and affirmatively ascertain and document her response. Dr. Diebel testified that if a patient refused to follow the physician's recommendations or was uncooperative in this regard: You would document it profusely if a patient- –you know, I explain to the patient that this is what's happening, this is what can happen, this is what the effects can be. I explained all that, she expressed understanding. Yeah, if only to cover myself, I want it to be very clear that we had this discussion and still her decision was otherwise. Dr. Tsinker's testimony that he believed that others had previously had discussions with D.G. about these risks and benefits did not satisfy this standard of care. Dr. Tsinker failed to have the appropriate discussions with D.G. or to document them, as he was required to do. Dr. Diebel's testimony that misoprostol should not be used to induce labor in patients who have had an earlier cesarean delivery was unrefuted and is accepted. Dr. Diebel also testified that the ordering of Pitocin for D.G. violated the standard of care. This conclusion was contested, however, and the basis for Dr. Diebel's conclusion was not carefully explained. While Dr. Diebel did describe risks of uterine rupture, as well as risks of causing contractions to be too close together, it was not explained in what way these risks were unique or increased with a TOLAC with breech presentation. Dr. Diebel testified: Q. Are there any risks associated with administering Pitocin to a patient attempting trial of labor after cesarean with breech presentation? A. Well, you won't find papers devoted to that particular thing, because it is not done. It's not-–breeches are not allowed to have a TOLAC. * * * Q. Why would it not be done? Why would Pitocin not be given in that situation? A. Well, because you wouldn't allow the situation to happen to begin with. Q. Right. A. Where you've got a breech and a previous cesarean section. So there'd be no reason to give Pitocin. This explanation does not provide a logical basis to support a separate charge of medical malpractice. Accepting Dr. Diebel's position that simply undertaking a TOLAC with breech constitutes medical malpractice, it does not follow that every other related, but distinct, element in the labor and delivery procedure would necessarily constitute a separate violation of the standard of care. Dr. Diebel acknowledged that it was appropriate to use a little Pitocin in a (non-breech) TOLAC where the patient is not having any contractions, but that it is run for only a short time, and then once the patient is in labor, discontinued. Dr. Diebel then contrasted that limited use with what was done in this case: In this situation, it was continued all day, even though she was having, in some place on the tracing, contractions a minute to a minute and a half apart, which are too close together. The basis of Dr. Diebel's concern with the use of Pitocin in this case thus appears to be that it was used for too long. However, that was not the charge in this case. The evidence was not clear or convincing that initially ordering Pitocin for D.G., as opposed to continuing its administration for too long, constituted medical malpractice. Dr. Diebel's testimony that D.G.'s admission history and physical was inadequately documented was not clear and convincing. He noted that the form was not properly timed, but the form itself appeared to be substantially completed, and Dr. Diebel did not sufficiently elaborate on what additional information should have been present. Dr. Diebel testified that the standard of care requires that a physician keep progress notes during the labor of their patients. Under cross-examination, Dr. Diebel admitted that as long as everything was going well, there was no need to write a progress note. However, he also testified that the fetal monitor indicated that after 1700 hours, everything was not going well in D.G.'s case. There were missed signals on the monitor, a loss of variability in the trace, and some decelerations before 2200 hours. It was undisputed that Dr. Tsinker failed to keep any progress notes on D.G.'s labor. Under these circumstances, Dr. Diebel's testimony that Dr. Tsinker failed to maintain adequate progress notes was clear and convincing. Dr. Diebel also credibly testified that Dr. Tsinker's delivery note describing what took place during D.G.'s delivery was inadequate. The stillborn child created a duty for Dr. Tsinker to fully document what took place during the course of labor and delivery, with careful attention to documentation of any possible factors that it might appear in retrospect to have contributed to the tragic outcome. Dr. Tsinker's Vaginal Delivery Summary, while briefly describing the placenta, blood loss, laceration, and suturing after delivery, as well as the failure of the NICU team to resuscitate the stillborn child, says almost nothing of the labor and delivery itself, noting only that Dr. Tsinker "assisted breech delivery" and that the baby was stillborn. This was not sufficient under the circumstances. Dr. Tsinker was charged with violating the standard of care in performing as an obstetrician/gynecologist during D.G.'s labor and delivery, and he failed to keep medical records reflecting his participation in the treatment of D.G. during that time. Prior Discipline No evidence was introduced to show that Dr. Tsinker has had any prior discipline imposed upon his license. Dr. Tsinker was not under any legal restraints on December 10, 2013. It was not shown that Dr. Tsinker received any special pecuniary benefit or self-gain from his actions on December 10, 2013. It was not shown that the actions of Dr. Tsinker on December 10, 2013, involved any trade or sale of controlled substances. On August 25, 2014, Dr. Tsinker completed an independent self-study course in Advanced Electronic Fetal Monitoring offered by PESI, Inc., consisting of 6.25 hours of instructional content. On April 6, 2015, Dr. Tsinker completed medical continuing education courses Documentation 154 and Documentation 155, consisting of one hour and two hours of instructional content, respectively, offered by OnlineContinuingEd, LLC.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the Board of Medicine finding that Dr. Simion Tsinker violated sections 458.331(1)(m) and (t), Florida Statutes (2013), as charged in the Amended Administrative Complaint; suspending his license to practice medicine for a period of four months; imposing an administrative fine in the amount of $20,000; and requiring that he complete continuing medical education as deemed appropriate by the Board. DONE AND ENTERED this 12th day of February, 2016, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S F. SCOTT BOYD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of February, 2016.
The Issue This is a license discipline proceeding in which the Petitioner seeks to take disciplinary action against the Respondent on the basis of allegations of misconduct set forth in a three-count Administrative Complaint. The Respondent is charged with having violated the following statutory provisions: Sections 458.331(1)(j), 458.331(t), and 458.331(1)(x), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact The Respondent is, and has been at all times material to this proceeding, licensed as a physician in the State of Florida, having been issued license number ME 0043763. The Respondent specializes in general medicine and is not board certified. On November 25, 1996, patient A. J., a 28-year-old female, presented to the Respondent for the purpose of having a physical examination performed by a physician. The patient A. J. sought the physical examination for the purpose of complying with requirements of the Immigration and Naturalization Service ("INS"). The patient A. J. brought with her an INS physical examination form. The form included instructions to the person to be examined, as well as instructions to the physician who would perform the examination. The instructions to the person to be examined included: "The doctor will examine you for certain physical and mental health conditions. You will have to take off your clothes." The instructions to the physician performing the examination included the following: Please medically examine for adjustment of status the individual presenting this form. The medical examination should be performed according to the U. S. Public Health Service "Guidelines for Medical Examination of Aliens in the United States" and Supplements, which have been provided to you separately. The Respondent was familiar with the INS guidelines for medical examination of aliens in the United States, because he had previously performed such examinations on numerous occasions, and he was a physician who had been approved by the INS to perform such examinations. At the time of the examination of the patient A. J., those guidelines were incorporated in a document titled Technical Instructions for Medical Examination of Aliens in the United States, dated June 1991. At page I-1, the technical instructions included the following in a description of the role of the civil surgeon: The civil surgeon is responsible for reporting the results of the medical examination and all required tests on the prescribed forms. The civil surgeon is not responsible for determining whether an alien is actually eligible for adjustment of status; that determination is made by the INS officer after reviewing all records, including the report of the medical examination. (Emphasis added.) At page II-2 the technical instructions included the following description of the required physical examination: d. a physical examination, including an evaluation of mental status, sufficient to permit a determination of the presence and the severity of Class A and Class B conditions. The physical examination is to include a mental status examination that includes, at a minimum, assessment of intelligence, thought, cognition (comprehension), judgment, affect (and mood), and behavior. a physical examination that includes, at a minimum, examination of the eyes, ears, nose and throat, extremities, heart, lungs, abdomen, lymph nodes, skin and external genitalia. all diagnostic tests required for the diagnosis of the diseases identified as communicable diseases of public health significance and other tests identified as necessary to confirm a suspected diagnosis of any other Class A or Class B condition. At all times material to this case, for purposes of INS physical examinations, Class A conditions were: Chancroid, Chronic alcoholism, Gonorrhea, Granuloma inguinale, Hansen's disease (infectious), HIV infection, Insanity, Lymphogranuloma venereum, Mental defect, Mental retardation, Narcotic drug addiction, Previous occurrence of one or more attacks of insanity, Psychopathic personality, Sexual deviation, Syphilis (infectious), and Tuberculosis (active). Class B conditions were: Hansen's disease (not infectious), Tuberculosis (not active), and "Other physical defect, disease or disability." At page II-2, the technical instructions clarified that: "The responsibility of the civil surgeon is only to conduct the examination and testing required to determine the alien's status regarding Class A and Class B conditions and to complete the medical report form. . . . If the alien needs further evaluation or treatment for conditions not relevant to the medical examination, the physician should advise the alien of this and should make recommendations for appropriate diagnostic evaluation and treatment." The patient A. J. had an appointment for 5:00 p.m. She had requested a late afternoon appointment to minimize the time she would miss from her work. When the patient A. J. arrived at the Respondent's office, the Respondent was the only other person present in the office. During the entire time that the patient A. J. was in the Respondent's office on November 25, 1996, the only people in the office were the patient A. J. and the Respondent. Upon her arrival, the Respondent took the patient A. J. to an office, where she filled out some paperwork, including her name, address, and telephone number. The Respondent inquired as to exactly where on her street her residence was located. The Respondent made repeated inquiries about the location of the patient's residence and even asked the patient to draw a map to her residence. The Respondent asked the Patient A. J. if he could stop by her house sometime. The patient A. J. said, "No." The Respondent also asked the patient A. J. if she was married and if her marriage was "real." After finishing the paper work, the Respondent took the patient A. J. into a laboratory room, where he drew blood for two of the tests, and also administered the agent for the skin test for tuberculosis. The Respondent then took the patient A. J. to an examination room, gave her a gown, and instructed her to remove her clothing. The patient A. J. inquired as to whether she should remove her underpants. The Respondent replied, "Only if you want me to do a pelvic." The patient A. J. thereupon told the Respondent that she was due for a PAP test and that she needed birth control pills. The Respondent told the patient A. J. that it would be a good idea for her to start using birth control pills, in case she wanted to do anything while her husband was not around, because the pills would be added protection against pregnancy. The patient A. J. told the Respondent that she did not sleep around, to which he replied, "You can never tell what will happen." During the entire time the patient A. J. was in the Respondent's office, there was music playing in the office. The physical examination included an examination of the patient's breasts. While examining the patient's breasts, the Respondent sang along with the music. The Respondent also commented to the patient A. J. that the singer on the background music, Luther Vandross, was the greatest love song singer of all time. Following the examination that was required by the INS, the Respondent performed an internal pelvic examination of the patient A. J. This was an examination that involved the insertion of instrumentation and the insertion of the doctor's fingers into the vagina of the patient. The Respondent took an excessive amount of time in performing the internal pelvic examination. During the course of the internal pelvic examination, the Respondent told the patient A. J. that she had a heavy discharge. He then proceeded to ask her how often she became sexually aroused and how easily she became sexually aroused. During the course of the internal pelvic examination the patient A. J. became worried and asked the Respondent if the two of them were the only people in the office. The Respondent replied in the affirmative. The patient then began to feel afraid when it was confirmed that she was alone with the Respondent. Her fear arose from the fact that she was alone with a physician who had been making what she considered to be inappropriate comments and questions about her marriage, her affairs, and her sexual arousal. The internal pelvic examination of the patient A. J. was not required by the INS. The Respondent would not have conducted an internal pelvic examination of A. J. if she had not requested that such an internal examination be performed. The specific reasons for which A. J. requested, and consented to, an internal pelvic examination was to have a PAP smear performed and to determine if she had any condition that would contra-indicate the use of birth control pills. The patient A. J. believed that a physician could not, or would not, prescribe birth control pills without first conducting a PAP smear and an internal pelvic examination. The patient was correct in this belief. Acceptable standards of medical practice mandate that a physician perform a PAP smear and conduct an internal pelvic examination prior to prescribing birth control pills to a patient. If the Respondent was not going to perform a PAP smear and was not going to prescribe birth control pills, there was no reason for him to perform an internal pelvic examination of the patient A. J. During the course of the internal pelvic examination, the Respondent did not do a PAP smear of the patient A. J. The Respondent also refused to prescribe birth control pills for the patient A. J. When the patient repeated her request for a prescription for birth control pills, the Respondent replied that he could not prescribe the birth control pills for "personal reasons." When the patient inquired as to what he meant by "personal reasons," the Respondent said that he did not want to establish a doctor/patient relationship with the Respondent "because you can never tell what the future might bring." The Respondent also said to the patient A. J. that "in the future we might get involved," and he went on to explain that if that were to be the case, he could get in trouble if he were to be her doctor. The Respondent also told the patient A. J. that she was "too charming" to be his patient, and mentioned again that he didn't want to prescribe the birth control pills for her "because he didn't know if in the future we might have an affair," and for that reason he did not want to get into a doctor/patient relationship with the patient A. J. During a discussion following the examination, the Respondent asked the patient A. J. to return the following Friday (the day after Thanksgiving) to obtain the results of her blood tests and to have her skin test read. The patient told the Respondent she had plans for the long weekend and asked if she could return on Wednesday. The Respondent agreed that she could return on Wednesday. He also inquired about her weekend plans. The patient A. J. told the Respondent that she was going on a fishing trip with a girlfriend. Thereupon the Respondent asked the patient if she would go fishing with him sometime. He went on to mention that someone had given him some new fishing equipment that he had never had a chance to use. When patient A. J. asked how much she owed for the examination, the Respondent replied, "the cost is usually $2,000.00, but for you it will only be $120.00." As the patient A. J. was exiting the Respondent's office, the Respondent followed her out to her car. The patient had not asked the Respondent to escort her to her car and his presence made her nervous because she did not know his purpose in following her out to the car. As a result of the Respondent's comments and conduct, the patient A. J., in her words, "felt violated." The patient felt that many of the Respondent's comments and questions were inappropriately personal. She also felt that the Respondent had taken advantage of her by conducting an internal pelvic examination for the purported purpose of performing a PAP smear and determining if there was any condition that contra-indicated her use of birth control pills, and then not performing a PAP smear and not prescribing birth control pills because of the Respondent's interest in the possibility that they might have a future affair. Two days later, on Wednesday, November 27, 1996, the patient A. J. returned to the Respondent's office for the purpose of obtaining the results of the blood tests and to have her skin test read. On this occasion the patient was not alone with the Respondent at any time and she had only minimal contact with him. The Respondent did notice that the patient seemed to have a hostile attitude. On Friday, November 28, 1996, the Respondent called the home telephone number of the patient A. J. The patient was home, but she did not answer the telephone. The Respondent left a message on the patient's answering machine to the effect that he was just calling to "touch base" and that he would call her again later. There was no medical purpose for the telephone call. The comments and questions the Respondent made to the patient A. J. regarding such matters as whether her marriage was real, commenting that she was charming, asking her to go fishing with him, suggesting the possibility of a future affair, requesting a map to her house, asking if he could come visit her, and asking about her sexual arousal, all constitute inappropriate and unacceptable conversation by a physician to a patient. Comments and questions of this nature may reasonably be interpreted by the patient as being sexual in nature. It is a departure from accepted standards of medical practice for a physician to perform an internal pelvic examination on a patient without also having a third person in the examination room. A reasonably prudent, similar physician acting under similar conditions and circumstances would not perform an internal pelvic examination on a patient without also having a third person in the examination room. It is a departure from accepted standards of medical practice for a physician to perform an unnecessary internal pelvic examination on a patient. A reasonably prudent, similar physician acting under similar conditions and circumstances would not perform an unnecessary internal pelvic examination on a patient.
Recommendation On the basis of all of the foregoing it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be issued in this case to the following effect: Dismissing the charge in Count Three of the Administrative Complaint; Concluding that the Respondent has violated Sections 458.331(1)(j) and 458.331(1)(t), Florida Statutes, as charged in Counts One and Two of the Administrative Complaint, and Imposing a penalty for those violations consisting of (a) a letter of reprimand, (b) an administrative fine in the amount of $5,000.00, (c) suspension of the Respondent's license for a period of one year, and (d) placement of the Respondent on probation for a period of one year immediately following the period of suspension, with probation terms to be established by the Board of Medicine. Further, during the period of suspension, the Respondent should be required to attend courses to be determined by the Board of Medicine covering the subject matters of the patient-physician relationship and medical ethics. DONE AND ENTERED this 15th day of June, 1999, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. MICHAEL M. PARRISH Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of June, 1999.
The Issue Whether Respondent committed the violations alleged in the Amended Administrative Complaint; and, if so, the appropriate penalty therefor.
Findings Of Fact Parties and Investigation Leading to Issuance of the Amended Complaint The Department is the state agency responsible for regulating the practice of medicine pursuant to section 20.43, Florida Statutes, and chapters 456 and 458, Florida Statutes. Respondent, Aunali Salim Khaku, M.D., is a neurologist and sleep medicine specialist licensed (ME 114611) in Florida. Respondent completed a neurology residency in 2013 and a sleep medicine fellowship in 2014. He practiced at the VA from 2014 until 2020, initially at the Lake Baldwin facility and then at the Lake Nona facility. From 2020 until early 2021, Respondent practiced at Orlando Health. Other than the allegations herein, the Department has never sought to discipline Respondent. The Department seeks to revoke Respondent’s license based on allegations that he engaged in sexual misconduct during office visits with three female patients—S.R., M.H., and M.V.S. The parties stipulated that the factual allegations, if proven by clear and convincing evidence, constitute sexual misconduct under Florida law. On or around December 6, 2020, M.V.S. reported to both the LMPD and the Department that Respondent acted inappropriately during an office visit on November 30, 2020. The Department investigated further, interviewed M.V.S. and Respondent, and obtained medical records from Orlando Health. On February 17, 2021, the Department issued an Order of Emergency Restriction of License (“ERO”) that restricted Respondent from practicing on female patients based on findings of sexual misconduct with M.V.S. On February 22, 2021, Respondent requested an expedited hearing under sections 120.569 and 120.57. The Department properly did not transmit the case to DOAH at that time, as judicial review of the ERO is via petition in the appellate court. §§ 120.60(6)(c) and 120.68, Fla. Stat. Respondent filed such a petition, but the First District Court of Appeal ultimately denied it on the merits. On March 9, 2021, the Department presented its disciplinary case to a probable cause panel of the Board. After hearing argument from both parties, the panel unanimously found probable cause to issue a three-count Administrative Complaint (“Complaint”) seeking to discipline Respondent for engaging in sexual misconduct with M.V.S. On March 10, 2021, the Department issued the Complaint. On March 16, 2021, Respondent requested an expedited formal hearing under chapter 120. However, the Department did not immediately transmit the Complaint to DOAH because it had just received notification that the VA investigated complaints of sexual misconduct against Respondent by two veterans, S.R. and M.H., who each saw Respondent multiple times between 2014 and 2016. The Department obtained records from the VA. As to S.R., the VA closed the matter as unsubstantiated based on S.R.’s decision not to pursue criminal charges and the VA’s finding of insufficient evidence to support the allegations. As to M.H., the VA found no conclusive evidence of misconduct based on Respondent’s testimony, which was corroborated by the testimony of his nurse and a medical student. After receipt of the VA records, the Department interviewed S.R. and M.H. Based on this additional information, the Department presented its case to another probable cause panel to amend the Complaint to include allegations relating to S.R. and M.H. After hearing from both parties, the panel voted unanimously on April 23, 2021, to find probable cause of sexual misconduct with S.R. and M.H. On April 27, 2021, the Department issued the three-count Amended Complaint seeking to discipline Respondent’s license for sexual misconduct with S.R., M.H., and M.V.S. On April 29, 2021, Respondent filed a third request for a hearing, which sought transmission of the case to DOAH for an expedited evidentiary hearing to be held within 30 days. On April 30, 2021, 45 days after Respondent’s request for a hearing on the initial Complaint, the Department transmitted the Amended Complaint to DOAH to conduct an evidentiary hearing under chapter 120.2 2 In filings prior to transmittal of the Amended Complaint to DOAH, in pleadings prior to the final hearing, and orally at the final hearing, Respondent argued that the Department improperly delayed transmitting the case to DOAH and violated his due process rights throughout the investigatory process. Even had Respondent preserved those arguments by including them in his PRO, the undersigned would have found that the Department’s investigation, the probable cause panel proceedings, and the timing of the transmittal of the case to DOAH did not render the proceedings unfair or impair the correctness of the Department’s action based on the weight of the credible evidence. For one, the Department presented its case to the probable cause panel 20 days after issuing the ERO and issued the initial Complaint the next day. It presented the new allegations to a probable cause panel 65 days after the ERO (and 44 days after filing the initial Complaint) and issued the Amended Complaint the next day. The Department then transmitted the Amended Complaint to DOAH on April 30, 2021, one day after Respondent requested a hearing on it and 45 days after requesting a hearing on the initial Complaint. Based on this timeline, the Department met its obligation to promptly institute chapter 120 proceedings. See § 120.60(6)(c), Fla. Stat. (“Summary suspension, restriction, or limitation may be ordered, but a suspension or revocation proceeding pursuant to ss. 120.569 and 120.57 shall also be promptly instituted and acted upon.”); see also § 456.073(5), Fla. Stat. (“Notwithstanding s. 120.569(2), the department shall notify the division within 45 days after receipt of a petition or request for a formal hearing.”); Fla. Admin. Code. R. 28-106.501(3) (“In the case of the emergency suspension, limitation, or restriction of a license, unless otherwise provided by law, within 20 days after emergency action taken pursuant to subsection (1) of this rule, the agency shall initiate administrative proceedings in compliance with Sections 120.569, 120.57 and 120.60, F.S., and Rule 28- 106.2015, F.A.C.”). The weight of the credible evidence also failed to establish any resulting prejudice to Respondent. He presented no evidence as to how the Department’s decision to investigate the new allegations and issue the Amended Complaint before transmitting the case to DOAH prejudiced his ability to defend against the allegations. The Department notified Respondent of M.V.S.’s complaint and allowed him to provide statements during the investigation, make arguments before both probable cause panels, conduct discovery, and adequately prepare for and defend against the allegations at a final hearing. The fact that the VA did not comply with Respondent’s discovery requests or make witnesses available is neither attributable to the Department nor a reasonable basis to argue prejudice, particularly where Respondent failed to enforce subpoenas or challenge the VA’s discovery objections in state or federal court. The undersigned simply cannot find that the Department violated Respondent’s due process rights by waiting 45 days to transmit the case to DOAH while the Department investigated new allegations involving two other female patients. At best, Respondent’s alleged prejudice is that the Department was able to prosecute him for sexual misconduct with two additional patients, which it had authority to do independently by separate complaint or by moving to amend the Complaint once it transmitted the case to DOAH. The latter option could have resulted in even more delay, as DOAH may have had to relinquish jurisdiction to allow for the new allegations to be approved by a probable cause panel if the Department had not already completed that necessary step. S.R.’s Two Appointments with Respondent in 2014 and 2015 In 2014, S.R., a 58-year-old veteran who just moved to Orlando, requested a neurology referral because she suffers from multiple sclerosis (“MS”). The VA referred her to Respondent with whom she had two office visits. On December 29, 2014, S.R. had her first appointment with Respondent at the VA Lake Baldwin facility. Respondent’s assistant took S.R.’s vitals but did not remain in the room during the examination.3 S.R. never asked for a chaperone to be present and one was not offered to her. Respondent entered the room and made introductions with S.R. They discussed the new VA facility in Lake Nona, where Respondent lived, and restaurants in that area. According to S.R., Respondent said that he hoped to see her, though she did not understand what that meant. S.R. explained that she suffered her first MS attack over 30 years earlier but only recently was diagnosed with the disease after a neurologist ordered an MRI. She discussed her current symptoms, including back pain, muscle spasms, and fatigue. Respondent told her that back problems were common for women with large breasts, which she thought was odd. But, she expressed hope that Respondent could continue to help with her symptoms much like her prior neurologists in South Carolina and South Florida. Respondent examined S.R. and tested her reflexes, vision, coordination, and physical limitations. Respondent said he wanted to listen to S.R.’s heart. Without even trying to listen over her clothes, he asked S.R. to lift her t-shirt. He began rubbing his stethoscope across both her breasts and under her bra. He then cupped the bottom of her left breast with the palm of 3 The VA advocate’s report indicated that S.R. said that Respondent instructed his assistant to leave the room prior to his examination. However, S.R. testified credibly that she never made that allegation and her handwritten statement to the VA advocate also contained no such allegation. That the VA advocate’s hearsay report says otherwise neither calls S.R.’s credibility into doubt nor undermines the clear and consistent nature of her testimony. his hand while holding the stethoscope between his fingers and touching her nipple. This portion of the examination lasted about ten seconds. At the end of the initial visit, Respondent discussed treatment plans, medication, and physical therapy with S.R. They scheduled a follow-up appointment for several months later. Respondent documented S.R.’s records based on his examination. Although S.R. testified credibly that she had a heart murmur, Respondent noted a regular heart rate and rhythm with no murmurs. He also continued S.R.’s prescription for Diazepam, though several months later he placed an addendum for that initial visit record to indicate the prescription was improperly entered under his name and that he would defer to S.R.’s primary care physician for that medication. S.R. thought Respondent’s conduct was weird because no doctor had ever listened to her heart under her clothes or touched her breasts in that manner. She felt confused and uncomfortable, but she did not report the incident then because she trusted Respondent as her doctor and thought it could have been a mistake. She also thought Respondent might be the only neurologist at the VA. She discussed the incident with her husband and decided that she would be more aware at subsequent appointments. On March 30, 2015, S.R. had her second visit with Respondent at the Lake Nona facility. She arrived early, but the office staff delayed bringing her back and then had trouble taking her vitals. S.R. did not request a chaperone for this visit because everyone seemed very busy. Respondent entered the room and they were again alone. Respondent seemed irritated because he thought S.R. arrived late, which made her defensive. She complained of left hip pain and told Respondent that she had not gone for physical therapy. He examined her hip by lifting her leg, which hurt. She then sat up and he said he needed to listen to her heart. Again, without attempting to listen over her t-shirt and bra, he told her to lift her t-shirt. Because of what occurred during the last visit, S.R. kept her arms tightly by her sides to limit Respondent’s ability to touch her breasts. He kept using his elbow to try to relax her arms while moving the stethoscope higher over her breasts, eventually cupping her breast under her bra. He grabbed at her breasts but got frustrated by her refusal to relax her arms. At that point, Respondent threw the stethoscope into the sink and became angry, which startled S.R. and made her uncomfortable. She requested that he continue her Diazepam prescription to help her sleep at night, which she said her prior neurologist prescribed for muscle spasms. Respondent told her that the drug was for anxiety, not muscle spasms, though he documented in her record that she should continue to take the medication. Respondent also documented again that S.R. had a regular heart rate and rhythm. S.R. felt uncomfortable during the entire visit. She had never had a neurologist get angry or confrontational with her, but she decided not to report the incidents at that time because she was in pain and just wanted to go home. About a month later, she awoke in the middle of the night and realized the inappropriateness of Respondent’s conduct. In August 2015, S.R. returned to the Lake Nona facility to schedule an appointment with a different neurologist. When she saw Respondent’s name on the signage, she immediately went to the patient advocate to report his misconduct in the hope of preventing him from engaging in the same behavior with other patients. She met with the patient advocate and the VA police, and she completed a written statement. Although she was supposed to testify before the VA investigative board, she had trouble finding the room that day and left without speaking to anyone. Based on S.R.’s decision not to pursue criminal charges and the VA’s finding of insufficient evidence to support the allegations, the VA closed the matter as unsubstantiated. However, the matter was referred for clinical and/or administrative follow- up, which resulted in the VA updating its chaperone policy to require signs to be posted in the offices to put patients on notice of their right to ask for a chaperone. S.R. did not report the incidents to the Department at the time because she did not realize she could do so. But, when the Department contacted her in 2021 about this case, she agreed to participate and testify. The undersigned found S.R. to be a highly credible witness who unequivocally testified about Respondent’s inappropriate sexual behavior. S.R.’s testimony was compelling, specific, clear, and materially consistent with the statements she made when the incidents first occurred. Respondent testified about his treatment of S.R., but he conceded he had no independent recollection of the visits. Instead, he based his testimony on what he documented in her medical records and his standard practice. Respondent testified that he conducted a thorough examination in the same manner that he evaluates all of his new patients. He performed a cardiac examination over S.R.’s clothing by placing a stethoscope on her chest in several areas to listen to her heart. He confirmed that he never places the stethoscope on, or allows his hand to come into contact with, a patient’s breasts and that it was impossible that such contact happened with S.R. even inadvertently. He also said that he always has a chaperone present if he needs to listen to a female patient’s heart under her clothing and that is exactly what he would have done had he needed to do so with S.R. Respondent denied engaging in any inappropriate behavior with S.R. and suggested instead that she misperceived what happened. However, he offered no credible explanation for S.R. having such a misperception, except to accuse her of being upset for his refusal to prescribe her Diazepam. S.R.’s medical records fail to document any cognitive impairment and Respondent confirmed that she did not suffer from hallucinations or ailments that would cause her to imagine things that did not happen. Although S.R. admitted that it took her a few months to fully realize what Respondent had done and to report it to the VA, the undersigned has no hesitation in finding her testimony to be a fair and accurate account of Respondent’s actual conduct. The records themselves also call the veracity of Respondent’s testimony into question. Although S.R. credibly testified that she had a heart murmur, Respondent documented the lack of such a murmur even after conducting two cardiovascular examinations of her. Had Respondent conducted a proper cardiac examination, he should have identified and documented her murmur. Further, it cannot be ignored that the treatment plan for both visits continued her prescription for Diazepam, even though Respondent—after the first visit but before the second visit—placed an addendum in the record to indicate that S.R. needed to obtain the prescription from her primary care physician. Respondent’s notes for the March 2015 visit also document that Diazepam continued to be an active prescription for S.R., undermining the suggestion that she would fabricate an allegation of sexual misconduct against Respondent on that basis. Moreover, Respondent’s expert neurologist had never heard of a patient fabricating sexual misconduct allegations against a doctor for failing to prescribe medication. Based on the weight of the credible evidence, the undersigned finds that the Department proved by clear and convincing evidence that Respondent engaged in sexual misconduct with S.R. During the first visit, Respondent directed S.R. to lift her shirt and inappropriately rubbed his stethoscope across her breasts and under her bra, cupped her left breast with the palm of his hand while holding the stethoscope between his fingers, and touched her nipple. During the second appointment, Respondent directed S.R. to lift her shirt again. Although S.R. kept her arms tightly against her sides to try to limit Respondent’s ability to touch her inappropriately, he inappropriately rubbed the stethoscope across her breasts, cupped her breast under her bra, and grabbed at her breasts. Respondent did so on both occasions without first attempting to listen to S.R.’s heart over her clothing, which itself was contrary to the standard of care. M.H.’s Four Appointments with Respondent in 2015 and 2016 In late 2015, the VA referred M.H., a 39-year-old veteran, to Respondent for a neurological evaluation after she had an abnormal MRI showing white matter changes in her brain following an illegal drug overdose. M.H. had four office visits with Respondent at the Lake Nona facility on August 12, 2015, November 6, 2015, June 23, 2016, and August 1, 2016. During the first three visits, Respondent discussed M.H.’s medical history, prior drug use, and symptoms, including migraines, pain, possible nerve damage, and cognitive and motor issues; he also conducted physical and neurological examinations. During the fourth visit, Respondent performed a nerve block procedure to address M.H.’s migraines. M.H. testified about the visits and her uncomfortable interactions with Respondent. During several visits, he discussed the lack of sex with his wife and that she allowed him to step outside the marriage. He either asked M.H. out on a date or to meet at a hotel, which she interpreted as an offer of sex, and he also asked if he could call her. He asked her questions about her sex life several times, including how often she had sex with her boyfriend, what positions they liked, the size of her bra, and whether sex was painful. M.H. testified that Respondent also acted inappropriately. During one visit, he either lifted her shirt or asked her to lift her shirt to look at her breasts and listen to her heart. He once blocked the door to prevent her from leaving the room and attempted to put his arms around her to hug her. He once put his hands on the bottom of her buttocks, like a lover’s caress. During the fourth visit when the nurse left the room after the procedure, he had an erection and rubbed it through his pants against her leg while trying to give her a hug. She said that she told her mother in the waiting room after that visit that Respondent had rubbed his erection on her. She also said that he told her not to say anything about their interactions at each visit. In August 2016, M.H. reported Respondent’s conduct to the VA; she did not report the conduct to the Department because she did not know she could. The VA investigative board conducted sworn interviews of M.H., Respondent, his nurse, and a medical student, and it considered numerous letters of recommendation from Respondent’s patients and colleagues. It found no conclusive evidence of sexual misconduct based on Respondent’s testimony, as corroborated by testimony from a nurse and a medical student. M.H. testified passionately about Respondent’s conduct and how it made her feel. However, her recollection of the details—as to what occurred, when, and who was present—was fuzzy and inconsistent in material ways with the testimony she gave to the VA board in 2016, her deposition testimony in this case, and the testimony of her mother. M.H. stated that her recollection in 2016 was better than now, but the inconsistencies outlined below affect the weight to be given to M.H.’s testimony. M.H. testified initially that she and Respondent were alone in the examination room at some point during each visit. M.H. testified that she asked to have her daughter present during either the third or fourth visit, but Respondent refused. M.H. also testified on cross examination that she could not recall if her mother was in the room with her during the first two visits, only to later confirm that her mother must have been present during those two visits based on the testimony she gave before the VA board in 2016. M.H.’s mother testified that she accompanied M.H. to two of the visits, though she could not recall the dates. Contrary to M.H.’s testimony, her mother said she neither came back to the examination room nor met Respondent at any visit and based her testimony solely on what M.H. said. M.H.’s mother testified that M.H. said that Respondent asked her out after one visit and rubbed his erection against her back after another visit, which contravened M.H.’s testimony that Respondent rubbed his erection against her leg while hugging her from the front. Before the VA board in 2016, and contrary to her testimony at the final hearing, M.H. said that Respondent acted professionally during the first two visits and that her mother was present in the examination room both times. M.H. testified that Respondent became unprofessional while they were alone in the room during the final two visits, at which he asked inappropriate questions about her sex life. M.H. explained that she was offered a chaperone before the third visit, but she refused because nothing unprofessional had occurred before, and that Respondent refused to allow her daughter to be in the room during the procedure on the fourth visit. M.H. said Respondent grabbed her buttocks during the third visit and, during the fourth visit, he blocked the door after the procedure, grabbed her buttocks, lifted her shirt to comment on how much he liked her breasts, and rubbed his erection through his pants on her leg. When cross-examined about the inconsistencies, M.H. testified at the final hearing that she may have been protecting Respondent by saying in 2016 that he acted professionally during the first two visits, though she now recalls him acting unprofessionally during all four visits. During her pre-hearing deposition in this case, M.H. testified that Respondent asked questions about her sex life and bra size, discussed his open marriage, and asked her out during the first visit, but he did not touch her inappropriately. M.H. testified that Respondent refused to allow her daughter to stay in the room with her during the second visit and, after the examination, he blocked the door, grabbed her and tried to hug her, rubbed his erection on her stomach and leg, and again reiterated that he was allowed to have sex outside his marriage. She testified that Respondent discussed his open marriage and asked her to date him during the third visit; M.H. said that the office refused to allow her mother to accompany her in the room. M.H. testified that the only uncomfortable thing that Respondent did during the fourth visit was ask her out repeatedly. M.H. testified that Respondent never asked if she wanted a chaperone at any of the visits, though she later acknowledged that a chaperone was present at the fourth visit. Respondent testified about his treatment of M.H. based only on what he documented in her chart, as he had no independent recollection beyond his review of her medical records. Respondent denied any inappropriate behavior with M.H. He claimed that he never allowed himself to be alone in a room with her because she was engaging in manipulative, drug-seeking behavior. He basically accused M.H. of fabricating the allegations against him because he refused to prescribe her pain medication. However, Respondent’s accusations against M.H. are questionable for several reasons. Respondent never documented in her record his concern about M.H.’s alleged drug-seeking behavior, that a chaperone needed to be present at all visits, or that she had requested pain medication. Although he documented the presence of his nurse and a medical student at the fourth visit, he failed to do the same for the first three visits. One would expect a physician—surely one as concerned about a patient’s drug-seeking history and behavior as Respondent now claims to be—to document those concerns and the presence of chaperones in the medical record to prevent any future false accusation. This is particularly so given that Respondent, at the time, had recently been accused of misconduct by S.R., which he believed was both false and based on her drug-seeking behavior. The medical records also confirm that M.H. informed Respondent at the June 2016 visit that she had been prescribed Lyrica for pain while in jail and that it was working. Respondent noted, “Renewed lyrica,” in the plan/recs section of the record for that visit. Respondent also noted Pregabalin, the generic name for Lyrica,4 in both the active and pending medication lists for both the June and August 2016 visits. The weight of the credible evidence does not support Respondent’s claim that M.H. fabricated her allegations because he refused to prescribe her pain medication, particularly given her credible testimony that she did not 4 According to WebMD, the generic name for Lyrica is Pregabalin. Available at https://www.webmd.com/drugs/2/drug-93965/lyrica-oral/details. need pain medication because Respondent continued her Lyrica prescription. It also bears repeating that Respondent’s own expert had never heard of a patient falsely accusing a doctor of sexual misconduct for refusing to prescribe medication. After evaluating the evidence, the undersigned finds M.H. generally to be a more credible witness overall than Respondent. She testified passionately and credibly about Respondent’s requests to meet her outside the office because he had an open marriage and his wife allowed such conduct. She also credibly explained how Respondent commented on the size of her breasts, grabbed her buttocks, and rubbed his erection on her. Importantly, however, the undersigned cannot ignore that the clear and convincing evidence standard applies in this case. M.H.’s recollection was too fuzzy and inconsistent to definitively find without hesitation that Respondent engaged in the exact sexual misconduct alleged by M.H. and set forth in the Amended Complaint. If the Department’s burden in this case was a mere preponderance of the evidence, the undersigned would likely find that it proved Respondent engaged in sexual misconduct with M.H. But, the clear and convincing evidence standard applies herein. And, because M.H. could not provide the type of definitive and clear testimony required in this disciplinary action, the Department failed to prove that Respondent engaged in sexual misconduct with M.H. M.V.S.’s One Appointment with Respondent in 2020 On November 30, 2020, M.V.S., a 68-year-old woman, had an initial neurology consult with Respondent at Orlando Health. M.V.S. sought a neurologist based on an abnormal MRI showing a cyst near her pituitary gland and complaints of neck pain radiating to her shoulder and arm. After filling out paperwork in the reception area, a medical assistant or nurse brought M.V.S. to an examination room. The room had an examination table, which could be lowered, a counter, and a chair. M.V.S. sat in the chair while the assistant took her vitals. Although M.V.S. has a history of blood pressure spikes, for which she has called 911 and even gone to the hospital several times, her blood pressure was within normal limits that morning. The assistant waited for M.V.S. to complete the paperwork and then left the room. Respondent entered the room a few minutes later and closed the door behind him. He wore green scrubs and a white lab coat; she wore a skirt, blouse, bra, and underwear. He and M.V.S. were alone for the remainder of the appointment. They initially discussed M.V.S.’s medical history and complaints. M.V.S. talked about her aunt, who had symptoms of Alzheimer’s disease and did not recognize her on a recent visit. She was concerned about the disease because she recently had forgotten some small details, like the name of an actor in a movie. M.V.S. did not believe she had significant memory issues, but she wanted research on the disease because it ran in her family. Respondent asked M.V.S. if she lived with anyone, which she interpreted as a question relating to her safety. She informed him that she lived alone within close proximity to a fire station. She also mentioned that her daughter lived in Orlando and her fiancé lived in Longwood. Respondent asked if she had sexual relations with her fiancé; she explained that they did not because her fiancé had prostate cancer. M.V.S. thought the question was odd given the reason for the appointment and because no other physician had ever asked that type of question before. Respondent moved on to M.V.S.’s complaints of neck pain. She explained that she experienced pain on the left side of her neck that radiated to her left shoulder and left arm. At that point, Respondent directed M.V.S. to sit on the table so he could examine her. While standing to M.V.S.’s left, Respondent rubbed and squeezed her neck and shoulders with his thumbs and fingers for a couple of minutes. No other doctor had examined her in that fashion before. He said she felt tense, but never asked if she experienced pain during the examination. She confirmed that it definitely felt like a neck and shoulder massage, which she had received many times. She noted that her cardiologist had recently palpated her neck for pain by using two fingers to poke and feel around, which was different than Respondent’s examination. Indeed, when a doctor palpates for pain, they typically use two fingertips to lightly press and prod in the trouble areas and obtain feedback from the patient about the level of pain. Respondent then examined M.V.S.’s spine while she stood in front of him. He thereafter examined her reflexes, eyes, and extremity strength while she sat on the table. He also conducted a memory test, which she passed. M.V.S. did not recall Respondent listening to her heart during the visit. At that point, Respondent directed M.V.S. to lie face-down on the table, which already was lowered. He asked if he could raise her skirt and she said, yes, because she believed it related to a muscular or skeletal examination. He raised her skirt and, over her underwear, rubbed her lower back and eventually moved down to her buttocks using both of his hands. He rubbed and squeezed both of her buttocks. She confirmed it felt like a deliberate, prolonged massage, which had never happened to her at a doctor’s office. Her mind raced, she felt frozen, and she could not believe what was happening. After one to two minutes, Respondent told her to sit up because he heard a voice. She sat on the end of the table and he began massaging and squeezing her right breast while standing on her right. He told her that he had never done this before and that she was beautiful. She thanked him in a low voice, but she was afraid and felt trapped because they were alone, there were no witnesses, and she was unsure of what he would do. Respondent asked if M.V.S. was comfortable with him massaging her breast and he stopped when she said no. He moved to her left side and explained that his wife would not have sex with him, so she permitted him to have sex outside the marriage. He asked if M.V.S. would meet him for sex and she declined. Respondent asked if that was because her fiancé would object, and she confirmed they had a commitment. At that point, Respondent pulled his lab coat back and said, “Look at this. Look what you did to me.” Respondent revealed his erect penis, which M.V.S. confirmed was clearly visible through his scrubs. Respondent told her to keep this between us, said his assistant would be in shortly with paperwork, and left the room. M.V.S. waited for about seven minutes and, when no one came, she left the room, tried to hold her composure, and checked out. She said nothing before leaving because she felt unsafe and was unsure if anyone would believe her anyway. M.V.S. turned on her car’s air conditioning and drank water to calm down. Her heart was pounding, and she feared having a blood pressure spike. As soon as she arrived home, M.V.S. called her daughter to tell her what happened. M.V.S.’s daughter, who is a nurse, told her to call the police. M.V.S. called the LMPD that afternoon. The officer with whom she spoke suggested that she file a complaint with the Department, which she did on December 6, 2020. Both the Department and the LMPD investigated the allegations, which included interviews of M.V.S. and Respondent.5 M.V.S. also reported the incident to Orlando Health risk management. The undersigned found M.V.S. to be a highly credible witness who testified passionately and definitively about Respondent’s inappropriate sexual behavior during the office visit. She immediately reported it to the LMPD and, within a week, filed complaints with both the Department and Respondent’s employer. M.V.S.’s testimony was clear, specific, detailed, compelling, and materially consistent with the interviews and statements she gave immediately following the visit. Respondent testified about his treatment of M.V.S., but—as he did with the S.R. and M.H.—he conceded he had little to no independent 5 Based on the information obtained from M.V.S. and Respondent, the LMPD placed the case into inactive status pending further evidence. recollection of her or the visit. Instead, he reviewed her medical records, which refreshed his recollection of what occurred during the visit. Respondent denied engaging in any inappropriate behavior with M.V.S. that could have been interpreted as sexual or outside the scope of a proper examination. He testified that he conducted a neurological examination, palpated her neck for pain, checked her reflexes, and conducted a memory test. He said he never massaged her neck and shoulders, touched or massaged her breasts or buttocks, discussed his marriage, solicited her to have sex, said she was beautiful, or revealed an erection through his scrubs. He also said she could not have laid face-down on the table because he never lowered the back or extended the footrest; he confirmed that he would have brought in a chaperone if he needed her to lie on the table. Respondent testified that M.V.S.’s accusations against him were the product of memory loss and cognitive impairment. Although M.V.S. reported a family history of Alzheimer’s and a fear of mild memory loss, Respondent documented that she performed well on her memory and cognitive examinations. M.V.S. and her daughter testified credibly that she did not experience significant memory loss beyond forgetting the name of an actor in a movie. Respondent himself confirmed that M.V.S. did not suffer from hallucinations or ailments that would cause her to perceive things that were not there—a point with which his expert neurologist agreed given the way Respondent documented the medical record. And, more importantly, M.V.S.’s ability to recall the specific details of the visit and do so consistently with the statements she made previously undermine Respondent’s belief that cognitive impairment caused her to fabricate her allegations. The weight of the credible evidence simply does not support the suggestion that M.V.S. misperceived, confabulated, or fabricated her allegations based on memory loss or cognitive impairment. Additionally, Respondent attempted to discredit M.V.S. by suggesting that she may have come onto him. Indeed, he testified that she was verbose and told him during their initial discussion about her history that her fiancé was older, that she was a 60s baby, and that she had not been touched in a while. Aside from M.V.S.’s credible testimony that she said no such things, it cannot be ignored that Respondent conceded that his memory of the visit was based on his review of the medical record, which contained no reference to these comments even though Respondent says they were odd. Respondent also presented evidence that M.V.S. had previously called 911 on multiple occasions relating to blood pressure spikes to undermine the veracity of her testimony. However, the recordings of the 911 calls reveal an individual who, despite being concerned about her blood pressure, is alert, aware of her surroundings, clear-headed, and in no way suffering from an illness that would raise doubts about the veracity of her testimony or her credibility overall. Based on the weight of the credible evidence, the undersigned finds that the Department proved by clear and convincing evidence that Respondent engaged in sexual misconduct with M.V.S. He inappropriately massaged her neck and shoulders, buttocks, and breast. He disclosed that he had an open marriage and solicited M.V.S. to meet him for sex outside the office. He also told her that she was beautiful and revealed his erection through his scrubs.
Conclusions For Petitioner: Kristen Summers, Esquire Elizabeth Tiernan, Esquire Prosecution Services Unit Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin C-65 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3265 For Respondent: Kathryn Hood, Esquire Pennington, P.A. 215 South Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Jon M. Pellett, Esquire Pennington, P.A. 12724 Gran Bay Parkway West, Suite 401 Jacksonville, Florida 32258
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Health, Board of Medicine, issue a final order finding Respondent committed sexual misconduct prohibited by sections 458.331(1)(j), 458.329, and 456.063(1), suspending Respondent’s license for two years, and thereafter permanently restricting his license to either prohibit him from seeing female patients or, at a minimum, doing so without a chaperone present.7 DONE AND ENTERED this 28th day of October, 2021, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ANDREW D. MANKO Administrative Law Judge 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of October, 2021. 7 Section 456.072(4), Florida Statutes, provides that the Board, in addition to any other discipline imposed through final order, “shall assess costs related to the investigation and prosecution of the case.” Prior to the final hearing, the parties agreed to bifurcate the investigative costs issue (including Respondent’s argument that such costs should not be assessed because they are based on unpromulgated rules) pending resolution of the merits of the Amended Complaint. Upon further reflection, the undersigned concludes that resolving such an issue—even in a bifurcated proceeding—is premature because the Board has not yet issued a final order disciplining Respondent or followed the procedure in section 456.072(4), which requires it to consider an affidavit of itemized costs and any written objections thereto. It is in those written objections where Respondent may challenge the costs as being based on an unpromulgated rule. And, if Respondent’s written objections create a disputed issue of fact, the Department can transmit the investigative costs issue to DOAH to resolve that dispute, just as it did in Case No. 20-5385F. COPIES FURNISHED: Jon M. Pellett, Esquire Pennington, P.A. Suite 401 12724 Gran Bay Parkway West Jacksonville, Florida 32258 Kathryn Hood, Esquire Pennington, P.A. 215 South Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Donna C. McNulty, Esquire Office of the Attorney General The Capitol, Plaza Level 01 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Paul A. Vazquez, JD, Executive Director Board of Medicine Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin C-03 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3253 Kristen Summers, Esquire Prosecution Services Unit Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin C-65 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3265 Elizabeth Tiernan, Esquire Prosecution Services Unit Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin C-65 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3265 Edward A. Tellechea, Esquire Office of the Attorney General The Capitol, Plaza Level 01 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Louise St. Laurent, General Counsel Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin C-65 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3265
The Issue Whether Respondent is guilty of violating Sections 458.331(1)(c), (j), (t), and (x), Florida Statutes, and if so, what penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Respondent, Jeffrey L. Katzell, M.D. (Dr. Katzell), is and has been at all material times to this proceeding a physician, licensed in the State of Florida by the Petitioner, Agency for Health Care Administration (AHCA). Dr. Katzell was issued license number ME 0050379. Dr. Katzell is a board certified orthopedic surgeon. He entered the private practice of orthopedic surgery in Palm Beach County in 1987. Prior to the allegations which are the subject of this proceeding, Dr. Katzell has never been the subject of a medical malpractice complaint or any form of disciplinary action by the Board of Medicine in any state. PATIENT T.B. T.B. is the female patient referred to in Counts 1-3 of DOAH Case No. 93-7122, DPR Case No. 92-3917. From December 12, 1991, through February 6, 1992, Dr. Katzell treated T.B. who was at that time 24 years old. Her chief complaints were of pain in her back, neck, wrist and chest as a result of trying to catch herself from falling while walking down some stairs. She complained of chest pain that felt like a band around her chest. She had pain when breathing. On the December 12, 1991, visit, a female medical assistant asked T.B. to disrobe and put on an examining gown which opened down the back. T.B. wore her panties under the gown and no bra. Dr. Katzell examined T.B. in the presence of a female medical assistant. As part of his examination, he palpated T.B.'s sternum and examined her ribs by placing his left hand through the armhole of the examining gown and his right hand on her back. Dr. Katzell moved the fingers of his left hand in different locations on her chest and asked T.B. if it hurt in those areas. During the examination, the palm of Dr. Katzell's hand touched the nipple of T.B.'s breast. It is possible for a physician to examine a female patient's sternum and ribs without touching her nipples but it is also possible that a physician could accidently touch the nipple of the breast while performing such an examination. It was appropriate for Dr. Katzell to examine T.B.'s sternum and ribs, given the nature of her complaints. It was not below the standard of care nor does it constitute sexual activity or sexual misconduct for an orthopedic surgeon to have physical contact with the breast in the manner described by T.B. during the course of performing an examination of the chest. On January 23, 1992, T.B. returned to Dr. Katzell for a follow-up examination. She was complaining of pain in the area of the left sciatic joint which is located in the buttock. For the examination she was wearing a T-Shirt, panties, and a bra underneath the examining gown. Dr. Katzell asked her to remove her panties so that he could give her a cortisone shot in her buttock. She removed her panties. Dr. Katzell gave her an injection of cortisone in her buttock while she lay face down on the examining table. He left the room for a short period of time. When he returned, he rubbed the medication in to diffuse the medicine. Then he asked her to turn over and he began to manipulate her legs to see if the shot had worked. The examination includes flexing and extending the legs, as well as abduction (spread eagle) and adduction (legs crossed). T.B. did not have any panties on while he was putting her legs in different positions and her genital area was exposed. It was appropriate for Dr. Katzell to check T.B.'s range of motion, but it was inappropriate for him to perform the examination while the lower half of her body, including her genitalia were exposed. To have performed the range of motion test while the patient's genitalia was exposed was below the level of care, skill, and treatment which is recognized by a reasonably prudent physician as being acceptable under similar conditions and circumstances. On February 6, 1992, T.B. returned for a follow up visit, continuing to complain of low back pain related to the sciatic joint. Again T.B. was asked to disrobe and put on an examining gown. She wore two tank tops, a bra, and panties underneath the examining gown. Dr. Katzell asked her to remove her panties so that he could give her another cortisone shot. She removed her panties. Another man was present when Dr. Katzell gave T.B. the injection. The man and Dr. Katzell left the examining room after the injection was administered. Dr. Katzell returned a short time later and told T.B. that he probably needed to manipulate the shot into the buttock. He opened the back of her gown and started to rub her buttock with both hands. Cortisone is a non-absorbable medication. The standard of care for orthopedic surgery recognizes that it is helpful and appropriate to massage the area of the injection to diffuse the medication. After Dr. Katzell massaged T.B.'s buttocks, he took his right hand and pulled her leg open. Dr. Katzell then made a sweeping motion with his hand from her vagina to her rectum. T.B. jumped to the side and pulled the gown closed. She asked him why he was giving her a shot in the buttock when it was her hip that hurt. Dr. Katzell told her that if she did not like it that she could come back for more. T.B. started to cry. The touching of T.B.'s genitalia from her vagina to her rectum was inappropriate and was below the level of care, skill, and treatment which is recognized by a reasonably prudent similar physician as being acceptable under similar conditions and circumstances. The touching was sexual misconduct in that the touching was a violation of the patient-physician relationship through which Dr. Katzell intentionally touched the vagina of T.B. and such touching was outside the scope of generally accepted treatment and examination of the patient. T.B. left Dr. Katzell's office and went to her workers' compensation attorney complaining of her treatment from the doctor. T.B. told her husband what had happened and they called the police. As a result of the above-described events T.B. filed a complaint with the State Attorney of Palm Beach County, Florida, upon which a criminal information was filed against Dr. Katzell bearing Case No. 92-28364-MMA02. On January 19, 1993, Dr. Katzell entered a plea of nolo contendere to the charge of battery on the person of T.B. and the Court adjudicated Dr. Katzell guilty. T.B. has filed a civil action for monetary damages against Dr. Katzell. PATIENT A.F. A.F. is the female patient referred to in Counts 4-6 of the Administrative Complaint in DOAH Case No. 93-7122, DPR Case No. 92-3917. A.F. was involved in a head on automobile accident on August 30, 1991. At that time she was 30 years old. After the accident she was treated by Dr. Michael Nathanson, a chiropractor. He referred her to Dr. Katzell for a complete orthopedic examination. Dr. Katzell first saw A.F. on October 9, 1991. She was complaining of pain in her sternum, sciatic pain, neck pain, and pain in the middle and low portion of her back. A.F. told Dr. Katzell that she had severe pain in sternum but that she did not have any bruises on her breasts. Her chiropractor had advised her that she had cracked two ribs. During Dr. Katzell's first examination of A.F. no other persons were present in the room. A.F. was wearing an examining gown, panties, and a bra. While A.F. was standing, Dr. Katzell pulled down her examining gown and removed her bra straps from her shoulder, exposing her sternum and breasts. She tried to pull the gown back up but he pushed it back down. Given the nature of A.F.'s complaints relating to her sternum and ribs, it was appropriate for Dr. Katzell to examine the sternum, to palpate the costochondral junction where the ribs meet the sternum, and to palpate the ribs. Dr. Katzell palpated the ribs and the costochondral junction during his examination. While he was examining her, his fingers did come in contact with A.F.'s breasts. The standard of care is not violated when a physician's hand comes in contact with the breast during an examination of the anterior chest such as was performed by Dr. Katzell. By touching A.F.'s breasts, Dr. Katzell did not engage in sexual activity. After her visit with Dr. Katzell, A.F. told Dr. Nathanson that she did not think that Dr. Katzell's examination had been appropriate. On October 29, 1991, A.F. returned to Dr. Katzell for a follow-up visit. She was complaining of hip pain and sciatic pain, with a pain in the crease of her leg where the elastic of her panties would be. She put on the examining robe and left on her panties and bra. No attendant was present during the examination. A.F. was standing while Dr. Katzell was examining her. He put his thumbs underneath her panties and palpated the inguinal crease (where the elastic of the panties would be located). As he was examining her, he put his right thumb in the crease in the vaginal area across her clitoris and went down underneath in the vaginal area. She told him that it did not hurt there and he went back up across the same area. Dr. Katzell's touching of A.F.'s clitoris and her vaginal area was unjustified and inappropriate. The touching was below the level of care, skill, and treatment which is recognized by a reasonably prudent similar physician as being acceptable under similar circumstances. The touching was also sexual misconduct. On November 11, 1991, A.F. returned to see Dr. Katzell for the results of her MRI test. Dr. Katzell asked her twice to put on the examining robe but she refused to do so. A.F. called Petitioner and filed a complaint against Dr. Katzell. Later A.F. instituted a civil action against Dr. Katzell. Additionally, as a result of the above-described events A.F. filed a complaint with the State Attorney of Palm Beach County, Florida, upon which a criminal information was filed against Dr. Katzell bearing case number 92-28366- MMA02. On January 19, 1993, Dr. Katzell entered a plea of nolo contendere to the charge of battery on the person of A.F. and the Court adjudicated the Respondent guilty. PATIENT BB Patient B.B. is the female patient referred to in Counts 7-9 of the Administrative Complaint in DOAH Case No. 93-7122 and DPR Case No. 92-3917. B.B. was a nurse in a hospital where Dr. Katzell performed surgery. In the summer of 1990, she began experiencing pain in her left hip, radiating to her left knee and foot and causing her to limp. Dr. Katzell noticed her limp and told her that a cortisone shot could help. She agreed to the injection. They went to the cast room in the emergency room of the hospital. Dr. Katzell asked her to put on an examining gown while he stepped out of the room. She complied. Dr. Katzell gave B.B. an injection and told her that it was not necessary for him to see her in his office. He did not charge B.B. for the treatment. It is not unusual for physicians to perform courtesy examinations for the nurses. B.B. experienced some minimal relief, but the pain returned in a couple of weeks. Dr. Katzell suggested another injection. They went to the cast room where the first examination had taken place. On the way to the cast room, B.B. told Dr. Katzell that she was also experiencing pain in her tailbone that resulted from an accident she had while giving childbirth years before. He told her that he would need to do a vaginal examination to determine where to place the shot in her tailbone. He performed a vaginal examination by inserting his fingers into her vagina. He did not perform a rectal examination. No one else was present during Dr. Katzell's examination of B.B. Vaginal examinations are not used in the diagnosis or treatment of back pain, coccydynia (pain in the tailbone) or to locate a favorable injection site for the treatment of these conditions. The giving of the vaginal examination fell below the level of care, skill, and treatment which is recognized by a reasonably prudent similar physician as being acceptable under similar conditions and circumstances. The vaginal examination also constituted sexual misconduct. B.B. wrote a letter to Petitioner concerning Dr. Katzell's examination but she was not specific about the nature of the complaint. She was later contacted by one of Petitioner's investigators. As a result of the above-described events B.B. filed a complaint with the State Attorney of Palm Beach County, Florida, upon which a criminal information was filed against Dr. Katzell bearing case number, 92-12233-CF. On January 19, 1993, Dr. Katzell entered a plea of nolo contendere to the charge of battery on the person of B.B. and the Court adjudicated Dr. Katzell guilty. PATIENT D.B. Patient D.B. is the female patient referred to in Counts 1-3 of the Administrative Complaint in DOAH Case No. 93-7123 and DPR Case No. 92-14422. D.B. first saw Dr. Katzell on May 16, 1991. She was complaining of instability with her left knee. At the time she was 24 years old. D.B. had had a patella tendon anterior cruciate ligament reconstruction in 1986. She saw Dr. Katzell again on June 13, 1991 and July 9, 1991. Dr. Katzell recommended arthroscopic anterior cruciate ligament reconstruction on her left knee because of a rupture of the anterior cruciate ligament. On July 15, 1991, D.B. was admitted to J.F.K. Medical Center, where Dr. Katzell performed surgery on her left knee. After the surgery, D.B.'s left leg was bandaged from the groin area to half way down her calf. On one of his hospital post-operative visits, Dr. Katzell came to check D.B.'s dressing. D.B. was wearing a hospital gown and no underpants, her left leg was in the air in a continuous motion machine, and she was on a bedpan when Dr. Katzell came into her room. While Dr. Katzell was checking her dressings, he rubbed his hand down her crotch. There was no medical necessity for rubbing across the crotch area of D.B. when Dr. Katzell changed her dressing while she was in the hospital. D.B., who was accompanied by her mother, saw Dr. Katzell in his office on July 26, 1991. He removed the staples. D.B. next saw Dr. Katzell on August 16, 1991. She put on an examination gown and kept on her T-shirt, bra, and panties underneath the gown. Dr. Katzell performed a range of motion test, which required D.B. to lie on the examining table, bend the leg at the knee while the leg was raised in the air, and gradually lower the leg. During the examination, Dr. Katzell placed his hand between her legs and slid it down the middle of the vaginal area from top to bottom. Dr. Katzell next saw D.B. in his office on September 13, 1991. D.B. was dressed in an examination gown with a shirt, panties and bra underneath the gown. Dr. Katzell performed another range of motion test and again touched her in her vaginal area, down the middle of her crotch from top to bottom. On October 11, 18, November 19, and December 19, 1991, D.B. returned for follow-up visits. On each visit, D.B. removed her shorts and put on an examination gown. During each visit Dr. Katzell measured her leg near the groin area for atrophy as she stood up with her back to him as he was sitting on a stool. While he was measuring during each visit, he briefly rubbed his hand between her legs in her crotch. On January 17, 1992, D.B. went to see Dr. Katzell at his office. She was wearing bike shorts and a sweater. She had intentionally worn bike shorts because she felt that the doctor could measure over the shorts and there would be no necessity for removing her shorts. The bike shorts had a built-in pantie so D.B. did not wear any additional underpants. Dr. Katzell asked her to remove the bike shorts and the sweater and put on a gown, explaining that he could not measure over the spandex of the bike shorts. It would not have been medically appropriate to measure the leg over the spandex because the bike shorts compress the muscles of the upper leg. D.B. removed her shorts and sweater and put on the gown, which left her wearing only the gown and a bra. Dr. Katzell performed a range of motion test and measured her leg for atrophy. When he was measuring her leg, he touched her in her vaginal area as he had done previously. There was no medical necessity that required Dr. Katzell to touch D.B. in her vaginal area while he was performing range of motion tests and measuring her leg for atrophy. The touching of D.B. in her crotch while she was in the hospital and during her subsequent office visits was inappropriate and fell below the level of care, skill, and treatment which is recognized by a reasonable prudent similar physician as being acceptable under similar conditions and circumstances. The touching also constituted sexual misconduct. As a result of the above-described events, D.B. filed a complaint with the State Attorney of Palm Beach County, Florida, upon which a criminal information was filed against Dr. Katzell bearing Case No. 92-28362-MMA02. On January 19, 1993, Dr. Katzell entered a plea of nolo contendere to the charge of battery on the person of D.B. and the Court adjudicated Dr. Katzell guilty. D.B. has made a civil claim against Dr. Katzell related to the above- described incidents. PATIENT T.C. Patient T.C. is the female patient referred to in Counts 4-6 of the Administrative Complaint, DOAH Case No. 93-7123 and DPR Case No. 92-14422. Dr. Katzell treated T.C. for chronic knee derangement from December 4, 1987 to November 18, 1991. During that time, he operated on her knee two times for internal derangement of the knee. On March 12, 1991, T.C. went to Dr. Katzell complaining of pain and swelling in her right knee. She also had right sided low back pain radiating into her right hip. Dr. Katzell examined her right hip and palpated the area in the inguinal crease. He moved her underpants to one side, exposing her vagina while he was palpating the inguinal crease. Dr. Katzell did not touch the vagina during the examination. Depending on the cut of T.C.'s underwear it may have been necessary to move her underwear to one side in order to palpate the inguinal crease. Dr. Katzell's actions on March 12, 1991, did not constitute sexual misconduct nor was it below the level of care, skill, and treatment which is recognized by a reasonably prudent similar physician as being acceptable under similar conditions and circumstances. On November 18, 1991, T.C. went to Dr. Katzell's office for a follow- up visit, complaining of continued pain in her right knee. Dr. Katzell asked her to disrobe and put on an examination gown. She complied, leaving on her underwear. During the examination of her knee, Dr. Katzell began to rub T.C. above her knee and on the inside of her right thigh. He touched her vaginal area over her underwear with his fingers. She moved forward when he touched her and he removed his hand. There was no medical necessity to touch the vaginal area of a patient during the examination of a knee. The touching of T.C.'s genitalia during the knee examination was inappropriate and was below the level of care, skill, and treatment which is recognized by a reasonably prudent similar physician as being acceptable under similar conditions and circumstances. The touching also constitutes sexual misconduct. Following the knee examination of November 18, 1991, T.C. immediately left Dr. Katzell's office and never returned. As a result of the above-described incident, T.C. filed a complaint with the State Attorney of Palm Beach County, Florida, upon which a criminal information was filed against Dr. Katzell bearing Case No. 92-28365-MMA02. On January 19, 1993, Dr. Katzell entered a plea of nolo contendere to the charge of battery on the person of T.C. and the Court adjudicated the Respondent guilty. T.C. has filed a lawsuit against Dr. Katzell seeking monetary damages. PATIENT S.M. Patient S.M. is the female patient referred to in Counts 7-9 of the Administrative Complaint, DOAH Case No. 93-7123 and DPR Case No. 92-14422. On July 22, 1991, S.M. went to see Dr. Katzell for an independent medical evaluation relating to a slip and fall at her workplace. S.M. was complaining of upper and lower back pain, bilateral hip pain, mild knee pain and some right shoulder discomfort. S.M. was given an examination gown to wear. She put on the gown, leaving on her slip, bra and g-string panties. Dr. Katzell began to examine her and told her she would have to remove her slip. He left the room while she did so. There was no attendant in the room during the examination. She lay on the examining table and he stretched her legs at 90 degree angles. He had his hand underneath the gown, between her legs and on top of her vagina. He would rub the crease area between S.M.'s thigh and pubic area and move his hand across the vaginal area as he went from one to side to the other. There was no medical purpose for Dr. Katzell to touch S.M.'s vaginal area during his examination. The touching was below the level of care, skill, and treatment which is recognized by a reasonably prudent similar physician as being acceptable under similar conditions. The touching also constituted sexual misconduct. As a result of the above-described incident, S.M. filed a complaint with the State Attorney of Palm Beach County, Florida, upon which a criminal information was filed against Dr. Katzell bearing Case No. 92-28362-MMA02. On January 19, 1993, Dr. Katzell entered a plea of nolo contendere to the charge of battery on the person of S.M. and the Court adjudicated him guilty. S.M. has filed a civil action against Dr. Katzell for monetary damages. MITIGATION In 1992, after the complaints surfaced concerning the above-referenced patients, Dr. Katzell voluntarily stopped his practice and sought help through the Physicians Recovery Network (PRN). He entered into a five-year supervisory contract with PRN and was participating in the contract at the date of the hearing. He agrees to remain under contract with PRN as long as necessary to demonstrate that he is safely practicing medicine. Dr. Katzell was in good standing with his agreement with PRN and had no reported problems as of the date of the final hearing. PRN referred Dr. Katzell to the Behavior Medicine Institute in Atlanta, Georgia, where he underwent an out-patient cognitive behavior type of treatment for sexual problems. The treatment program is headed by Dr. Gene Abel. The recidivism rate for physicians treated in Dr. Abel's program is 0 percent. As a result of the charges made by the six patients, Dr. Katzell has made changes in his orthopedic practice. These changes in methods include always examining a female patient in the presence of a chaperon or attendant and explaining to the patient the need for any examinations which could be perceived as being in close proximity to a private area. When patients are to receive a cortisone injection, his female office staff will drape the area outside the presence of Dr. Katzell and he will return simply to administer the injection in the presence of his attendant. The medication will be massaged into place by a female attendant and not by Dr. Katzell. There have been no complaints in the three years since Dr. Katzell has made these changes in his orthopedic practice. Over twenty witnesses testified at the final hearing concerning Dr. Katzell's practice of medicine since the incidents involving the six female patients. The witnesses found that in their dealings with Dr. Katzell they found him to be a capable, professional and caring physician. Dr. Katzell was interviewed, tested, and evaluated by two forensic psychologists, Theodore Blau, Ph.D. and Florence Kaslow, Ph.D. Based on their evaluations, it is their opinion that Dr. Katzell can safely practice medicine in the future and that Dr. Katzell's fear of loss of the ability to practice medicine in the future is so overwhelming that he will not be expected to exceed the boundaries of acceptable behavior that the law or ethics require of him as a physician. The evidence did not establish that the six patients suffered any physical or severe permanent psychological harm. On the advice of counsel, Dr. Katzell entered pleas of nolo contendere to battery on the six patients. When he did so it was his understanding that would not have any significant impact with regard with his license to practice medicine. In order to get the State Attorney to agree to a plea agreement, Dr. Katzell opted to forego the taking of any depositions in the criminal case.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered finding that Jeffrey L. Katzell, M.D., violated Section 458.331(1)(c), Florida Statutes, in Counts 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6 of the Administrative Complaint in DOAH Case No. 93-7124, dismissing Count 7 of the Administrative Complaint in DOAH Case No. 93-7124, finding that Jeffrey L. Katzell, M.D. violated Section 458.331(1)(t), Florida Statutes in Counts 3, 6, and 9 in the Administrative Complaint filed in DOAH Case No. 93- 7122 and in the Administrative Complaint filed in DOAH Case No. 93-7123, finding that Jeffrey L. Katzell, M.D. violated Section 458.331(1)(x) by violating Section 458.329, Florida Statutes, in Counts 2, 5, and 8 of the Administrative Complaint in DOAH Case No. 93-7122 and Counts 1, 4, and 7 of the Administrative Complaint in DOAH Case No. 93-7123, dismissing Counts 1, 4, and 7 of the Administrative Complaint in DOAH Case No. 93-7122 and Counts 2, 5, and 8 of the Administrative Complaint in DOAH Case No. 93-7123 as not providing a separate ground for disciplinary action given the findings that Dr. Katzell violated Section 458.329 and thus, Section 458.331(1)(x), Florida Statutes. It is recommended that the following penalty be imposed: Suspension of the license of Dr. Katzell for six months; Imposition of an administrative fine of $2,000 for each violation for a total of $36,000; Five years probation following the suspension of the license; All examinations of female patients by Dr. Katzell be made in the presence of a female chaperon, and this shall be a permanent requirement of his medical license; and Dr. Katzell is to remain under a supervisory contract with the Physician Recovery Network until the conclusion of his probationary period. DONE AND ENTERED this 19th day of May, 1995, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. SUSAN B. KIRKLAND Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of May, 1995. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NOs. 93-7122, 93-7123, and 93-7124 To comply with the requirements of Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes (1993), the following rulings are made on the parties' proposed findings of fact: Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact. Paragraphs 1-10: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 10 (there were two paragraphs numbered 10): Accepted in substance. Paragraphs 11-24: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 25: Rejected as not supported by clear and convincing evidence. Paragraphs 26-27: Rejected as unnecessary because incidents related to the December 30 visit were not alleged in the Administrative Complaint. Paragraph 28: Accepted in substance except that the undergarment that Dr. Katzell asked her to remove was her panties. Paragraphs 29-37: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 38: Accepted in substance except as to the date on which he began treatment for chronic knee derangement. Paragraphs 39-54: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 55: Rejected as irrelevant. Paragraph 56: Rejected as not supported by clear and convincing evidence. Paragraphs 57-65: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 66: Accepted in substance except that in relation to the criminal information pertaining to A.F., Dr. Katzell entered a plea of nolo contendere to battery on the person of A.F. not T.B. Paragraphs 67-70: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 71: Rejected because the allegations were not part of the Administrative Complaint Paragraphs 72-77: Accepted in substance. Paragraphs 78: Rejected because the allegation was not part of the Administrative Complaint. Paragraphs 79-81: Accepted in substance. Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact Paragraph 1: The first two sentences are accepted in substance. The last sentence is rejected as unnecessary. Paragraph 2: The first sentence and the first half of the second sentence are rejected as unnecessary. The remainder is accepted in substance. Paragraph 3: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 4: Rejected as unnecessary detail. Paragraphs 5-7: Rejected as unnecessary detail. Paragraphs 8-11: Rejected as subordinate to the findings that were actually made. Paragraphs 12-15: Rejected as unnecessary detail. Paragraph 16: Rejected to the extent that it implies that all of Dr. Katzell's actions were in compliance with the orthopedic standard of care. Accepted in substance to the extent that the medical records alone do not show the violations charged in the administrative complaints. Paragraphs 17-18: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 19: The first sentence is rejected to the extent that the patient indicated that she had fallen. She indicated that she caught herself from falling as she was walking down the stairs. The remainder is accepted in substance. Paragraphs 20-24: Accepted in substance. Paragraphs 25-26: Rejected as unnecessary. Paragraphs 27-30: Accepted in substance. Paragraphs 31-37: Rejected as unnecessary because the actions of Dr. Katzell during the December 30 visit were not alleged in the Administrative Complaint. Paragraph 38-39: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 40: Rejected as unnecessary detail. Paragraphs 41-42: Accepted in substance. Paragraphs 43-44: Rejected as unnecessary detail. Paragraph 45: The first two sentences are rejected as unnecessary detail. The last sentence is accepted in substance. Paragraphs 46-48: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 49: The first sentence is rejected as constituting argument. The second sentence is rejected as unnecessary detail. Paragraph 50: The portion of the sentence dealing with sexual activity is accepted in substance as it relates to the January 23 visit but the portion dealing with practice below the standard of care is rejected as not supported by the evidence. Paragraphs 51-53: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 54: Rejected as unnecessary detail. Paragraph 55: The first and third sentences are accepted in substance. The second sentence is rejected as unnecessary detail. Paragraphs 56-58: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 59: Rejected as constituting argument. Paragraph 60: Rejected as irrelevant. The inappropriate touching of the vagina is sexual activity and it is irrelevant whether they talked about sexual topics or whether either person was sexually aroused by it. Paragraph 61: The first sentence is accepted in substance. The second sentence is rejected as constituting argument. Paragraph 62: The first sentence is rejected as unnecessary. The second sentence is accepted in substance. Paragraph 63: The first sentence is rejected as not supported by the evidence. Having judged the credibility of the witnesses, the second sentence is rejected. Paragraphs 64-71: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 72: Rejected as unnecessary. Paragraph 73: The first sentence is accepted in substance. The second sentence is rejected as unnecessary detail. Paragraphs 74-75: Rejected as subordinate to the facts found. Paragraphs 76-78: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 79: The first sentence is rejected as unnecessary. The second sentence is accepted in substance. Paragraphs 80-85: Rejected as unnecessary because the Administrative Complaint does not contain allegations related to this portion of the October 9 visit. Paragraphs 86-87: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 88: Rejected as unnecessary detail. Paragraph 89: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 90: Rejected as unnecessary detail. Paragraph 91: The first half of the sentence is rejected as unnecessary detail. The last half of the sentence is accepted in substance. Paragraph 92: Rejected to the extent that it implies that Dr. Katzell did not touch A.F.'s clitoris and her vaginal area. Paragraphs 93-95: Rejected as irrelevant because it was the touching of the clitoris and the vaginal area which was at issue not the palpating of inguinal crease or the touching of the pubic bone. Paragraph 96: The first sentence is accepted in substance. The second sentence is rejected as irrelevant since the complained touching was not in close proximity but was in the vagina. Paragraph 97: Rejected as irrelevant. Paragraph 98: Rejected as constituting argument. Paragraph 99: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 100: Having judged the credibility of the witnesses, this paragraph is rejected. Paragraph 101: Rejected as not supported by the evidence. If the clitoris is covered by the labia, it is uncovered when a person sticks his thumb in the vaginal crease and runs his thumb down the crease and back up again. Paragraph 102: The first sentence is rejected as not supported by the evidence. The last sentence is rejected as irrelevant. Paragraphs 103: Rejected as irrelevant. Paragraph 104: Accepted in substance. Paragraphs 105-107: Rejected as irrelevant. Paragraph 108: Rejected as constituting argument. Paragraph 109: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 110: Rejected as not supported by the evidence. Paragraphs 111-115: Accepted in substance. Paragraphs 116-122: Rejected as unnecessary because the Administrative Complaint does not contain allegations concerning the touching of B.B.'s breasts. Paragraphs 123-127: Accepted in substance. Paragraphs 128: Rejected as unnecessary detail. Paragraphs 129-131: Rejected as irrelevant since the finding is that a vaginal examination was performed. Paragraph 132: Rejected as constituting argument and subordinate to the finding that Dr. Katzell did perform a vaginal examination. Paragraph 133: Rejected as unnecessary detail. Paragraph 134: Rejected as subordinate to the finding that he did perform a vaginal examination. Paragraph 135: Rejected as irrelevant as to whether she felt that he was engaging in sexual activity. Paragraph 136: Rejected as not supported by the greater weight of the evidence that the pressure that B.B. felt was consistent with a rectal examination. Paragraphs 137-138: Rejected as subordinate to the facts actually found. Dr. Koulisis's statement corroborated B.B.'s testimony that a vaginal examination was performed. Paragraph 139: Rejecting as constituting argument. Paragraph 140: Rejected as irrelevant. Paragraph 141: Rejected as constituting argument. Paragraph 142: Accepted in substance. Paragraphs 143-144: Rejected as irrelevant. There was no showing that Dr. Katzell was prejudiced by the loss of the letter. Paragraph 145: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 146: The first and third sentences are accepted in substance. The remainder is rejected as unnecessary detail. Paragraph 147: The first and last sentences are accepted in substance. The second sentence is rejected as unnecessary detail. Paragraph 148: Rejected as unnecessary detail. Paragraph 149: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 150: The first sentence is accepted in substance. The remainder is rejected as unnecessary detail. Paragraphs 151-153: Rejected as constituting argument and subordinate to the facts actually found. Dr. Katzell did see D.B. in the hospital on at least one occasion and he did touch her in her vaginal area during that examination. Paragraphs 154-155: Accepted in substance. Paragraphs 156-157: Rejected as irrelevant. The inappropriate behavior was not touching near the crotch area but the touching of the crotch. Paragraphs 158-159: Rejected as not supported by the evidence. Paragraph 160: Rejected as irrelevant. Paragraph 161: Rejected as subordinate to the finding that there was a touching. Paragraphs 162-164: Accepted in substance. Paragraphs 165-166: Rejected as irrelevant. Paragraph 167: Rejected as it refers to the last visit, otherwise accepted in substance. Paragraphs 168-172: Rejected as subordinate to the finding that there was a touching in the crotch area. Paragraph 173-175: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 176: Accepted. Paragraphs 177-179: Rejected as subordinate to the facts actually found that there was a touching in the vaginal area. Paragraph 180: Accepted in substance. Paragraphs 181-182: Rejected as subordinate to the finding that there was a touching in the vaginal area. Paragraph 183: Rejected as unnecessary. Paragraph 184: The first sentence is rejected as unnecessary. The sentence is rejected as constituting argument and as not supported by the evidence. Both women indicated that D.B. did not go into specifics and the sister-in-law testified that D.B. did not like the way that he had examined her and touched her legs. Paragraph 185: Rejected as not supported by the evidence. There was testimony that D.B. advised her husband. Paragraph 186: Rejected as irrelevant. Paragraphs 187-188: Rejected as subordinate to the finding that there were inappropriate touchings of the vagina. Paragraph 189: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 190: Having judged the credibility of the witnesses, it is rejected. Paragraph 191: Rejected as not supported by the evidence. Paragraphs 192-195: Accepted in substance. Paragraphs 196-199: Rejected as unnecessary detail. Paragraphs 200-203: Accepted in substance. Paragraphs 204-205: Rejected as irrelevant. Paragraphs 206: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 207: Accepted that Dr. Katzell moved the underwear, but rejected as irrelevant as to whether he remembers exposing the vagina. Paragraph 208: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 209: Rejected as unnecessary detail. Paragraph 210: The first sentence is accepted in substance. The remainder is rejected as unnecessary detail. Paragraphs 211-212: Rejected as unnecessary detail. Paragraphs 213: Rejected as subordinate to the finding that he touched the vagina. Paragraph 214-216: Rejected as subordinate to the fact that he touched the vagina. Paragraph 217: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 218: Rejected as not supported by the evidence. Paragraphs 219-220: Accepted in substance. Paragraphs 221-222: Rejected as unnecessary detail. Paragraph 223: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 224: The first sentence is rejected as unnecessary detail. The last sentence is accepted in substance. Paragraph 225: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 226-228: Rejected as unnecessary detail. Paragraph 229-231: Accepted in substance. Paragraphs 232: Rejected as irrelevant. Paragraph 233: Rejected as subordinate to the finding that there was a touching of the vaginal area. Paragraph 234: The first sentence is accepted in substance. The remainder is rejected as subordinate to the finding that there was a touching of the vaginal area. Paragraphs 235-236: Rejected as subordinate to the finding that there was a touching of the vaginal area. Paragraph 237: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 238: Rejected as irrelevant. Paragraph 239: Rejected to the extent that it implies that Dr. Katzell did not touch the vaginal area, but otherwise accepted in substance. Paragraph 240: Accepted in substance to the extent that it refers to the actions described in Paragraph 239 of Respondent's Findings of Fact. Paragraph 241: Rejected as subordinate to the finding that Dr. Katzell touched S.M.'s vaginal area. Paragraphs 242-245: Rejected as irrelevant. Paragraph 246: Rejected as constituting argument. Paragraphs 247: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 248: Rejected as constituting argument. Paragraph 249: Rejected as not supported by the evidence. Paragraph 250: The first sentence is rejected as unnecessary. The second sentence is accepted in substance. Paragraph 251: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 252-257: Rejected as unnecessary detail. Paragraph 258-261: Rejected to the extent it implies that the tests and evaluations indicate that Dr. Katzell did not commit the violations alleged in the Administrative Complaint. Paragraph 262: The first two sentences are rejected as irrelevant. The third sentence is rejected as not supported by evidence that Dr. Katzell did not engage in sexual activity with the patients. Paragraph 263: The first two sentences are rejected to the extent that it implies that Dr. Katzell did not commit the violations alleged in the administrative complaints. The last sentence is accepted in substance. Paragraph 264: Rejected to the extent that it implies that Dr. Katzell did not commit the violations alleged in the administrative complaints. Paragraph 265: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 266: Rejected as not supported by the evidence. Paragraph 267: Rejected as constituting argument. Paragraph 268: The first sentence is accepted in substance. The remainder is rejected as unnecessary detail. Paragraph 269: Accepted in substance. Paragraphs 270-271: Rejected as irrelevant since there was sufficient evidence to establish that Dr. Katzell did commit a battery on each of the six patients. In the case of D.B., he did commit a battery on her on July 17, 1991 and out of the eleven counts of battery on D.B. for which Dr. Katzell was charged there was sufficient evidence to support a charge of battery on eight of the counts. Paragraph 272-273: Rejected as irrelevant. Paragraph 274-277: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 278: Rejected as unnecessary. Paragraph 279: Accepted in substance. Paragraphs 280-282: Rejected as subordinate to the findings that committed the violations as set forth in the Findings of Fact of this Recommended Order. Paragraphs 283-287: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 288: The first sentence is accepted in substance. The second sentence is rejected as unnecessary. Paragraph 289: The first sentence is rejected as unnecessary. The second sentence is accepted in substance. The third sentence is rejected as irrelevant. Paragraph 290: Accepted to the extent that the evidence presented established that it is not likely that Dr. Katzell is not likely to commit in the future the type of actions alleged in the Administrative Complaint. COPIES FURNISHED: Albert Peacock, Esquire Hugh R. Brown, Qualified Representative Department of Business & Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street, Suite 60 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Mark A. Dresnick, Esquire Grand Bay Plaza Suite 201 2665 South Bayshore Drive Miami, Florida 33133 Dr. Marm Harris Executive Director Agency For Health Care Administration Board of Medicine 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0770 Tom Wallace Assistant Director Agency For Health Care Administration The Atrium, Suite 301 325 John Knox Road Tallahassee, Florida 32303
Findings Of Fact Respondent, Robert W. Fausel, Jr., M.D., is a licensed physician in Florida, holding license number ME0016953. By Final Order dated January 3, 1984, Respondent was placed on five years probation by the Florida Board of Medicine for alcoholism and inappropriate prescribing of controlled substances to patients. Currently, Respondent's medical license remains in a probationary status. In 1984, F.S., a sixty-eight (68) year-old male, was a patient at the Family Practice Center, a health maintenance organization (HMO), in West Palm Beach, Florida. On May 15, 1984, F.S. presented to the Family Practice Center for problems with a hiatal hernia and was seen by Salomin Levin, M.D., one of the physicians on staff at the HMO. During this visit, Dr. Levin explained the physiology of a hiatal hernia and advised F.S. to return to the Center as needed. The patient history recorded by Dr. Levin during F.S.' 1984 visit revealed that F.S. had not been to a doctor in the past four (4) years and had not had a physical during that four year time period. At the time of F.S.' 1984 visit, the standard of care for a male over 40 years of age required that a complete medical history should be gathered and an annual physical examination including a rectal examination be performed, or at the very least have been offered, and either arranged for or refused by the patient. However, the medical records do not reveal that the need for a complete physical was discussed during F.S.' visit or that such a physical was performed. Likewise, the records do not reveal that F.S. was worked up for a complete medical history during his May 15, 1984, visit. On March 4, 1985, F.S., at age sixty-nine, presented to the Family Practice Center with complaints of pain in the hip, thigh and lower back. Respondent, then on staff at the Family Practice Center, saw F.S. during his March 4, 1985, visit and observed a deceptively healthy looking older man. The entry on F.S.' medical records written by Dr. Fausel stated that "The patient lifted an elderly man who had fallen out of bed 3 weeks ago; now has pain in left hip and thigh and low back." Significantly, F.S. did not report that he had any pain in the hip, thigh or back prior to lifting the elderly man. Further, F.S. did not report that he had any urinary symptoms such as difficulty with urination, dysuria, cloudy or bloody urine. 1/ However, other than the history associated with F.S.'s back pain, Respondent did not record any sort of general history, physical or rectal examination of F.S. even though Respondent knew, through a review of F.S.'s medical records, that F.S.' medical records did not reflect that F.S. had been worked up for a complete history or physical during his previous visit in 1984. Respondent did treat F.S. for the primary complaint for which he came to the Center, i.e., pain in the hip, thigh and lower back. Given the history F.S. related regarding his pain, Respondent appropriately suspected that F.S. had suffered a musculoskeletal injury involving the left hip, thigh and lower back and referred F.S. to Dr. Stopek, a chiropractor for further examination of F.S.' condition. F.S. initially saw the chiropractor on March 5, 1985. Thereafter, F.S. saw the chiropractor at least four more times through out the month of March. At some point X-rays were taken of F.S.' left hip, thigh and lower back. Eventually, F.S. was referred back to Respondent with a diagnosis of DJD in the left hip and a recommendation that the patient be given a prescription for the pain medication Feldene, a legend drug. On or about April 4, 1985, F.S. returned to Respondent at the Family Practice Center for his continued pain. Respondent diagnosed F.S. with arthritis in the left hip. Respondent also, at the request of the chiropractor, prescribed Feldene to F.S. for pain relief. Additionally, Respondent began a general physical examination of F.S. with the expectation that the blood and rectal exam would be completed during later visits. In essence, a complete physical examination of F.S. would be accomplished in stages. Following that course of action, F.S. arranged to have a standard blood profile accomplished. The actual blood work was performed on June 4, 1985, and a report of the results was issued. Unfortunately, for reasons due mainly to the operation of the HMO and the assignment of doctors to patients on a daily basis, Dr. Fausel never saw F.S. again and the doctor patient relationship between Respondent and F.S. terminated. A rectal exam was never performed on F.S. by Respondent. However, F.S. was seen by other doctors at the HMO on at least eight occasions throughout 1985 and 1986. These doctors had F.S.' medical records available to them and were aware that those records did not indicate that either Respondent or any of the post-Respondent doctors, prior to December 3, 1986, performed a rectal examination on F.S. These doctors did continue to evaluate F.S.' pain as either some form of arthritis or paget's disease. In 1986, F.S. was referred to an orthopedic surgeon and rheumatologist for further evaluation of his pain. It was the rheumatologist who finally performed a rectal examination of F.S. and noted a hard prostrate, indicating possible cancer. At that point, F.S was referred for blood tests specific to prostate cancer and to an urologist. On October 23, 1986, Jitendra Varma, M.D., the urologist, ordered a prostate biopsy on F.S. which revealed adenocarcinoma. Subsequently, on November 24, 1986, Dr. Varma performed a bilateral orchiectomy on F.S. In this case the Department is attempting to prove a case of malpractice based solely on F.S. medical records which may or not be complete. In fact, the evidence demonstrated that no records custodian from the HMO had custody of F.S.' medical records or that those records were complete. Many of the records submitted into evidence were impossible to read. No testimony from F.S. to fill in important details as to what took place during his HMO visits was presented at the hearing. In short, the Department is attempting to infer from an absence of entries in a patient's medical records that some medical service did not occur or was not offered. However, given the brevity of the medical records from the HMO, the healthy appearance of F.S., the loss of memory due to the age of this case and the lack of testimony from F.S., it is impossible to determine if any malpractice occurred since the absence of an entry from F.S.'s medical records does not mean that the need for a physical and follow-up appointments were not discussed or that Respondent failed to perform an adequate evaluation of F.S. which would have included a medical history. The same can be said for the lack of a rectal exam during the brief two visits Respondent treated F.S. for his primary complaint of pain. Indeed the medical records reflect that on September 14, 1985, someone from the HMO contacted F.S. and that he stated everything had been taken care of. Additionally, the Department's own experts disagreed on whether the "piecemeal" basis of F.S.'s physical examination was inappropriate or that the referral to the chiropractor was inappropriate. Given these facts, the evidence did not clearly and convincingly demonstrate that Respondent failed to treat F.S. with an appropriate standard of care by either referring F.S. to a chiropractor, performing a physical exam on a piecemeal basis or by failing to perform a rectal examination on F.S. Given these facts, the Department has failed to clearly and convincingly demonstrate that Respondent failed to practice medicine with an acceptable level of care in regard to patient F.S. Indeed, the best that can be said of this case is that Respondent may not have kept adequate medical records. However, Respondent was not charged with such a failure and the matter was not an issue in this hearing. Because of the Department's failure of proof the Administrative Complaint relating to Respondent's care of F.S. should be dismissed. By 1987, Respondent had moved to North Florida and opened a general practice in Century, Florida. Respondent was also on staff at Jay Hospital. From November, 1987, through June, 1989, C. David Smith, M.D., was Respondent's monitoring physician under the terms of Respondent's probation. Additionally by 1989, Respondent had developed a number of serious medical problems as well as some mental difficulties associated with his diabetes and bipolar disorder. One such problem was impotence with a very low libido. On March 20, 1989, Respondent began treating Patient C.C. and admitted C.C. to Jay Hospital under his care for evaluation and treatment of a medical condition. C.C. had a ten (10) year history of psychiatric illness. Some of the symptoms of her mental illness were depression and anxiety. C.C.'s medical condition was not associated with her mental condition. On April 4, 1989, after treatment of her medical condition, Respondent discharged C.C. from Jay Hospital. Respondent's discharge summary for C.C. dated April 4, 1989, included the following: . . . At that point, on 3/23/89, it was noted that the patient was making statements which sounded quite psychotic, referring to delusional material. She stated that she believed her neck and cervical spine in the back of her head and the roof of her mouth were 'rotten' and cancerous. She stated that God had revealed to her the fact that she was going to die of cancer. She stated that God had been quite specific as to the means by which she would die, namely, by the collapse of the roof of her mouth, jaws, and skull, which would then occlude her airway, making her choke to death or die of asphyxiation. She stated that God had revealed to her the fact that she was going to die of cancer. In addition, she stated that she had been dead and had come back to life. She made additional statements which lead me to believe that she was psychotic. I began a series of discussions with the patient, to evaluate her psychosis, and I found that the patient was extremely resistant to the idea of psychiatric evaluation. She felt that she was not psychotic or 'crazy' at all. In addition, she resented anyone implying that she was psychotic or crazy. She stated that her family members had implied in the past that she was crazy or psychotic and this made her very resentful. . . . The patient stated that on May 12, 1984, she heard God's voice warning her that her death was imminent. She added that God had told her that she was going to die of cancer, specifically bone cancer, brain cancer, and cancer of the ears, mouth and jaw bones and neck and spine. She stated that the medical terminology for the type of cancer from which she was going to diet [sic] was a medullablastoma. The patient also stated that she was a prophetess of God, one of five listed in the Bible. She stated that she had been told by God that she was literally going to choke to death and that her time was drawing near. Paramount in her delusion was the idea that she was going to diet [sic] within a very short time. I pointed out to her that she continued to live, in spite of her predictions that she would be dead within 24 hours. She explained this by stating that God gave her small extensions of life, and this was why she continued to live. I noted that she experienced a great deal of anxiety about death and that this anxiety repeated itself on a daily basis. She has a continual fear that her death is very close, and yet insists that she does not fear this death, because she stated that she is a prophetess of God and is going straight to Heaven. In the past, she had been treated with Prolixin, Artane and Lithium Carbonate for her psychotic problems. Conversation with her family indicated that they thought that she was 'crazy', but 'harmless'. My arguments with the patient that there was absolutely no physical evidence for her death were useless. Discussions with her family indicated that she had been hospitalized for psychotic problems in the past. I discussed with the patient the possibility of admitting her to a psychiatric institution, however, the patient was adamantly resistant to this idea. The patient also was extremely resistant to the [sic] idea of taking Prolixin, Lithium Carbonate, and Artane. . . . It was apparent that the patient was frankly psychotic and probably falling into the paranoid schizophrenic category, with religious delusions and auditory hallucinations. . . . At no time did I hear the patient express any suicidal ideation, and she did not seem to be a danger to herself or to other people. Also, at no time did the patient threaten to harm anyone else, or seem to constitute a danger to other people. . . . The evidence did not show that C.C. had any tendency to sexual delusion or sexual preoccupation. On May 17, 1989, Respondent again admitted C.C. to Jay Hospital for treatment of a medical condition not associated with her mental condition. C.C.'s mental illness continued to manifest itself as outlined in the April 4, 1989, discharge summary despite Respondent's assurances that he could not find any evidence of cancer. Again the evidence did not show that C.C. had any sexual delusions or preoccupations. Additionally, the evidence did not show that C.C. desired a psychiatric referral or could have been forced to accept such a referral. Because C.C. had manifested her fixed delusions for such a long time, her friends and family were fed up with her and did not overly concern themselves with C.C.'s condition. C.C. felt very much lost and alone. Because of C.C.'s loneliness, Respondent felt sorry for C.C. and tried to be friends with her. C.C. saw Respondent's attentiveness as a salvation and would call on him when she felt anxious about her personal or medical state. The evidence did not demonstrate that C.C. saw Dr. Fausel in a romantic or sexual way, but only in a friendly Christian love way. Likewise, the evidence did not reveal that Respondent's attempts at friendship with C.C. were for sexual reasons. Indeed, except for one church tent revival, Respondent did not attend any social outings or church functions with C.C. C.C. believed that Respondent felt Christian love for her. On June 20, 1989, Respondent received a telephone call from C.C. C.C. was having severe anxiety and advised Respondent that she was contemplating suicide. Respondent arranged to meet with C.C. later that evening. On the evening of June 20, 1989, after normal business hours, Respondent met C.C. and they went to his office at 8401 North Century Boulevard, Century, Florida. Respondent was seeing the patient as both a friend and a medical doctor. Respondent and C.C. went into a vacant examination room in Respondent's office. The lights in the room were on. Respondent and C.C. sat on the floor. Because Respondent was somewhat obese, Respondent undid the top button of his pants so that he could more comfortably sit on the floor. The office air conditioning was off and it was hot in the room. Respondent and C.C. discussed religious matters and C.C. sang hymns. At one point, both stretched out on the floor facing each other. Just prior to 11:00 p.m., C.C. removed her dress and turned off the lights. She still had on her slip and underwear. C.C. lay back down on the floor within approximately one foot of Respondent. C.C. did not make any sexual advances towards Respondent and her disrobing was not for sexual purposes. Respondent asked her to put her dress back on at least twice. He told her that she looked more saintly fully dressed. Respondent did not make any sexual advances toward C.C. Within a few minutes of C.C.'s disrobing, at approximately 11:00 p.m., Respondent's nurse, Jane Jackson, found Respondent and C.C. on the floor of the vacant room. Nurse Jackson turned on the office lights as she entered the room occupied by C.C. and Respondent. With little conversation, Nurse Jackson left the clinic and reported what she had seen to C. David Smith, Respondent's monitoring physician. Dr. Smith telephoned the administrator of Jay Hospital, Mr. Allen Foster, and arranged a meeting during which Dr. Smith informed Mr. Foster of Nurse Jackson's observations. Dr. Smith and Mr. Foster met with the Respondent to discuss what had transpired. On June 21, 1989, Respondent withdrew from practicing at his office in Century, Florida and voluntarily began treatment for the depression he was experiencing. In essence, the facts of this case do not establish that Respondent used his doctor patient relationship with C.C. for any sexual purpose or that Respondent committed any acts of sexual misconduct involving C.C. The evidence only demonstrated that C.C. had a tendency to act in a bizarre manner by disrobing when she was overheated and that Respondent did not overreact to his patient's inappropriate behavior, but attempted to try to redirect her conduct to more appropriate behavior. Such action by Respondent does not constitute sexual misconduct and the Administrative Complaint charging Respondent with such misconduct should be dismissed.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is accordingly, RECOMMENDED: That the Board of Medicine enter a Final Order dismissing both the Administrative Complaints. ENTERED this 3rd day of March, 1993, in Tallahassee, Florida. DIANNE CLEAVINGER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of March, 1993.
