Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the owner of real property known as Lot 6, Block 10, Angler's Park, in Key Largo, Florida. He purchased that property in November of 1986. Petitioner's property is contiguous to sovereign submerged lands in Largo Sound, a sound of the Atlantic Ocean. The Board of Trustees of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund of the State of Florida holds title to submerged lands waterward of the mean high water line contiguous to Petitioner's property. The submerged lands contiguous to Petitioner's property lie within the boundaries of John Pennekamp Coral Reef State Park. The Board of Trustees dedicated the submerged lands contiguous to what is now Petitioner's property to the Florida Board of Parks and Historical Memorials, now the Division of Recreation and Parks of the Department of Natural Resources, on September 21, 1967. A dock existed on the submerged lands contiguous to Petitioner's property prior to 1967. The entire dock existed at least by 1938. The historic dock was probably one of the oldest docks in Largo Sound. Due to the passage of time and hurricanes, only the pilings and a concrete pad near shore still existed as of 1967. The dock was not rebuilt until 1988. Throughout the years, boats were moored at the dock. After the planking on the dock no longer existed, people still moored their boats to individual pilings. The dock was considered an excellent location for fishing, and people travelled by boat to the location, tying their boats to the pilings to fish. When Petitioner purchased his property, the only structures left on the contiguous submerged lands were thirteen concrete pilings and the concrete pad near shore. Only four of the pilings were sticking up out of the water. The remaining pilings were submerged. The original configuration of the historic dock was easily ascertained by the pilings and concrete pad. After Petitioner purchased his property, he began constructing a residence. He would travel from elsewhere in the Key Largo area by boat, would tie his boat to one of the pilings, and would wade ashore. Petitioner applied to Monroe County for a permit to rebuild portions of the dock. Although Monroe County accepted and retained his permit application fee, he was not issued a permit. Instead, he was told that he should contact the people at Pennekamp State Park. Petitioner then contacted Respondent's employees at Pennekamp State Park about reconstructing portions of the dock. In response to that inquiry Petitioner received a letter dated June 10, 1987, advising him that Respondent was not a permitting agency. That letter further recited two of Respondent's rules prohibiting the removal or destruction of natural features and marine life and construction activities in that state park. Having been frustrated by his attempts to obtain a permit to rebuild the dock from both Monroe County and from Respondent's employees at Pennekamp State Park, Petitioner made no further effort to obtain a permit or authorization from any other state, local, or federal government agency to reconstruct his dock. One day he backed a pickup truck to the edge of the water, hooked up, and raised the closest piling up in the air. Utilizing the existing pilings and adding additional ones, Petitioner rebuilt the dock "going a step at a time." In the course of his rebuilding the dock, Petitioner replaced the wooden decking and fasteners, replaced the wooden stringers and fasteners, added seven new concrete pilings, raised and repositioned several existing concrete pilings, and poured concrete footings for the new pilings. He completed rebuilding the dock in 1989. During the almost one year that he was rebuilding the dock, he worked in plain view of employees of local and state agencies. He was easily observed by the Coast Guard, the Marine Patrol, and the Park Service boats travelling to and through the Marvin D. Adams Waterway located approximately seventy-five feet from his property. No one told Petitioner to stop his construction activities. When it was completed, his dock was 12 feet wide and 84 feet long, 28 feet shorter than the historic dock. Petitioner's entire dock consists of 1018 square feet. Petitioner's dock is in the same location as the historic dock. Petitioner's dock is a private dock, used only by him when he moors his boat there occasionally. In re-building his dock, Petitioner extended it to a distance so that the water depth at the end of Petitioner's dock is four feet mean low water. Additionally, Petitioner left an open space of one to two inches between each plank on the deck so that sunlight could penetrate between the deck planking the entire distance of the dock. Pilings are an integral part of a dock. In 1988 Respondent began conducting a survey of private docks, commercial marinas, and fills, both authorized and unauthorized, within the boundaries of Pennekamp State Park as those boundaries were extended in 1967 to Key Largo. The survey was to be utilized in developing a policy regarding structures within the extended park boundaries. Petitioner's dock was included in that survey. The information which Respondent transmitted to the Governor and Cabinet regarding Petitioner's dock was that it was not authorized, that it was built in 1990, and that the water depth at the mooring area, considered by Respondent to be the terminal end of the dock, was two feet. Respondent did not advise the Governor and Cabinet that a dock had been in existence at Petitioner's property prior to 1967 and as far back as at least 1938, that the concrete pad and thirteen pilings from the historic dock still existed, or that Petitioner had rebuilt the dock in the same location, but shorter, than the historic dock. Further, Respondent did not advise the Governor and Cabinet that its water depth measurement of two feet was not taken at the waterward end of the dock, the way such a measurement is normally done. Respondent did advise the Governor and Cabinet that the access channel to the dock was four feet deep. On April 12, 1990, the Governor and Cabinet, sitting as the head of Respondent, approved a policy regarding development encroachments in Pennekamp State Park. The portion of that policy which relates to private docks provides as follows: Private docks must (1) be in existence prior to 1967 within state park waters to receive authorized structure status; (2) all docks within state park waters legally authorized by the Department of Natural Resources or the Board of Trustees during or after 1967 receive status as authorized structures; (3) that all other private docks in existence since 1967 within state park waters that are not legally authorized by Department of Natural Resources or the Board of Trustees have been evaluated on a case-by-case basis, taking into consideration any authorization issued by state and federal environmental agencies and, using the Florida Keys Marina and Dock Siting Policies and Criteria - 18-21.0041 Florida Administrative Code, as a guideline for reviewing environmental impact on marine communities, designate the structure as either authorized or require removal or modification; and (4) that no future authorizations will be issued for the construction of new private docks in state park waters. Respondent subsequently notified Petitioner that his dock fell into category (3), that it had been evaluated on an individual basis using the Florida Keys Marina and Dock Siting Policies and Criteria, that his dock had an impact on marine communities because it exceeded the size and dimension requirements and did not meet the water depth requirements, and that Petitioner's dock needed to be "modified." Respondent further advised Petitioner that the modifications required included reconstructing his dock to a T-shaped structure rather than Petitioner's rectangular-shaped structure. The new structure would be required to have a four-foot wide walkway with a terminal platform of no more than 160 square feet. Further, Respondent's proposed dock would also extend an additional 28 feet further into Largo Sound than Petitioner's dock. Respondent also required that Petitioner install permanent handrails along the dock in order to convert it to only a swimming/fishing pier, and the mooring of any water craft to the structure would be prohibited. Petitioner has not so modified his dock. There are algae, sea grasses, sponges, coral, and other vegetation and marine life beneath and adjacent to Petitioner's dock, constituting a marine community. Shading has an adverse impact on the growth of sea grasses and marine vegetation. Where shading exists under Petitioner's dock, the submerged land under the dock is nearly barren. However, Petitioner rebuilt the dock in a manner so as to reduce the effect of shading. The dock is 41 inches above water at high tide. The spacing between planks on the deck also allows sunlight to penetrate the water below Petitioner's dock. An underwater videotape of the area beneath and around Petitioner's dock reveals an extensive marine life habitat and nursery. The pilings which have been under water for such a long time have an extensive buildup of sponges and coral which, in turn, provide a habitat for an enormous number of fish. Spiny Florida lobsters live under Petitioner's dock, as do mangrove snapper, barracuda, porkfish, damselfish, reef fish, sea cucumbers, and urchins. In effect, Petitioner has created an artificial reef. Some of the barren areas beneath Petitioner's dock are a result of the halo effect, i.e., the crustaceans and fish living under the dock and in the sponges and soft corals on the pilings only graze so far from their homes in order to avoid predators. This halo effect can also be seen around the free-standing pilings outside of Petitioner's dock area. Even if the planking on Petitioner's dock were removed, the sea grasses would not grow back around the pilings since the grazing organisms would still be present. Although there may be less shading beneath Respondent's proposed dock than exists underneath Petitioner's dock, substantial damage to the marine community beneath Petitioner's dock would be caused by the removal of Petitioner's dock and the building of a new one. It is not clear that the long- term effect of Respondent's proposed dock would have less adverse impact than Petitioner's dock. It is likely, however, that the removal of the present dock, with or without the subsequent construction of Respondent's proposed dock, would have a substantial adverse effect on the healthy marine community now existing beneath and around Petitioner's dock.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered giving Petitioner's dock authorized structure status. DONE and ENTERED this 10th day of February, 1992, at Tallahassee, Florida. LINDA M. RIGOT Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of February, 1992. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER Petitioner's proposed findings of fact numbered 1-3 and 5-7 have been adopted either verbatim or in substance in this Recommended Order. Petitioner's proposed findings of fact numbered 4 and 9 have been rejected as unnecessary for determination of the issues involved herein. Petitioner's proposed findings of fact numbered 8 and 10-19 have been rejected as not constituting findings of fact but rather as constituting conclusions of law, argument of counsel, or recitation of the testimony. Respondent's proposed findings of fact numbered 2-7, 9-13, 16-18, 20, 21, 26-31, 33, 36, and 37 have adopted either verbatim or in substance in this Recommended Order. Respondent's proposed findings of fact numbered 1, 8, 14, 15, 25, 35, 40, and 41 have been rejected as being unnecessary for determination of the issues herein. Respondent's proposed findings of fact numbered 22-24 have been rejected as not constituting findings of fact but rather as constituting conclusions of law, argument of counsel, or recitation of the testimony. Respondent's proposed finding of fact numbered 19 has been rejected as being irrelevant to the issues herein. Respondent's proposed findings of fact numbered 32, 34, 38, 39, and 42-44 have been rejected as not being supported by the weight of the evidence in this case. COPIES FURNISHED: James H. Burgess, Jr., Esquire Syprett, Meshad, Resnick & Lieb, P.A. Post Office Box 1238 Sarasota, Florida 34230-1238 Suzanne B. Brantley, Esquire Department of Natural Resources Mail Station 35 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard Tallahassee, FL 32399-3000 Don E. Duden Acting Executive Director Department of Natural Resources Mail Station 10 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard Tallahassee, FL 32399-3000 Ken Plante, General Counsel Department of Natural Resources Mail Station 10 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard Tallahassee, FL 32399-3000
Findings Of Fact Background Respondents, John F. and Chere Kuller, were minority partners in a limited partnership which developed and constructed a seventeen unit condominium project known as Bahia East Condominium (project).2 Thee precise location of the project was not disclosed, but it is in the Fort Walton Beach area. Respondents, as developers, are subject to the regulatory requirements of petitioner, Department of Business Regulation, Division of Florida Land Sales, Condominiums and Mobile Homes (Division). The project was completed in 1979, and its declaration was filed on September 28, 1979. Units immediately went on sale. Financing for these units we" arranged with a Pensacola lending institution, and based upon that institution's commitment, contracts for the sale of all seventeen units were executed by prospective buyers. When the institution experienced financial problems and could not honor its commitment, none of the buyers purchased units. Because of this, the first sale did not occur until October 4, 1980. A developer is required to adhere to a number of Division requirements, including the payment of monthly assess meets on developer-owned units, funding a repair reserve, and furnishing annual financial statements to all unit owners. This proceeding stems from a complaint filed by certain unit owners after the developers relinquished control of the project to the homeowners' association on May 11, 1984. Prior to that time, respondents controlled the board of directors of said association, and were responsible for the keeping of its books and records. Count I - Monthly Assessments As a general rule, a developer is not liable for the payment of monthly assessments on all unsold units until the first calendar date of the fourth month following the sale of the first unit. This ninety day grace period is commonly referred to as the election period. However, the developer may be excused from future payments if the developer guarantees to each purchaser that the monthly assessment will not increase, for a certain period of time, and obligates himself during this period of time to pay all common expenses incurred above the amount of assessments received from unit owners. In the case at bar, there was no written or oral guarantee by respondents to freeze the monthly assessments. This was confirmed through testimony of a unit owner, and evidenced by a monthly assessment increase that took effect in March, 1984, or prior to the turnover date. Between October, 1980 and March, 1984, the cost of the monthly assessment varied with the size of the unit, and ranged from $27.50 for the smallest unit, to $55.00 for a two bedroom, one bath unit, to $82.50 for the largest unit. Since no guarantee was made, respondents were obligated to begin paying assessments on their unsold units in February, 1981. However, they failed to do so. Instead, they calculated their other expenses in maintaining the project, and credited the amount of monthly assessments owed against these other expenses. Since other expenses always exceeded the amount of assessments owed, no funds were ever specifically earmarked into the monthly assessment account. Had such assessments been paid from February, 1981 through May 11, 1984, which is the turnover date, respondents' obligation would have been $15,948.64. This amount was derived from records given by respondents to the association at turnover and was not credibly contradicted. Count II - Reserves The complaint charges that respondents "failed to submit reserves annually nor fund reserves as required." According to Division requirements, a developer is required to establish and fund a reserve to cover future repairs from the date of declaration until the end of the election period. These funds are then turned over to the association. Beginning after the election period, a developer is required to establish and fund a reserve account in an amount prescribed by the project's declaration. In this case, the project's recorded declaration provided that the reserve had to equal 10% of the total annual monthly assessments paid by unit owners. Therefore, respondents were required to establish a reserve no later than February, 1981, and to fund it by setting aside 10% of the total monthly assessments. Such an account was timely established by respon- dents at a Pensacola bank in January, 1981 in the amount of $480. This amount was spent within three or four months on repairs to an air-conditioner generator and the purchase of reserved parking signs. No additional funds were placed in the reserve account after January, 1981. Each year a projected annual budget was prepared by the developers which included an amount for the reserve, but no funds were ever actually set aside for that purpose. Although this requirement can be waived by vote of the association, respondents conceded that the funding requirement was never waived. Respondents justified their course of action on the theory the association account into which the assessments were placed was running a deficit, and the developers had already guaranteed to cover all expenses. However, this procedure is not sanctioned by statute or rule. According to uncontradicted testimony, had appropriate reserves been funded as required, respondents would have funded $4,770.56 from February, 1981 until the turnover. Count III - Annual Financial Statements The final count involves an allegation that respondents "failed to furnish unit owners with an annual financial statement for the years 1980, 1981, 1982 and 1983." According to Division requirements, all non-developer unit owners must be furnished a copy of the project's "annual financial statement" each year. This document must be prepared and distributed by mail or personal delivery. Respondents claimed that this was done. However, petitioner presented the testimony of two unit owners for the purpose of showing that such statements were not distributed as required. One unit owner, William C. Naftel, received the 1982 statement, but could not recall one way or the other whether he received statements in the years 1981, 1983 and 1984. A second unit owner, Max C. Bolton, Jr., testified he "may have" received such a statement in 1982, but did not receive one for the years 1980, 1981 and 1983. Mitigation This project was respondents' first and only development venture in Florida. Respondents' lack of compliance with Division requirements did not appear to the undersigned to be intentional. Rather, it stemmed from a combination of poor outside advice and a failure on their part to make diligent inquiry as to what precise obligations the statutes and Division rules imposed upon them from an accounting and legal standpoint. At hearing, respondents claimed they have lost a considerable amount of money on the project, which amount far outweighs any claims advanced by the agency.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that respondents be found guilty of violating Subsections 718.115(2), 718.112(2)(k); and 718.111(13), Florida Statutes (1985), and that a $2,500 civil penalty be imposed; to be paid within thirty days from date of final order. DONE and ORDERED this 3rd day of June, 1986, in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of June, 1986.
The Issue Whether Wayne Zimmet's proposed single-family boat dock and lift project is exempt from the need to obtain an Environmental Resource Permit (ERP) from the Department of Environmental Protection (Department) under Florida Administrative Code Rule 40E-4.051(3)(c).1
Findings Of Fact Both Wayne Zimmet and Scott Rosenblum own property in Tequesta, Florida, in a community known as North Passage, which has a man-made navigation and drainage easement canal that terminates at its eastern end at Mr. Rosenblum's property, which is Lot 74, at 8738 Riverfront Terrace. Mr. Zimmet's property, which is Lot 75, at 8750 Riverfront Terrace, is south of the eastern terminus of the canal. The Rosenblum and Zimmet properties are adjacent and share a common boundary. There is an existing dock extending from Mr. Rosenblum's property into the canal. The existing dock is perpendicular to, and extends west from the middle of, the shore of the eastern terminus of the canal. There is a wooden walkway leading from the residence on Mr. Rosenblum's property to the existing dock. However, there also has been a wooden walkway leading from Mr. Zimmet's property to the existing dock. As indicated in the Preliminary Statement, there is a dispute between Mr. Zimmet and Mr. Rosenblum as to who is entitled to access and use the existing dock--and in particular the south side of the existing dock. That dispute will be resolved in state circuit court.2 For purposes of this proceeding, it will be assumed that Mr. Rosenblum has the right to use the existing dock. On or about May 25, 2006, Mr. Zimmet filed an application requesting an ERP exemption to install an eight-foot by twenty-foot (160-square feet) marginal dock with a two-pile elevator lift to designed to accommodate his boat, which is approximately 24.5 feet long (22 feet at the waterline) and eight feet wide. According to documentation submitted with the application, the proposed dock would be centered along the waterfront of his property and extend approximately four feet into the canal. The proposed boat lift would be skewed toward the western end of the proposed marginal dock with the intent being to dock his boat with the bow facing the west so that proposed dock could be used to enter and load the boat from the stern. This positioning of the proposed lift and boat at the proposed dock would skew a boat on the lift at the proposed dock about three feet to the west, away from the existing dock. Based on the evidence, it is found that Mr. Zimmet did not prove by a preponderance of the evidence that his proposed boat dock and lift, even if skewed to the west as indicated in the application drawings, would not "impede navigation" to and from the south side of the existing dock. (Otherwise, Mr. Zimmet's proposed dock and lift would not "impede navigation" in the canal.) This impediment to navigation to and from the south side of the existing dock is not a mere inconvenience. Although Mr. Rosenblum now only owns and uses a raft at the existing dock, he testified that he plans on purchasing and using a boat. Boats in the range of approximately 24.5 feet in length with a beam of 8 to 8.5 feet are common in the North Passage canal. A boat of that size docked at the south side of the existing dock would barely fit alongside Mr. Zimmet's boat, whether docked or on the lift, and there would not be a reasonable amount of clearance for navigating a boat of that size commonly to or from the south side of the existing dock if Mr. Zimmet's boat were docked at the proposed dock or on the proposed lift. (Likewise, if a boat of that size were docked on the south side of the existing dock, there would not be a reasonable amount of clearance for Mr. Zimmet to use his proposed dock and lift.) There was no evidence of any impediment to navigation to and from the north side of the existing dock.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Environmental Protection enter a final order concluding that, absent a circuit court determination that Mr. Rosenblum does not have the right to access and use the south side of the existing dock, Mr. Zimmet's proposed dock and lift project is not exempt from the need to obtain an ERP. DONE AND ENTERED this 23rd day of October, 2007, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S J. LAWRENCE JOHNSTON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of October, 2007.
Findings Of Fact For purposes of the Motions to Dismiss filed by Agrico and the Department, the following findings of fact are based upon the pleadings in this case, matters to which the parties have stipulated, and DOAH Case Number 86-3618, as well as final agency action resulting therefrom: On or about August 26, 1986, Petitioners filed with the Department a petition for formal administrative proceeding which challenged the dredge and fill permit that the Department intended to issue to Agrico. The Department transmitted this matter to the Division of Administrative Hearings for hearing, and it was assigned to the undersigned Hearing Officer as DOAH Case Number 86- 3618. Petitioners relied upon Sections 120.57(1) and 403.412(5), Florida Statutes, to "initiate" DOAH Case Number 86-3618 as is clearly set forth in paragraph 20 of their Petition filed in that case. In their Motion for Fees and Costs at paragraph 3, Petitioners further allege, and thereby concede, that they "initiated the above styled proceeding (DOAH Case Number 86-3618)." A final hearing was scheduled to begin on April 28, 1987 in DOAH Case Number 86-3618. However by letter to the Department dated March 2, 1987, Agrico voluntarily withdrew its application for a dredge and fill permit which was the subject of that case. Thereafter, a telephone conference call was held on March 17, 1987, following which an Order Closing File was filed in DOAH Case Number 86-3618 on that same date, and jurisdiction was relinquished to the Department. The Final Order in Case Number 86-3618 was entered by the Department on May 18, 1987 which states: Upon consideration, it is ORDERED that the withdrawal of permit application number 53-1093999 is GRANTED with prejudice to further Department consideration of the application, but without prejudice to the future submission of another dredge and fill application covering the same tract of land covered by application number 53-1093999. The withdrawal of permit application number 53-1093999 divests the Department of jurisdiction to proceed with consideration of (Booker Creek and Manasota's) petition. Humana of Florida, Inc., v. Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, 500 So.2d 186 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986). Accordingly, the above-captioned case (DOAH Case Number 86-3618) is DISMISSED as moot. On July 16, 1987, Petitioners timely filed their Motion for Fees and Costs which was assigned to the undersigned Hearing Officer and given DOAH Case Number 87-3007F. Petitioners are each incorporated as not-for-profit corporations within the State of Florida, with principal off ices in Florida, and each having less than twenty-five full time employees, as well as a net worth of not more than two million dollars.
The Issue The issue in the case is whether the Petitioner should be granted an environmental resource permit and authorization to use sovereign submerged lands for construction of an extension to an existing multi-family residential docking facility.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner, Bay Oaks Circle Association, Inc., represents the 20 property owners of the Bay Oaks Circle subdivision. Bay Oaks Circle borders on Lemon Bay. Lemon Bay is a Class II Outstanding Florida Water. Lemon Bay is also an aquatic preserve and a designated state "Special Water." The Lemon Bay aquatic preserve is recognized for its water quality and resources. To protect the resources, special standards are applicable to review of permits for aquatic activities. The Petitioner's existing dock was permitted in the 1970's. The dock has four slips and extends approximately 100 to 120 feet from the shoreline into water depths of approximately one to one and a half feet at low tide. The dock attaches to the shoreline from a 45.5-foot wide easement owned by the Petitioner. There is evidence of prop dredging in the existing mooring area. The existing mooring area has little natural value as a water resource. Initially, the proposed dock was to extend another 120 feet (for a total extension of 220-240 feet) into deeper water approximately three to three and a half feet at low tide and would accommodate a mooring area for eight slips. In the area of the proposed dock, most of Lemon Bay is about three and a half feet deep at low tide. The application was subsequently amended to provide an extension of 112 feet for a total length of 199.5 feet, with six boat slips. The final proposal provided for a 104 feet long by three feet wide access walkway. Two 16 feet long by two feet wide "finger" piers would extend from the walkway. The end of the walkway would terminate in a dock platform 8 feet by 20 feet wide. The total square footage of proposed structure over water is 536 square feet. The proposed mooring areas are defined by mooring pilings place into the bay bottom. The applicant seeks a sovereign submerged land lease to permit the preemption of 2,219 square feet of submerged bottom land. Because the proposed dock exceeds 500 square feet in an Outstanding Florida Water, a standard environmental resource permit must be obtained before the proposal can be constructed. Two of the proposed mooring slips are over seagrasses. Additionally, two shallow areas located nearby contain seagrasses. Seagrasses provide the basis of the food chain in the waters. Adverse impacts to seagrass beds negatively affect marine productivity, as well as the fishing and recreational values of the waters. The proposed dock expansion poses a threat to the seagrass beds at the mooring slips and in the shallow areas near the shoreline and to the east of the proposed dock. Although the proposed dock extension does not appear to directly impede a marked navigation channel, review of the bay bottom suggests that boats currently navigate in the proposed mooring area to avoid a shallower nearby shoal. It is likely that the proposed dock expansion would result in diversion of boat traffic into the seagrassed area of the shallower waters. Section 373.414(1), Florida Statutes, sets forth the review criteria used in consideration of a permit application when the proposed activity occurs in an Outstanding Florida Water. The Petitioner offered no evidence to establish that the permitting criteria set forth at Section 373.414(1), Florida Statutes, have been met. The proposed multi-family docking facility requires issuance of a sovereign submerged land lease before the facility can be constructed. Sovereign submerged land leases are reviewed according to the size of the proposed facility and the quality of the lands to be impacted by construction and operation. Submerged land is classified according to resource quality into "Resource Protection Areas (RPA)" to permit appropriate application review. An RPA I is an area of fragile, easily-damaged marine resources such as coral beds or seagrasses, that require the highest level of protection. An RPA II is an area or seagrasses or benthic animals which, while not as fragile as an RPA I, still require substantial protection. An RPA III is an area of sand that contains fewer marine resources than an RPA I or II. The seagrassed areas near the proposed docking facility are classified as an RPA I. The areas near the proposed docking facility contain less seagrass, but have substantial evidence of benthic anumals, and are classified as RPA II. According to the parties, the Petitioner must meet a "ten to one" rule to obtain a permit. In the alternative, the Petitioner may qualify for a lease if the proposed facility does not exceed the maximum square footage permitted for a single- family dock. The ten-to-one criteria provides that the total dock structure may not preempt more than ten times the linear footage of the property owner's shoreline, in which case a lease may be issued. In this case, the shoreline is 45.5 feet, resulting in a permissible preemption of 455 square feet. In this case the applicant proposes to preempt 2,219 square feet. According to the credited testimony of the Respondent’s witness, the single-family dock methodology does not qualify the proposed dock for permitting. Although a number of hypothetical dock proposals were discussed at the hearing, the hypothetical proposals are not included in the permit application. There is no evidence that the agency gave any formal consideration to hypothetical proposals prior to the hearing. At the hearing, the Petitioner proposed that the applicable rules be waived to allow the permit and lease to be issued. Specifically, the Petitioner proposed that the permitting criteria be waived as to dock design and minimum square footage. There is no credible evidence to support waiver of applicable statutes and rules in this case.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Department of Environmental Protection enter a final order denying the application for the proposed dock extension filed by the Bay Oaks Circle Association, Inc. DONE AND ENTERED this 16th day of July, 1999, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. WILLIAM F. QUATTLEBAUM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of July, 1999. COPIES FURNISHED: Barry L. Dasher Bay Oaks Circle Association, Inc. 3075 Bay Oaks Circle Englewood, Florida 34223 Francine M. Ffolkes, Attorney Department of Environmental Protection Mail Station 35 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3000 Richard G. Perkins 4005 Bay Oaks Circle Englewood, Florida 34223 Kathy Carter, Agency Clerk Office of the General Counsel Department of Environmental Protection Mail Station 35 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3000 F. Perry Odom, General Counsel Department of Environmental Protection Mail Station 35 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3000
Findings Of Fact Respondent Carter is the owner of real property located at 102 Hummingbird Lane, Crescent City, Putnam County, Florida, ("The Property") The Property has a shore length of 68.5 feet on Crescent Lake. Crescent Lake is a "water of the state" as defined in Section 403.031, F.S. The agency, now DEP, is the state agency charged with environmental concerns and permission to use submerged state lands. There are two types of authorization an applicant must receive in order to construct a dock on state owned submerged lands. The first is regulatory, which addresses issues concerning environmental impacts. The second is proprietary, which addresses issues concerning use of state owned submerged lands. Mr. and Mrs. Hageman, Petitioners herein, own property adjacent on the east of Mr. Carter's property. 1/ They have a 240 foot dock in place going out into Crescent Lake. Mr. Carter's westerly neighbor also has a shorter dock going into the lake. The Carters purchased the Property from an estate, with the announced intention to erect their own dock for water recreational purposes. Before closing the sale, they were warned off the property by Mr. Hageman who claimed his riparian rights would be violated if any dock were built on the Property. After inquiries to DEP and the Army Corps of Engineers, the Carters purchased The Property anyway. DEP has no jurisdiction to regulate docks under 1000 square feet. Mr. Carter received DEP Exemption 542504222 to construct a dock under 1000 square feet on The Property. Mr. Carter constructed a single family private use dock, including a boat shelter, extending from The Property into Crescent Lake. The dock was built approximately 35 feet from Hagemans' property line, straight out into the water, and 25 feet from the property line of his neighbor on the other side. This placed the Carter dock roughly perpendicular to the approximate center of Mr. Carter's shoreline. Petitioners conceded that Mr. Carter honored his westerly neighbor's property line, but asserted that he should have, and had not, honored his easterly property line, the line dividing his and Petitioners' property, waterward beyond the shoreline. In all, Petitioners Hageman have filed three formal petitions against the Carter dock. See Findings of Fact 16, 18, and 33, infra. All three petitions herein oppose the Carter dock as constructed upon a theory that it crosses Petitioner's riparian rights line and therefore violates the setback criteria found in Rule 18-21.004(3)(d) F.A.C.; that it blocks a channel exclusive to Petitioners' use and poses an impediment to navigation of all boats, particularly Petitioners' sailboat; that its boat shelter is enclosed contrary to rule; that it does not meet the ten-to-one rule; and that it blocks Petitioners' view and lowers their property value. The Hagemans initially filed a complaint with the DEP in regard to the dock. In response to the Hagemans' complaint, Steven Biemiller, an environmental specialist in the dredge and fill compliance/enforcement section of DEP's northeast district, and John Hendricks of the Army Corps of Engineers visited the Property on July 25, 1994. They found that the Carter dock as built exceeded 1,000 square feet in surface area. It was, however, consistent in length, width, and alignment with other docks in the area, including Petitioners' dock. Mr. Biemiller calculated Carter's dock to be 1,400 square feet. It therefore exceeded the state exemption criteria and required a state permit. Mr. Carter had constructed his dock without a valid permit from the state agency, and DEP responded by issuing him a warning letter. Carter and DEP thereafter entered into Consent Order O.C.G. 94-2443 to address the unpermitted dock construction. Testifying as an expert in the agency's enforcement and compliance procedures, Mr. Biemiller established that negotiated consent orders of this type are a standard agency procedure to resolve minor permitting violations. His testimony is accepted on that issue and to the effect that the purpose of all consent orders, including the one at issue here, is to return the non-complying structure to compliance with the applicable state rules and statutes. The consent order provides, in pertinent part, that Mr. Carter will (a) pay the agency $300.00, which amount includes a $200.00 civil penalty and $100.00 for agency costs and expenses; AND (b) reduce the size of his dock to under 1,000 square feet or obtain an after-the-fact permit whereby the agency would authorize the 1400 square foot dock to remain in place as already constructed. The Hagemans timely filed a petition challenging the consent order. The consent order herein addressed DEP's environmental concerns by jump-starting the permit process through which the agency could examine the environmental impacts posed by the dock project. In Mr. Biemiller's expert opinion, this consent order accomplished the agency's statutory and regulatory goals at that point because Mr. Carter paid his fine and applied for a dredge and fill permit. Agency permit 542558842 was issued to Mr. Carter on November 16, 1994. It approved the proposed project and authorized construction of a private use dock having a 4.75-foot wide plus 230-foot long access walkway, a 10.3-foot wide and 20.3-foot long covered boat shelter, plus an 8.5-foot long and 12.8-foot wide waterward "L" platform, within Crescent Lake, Putnam County. The Hagemans timely filed a petition challenging the permit. The Hagemans' concerns about the Carter dock and boat shelter blocking their view and diminishing their property value were raised by their petitions, but no evidence or argument was presented on the latter issue. "View" and market value concerns are not addressed by the jurisdiction or authority conferred upon DEP by either statute or rule, and may not be considered here. In determining whether or not to issue dredge and fill permits, the agency examines a project's impact on water quality, its biological impacts, whether the project is contrary to the public interest and how it impacts, if at all, on wetlands. The agency does not look at riparian rights. Those rights are addressed, if at all, by agency review of applications for consents of use and the rules applicable thereto. Thomas Wiley was the field inspector for the dredge and fill permit which is at issue. He visited Mr. Carter's property with another agency employee, Erica Robbins, to conduct a site assessment. Mr. Wiley prepared the Permit Application Appraisal. Mr. Wiley has a Bachelor of Science degree in environmental biology and twelve hours towards his Masters degree in the same discipline. He has been employed by the agency for four and a half years as a environmental specialist. During that time, he has reviewed approximately 300 dredge and fill applications. He was accepted as an expert in the agency's environmental resource permitting procedures and the impacts of dredging and filling projects on wetlands. Mr. Wiley recommended issuance of the permit in part based on his determination that the long term adverse impacts of the Carter dock on water quality are minimal and that the long term adverse impacts of the project on submerged resources also are minimal. His expert opinion on these issues is accepted, as is his unrefuted mixed fact and opinion testimony that the project site contains submerged beds of eelgrass (vallisnaria). These eelgrass beds end approximately 20 feet landward of the Carter boat shelter and dock. Carter's boat shelter and dock do not pose a significant impact to the eelgrass and will not adversely affect the conservation of fish and wildlife. The Carter boat shelter has one almost closed side, one side which descends to about one and a half feet above the water and two open ends. It is not substantially different from other local boat shelters. There are water hyacinths in the same area as the eelgrass and nearer to the shoreline. DEP has issued a permit to Mr. Hageman to clear such water hyacinths from a 25-foot swath in front of his property so as to keep clear the channel to his dock and boat shelter. The greater weight of the credible evidence is that Mr. Hageman has been zealous in his removal of water hyacinths and has exceeded the 25-foot limitation. Existence of this permit allowing Mr. Hageman to remove hyacinths and existence of this larger cleared swath of water/shoreline is not dependable evidence of the Hagemans' riparian rights claim and does not alter or affect DEP's determination that no aquatic plants will be seriously endangered by the Carter dock and boat shelter. The parties stipulated that the construction of Carter's dock has not, and will not, degrade the water quality of Crescent Lake and that the water quality standards set forth in Chapter 62-302 F.A.C., are not violated because of the construction of the dock. The parties stipulated that the Carter dock as constructed will not adversely affect the fishing or recreational value or marine productivity on Crescent Lake. The parties stipulated that the dock as constructed will not adversely affect any historical or archaeological resources under the provisions of Section 267.061 F.S. In determining whether a dock poses a navigational impediment, DEP looks for the presence of marked navigational channels and the proximity of the dock to other docks in the area. The credible competent evidence as a whole shows that the Carter dock is similar to the Hagemans' dock and is located about 100 feet west of the Hagemans' dock. The Carter structure also conforms with the prevailing alignment of all docks in the immediate area and its distance from neighboring structures is sufficient so that the Carter dock will not present a hindrance to navigation. The greater weight of the credible evidence is that the Hagemans have sailed in and out from their adjacent dock without any obvious problems occasioned by the Carter dock. There is plenty of room between the Carter and Hageman docks so that the Carter dock has not so far obstructed the Hagemans' ability to navigate their sailboat. Mr. Carter has provided reasonable assurances that his dock is not contrary to the public interest under Section 373.414 (1)(a) F.S. In determining the cumulative impacts a project may have, the agency looks at the total impact of past, present and future projects on water quality and function in wetland systems. Mr. Wiley determined it is reasonable to expect other lakefront property owners will construct docks into the lake, but based on his experience and expertise, he concluded that Mr. Carter's project's long-term impact still will continue to be minimal. The permit is appropriate and insures compliance with all applicable statutory and rule guidelines for dredge and fill permits. Mr. Carter also applied to the agency for a consent of use for submerged state lands. This was appropriate because Crescent Lake is a "water of the state". A consent of use is generally a letter of authorization for minor projects, such as single family docks, bulkheads and dredging that occur on state owned land and submerged land. The ten-to-one ratio found in Rule 18- 21.005(1)(a)2 F.A.C. allows an applicant to have ten square feet of preempted area for every linear foot of the shoreline that he owns. If an applicant meets the rule criteria, he is issued a consent of use. Generally, if an applicant exceeds the criteria, he would be issued a lease, as opposed to a consent of use. The agency issued a consent of use to Mr. Carter on December 5, 1994. The Hagemans filed a petition challenging the consent of use. DEP acts as staff for the Board of Trustees of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund. The authority to issue consents of use has been delegated to a planning manager. In the instant situation, that planning manager was Russell Price. Russell Price is employed by DEP as planning manager of the submerged land section and has served in that capacity for two years. Mr. Price holds a Bachelor of Science degree in biology, has a year of education towards his Master's degree in biology, and has reviewed approximately two to three hundred applications for consents of use. Mr. Price was accepted as an expert in state lands determination and regulation. In issuing the consent of use to Mr. Carter, Mr. Price relied on his education, training and experience in state lands regulation, and considered the application, the drawings, the agency's regulatory permit section's field report, comments from staff of the Army Corps of Engineers and a memorandum from the agency's Bureau of Surveying and Mapping. See Finding of Fact 40. Mr. Price opined, on behalf of the agency's interpretation of its own statute and rules, that the agency does not uniformly require a lease where the ten-to-one rule is minimally exceeded; that the agency will issue a consent of use if the applicant's structure is still relatively small and is configured in the minimum way possible to obtain access at reasonable water depths; that in its discretion, the agency does not apply the ten-to-one rule to require leases; 2/ and that consents of use are issued to single docks that are the minimum length necessary to reach reasonable access to navigable waters. Mr. Price issued the consent of use in this case after determining that Mr. Carter's dock as constructed was a single family dock configured in the minimum size and length necessary to achieve reasonable access to navigable waters and that the nearshore area located adjacent to Mr. Carter's upland property required that his dock exceed the ten-to-one ratio in order to access reasonable water depths for navigation. In so doing, Mr. Price relied on the DEP Permit Application Appraisal measurement of the water depth at the end of Carter's dock as 4.5 feet deep and analyzed the configuration and angle of the other docks in the area. This was in accord with the specific language of Rule 18-21.005(1)(a)1 F.A.C. 3/ Evidence adduced at formal hearing suggests that there has been some erosion, possibly due to the removal of the water hyacinths and that shows that it is environmentally desirable to avoid recreational contact with the eelgrass, especially by boats. These factors also support the reasonableness of Carter's dock configuration, even though it minimally exceeds the ten-to-one rule. Petitioners Hageman contended that their riparian rights may be determined by projecting a line straight waterward from the upland fence line between their lot and Mr. Carter's property. If that is the appropriate determination of their riparian rights, then the Carter dock does cross that projected line, but that projected line has not been placed by a surveyor or determined by a court of competent jurisdiction. At best, there has been a post erected by Mr. Hageman as the result of a prior lawsuit concerning easements. Respondent Carter's property is narrower than Petitioners' property and somewhat wedge-shaped. Petitioners assert that because the lake curves, Mr. Carter's riparian rights form a narrow pie slice-shaped area in the water. However, without a legal determination to that effect, there is only the foregoing unsupported assertion concerning either landowner's riparian rights. Although the agency's rules require a 25-foot setback of a dock (10- foot setback for marginal docks) from the applicant's riparian rights line, 4/ the agency does not measure the setback of a dock by that rule unless there has already been a determination of a riparian rights line by a court of law. DEP witnesses clearly enunciated and explicated agency policy that DEP does not affirmatively take it upon itself to determine riparian rights as between private land owners because the agency has no constitutional or statutory jurisdiction to do so. To Mr. Price's knowledge, the agency has never determined the riparian rights line of two private property owners. The agency relies on circuit courts to resolve those types of disputes. In response to the Hagemans' concerns about encroachment on their asserted riparian rights and in an abundance of caution, Mr. Price sent aerial photographs, the county plat map, and the drawings submitted with Mr. Carter's application to the DEP's Bureau of Surveying and Mapping. He requested that the Bureau make a guesstimation of the common riparian rights line based on a methodology it has developed for estimating riparian rights lines. The memorandum constitutes little more than legal research discussing various methodologies courts have used in the past for determining riparian rights. It reaches no definite conclusion with regard to the riparian rights between the Hagemans and Carter. Beyond explaining and supplementing the direct evidence of the agency policy to rely on courts to determine riparian rights, its contents and conclusions are unreliable hearsay which is outside the parameters of Section 120.58(1)(a) F.S., because no one connected with the preparation of that report testified at formal hearing. No reliable determination of the riparian rights line dividing the Petitioners' property and the property of Applicant/Respondent Carter was presented as evidence at formal hearing. DEP is not aware that any court determination specifically setting out the boundaries of the parties' riparian rights exists. DEP did not require Mr. Carter to institute a lawsuit to establish riparian boundaries before considering his application. This also appears to be common agency procedure. The agency addressed the absence of a clear showing of riparian rights and implemented its policy directed thereto in the standard language of the consent of use, which provided in pertinent part, as follows: 2. Grantee agrees that all title and interest to all lands lying below the historical mean high water line or ordinary high water line are vested in the Board, and shall make no claim of title or interest in said lands by reason of the occupancy or use thereof * * * 5. Grantee agrees to indeminity, defend and hold harmless the Board and the State of Florida from all claims, actions, lawsuits and demands arising out of this consent. * * * 12. In the event that any part of the structure(s) consented to herein is determined by a final adjudication issued by a court of competent jurisdiction to encroach on or interfere with adjacent riparian rights, Grantee agrees to either obtain written consent for the offending structure from the affected riparian owner or to remove the interference or encroachment within 60 days from the date of the adjudication. Failure to comply shall constitute a material breach of this consent and shall be grounds for its immediate termination.
Recommendation Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED That the Department of Environmental Protection enter a final order that dismisses the three petitions, ratifies the consent order, and issues the after- the-fact permit and consent of use with the safeguards already contained therein to protect the Petitioners' riparian rights in case the Petitioners hereafter obtain a circuit court determination of those riparian rights. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 7th day of July, at Tallahassee, Florida. ELLA JANE P. DAVIS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of July, 1995
Findings Of Fact The Applicant is a partnership which is developing a 48-unit condominium on property owned by the Applicant on the southeast and southwest corners of 28th Street South and Highway A1A in Cocoa Beach, Florida. The Applicant is in the process of constructing and completing 48 oceanfront condominium units east of Highway A1A. The Applicant plans eventually to develop 20 additional condominium units which would front on the Banana River on the Applicant's property west of Highway A1A. The Applicant has deeded a portion of its property west of Highway A1A to the condominium unit owners jointly. Through this proceeding the Applicant is seeking authority to construct a pier or dock into the Banana River on this property. The Petitioners own and reside on property south of the Applicant's property west of Highway A1A. The Intervenor is a voluntary association of homeowners in a subdivision known as Snug Harbor. The Snug Harbor subdivision is located approximately 4,000 feet north of the proposed dock. Many of the subdivision residents use the waters of the Banana River, including waters adjacent to the proposed dock, for recreational and other purposes. The Banana River in the area of the proposed dock is approximately three miles wide. The main Banana River channel is approximately 1,500 feet west of the Applicant's shoreline. The Applicant originally proposed to construct a dock that would extend 270 feet from its shoreline into the Banana River. Twenty boat slips were proposed for construction along each side of the proposed dock. The shoreline in this area is vegetated with wax myrtles, buttonwood and pepper trees. The submerged land has shallow (three to four feet deep) sandy bottoms, densely vegetated by submerged grasses and other vegetation. These seagrasses stabilize the bottom, minimize cloudy conditions in the water, and provide valuable habitat for many aquatic creatures. This is a very productive marine area. A large number of boat slips in this shallow area would result in eventual deterioration of seagrass beds in the area, and a consonant reduction in viable marine habitat. DER accordingly issued a notice of intent to deny the original application. After discussing the matter with DER, the Applicant proposed to extend its dock 30 feet further into the Banana River, and to place 10 rather than 40 boat slips at the end, rather than along the sides of the dock. Since the seagrass vegetation extends approximately 250 to 300 feet out from the shoreline, this proposal would serve to minimize the project's impact upon the seagrass vegetation and upon the marine habitat. Provide appropriate restrictions are applied and adhered to, the environmental consequences of the proposed dock would be inconsequential. In processing this permit application, DER solicited the opinion of the Florida Department of Natural Resources as required by statute. The Department of Natural Resources responded to the inquiry as follows: This is to advise you that a submerged land lease will not be required for the above-captioned application since it is considered non-income producing. The proposed dock would extend 300 feat into the Banana River. The waters in this area are from 3 to 4 feet deep. The project would have no impact upon large boat traffic in the Banana River since the main river channel is more than 1,000 feet away from the end of the proposed dock. Small boats do, however, utilize these shallow areas. Several local residents testified at the heating that they would be forced to take their boats further out into the river where currents and winds are more severe, and where boating is note hazardous. Small boats, now able to stay very close to the shoreline in this area, would be forced to go further into the river in order to go around the proposed dock. Under windy, tough water conditions, this would be an undeniable hazard. Under such conditions, however, small boat users should avoid using the river, even close to the shoreline. The navigational impact of the proposed project is distinct, but not overbearing. There are two other docks approximately 250 to 270 feat long in the area just north of the Applicant's property and small boat navigation is already impacted by these docks. One member of the public present at the hearing indicated that various employees of DER had demonstrated prejudice in favor of the proposed project, and that accordingly the permit should be denied. Beyond the allegation, no testimony or statements were offered in support of this contention. In order to minimize the environmental impacts of navigational impacts of the proposed project, it is appropriate that restrictions be imposed in connection with the issuance of a permit. Appropriate restrictions would be as follows: (a) To applicant has removed vegetation from a portion of its shoreline in the area of the proposed dock. The applicant should be required to revegetate the shoreline, and has stipulated that it would do so. (b) The dock should be adequately lighted so that it would be visible to boat traffic at night. (e) No docking should be permitted on the dock except at the slips located at the end of the dock. No additional slips should be permitted for construction. (d) Living aboard any vessels docked at the facility should be prohibited. (a) No sewage or garbage should be discharged from the deck, and trash receptacles should be provided.
Findings Of Fact Patco proposes to build a dock offshore of a condominium it is now constructing on Anna Maria Key in Manatee County, Florida. At the proposed dock, condominium residents could moor 22 boats in Watson's Bayou, which opens onto Sarasota Pass (also known as Anna Maria Sound). A house owned by Mildred S. Mansfield, petitioner Peter's mother, sits on a waterfront lot on the north shore of Watson's Bayou. The main part of the proposed dock would parallel the edge of the bayou, running 248 feet in a north-south direction, 30 to 45 feet offshore. Some 47 marine pilings six inches in diameter would support the decking on the main part, which would be elevated four feet above mean sea level. At its mid- point, the main part of the dock would be joined to the land by a perpendicular- access walkway with the same open substructure and at the same height as the main part of the dock. Of the ten pilings planned as the foundation for the access walkway, six would be seaward of the mean high water line. Eleven catwalks or finger piers are planned to extend perpendicularly into the bayou from the main part of the dock, at intervals of 24 to 28 feet. Two six inch marine pilings would support each catwalk or finger pier at a height of slightly more than three feet above mean sea level. Between every pair of finger piers, two boat slips are planned; and slips are planned on either side of every finger pier. Between every pair of slips not separated by a finger pier, Patco proposes to place a mooring piling, equidistant from the two finger piers nearest it. These ten mooring pilings would stand seaward of the finger piers, but no more than 70 feet seaward of the mean high water line. Patco also plans to put in two pilings along each of two imaginary lines, running shoreward from either end of the main part of the dock, and perpendicular to the main part of the dock. The purpose of these pilings, which would be about eight feet apart, would be to discourage boat traffic between the main part of the dock and the shore. Two boulders would be placed in shallow water for the same purpose. A water system and electrical service are planned for the dock, but neither fuel nor lubricants are to be dispensed and no waste or sewage system is planned. Patco plans to operate the facility, including emptying containers it intends to provide for trash, until it sells the dock to an association of slip owners, who will take over its management. Patco will not allow people to live aboard boats moored at the dock and a condition of any sale to an association will be that the association not allow live-aboards. With occasional breaks, there is a fringe of black, white and red mangroves along the shore opposite the main part of the proposed dock. Louise Robertson testified without contradiction that mangroves bordering Patco's property have been trimmed and in some cases cut down. The access walkway is planned for one of the natural breaks in the mangrove fringe, however, a spot where there are no mangroves. Applicant's Exhibit No. 6. The waters of Watson's Bayou are Class III waters. Experience with a similar dock built by Patco near the proposed site some 15 months before the hearing indicates that the proposed dock would not violate DER's water quality standards. Shortly before the hearing, a biologist's superficial examination of waters in the vicinity of the dock that has been built revealed no water quality problems as a result of the dock. Increased boat traffic in the vicinity would result in additional oils and greases in the water but, after reasonable opportunity for mixture with the waters of Watson's Bayou, oils and greases would probably not exceed 15 milligrams per liter, or otherwise violate the criteria set forth in Rule 17-3.05(2)(r) Florida Administrative Code. Patco plans to engage a subcontractor to put the pilings in. The subcontractor would "jet" the pilings by using a pump mounted on a barge to force water down to the bottom through a hose. This process would result in sand being temporarily suspended in the water. Patco proposes to curtain off or "diaper" the area where pilings are to be jetted in, so as to contain the turbidity, and so as to keep silt out of an oyster bed nearby. The parties stipulated that the project would not violate turbidity standards, if such precautions are taken. The parties also stipulated that the proposed dock would not violate DER's dissolved oxygen or biochemical oxygen demand standards. The evidence established that DER has reasonable assurance that none of its water quality standards would be violated by the dock Patco proposes to build. At mean sea level, there is ample water at the site of the proposed slips to float any vessel capable of entering Watson's Bayou from the waters outside. The channel into Watson's Bayou from Sarasota Pass is only three feet deep at low tide. This shallow channel prevents boats drawing more than a few feet from entering the Bayou through the channel, but a 46 foot ketch once came in on a high tide. In the proposed slips, mean sea level depths would range from six or seven feet at the seaward end of the finger piers to three or four feet at the landward end of the slips. Mean low water depths are about seven/tenths of a foot lower. With a spring tide, the water may fall six inches below mean low water levels. There is virtually no danger that boats would run aground in the proposed slips. The bottom underneath the proposed dock is sandy and wholly devoid of grasses or other marine vegetation. Between the shore and the main part of the dock however, there is an oyster bed whose northern edge is approximately five or ten feet south of the site proposed for the access walkway. This oyster bed extends about 280 feet in a southerly direction, but does not extend as far west as the site proposed for the main part of the dock. Jetting in the proposed pilings would not result in the death of a single oyster. As long as boats stay on the seaward side of the main part of the proposed dock, the oysters would not be harmed by boat traffic. Other fauna at the site include some benthic polychaetes, tunicates and other arthropods. The jetting in of pilings would injure and displace any of these creatures who were in the immediate vicinity, but their mobility is comparable to that of fishes and they would soon reestablish themselves. Once in place, the pilings would afford a habitat for barnacles and related marine life. A public boat launching ramp is situated 150 to 200 feet from the southern end of the proposed dock. The ramp is far enough away from the proposed dock that construction of the dock would not interfere with launching boats. The water in this part of Watson's Bayou is deep enough that the proposed dock would not create a serious impediment to navigation. Under certain wind conditions, however, a sailboat beating into the main part of Watson's Bayou from the ramp might have to make an additional tack or two if the proposed dock is built. Conversely, with southerly winds, a boat under sail making for the ramp from the main part of Watson's Bayou might have to tack more often if Patco builds the dock it proposes. The dock Patco plans to build would not create a navigational hazard nor cause erosion of the shoreline. The parties stipulated that the dock would not substantially alter or impede the natural flow of navigable waters. The State of Florida owns the bottom into which Patco plans to jet pilings. Respondent DER contacted Florida's Department of Natural Resources about the proposed dock in October, 1978. By letter dated November 21, 1978, the Department of Natural Resources advised the DER that the project would "not require a lease . . . as this application is considered a private dock." DER's Exhibit No. 1. On the strength of biological and ecological surveys and repeated visits to the site by Linda Allen, an environmental specialist in DER's employ, the DER gave notice of its intent do issue the permit Patco seeks. The foregoing findings of fact should be read in conjunction with the statement required by Stuckey's of Eastman, Georgia v. Department of Transportation, 340 So.2d 119 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976), which is attached as an appendix to the recommended order.
Recommendation Upon consideration of the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That DER grant Patco's application for permit on the following conditions: That no submerged or transitional vegetation be destroyed in constructing the dock. That the construction area be diapered so as to restrict siltation to the smallest practicable space and, in any event, so as to separate the work area from the oyster bed. That no dredging by any method be used to gain access to the dock. That the owner of the dock allow no docking except in slips seaward of the main part of the dock. That the owner of the dock maintain lines and floats between the ends of the main part of the dock and the landward pilings; and take other appropriate steps to discourage boat traffic between the main part of the dock and the shore. That the owner of the dock forbid living on board boats moored at the dock; forbid the discharge of sewage and garbage into the water; and furnish trash receptacles for the dock. DONE and ENTERED this 6th day of June, 1979, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT T. BENTON, II Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 101, Collins Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 APPENDIX Paragraphs one through eleven, thirteen through seventeen and nineteen through twenty-two of respondent Patco's proposed findings of fact, have been adopted, in substance. Paragraph twelve of respondent Patco's proposed findings of fact has been adopted insofar as the plan for pilings and boulders. The evidence did not establish that this, without more, would suffice to protect marine life on the bottom between the shore and the main part of the dock. Paragraph eighteen of respondent Patco's proposed findings of fact reflects the evidence in that it was shown that the proposed dock would not degrade water quality below minimum standards for Class III waters; but degradation of water quality as a result of oils and greases can be expected, within lawful limits. COPIES FURNISHED: Dewey A. Dye, Jr., Esquire Patricia A. Petruff, Esquire Post Office Box 9480 Bradenton, Florida 33506 Alfred W. Clark, Esquire Twin Towers Office Building 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Mr. Peter W. Mansfield 1861 Meadow Court West Palm Beach, Florida 33406
The Issue The issue in this proceeding is whether Petitioner’s single-family residence is an “eligible structure” for purposes of receiving housing assistance under the Rebuild Florida Housing Repair and Replacement Program.
Findings Of Fact DEO is the state administrative agency responsible for disbursing federal funds allocated to Florida for disaster recovery pursuant to a U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (“HUD”) block grant. In June 2018, HUD approved the state’s Action Plan for rebuilding those areas in Florida which were most impacted by Hurricane Irma, agreeing to fund the Rebuild Florida Housing Repair and Replacement Program (the “Program”). The Program provides financial assistance to Florida homeowners for fixing hurricane-damaged residential structures, using federal funds appropriated to the Community Development Block Grant Program under the Supplemental Appropriations for Disaster Relief Act of 2017.1 To administer the Program, DEO developed a detailed policy manual called the Single Family Owner-Occupied Housing Guidelines (the “Guidelines”). The Guidelines are approved by HUD and may not be modified without HUD’s consent. As relevant, the Guidelines enumerate both “eligible structures” and “ineligible structures.” To receive assistance under the Program, an owner or occupant’s housing must be an “eligible structure.” Challancin owns and occupies a housing “structure” in Okeechobee, Florida, which he purchased in 2012 and has lived in ever since. Challancin considers his dwelling to be a “mobile home,” whereas DEO deems it a “camper trailer.” This disagreement is at the heart of the instant dispute because, under the Guidelines, mobile homes are among the “eligible structures,” while camper trailers are on the list of “ineligible structures.” What is not disputed, however, is that whatever its type, the subject structure is Challancin’s permanent residence (the “Residence”). It is hereby found, as stated in Department of Economic Opportunity’s Proposed Recommended Order (“DEO-PRO”), that the Residence “is used as a residence and [is] recognizable as such.” DEO-PRO at 8. The Residence suffered damage due to Hurricane Irma. In May 2019, Challancin applied to DEO seeking assistance under the Program. In his application, when asked to describe the “structure type” of his housing, Challancin identified the Residence as a “mobile home.” In fact, the 1 The Community Development Block Grant Program comes under DEO’s jurisdiction pursuant to section 20.60(5)(b)2., Florida Statutes. Residence incorporates a 32-foot 1984 Corsair trailer (the “Corsair”) as a structural element of the building envelope, and, at all times relevant, the Corsair has been registered as a mobile home with the Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles. Yet, although the Corsair is an identifiable and distinct part of the Residence, the Residence indisputably comprises other structural elements as well, including a common roof, several walls, and a ceiling, which elements together form a unified single building that exists as a separate creation, at once integrated with—and more than—the Corsair. The undersigned adopts, as accurate, the following description of the Residence, by DEO: [The Residence] consists of [the Corsair], to which additional rooms have been attached on one side, all capped with a single roof which extends over a carport/patio on the other side. The carport/patio is met by a driveway. A sidewalk runs from the driveway to an external door to one of the attached rooms. DEO-PRO at 5. Further, as DEO correctly states, the Residence “is affixed directly to one or more contiguous, concrete slabs and is attached to utilities and an external HVAC unit.” Id. at 6. The Residence is a unique structure, and for that reason photographs might be more helpful than words in depicting this atypical dwelling. Figure 1, below, shows the front of the Residence. Figure 1 The Corsair is in the center, with the covered patio to the right, and the “additional rooms” to the left. Hurricane damage to the roof can also be seen in the picture. Figure 2 is a photograph of the back of the Residence. The Corsair (outlined in yellow highlighter) is located to the left of the “additional rooms.” It is, noticeably, less than half the width of those attached rooms. The central HVAC unit mentioned above is on the ground, adjacent to the Corsair. Look closely, and, in the circle above the HVAC, the Corsair’s license plate is visible. Figure 2 The covered patio is shown in Figure 3, as is the Corsair, which forms the outer wall of the Residence on this side of the building. Figure 3 The other side of the Residence, opposite the patio, is shown in Figure 4. Figure 4 The total area of the Residence is 568.90 square feet, which means that the combined width of the Corsair plus the additional rooms is approximately 17.78 feet (since the length of the Corsair is 32 feet). The enclosed “floor area” within the building envelope (i.e., the portion “under air”) is 514.90 square feet. Although the record lacks specific measurements, a back-of-the-envelope calculation, based on the observation that the Corsair appears to be roughly 40% as wide as the entire building (see Figure 2), reveals that the Corsair contributes approximately 206 square feet to the Residence, while the “additional rooms” afford approximately 309 square feet of living space. To be clear, these are admittedly not precise numbers. What the rough numbers drive home, however, is that the Residence is not just the Corsair; indeed, the Corsair is not even most of the Residence. In arguing over whether the Corsair is a mobile home or a camper trailer, the parties have misidentified the ultimate issue as being whether the Corsair is an eligible structure. The real issue, which the parties have overlooked, is whether the Residence is an eligible structure. As discussed above, the Residence and the Corsair are two different things. It is found that, regardless of whether the Corsair is considered to be a mobile home or a camper trailer, the Residence, as a matter of fact, is neither a mobile home nor a camper trailer. The Residence, rather, is an integrated structure of which the Corsair is a connected and contiguous component, which forms a single, unified building envelope under a common roof. Because the Residence is not a camper trailer, it is determined, as a matter of ultimate fact, that the Residence is not an “ineligible structure” for the reason advanced by DEO. At the same time, because the Residence is not, in fact, a mobile home, it cannot be considered an “eligible structure” qua mobile home. This is not fatal to Challancin’s application for assistance, however, because, while all mobile homes are eligible structures pursuant to the Guidelines, not all eligible structures are mobile homes. Because there is no basis in law or fact for deeming the Residence as anything other than a physically unified, structurally integrated, single- family residential dwelling, it is determined, as an ultimate fact, that the Residence is an “eligible structure” for purposes of receiving housing assistance under the Program.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Economic Opportunity enter a final order determining that James Challancin’s Residence is an “eligible structure” for purposes of receiving housing assistance under the Program. DONE AND ENTERED this 11th day of December, 2020, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. COPIES FURNISHED: James Challancin Lot 48 8761 Highway 78, West Okeechobee, Florida 34974 S JOHN G. VAN LANINGHAM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of December, 2020. Brandon W. White, Esquire James M. Jordan, Esquire Department of Economic Opportunity 107 East Madison Street, Mail Stop 110 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 (eServed) Janay Lovett, Agency Clerk Department of Economic Opportunity 107 East Madison Street, Mail Stop 110 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 (eServed) Dane Eagle, Executive Director Department of Economic Opportunity Caldwell Building 107 East Madison Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-4128 (eServed) Mark Buckles, Interim General Counsel Department of Economic Opportunity Caldwell Building, Mail Stop 110 107 East Madison Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-4128 (eServed)
