The Issue The issue for determination in this matter is whether Respondents engaged in acts of housing discrimination against Petitioners on the basis of race in violation of the Florida Fair Housing Act.
Findings Of Fact Petitioners, Donald Travis and Lisa Harrell, are a bi-racial couple (Mr. Travis is African-American and, therefore, belongs to a class of persons subject to protection under Florida's Fair Housing Act, Sections 760.20 through 760.37, Florida Statutes, and Ms. Harrell is white). They have two sons who are bi-racial (one is African-American and white, the other is white and Asian). Petitioners lived in Apartment 163 at 10075 West Highway 98, Pensacola, Florida 32506. Respondents, John and Anne Cutler, are the owners of two four-plex apartments at 10075 West Highway 98, Pensacola, Florida 32506, including the unit occupied by Petitioners that gave rise to this matter. They are both retired educators who own and operate their apartment rental business in their retirement. In their teaching and professional careers, both have instructed students of various races and national origins. Petitioner, Donald Travis, is a veteran of Desert Storm and has been treated for Post Traumatic Stress Disorder. He regularly takes medications to treat anxiety and depression. On April 4, 2008, Petitioners moved into Apartment 163, which had been recently painted, carpeted, and had a new ceiling fan and light installed in the living room. Everything went smoothly between Petitioners and Respondents for several months. Mr. Cutler had to unplug the downstairs toilet with a plunger a few times, but everything else seemed to be in working order. Both Mr. and Ms. Cutler considered Petitioners to be good tenants. As summer approached, Mr. Travis asked Mr. Cutler about installing a screen door for the sliding glass doors. This could not be done without replacing the entire sliding glass doors. When Apartment 131 became vacant, its screen door was moved to Petitioners' apartment. The screen door had a slit in it, which Ms. Cutler repaired with tape. When Apartment 132 became vacant, the good screen door from that apartment was used to replace the taped one in Petitioners' apartment. Respondents tried to keep everything in working order in Petitioners' apartment. When Petitioners' refrigerator door would not close, Respondents replaced the refrigerator. Respondents thought Petitioners were happy with their apartment. Petitioners called Respondents about a plumbing leak and said feces was running down the wall. The leak and pipe were fixed by B & G Plumbing. Petitioners were shown the water shut-off valve in case of future leaks. Petitioners believe that Respondents treated them differently from other tenants in the apartment buildings. Petitioners believe that other tenants were allowed to keep pets in their apartments while they were not. Respondents allowed tenants who had pets when they purchased the apartments to keep them, but banned pets on all future rentals. The rent for Petitioners' apartment, including water, sewer, and garbage, was $650.00. Petitioners always paid their rent on time. Petitioners asked to be moved into a better unit since they believed their unit was inferior to others in the complex. Petitioners wanted to move into Apartment 162 which, in their opinion, was in much better shape than their unit. Respondents offered to put new carpet into Apartment 162 before Petitioners moved in, but they refused. Petitioners decided to leave the apartment because they believed the maintenance was not properly performed. On December 5, 2008, the day Petitioners made known their desire to leave the apartment, Mr. Travis confronted Mr. Cutler. Mr. Cutler offered Apartment 132 to Petitioners because it was ready for occupancy after its occupants had moved out. Apartment 133 would soon be ready, and was also offered to Petitioners. Mr. Travis angrily refused to move into any apartments in the two four-plexes. He yelled at Mr. Cutler and told him he hated him. This exchange was witnessed by a neighbor, Gary Denton. Mr. Cutler offered to let Petitioners move out without penalty, and agreed to return their $650.00 deposit. Petitioners accepted the offer and received the deposit in full as well as a waiver of the first five days' rent for December and an additional four days of rent to allow them time to pack and move. Petitioners accused Respondents of renting one four-plex to whites only and the other to minorities. At the time Petitioners moved out, both four-plexes had tenants of different races. As of the date of the hearing, five of the six total units rented were to non-white tenants. Only one was rented to a white couple.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 25th day of November, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ROBERT S. COHEN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of November, 2009. COPIES FURNISHED: John Cutler Anne Cutler 5970 Limestone Road Pensacola, Florida 32504 Donald Travis Lisa Harrell 1008 West Young Street Pensacola, Florida 32501 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Larry Kranert, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue The issues in this case are, one, whether Respondent unlawfully discriminated against Petitioner on the basis of her alleged handicap in violation of the Florida Fair Housing Act; and, two, whether Respondent subjected Petitioner to acts of coercion or retaliation as a result of Petitioner's exercise, or attempted exercise, of a protected housing right.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner Maria Thornhill ("Thornhill") owns and lives in a unit in the Admiral Farragut Condominium Apartments. Respondent Admiral Farragut Condominium Association, Inc. ("AFCA"), manages the property of which Thornhill's condominium is a part. This case continues a dispute between Thornhill and AFCA which began in 1997, when Thornhill——without first securing AFCA's permission——installed three wooden steps leading from her rear balcony down to a patio located about 30 inches below. AFCA disapproved of the steps and directed Thornhill to remove them, which was done long ago. In the past, Thornhill has alleged, among other things, that AFCA and its individual directors unlawfully discriminated against her in denying her many requests to reinstall the steps, which she claims are needed as a reasonable accommodation for her handicap.2 Consequently, the parties have been pitted against each other for years in one legal proceeding after another, in various forums including DOAH. Thornhill has lost many battles in this protracted litigation——and consequently been ordered to pay tens of thousands of dollars in sanctions, court costs, and attorney's fees. Still, she presses on. In this case, Thornhill argues, as she has for more than a decade, that she needs to attach steps to her rear balcony because she is physically unable to traverse the 30 inches which separate the balcony from the ground and hence would be trapped if a fire were to block both of the unit's two doors to the outside. Not for the first time, Thornhill alleges here that AFCA discriminated against her on the basis of handicap when it denied her request(s), the most recent of which was made in January 2004, for approval of the steps. In addition to her claim involving the steps, Thornhill alleges that AFCA has discriminated or retaliated against her, in some unspecified way(s), in connection with a boat slip, which she is, evidently, "next in line" to rent, once the lease expires under which another unit owner currently enjoys the right to use the slip. Finally, Thornhill contends that, in its efforts to collect the various money judgments it has been awarded, AFCA has retaliated against her unlawfully. Determinations of Ultimate Fact With regard to the steps, Thornhill presented no evidence suggesting that such a modification is reasonable, nor any proof that installation of such steps is necessary to ameliorate the effects of her particular handicap. There is no evidence that any of AFCA's decisions concerning the boat slip were motivated in any way by discriminatory animus directed toward Thornhill. There is likewise no evidence that AFCA ever undertook to execute or otherwise enforce the judgments it has obtained against Thornhill because of discriminatory animus. In sum, there is not a shred of competent, persuasive evidence in the record, direct or circumstantial, upon which a finding of any sort of unlawful housing discrimination, coercion, or retaliation could possibly be made. Ultimately, therefore, it is determined that AFCA did not commit any prohibited act.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the FCHR enter a final order finding AFCA not liable for housing discrimination and awarding Thornhill no relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 20th day of January, 2010, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. JOHN G. VAN LANINGHAM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of January, 2010.
The Issue Whether Petitioner was the subject of unlawful discrimination in the provision of services or facilities in connection with his dwelling based on his handicap, and whether Respondent refused to make reasonable accommodations in its rules, policies, practices, or services necessary to afford Petitioner equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling in violation of the Florida Fair Housing Act, chapter 760, Part II, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a homeowner in the Royal Highlands community in Leesburg, Florida, and has been a member of the RHPOA since moving into his home in April 2001.1/ From September 2010, through February 2011, Petitioner served on the RHPOA Board of Directors. Respondent is a property owners? association, membership in which is limited to property owners in the Royal Highlands residential community in Leesburg, Florida. There are 1,499 homes in the Royal Highlands community. The community is divided into twelve “districts.” Respondent?s Board of Directors (Board) consists of one representative from each of the twelve districts. Meetings of the Board are held monthly, except for August when community activities are typically sparsely attended. Leland Management is a community association management company that provides management services to the RHPOA along with other community associations. Petitioner alleged that he suffers from a disability because he walks with the use of a cane, and that his ability to speak is impaired as a lingering effect of a 2004 neck surgery that involved insertion of an endotracheal tube during and immediately after the procedure. During the month of February 2011, Petitioner was running for reelection to the RHPOA Board of Directors. On the day of the election, and prior to the vote of the membership, Petitioner appeared at the RHPOA meeting to make a final statement and thank his supporters. He walked to the front of the community meeting room, known as the Great Hall, but did not want to take the steps up to the elevated stage for fear that he might lose his balance and fall off. Petitioner was given a microphone and he thanked his supporters from the base of the stage. Afterwards, he walked back to his seat. Petitioner was not reelected to the Board, but continued to attend meetings as a member of the RHPOA. A monthly meeting of the RHPOA was held on July 13, 2011. The agenda included four items, including an item that would authorize the Board of Directors to retain legal counsel in the event a threatened lawsuit was filed against Bob Fitzpatrick, who was then the president of the RHPOA. The nature of the potential lawsuit was not in evidence, except that it involved a complaint filed with the Lake County Sheriff by Petitioner against Mr. Fitzpatrick. Mr. Fitzpatrick recused himself from the vote, since any legal fees would be expended on his behalf as president. John Banahan, then the vice-president of the RHPOA, acted as chair during the consideration and vote on the agenda item. The RHPOA allows members to speak regarding any issue on the agenda. Members must sign a “Sign-Up Sheet to Speak to Agenda Item” for each item on which they wish to be heard. Members are allowed three minutes to speak on each issue for which they have signed up. The minutes regarding a particular agenda item typically reflect only whether a motion was made, who seconded the motion, who voted, and the results of the vote. When there is a significant amount of discussion, the minutes may, as did the minutes for the legal counsel agenda item of the July 13, 2011 meeting, include something no more detailed than “[m]uch discussion, residents and Board Members.” Neither the comments of property owners nor the discussions of the Board members as to an agenda item are recorded in the minutes of meetings of the RHPOA. When Petitioner was on the Board, he would routinely take notes at meetings, and then destroy the notes after the meeting was concluded. That was consistent with the practice described by other testifying members of the Board. Petitioner attended the July 13, 2011 meeting of the RHPOA with his wife. He entered the meeting room on his own power and without difficulty, though he used a cane, signed up at the door to speak on the agenda item regarding the Board?s proposal to retain legal counsel, and took a seat at one of the tables. Petitioner made no request for assistance of any kind at the time he signed up to speak. Stacey Peach attended the July 13, 2012 meeting as a representative of Leland Management. Ms. Peach periodically attends meetings of the various associations served by Leland Management. Her attendance at the July 13, 2012 RHPOA meeting was coincidental. Ms. Peach was seated at a table in front of Petitioner. When it was his turn to speak on the legal counsel agenda item, Petitioner was recognized by Mr. Banahan. Petitioner announced, without assistance of a microphone, that he could not go to the podium. Mr. Banahan noted “confusion” in the audience, but did not realize what was going on with regard to Petitioner?s request to speak on the agenda item, though he understood that Petitioner was unable to come to the podium at the front of the room. Mr. Banahan testified convincingly that he had no problem with Petitioner speaking from his seat. He was aware of at least two other instances in which a microphone was taken to an attendee of a Board meeting so as to allow them to speak while seated, one of which occurred when he was a member of the Board. Ms. Peach heard Petitioner state that he was not able to go to the podium to offer his comments. She thereupon got a portable microphone and handed it to Petitioner. Petitioner asked Ms. Peach if she would speak on his behalf. Petitioner had not spoken with Ms. Peach earlier, and his request caught her off guard. Not knowing what Petitioner wanted her to say, she declined to speak for him. Her refusal was based on surprise and uncertainty, and not on any discriminatory motive. After Ms. Peach declined to speak on Petitioner?s behalf, Petitioner took the microphone provided to him, and offered his comments on the agenda item from his seat. Petitioner testified that as long as the microphone was working, he saw no reason why he would not have been heard. Except for Ms. Hoffman, whose testimony is discussed below, the witnesses who were asked indicated they had no problem hearing what Petitioner had to say, though none could remember the substance. Petitioner testified that he made a specific request of Mr. Banahan to allow someone to speak on his behalf, and that Mr. Banahan refused the request. Petitioner?s testimony was contradicted by Ms. Peach, who was directly involved in the incident; Mr. Norden, who was seated next to Petitioner; Mr. Reichel, who attended the meeting as a Board member; and Mr. Banahan. The greater weight of the evidence establishes that no request for another person to speak on Petitioner?s behalf was made to any member of the Board, and that the only such request was made, without prior notice, to Ms. Peach. Petitioner?s claim that his request was denied by Mr. Banahan was supported only by the testimony of Ms. Hoffman. However, Ms. Hoffman?s testimony was undermined by the fact that her overall account of the incident differed in several significant and material respects from the testimony of other witnesses, including that of Petitioner. For example, Ms. Hoffman indicated that Ms. Peach was not asked to speak for Petitioner, that Petitioner asked someone seated next to him to speak, that Petitioner had difficulty reading his notes, that Petitioner was unable to complete his comments, and that Petitioner?s speech was, at best, marginal. Whether Ms. Hoffman?s description of events was the result of a poor vantage point or of poor memory, it is not credited. Mr. Banahan testified that if Petitioner had been unable to speak, he would have allowed someone to read a statement on his behalf.2/ However, Mr. Banahan testified that he was not asked to make such an accommodation, and that Petitioner was able to comment on the agenda item from his seat. Mr. Banahan?s testimony is credible and is accepted. Mr. Banahan testified that he has known Petitioner from his service as a member of the Board and never perceived him as having a handicap. Mr. Banahan knew that Petitioner walked with a cane. However, Mr. Banahan?s wife walks with a cane and he does not consider her to have a handicap. Petitioner provided Respondent with no medical records, letters from his physicians, or competent evidence of any kind to establish that he had a disability or that he required an accommodation in order to participate in the July 13, 2011 meeting, nor did he produce any such evidence at the hearing. At the hearing, based upon the undersigned's observation, Petitioner had little or no difficulty walking or speaking. Petitioner failed to prove that he has a physical impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities, or that he was regarded by any director or member of the RHPOA as having any such physical impairment. To the contrary, the greater weight of the evidence demonstrates that Petitioner does not suffer from a handicap as defined in the Fair Housing Act. Ultimate Findings of Fact There was no competent, substantial evidence adduced at the hearing that Petitioner suffered from a handicap that hindered his ability to actively participate in the July 13, 2011 RHPOA meeting. There was no competent, substantial evidence adduced at the hearing that Respondent knew of any alleged handicap or regarded Petitioner as being handicapped. There was no competent, substantial evidence adduced at the hearing that Respondent failed to reasonably accommodate Petitioner when he asserted that he would not be able to walk to the podium. The evidence adduced at the hearing established that Petitioner made no direct request to any member of the RHPOA Board of Directors to allow someone to speak on his behalf. The evidence adduced at the hearing established that Petitioner was able to clearly state his comments on the legal representation agenda item by using the portable microphone provided to him by Ms. Peach. The evidence did not establish that Petitioner was the subject of unlawful discrimination in the provision of services or facilities in connection with his dwelling based on his handicap, or that Respondent refused to make reasonable accommodations in its rules, policies, practices or services necessary to afford Petitioner equal opportunity to use and enjoy his dwelling.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief filed in FCHR No. 2012H0158. DONE AND ENTERED this 18th day of October, 2012, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S E. GARY EARLY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of October, 2012.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondent, Community Housing Initiative, Inc. (Respondent), committed a discriminatory housing practice against Petitioner, Karen Lee Krason (Petitioner), in violation of Chapter 760, Florida Statutes (2008).
Findings Of Fact On or about June 11, 2009, Petitioner filed a Housing Discrimination Complaint with the Commission. Pursuant to the Commission's procedure, an investigation of the matter was completed that resulted in a Notice of Determination of No Cause. Essentially, the Commission found that based upon the allegations raised by Petitioner there was no cause from which it could be found that Respondent had violated the Florida Fair Housing Act. Thereafter, Petitioner elected to file a Petition for Relief to challenge the determination and to seek relief against Respondent for the alleged violation. The Commission then forwarded the matter to DOAH for formal proceedings. DOAH issued a Notice of Hearing that was provided to all parties at their addresses of record. The postal service did not return the notices as undelivered. It is presumed the parties received notice of the hearing date, time, and location. Petitioner did not appear at the hearing.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing Petitioner's claim of discrimination. DONE AND ENTERED this 4th day of February, 2010, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S J. D. PARRISH Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of February, 2010. COPIES FURNISHED: Karen Lee Krason 1715 Erin Court Northeast Palm Bay, Florida 32905 Larry Kranert, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 COPIES FURNISHED BY CERTIFIED MAIL Nicole Tenpenny, Registered Agent Community Housing Initiative, Inc. 3033 College Wood Drive Melbourne, Florida 32941 (Certified No. 91 7108 2133 3935 7995 3000) Nicole Tenpenny, Registered Agent Community Housing Initiative, Inc. Post Office Box 410522 Melbourne, Florida 32941-0522 (Certified No. 91 7108 2133 3935 7995 2997) Michael Rogers, Officer/Director Community Housing Initiative, Inc. 1890 Palm Bay Road, Northeast Palm Bay, Florida 32905 (Certified No. 91 7108 2133 3935 7995 2980)
The Issue Whether Petitioner is entitled to an award of attorney's fees and costs as a prevailing small business party in an adjudicatory proceeding initiated by a state agency as provided under the Florida Equal Access to Justice Act (FEAJA), Section 57.111, Florida Statutes. Whether the amount claimed by Petitioner for attorney's fees and costs is reasonable.
Findings Of Fact The Respondent agency is charged with the administration of the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992, as amended, Section 760.30, Florida Statutes (1995). If Petitioner is unable to obtain voluntary compliance with Sections 760.20 - 760.37, Florida Statutes, or has reasonable cause to believe a discriminatory housing practice has occurred, the Respondent agency may institute an administrative proceeding under Chapter 120, Florida Statues, on behalf of the aggrieved party. On February 3, 1993, Polly Leggitt filed a complaint with the Respondent agency and the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development. The Complaint named Carole Naylor, Property Administrator, as the person who discriminated against her. On March 24, 1993, the Respondent agency notified Regency Place Apartments and Carole Naylor that the Complaint had been filed, and stated that within 100 days, the Respondent agency would investigate the Complaint and give notice whether there was or was not reasonable cause to believe that a discriminatory housing practice had occurred. The notice further provided that final administrative disposition of the Complaint would be completed within one year from the filing of the Complaint, which would be on or about February 3, 1994. A Notice of Determination: Cause and Issuance of an Administrative Charge was made and issued and served on August 28, 1996. It named Regency Place Apartments; Carole Naylor, Frank Cutrona, Property Manager; and Robert Stitzel, owner. The notice was issued more than one year after the filing of the Complaint. Following the formal hearing, this Administrative Law Judge made certain findings of fact which were incorporated in the Recommended Order. Those findings held, inter alia: Robert Stitzel was the developer and owner of Regency Place Apartments. Carole Naylor, at the direction of the manager Frank Cutrona, sent Ms. Leggitt letters rejecting her application for an apartment unit at Regency Place Apartments because there was no apartment of the kind she wanted that was available and further that her income was insufficient to qualify her for housing at that place. Cutrona died on December 26, 1996. Carole Naylor did not work in the rental office. She made no judgments regarding the rental of the apartment, nor the creditworthiness of the prospective tenants. Robert Stitzel made no judgments regarding the tenants. Regency Place Apartments had a policy which requires income equaling three times the gross rental. The creditworthiness and the determination of who would rent apartments was left solely with the resident manager. Stitzel demonstrated that many disabled people had lived in the apartment complex. Accommodations were made for people with disabilities by the manager and such costs for these accommodations were paid by Regency Place Apartments. The agency made a prima facie case of discrimination in that Leggitt is a handicapped person, who is otherwise qualified to rent the apartment, and suffered a loss of a housing opportunity, under circumstances which lead to an inference that Stitzel based its action solely upon her handicap. Evidence was presented that Regency Place Apartment's requirement of gross income equaling three times the monthly rent had not been satisfied by Leggitt's mother's agreement to contribute $550 per month. Leggitt's income was $281.34 per month. Three times the monthly rent was $1,140.00, thus rendering her income short by $308.66 per month. The motivation for rejecting the application was that the apartment which Leggitt wanted was not available and Leggitt did not have sufficient income to qualify. There was no evidence of a discriminatory motive on the part of Cutrona, Naylor, Stitzel, or Regency Place Apartments, other than conjecture. There was no evidence that suggests the reasons given were not true at the time the letters were written or that they were merely pretextual. Further, it did not appear from the evidence that any discriminatory motive was proven. There was nothing in the evidence that proves that Leggitt's legal blindness was a cause of the rejection of her application. There was no evidence of any act or conduct which would suggest discriminatory conduct or a discriminatory animus by any of the persons named as Respondents in the Administrative Charge. Taken as a whole, the credible evidence indicated that the sole basis for rejecting Leggitt's application was the unavailability of the unit that she requested, and her failure to satisfy management of her financial ability to meet the financial requirements of Regency Place Apartments. Although Leggitt testified as to her inconvenience caused by the denial of her application, there was no evidence of any quantifiable damages presented at the hearing. In the Conclusions of Law, it was determined that the Motion to Dismiss should have and was granted on the grounds that the Respondent agency failed to comply with the statutory time requirements: Under the Federal Fair Housing Amendments Act, "the Secretary shall make an investigation of the alleged discriminatory housing practice and complete such investigation within 100 days after filing of the Complaint . . . unless it is impracticable to do so." 42 U.S.C. s 3610(a)(1)(B)(iv). The statute also provides that if "the Secretary is unable to complete the investigation within 100 days" after complainant files the complaint, the Secretary "shall notify the complainant and respondent in writing of the reasons for not doing so." 42 U.S.C. s. 3610(a)(1)(c). This same provision is found in the Florida Fair Housing Act. See Section 760.34, Florida Statutes (1995), and Chapter 60Y-7, Florida Administrative Code. The Florida Administrative Code provides as follows: "Section 60Y-7004(8)(b) If the Commission is unable to complete its investigation within 100 days, it shall notify the complainant and respondent in writing of the reasons for not doing so." Section 60Y-7.004(10) The Commission will make final administrative deposition of a complaint within one year of the date of receipt of the complaint, unless it is impracticable to do so. If the Commission is unable to do so, it shall notify the complainant and respondent in writing of the reasons for not doing so." It is undisputed in this case that the Respondent agency did not file its determination until August 28, 1996, over three and one-half years from the time Leggitt filed her complaint. It is also undisputed that the Respondent agency never notified Petitioner, or the other parties, that it would be unable to complete the investigation within 100 days as required by statute. Nor did it notify Stitzel in writing why an administrative disposition of a Complaint had not been made within one year of receipt of the Complaint. Petitioner established that the Respondent agency violated the statutory time limits and that the three and one- half year delay in filing the Respondent agency's Notice of Probable Cause caused the proceedings to be impaired and was to Petitioner's extreme prejudice. At the attorney's fee hearing, Respondent agency offered no testimony or other evidence as to the cause for the extreme delay in the filing of the Administrative Charge, or the rationale for filing the Charge two and one-half years after the expiration of the statutory deadline for filing said charges. At the attorney's fees hearing, Respondent agency offered no testimony or other evidence as to why it claimed to be substantially justified in finding probable cause and filing the Administrative Charge. The Petitioner, demonstrated that, at the time the matter was initiated, Regency Place Apartments was a business operating as a limited partnership and that Robert Stitzel was the general partner; that the principal place of business was in Florida; and that it did not have more than 25 full-time employees. Petitioner retained counsel to defend it on the charges contained in the Notice of Determination, Cause and Issuance of an Administrative Charge, and Petitioner was the prevailing small business party. Counsel for Petitioner expended 76 hours on this matter, not including time expended on the Petition for Attorney's Fees or time expended following his appearance before the Commission prior to the issuance of the final order. Counsel's billing for Petitioner's time at an hourly rate of $200 is reasonable in this case. The Petitioner's billable costs of $609.75 are reasonable.
The Issue Whether Respondent discriminated against Petitioner in the rental of a dwelling based on her race, in violation of Florida Fair Housing Act, chapter 760, Part II, Florida Statutes (2015).
Findings Of Fact The following Findings of Fact are based on the exhibit admitted into evidence and testimony offered by witnesses at the final hearing. Ms. Smith is a Black female and currently resides in Gainesville, Florida. Saul Silber Properties is a company that manages Oak Glade located at 3427 Southwest 30th Terrace, Gainesville, Florida 32608. Respondent provides residential rental apartments in Gainesville, Florida. Saul Silber is the owner of Saul Silber Properties. Ms. Smith is a former resident of apartment number 54I of Oak Glade.1/ Ms. Smith rented the apartment pursuant to a residential lease agreement entered into on January 15, 2014.2/ The lease was for a one-year renewable term. Ms. Smith filed a complaint with the Commission alleging Respondent issued her a Notice of Non-Renewal of her lease agreement on the basis of her race. The Commission issued a “No Cause” determination and Ms. Smith filed a Petition for Relief, which is the matter before the undersigned. During her tenancy at Oak Glade, Ms. Smith had raised numerous complaints with the property manager regarding matters involving her neighbor, Anne E. Dowling. Ms. Dowling, who was White, was a former resident of apartment number 54H. Ms. Smith’s issues with Ms. Dowling included complaints concerning smoking, loud music, non-residents living in the apartment, the number of visitors outside Ms. Dowling’s apartment, and Ms. Dowling’s cat scratching her car. All of the complaints were addressed and resolved by the property manager. The incident that led to the major blow-up between the neighbors involved Ms. Smith and Ms. Dowling’s daughter. Ms. Smith and Ms. Dowling’s daughter were involved in a verbal altercation after Ms. Smith verbally reprimanded Ms. Dowling’s granddaughter (age range of 7-9 years old) and her friend. Ms. Smith testified that the two girls turned their backs to her, bent over, and wiggled their buttocks in a side-to-side motion. Ms. Smith understood this gesture to be disrespectful and a suggestion to “kiss their behinds.” Ms. Dowling’s daughter was not a resident of the apartment complex. The altercation was so loud that Ms. Osteen heard people “screaming” while she was in her office. Ms. Osteen discovered Ms. Smith and Ms. Dowling’s daughter involved in a screaming match. Ms. Osteen later consulted with the senior property manager about the incident and it was determined that both Ms. Dowling and Ms. Smith would be issued a Notice of Non-Renewal. On March 15, 2016, Respondent issued Ms. Smith and Ms. Dowling a Notice of Non-Renewal, which was posted on the door of each tenant’s respective apartment. The notices did not state a reason for non-renewal. Ms. Dowling’s lease would expire effective May 30, 2016; and Ms. Smith’s lease would expire effective December 30, 2016. Prior to expiration of her lease, Ms. Dowling advised Ms. Osteen that she was terminally ill and requested that she be permitted to stay at Oak Glade. Ms. Dowling explained that her support system was located in the area and due to financial limitations, moving from the complex would create a hardship for her. For these reasons, Ms. Dowling was permitted to enter a new lease and was moved to a different apartment. The decision to permit Ms. Dowling to remain at the complex was made by the senior property manager. Ms. Dowling passed away approximately four months later, on September 28, 2016. Other than her mistaken belief that Ms. Dowling did not receive a Notice of Non-Renewal, Ms. Smith did not offer any evidence to support her claim of housing discrimination in violation of the Florida Fair Housing Act.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a final order: finding that Respondent, Saul Silber Properties, LLC, did not commit a discriminatory housing practice against Petitioner, Ms. Smith; and dismissing the Petition for Relief filed in FCHR No. 2017H0320. DONE AND ENTERED this 29th day of August, 2018, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S YOLONDA Y. GREEN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of August, 2018.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondents committed a housing discriminatory practice in violation of Chapter 760, Florida Statutes (2008).
Findings Of Fact On or about January 20, 2009, the Petitioner filed a Housing Discrimination Complaint with the Florida Commission on Human Relations (Commission). Pursuant to the Commission's procedure, an investigation of the matter was completed that resulted in a Notice of Determination of No Cause. Essentially, the Commission found that based upon the allegations raised by the Petitioner there was no cause from which it could be found the Respondents had violated the Florida Fair Housing Act. Thereafter, the Petitioner elected to file a Petition for Relief to challenge the determination and to seek relief against the Respondents for the alleged violation. The Commission then forwarded the matter to the Division of Administrative Hearings for formal proceedings. The Division of Administrative Hearings issued a Notice of Hearing that was provided to all parties at their addresses of record. The postal service did not return the notices as undelivered. It is presumed the parties received notice of the hearing date, time, and location. No party appeared at the hearing.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a Final Order dismissing the Petitioner's claim of discrimination. DONE AND ENTERED this 6th day of August, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. J. D. PARRISH Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of August, 2009. COPIES FURNISHED: Leaford Green Danett Green 3758 Southwest Findlay Street Port St. Lucie, Florida 34953 Paula Adams Post Office Box 1665 Fort Pierce, Florida 34950 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Larry Kranert, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent, The Pines at Warrington, LP, et al., and Pinnacle, and American Management Service Company (The Pines), discriminated against Petitioner, Susan M. Walters (Ms. Walters), because of her disability and gender in violation of the Florida Fair Housing Act, Sections 760.20- 760.37, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Ms. Walters, during times pertinent, suffered from schizophrenia, chronic differentiated type alcohol abuse, and a personality disorder. The Pines is an apartment community consisting of 160 units. The community is managed by Pinnacle, a subsidiary of American Management Services, LLC. Approximately 90 percent of the residents at The Pines are women. Ms. Walters completed a detailed application for residency in The Pines with Joy John (Ms. John), the facility's leasing specialist. Ms. Walters signed the application on October 24, 2007. She entered into a lease for a term of one year on October 31, 2007. During the course of these events, Ms. Walters did not claim a disability or mention that she was disabled. No one in management at The Pines perceived Ms. Walters to be disabled. During the application and contract process, Ms. Walters was provided with copies of the rules and regulations governing residents of The Pines. The lease required Ms. Walters to provide management at The Pines 60 day's notice, if she wanted to vacate the premises. In or around February 2008, Ms. Walters acquired a dog. She informed management at The Pines, and in accordance with the lease agreement, began making payments toward the required pet deposit. During April 2008, Ms. John and Dawn Chapman, Property Manager, received complaints about Ms. Walters' dog. The dog's barking was disturbing residents of The Pines. Four to five complaints were received each week during April. Ms. John and Ms. Chapman advised Ms. Walters of the complaints and provided her with suggestions as to how to ameliorate the problem. Nevertheless, the barking continued. On May 13, 2008, Ms. Walters was provided a "Seven Day Notice of Noncompliance with Opportunity to Cure," addressing the dog issue. It informed Ms. Walters that she must prevent the dog from disturbing other tenants. It further informed her that if the problem continued, she might be evicted. Another week of barking precipitated a "Seven Day Notice of Noncompliance with Possible Lease Termination Following." This was dated May 21, 2008, and signed by Dawn Chapman. The notice again made clear to Ms. Walters that if the barking continued she might be evicted. These notices were often given to other residents of The Pines when their barking dogs annoyed other tenants. Many of the residents of The Pines were minorities. One of them, Rhonda Lavender, complained about Ms. Walters because she put up a sign in a stairwell that included the word "nigger." Another resident, a disabled man who lived in the unit above her, complained that she "lambasted him" because he dropped a boot and it made a loud noise. Others complained about her coming out of the door to her apartment and screaming. None of the residents, who complained about Ms. Walters' barking dog, or her other offensive actions, mentioned her gender or that she was disabled. At no time during the residency of Ms. Walters at The Pines did she provide Ms. John or Ms. Chapman information with regard to having a disability. The only evidence of a disability presented at the hearing was a form Ms. Walters referred to as "a doctor's release for medical records," signed by an unidentified "physician." It was also agreed that Ms. Walters received payments based on a disability from the U.S. Social Security Administration. However, no evidence was adduced that indicated Ms. Walters was limited in one or more major life activities. Ms. Walters' rent payment for June was due June 5, 2008, but was not paid. On June 6, 2008, a "Three Day Notice- Demand for Payment of Rent or Possession" was affixed to the door of her apartment. The notice demanded payment of the sum of $518.00 or delivery of possession of the premises. The notice informed Ms. Walters that eviction proceedings would ensue if she did not pay in three days. By June 6, 2008, however, Ms. Walters had determined that she was going to vacate the premises. She told Ms. Chapman that she would pay her June rent on June 20, 2008, but this was a prevarication because Ms. Walters had no intention of paying any more rent. On or about July 4, 2008, Petitioner vacated her apartment. She placed her keys in the drop box designated for rental payments. The rent for June was never paid. Ms. Walters testified under oath that during her occupancy of the dwelling her bank card went missing. She stated that on another occasion $20 went missing from her apartment and that subsequently $10 disappeared. She said the fire alarm rang once for two hours. She said she was disturbed by noisy neighbors and a loud maintenance man. She said that once after returning from her job she discovered a glass plate in her apartment that had been shattered. She did not reveal any of these allegations to management at The Pines when they occurred, if they did occur. Ms. Walters claimed that someone entered her apartment in May and sprayed a chemical that encouraged her dog to defecate inside the apartment. She said she could not check her mail because management at The Pines had locked her out of her mailbox. She said someone came in and scratched her Teflon frying pan and burned up her microwave oven. She did not make these allegations to management at The Pines when they occurred, if they did occur. Even if one believes that her property was violated, and evidence to that effect was thin, there is no indication at all that anyone involved in managing The Pines was involved. Moreover, no adverse action was taken toward Ms. Walters. Two notices about barking dogs and a written demand that she pay rent do not amount to an adverse action.
Recommendation Based upon the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Petition for Relief of Susan M. Walters be dismissed. DONE AND ENTERED this 16th day of October, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S HARRY L. HOOPER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of October, 2009. COPIES FURNISHED: Dawn Chapman The Pines at Warrington 4101 West Navy Boulevard Pensacola, Florida 32507 Angela North Olgetree, Deakins, Nash, Smoak & Stewart, P.C. 301 Congress Avenue, Suite 1150 Austin, Texas 78701 Susan M. Walters 1112 Bartow Avenue Pensacola, Florida 32507 Monica Jerelle Williams, Esquire Ogletree, Deakins, Nash, Smoak, and Stewart, P.C. 100 North Tampa Street, Suite 3600 Tampa, Florida 33602 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Larry Kranert, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondent, Center Lake Owner's Association, Inc. ("Center Lake"), discriminated against Petitioner, James Schweim ("Schweim"), on the basis of his purported disability in violation of the Florida Fair Housing Act.
Findings Of Fact Schweim is a white male who at all times material hereto resided at Center Lake. Schweim provided some evidence of his medical condition at final hearing, but did not affirmatively establish a disability, per se. Notwithstanding that fact, a review of the facts will be made concerning the merits of Schweim's claim. Center Lake is the homeowner's association for the Center Lake subdivision located in Manatee County. The association has been in existence since 1986. The subdivision is subject to various deed restrictions as set forth in the Declaration of Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions for Centre1/ Lake, recorded at O.R. Book 1168, Page 1508, in the public records of Manatee County, Florida. Of significance to this proceeding, Section 11 of the deed restrictions is relevant. Section 11, as it will be referred to herein, states in whole: Vehicles. No vehicle of a subdivision resident shall be parked in the subdivision except on a paved driveway, or inside a garage. No vehicle shall at anytime be parked on grass or other vegetation. No trucks or vehicles which are used for commercial purposes, other than those present on business, nor any trailers, may be parked in the subdivision unless inside a garage and concealed from public view. Boats, boat trailers, campers, vans, motorcycles and other recreational vehicles and any vehicle not in operable condition or validly licensed shall be permitted in the subdivision only if parked inside a garage and concealed from public view. No maintenance or repair of any boat or vehicle shall be permitted upon any Lot except within an enclosed garage. Beginning some time in 2004, Schweim and Center Lake commenced a dispute concerning Schweim's alleged violation of the provisions of Section 11. Specifically, Schweim was accused of parking a recreational vehicle (the "RV") on his property in violation of the deed restriction. There is no dispute between the parties that Schweim owns a 23-foot recreational vehicle, which is kept on his property (at 3550 65th Avenue Circle East). As a result of the 2004 dispute, the parties entered into a Settlement Stipulation signed by Center Lake and its attorneys on December 6 and 7, 2004, respectively. Schweim's attorney signed the document on November 24, 2004; Schweim and his wife signed on that same date. The Settlement Stipulation was admitted into evidence at the final hearing. Schweim asserted that the version of the Settlement Stipulation entered into evidence was not the version he signed, but the most persuasive evidence is that it is the same version. Schweim does not agree that all the terms and conditions in the Settlement Stipulation were extant at the time he signed, but he could not produce a copy of any other version of the document for comparison. In the Settlement Stipulation, Schweim agreed to move the RV from his property and not to bring it onto the property except for loading or unloading. In exchange, Center Lake agreed to voluntarily dismiss its then-pending lawsuit against Schweim. Despite the resolution of the aforementioned lawsuit, Schweim did not remove his RV from his property. Instead, Schweim kept the RV on the property and, ultimately, filed a discrimination action against Center Lake because of their efforts to have him remove the RV. That action is the subject of the instant proceeding. Schweim does not dispute that he is keeping the RV on his property in violation of the deed restrictions. Rather, Schweim suggests that he should be allowed to do so on three bases: One, that he is proposing a fence on his property that will cover the RV and make it hidden from view from the street; Two, that there are other residents of the subdivision who are also in violation of the deed restrictions; and, three, that he is disabled and needs the RV parked on his property to accommodate his disability. As to his first reason, Schweim's proposal is simply that, a proposal. There is no evidence that the fence proposed by Schweim would satisfy the requirements of the deed restriction. Further, Center Lake has no confidence, based on its history with Schweim, that he would follow through with the proposal. There is some evidence that other residents in the area appear to be in violation of the deed restrictions. However, there was no evidence presented at final hearing that those residents had refused to move their vehicles upon filing of a complaint. That is, the homeowner's association tends not to take any action unless a homeowner files a formal complaint concerning a violation. In Schweim's case, several complaints were filed as to his RV. There was also some discussion at final hearing as to the appropriate licensure for the RV. Any vehicle not properly licensed is not allowed to be parked in the subdivision based on the deed restrictions. However, Schweim says the license is currently up-to-date and that is no longer an issue. Concerning Schweim's disability, he presented the following facts: At age 23, Schweim suffered a gunshot wound to his abdomen, causing long-term damage; In 1991, Schweim had a ruptured disc; Surgical fusion of his disc was performed in 2002 and again in 2004; In 2009, Schweim underwent a lumbar fusion. As a result of those events, Schweim has what he describes as an acute medical condition limiting his ambulatory abilities. At the final hearing, Schweim negotiated the hearing room slowly and with some difficulty. Judy Schweim, a nurse, testified that she transports Schweim to doctor's appointments and other medical situations. At times, Schweim's back will "go out," and she is responsible for getting him to medical treatment as soon as possible. Schweim produced evidence that he has received a Florida parking permit for disabled persons. The application for the permit indicates his condition as "severe limitation in a person's ability to walk due to an arthritic, neurological, or orthopedic condition." A doctor's order dated May 6, 2004, indicates that it is "medically necessary for [Schweim] to have ready access to a walk-in vehicle to accommodate his disability." An August 19, 2010, memo from Dr. Tally at the Neuro Spinal Associates, P.A., and a September 27, 2010, memo from the Dolphin Medical Group, state essentially the same thing. None of the hearsay documents were sufficient to establish a disability, per se. Schweim says that his disability makes it necessary for him to have the RV parked in his yard so that, when necessary, he can use it to get medical treatment. Schweim says that when his back goes out, he needs a vehicle that he can walk into while standing up. He cannot sit down into an automobile at those times. The incidences of Schweim's debilitating back pain only occur every couple of years. When not experiencing that pain, Schweim is able to drive his red car, described by neighbors as a "hot rod," without any problem. Schweim drove a motorcycle for years, but says he has not driven it for quite some time. Schweim said that an ambulance was not a viable option for him when he has the back pain, because the ambulance will not take him where he needs to go, i.e., straight to a particular doctor, rather than the emergency room. There is no competent evidence to support that contention. Schweim candidly admits that the only time he needs the RV is when he has an episode with his back and that such episodes are few and far between. And while it is true that an episode may occur at any time, there is insufficient evidence to support Schweim's claim that the RV is integral to him receiving prompt and appropriate medical care.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the Florida Commission on Human Relations dismissing the Petition for Relief filed by Petitioner, James Schweim, in its entirety. DONE AND ENTERED this 7th day of July, 2011, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. R. BRUCE MCKIBBEN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of July, 2011.
